The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondents owe Petitioner approximately $591 for a quantity of watermelons provided by Petitioner; secondarily, resolution of this issue 1 Correction of obvious error has been made to the style of this case, adding the name of Co-Respondent U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., and eliminating the Department of Agriculture and Consumer requires a determination of whether Respondents acted as an agent for Petitioner as opposed to a direct purchase of Petitioner's melons by Respondents.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a farmer who produces agricultural products, including watermelons. Petitioner also has trucks in which he hauls agricultural products, including watermelons. When all his trucks are in use, he frequently calls a friend, Freddy Bell, to provide some of Bell’s trucks to haul his products. Petitioner, in turn, helps Bell when Bell’s trucks are all in use. Respondent Wilson is a dealer of such products in the course of normal business activity. Respondent Wilson acts as a broker in these arrangements, receives the gross sales receipts from buyers and from that sum deducts costs of labor, freight, inspections, any other associated costs and his commission. The net balance of the gross sales receipts are paid to the melon producers. Respondent U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Company is the bonding agent for Respondent pursuant to Section 604.20, Florida Statutes. Petitioner had not discussed any arrangement for the sale of his melons with Respondent Wilson. Instead, Petitioner discussed the sales price of his melons with Freddy Bell. Petitioner testified that Bell represented to Petitioner that he could get a price of $4.00 per hundred weight for Petitioner’s melons. Petitioner relied on Bell to provide transport his melons and obtain the promised price. While Bell did not testify at the final hearing, the parties are in agreement that Bell arranged for sale and shipment of Petitioner’s melons through Wilson. Wilson’s President, Robert M. Wilson, testified at hearing that Bell was not empowered by him to represent a guaranteed price for melons to anyone and that he could not affirm that Bell operated as his agent. He added that Melons were plentiful this past season and no melons were brokered on a guaranteed price basis. Testimony of Robert M. Wilson at the final hearing establishes that the arrangement between Respondent Wilson and Freddy Bell on Petitioner’s behalf was a brokerage arrangement and that the sale of the melons was subject to conditions and demands of the market place, i.e., that the melons would sell for the best possible price which Wilson could obtain for them. Testimony of Petitioner is uncorroborated and fails to establish that the agreement between the parties contemplated a direct sale of the melons to Respondent Wilson or a guaranteed price by Wilson.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing Petitioner's complaint.DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of March, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Bo Bass 2829 Southwest SR 45 Newberry, FL 32669 John M. Martirano, Esquire US Fidelity and Guaranty Co Post Office Box 1138 Baltimore, MD 21203-1138 Robert M. Wilson, President Wilson and Son Sales, Inc. 2811 Airport Road Plant City, FL 33567 Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol - Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture Mayo Building, Room 508 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800
Findings Of Fact The Southland Corporation is a corporation engaged in the operation of convenience food stores under the name "Seven Eleven Food Stores." Petitioner, Richard V. Ballard, was employed by Southland in March of 1984. Michael Jones, Supervisor of Southland, hired Ballard. Jones interviewed Ballard and reviewed his application prior to hiring him. At the time he interviewed Ballard, Jones noticed a gap on the application in Ballard's employment which he asked Ballard about. Ballard stated he had some operations on his arm and leg and that he had omitted a job with Huntley Jiffy Foods Stores where he had been terminated unfairly and had filed a handicap complaint against them. Jones asked him if he had left anything else out, to which Ballard replied no. Ballard had been previously employed part-time at Citgo, another convenience food store, and failed to reveal this on his application. He also failed to tell Jones about this previous employment when Jones questioned him prior to his being hired by Southland. Southland was aware that Ballard was handicapped when he was hired. In fact, Jones had a discussion with Ballard at the time he was hired about any possible limitations which would have an affect on his job performance. Ballard has cerebral palsy. Jones hired Ballard knowing that he was handicapped and knowing that he had filed a handicap complaint against Huntley Jiffy Foods. After he was employed, Ballard received two raises including a $0.20 merit increase, which was the highest increase for which he was eligible, and the increase was approved by Jones on May 25, 1984, effective May 11, 1984. Subsequent to his receiving the merit increase, Ballard was counseled for several incidents involving his job performance. On September 14, 1984, Jones became aware through a conversation with a former supervisor of Ballard's that Ballard had worked for Citgo previous to his working with Southland. Jones double-checked Ballard's application and found that he had omitted his employment with Citgo from his application and he had failed to disclose the Citgo employment to Jones during the interview. Ballard was suspended on September 14, 1984, pending a meeting with Jones on September 17, 1984. At the meeting on September 17, 1984, Ballard admitted that he had worked for Citgo and that he had omitted it from his application because he did not think he would be hired if he put it on his application because he would have been terminated from two previous jobs. Ballard had omitted two previous jobs in his application, Huntley Jiffy Foods and Citgo. The application which Ballard filled out contained the statement "I certify the facts set forth in my application for employment are true and complete. I understand that, if employed, false statements on this application shall be considered sufficient cause for dismissal." Southland has a policy prohibiting falsification of applications and providing for termination of employees for falsifying their applications. Southland had terminated employees other than Ballard for falsification of applications. While Ballard alleges that he was terminated because he had filed a discrimination complaint against Citgo, in fact, Jones had no knowledge at the time he terminated Ballard that Ballard had filed a charge against Citgo. Southland did not learn that Ballard had filed a discrimination charge against Citgo until sometime in October, 1984, after it terminated Ballard. Southland learned of the charge against Citgo from the documents Ballard filed charging retaliation in this case. Southland purchased a part of City Service (Citgo) in September, 1983, including the Kwik Mart facilities where Petitioner had worked previously. However, it did not incur liability for charges filed against City Service. The discrimination charge filed by Ballard against City Service is being defended by City Service. Southland is not involved in the that matter in any way.
The Issue Whether the Department of General Services should award state contracts for "walk-up convenience copiers" to Xerox Corporation in categories where Xerox was the only responsive bidder, or should reject Xerox's bid and solicit new bids on grounds that competitive bids were not received and there is no basis or excepting the award from competitive bid requirements; Whether the Department should disqualify Xerox's bid in one category for alleged material deviation from bid specifications where Xerox failed to initial a change in its bid price.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That DGS reject Xerox's single responsive bids and readvertise; and That Xerox's bid for category Group-I, Type 3, Class 12, monthly rental acquisition plan, be rejected as nonconforming. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of July, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 1984.
The Issue The issue to be determined in this proceeding is whether Respondents Wilson and Son Sales, Inc. (Wilson), and Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, as surety, are indebted to Petitioner for certain Florida-grown agricultural products.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a producer of several vegetable crops in Hardee County. Wilson is a dealer in agricultural products. More specifically, Wilson operates an agricultural broker business in Plant City. Wilson’s surety is Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. Although Wilson has written contracts with some producers, Wilson does not have written contracts with all producers. In the absence of a contract, the terms of Wilson’s broker services are almost always the same; that is, Wilson gets a commission of 10 percent on the sale of the produce and $.35 per box for palletizing and pre-cooling the produce, in return for which Wilson makes a reasonable and good faith effort to sell Petitioner’s produce for the best price. Petitioner contacted Wilson in January 2007, about bringing flat beans to Wilson to sell. Wilson expressed interest and informed Petitioner about Wilson’s standards terms as described above. These terms were agreeable to Petitioner and he brought the beans to Wilson later that month. Although Petitioner and Wilson had no written contract, the parties’ mutual understanding of the terms of their agreement created an enforceable oral contract. Wilson sold Petitioner’s beans and no dispute arose from this first transaction. The parties’ subsequent transactions for other produce were undertaken pursuant to the same oral contract terms. Because Wilson works on a commission basis, it is generally in Wilson’s self-interest to sell growers’ produce for the best price. Petitioner contacted Robert Wilson, Wilson’s owner, by telephone in February 2007, and informed Wilson of his plans to grow wax beans and “hard squash.” It was not stated in the record whether all three varieties of hard squash later grown by Petitioner, butternut squash, acorn squash, and spaghetti squash, were discussed by Petitioner and Robert Wilson during their February 2007 telephone conversation. A major dispute in the case was whether the parties’ February discussion about hard squash created some obligation on the part of Wilson beyond the oral contract terms described above. Petitioner claims that Wilson encouraged him to plant the squash and that Petitioner would not have planted the squash otherwise. Petitioner never made clear, however, what additional obligation was created by Robert Wilson’s encouragement beyond the obligation to accept delivery of and make good faith efforts to sell Petitioner’s squash at the best price. Petitioner did not use the word “guarantee,” but his claim seems to be that Wilson became obligated to guarantee that the squash would be sold for a price close to the price published in the Columbia (South Carolina) Market Report, a periodic publication of produce prices. Such an obligation on the part of a broker is contrary to the general practice in the trade. Petitioner’s evidence was insufficient to prove more than that Robert Wilson thought he could sell Petitioner’s squash and had a genuine interest in acting as broker for Petitioner’s squash. The evidence was insufficient to prove the existence of a contractual guarantee that Wilson would obtain a certain price for Petitioner’s hard squash or do more than was promised with regard to the beans that Wilson had sold for Petitioner; that is, to try to sell the produce for the best price. When Petitioner’s wax beans were picked in late April, he brought them to Wilson to sell. No dispute arose regarding the sale of the wax beans. Petitioner brought squash to Wilson in five deliveries between May 12 and May 29, 2007. Petitioner said that on one of these deliveries, he had to leave the boxed squash in the parking lot of Wilson’s facility because there was so much cantaloupe that had been delivered ahead of him. Petitioner says he was told by a Wilson employee that the squash would not be put in the cooler. Petitioner thinks Wilson was more interested in moving the cantaloupe than the hard squash. Petitioner thinks his squash was not put in the cooler or was put in too late. Wilson denies that Petitioner’s squash was not put into the cooler or was put in late. Robert Wilson claims that he made many calls in an effort to sell Petitioner’s squash, but he could not find interested buyers for all of the squash because (1) the demand for hard squash dried up, (2) some of Petitioner’s squash was of low quality, and (3) the squash began to spoil. Petitioner denied these allegations. Petitioner received invoices and other paperwork from Wilson showing that Wilson sold Petitioner’s first delivery of 490 boxes of acorn squash for $10.18 per box. It sold Petitioner’s second delivery of 519 boxes of acorn squash for $2.08 per box. For Petitioner’s third delivery of 110 boxes of acorn squash and 240 boxes of spaghetti squash, Wilson “dumped” the acorn squash by giving it to away for free to the Society of St. Andrews food bank, and sold the spaghetti squash for $5.15 per box. Wilson sold petitioner’s fourth delivery of 279 boxes of butternut squash for $.55 per box.1 Competent substantial evidence in the record established that it is a regular occurrence for agricultural products awaiting sale to decay and become unsellable, and for the broker to dump the products in a landfill or give the products to a charitable organization and then provide the grower a receipt for tax deduction purposes. It was undisputed that Wilson did not notify Petitioner before disposing of his squash. Petitioner claims he should have been notified by Wilson if the squash was beginning to spoil. However, Petitioner did not prove that prior notification was a term of their oral contract. Petitioner claims further that the federal Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act required Wilson to notify Petitioner before dumping the squash and to have the squash inspected to determine whether, in fact, it was spoiled. As discussed in the Conclusions of Law below, this federal law is not applicable. Competent substantial evidence in the record established that the market for agricultural products fluctuates and, at times, can fluctuate rapidly. For hard squash, which is normally prepared in an oven, the market demand can drop dramatically due to the onset of warm weather simply because people tend not to cook hard squash dishes in warm weather. Petitioner’s squash was being marketed in May, which means the beginning of warm weather for most areas of the United States. This fact supports Wilson’s claim that the demand for hard squash had been good, but fell rapidly just at the time Wilson was trying to sell Petitioner’s squash. The problem with the claims made by Petitioner in this case is simply one of insufficient proof. It is not enough for Petitioner to offer theories about what he thinks happened or to raise questions which are not fully answered. Petitioner had no proof that his squash was not put in Wilson’s cooler, that his squash did not begin to decay, that the demand for hard squash did not fall rapidly, that Wilson did not make reasonable efforts to sell the squash, that Wilson had willing buyers for Petitioner’s squash at a better price, or that Wilson sold squash from other growers at a better price. Petitioner’s evidence for his claims consisted primarily of market price reports that he contends show the approximate price Wilson should have gotten for the hard squash. Market price reports have some relevance to the issues in this case, but competent evidence was presented that the prices quoted in the publications are not always reliable to indicate the price a grower can expect to get on any given day, because there are factors that cause the published market price to be an inflated price (and applicable to the highest grade of produce) and because the market price can change rapidly with a change in demand for the product. The oral contract between Petitioner and Wilson required Wilson to try to get the best price for Petitioner’s squash, not some particular price appearing in a particular market price report. Petitioner did not show that Wilson got a better price for hard squash of equal quality, or that other brokers in the area got a better price for hard squash of equal quality at the times relevant to this case. Petitioner’s evidence was insufficient to prove that Wilson did not make a reasonable and good faith effort to sell Petitioner’s squash at the best price.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s amended claim. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 2008.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: In March of 1993, the Department issued an Advertisement for Bids (hereinafter referred to as the "Advertisement") through which it solicited the submission of bids on a construction project (Department Project No. NV-30A, which is hereinafter referred to as the "Project") involving the expansion of the water treatment facility at the Martin Correctional Institution. The Advertisement, along with the other bid documents issued in conjunction with the Advertisement, including, but not limited to, the Instructions to Bidders (hereinafter referred to as the "Instructions") and the Proposal Form, were compiled in a two-volume Specifications Manual (hereinafter referred to as the "Manual") that was made available for public inspection. Section B of the Manual's first volume contained the Instructions. Section B-2 2.A.(11) thereof provided that "Section 01420 as contained in the Technical Specifications must be submitted and the qualifications listed therein must be satisfactory to the Owner and the Engineer. " "Section 01420 as contained in the Technical Specifications" was a "Bidder's Qualification Form, Reverse Osmosis Treatment System Component" (hereinafter referred to as the "R.O. Form"), on which the bidder was to provide "R.O. [Reverse Osmosis] System Supplier" information. The R.O. Form repeated the directive that the bidder was to "[r]eturn [the] [c]ompleted [R.O.] Form [w]ith [its] proposal." Section B-14 of the Instructions addressed the subject of "preparation and submission of bids" and provided, in pertinent part, as follows: Each Bidder shall copy the proposal form on his own letterhead, indicate his bid prices thereon in proper spaces, for the Base Bid and for alternates on which he bids. . . . Proposals containing . . . . items not called for or irregularities of any kind may be rejected by the Owner. Section B-16 of the Instructions addressed the subject of "disqualification of bidders" and provided, in pertinent part, as follows: More than one bid from an individual, firm, partnership, corporation or association under the same or different names will not be considered. Reasonable grounds for believing that a Bidder is interested in more than one proposal for the same work will cause the rejection of all proposals in which such Bidders are believed to be interested. The subject of "contract award" was addressed in Section B-21 of the Instructions, which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: . . . The recommendation for contract award will be for the bidder qualified in accordance with Section B-2 and submitting the lowest bid provided his bid is responsible and it is in the best interest of the Owner to accept it. The qualified bidder submitting the lowest bid will be that bidder who has submitted the lowest price for the base bid, or the base bid plus additive alternates or less deductive alternates, taken in the numerical order listed in the bid documents in an amount to be determined by the Owner. The Order of the alternates may be accepted by the Owner in any sequence so long as such acceptance does not alter the designation of the low bidder. The Owner reserves the right to waive any informality in bids received when such waiver is in the interest of the Owner. Section C of Volume I of the Manual contained the Proposal Form that all bidders were required to use to indicate their bid prices. The following statement appeared at the bottom of the second page of the Proposal Form: There is enclosed: A certified check, cashier's check, treasurer's check, bank draft or Bid Bond in the amount of not less than five (5) percent of the Base Bid payable to the Department of Corrections, as a guarantee. An executed Trench Excavation Safety Certification, Section F-13. An executed Experience Questionnaire and Contractor's Financial Statement and Public Entity Criminal Conviction Form, Section L. An executed Bidder's Qualifications Form (Reverse Osmosis), Technical Specification Section 01420. While one completed R.O. Form had to accompany each bid, there was no provision in any of the bid documents issued by the Department requiring a bidder to submit only one such completed form and no more. Petitioner, McMahan and R.J. Sullivan Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Sullivan") were among the contractors that timely submitted bids in response to the Advertisement. McMahan's and Sullivan's bids were each accompanied by more than one completed R.O. Form. Petitioner, on the other hand, provided the Department with only one completed R.O. Form along with its bid. Of the bids submitted, McMahan's was the lowest, Sullivan's was the second lowest and Petitioner's was the third lowest. McMahan's base bid price was $857,000.00. Petitioner's was $905,000.00. McMahan's total price, including the nine additive alternates accepted by the Department, was $948,000.00. Petitioner's was $1,032,600.00, $84,600.00 more than McMahan's. By letter dated July 1, 1993, the Department advised McMahan of its intent "to award the contract [for Department Project No. NV-30A] to [McMahan] as the lowest responsive bidder." On July 9, 1993, Petitioner filed a formal written protest of the preliminary determination to award the contract to McMahan alleging that McMahan was not a responsive bidder inasmuch as McMahan "submitted Reverse Osmosis ("R.O.") Qualifications Forms for more tha[n] one vendor." According to Petitioner, "[t]his [was] not in conformance with the Bid Documents and gave [McMahan] an unfair advantage."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Corrections enter a final order finding Petitioner's bid protest to be without merit and awarding McMahan, as the lowest responsive and qualified bidder, the contract for Department Project No. NV-30A. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2nd day of September, 1993. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of September, 1993.
Findings Of Fact On August 31, 1994, the Respondent received and opened bids for its Project No. HSMV 92044000, Repairs, Art Sutton Drivers' License Office, Miami, Florida (the Project). The bid specification documents (the Specifications) for the Project included requirements for a Base Bid and for specific alternate proposals with respect to three defined items of alternate work. Section 01100 of the Specifications stated that "[a]ll Alternates described in this Section are required to be reflected on the Bid Form as submitted by the bidder." Part 2 of that section provided: ALTERNATE NO. 1 A. Provide a deductive price to the base bid for the removal of existing window units and the installation of new units as indicated in plans and specification Section 08520. ALTERNATE NO. 2 A. Provide a deductive price to the base bid for the provision of communications conductors see specification Section 16400. ALTERNATE No. 3 A. Provide a deductive price to the base bid for the installation of all landscape materials as indicated on plans and as per specification Section 02960. Also included in the Specifications as Exhibit 4 was a Proposal Form. The Specifications required each bidder to submit this form in triplicate on the bidder's letterhead. With respect to alternates, the Proposal Form required: With the foregoing as a Base Bid, the following costs of alternate proposals are submitted in accordance with the drawings and specifications. Alternate No. 1 Add or Deduct $ Alternate No. 2 Add or Deduct $ Alternate No. 3 Add or Deduct $ The Respondent's architect received four bids on August 31, 1994. As recorded on the Bid Tabulation and Notice of Award Recommendation, three bidders provided specific prices for the three alternates, as well as a Base Bid. The Bid Tabulation shows that two bidders provided specific prices for the three alternates and included the alternate prices in their Base Bids. The Petitioner provided specific prices for the three alternates, but excluded the alternate prices from its Base Bid. The fourth bidder provided a specific price for only one alternate and excluded that alternate price from its Base Bid. (The fourth bidder was disqualified as non-responsive for failing to submit prices on all three alternates.) In pertinent part, the Petitioner's proposal read: With the foregoing as a Base Bid, the following costs of alternate proposals are submitted in accordance with the drawings and specifications: Alternate No. 1 Add or Deduct . . . $4,400.00 Alternate No. 2 Add or Deduct . . . $1,158.00 Alternate No. 3 Add or Deduct . . . $2,084.00 These Alternates were in addition to the Petitioner's Base bid of $204,322.00. The proposal form submitted by the Petitioner comports with Exhibit 4 to the Specifications, which was the mandatory Proposal Form. On August 31, 1994, William Phillip Austin, Peitioner's President, wrote the architect: Per our telephone conversation this date regard- ing the confusion relating to the Add/Deduct for Alternates 1, 2 and 3 for the above project, please be advised that our base bid did not include the work described in the Alternates. As stated if you want work described in Alternates 1, 2 and 3, you must add the cost to our base bid. The base bid including Alternates 1, 2 and 3 would, therefore, be $211,964.00. If we can provide additional information, please do not hesitate to contact us. The Respondent's architect completed and submitted the bid Tabulation and Notice of Award Recommendation to the Respondent in early September. The document clearly discloses the amounts of each bidder's Base Bid and Alternate proposals. Using plus (+) and minus (-) signs, the Bid Tabulation further shows each bidder's method of calculation. The record is devoid of evidence that the Respondent had any problem in evaluating the bids and identifying the lowest bidder. The Petitioner was the lowest bidder on any combination of base bid plus or minus any or all alternates. Subsequently the Petitioner received a NOTICE OF AWARD RECOMMENDATION dated October 4, 1994. The Notice informed the Petitioner that the Respondent "has recommended that the contract be awarded to your firm in the total amount of $211,964.00, accepting the Base Bid and Alternates #1, #2 & #3. The Administrator of Contracts Design and Permitting, Division of Building Construction, Department of Management Services, State of Florida will consider this recommendation." Larry R. Coleman, Construction Projects Administrator, signed the letter. The Petitioner acknowledged receipt. A representative of the second lowest bidder, Kalex Construction, then contacted the Respondent, complaining of the Award Recommendation. The grounds for the Kalex complaint are not in the record. However, on October 14, 1994, H. R. Hough, the Respondent's Contracts Administrator, sent the Petitioner a letter "to notify you of the State's decision to reject all bids on the above referenced project due to ambiguities in the specifications." Mr. Hough's reasons for the rejection are "other than those stated by the protestor," Kalex. The Respondent's Rule 60D-5.007, Florida Administrative Code, states: Determination of Successful Bidder. All projects except where competitive bidding is waived under the provisions of Rule 60D-5.008 will be publicly bid in accordance with the provisions in the project specifications bidding documents. Award of contract will be made to the responsive bidder, determined to be qualified in accordance with the provisions herein and meeting the requirements of the bidding documents, that submits the lowest valid bid for the work. The lowest bid will be determined as follows: The lowest bid will be the bid from the responsive bidder that has submitted the lowest price for the base bid or the base bid plus the additive alternates or less the deductive alternates chosen by the Agency to be included in or excluded from the proposed contract, taken in numerical order listed in the bid documents. The order of the alternates may be selected by the Agency in any sequence so long as such acceptance out of order does not alter the designation of the low bidder. Under the above-quoted rule, the Respondent compares bids beginning with the lowest "base bid." The Respondent is of the view that for this comparison to be fair and equal, all bidders must include the same scope of work in the "base bid." The Respondent does not interpret the above-quoted rule to allow deductive alternates from some bidders and additive alternates from others. (For reasons discussed in the Conclusions of Law which follow, the Respondent's interpretation and application of the above-quoted rule is erroneous.) The Specifications contain some ambiguous and inconsistent language regarding whether alternates should be treated as additive or deductive. The ambiguous and inconsistent language did not provide any bidder with an advantage or a disadvantage, nor did it otherwise affect the fairness of the bidding process.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services issue a Final Order in this case awarding a contract for the subject project to the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of December 1994. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December 1994. APPENDIX The following are my specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner Paragraph 1: This is primarily a statement of position and is addressed in the Preliminary Statement. Paragraphs 2 through 10: Accepted in substance with a few unnecessary details omitted. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent Paragraphs 1 through 6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence rejected as constituting a conclusion which is not warranted by the evidence. Third sentence is accepted as an accurate statement of how Respondent has been interpreting the subject rule, but is not accepted as constituting a correct interpretation of the rule. Paragraph 8: Rejected as misleading and confusing because the "scope of work" to be performed under the contract can only be determined after the Respondent decides which alternates to include and which to exclude. Paragraph 9: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as constituting a conclusion which is not warranted by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Timothy J. Armstrong, Esquire Armstrong & Mejer Suite 1111 Douglas Centre 2600 Douglas Road Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Stephen S. Mathues, Esquire Department of General Services Knight Building, Suite 312 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of General Services Knight Building, Suite 312 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of General Services Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether Saxon Business Products, Inc.'s ("Saxon") response to the Department of General Services' invitation to bid for walk-up convenience copiers should be disqualified on grounds that: Saxon's omission of a supply price list was a material deviation from the bid specifications and conditions; and Saxon's walk-up convenience copier, model "Saxon 300," failed to prove two-sided copy capability.
Findings Of Fact I. Invitation to Bid On June 10, 1981, DGS issued invitation to Bid No. 544-600-38-B ("ITB") entitled, "Walk-Up Convenience Copiers; Bond Paper and Magazine Finish Bond Paper." The ITB proposes an annual contract under which state agencies and institutions can purchase copying machines. It contains general and special conditions and specifications, and warns vendors that bids that do not comply with such conditions "are subject to rejection." (Testimony of Celnik) The ITB specifications divide copiers into two groups: Group I, plain bond copiers, Group II, magazine finish copiers. The copiers are further categorized by type: Type I indicates minimum features; Type II indicates two- sided copying capability; Type III indicates one reduction capability; and Type IV indicates two or more reduction capabilities. These types are further separated into 12 classes on the basis of speed and volume (P-1.) The ITB special conditions instruct bidders to submit bid sheets 2/ breaking down all copying costs to a per-copy basis. Bids are to be evaluated and contracts awarded to bidders submitting the, lowest cost per copy in each category of copier. Cost per copy is calculated by using a specific cost formula. (P-1.) The ITB cost formula contains three components: machine cost, labor cost, and supply cost. DGS proposes to disqualify Saxon's bid in several categories of copiers for failure to supply a supply price list required by the supply cost component. This component provides, in relevant part: C) SUPPLY COST - The bidder shall compute supply costs on the Manufacturer's Brand. If there is an existing state con- tract for supplies for the manufacturer's brand equipment, the state contract price may be substituted. Supply costs will be rounded to six (6) decimal points. All other costs will also be rounded off to six (6) decimal points. The volume price used by the vendor to compute supply cost shall be based on the monthly median vol- ume of the type and class being bid. Supply cost submitted shall be firm for the contract period, except for paper, and all supply costs shall be current market price, verifiable. Vendor must submit supply price lists with his bid to substantiate that correct price vol- umes were used, unless state contract prices were used. A contract award may include supplies if deemed in the best interest of the State. By electing to substitute state contract supplies, the vendor is certifying that his equipment, using said supplies, will meet all per- formance requirements of this bid and of the equipment manufacturer. NOTE - All cost formulas will be verified by the Division of Purchasing and errors in extension will be corrected. In the event incorrect supply cost volumes are used by a bidder, the Division of Purchas- ing will adjust these costs to the median volume range. (e.s.)(P-1.) The purpose of the supply price list requirement, included in DGS's 1980 and 1981 ITB for convenience copiers, is to enable DGS to verify the supply cost figures shown on a vendor's bid sheets; in this way, DGS can insure that all vendors are using correct quantity pricing on their bid sheets. 3/ (In the past, some bidders had used lower supply prices, which were tied to high volume purchases; but those volumes frequently exceeded the state's needs and the median volumes specified by the ITB for each category of copier.) The verification procedure followed by DGS in both 1980 and 1981 involves checking the vendor's bid sheets against the prices shown on the supply price list. 4/ If DGS finds an inconsistency between the two, it "corrects" the bid sheet supply cost upward or downward to reflect the price shown on the supply price list. 5/ Such a bid sheet correction would also change the total median cost per copy, the factor used to evaluate competing bids. DGS also checks the supply list to determine whether it contains current market prices. (Testimony of Hittinger, Eberhard.) If a vendor fails to submit a supply price list, DGS cannot verify that the supply prices used on the bid sheet (to compute total median cost per copy) accurately reflect the median volumes specified in the ITB. Neither can DGS determine whether the supply prices used on the bid sheet are set prices, which do not vary with volume, or volume prices, which do; the bid sheets, on their face, do not reveal which type of pricing is being used. (Testimony of Eberhard; P-1.) After sealed bids are publicly opened, DGS has an established practice of not allowing any bidder to submit additional material which could alter price or other information previously submitted on bid sheets. DGS does, however, accept late information if it can be corroborated by an independent source. For example, a bidder might -- after bid opening -- supply its corporate charter number, which can be easily verified by contacting the Department of State. (Testimony of Hittinger, Eberhard.) The ITB special conditions also require DGS to test and approve copiers prior to bid opening. Copiers which are not tested and accepted by DGS are ineligible for a contract award: EQUIPMENT APPROVAL - Each item of equipment bid shall have been tested by the Division of Purchasing prior to the bid opening time and date for performance and reliability under normal working con- ditions. Any bidder whose equipment has not been tested shall provide a model of the equipment on which he intends to bid to a specified testing station, complete with all supplies, at no expense to the State. Testing will extend for a period of twenty (20) working days. In the event evaluation and acceptance of untested ma- chines has not been accomplished prior to the bid opening date and time, such machine shall not be eligible for an award. (P-1.) II. Bid Opening: Saxon's Failure to Submit Supply Price List Prior to the 1981 bid opening, Saxon failed to submit a supply price list in connection with its bid. This was apparently an oversight on its part; a year earlier, it had furnished a supply price list in response to a similar ITB for convenience copiers. Because of Saxon's omission, DGS was unable to verify the supply prices used by Saxon on its bid sheets or determine whether Saxon was utilizing set or volume prices. (Testimony of Eberhard, Celnik, Hittinger.) After bid opening, Saxon notified DGS that the supply prices shown on its bid sheets were set supply prices -- unit prices which do not vary with volume -- and confirmed that they are the supply prices which it now offers to the state. (Testimony of Celnik.) In its evaluation of the bids, DGS applied the requirement of a supply price list equally to all bidders. All bidders who omitted a supply price list were informed that they were disqualified. Saxon's bid was disqualified in five copier categories: Group I, Type I, Class I; Group I, Type I, Class II; Group I, Type I, Class IV; Group I, Type II, Class I; and Group I, Type II, Class II. At least 11 vendors, however, did submit supply price lists with their bid sheets; approximately one-third were set price lists, the remaining were volume price lists. (Testimony of Eberhard; P-3.) If a vendor could submit a supply price list after the bid opening, it could effectively decrease or increase its bid. (This is so because, in case of a conflict between the bid sheet supply price and the supply price list, the price list value will prevail. A change in the bid sheet supply price will change the cost per copy figure the determining factor in awarding contracts.) A vendor submitting a late supply price list would have an unfair advantage since it could change its bid after bid opening while its competitors could not. The competitive nature of the bidding process would be impaired. (Testimony of Hittinger, Eberhard.) Furthermore, if late submittal of a supply price list was allowed, a bidder could disqualify itself by refusing to provide it; the bidder would then have the advantage of revisiting its bid and -- if it chose -- withdrawing it after bid opening. The opportunity to withdraw a bid -- after bid opening -- would be an advantage not enjoyed by those who timely submitted supply price lists with their bids. (Testimony of Hittinger, Eberhard.) In some copier categories, the vendors who omitted supply price lists were the low bidders. If DGS disqualifies them for their omission, it must award the contract to the next highest bidder. The difference between those low bids and the next higher bid is substantial -- in some cases exceeding 23 percent. 6/ (Testimony of Celnik, Eberhard, Nee, Reinhart.) III. Failure of "Saxon 300" to Demonstrate Two-Sided Copying Capability In accordance with the ITB, Saxon submitted its "Saxon 300" copier to DGS for evaluation and testing. Prior to bid opening, DGS conducted a 20-day test of the machine. The "Saxon 300" machine which DGS tested lacked two-sided copying capability. It could reproduce clearly on one side, but not on the other. The "Saxon 300" sales literature and instruction manual submitted with the machine did not represent that the machine had two-sided copying capability. (Testimony of Nee; 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, R-2.) The "Saxon 300" may have two-sided copying capability, but only after special modifications are made to the copier. These modifications include removal of a roller device, replacement of the heating element, and replacement of the blower system. Saxon did not indicate at the time of testing, or in its bid, that the "Saxon 300" required such modification for two-sided copying capability. Neither did it indicate what, if any, additional costs would be charged for such modifications. (Testimony of Nee, Wallace; R-3.) After DGS tested the "Saxon 300," it sent Saxon a form letter indicating that the copier met minimum operating requirements. The letter did not inform Saxon that the machine lacked two-sided copying capability because DGS did not consider the lack of such capability a major malfunction in the equipment. (Testimony of Nee.) If a machine malfunctions, DGS has -- in the past -- allowed vendors to correct the deficiency or substitute another machine. (Testimony of Nee.) The Group I, Type II, Class I category of copiers, requires two-sided copying capability. Saxon bid its "Saxon 300" as a copier which meets this requirement. (Testimony of Celnik, Nee; P-1.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Saxon's bids in Group I, Type I, Class I; Group I, Type I, Class II; Group I, Type I, Class IV; Group I, Type II, Class I; and Group I, Type II, Class II be disqualified; and That Saxon's bid in Group I, Type II, Class I be disqualified. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 26th day of February, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 1982.
The Issue Whether the bid submitted by VSM of Florida, Inc., under cover of the bid blank issued to VSM, Inc. for the construction on State Project 16070-3511 (the Project), with the Florida Department of Transportation (Department), was the lowest responsive bid. Whether the Department acted arbitrarily, illegally, dishonestly or fraudulently in rejecting the bid submitted by VSM of Florida, Inc. under cover of the bid blank issued to VSM, Inc. for the construction of the Project based on the Department's determination that VSM of Florida, Inc. was not a prequalified contractor. Whether VSM, Inc., has standing to bring this bid protest by and on behalf of its operating subsidiary, VSM of Florida, Inc.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of all of the evidence, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Bids submitted on the Project were opened on May 27, 1992 and posted on June 18, 1992. The bid submitted by VSM of Florida, Inc. under cover of the bid blank issued by the Department to VSM, Inc., a prequalified contractor, was the apparent low bid on the Project in the amount of $1,565,565.00. The bid submitted by Leware under cover of the bid blank issued by the Department to Leware, a prequalified contractor, was the apparent second low bid on the Project in the amount of $1,600,000.00. All contractors who seek to bid on Department projects in excess of $250,000.00 must be prequalified by the Department in order to bid on such projects. The Project was in excess of $250,000.00 thereby requiring all bidders to be prequalified contractors. The Department's Contract Administration Office (CAO) is responsible for prequalifying contractors to bid on Department projects in excess of $250,000.00, for issuing bid packages for such projects, and for processing bids for award of a contract. The Department will not issue a bid blank for a project in excess of $250,000.00 unless a request for a bid blank is received from a prequalified contractor. Upon a request being made, the Department first determines that the contractor making the request is prequalified and has the capacity to bid on the project, then the Department prints or stamps the name of the prequalified contractor on the front page (cover sheet) of the bid blank and mails the bid package to the prequalified contractor. Contractors do not have to be prequalified to bid on projects of less than $250,000.00 but the Department's Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) requirements would be applicable to projects of less than $250,000.00 as well as those in excess of $250,000.00. Contractors do not have to be prequalified to work as subcontractors on a Department project. The Department does not approve subcontractors on Department projects but does review and approve the use of subcontractors on Department projects to ensure that subcontractors do not perform in excess of 49% of the work on the project in violation of Standard Specification No. 8 in the Department's contract. Review of the subcontractors being used on a project is conducted by the Department's District offices and the CAO is not made aware of which contractors are being used as subcontractors an a project. There is no specific language in the application for prequalification that requires a separate application be submitted for each contracting firm seeking prequalification. However, a copy of the Department's rule included in the application package does require that a separate application must be submitted for each contracting firm seeking prequalification. The purpose of the information sought in Question 8 (Question 6 in 1989) of the application concerning the affiliates of the parent company is to: (a) determine if any of the affiliates have been disbarred by other agencies or convicted of contract crimes which would disqualify them or; (b) alert the Department that an affiliate is applying for prequalification independent of the parent company so that the Department can properly audit the financial statements of each applicant. It is not intended to allow or provide for a joint application. The application must be accompanied by an audited financial statement and an equipment list. First-time applicants must also provide resumes and letter of recommendation supporting the applicant's representation that it is qualified and capable of performing the type of work for which it is seeking qualification. The CAO reviews the application for completeness and checks various data bases to determine if the applicant and its affiliates have adverse reports from other contracting agencies. The Department's Internal Audit Section reviews the financial information provided with the application for purposes of developing the Current Ratio and Net Worth Factors for use in calculating the applicant's Maximum Capacity Factor. The Internal Audit Section also reviews the information on corporate subsidiaries provided in response to "Question 8" (Question 6 in 1989) on the application. The Department's Construction Office reviews the equipment and experience information provided with the application to develop an applicant's Ability Factor for use in calculating the applicant's Maximum Capacity Factor. The Internal Audit Section and the Construction Office report their conclusions to the CAO, which issues the Certificate of Prequalification (Certification) to the applicant. Where the Opinion Letter of the applicant's Certified Public Accountant, which must be included with the application, states that the financial statement was audited in accordance with General Accepted Accounting Principles, the Department can rely on the Opinion Letter and the financial statements submitted with the application, unless there is a reasonable basis for the Department to question the financial statements. Where the Opinion Letter identifies the entity and subsidiaries, if any, whose financial condition is reflected in the financial statement, it is the Department's practice and policy to issue the Certification in name of the entity whose financial condition is reflected in the financial statement as indicated by the Opinion Letter. Where the Opinion Letter indicates that the financial condition of both the parent company and subsidiaries are reflected in the financial statement, then the Department will issue the Certification in the name of the parent company and the generic term "subsidiaries" or "subsidiary". Neither the parent company nor the subsidiary would be qualified separately. Under the above circumstances, the Department would accept a bid submitted by the parent company without the subsidiary even though the bid blank had been issued in the name of the parent company and "subsidiary" or "subsidiaries". For example, a Certification was issued by the Department to "Balfour Beatty Construction, Inc. and subsidiary", the bid blank was issued in the same name but the bid was submitted by and awarded to Balfour Beatty Construction, Inc. There was at least one other instance where the Department followed a similar procedure. The Department's justification for this practice is that the parent company has control over its subsidiaries and could submit a bid on their behalf and enter into a contract with the Department that would bind the subsidiaries. Whereas, with the converse, the subsidiary or subsidiaries are normally without authority to submit a bid on behalf of the parent company or enter into a contract with the Department on behalf of the parent company. However, where a prequalified parent company gives proper written authorization to a subsidiary to submit a bid on its behalf and such authorization is attached to bid, then the Department would not consider such bid submitted by the subsidiary as irregular. Where a parent company relies on the assets and experience of its majority-owned subsidiaries in its application for prequalification to which it has access to, and control over, and the Opinion Letter indicates the parent company to be the entity whose financial condition is reflected in the financial statement, then the Department would certify the parent company in its name alone and allow the parent company to bid on Department projects in excess of $250,000.00. Furthermore, the Department would allow the parent company's subsidiaries to perform all of the work on the project for the parent company notwithstanding Standard Specification No. 8 limiting the percentage of work which the subcontractors are allowed to perform on a Department project to 49%. The Department does not consider subsidiaries performing work for a parent corporation on a Department project as subcontractors within the meaning of Standard Specification No. 8 and thus, a parent company could bid on a Department project in its own name and rely solely on its subsidiaries to perform 100% of the work on the project without violating Standard Specification No. 8. For example, VSM, Inc. could bid on a Department project and, if awarded the bid, could rely solely on VSM of Florida, Inc. to perform 100% of the work on the project. It was conceded by the Department that VSM of Florida, Inc. has the expertise, experience and equipment to perform all of the work bid for on the Project. Where the applicant's name on the face of the application does not exactly correspond with the name of the entity whose financial condition is reflected in the financial statement, then the Department will issue the Certification in the name of the entity whose financial condition is reflected in the financial statement as indicated in the Opinion Letter. VSM, Inc. is a Florida corporation that was incorporated in 1988. In 1988 VSM, Inc. formed two subsidiary corporations, VSM of Florida, Inc. and VSM of Virginia, Inc. The parent corporation, VSM, Inc., owns 80% of the stock in both VSM of Florida, Inc. and VSM of Virginia, Inc. Van Monroe is the sole stockholder, sole director and president of VSM, Inc. Van Monroe is also the sole director and president of VSM of Florida, Inc. The remaining 20% stock of VSM of Florida, Inc. is owned by Gregory Monroe, brother of Van Monroe. Gregory Monroe is also vice president of VSM of Florida, Inc. These corporations (VSM, Inc. and VSM of Florida, Inc.) are separate entities with each having a separate Federal Identification Number. Beginning in 1989, VSM, Inc. applied for Certification with the Department to qualify to bid on projects in excess of $250,000.00. In the application form (Question 6), the applicant is requested to: "List the following for all affiliated companies: (a) Name and Address; (b) States Qualified ; and (c) Explain in detail your connection with this company and whether or not this company is qualifying with FDOT. In response to that question, VSM, Inc. answered in pertinent part as follows: (a) VSM of Florida, Inc., P. O. Box 5761, Jacksonville, FL 32247 (58-2916127); (b) Florida and; (c) VSM, Inc. - 80% Stockholder, Gregory B. Monroe - 20% Stockholder (We would qualify VSM of Florida, Inc. as a subsidiary of VSM, Inc.). The Department issued the Certification on April 21, 1989 in the name of VSM, Inc. Each of the applications for renewal of the Certification issued on April 21, 1989 submitted on March 26, 1990, March 26, 1991 and March 30, 1992 requested basically the same information in Question 8, as had Question 6 in the original application, and the answers were basically the same as in the original application. The renewal applications submitted on March 26, 1990 and March 30, 1992 have both VSM, Inc. and VSM of Florida listed as applicants. The Department subsequently lined out VSM of Florida, Inc. on each of these renewal applications and issued the Certification to VSM, Inc. The reason being, that each contracting firm seeking Certification must file a separate application, and the Opinion Letter indicated that the entity whose financial condition was reflected in the financial statement was VSM, Inc. A Certification was issued to VSM, Inc. on April 30, 1990, April 10, 1991 and April 16, 1992, respectively in response to the above renewal applications for Certification. The Certification dated April 16, 1992 expanded the classes of work to be performed under the certificate to include Bascule bridge repair (rehabilitation) work. In each of the above years, Van Monroe, the president of both VSM, Inc. and VSM of Florida, Inc., consciously chose not to seek Certification for VSM of Florida, Inc. independently of VSM, Inc. because VSM, Inc. and its subsidiaries operate as an integrated operation and could not be separated. Beginning in 1990 and each year thereafter, when VSM, Inc. applied for renewal of its Certification with the Department, it included a consolidated financial statement which contained the financial condition of its two subsidiaries, VSM of Florida, Inc. and VSM of Virginia, Inc. The Department chose not to issue the Certification in the name of "VSM, Inc. and subsidiaries" for these years because the Department concluded that the Opinion Letter indicated that the only entity whose financial condition was reflected in the financial statement was VSM, Inc. Although the Department conceded that the Certification could possibly have been issued to "VSM, Inc. and subsidiaries", the Department contended that this would not have changed the result of the bid since under either situation, VSM of Florida, Inc. had not submitted written authorization from VSM, Inc. authorizing VSM of Florida, Inc. to submit a bid on behalf of VSM, Inc. Since 1989, both VSM, Inc. and VSM of Florida, Inc., after requesting and receiving permission from the Department, have used the same vendor (prequalification) identification number. Additionally, the names VSM, Inc. and VSM of Florida, Inc. have been used interchangeably on documents submitted to and received from the Department. The current Certificate of Capacity, required by the Department of all prequalified contractors, was issued in the name of VSM of Florida, Inc. On February 26, 1992 under cover of the bid blank issued to VSM, Inc. by the Department, VSM of Florida, submitted a bid on a Department project in Polk County, Job No. 16630-3601. Because this bid was third lowest bid, no objection or declaration of irregularity to this bid format was made by the Department. On May 27, 1992 under cover of the bid blank issued to VSM, Inc. by the Department, VSM of Florida, Inc. submitted a bid on a Department project in Gadsden County. The Department notified VSM, Inc. by form letter dated June 17, 1992 that the bid proposal had been taken apart and not been stapled back in the same order as when issued and that such errors or omissions could result in a future bid proposal being declared irregular. One of the items (Item 5) on this form letter states "the bidder's name is not as issued per their prequalification application on the front sheet (Bid Blank)". Item 5 was not checked or noted as a deficiency in the bid on the Gadsden County project along with the other noted problem because the name (VSM, Inc.) on the cover sheet had not been altered - it was the same as issued on the Certification. The Gadsden County project bids were posted on June 18, 1992 under the name "VSM,Inc." as irregular but with no reason stated for the irregularity and there is nothing in the minutes of the Department's Bid Review Committees indicating the reason for the irregularity. Again, the bid submitted by VSM of Florida, Inc. under cover of the bid blank issued to VSM, Inc. was not the low bid on the Gadsden County project. On May 27, 1992 VSM of Florida, Inc., under cover of a bid blank issued to VSM, Inc. by the Department submitted a bid on another Department project in Polk County, Job No. 16070-3501, the apparent low bid on the project and the bid in dispute here. The name of VSM, Inc. under which the bid blank was issued by the Department was not altered on the bid submitted by VSM of Florida, Inc. The bid as submitted by VSM of Florida, Inc. was signed by V. S. Monroe and G. B. Monroe as president and secretary, respectively of VSM of Florida, Inc. Although the bid did not contained written authorization from VSM, Inc. authorizing VSM of Florida, Inc. to submit the bid on behalf of VSM, Inc., there is sufficient evidence in the record to show that at the time of the bid submittal VSM, Inc. had knowledge of, consented to and authorized the bid submittal by VSM of Florida, Inc. Also, at the time of the bid submittal, VSM, Inc. and VSM of Florida, Inc. were under the impression (rightfully or wrongfully) that VSM, Inc. and VSM of Florida, Inc. had been previously prequalified jointly by the Department. By letter dated May 29, 1992, the Department advised VSM, Inc. that it needed to file a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) affirmative action plan with the Department in order for its bid of May 27, 1992 to be considered responsive. The DBE plan was furnished by VSM of Florida, Inc. and approved by the Department. The Department also requested that VSM, Inc. submit a current capacity rating status so that the Department could determine if the current capacity of VSM, Inc. was such that it was still qualified to perform the work required by the Project. The current capacity rating status was filed by VSM of Florida, Inc. on June 3, 1992. On June 11, 1992, the Department's Technical Review Committee (TRC) recommended that the bid executed and submitted by VSM of Florida, Inc. under cover of the bid blank issued to VSM, Inc. be declared irregular based on the TRC's determination that VSM of Florida, Inc. was not a prequalified contractor. On June 16, 1992, the Department's Contract Awards Committee (CAC) unanimously adopted the recommendation of the TRC and declared the bid submitted under cover of the bid blank issued to VSM, Inc. to be irregular. The CAC voted to post an intent to award the bid on the Project to Leware. The Department rejected the bid submitted by VSM of Florida, Inc. under cover of the bid blank issued to VSM, Inc. on the basis that VSM of Florida, Inc. was not a prequalified contractor. The bid was rejected by the Department without any review of the Department's prequalification file of VSM, Inc., or without any review as to whether the irregularity could be cured by VSM, Inc. ratifying the action of VSM of Florida, Inc. by supplying the Department with written authorization for VSM of Florida, Inc. to submit the bid on behalf of VSM, Inc. There was no evidence that curing this irregularity would provide the Petitioner with such a competitive advantage that it would restrict or stifle competition or that curing this irregularity would violate any rule or statute. The intent to award the Project to Leware was posted on June 18, 1992. VSM, Inc., by and on behalf of its operating subsidiary, VSM of Florida, Inc., filed a timely initial protest to the intent fo award on June 23, 1992 and a timely formal protest on July 1, 1992.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, accordingly RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a Final Order awarding the contract for the construction of the Project to the Petitioner upon VSM, Inc. curing the technical deficiency in the bid by submitting to the Department authorization for VSM of Florida, Inc. to have submitted the bid on the Project on behalf of VSM, Inc. DONE and ORDERED this 12th day of November, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of November, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NUMBER 92-4859BID The following constitutes my rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Proposed findings of fact 1 - 4, 6 and 8 - 11 are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. Proposed findings of fact 5 and 7 are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order, but see Findings of Fact 41 relating to reliance. Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Proposed findings of fact 1 - 42 and 44 are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. Proposed finding of fact 43 is rejected as not being a finding of fact but more of an argument as to the weight to be given certain evidence. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Intervenor, Leware 1. Proposed findings of fact 1 - 35 are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Allen P. Clark, Esquire CAVEN, CLARK, RAY and TUCKER 3306 Independent Square Jacksonville, FL 32202 George M. Meros, Jr., Esquire 106 College Avenue Tallahassee, FL 32301 Carolyn Holifield, Esquire Paul Sexton, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Mary M. Piccard, Esquire CUMMINGS LAWRENCE & VESIMA 1004 DeSoto Park Drive Tallahassee, FL 32302
The Issue The issues in these consolidated cases are: (1) whether the decision by Respondent, Department of Transportation, to reject all bids for the contract at issue was illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent; and (2) if so, whether Respondent's actions in cancelling the notice of intent to award the contract at issue to Cyriacks Environmental Consulting Services, Inc., ("CECOS") and requiring the submittal of new price proposals were clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.2/
Findings Of Fact The Parties Respondent is the state agency that issued the RFP to procure the Contract for Respondent's District IV. CECOS is an environmental consulting and services firm that submitted a response to the RFP, seeking award of the Contract. DB is an environmental consulting and services firm that submitted a response to the RFP, seeking award of the Contract. DB was granted party status to DOAH Case No. 16-0769 by Order dated February 29, 2016, and by Order dated March 9, 2016, was determined to have standing in that case as a party whose substantial interests were affected by Respondent's decision to reject all proposals. Overview of the Procurement Process for the Contract Respondent issued the RFP on or about October 1, 2015. The RFP sought to obtain support services related to environmental impacts review for projects in Respondent's District IV work program; wetland mitigation design; construction, monitoring, and maintenance; permitting of mitigation sites; exotic vegetation control and removal in specified locations; relocation of threatened, endangered, or rare flora and fauna; permit compliance monitoring; and other services specified in the RFP. The RFP stated Respondent's intent to award the Contract to the responsive and responsible proposing vendor6/ whose proposal is determined to be most advantageous to Respondent. The responses to the RFP were scored on two components: a technical proposal, worth a total of 60 points, that addressed the proposing vendor's experience, qualifications, and capabilities to provide high-quality desired services; and a price proposal, worth a total of 40 points, that addressed the proposed price without evaluation of the separate cost components and proposed profit of the proposing vendor, compared with that proposed by other vendors. The price proposal evaluation was based on the following formula: (Low Price/Proposer's Price) X Price Points = Proposer's Awarded Points. The Special Conditions section of the Advertisement portion of the RFP, paragraph 3, stated in pertinent part: In accordance with section 287.057(23), Florida Statutes, respondents to this solicitation or persons acting on their behalf may not contact, between the release of the solicitation and the end of the 72- hour period following the agency posting the notice of intended award, . . . any employee or officer of the executive or legislative branch concerning any aspect of this solicitation, except in writing to the procurement officer or as provided in the solicitation documents. Violation of this provision may be grounds for rejecting a response. The period between the release of the solicitation and the 72-hour period after posting of the intended award is commonly referred to as the "cone of silence." The Special Conditions section of the Advertisement portion of the RFP, paragraph 19, informed vendors that Respondent reserved the right to reject any or all proposals it received. Exhibit B to the RFP, addressing compensation, limited compensation for all authorizations for work performed under the Contract to a total of $5,000,000. Exhibit B stated that the schedule of rates listed in the Price Proposal Form C (i.e., the rates submitted for the sections comprising Exhibit C to the RFP) would be used for establishing compensation. On October 7, 2015, Respondent issued Addendum 1 to the advertised RFP. Addendum 1 revised Exhibit A to the RFP, the Scope of Services; and also revised Exhibit C to the RFP, the Bid Sheet, to provide it in Excel format. As revised by Addendum 1, Exhibit C consists of an Excel spreadsheet comprised of six sections, each of which was to be used by the responding vendors to propose their rates for the specified services being procured in each section of the Bid Sheet. Section 6 of the Excel spreadsheet, titled "Trees, Schrubs [sic], and Ground Cover, consists of eight columns and 258 rows, each row constituting a plant item on which a price proposal was to be submitted. The columns are titled, from left to right: No.; Scientific Name; Common Name; Unit; Estimated of [sic] number of Unites [sic]; Rate; Extension (Unit X Rate); and Multiplier 2.5 (Price X 2.5). Each row of the spreadsheet in Section 6 identified, as a fixed requirement for this portion of the proposal, the specified type of plant, unit (i.e., plant size), and estimated number of units (i.e., number of plants). For each row of the Section 6 spreadsheet, only the cells under the "Rate" column could be manipulated. Vendors were to insert in the "Rate" cell, for each row, the proposed rate for each plant item. The cells under all other columns for each row were locked, and the RFP stated that any alteration of the locked cells would disqualify the vendor and render its proposal non-responsive. The instructions to Exhibit C, Section 67/ stated: Trees, Schrubs [sic], and Ground Cover Price of plants shall include project management, field supervision, invoicing, installation, mobilization of traffic, water throughout the warranty period, fertilizer and [sic] six (6) month and demobilization, minor maintenance guarantee. Installation of plant material shall be per the Scope of Services. All planting costs shall include the cost to restore area to pre-existing conditions (i.e., dirt, sod, etc.). On October 20, 2015, Respondent issued Addendum 2, and on October 29, 2015, Respondent issued Addendum 3. Both addenda changed Respondent's schedule for reading the technical proposal scores, opening the sealed price proposals, and posting the intended awards. Addenda 1, 2, and 3 were not challenged. However, a key dispute in these consolidated proceedings is whether the Addendum 1 Bid Sheet in Section 6 and the instructions for completing that Bid Sheet were ambiguous, or whether Respondent reasonably believed them to be ambiguous. The vendors were to submit their responses to the RFP, consisting of their technical proposals and price proposals, by October 16, 2015. CECOS, DB, and four other vendors timely submitted responses to the RFP. On November 2, 2015, the scores for the technical proposals submitted by the vendors were presented to the Selection Committee ("SC") at a noticed meeting. DB received the highest number of points on the technical proposal portion of the RFP. The SC met again on November 3, 2015. At that time, Respondent's Procurement Officer, Jessica Rubio, read the total awarded points for each vendor's price proposal, as well as each vendor's total combined points——i.e., total points for technical proposal and price proposal. CECOS received the highest number of points for the price proposal portion of the RFP, and also received the highest total combined points. Respondent recommended, and the SC concurred, that Respondent should award the Contract to CECOS. At 10:00 a.m. on November 3, 2015, Respondent posted the Proposal Tabulation, constituting its notice of intent that CECOS would be awarded the Contract.8/ CECOS submitted a price proposal of $4,237,603.70. DB submitted a price proposal of $9,083,042.50. The other four vendors' price proposals ranged between $4,540,512.90 and $5,237,598.55. The "cone of silence" commenced upon Respondent's posting of the Proposal Tabulation, and ended 72 hours later, on November 6, 2015, at 10:00 a.m. As discussed in greater detail below, after the Proposal Tabulation was posted, Respondent discovered an apparent ambiguity in Exhibit C, Section 6, regarding the instructions to that section and the inclusion of the "2.5 Multiplier" column on the Bid Sheet. After an internal investigation, Respondent decided to cancel its intent to award the Contract to CECOS. On November 5, 2015, Respondent posted a notice that it was cancelling the intent to award the Contract to CECOS. On November 5, 2015, DB filed a Notice of Protest, stating its intent to challenge the award of the Contract to CECOS. Thereafter, on November 9, 2015, DB contacted Respondent by electronic mail ("email") to withdraw its Notice of Protest.9/ Due to the apparent ambiguity in Exhibit C, Section 6, on November 9, 2015, Respondent issued Addendum 4 to the RFP. Addendum 4 required the responding vendors to submit new price proposals for all sections (i.e., sections 1 through 6) of Exhibit C to the RFP. Addendum 4 also established a new timeline for a mandatory pre-bid conference to be held on November 12, 2016; set a sealed price proposal due date of November 19, 2016; and identified new dates for opening the price proposals and posting the Notice of Intended Award of the Contract. On November 12, 2015, Respondent conducted a mandatory pre-bid conference to address Addendum 4. The participating vendors expressed confusion and posed numerous questions regarding the submittal of new price proposals and their technical proposals. Immediately following the pre-bid conference, Respondent issued Addendum 5, which consisted of a revised Exhibit A, Scope of Services; revised Exhibit C, Bid Sheet in Excel format for all six sections; and responses to the questions posed at the pre-bid conference.10/ The Addendum 5 Bid Sheet comprising Exhibit C, Section 6, was substantially amended from the version that was published in Addendum 1. Specifically, the column previously titled "Rate" was changed to "Rate Per Unit"; the "Extension (Unit X Rate)" and "Multiplier 2.5" columns were deleted; and a new column titled "Proposed Cost (Rate per Unit X Est. No. of Units)" was added. Additionally, the instructions for Section 6 were substantially amended to read: "'Rate Per Unit' must include all costs associated with the purchase, installation, watering, fertilization, project management, field supervision, travel, invoicing, labor, maintenance of traffic, mobilization and demobilization, staking and guying, maintenance of planting site throughout the 180[-]day plant warranty." These amendments were intended to clarify that the proposed rate for each plant unit was to include all overhead costs associated with performance of the Contract with respect to that particular unit. On November 13, 2015, CECOS filed a Notice of Protest to Respondent's issuance of Addendum 4, requiring the vendors to submit new price proposals. Thereafter, on November 23, 2015, CECOS filed the First Petition challenging Respondent's decision, announced in Addendum 4, to require the responding vendors to submit new proposals for the price proposal portion of the RFP, and its decision to cancel the notice of intent to award the Contract to CECOS.11/ Once CECOS filed its Notice of Protest on November 13, 2015, Respondent ceased all procurement activity directed toward awarding the Contract. On December 17, 2015, Respondent posted notice that it was rejecting all proposals and that the Contract would be re- advertised through issuance of a new RFP. On December 22, 2015, CECOS filed a Notice of Protest, and on January 4, 2016, filed its Second Petition challenging Respondent's decision to reject all proposals and re-advertise the Contract. Bases for Respondent's Actions Shortly after Respondent posted the Proposal Tabulation noticing its intent to award the Contract to CECOS, Christine Perretta, owner and president of DB, sent an email to Respondent, then called Rubio to inquire about Respondent's decision to award the Contract to CECOS. The evidence shows that these contacts occurred sometime on or around November 3, 2016.12/ In her telephone discussion with Rubio, Perretta inquired about how to file a notice of protest13/ and also asked whether Respondent had reviewed the vendors' price proposals for correctness or accuracy, or had simply chosen the lowest price proposal. In the course of the discussion, Perretta informed Rubio that DB had submitted a "loaded" rate for each plant unit ——meaning that DB's rate proposed for each plant item in the "Rate" column on the Section 6 Bid Sheet consisted not only of the cost of the plant item, but also the cost for all associated overhead services listed in the instructions to Section 6 and in the RFP Advertisement, paragraph 18(v), plus compensation.14/ Rubio could not clearly recall whether, in the course of their discussion, Perretta had inquired about the use of the 2.5 multiplier, and there is conflicting evidence as to whether Perretta related her view that CECOS may not be able to perform the Contract based on the price proposal it had submitted. In any event, as a result of Rubio's discussion with Perretta, Rubio determined that she needed to review Exhibit C, Section 6. In the course of her investigation, Rubio called Wendy Cyriaks, owner and president of CECOS.15/ Cyriaks confirmed that CECOS had submitted an "unloaded" rate for each plant item—— meaning that it had included only the cost of each plant item in the "Rate" column on the Section 6 Bid Sheet, and had not included, in the proposed rate for each plant item, the cost of the associated overhead services listed in the instructions to Section 6 or RFP Advertisement, paragraph 18(v), or compensation. Cyriaks told Rubio that CECOS expected that its overhead costs and compensation for each item would be covered through use of the 2.5 multiplier. Also in the course of her investigation, Rubio asked Bogardus whether he had intended the 2.5 multiplier to be used to cover all costs, including vendor compensation, associated with obtaining, installing, and maintaining the plant items listed in Section 6. Bogardus initially confirmed that his intent in including the 2.5 multiplier on the Section 6 Bid Sheet was to cover all of the overhead costs and compensation. However, the persuasive evidence establishes that Bogardus subsequently agreed with Rubio that the 2.5 multiplier should not have been included in Section 6. Pursuant to her discussions with Perretta and Cyriaks, Rubio realized that the wide discrepancy between DB's and CECOS' price proposals was due to their differing interpretations of the instructions in Section 6 regarding plant item rates and the inclusion of the "2.5 Multiplier" column in the Section 6 Bid Sheet. Rubio testified, persuasively, that the inclusion of the "2.5 Multiplier" column rendered Exhibit C, Section 6, of the RFP ambiguous. To that point, the RFP does not contain any instructions or discussion on the use of the 2.5 multiplier. Therefore, to the extent the multiplier was intended to be used by the vendors to build overhead costs and compensation into their price proposals, the RFP fails to explain that extremely important intended use——leaving the significance and use of the multiplier open to speculation and subject to assumption by the vendors in preparing their price proposals. Rubio reasonably viewed DB's and CECOS' divergent interpretations of the instructions and the inconsistent use of the 2.5 multiplier as further indication that Section 6 was ambiguous. She explained that in order for Respondent to ensure that it is procuring the most advantageous proposal for the State, it is vitally important that the RFP be clear so that responding vendors clearly understand the type of information the RFP is requesting, and where and how to provide that information in their price proposals. Rubio persuasively testified that in her view, the instructions in Section 6 had, in fact, called for a loaded rate, but that CECOS had erroneously assumed, based on the inclusion of the "2.5 Multiplier" column in the Section 6 Bid Sheet, that overhead and compensation for each plant item would be covered through use of the 2.5 multiplier, and that as a consequence, CECOS incorrectly proposed unloaded rates for the plant items. In Rubio's view, CECOS' error was due to the ambiguity created by the unexplained and unsupported inclusion of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6. Rubio testified that CECOS had been awarded the Contract because it had submitted the lowest price proposal, but that its proposal was based on an unloaded rate for the plant items, contrary to the instructions for Section 6. In Rubio's view, CECOS' price proposal was unresponsive, and CECOS should not have been awarded the Contract. Rubio also testified, credibly and persuasively, that the use of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6 for compensation purposes rendered the RFP arbitrary. Respondent's District IV historically has not used a 2.5 multiplier for compensation purposes for commodities contracts, and no data or analyses exist to support such use of a 2.5 multiplier.16/ This rendered the RFP both arbitrary and unverifiable with respect to whether it was structured to obtain the most advantageous proposal for the State. To this point, Rubio credibly explained that Respondent's existing environmental mitigation services contract with Stantec was procured through the "Invitation to Negotiate" ("ITN") process. In that procurement, Respondent negotiated to obtain the best value for the State. The ITN bid sheet contained a 2.5 multiplier that was used only for weighting purposes to evaluate and determine which firms would be "short- listed" for purposes of being invited to negotiate with Respondent for award of the contract. Importantly——and in contrast to the RFP at issue in this case——the multiplier in the ITN was not used to determine the final prices, including compensation, to install trees, shrubs, and ground cover under that contract. Rubio also testified, credibly, that the Bid Sheet was structurally flawed because it did not allow the vendor to clearly indicate the "unit price" inclusive of all overhead costs, and that this defect would result in Respondent being unable to issue letters of authorization to pay invoices for the cost of installing the plant items or compensating for work performed. For these reasons, Respondent determined that it needed to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS. As noted above, Respondent posted the cancellation of the intent to award the Contract on November 5, 2015. At a meeting of the SC conducted on November 9, 2015, Respondent's procurement staff explained that the intent to award the Contract had been cancelled due to ambiguity in the instructions and the Bid Sheet for Exhibit C, Section 6. Ultimately, the SC concurred with Respondent's cancellation of the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and agreed that the vendors should be required to submit new price proposals. Thereafter, on November 9, 2015, Respondent issued Addendum 4, announcing its decision to solicit new price proposals from the responding vendors. Respondent conducted a pre-bid meeting with the vendors on November 12, 2015, and immediately thereafter, issued Addendum 5, consisting of a revised Scope of Services and a substantially revised Bid Sheet for all six sections of Exhibit C. As previously discussed, the Section 6 Bid Sheet issued in Addendum 5 was revised to, among other things, delete the "2.5 Multiplier" column and the column previously titled "Rate" was changed to "Rate Per Unit." Also as discussed above, the instructions to Section 6 were revised to clarify that the "Rate Per Unit" provided for each plant unit must contain all costs associated with the purchase, installation, watering, fertilization, project management, field supervision, invoicing, labor, maintenance of traffic, and other costs specified in the instructions——i.e, constitute a loaded rate. All of these changes were made in an effort to clarify, for the benefit of all vendors, the specific information that Respondent needed to be provided in the price proposals. Rubio testified, credibly, that in requiring the vendors to submit new price proposals pursuant to revised Exhibit C, Respondent did not give, or intend to give, any vendor a competitive advantage over any of the other vendors, nor did Respondent place, or intend to place, CECOS at a competitive disadvantage by requiring the vendors to submit new price proposals pursuant to revised Exhibit C. As noted above, once CECOS filed its Notice of Protest, Respondent ceased all procurement activity directed toward awarding the Contract. Consequently, the vendors did not submit new price proposals and the scheduled meetings at which the new price proposals would be opened and the intended awardee announced were cancelled. On December 17, 2015, Rubio briefed the SC regarding the problems with the RFP and described her concerns about proceeding with the procurement. She explained that Respondent's procurement staff was of the view that the instructions in Section 6, as previously published in Addendum 1, were ambiguous because they did not clearly provide direction on how to complete the Bid Sheet for that section. Additionally, the Section 6 Bid Sheet, as structured in Addendum 1, did not allow the vendors to provide a plant unit rate that was inclusive of all overhead costs. To this point, she noted that unless the vendors provided a loaded rate——i.e., one that included all overhead costs——Respondent would not be able to issue work orders for any plant items in Section 6.17/ She explained that these flaws constituted the bases for Respondent's decision, announced on November 9, 2015, to require the submittal of new price proposals. Rubio further explained that in Respondent's rush to issue a revised Scope of Services as part of Addendum 5, mistakes had been made18/ and Respondent's Environmental Office needed more time to carefully review the Scope of Services and Bid Sheet, to ensure the RFP was correctly drafted and structured so that the Contract could be accurately solicited and procured. Additionally, the vendors——including Mark Clark of CECOS——had expressed confusion regarding the revised Bid Sheet and submitting new price proposals, and some vendors had inquired about submitting new technical proposals. Further, under the revised procurement schedule issued as part of Addendum 4 on November 9, 2015, the vendors had a very compressed timeframe in which to prepare and submit their new price proposals, heightening the potential for mistakes to be made. Because of these substantial problems and concerns with the RFP, Rubio recommended that Addendum 5 be rescinded, that all vendor proposals (both technical and price) be rejected, and that the entire procurement process be re-started. The SC concurred with her recommendation. As noted above, on December 17, 2015, Respondent rejected all proposals and announced that the Contract would be re-solicited in the future through issuance of another RFP. CECOS' Position CECOS takes the position that the RFP and the Section 6 Bid Sheet published in Addendum 1 were not ambiguous. Specifically, CECOS contends that the use of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6 clearly indicated that Respondent was seeking an unloaded rate for the plant items listed on the Section 6 Bid Sheet. In support of this position, CECOS notes that all of the vendors other than DB had submitted unloaded rates for the plant items in Section 6. CECOS contends that this shows that Section 6 was not ambiguous, and that DB simply did not follow the RFP instructions——of which it was fully aware——in preparing and submitting its price proposal.19/ CECOS also contends that Rubio's failure to contact the other vendors to determine if they found the instructions or use of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6 ambiguous evidences that Rubio's conclusion that Section 6 was ambiguous lacked any factual basis, so was itself arbitrary. CECOS asserts that Bogardus' intent to use a 2.5 multiplier for compensation purposes was evidenced by its inclusion on the Section 6 Bid Sheet, that its use on the Section 6 Bid Sheet did not render the RFP flawed, and that Bogardus' intent to compensate using the multiplier should control the structure of compensation paid under Section 6.20/ CECOS also notes that the use of the 2.5 multiplier on the Section 6 Bid Sheet mirrors the 2.5 multiplier in the existing environmental mitigation support services contract with the current contractor.21/ CECOs further contends that there was no material difference, with respect to structuring compensation for the plant items, between the ITN process used for procuring the existing contract and the RFP process used to procure this Contract. As additional support for its argument that the use of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6 was valid, CECOS points to a request for proposal for environmental mitigation services issued by Respondent's District VI. In that contract, a 2.5 multiplier was used for compensation purposes, albeit for specific plant items that were not contained in the original list of specific plant items for which rate proposals had been solicited in the request for proposal. CECOS further contends that Respondent——and, most particularly, Rubio——did not conduct a thorough investigation into the historic use of 2.5 multipliers in Respondent's commodities contracts. CECOS argues that as a consequence, Respondent's determination that the use of the 2.5 multiplier rendered the Section 6 Bid Sheet structurally flawed and arbitrary was unsupported by facts, so was itself arbitrary and capricious. CECOS asserts that cancelling the notice of intent to award the Contract to CECOS and requiring the vendors to submit new price proposals placed CECOS at a competitive disadvantage and was contrary to competition because once the Proposal Tabulation was posted, the other vendors were informed of the price that CECOS had bid, so knew the price they had to beat when the Contract was re-solicited. CECOS also points to what it contends are procedural irregularities with respect to Respondent's treatment of, and communication with, CECOS and DB once Respondent decided to cancel the notice of intent to award the Contract to CECOS. Specifically, CECOS contends that Respondent did not respond to its calls or email asking why the intent to award the Contract to CECOS had been cancelled. CECOS also contends that Respondent communicated with DB on substantive matters during the "cone of silence." CECOS further notes that Respondent did not convene a resolution meeting within the statutorily- established seven-day period after CECOS filed its First Petition, but instead held the meeting over 60 days later, on January 28, 2015, and that even then, Respondent did not engage in good faith negotiation to resolve the challenge. Finally, CECOS contends that Respondent's decision to reject all proposals and start the procurement process anew was predicated on a series of arbitrary and erroneous decisions (discussed above) that created confusion, so that Respondent's ultimate decision to reject all proposals was itself arbitrary and capricious. CECOS asserts that it followed the instructions in the RFP in preparing its price proposal, submitted the lowest price proposal, and is ready, willing, and able to perform the Contract at the rates it proposed in its response for Section 6. On that basis, CECOS contends that it is entitled to the award of the Contract. Findings of Ultimate Fact CECOS bears the burden in this proceeding to prove that Respondent's decision to reject all proposals was arbitrary, illegal, dishonest, or fraudulent.22/ Even if CECOS were to meet this burden, in order to prevail it also must demonstrate that Respondent's actions in cancelling the intent to award the Contract and requiring the submittal of new price proposals were clearly erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to competition. For the reasons discussed herein, it is determined that CECOS did not meet either of these burdens. The Multiplier Rendered Section 6 Ambiguous, Arbitrary, and Structurally Flawed As discussed in detail above, Respondent decided to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and to require the submittal of new price proposals by the vendors only after it had conducted an extensive investigation that included a careful review of numerous provisions in the RFP and the instructions to Section 6 and had analyzed the structure of Section 6 in relation to other provisions in the RFP. That investigation showed that nowhere in the RFP was the use of the 2.5 multiplier in Exhibit C, Section 6, discussed or explained. Thus, to the extent the multiplier was to be used in determining reimbursement for overhead costs and compensation, the RFP failed to explain this extremely important point, leaving the multiplier's purpose, use, and significance open to speculation and assumption by the vendors in submitting their price proposals. This rendered the multiplier's use in Section 6 ambiguous. This ambiguity is further evidenced by DB's and CECOS's widely divergent price proposals for Section 6, and the credible testimony of Perretta and Cyriaks regarding their differing views of the purpose of the 2.5 multiplier. The credible, persuasive evidence establishes that the ambiguity in Section 6 caused the vendors to have differing interpretations of the manner in which they were to propose plant unit rates in Section 6; that the vendors submitted plant price proposals predicated on differing assumptions; and that this resulted in Respondent being unable to fairly compare the price proposals for purposes of obtaining the most advantageous proposal for the State. On these bases, Respondent reasonably concluded23/ that the inclusion of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6, rendered that portion of the RFP ambiguous. As extensively discussed above, the credible, persuasive evidence also establishes that Respondent concluded, based on its investigation and review of Section 6, that inclusion of the 2.5 multiplier rendered Section 6 both arbitrary and structurally flawed.24/ The credible, persuasive evidence further establishes that Rubio investigated Respondent's use of multipliers in commodities procurements and contracts to the extent necessary and appropriate for her to reasonably conclude that the use of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6 rendered this portion of the RFP ambiguous, arbitrary, and structurally flawed.25/ In sum, the credible, persuasive evidence establishes that Respondent engaged in a thorough and thoughtful investigation before concluding, reasonably, that the inclusion of the 2.5 multiplier in Exhibit C, Section 6 rendered that portion of the RFP ambiguous. Respondent's Actions Were Not Contrary to Competition Although the evidence shows that CECOS may suffer some competitive disadvantage because competing vendors were informed of the lowest "bottom line" price they would have to beat, it does not support a determination that Respondent's decisions to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and require the vendors to submit new price proposals were contrary to competition. To that point, in Addendum 5, Respondent substantially restructured the Section 6 Bid Sheet and also amended the Bid Sheet comprising the other price proposal sections in Exhibit C, so that CECOS' and the other vendors' price proposals submitted in response to Addendum 5 may have substantially changed from those submitted in response to Addendum 1. In any event, it cannot be concluded that Respondent's decisions to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and require submittal of new price proposals are contrary to competition such that they should be overturned in this proceeding. Procedural Irregularities CECOS also points to certain procedural irregularities in Respondent's treatment of, and communication with, CECOS once Respondent decided to cancel the notice of intent to award the Contract to CECOS and require submittal of new price proposals. CECOS apparently raises these issues in an effort to show that Respondent's actions were clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. The undisputed evidence establishes that Rubio communicated with both DB and CECOS during the "cone of silence" following the posting of its intent to award the Contract to CECOS. The undersigned determines that the "cone of silence" applied to Rubio and her communications with DB and CECOS within the 72-hour period following Respondent's posting of the intent to award the Contract. Specifically, she is an employee of Respondent's District IV Office, so is an employee of the executive branch of the State of Florida. Further, the evidence shows that her communications with both DB and CECOS during the "cone of silence" period dealt specifically with substantive, rather than "administrative" issues regarding the RFP and the vendors' price proposals. Accordingly, it is determined that these communications did, in fact, violate the "cone of silence." However, this does not require that Respondent's decision to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS be overturned. The credible, persuasive evidence shows that while DB's conversation with Rubio may have spurred Rubio to decide she should investigate the Section 6 instructions and use of the 2.5 multiplier, it was not the reason why Respondent ultimately determined that the intent to award the Contract should be cancelled. Rather, Respondent's discovery of the ambiguity and structural flaws in Section 6, through Rubio's investigation, was the reason that Respondent determined that the intent to award the Contract to CECOS should be cancelled. In sum, the credible, persuasive evidence shows that notwithstanding Rubio's communications on substantive matters during the "cone of silence" with both DB and CECOS, the integrity of the procurement process was not undermined such that Respondent's decision to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. CECOS failed to present persuasive evidence establishing that other procedural irregularities rendered Respondent's actions in cancelling the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and requiring the vendors to submit new price proposals were clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. Respondent's Decisions to Cancel Intent to Award the Contract and Require Submittal of New Price Proposals Based on the foregoing, it is determined that CECOS did not meet its burden to show that Respondent's decisions in cancelling the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and requiring the vendors to submit new price proposals were clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. Respondent's Decision to Reject All Proposals As noted above, CECOS contends that Respondent's decision to reject all proposals and start the procurement process anew was predicated on a series of arbitrary and erroneous decisions that created confusion, so that Respondent's ultimate decision to reject all proposals was itself arbitrary and capricious. However, the credible, persuasive evidence shows that Respondent's ultimate decision to reject all bids was factually supported and was reasonable. As discussed above, Respondent initially decided to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and to require the vendors to submit new price proposals after it discovered the ambiguity and structural flaws resulting from the use of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6. At that point, rather than rejecting all proposals, which would require the vendors to go to the time and expense of preparing completely new proposals, it decided to instead only require the vendors to submit new price proposals. Due to the interrelated nature of the six sections of Exhibit C comprising the complete price proposal for the RFP, Respondent determined revision of Section 6 would also require revision of the other five sections of Exhibit C, in order to ensure that they were internally consistent with each other. At the mandatory pre-bid meeting preceding the issuance of Addendum 5, the participating vendors had numerous questions about the sweeping revisions to all six sections of Exhibit C, and they expressed confusion about the revisions and their effect on preparation of new price proposals. Some vendors also expressed concern that they may have to change their personnel in order to be able to accurately prepare new price proposals, raising the question whether the technical proposals needed to be revised. As a result of vendor confusion and concern, and also because Respondent's Environmental Office needed additional time to carefully review and revise the RFP as needed, Respondent decided to reject all proposals and to start the procurement process anew. Respondent's decision to reject all bids was made after fully considering all of the pertinent information regarding the ambiguity and structural flaws in Section 6, vendor confusion and concern caused by Respondent's revisions to Exhibit C needed to address the ambiguity and flaws in Section 6, and Respondent's need for additional time to ensure that its RFP accurately and clearly solicited the needed environmental mitigation support services. Accordingly, Respondent did not act arbitrarily in deciding to reject all bids. Further, no persuasive evidence was presented to show that Respondent's decision to reject all bids was illegal, dishonest, or fraudulent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation: Issue a final order in Case No. 16-0769 finding that the rejection of all proposals in response to Request for Proposal RFP-DOT-15/16-4004PM was not illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent; and Issue a final order in Case No. 16-3530 finding that the decisions to cancel the award of the Contract for Request for Proposal RFP-DOT-15/16-4004PM to CECOS and to require the vendors to submit new price proposals for Request for Proposal RFP-DOT-15/16-4004PM were not clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 2016.
Findings Of Fact On May 19, 1983, Respondent mailed official Invitations to Bid (IFB) forms to 18 different firms, including Petitioner, soliciting bids for Class VI printing in accordance with the specifications and conditions attached to the letter, signed by R. E. Read, Jr. This letter contained the comment, "As the best interests of the State may require, the right is reserved to reject any and all bids and to waive any irregularities in bids received." This letter also advised prospective bidders who had questions regarding the IFB to call Larry Amison, the individual who had drafted the accompanying specifications. The notice of IFB, published in the Tallahassee Democrat on Thursday, May 19, 1983, also contained a notice of reservation of the right to reject all bids. Only five IFB forms were returned. Three of the five were returned without bids for various reasons, such as "Not Competitive," "Unable to meet specified delivery date" and "Cannot schedule job of this proportion at this time." This type of explanation, in government procurement circles, need not be taken at face value, but is often used to signal the recipient's thanks for the invitation to bid and a desire to be invited to bid again at some time in the future. The other two forms received were bids: one from Zenith Communications Group, and one from Petitioner. This procurement was somewhat unusual in that the IFB stipulated the amount of money the agency had to spend and requested a hid as to the most product it could get for that money. There were two publications involved: "A" and "B." An alternative was given on delivery date options: one within 30 working days of receipt of approved proofs, and one within 45. Zenith offered to provide 7,180 copies of Book "A" and 7,155 copies of Book "B" (14,335 total books) for a total price of $53,400 1/ within 30 working days. Petitioner offered to provide 9,473 copies of Book "A" and 4,950 copies of Book "B" (15,423 total books) for a total price of $53,344.64 within 45 days. The bids were opened on June 1, 1983, and published from June 1 through June 10, 1983. They were brought to the Director for consideration upon opening. It is his responsibility to evaluate the bids and make a recommendation to the Commissioner of Agriculture on the successful low bidder. Since there was only one bid on each delivery date, the Director felt there were not two comparative bids. As a result, he forwarded the bid package to Ms. Grace Harrison, a purchasing agent with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and an individual very familiar with the procurement of printing services. After a review of the entire bid package, Ms. Harrison's studied opinion was that there were two valid bids and Douglas was the low bidder, and it is so found. Ms. Harrison also felt it was unusual not to receive any more responses than were received on a procurement of this magnitude. This same opinion is held by Mr. Amison, who drafted the specifications. Others have differing opinions, however. Whether it was unusual or not, however, is immaterial. There were two valid bids, and only two are required for an award. However, even in the case of two bids, the agency reserved the right to reject any and all bids. As a result, on or about June 6, 1983, the Director decided, based on his understanding of state policy on the matter and in light of the size of the procurement, to seek more bids through rebidding. In this case, the Director felt more bids were available because of the responses of the nonbidders which referred to the response times being so short. Therefore, he directed a rebid, and this information was communicated to all bidders, including Petitioner. On June 7, 1983, Petitioner wrote to the Director, disagreeing with his decision and notifying him of its protest. On the following day, the Director notified Petitioner the rebidding was being delayed, giving Petitioner 10 days to file a formal notice of protest. This was done in a timely manner. The phrase regarding the agency's right to reject bids is contained in every State IFB. Its purpose is to permit state agencies to reject bids where it becomes apparent there is a valid and legitimate benefit to be gained by the agency in doing so. One such situation is when, in the bona fide opinion of the agency, there are insufficient bids. While there is a difference of opinion as to whether only two bids are unusual in a procurement of this nature, there is no dispute that it would have been beneficial to the agency to have received more than two, since more bids would increase competition. To rebid the contract at this juncture would undoubtedly increase competition to the potential benefit of the Respondent. However, Petitioner claims it would also work to its detriment because other potential bidders would have access to the details of the two present bids and would thereby gain an advantage. This may be the result of rebidding.
Recommendation In light of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner, Douglas Printing Company, Inc., be awarded Contract DOF- ADM-79. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of September, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 1983.
