Findings Of Fact The facets herein are undisputed. On May 31, 1973 Petitioner purchased Thomas Concrete Company, and on February 28, 1973 Petitioner purchased Kelly Builders, Inc. Both companies were forthwith liquidated and federal income tax returns were filed in which depreciation in excess of fair value of the properties was recaptured for federal tax purposes. In his state corporate income tax returns Petitioner claimed deduction for that portion of the recaptured depreciation which occured prior to November 2, 1971, the effective date of the Florida Corporate Income Tax Statute. These deductions were disallowed by the Department of Revenue, that portion of the tax relating to Thomas Concrete Company was paid under protest, the portion relating to Kelly Builders, Inc. was not paid, and this petition was filed. In 1974 Petitioner sold real property on which it made a substantial capital gain. In computing its federal income tax the full capital gain was reported. However, that portion of its capital gain accruing prior to November 2, 1971 was excluded from its Florida corporate income tax and the assessment of $50,494.75 was levied against Petitioner by Respondent, Department of Revenue for the full amount of the capital gain as income received in 1974. The two issues here involved are whether Petitioner is taxable under Chapter 220 F.S. on depreciation taken prior to the effective date of Chapter 220, and subsequently recaptured, and whether Petitioner is taxable under Chapter 220, F.S. for the full amount of capital gain realized on property held prior to the effective date of Chapter 220 where part of appreciation occurred prior to the effective date of the Florida Corporate Income Tax law.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner is liable for the tax, penalty, and interest assessed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business located at 2836 North Tamiami Trial, Sarasota, Florida. Petitioner primarily engages in the business of selling classic, vintage automobiles. Petitioner sells automobiles for delivery in-state, interstate, and internationally. Petitioner also engages in the business of selling other collectible items, including jukeboxes. Respondent is the state agency responsible for the administration of the Florida sales and use tax pursuant to Sections 20.21 and 213.05, Florida Statutes (1991). (All references to Florida Statutes are to Florida Statutes 1991 unless otherwise stated.) In accordance with Section 212.34, Respondent audited Petitioner's business records for the period from May 1, 1991, through July 31, 1996 (audit period). Respondent determined a deficiency and assessed Petitioner for $114,878.68, including tax, penalty, and interest through January 26, 1999. Respondent assessed tax in the amount of $55,771.16, penalty in the amount of $26,528.02, and interest through January 26, 1999, in the amount of $32,579.50. Additional interest accrues at the daily rate of $20.97. The assessed tax is based on several alleged deficiencies. Some deficiencies involve alleged failures of Petitioner to comply with taxing provisions. Other deficiencies involve alleged failures of Petitioner to comply with the requirements of claimed exemptions. Taxing provisions are construed narrowly against the taxing authority while the provisions authorizing exemptions are construed narrowly against the person claiming the exemption. The assessment against Petitioner includes tax on $51,353.10 in under-reported retail sales for 1994. Respondent compared the gross income reported by Petitioner for the 1994 tax year with the state sales tax revenues reported by Petitioner for the same year and determined that Petitioner under-reported sales tax revenues in the amount of $51,353.10. Mr. Martin Godbey is a corporate officer for Petitioner and a controlling shareholder. Mr. Godbey testified at the hearing. Mr. Godbey testified that $45,000 of the $51,353.10 was not under-reported gross sales in 1994. According to Mr. Godbey, Petitioner's accountant over-reported gross income for purposes of the federal income tax. Petitioner derives some income from providing brokerage services as an liaison between a buyer and seller. Mr. Godbey testified that Petitioner earned $1,400 in 1994 as a broker for the sale of a 1956 Jaguar XJ140 roadster on behalf of an automobile dealership in Virginia. The testimony is that Petitioner introduced the seller and buyer but never possessed the vehicle or delivered the vehicle. The price of the vehicle was approximately $45,000. Mr. Godbey testified that Petitioner's accountant incorrectly reported $45,000 as gross income under the federal income tax law and reported the difference between $45,000 and $1,400 as the cost of goods sold. The testimony of Mr. Godbey was credible and persuasive. However, the testimony was not supported by documentary evidence of Petitioner's federal income tax return or by testimony of Petitioner's accountant. The unsupported testimony of Mr. Godbey does not rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence. Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner over-reported gross income for the purpose of the federal income tax rather than under-reported gross sales for the purpose of the state sales tax. The testimony of Mr. Godbey did not explain the difference between the $51,353.10 amount determined by Respondent and $45,000 amount testified to by Mr. Godbey. For the period from 1991 through 1993, Petitioner collected sales tax on retail sales but did not remit the tax to Respondent. Rather, Petitioner paid the tax to two automobile dealers identified in the record as International Antique Motors, Inc. (IAM) and Autohaus Kolar, Inc. (AK). Petitioner registered with Respondent as a dealer sometime in 1991. However, Petitioner did not obtain a retail dealer's license from the Department of Motor Vehicles (Department) until late in 1993. From 1991 through most of 1993, Petitioner was licensed by the Department as a wholesale dealer and was not authorized by the Department to engage in retail sales of motor vehicles. Section 320.27(2) prohibited Petitioner from selling motor vehicles at retail and made such sales unlawful. Petitioner asserts that it could not have engaged in retail sales, within the meaning of Section 212.06(2)(c) and (d), because Petitioner had no legal authority to do so. From 1991 through 1993, Petitioner engaged in retail sales within the meaning of Section 212.06(2)(c) and (d). Petitioner engaged in retail sales by selling automobiles at retail in violation of Section 320.27(2). Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner collected sales tax on each sale. Petitioner did not engage in retail sales and collect sales tax on each sale in the capacity of an agent for IAM or AK. Petitioner acted in his own behalf as a principal. IAM and AK had no actual or legal control over the sales conducted by Petitioner. IAM and AK merely processed the title work for each retail sale conducted by Petitioner. Even if Petitioner were an agent for IAM and AK, Petitioner engaged in retail sales as a dealer defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.0066. (All references to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code during the audit period.) Petitioner registered the vehicles sold at retail from 1991 through 1993 by way of a business arrangement with IAM and AK. After Petitioner collected sales tax on each retail sale, Petitioner remitted the tax to IAM and AK. IAM and AK then registered the vehicles with the Department. Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner paid to IAM and AK the sales tax that Petitioner collected from each customer. Nor does Respondent dispute that the amount of tax Petitioner paid to IAM and AK was sufficient to pay the tax due. Section 212.06(10) requires IAM and AK to issue a receipt for sales tax with each application for title or registration. IAM obtained title or registration for 21 vehicles sold by Petitioner and at issue in this case. AK obtained title or registration for three vehicles at issue in this case. Section 212.06(10) does not operate to create a factual presumption that IAM and AK paid the sales tax due on the 24 vehicles at the time that IAM and AK applied for title or registration of each vehicle. In practice, the receipt issued by dealers with each application for title or registration contains a code indicating that the dealer has collected the tax and will pay the tax in the dealer's ensuing sales tax return. After IAM applied for title or registration for the vehicles evidenced in Petitioner's Exhibits 2, 4, 6, and 21, IAM remitted taxes to Respondent in an amount sufficient to pay the tax due on those sales by Petitioner. Respondent has no record of any tax deficiencies against IAM. Respondent's admitted policy is to avoid the collection of tax if the tax has already been paid. After IAM applied for title or registration for the vehicles evidenced in Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 3, 5, and 7 through 20, IAM remitted taxes to Respondent in an amount that was insufficient to pay the tax due on those sales. Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that IAM remitted to Respondent the taxes that Petitioner collected and paid to IAM in connection with the sales evidenced in Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 3, 5, and 7 through 20. Petitioner is not entitled to a set-off of the taxes remitted to Respondent by IAM after the sales evidenced in Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 3, 5, and 7 through 20. There is insufficient evidence to show that the taxes remitted by IAM were collected on the sales at issue in this case rather than other sales made by IAM. AK processed three vehicles for Petitioner that are at issue in this case. AK paid to Respondent the sales tax due on the three retail sales at issue. The relevant sales are evidenced in Petitioner's Exhibits 24 through 26. AK remitted taxes in an amount that was more than sufficient to pay the tax due on those sales by Petitioner. Respondent has no record of a tax deficiency against AK. Respondent's policy is to avoid the collection of tax if tax has already been paid. Several deficiencies are attributable to disallowed exemptions for 16 sales that include 14 vehicles and two jukeboxes. Statutory requirements for exemptions are strictly construed against the person claiming the exemption. Petitioner did not satisfy essential requirements for any of the disallowed exemptions. The exemptions asserted by Petitioner in its PRO are discussed in greater detail in the following paragraphs. During the audit period, Petitioner sold a 1972 Italia Spyder automobile, VIN: 50413414, to a Texas automobile dealership identified in the record as North American Classic Cars/Gene Ponder, of Marshall, Texas (North American). Petitioner claims that the sale to North American is exempt because it is a sale for resale to a non-resident dealer. The sale to North American is not exempt. Petitioner failed to obtain a non-resident dealer affidavit at the time of sale in violation of Section 212.08(10). During the audit, Petitioner obtained a Sales Tax Exemption Affidavit (DR-40) from North American. A DR-40 is not appropriate for a sale for resale to a non-resident dealer. The appropriate affidavit would have required the non-resident dealer to attest that "the motor vehicle will be transported outside of the State of Florida for resale and for no other purpose." Hand written notations on the bill of sale for the Italia Spyder indicate the North American representative took possession of the automobile in Florida. In addition, a hand- written letter to Petitioner indicates that the Italia Spyder was purchased for the private collection of the owner of North American rather than for resale. During the audit period, Petitioner sold a 1959 Mercedes Benz 190SL automobile, VIN: 12104-10-95012, to Mike Hiller, of Coral Springs, Florida (Hiller). Petitioner claimed, on the bill of sale, that the sale was exempt because it was a sale to a non-resident dealer for resale. The sale to Hiller is not exempt. At the time of the sale, Petitioner failed to obtain a non-resident dealer affidavit or a resale certificate. The bill of lading lists Hiller as an exporter and indicated that Hiller, as the exporter, took possession of the automobile in Florida. The bill of lading does not show unbroken, continuous transportation from the selling dealer to a common carrier or directly out of Florida as required in Section 212.06(5)(b)1. During the audit period, Petitioner sold a 1959 MGA Roadster, VIN: 54941, to Fabiana Valsecchi, of Rome, Italy. Petitioner claims the sale is exempt as a sale for export. The sale to Valsecchi is not exempt. At the time of the sale, Petitioner failed to obtain a bill of lading, or other shipping documentation that shows unbroken, continuous transportation from Petitioner to a common carrier or directly out of Florida. The bill of sale signed by the purchaser's agent shows that the agent took possession of the automobile in Florida. Petitioner failed to show that the sale was exempt because it was a sale for resale. Petitioner did not provide a resale certificate from the purchaser. During the audit period, Petitioner sold a 1961 Triumph TR3 automobile, VIN: TS753 38L, to Classic Automobile Investors, Inc., of Germany (Classic). Petitioner claims that the sale is exempt because it was a sale for export. The sale to Classic is not exempt. At the time of sale, Petitioner failed to obtain a bill of lading, or other shipping documentation which shows unbroken, continuous transportation from Petitioner to a common carrier or directly out of Florida. During the audit period, Petitioner sold a 1947 Bentley MKVI automobile, VIN: B137B, to Mr. Bob Erickson, of Palmetto, Florida. Petitioner failed to collect and remit Local Government Surtax on the sale and owes the uncollected tax. During the audit period, Petitioner sold two jukeboxes and other items of tangible personal property to Mr. C.P. Loontjens. Petitioner claims that the sales are exempt from sales tax because they were sales for export. At the time of the sale, Petitioner failed to obtain documentation from the buyer to show that items sold were delivered to a common carrier or directly delivered outside of Florida. During the audit period, Petitioner was engaged in the business of selling items of tangible personal property other than vehicles and jukeboxes. Petitioner failed to collect and remit sales tax on the sale of these items of tangible personal property. Respondent properly assessed Petitioner for sales tax due on tangible personal property other than vehicles and jukeboxes in the amount of $3,352.50. Vintage rented commercial real property for its business. Rental payments for such real property are subject to sales tax pursuant to Section 212.031. During the audit period, Petitioner failed to pay sales tax on two payments for the commercial rental of real property. Petitioner is liable for use tax on the use of real property during the audit period. Respondent properly assessed Petitioner for additional use tax in the amount of $108.00. Although Petitioner maintained some books and records of sales and purchases, Petitioner failed to maintain adequate records. Respondent properly conducted an audit by sampling Petitioner's available books and records in accordance with Section 212.12(6)(b) but limited the claimed penalty to a delinquent penalty. The trier of fact cannot determine the taxes, interest, and penalty that are due after eliminating the deficiencies found in paragraphs 21 and 24 not to exist in connection with the sales evidenced in Petitioner's Exhibits 2, 4, 6, 21, and 24 through 26. Only Respondent can make that calculation using the same sampling formula that Respondent used to calculate the tax, interest, and penalty in the assessment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order ordering Petitioner to pay the tax, interest, and penalty that is due after Respondent recalculates the assessment against Petitioner in accordance with the findings pertaining to Petitioner's Exhibits 2, 4, 6, 21, and 24 through 26. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of March, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Carrol Y. Cherry, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Martha F. Barrera, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 R. John Cole, II, Esquire Law Offices of R. John Cole, II 46 North Washington Boulevard, Suite 24 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Whether Respondent is entitled to a Consumer Certificate of Exemption under Section 212.08?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Respondent is a nonprofit Florida corporation that was formed in 1980 to promote economic development and revitalization (and the resultant creation and retention of jobs) in targeted areas in the City of Miami and Dade County, Florida, by lending money to business desiring to locate or remain in these targeted areas. Article II of Respondent's Articles of Incorporation sets forth the "purposes" of the corporation. It reads as follows: This corporation is organized exclusively for charitable, education and economic development purposes which include promotion of community welfare by: (i) lessening of neighborhood tensions, (ii) lessening discrimination and (iii) combatting community deterioration by promoting and fostering the economic development of the City of Miami and Dade County, Florida. In furtherance of these purposes the corporation intends to engage in the following types of activities: Making investments in, and loans to, corporate or other business entities with monies which are directly or indirectly attributable to funds provided by the City of Miami, Dade County, Florida or other funds provided by the United States, the State of Florida or any agency or instrumentality of any of the foregoing, with funds generated by the repayment of the principal amount and accrued interest thereon of any loans made with such funds, or any dividends or other distributions paid to the corporation by any entity in which the corporation has an ownership interest, and with any funds contributed to the corporation by any individual or entity; Providing assistance for individuals, groups and organizations in planning and executing successful economic development projects; Providing professional assistance and counseling of all types, including business planning for individuals, organizations and their members where such counseling may be necessary for the economic development of low income or low employment areas; Acting as an intermediary, where appropriate, between various economic development programs and between organizations and individuals which may be involved in any capacity in economic development; Acquiring charitable contributions and assistance capital including seed money, which may be necessary for successful economic development projects; and Engaging in such other activities as the Board of Directors shall from time to time approve, provided that in no event shall this corporation be operated for purposes other than those permitted under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 or corresponding sections of any prior or future law. The corporation shall have the power, either directly or indirectly, either alone or in conjunction or cooperation with others, to do any and all lawful acts and things and to engage in any and all lawful activities which may be necessary, useful, suitable, desirable or proper for any and all of the purposes for which the corporation is organized, and to aid or assist other organizations whose activities are such as to further accomplish, foster or attain any of such purposes. Such activities shall include, but shall not be limited to, acceptance of gifts, grants, devises or bequests of funds, or any other property from any public or other governmental body and any private person, including but not limited to, private and public foundations, corporations and individuals. 2/ Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, this corporation may exercise any and all, but not other, powers as are in furtherance of the exempt purposes of organizations set forth in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and its regulations as the same now exist, or as they may be hereafter amended from time to time. No part of the income or principal of this corporation shall inure to the benefit of or be distributed to any member, director or officer of the corporation or any other private individual in such a fashion as to constitute an application of funds not within the purpose of exempt organizations described in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. However, reimbursement for expenditures or the payment of reasonable compensation for services rendered shall not be deemed to be a distribution of income or principal. In the event of the complete or partial liquidation or dissolution of the corporation whether voluntary or involuntary, no member, director or officer shall be entitled to any distribution or division of the corporation's property or its proceeds, and the balance of all money and other property received by the corporation from any source shall, after the payment of all debts and obligations of the corporation in accordance with Chapter 617 of the Florida Statutes, be distributed and paid over by the Board of Directors to the City of Miami for public purposes. The corporation does not contemplate receiving any pecuniary gain or profit, incidental or otherwise. No substantial part of the activities of the corporation shall be the carrying on of propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence legislation, and the corporation shall not participate or intervene in, directly or indirectly, (including the publishing or distribution of statements) any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office. Over the past 16 years, Respondent has made 472 direct low interest business loans amounting to approximately $31.4 million. 3/ The recipients of these loans have collectively received from both public and private sources nearly $16.3 million in additional, matching funds. A potential borrower need not be disadvantaged or suffering from a hardship in order to receive a loan from Respondent. Indeed, as a general rule, Respondent will not make a loan unless the applicant demonstrates, during the application process, an ability to repay the loan. To this extent, and to this extent alone, Respondent takes into consideration the applicant's economic status in determining whether to grant the applicant's loan application. An intended 4/ by-product of Respondent's lending activities has been the creation and preservation of jobs in the targeted areas. The business investment that Respondent's activities have made possible has produced approximately 3,313 new jobs and preserved an estimated 1,391 jobs in these areas. The Internal Revenue Service treats Respondent as an exempt organization under Section 501(3)(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. In 1991, Respondent received from the Department a Consumer Certificate of Exemption, which, according to the cover letter that accompanied the Certificate, was "granted to [Respondent] in accordance with Section 212.08(7), Florida Statutes" and "exempt[ed Respondent] from the payment of sales and use tax on purchases of tangible personal property." The Certificate had an "issue date" of February 7, 1991, and an "expiration date" of February 7, 1996. Prior to the "expiration date," Respondent filed an application with the Department to renew the Certificate. The Department has preliminarily determined that the Certificate should not be renewed. It is this preliminary determination that is the subject of the instant controversy
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding that Respondent is not entitled to the Consumer Certificate of Exemption it is seeking pursuant to Section 212.08(7)(o)2.b.(IV), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of January, 1997. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of January, 1997.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner showed by a preponderance of the evidence that it is entitled to a refund of $1,500,216.60 in sales and use tax paid during the period from January 2005 through January 2007 to purchase industrial printing machinery that allegedly satisfied the statutory requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output for printing facilities that manufacture, process, compound or produce tangible personal property at fixed locations in the state within the meaning of Subsection 212.08(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Administrative Rule 12A-1.096.1/
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency responsible for administering the state sales tax imposed in Chapter 212. Petitioner is a "for profit" Florida corporation located in St. Petersburg, Florida. Petitioner is engaged in the business of publishing newspapers and commercial printing. Petitioner derives approximately 85 percent of its revenue from advertising and approximately 15 percent of its revenue from circulation subscriptions. In April, 2007, Petitioner requested a refund of $403,780.05 in sales and use taxes paid for the purchase of industrial machinery and equipment during the period from January, 2005, to January, 2006. In October, 2007, Petitioner requested a refund of $1,096,436.61 in sales and use taxes paid for the purchase of industrial machinery and equipment for the period from January, 2006, to January, 2007. The first refund request in April, 2007, became DOAH Case Number 08-3938, and the second refund request in October, 2007, became DOAH Case Number 08-3939. The two cases were consolidated into this proceeding pursuant to the joint motion of the parties. The parties stipulated that the only issue for determination in this consolidated proceeding is whether Petitioner satisfied the requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A- 1.096. If a finding were to be made that Petitioner satisfied the 10 percent requirement, the parties stipulate that the file will be returned to Respondent for a determination of whether the items purchased are qualifying machinery and equipment defined in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A-1.096. The issue of whether Petitioner satisfied the statutory requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A-1.096 is a mixed question of law and fact. The ALJ concludes as a matter of law that Petitioner did not satisfy the 10 percent requirement. The ALJ discusses that conclusion briefly, for context, in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Findings of Fact, and explains the conclusion and the supporting legal authority more fully in the Conclusions of Law. It is an undisputed fact that Petitioner counts items identified in the record as "preprints," "custom inserts," and "circulation inserts" separately from the "newspaper" as a means of exceeding the 10 percent requirement in Subsection 212.08(5)(b). Respondent construes the 10 percent exemption authorized in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) in pari materia with the exemption authorized in Subsection 212.08(5)(1)(g) for "preprints," "custom inserts," and "circulation inserts" (hereinafter "inserts"). The latter statutory exemption treats inserts as a "component part of the newspaper" which are not to be treated separately for tax purposes. For reasons stated more fully in the Conclusions of Law, the ALJ agrees with the statutory construction adopted by Respondent. That conclusion of law renders moot and, therefore, irrelevant and immaterial, the bulk of the evidence put forth by the parties during the two-day hearing because the evidence assumed arguendo that Petitioner's statutory interpretation would be adopted by the ALJ, i.e., inserts would be counted separately from the newspaper for purposes of satisfying the 10 percent requirement in Subsection 212.08(5)(b). In an abundance of caution, the fact-finder made findings of fact based on the legal assumption that inserts are statutorily required to be counted separately for purposes of the 10 percent requirement in Subsection 212.08(5)(b). Those findings are set forth in paragraphs 9 through 11. The verification audit by Respondent's field office was able to verify an output increase of only 4.27 percent for 2005 and only 8.72 percent for 2006. A preponderance of evidence in this de novo proceeding did not overcome those findings. The trier of fact finds the evidence from Petitioner during this de novo proceeding to be inconsistent and unpersuasive. For example, Petitioner inflated production totals by counting materials printed for its own use, and materials in which the unit of measurement was inconsistent. In other instances, production totals for printing presses identified in the record as Didde and Ryobi presses varied dramatically with circulation. In other instances, Petitioner's reporting positions changed during the course of the proceeding. There is scant evidence that the alleged increase in production created jobs in the local market in a manner consistent with legislative intent. Rather, a preponderance of evidence shows that when Petitioner placed the equipment in service it was job neutral or perhaps reduced jobs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner did not satisfy the requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output defined in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A-1.096, and denying Petitioner's request for a refund. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of October 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 2009.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to an exemption from sales and use tax as a religious or charitable organization.
Findings Of Fact By Application for Consumer Certificate of Exemption dated March 17, 1992, Petitioner requested a sales tax exemption as a religious organization. The application indicates that Petitioner was incorporated on February 18, 1992. At all times, the president of Petitioner has been Reverend Robert M. Rinaldi. By letter dated April 16, 1992, Respondent requested that Petitioner supply information concerning its primary purpose, including a list of all activities or services and to whom they are generally offered. The letter also requested, among other things, statements of receipts and expenditures and a copy of the letter determining that Petitioner is exempt from federal income tax. Petitioner submitted to Respondent evidence of 12 expenditures during the quarter ending March 31, 1992. The expenditures and their descriptions are as follows: Morrisons-- dinner business; Holiday Inn in Tampa--lodging for quarterly convention; Maas Brother in Naples--attire; Marshalls-- personal; Martha's Health Food Shop--personal; Things Remembered--card case/business cards; RJ Cafe Tropical--lunch interview; Beach Works Marco Island--attire; annual membership fee for vice president's American Express card; Las Vegas Discount golf and tennis in Naples--personal; Eckerd's Vision Works--medical eyeglasses; Quality Inn Golf Country Club in Naples--lodging during business travel; Avon Fashions/Hampton-- personal; Del Wright in Sarasota--automobile expenses and travel; JC Penney--personal; Amador's Restaurant in Naples-- dinner/lunch; Avon Fashions/Hampton--personal; annual membership fee for treasurer's American Express card; and Mobil Oil--business travel. Petitioner produced other evidence of similar types of expenditures, such as for fitness center fees, car insurance, car service, car payments, utilities, and rent. Nothing in the record links these expenditures to religious or charitable activities. There were expenditures for printing religious tracts and self- improvement educational materials, but they do not appear to be a substantial part of the total expenditures of Petitioner during the time in question. After receiving these materials, a representative of Respondent telephoned Reverend Rinaldi and stated that Petitioner would have to submit additional documentation of its income and expenses and formal affiliation with prison chapels where Petitioner reportedly conducted outreach programs. Respondent's representative also asked for evidence of Reverend Rinaldi's counselling credentials. Petitioner next submitted a copy of a letter from the Department of Treasury determining that Petitioner was exempt from federal income tax. Petitioner also submitted a budget for the year ending 1992 and a proposed budget for the year ending 1993. However, the budgets did not document a charitable purpose. The budget reveals that the largest disbursement was $4200, which was rent for an office and living quarters. The largest single receipt was $1764.27, which was a contribution from the incorporator, who was Rev. Rinaldi. There were no charitable receipts, such as from contributions from members, the public, or anonymous sources. On November 10, 1992, Respondent sent a letter to Petitioner requesting additional information, including statements of the primary purpose of the organization and of receipts and expenditures. The request asked for a description or explanation for each charity-related program expenditure. On November 18, 1992, Petitioner submitted a second Application for Consumer's Certificate of Exemption. The information was essentially unchanged from the first application. Rev. Rinaldi also sent Respondent a religious flyer. On February 10, 1993, Petitioner submitted a third Application for Consumer's Certificate of Exemption. The material was essentially unchanged from the preceding two applications. On March 30, 1993, one of Respondent's representatives sent a letter to Petitioner stating that Petitioner does not meet the criteria for exemption from sales tax. In response, Petitioner sent a letter to Respondent received April 8, 1993, requesting reconsideration of the denial. On May 4, 1993, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter stating that, as indicated during an earlier telephone conversation, Respondent had not yet received sufficient documentation to justify a sales tax exemption. Following up on Rev. Rinaldi's opinion that Petitioner qualified as a charitable organization, the letter suggests that he submit materials describing each charitable service or activity, the types of persons receiving such services, the frequency that the services are offered, the demonstrated benefit provided by Petitioner to disadvantaged persons, the fees charged by Petitioner, and the availability of Petitioner's services at the same or less cost elsewhere. The letter also asks for a statement of income and expenses. In response, Petitioner filed a fourth Application for Consumer's Certificate of Exemption on November 10, 1993. Rev. Rinaldi explained Petitioner's activities as informing people of the truth and the second coming of Jesus Christ and stopping addictions to drugs and alcohol. The enclosed materials included a church telephone number. The materials state that services are available 24 hours a day for no fees and are provided solely for the spiritual preparation of humanity. The materials also indicate several addresses at which religious activities are conducted. Upon investigation, Respondent learned that Petitioner's telephone number had been disconnected, the street address is Rev. Rinaldi's apartment, and the addresses at which religious activities are conducted are locations of Alcoholic Anonymous, from which Rev. Rinaldi and his church had been barred as public disturbances. Checking with the post office, the investigator learned that all mail for Rev. Rinaldi and Petitioner is being forwarded to an address in New York. Respondent asked for more information, and Petitioner supplied information no different than that previously supplied. By letter dated April 26, 1994, Respondent informed Petitioner that its application was denied. Following another exchange of correspondence, Respondent sent Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Deny dated June 17, 1994. The Notice of Intent to Deny states that Respondent determined that: [Petitioner] travels from church to church and does not assemble regularly at a particular established location. [Petitioner] conducts services for short periods of time at numerous temporary locations. [Respondent] has reviewed your application and supporting documents and has determined that the primary purpose of your organization fails to meet the qualifications for sales tax exemption authorized by Section 212.08(7), Florida Statutes. By letter dated June 24, 1994, Petitioner requested a formal hearing on its application for sales tax exemption. Petitioner does not regularly conduct services. Petitioner does not engage in other religious activities nor does Petitioner provide services typically associated with a church. Petitioner has no established physical place for worship. Petitioner has generalized plans to construct one or more places for worship. However, these plans are post-apocalyptic in nature and thus do not assure the commencement of construction in the immediate future.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for an exemption certificate from sales and use tax. ENTERED on December 20, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 20, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Rev. Robert Rinaldi P.O. Box 1081 167 N. Collier Blvd. J-3 Marco Island, FL 33937-1081 Attorney Lisa M. Raleigh Office of the Attorney General The Capitol--Tax Section Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
The Issue Whether Respondent is entitled to a Consumer Certificate of Exemption under Section 212.08, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is a nonprofit Florida corporation that was formed in 1996 to serve the religious needs of persons living in Miami-Dade County's Overtown community, including, in particular, the homeless and young people in the area. Article II of Petitioner's Articles of Incorporation, which were filed with the Florida Department of State on May 10, 1996, sets forth the "purpose of the corporation" as follows: The Corporation is organized exclusively for charitable, religious, educational, and scientific purposes, including, for such purposes, the making of distributions to organizations that qualify as exempt organizations under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, or the corresponding section of any future federal tax code. Petitioner's by-laws reflect that it is a "full-gospel ministry" comprised of "Christian believers." Its "civil officers" include a President, who also serves as the Pastor of the Gibson Park Church, which Petitioner operates. Gibson Park, after which the Gibson Park Church is named, is a park located in Overtown. It has, among other things, an open-air amphitheater, with a stage. Morris Mays is presently the President of Petitioner and Pastor of the Gibson Park Church. He resides in an apartment (apartment number 18) that he leases in his own name from the Church of God in Christ at 1767 Northwest Third Avenue in Miami-Dade County (Pastor Mays' Apartment). Pastor Mays' apartment presently serves as Petitioner's headquarters, as a sign in the window of the apartment reflects. Petitioner hopes to purchase, and move its headquarters to, a building across the street from Gibson Park. (The owner of the building has expressed, in writing, an interest in selling the building to Petitioner.) Pastor Mays donates the use of his apartment, and also volunteers his time, to Petitioner. There are other individuals, besides Pastor Mays, who help carry out the purposes of Petitioner. Like Pastor Mays, they also volunteer their time and are not compensated. Petitioner regularly conducts nonprofit worship and prayer services and other religious activities at Pastor Mays' apartment on Wednesday evenings and at the amphitheater in Gibson Park on Sundays. 1 Petitioner has been conducting Sunday morning services at the Gibson Park amphitheater since it received written permission from the City of Miami to do so in the late summer of 1997. These Sunday morning services (at which Pastor Mays preaches) are open to the general public and are advertised in a newsletter that Petitioner publishes and distributes in the Overtown community. The services are attended, on the average, by approximately 50 people, many of whom are homeless. Every other Sunday, following regular morning services, Petitioner, with the help of guest "DJs," conducts special youth services. Wednesday evening services at Pastor Mays' apartment are less formal and shorter than Sunday morning services. They are not publicized in Petitioner's newsletter. Attendance averages only about seven to ten people.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding that Petitioner is entitled to the Consumer Certificate of Exemption it is seeking pursuant to Section 212.08(7)(o), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of May, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of May, 1998.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is, and during the years in question was, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Delaware, properly qualified and authorized to do business in the State of Florida, and the parent company of a consolidated group of corporations that kept its books and records and filed its federal and state income tax returns on the basis of a fiscal year ending August 31. During the tax years in question, the consolidated group consisted of 36 corporations, of which 15 (including Petitioner) had Florida transactions or were otherwise separately subject to taxation under the Florida Corporate Income Tax Code (the "Florida members"). The other 21 corporations had no such transactions or were not subject to taxation under the Florida Code (the "non- Florida members"). For both years 1972 and 1973, petitioner filed federal and Florida income tax returns on behalf of the entire group. On the Florida return's, it duly elected under the second sentence of Subsection 220.131(1), F.S., to include both the Florida and non-Florida members. As required by Subsections 220.131(1)(a), (b) and (c), each member of the group consented to such filing, the group filed a consolidated federal return for each year, and the component members of the Florida return group were identical to the members of the federal return group. Petitioner protested the proposed corporate income tax assessment for 1972 and 1973, but, by letter, dated July 7, 1976, T. H. Swindal, Chief, Corporation Income Tax Bureau, Florida Department of Revenue, adhered to the original determination that for a parent corporation to include all of its subsidiary corporations for the purposes of consolidating its taxable income, it must be incorporated in Florida. The letter further explained: ". . . The Florida Legislature obviously considered these classifications justified and constitutionally permissible. Any regulation, therefore, which is so drafted as to permit an interpretation which in substance changes or strikes the statutory classification is a nullity. It appears that the Department's regulation may have been inadvertently so drafted as to invite an unintended and contrary-to-the- statute interpretation. When the Department became aware of the situation it proceeded, in accordance with the prescribed statutory requirements of Chapter 120, to amend the regulation by striking those words being misinterpreted." The regulation referred to in Swindal's letter was Rule 12C-1.131(1), F.A.C., the first sentence of which had read as follows: "12C-1.131 Adjusted Federal Income; Affiliated Groups. The term "Florida parent company" as used in the second sentence of Code subsection 220.131(1) shall mean any corporation qualified to do business in Florida or otherwise subject to tax under the Code, irrespective of its place of incorporation " The aforesaid rule was in effect during 1972 and 1973, and was amended on August 4, 1975, to delete the above-mentioned sentence.
Recommendation That Petitioner not be held liable for the proposed assessment of corporate income tax deficiency for fiscal years 1972 and 1973. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of April , 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: E. Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Alan L. Reinstein, Esquire Dancona, Pflaum, Wyatt and Riskind 30 North LaSalle Street Chicago, Illinois 60602
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Nick Farah, Sr., is liable for the taxes assessed under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, for the March 1, 1989 - February 28, 1994 audit period, and to what degree, if any, the audit debt may be compromised as uncollectible.
Findings Of Fact This case involves an assessment of sales taxes and charter transit system surtaxes associated with audit number 9501539, and covering the audit period of March 1, 1989, to February 28, 1994 (audit period), for Farah's Gazebo Restaurant (the restaurant) located at 3541 University Boulevard, North, Jacksonville, Florida. Sales of food and alcoholic beverages were made at the restaurant during the audit period. Sales tax was collected and remitted to the Department on the sales of alcoholic beverages during the audit period, but not on the sales of prepared food. The assessment relates to the sale of food during the audit period. The restaurant was first opened as a sandwich shop in 1974 by both Petitioners, Nick Farah, Sr., and Sue Farah, who at all times material have been husband and wife. Mrs. Farah's middle initial is "N." Mr. Farah is now 74 years old. Mrs. Farah is 63. When the restaurant was opened in 1974, Nick Farah, Sr., opened a utility account with the City of Jacksonville in his name alone. At all times material, that same account in Nick Farah, Sr.'s name has been used by the restaurant. At all times material, Nick Farah, Sr., and Sue Farah had a checking account (number 467835202-01), in the name "Nick Farah d/b/a Farah's Gazebo Cafe, Restaurant & Lounge" with American National Bank of Florida (American National checking account). During the audit period, this account was used by Petitioners as both the restaurant's checking account and their personal checking account. During the audit period, all proceeds from sales at the restaurant were deposited into the American National checking account. All of the Petitioners' personal living expenses were paid from monies deposited into the American National checking account. During the audit period, Nick Farah, Sr., ran banking and shopping errands for the restaurant at his wife's direction, and considered it appropriate to write checks on behalf of the restaurant in his wife's absence. When their restaurant was first opened, Petitioners obtained a sales tax registration certificate from the Department of Revenue. This certificate was issued in the names of both Petitioners. In 1986, Petitioners refurbished and expanded their sandwich shop to a full restaurant serving dinner along with alcoholic beverages. During the several months in which the restaurant was being expanded, the restaurant was closed for business. Petitioners have a son, Nick Farah, Jr., who has a restaurant and lounge in Gainesville, Florida. Nick Farah, Jr., helped his parents expand their restaurant and donated certain restaurant equipment for the expansion. In 1986, Nick Farah, Jr., obtained alcoholic beverage license 26-02438SRX solely in his name for the restaurant. In 1988, Petitioners' other son, John Farah, became actively involved with the operation of the restaurant, in order to allow his father, Nick Farah, Sr., to retire. John Farah's involvement with the restaurant lasted approximately six or seven months, after which he was no longer involved. In 1988, due to numerous medical problems, including high blood pressure, prostate cancer, diabetes, and weak eyes, Nick Farah, Sr., "retired." He advised the social security office in 1988 of his retirement and filed all necessary papers in order to begin to receive his social security benefits. His social security income was "direct deposited" to a Barnett Bank account set up solely for that purpose. Nick Farah, Sr., listed himself as "retired" on the couple's joint 1989-1994 federal income tax returns. These returns include Schedule C, "Profit or Loss from Business," and listed the restaurant as solely owned by Sue Farah, as proprietor. On these returns, Sue Farah stated that she was sole owner of the business known as Farah's Gazebo Restaurant. When Nick Farah, Sr., retired, Sue Farah began paying bills and making all executive decisions concerning employees, doing the ordering, deciding on the menu, and pricing. However, since 1988, the restaurant also has had a manager who has dealt with the employees and food ordering as well. Although he considers himself retired, Nick Farah, Sr., consistently has gone to the restaurant to eat, talk with friends, and play rummy. He has also performed errands and written checks for the restaurant. (See Finding of Fact 8) In testimony, he referred to the American National account as "our Gazebo account." (TR-111) Sales Tax Registration Certificate No. 26-08-093045- 08/1 was issued in the name of Nick Farah, Sr., Sue N. Farah, and Nick Farah, Jr., until June 1, 1992. On June 1, 1992, Sales Tax Registration Certificate No. 26-08-126824-08/1 was issued in the names of Nick Farah, Sr., and Sue N. Farah. This was done to separate the restaurant from Nick Farah, Jr.'s, Gainesville restaurant. The type of business organization listed on the certificate is "partnership." On each of the sales tax registration certificates, Nick Farah, Sr.'s social security number was used as the federal identification number. In 1993, the Alcoholic Beverage License was renewed in the names of Nick Farah, Sr., and Sue Farah. Petitioners' personal residence is held jointly in their names. During the audit period, Petitioners refinanced their personal residence and obtained a home equity loan through American National Bank. The proceeds from this loan were used to pay expenses related to the restaurant. (See Finding of Fact 52). On March 24, 1994, the Department issued its DR-840 Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records to "Nick & Sue Farah d/b/a Farah Gazebo Restaurant." Notices of Intent are usually issued in the name(s) on the current Sales Tax Registration Certificate. On April 14, 1994, the Farahs both executed a Power of Attorney appointing their attorney to represent them in matters relating to the audit. Subsequent to the audit, the Department issued its "Notice of Intent to Make Sales & Use Tax Audit Changes," under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, on November 4, 1994, in the names of "Nick & Sue Farah d/b/a Farah Gazebo Restaurant." Taxes for the audit period March 1, 1989 - February 28, 1994, were assessed in the amount of $65,093.44. Penalties were assessed up to that point in time in the amount of $20,679.43. Interest was assessed up to that point in time in the amount of $22,678.86. The total was $108,451.73. Interest would continue to run. Also on November 4, 1994, the Department issued its "Notice of Intent to Make Charter County Transit System Surtax Changes" in the names of "Nick & Sue Farah d/b/a Farah Gazebo Restaurant." Taxes were assessed in the amount of $5,424.46; penalties were assessed in the amount of $1,723.27; and interest was assessed in the amount of $1,889.92 for a total of $9,037.65. The Department revised its audit on January 17, 1995. Two revised Notices of Intent were issued, each in the names of "Nick & Sue Farah d/b/a Farah Gazebo Restaurant," with assessment in the following amounts: $62,974.40 (sales and use taxes), $19,839.95 (penalties), and $28,373.14 (interest); and $5,247.86 (charter county surtaxes), $1,653.29 (penalties), and $2,367.18 (interest). These revised notices were issued to reflect the deduction of certain non-revenue items from the gross deposits reflected on the Petitioners' bank statement. They also show accruing interest. By their attorney's letter dated February 6, 1995, Petitioners raised the issue of Nick Farah, Sr.'s liability for the assessment, arguing that his involvement with the restaurant during the audit period was insufficient to render him a "taxpayer" as contemplated by the applicable statutes and rules, and insufficient to create such a tax liability for him. The letter from Petitioners' counsel stated that Petitioner Sue Farah "considered the restaurant to be hers, and has filed her federal income tax returns accordingly. She is willing to sign the Notice of Intent and enter into a payment arrangement." Donald Ritchie, the Department's Jacksonville tax auditor who had initiated the audit, subsequently issued a "Memo to File," dated February 7, 1995, stating, Auditor contacted atty. Jeff Dollinger in response to his letter of 2-6-95 in which he states TP's claim that Sue Farah is sole proprietor of restaurant and Nick is not a "dealer" in connection with the restaurant operation. He stated in a telephone conversation that Sue Farah wished to sign NOI indicating agreement with the proposed audit changes "with the exception of penalty" and obtain a stipulated payment schedule but only if registration and audit were changed to eliminate Nick's name. On February 7 and 8, 1995, Peggy Bowen, a Departmental superior of Mr. Ritchie, directed two memoranda by electronic mail (e-mail) to another Departmental employee, Allen Adams, located in Tallahassee. These memoranda requested guidance on how to proceed with the questions raised by Petitioners' counsel. In response to these requests, a series of e-mail memoranda were exchanged within the Tallahassee office of the Department. The first, on February 8, 1995, from George Stinson, stated, in part: What advantage would we have if we assessed "Nick's Partnership"? . . . from what Peggy said, "Nick's Partnership" doesn't even exist, but "Sue's Sole Proprietorship" does. It seems to me that it would be absurd to assess an entity ("Nick's Partnership") that, by the taxpayer's own admission, doesn't exist. Just because the registration social data on the database is erroneous doesn't mean we should issue an erroneous assessment. The second February 8, 1995, electronic mail memorandum from Allen Adams to Peggy Bowen, stated, "OK, I take this as an approval to change our NOI and get an agreed case." The final electronic mail memorandum dated February 9, 1995, from George Stinson to Allen Adams provides: Allen...While mulling this all over in my brain, it occurred to me it would not be unwise for Peggy to prepare (but hold on to for the time being) an NOI under "Nick's Partnership" in case the other one somehow goes awry. If "Sue's Sole Proprietership" [sic] tries to pull a "fast one" and reneg on their agreement and stip because they claim they weren't the "registered" or "840'd" entity, we can file off the other one to make sure all bases are covered. If the TP seems to be dragging their feet and we're getting into a jeopardy situation, we could even have both NOI's (and assessments) in existence concurrently to keep us protected. Donald Ritchie testified that he did not know of the existence of a "Nick's Partnership" or where such a term came from. However, see Findings of Fact 21, 25, and 46. A memo to file was subsequently produced by Peggy Bowen, dated February 10, 1995, which stated in part: I spoke to Allen Adams on the telephone regarding the memo from George Stinson dated 2/9/95. We agreed that our procedure would be to revise the existing NOI which is in the name Nick and Sue Farah to Sue Farah, and correct the SSN, under the existing audit number. We issued the existing NOI as a sole proprietorship, as Nick & Sue Farah, and we are only clarifying the name of the sole proprietorship to Sue Farah. There were not any partnership federal tax returns filed only joint 1040. Neither Petitioner was privy to the internal e-mail memoranda of the Department. The parties have stipulated that the Department agreed to remove Nick Farah, Sr.'s name from the Notices of Intent in exchange for Sue Farah's agreement to sign the notices as "agreed" liabilities. Accordingly, the Department's Second Revised Notices of Intent were issued on February 13, 1995. The Second Revised Notices of Intent were issued in the name "Sue Farah d/b/a Farah Gazebo Restaurant." These were issued by Donald Ritchie.1 The Second Revised Notice of Intent to make Sales and Use Tax Audit Changes (also referred to as "the second NOI") states in paragraph #1, "The Department of Revenue presents you with a Notice of Intent to make Sales and Use Tax Audit Changes for the period of time which you have been found to be liable on various transactions subject to the tax under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, during the period 03/01/89 Through 02/28/94." It further states on the bottom of the first page, "NOTE: The execution and filing of this waiver will expedite adjustment of the tax liability as indicated above. . . . If you now agree with the tax audit changes, please sign this form and return it to the audit office indicated above." Petitioner Sue Farah signed the Second Revised Notices of Intent on March 10, 1995. Also on March 10, 1995, Petitioner Sue Farah submitted a request for compromise of taxes, penalties, and interest. The Department's representative in Jacksonville agreed to waive the penalties on the assessment. Subsequently, the Department's auditor forwarded the audit file to Tallahassee for further consideration of the Request for Compromise of Taxes and Interest. Donald Ritchie testified that during the course of the audit, it was apparent to him that it was an operation that was owned and operated by a husband and wife, Nick Farah, Sr., and Sue Farah, but that a Notice of Intent is issued in the name of the taxpayer as it is listed on the sales tax registration. It is noted, however, that the audit period covered a period in which there were two sales tax registration numbers for the restaurant in the name(s) first of Nick, Sr., Sue and Nick, Jr., until June 1, 1992, and thereafter as Nick Farah, Sr. and Sue Farah, a partnership. (See Findings of Fact 20-21.) After the audit was conducted, the audit file was forwarded to Tallahassee for review. Included within the audit file was the Standard Audit Program & Report for Sales and Use Tax form. Donald Ritchie testified that he filled out the Standard Audit Program & Report for Sales and Use Tax form listing the taxpayers as "Nick & Sue Farah d/b/a Farah's Gazebo Restaurant," and indicating that the entity was a "sole proprietorship" because he understood that a business entity run by a husband and wife did not constitute a partnership but rather a sole proprietorship in the absence of the formal procedures of organizing a partnership. Donald Ritchie further testified that he forwarded the file to Tallahassee as an "unagreed audit," because after signing the second NOI the Petitioners had asked for "additional conditions," including a request by Sue Farah for compromise of the taxes, penalties, and interest, that had not been specified at the time Sue Farah signed. However, he conceded that anyone signing an NOI could request such compromise. It is also clear that Sue Farah had always retained the right to compromise the penalties. (See Findings of Fact 30, 32 and 44-45) The Department subsequently issued its Notices of Proposed Assessment (NOPA) on September 6, 1995, in the names of both husband and wife, as "Nick & Sue Farah/Farah Gazebo Restaurant." By letter dated November 3, 1995, Petitioner Sue Farah d/b/a Farah Gazebo Restaurant protested the entire proposed assessments, on the ground of "doubt as to collectability." By letter dated January 15, 1996, Petitioner Sue Farah submitted her financial information in support of her protest. Petitioners had borrowed additional monies in order to pay off general debts and debt associated with the restaurant involved in this proceeding. They then borrowed again in order to open a second restaurant on "Mandarin" in Jacksonville. This new venture was to be run by a newly created corporation, of which Sue Farah is sole stockholder. Petitioners are agreed that if the restaurant which is at issue in this cause were sold, Sue Farah would get all the proceeds. By letter dated March 15, 1996, Kathleen Marsh, CPA and Tax Law Specialist for the Department, requested certain financial information from both Petitioners in order to consider the issues raised in the letter of protest, including but not limited to, audit papers, bank statements for the years 1995 and 1996, and various information relating to the operation and financial position of the second restaurant. By letter dated April 8, 1996, Kathleen Marsh notified Petitioners that she had not yet received the information she had requested, and was going to issue the Notice of Decision. By letter dated April 17, 1996, Petitioners' CPA responded in part to the Department's request for additional financial information, but it does not amount to a certification or audit of the Farahs' financial statements. Also on April 17, 1996, the Department issued its Notice of Decision, sustaining the assessment in its entirety, determining that doubt as to collectability had not been established by the Petitioners. The Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Department's determination, raising the additional argument that Nick Farah, Sr., was not sufficiently involved in the operation of the restaurant during the audit period so as to be liable for the tax assessment. The following information had been requested by the Department but was never received from the Petitioners: a copy of an IRS audit, bank statements for all accounts for the years 1995 and 1996, information relating to ownership of stock in the new restaurant corporation, and information relating to sales tax registration for the new restaurant. The Department issued its Notice of Reconsideration on November 5, 1996, again sustaining the assessment in its entirety and determining that doubt as to collectability still had not been established. It further determined that Nick Farah, Sr., was a registered dealer under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and was otherwise sufficiently involved in the operation of the restaurant so as to be liable for the assessment. Petitioners timely filed their Petition for this administrative hearing under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Petitioners agreed that the amount of the tax assessed by the Department is correct. Since the offer of compromise, several properties owned either jointly by husband and wife or owned solely by Nick Farah, Sr., have been foreclosed. Otherwise, the sworn financial statements in the audit file have been adopted by the Petitioners' testimony as still accurate. None of these financial statements bear a certification by a certified public accountant. Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Farah's financial situation has remained static in the ensuing two years. Sue Farah still desires to compromise the total tax bill with small monthly payments, but she could not articulate an amount she can currently pay and relied on her earlier offer.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Revenue that: Assesses the entire liability for the March 1, 1989 - February 28, 1994, audit period against Sue Farah for the taxes, penalties, and accruing interest; Absolves Nick Farah, Sr., of any liability for the same audit period; and Denies all compromise of the amount(s) assessed. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of June, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1998.
