The Issue Whether the Respondent is guilty on six counts of charging an advance fee for the listing of time-share estates for sale, in violation of Section 721.20(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a corporation organized under the laws of Arkansas and was authorized by the Florida Secretary of State to transact business in the State of Florida from November 1991 through December 1997. Respondent's main office is now located in Mountain Home, Arkansas. Respondent's credit card terminals are in Arkansas. Respondent has an escrow and operating account in Mountain Home, Arkansas. Respondent hired Jack McClure to open and operate its Florida office. Jack McClure held a Florida real estate broker's license. National Resort Mart conducted business from its Florida office in Kissimmee, Florida, until McClure's death in December 1997. Respondent opened and maintained escrow and operating accounts in Florida from 1992 through 1997 for its Florida business. The Florida office was limited to the activities of time-share real estate sales. The Respondent did not list time- shares, nor collect any advance fees for listing time-shares at its Kissimmee, Florida, branch office. Global Title Company of Naples, Florida, conducts the closings for Respondent for the majority of their Florida time- share sales. Respondent advertised its Florida office in its direct mail brochure, sent to Florida time-share owners, with the statement: "Our Orlando office is situated only seven miles from Disney World." Ms. Valnecia Williams of Madison, Florida, owns a time- share unit at Cypress Point Resorts in Central Florida. Williams received a mailed "brochure" from Respondent's home office which advised her that Respondent was in the business of buying and selling time-shares. Based on the Respondent's direct mail flyer, Williams called the Kissimmee, Florida, telephone number to find out information related to her listing. Apparently, the call was automatically switched to the home office. She received some initial information. Several weeks later she called the Respondent's Arkansas office and talked to a different salesperson. Williams agreed to list her time-share, Cypress Pointe Resort, Unit 5206, Week 37, with Respondent on March 5, 1997, at an asking price of $12,9000 in an open listing for a period of a year. Consideration was in the form of a seven percent of gross sale of the unit, or a $750 minimum commission, to be paid to Respondent at the closing of the sale. Respondent charged an advance fee of $439 from Ms. Williams of Madison, Florida, at the time she listed her Florida time-share period at Cypress Point Resort for sale with Respondent. Williams authorized Scott Fisher, Respondent's salesperson in Arkansas to charge the refundable advertising and marketing fee of $439 to Williams' USAA Federal Savings Bank charge card. Williams was not pleased with the service provided by Respondent and, on or about July 28, 1997, demanded a refund from the Respondent. Sometime within the next two months Respondent complied with the request and refunded the fee by crediting Williams' charge card with the same amount. Kim Collins of Faith, North Carolina, owns a time-share unit at Westgate Lakes, Orlando, Florida. Collins received brochures from Respondent's home office seeking a listing for her time-share unit in Florida, approximately one year later. Collins called Respondent at an "800" number which was automatically forwarded to Respondent's main office in Arkansas. Eventually, Collins decided to use Respondent's services and borrowed the money from her mother to pay the advance fee and sign the listing contract. Respondent collected an advance fee from Mr. and Mrs. Richard Collins of Faith, North Carolina, of $439 at the time they listed their Florida time-share period at Westgate Lakes, Orlando, for sale with Respondent, by mail and check to the Respondent's main office in Arkansas. Collins' time-share has been listed for sale with Respondent since July 1, 1996. Dan Coffey of Jacksonville, Florida, owns a time-share unit at Orange Lake in Central Florida. Coffey received a brochure from Respondent's home office and called for more information. Coffey agreed to list his unit for sale with Respondent on October 14, 1996, at a negotiable price of $12,900. Respondent collected an advance fee from Mr. and Mrs. Daniel Coffey of Jacksonville, Florida, of $439 at the time they listed their Florida time-share period of Orange Lake Resort, Orlando, Florida, for sale with Respondent. In like manner, Respondent collected an advance fee from Mr. and Mrs. Rick Rogers of Maumee, Ohio, at the time they listed their Florida time-share period with Respondent. Respondent also collected an advance fee from Mr. and Mrs. Donald Gordon of Pensacola, Florida, at the time they listed their Florida time-share period with Respondent. Respondent collected an advance fee from Mr. and Mrs. William Budai of Duquesne, Pennsylvania, of $539 at the time they listed their Florida time-share period at Westgate Villas, Kissimmee, Florida, for sale with Respondent. The contract signed by each complainant was titled "Listing Agreement." The Listing Agreement between the time- share owner of the Florida unit and Respondent was for the listing of their time-share for sale for a percent of gross sale of the unit to be paid at the closing, with an advance fee payable immediately. All transactions between the owners and Respondent were made through the Respondent's home office in Arkansas. No advance fee was collected within the boundaries of the State of Florida. Complainants Collins and Coffey did not receive refunds of the advance fees they paid to Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, enter a final order that: Finds Respondent guilty of six violations of Section 721.20(4), Florida Statutes. Respondent pay a penalty of $10,000 per violation for each of the six violations, to be paid within thirty (30) days of the entry of the final order. That Respondent refund $439 each to Kim Collins and Daniel Coffey, to be paid within thirty (30) days of the entry of the final order. That Respondent cease and desist from collecting advance fees for the listing of time-share periods for Florida residents and/or Florida time-share units. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary Denise O'Brien, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 James H. Gillis, Esquire James H. Gillis Associates, P.A. 8424 Pamlico Street Tallahassee, Florida 32817-1514 William Woodyard, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Philip Nowick, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condos, and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether the Petitions filed by Ambar Trail, Ltd.; Sierra Meadows Apartments, Ltd.; and Quail Roost Transit Village IV, Ltd., should be dismissed for lack of standing.
Findings Of Fact Florida Housing is a public corporation created under Florida law to administer the governmental function of financing or refinancing affordable housing and related facilities in Florida. Florida Housing administers a competitive solicitation process to implement the provisions of the housing credit program, under which developers apply and compete for funding for projects in response to RFAs developed by Florida Housing. The RFA in this case was specifically targeted to provide affordable housing in Miami-Dade County, Florida. The RFA introduction provides: 2 As this Recommended Order of Dismissal is based upon a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the three Petitions filed by the Petitioners in this consolidate case are accepted as true, and the Findings of Fact are derived from the four corners of those Petitions, see Madison Highlands. LLC v. Florida Housing Finance Corp., 220 So. 3d 467, 473 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017), and facts that are not otherwise in dispute. This Request for Applications (RFA) is open to Applicants proposing the development of affordable, multifamily housing located in Miami- Dade County. Under this RFA, Florida Housing Finance Corporation (the Corporation) expects to have up to an estimated $7,195,917 of Housing Credits available for award to proposed Developments located in Miami-Dade County. After Florida Housing announced its preliminary funding award decisions for RFA 2019-112 for Housing Credit Financing for Affordable Housing Developments Located in Miami-Dade County, each of the Petitioners filed Petitions challenging the decisions. Petitioners do not allege that Florida Housing improperly scored or evaluated the applications selected for funding, nor do they contend that Petitioners' applications should be funded. Instead, Petitioners allege that the evaluation was fundamentally unfair and seeks to have the entire RFA rescinded based on alleged improprieties of one responding entity and its affiliates. Petitioners claim that the evaluation process was fundamentally unfair is based entirely on allegations that several entities associated with Housing Trust Group, LLC (HTG), combined to submit 15 Priority I applications in contravention of the limitation in the RFA on the number of Priority I applications that could be submitted. Even assuming Petitioners' assertions are correct, there is no scenario in which Petitioners can reach the funding range for this RFA. In order to break ties for those applicants that achieve the maximum number of points and meet the mandatory eligibility requirements, the RFA sets forth a series of tie-breakers to determine which applications will be awarded funding. The instant RFA included specific goals to fund certain types of developments and sets forth sorting order tie-breakers to distinguish between applicants. The relevant RFA provisions are as follows: Goals The Corporation has a goal to fund one (1) proposed Development that (a) selected the Demographic Commitment of Family at questions 2.a. of Exhibit A and (b) qualifies for the Geographic Areas of Opportunity/SADDA Goal as outlined in Section Four A. 11. a. The Corporation has a goal to fund one (1) proposed Development that selected the Demographic Commitment of Elderly (Non-ALF) at question 2.a. of Exhibit A. *Note: During the Funding Selection Process outlined below, Developments selected for these goals will only count toward one goal. Applicant Sorting Order All eligible Priority I Applications will be ranked by sorting the Applications as follows, followed by Priority II Applications. First, from highest score to lowest score; Next, by the Application's eligibility for the Proximity Funding Preference (which is outlined in Section Four A.5.e. of the RFA) with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications that do not qualify for the preference; Next, by the Application's eligibility for the Per Unit Construction Funding Preference which is outlined in Section Four A.lO.e. of the RFA (with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications that do not qualify for the preference); Next, by the Application's eligibility for the Development Category Funding Preference which is outlined in Section Four A.4.(b)(4) of the RFA (with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications that do not qualify for the preference); Next, by the Applicant's Leveraging Classification, applying the multipliers outlined in Item 3 of Exhibit C of the RFA (with Applications having the Classification of A listed above Applications having the Classification of B); Next, by the Applicant's eligibility for the Florida Job Creation Funding Preference which is outlined in Item 4 of Exhibit C of the RFA (with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications that do not qualify for the preference); and And finally, by lotterv number, resulting in the lowest lottery number receiving preference. This RFA was similar to previous RFAs issued by Florida Housing, but included some new provisions limiting the number of Priority I applications that could be submitted. Specifically, the RFA provided: Priority Designation of Applications Applicants may submit no more than three (3) Priority I Applications. There is no limit to the number of Priority II Applications that can be submitted; however, no Principal can be a Principal, as defined in Rule Chapter 67- 48.002(94), F.A.C., of more than three ( 3) Priority 1 Applications. For purposes of scoring, Florida Housing will rely on the Principals of the Applicant and Developer(s) Disclosure Form (Rev. 05-2019) outlined below in order to determine if a Principal is a Principal on more than three (3) Priority 1 Applications. If during scoring it is determined that a Principal is disclosed as a Principal on more than three (3) Priority I Applications, all such Priority I Applications will be deemed Priority II. If it is later determined that a Principal, as defined in Rule Chapter 67-48.002(94), F.A.C., was not disclosed as a Principal and the undisclosed Principal causes the maximum set forth above to be exceeded, the award(s) for the affected Application(s) will be rescinded and all Principals of the affected Applications may be subject to material misrepresentation, even if Applications were not selected for funding, were deemed ineligible, or were withdrawn. The Petitioners all timely submitted applications in response to the RFA. Lottery numbers were assigned by Florida Housing, at random, to all applications shortly after the applications were received and before any scoring began. Lottery numbers were assigned to the applications without regard to whether the application was a Priority I or Priority II. The RFA did not limit the number of Priority II Applications that could be submitted. Review of the applications to determine if a principal was a principal on more than three Priority 1 Applications occurred during the scoring process, well after lottery numbers were assigned. The leveraging line, which would have divided the Priority I Applications into Group A and Group B, was established after the eligibility determinations were made. All applications were included in Group A. There were no Group B applications. Thus, all applications were treated equally with respect to this preference. The applications were ultimately ranked according to lottery number and funding goal. . If Florida Housing had determined that an entity or entities submitted more than three Priority I Applications with related principals, the relief set forth in the RFA was to move those applications to Priority II. Florida Housing did not affirmatively conclude that any of the 15 challenged applications included undisclosed principals so as to cause a violation of the maximum number of Priority I Applications that could be submitted. All of the applications that were deemed eligible for funding, including the Priority II Applications, scored equally, and met all of the funding preferences. After the applications were evaluated by the Review Committee appointed by Florida Housing, the scores were finalized and preliminary award recommendations were presented and approved by Florida Housing's Board. Consistent with the procedures set forth in the RFA, Florida Housing staff reviewed the Principal Disclosure Forms to determine the number of Priority I Applications that had been filed by each applicant. This review did not result in a determination that any applicant had exceeded the allowable number of Priority I Applications that included the same principal. One of the HTG Applications (Orchid Pointe, App. No. 2020-148C) was initially selected to satisfy the Elderly Development goal. Subsequently, three applications, including Slate Miami, that had initially been deemed ineligible due to financial arrearages were later determined to be in full compliance and, thus, eligible as of the close of business on January 8, 2020. The Review Committee reconvened on January 21, 2020, to reinstate those three applications. Slate Miami was then recommended for funding. The Review Committee ultimately recommended to the Board the following applications for funding: Harbour Springs (App. No. 2020-101C), which met the Geographic Areas of Opportunity/SADDA Goal; Slate Miami (App. No. 2020-122C), which met the Elderly (non-ALF) Goal; and Naranja Lakes (App. No. 2020-117C), which was the next highest-ranked eligible Priority I Application. The Board approved the Committee's recommendations at its meeting on January 23, 2020, and approved the preliminary selection of Harbour Springs, Slate Miami, and Naranja Lakes for funding. The applications selected for funding held Lottery numbers 1 (Harbour Springs), 2 (Naranja Lakes), and 4 (Slate Miami). Petitioners' lottery numbers were 16 (Quail Roost), 59 (Sierra Meadows) and 24 (Ambar Trail). The three applications selected for funding have no affiliation or association with HTG, or any of the entities that may have filed applications in contravention of the limitation in the RFA for Priority I applications. The applications alleged in the Petitions as being affiliated with HTG received a wide range of lottery numbers in the random selection, including numbers: 3, 6, 14, 19, 30, 38, 40, 42, 44, 45, 49, 52 through 54, and 58. If Petitioners prevailed in demonstrating an improper principal relationship between the HTG applications, the relief specified in the RFA (the specifications of which were not challenged) would have been the conversion of the offending HTG applications to Priority II applications. The relief would not have been the removal of those applications from the pool of applications, nor would it have affected the assignment of lottery numbers to any of the applicants, including HTG. The Petitions do not allege any error in scoring or ineligibility with respect to the three applications preliminarily approved for funding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Petitioners lack standing and dismissing the Petitions with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Maureen McCarthy Daughton, Esquire Maureen McCarthy Daughton, LLC Suite 3-231 1400 Village Square Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32312 (eServed) Michael P. Donaldson, Esquire Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 500 Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0190 (eServed) Donna Elizabeth Blanton, Esquire Brittany Adams Long, Esquire Radey Law Firm, P.A. Suite 200 301 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Hugh R. Brown, General Counsel Betty Zachem, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed) M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire Oertel, Fernandez, Bryant & Atkinson, P.A. Post Office Box 1110 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1110 (eServed) J. Stephen Menton, Esquire Tana D. Storey, Esquire Rutledge Ecenia, P.A. 119 South Monroe Street, Suite 202 Post Office Box 551 (32302) Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Corporation Clerk Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed)
The Issue The issue for disposition is whether Respondent violated Article II, Section 8(e), Florida Constitution, by personally representing his private employer for compensation before the Orlando-Orange County Expressway Authority while serving as a State Senator. After admissions and stipulation of the parties, the single issue of law and fact is whether the Orlando-Orange County Expressway Authority is a "state agency" for purposes of Article II, Section 8(e), Florida Constitution.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, George Stuart, served as State Senator from District 14, the Orlando area, from 1978 until November 1990. On September 22, 1986, Respondent was hired by the brokerage firm, Drexel Burnham Lambert, to serve in the company's municipal bond finance division. He served as vice president of the division until December 29, 1989. Respondent was compensated for his services, which services included calling on clients to explain how Drexel Burnham could assist in their bond issues and to urge the issuer to select Drexel Burnham as an underwriter. The Orlando-Orange County Expressway Authority (OOCEA, or Authority) was created in 1983 by section 348.753, F.S. It has five members, three of whom are appointed by the Governor; the fourth member is chair of the Orange County Board of County Commissioners, and the fifth member is the district secretary for the Department of Transportation for the district which includes Orange County. OOCEA is limited in its operation to Orange County. Its budget has no legislative oversight and it is not operated with state funds appropriated to meet its budget. Tolls collected by the Authority are used for construction, financing and operation of its expressway system. Once built, the roads are operated and maintained by the Department of Transportation. OOCEA members are required to file financial disclosure statements. OOCEA participates in the Florida Retirement System. Bonds issued by the OOCEA are tax exempt. The Authority's General Counsel, J. Fennimore Cooper, advised that the Florida Constitution requires legislative approval for revenue bond issues; and in 1986, he sent a letter to Respondent seeking assistance in obtaining the necessary appropriations proviso language to approve various projects of the Authority. In 1988 when OOCEA decided to issue bonds to finance its Central Connector Project, legislative approval was again required and the necessary language was provided by its General Counsel to its registered lobbyist, Bobby Hartnett. The OOCEA received the legislative approval for the project during the Special Session on June 8, 1988. Chapter 88-557, Laws of Florida, containing appropriations act proviso language, includes this section: Section 59. The Orlando-Orange County Ex- pressway Authority is hereby authorized to construct the Central Connector and the Southern Connector of the Expressway System as part of the authority's 20-year capital projects plan. These extensions shall each be financed with revenue bonds issued by the Division of Bond Finance of the Department of General Services on behalf of the author- ity pursuant to s. 11, Art. VII of the State Constitution and the State Bond Act, ss. 2156.57-215.83, Florida Statutes. Respondent met with the chairman of the OOCEA to express Drexel Burnham's interest in serving as a co-managing underwriter for the issue and to ask for a request for proposal to which Drexel Burnham could respond. Respondent made a similar visit to the executive director of the Authority. A September 23, 1988 contact by Respondent was specifically regarding the Central Connector bond issue. On August 12, 1988, Respondent, as vice president of the Municipal Bond Finance Division and Ander Crenshaw, as first vice president, submitted Drexel Burnham's "Proposal to Serve as Co-Managing Underwriter for the Central Connector Project" to the Authority. Respondent received compensation for all representations he made for Drexel Burnham, including this one. The Authority received twenty-two proposals and ultimately selected nine co-managers, one of which was Drexel Burnham. Drexel Burnham co-managed a small percent of the issue and received $59,940 total compensation. The total amount of the bond issue was $140,600,000.00. The Department of General Services, Division of Bond Finance, served as agent for the OOCEA's 1988 bond issue. In his contacts with OOCEA, Respondent did not consider there was any ethical proscription. He avoided Cabinet-level bond issues and called on cities, hospital districts, or airport authorities. He considered OOCEA a similar local agency.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics issue its Final Order and Public Report finding that Respondent, George Stuart, violated Article II, Section 8(e), Florida Constitution, by representing Drexel Burnham Lambert before the Orlando-Orange County Expressway Authority for compensation while serving as State Senator. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of August, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of August, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Dexter Douglass, Esquire Post Office Box 1674 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1674 Bonnie Williams, Executive Director Ethics Commission Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006 Phil Claypool, General Counsel Ethics Commission Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, respondent Alan Kaye was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida and respondent KNAC of Miami Realty, Inc. was a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida. Respondent Alan Kaye was an officer of and qualifying broker for respondent KNAC of Miami Realty, Inc. Respondents secured a 90-day listing from Christina Trivino for the sale of her residence located at 271 N.W. 148th Street in North Miami, Florida. When that listing expired, respondents obtained an extension. On or about November 28, 1987, respondents solicited and obtained a sales contract for the purchase and sale of the Trivino property. In connection therewith, the purchasers, Marie C. Eduoard and Henry S. Roy, entrusted to the respondents a total earnest money deposit of $6,200.00, and the respondents placed the deposit in the escrow account of respondent KNAC of Miami Realty, Inc. In accordance with the provisions of the sales contract, the purchasers were to pay a total of $62,000 for the property, and assume the existing first mortgage in the principal amount of approximately $45,000. While the contract initially called for the closing to occur on or before February 15, 1988, Ms. Trivino was very anxious to close earlier due to some problems she was having with the Internal Revenue Service. Accordingly, the closing date was changed to occur on or before January 15, 1988. Among the terms of the sales contract was a provision that conditioned the sale upon the purchasers' assumption of the first mortgage in the principal amount of approximately $45,000. Paragraph 8 of the contract provided that If, after diligent effort on the part of the purchaser, the purchaser is unable to obtain said first mortgage, all monies deposited hereunder shall be refunded to purchaser and parties herewith agree to enter into a Release on Deposit Receipt; and this contract shall be declared null and void. At some point in time, it became known to the respondents and the seller Trivino that the bank which held the first mortgage on the subject property would not authorize an assumption of the mortgage by the purchasers without either a $3,000 paydown of the mortgage amount or the completion of qualifying papers by the purchasers. The testimony from Ms. Trivino and Mr. Kaye differ widely with regard to the dates upon which and the manner in which they became aware of this problem, as well as their communications with each other thereafter. Ms. Trivino testified that in early January, 1988, she became concerned about the status of the transaction and began making repeated calls to the respondents which calls were never returned. She admits talking with Todd Kaye, respondent's son, in the respondents' offices on January 5, 1988, whereupon the mortgage problem was discussed. At that time, needing "desperately" to sell the house, Ms. Trivino offered to hold a second mortgage for the purchasers in the amount of approximately $3,000.00. She states that she also spoke with the officials at the bank regarding the mortgage. In spite of numerous unreturned telephone calls, Ms. Trivino did not hear anything further from Mr. Kaye until his letter dated January 29, 1988. That letter informed Ms. Trivino of the mortgage situation and indicated that "there is some doubt whether or not the Buyer has this extra money." Mr. Kaye further informed Ms. Trivino that "for all practical purposes, since the closing has not taken place, due to no one (sic) fault, the contract is void." Ms. Trivino then had her employer, a licensed real estate broker, write a letter dated February 3, 1988, to Mr. Kaye requesting Mr. Kaye to retain the $6,200 deposit pending a determination of the matter. She asserts that she made numerous further attempts to contact Mr. Kaye regarding this matter, but he would not return her calls. According to Mr. Kaye, he delivered the sales contract to a title company in early December, 1987, with the requests that the title company do a title check, that the mortgage holder be contacted, and that a mortgage assumption package for the buyers be obtained. Mr. Kaye states that he was thereafter informed by the title company that the mortgage holder would not allow an assumption of the mortgage without a paydown of about $3,000. Mr. Kaye states that he communicated to the buyers the problem with the mortgage assumption and also communicated Ms. Trivino's offer to take a second mortgage for $3,000. According to Mr. Kaye, the buyers did not want a second mortgage and did not feel that they could qualify for an assumption of the first mortgage because they were unemployed at the time. Instead, they wanted a return of their $6,200 deposit. Mr. Kaye felt that the sales contract had become void because of the inability of the buyers to assume the first mortgage, as provided in Paragraph 8 of the sales contract. Accordingly, he returned the $6,200 deposit to the buyers on January 10, 1988. He did not request Ms. Trivino's consent nor did he notify Ms. Trivino that he had refunded the deposit to the buyers because he felt that Ms. Trivino was fully aware that "the deal was dead."
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed against the respondents be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 15th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4062 The parties' proposed findings of fact have been fully considered and are accepted and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, with the following exceptions: Petitioner 8. The evidence demonstrates that the amount of the deposit was $6,200 in lieu of $6,000. 13. Partially rejected based upon the seller's testimony that she spoke to Todd Kaye in respondent's offices on or about January 5, 1988. 15. Accepted with the addition of the fact that the respondent communicated this offer to the buyers. Respondent 4. The evidence demonstrates that the amount of the deposit was $6,200 in lieu of $6,000. 8. The date of "early December" is rejected as not established by competent, substantial evidence. 10. Rejected as not established by competent, substantial evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire DPR, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Manuel M. Arvesu, Esquire 100 North Biscayne Blvd. Miami, Florida 33132 Darlene Keller, Executive Director DPR, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 =================================================================
The Issue The issue is whether respondent acted as a mortgage lender within the meaning of Section 494.001(3), Florida Statutes, and thus is subject to Division licensure requirements.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance (Division), is a state agency charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing the Florida Mortgage Brokerage and Lending Act which is codified in Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. Among other things, the Division regulates mortgage lenders and requires such persons or entities to secure a license. Respondent, White Pine Resouces, Inc. (WPR), is a Florida corporation formed in March 1986. Its sole shareholder is John R. Grass, a Pensacola attorney. Although the corporation was originally formed for a number of purposes, its primary activity is the real estate investment business. It holds no licenses issued by, or registrations with, the Division. WPR's current business address is 358-C West Nine Mile Road, Pensacola, Florida. WPR's principal source of money is Grass, or his professional association, who loan money to the corporation. In some cases, the money is used to acquire parcels of property for resale, make necessary repairs or improvements, and then provide owner financing to the buyer. In other cases, WPR loans money to persons needing to make improvements to their homes or rental property and takes back a second mortgage from the borrower. These types of transactions, which occurred during the years 1992-95, are found in documents offered in evidence as petitioner's exhibits 1-5. Respondent has also stipulated that several other transactions of this nature occurred during that same period of time. In every case, WPR was investing its own money or that of its principal. In 1992, a Division examiner analyst noted the following listing in the Yellow Pages section of the Pensacola telephone directory under the heading of "Mortgages": White Pine Resources Having Trouble With Financing Residential & Land Fast Service on 1st Mortgages The advertisement also contained respondent's street address and telephone number. In the 1993-94 telephone directory, WPR carried the following advertisement under the "Mortgages" section of the Yellow Pages: White Pine Resources Specialists! Bad Credit - We Can Help Vacant Land Loans In the 1995-96 telephone directory, WPR placed the following advertisement in the "Mortgages" section of the Yellow Pages: White Pines Resources A Private Investor Not a Mortgage Broker Specialists! We Can Help Vacant Land Loans Although the Division first noted one of WPR's Yellow Page advertisements in 1992, for some reason it did not conduct a formal investigation of respondent's activities until February 28, 1994. On that day, an examiner analyst made an unannounced visit to respondent's office for the purpose of inspecting its records to determine if WPR was acting as a mortgage lender. However, WPR's principal, John R. Grass, was not in the office, and the analyst simply left his business card and a message for Grass to contact him. The next morning, Grass telephoned the analyst's supervisor and advised him that since WPR was merely a private investor, and not a mortgage lender, it was not subject to the Division's regulation, and hence it would not provide copies of its records. A subpoena duces tecum was then issued by the Division, records were produced pursuant to the subpoena, and this controversy ensued. The parties agree, however, that this action was not prompted by complaints from consumers or other persons having dealings with WPR. The record indicates that a mortgage lender differs from a private investor in several material respects. An important distinction is that a private investor uses its own funds rather than those of another party. Also, a private investor does not buy or sell paper, does not escrow taxes, does not split or broker commissions, and does not close its own loans. In all of these respects, WPR had the attributes of a private investor. When mortgage brokerage firms are involved in transactions with private investors, they must supply the private investor with certain documents that are not provided to an institutional investor. Among others, they include a disclosure agreement, receipt of recorded instruments, an appraisal or waiver of the same, and title insurance. In addition, Division rules require that a mortgage brokerage firm record its transactions with private investors in a log journal known as DBF-MB-888. The evidence shows that for transactions between WPR and at least two mortgage brokerage firms during the years in question, the two firms recorded those transactions on DBF-MB-888. They also provided WPR with documents typically given to private investors. The Division has adopted Rule 3D-40.290(2), Florida Administrative Code, which provides that a person is deemed to be holding himself out to the public as being in the mortgage lending business if he advertises in a manner "which would lead the reader to believe the person was in the business of buying, making or selling mortgage loans." The rule has not been challenged and, for purposes of resolving this controversy, is presumed to be valid. In view of the representations that WPR provided "Fast Service on 1st Mortgages" and "Vacant Land Loans," it is fair to infer that the Yellow Page advertisements made by WPR would reasonably lead the reader to believe that WPR was in the business of buying, making or selling mortgage loans. Therefore, by virtue of advertising in the Yellow Pages, WPR is deemed to be holding itself out to the public as being in the mortgage lending business. During the years 1993-95, the Division routinely sent WPR questionnaires regarding various WPR transactions with licensed lenders. The transmittal letter accompanying the questionnaire noted that the Division was conducting "a routine examination" of the licensed lender (and not WPR), and WPR's comments would "be of material assistance to (the Division) in determining compliance with the Florida Mortgage Brokerage Act." By way of an estoppel defense, WPR has essentially contended that the questionnaires constituted a representation by the Division that WPR was merely a private lender. It further contends that, to its detriment, it relied upon that representation. But there is nothing in the documents that states that the Division considered WPR to be a private lender. Nor is there any evidence that the Division made any other oral or written representations to WPR that it did not need to secure a license. Finally, assuming arguendo that such a representation occurred, there was no showing that WPR relied to its detriment on such an alleged "misstatement of fact." WPR also raises the defense of laches arguing that it was severely prejudiced by the Division's delay in prosecuting this action. Except for testimony that respondent was forced to secure the services of an attorney to defend against this action, and its principal was required to attend a hearing, there was no showing of prejudice on the part of WPR.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a final order requiring respondent to cease and desist from engaging in the mortgage lending business without a license. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 95-0290 Petitioner: Because petitioner's post-hearing filing is more in the nature of a memorandum of law containing argument rather than proposed findings of fact, specific rulings have not been made. Respondent: Because respondent's post-hearing filing is more in the nature of a memorandum of law containing argument rather than proposed findings of fact, specific rulings have not been made. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Milligan Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Harry L. Hooper, III, Esquire Department of Banking and Finance Room 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Clyde C. Caillouet, Jr., Esquire 4900 Bayou Boulevard, Suite 103 Pensacola, Florida 32503 John T. Reading, Jr., Esquire 358-C West Nine Mile Road Pensacola, Florida 32534-1818
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits received in evidence at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: On January 9, 1980, Richard Morgentaler, Trustee, obtained title to 574 lots in Pinecrest Estates, a subdivision located in St. Johns County, Florida. Pinecrest Estates is registered with the Division. (Pet. Ex. 1) Richard Morgentaler paid 22,960.00 for the 574 lots, or approximately $40 per lot. (Pet. Ex. 23) On July 21, 1980, Richard Morgentaler conveyed 44 lots to Florida Crown Corporation. (Pet. Ex. 15) The deed reflects a documentary stamp tax of 8.80. Murray Fields was the president and sole stockholder of Florida Crown Corporation. (Pet. Ex. 20) The Corporation was formed on July 17, 1980, only 4 days before the corporation obtained title to the 44 lots from Richard Morgentaler. On August 29, 1980, Richard Morgentaler also conveyed 10 lots in Pinecrest Estates to Murray Fields. (Pet. Ex. 18) Neither Florida Crown Corporation nor Murray Fields has ever been registered with the Division to offer or sell subdivided lands. (Pet. Ex. 2) On August 29, 1980, Shirley Arthur purchased 9 lots in Pinecrest Estates from Richard Morgentaler, Trustee, for $21,860.00. (Pet. Ex. 16 & 22) Present at the closing in Morgentaler's office were Shirley Arthur, Murray Fields, Barry Shelomith and Richard Morgentaler. Shirley Arthur had previously met Murray Fields when Murray Fields became her driving instructor. As a friendship developed between Shirley Arthur and Murray Fields, Shirley Arthur placed a great deal of trust and confidence in Murray Fields. Murray Fields told Shirley Arthur about some allegedly great investments in land through Barry Shelomith, who was described by Fields as "liquidator of estates." Fields and Shelomith presented brochures about Pinecrest Estates and the surrounding area and made many representations to Shirley Arthur about the value of the land as well as potential development in the area. (Pet. Ex. 21) Murray Fields also told Shirley Arthur that he was buying 10 lots in Pinecrest Estates at the same time. Shirley Arthur's belief that Murray Fields was buying lots at the same time was a major factor in her decision to purchase, because of the trust she placed in Murray Fields. Shirley Arthur was not given a public offering statement prior to or at the closing. At no time did Murray Fields disclose to Shirley Arthur the adverse features of the land, the absence of roads to the subdivision, the absence of roads in the subdivision, or the amount of water continually covering the subdivided land. (Testimony of Shirley Arthur; Pet. Ex 4) As president of Florida Crown Corporation, Murray Fields sold subdivision lots to many individuals from July 1980 to July 1981. (Pet. Ex. 5 through 14) Most of these deeds reflect documentary stamp taxes in the amount of $5.20 to $13.60). 1/
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing it is recommended that the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums, issue a Final Order as follows: Ordering Murray Fields to cease and desist from offering or disposing and from partici pating in the offer or disposition of interests in Pinecrest Estates or any other subdivided lands until he has a valid order or registration, delivers a current public offering statement, and otherwise complies with Chapter 498, Florida Statutes: and Ordering Murray Fields to pay to the Division, within 30 days from the entry of the Final Order, a civil penalty in the amount of $5,000 for violation of Section 498.023(1) and Section 498.023(2), Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of September, 1984, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1984.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the foregoing and in consideration of Pitts' failure to timely respond to Requests for Admissions, the following Findings of Fact are made in this matter: On or about December 12, 2007, J2J filed a form entitled, "Appointment of Campaign Treasurer and Designation of Campaign Depository for Political Committees and Electioneering Communication Organizations" with the Florida Division of Elections (the "Division"). The form designated Pitts as the chairman and treasurer of J2J. The Division then sent Pitts a letter dated December 14, 2007, providing directions concerning the filing of a Committee Campaign Treasurer's Report ("Report") by J2J in accordance with the campaign financing requirements set forth in chapter 106, Florida Statutes (2007). Pitts received the letter from the Division. By letter dated April 13, 2009, the Division notified Pitts that J2J had failed to file the Report which had been due on April 10, 2009. Pitts received the letter from the Division concerning the overdue Report. The Division sent a follow-up letter to Pitts dated April 27, 2009, concerning the delinquent Report. Pitts received the letter from the Division. As of the date of its Motion for Summary Final Order, the Division had not received the Report from Pitts. J2J is in violation of the campaign financing requirements for political committees in Florida. The Division deems Pitts' failure to file the Report for J2J to be a willful violation of the Florida campaign financing laws.
The Issue Whether Petitioner transferred to the Florida Retirement System (FRS) Investment Plan from the FRS Pension Plan, pursuant to section 121.4501, Florida Statutes (2012).1/
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 32-year-old former employee of the Florida Department of Corrections. Petitioner was employed as a correctional officer at the Northwest Florida Reception Center in Washington County, Florida from June 14, 2004, until he resigned on July 23, 2012. Petitioner is a fully vested member of the State of Florida Retirement System (FRS). Respondent, State Board of Administration, is the agency with the duty and responsibility to administer the State of Florida Retirement System Investment Plan. See § 121.4501(8), Fla. Stat. In mid-2011, Petitioner decided to look for other employment and began researching his retirement options. Petitioner discovered he needed to be employed by the State for six years to be fully vested in the FRS and have the option to transfer from the FRS Pension Plan (a defined benefit plan) to the FRS Investment Plan (a defined contribution plan). Sometime between May 1 and 10, 2012, Petitioner accessed the FRS website, either downloaded or printed the FRS “second election form” –- the paperwork required to transfer his retirement account to the Investment Plan -- and completed the form. Although Petitioner does not remember the exact date, Petitioner approached Ms. Charity Pleas, Secretary Specialist for the Chief of Security, and asked her to file his second election form for him by facsimile transmission (fax). Ms. Pleas testified she faxed the document to the number on the form. Petitioner observed Ms. Pleas place the paperwork into the fax machine, dial a fax number, complete the fax transmission, and retrieve a fax transmission confirmation report. Ms. Pleas handed the confirmation report to Petitioner. Petitioner cannot be certain what became of the confirmation report or his original second election form. Petitioner did not contact anyone with the Florida Retirement System to confirm receipt of his second election form. Ms. Pleas often sends faxes on behalf of employees at the Reception Center where she has been employed since 2007. Ms. Pleas occasionally receives complaints from employees that a fax she has sent on their behalf was not received by the other party. Sometimes this happens despite the fact that she has received a fax confirmation report. Petitioner began employment in the private sector with Power South on July 30, 2012. In early August 2012, Petitioner contacted the FRS to find out if the retirement funds were available to move into a 401K account with his new employer. He spoke with someone named “Jason” who said there was no record of a second election having been made by Petitioner. An investigation ensued. Aon Hewitt is the Plan Choice Administrator for the FRS Investment Plan. Aon Hewitt provides services to the SBA in connection with the Investment Plan, including processing enrollments and second elections. Lynette Murphy is Benefits Operations Manager for Hewitt Associates, LLC, a division of Aon Hewitt. Ms. Murphy researched the issue of whether Petitioner’s second election form was received by Aon Hewitt. She conducted several searches of the company’s files, including a search by Petitioner’s name (both first and last names) and social security number. In case the second election form had been received without a member name or social security number, Ms. Murphy also conducted a search on the numbers “99” and “90,” the codes assigned to forms received which are unidentifiable. Ms. Murphy’s search included not only forms received between April 1, 2012 and July 30, 2012, but also all dates covering the life of Petitioner’s eligibility and enrollment in the FRS. Ms. Murphy was unable to find any record of a second election form filed by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration enter a final order denying the relief requested in Petitioner’s Petition for Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this <day> day of <month>, <year>, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this <day> day of <month>, <year>.
