The Issue Petitioner claims that Respondent owes approximately $6,000.00 for the purchase of grass sod. Respondent argues that the funds claimed by Petitioner are for repairs on equipment, not sod, and that its only indebtedness to Petitioner is $6.00, mistakenly omitted from a payment. The issue is whether Petitioner's claim is proper and cognizable under section 604.31, F.S., related to complaints of breach of agreement by a licensed dealer in agricultural products.
Findings Of Fact Hillside Sod Farms, Inc. (Hillside) produces grass sod for sale to landscaping firms and similar customers. Its business address is 1620 East State Road 46, Geneva, Florida. Bill Hatfield Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Bill's Landscaping (Hatfield) is a licensed dealer in agricultural products, bonded by Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, as surety. Hatfield's business address is 1116 State Road 434, Winter Springs, Florida. Sometime around April 1989, Hatfield began purchasing sod from Hillside. Hatfield uses a lot of sod in his landscaping business. The arrangement between the parties was that Hillside would charge an extra 1/2 cent a square foot on his price for the sod for the use of heavy equipment (forklifts). Hillside owns twenty-seven such machines and loaned three out to Hatfield. The equipment stayed at Hatfield's job sites and was operated by Hatfield's crew. When the equipment broke down, Hatfield notified Hillside, who had it repaired. At least some of the repair bills were sent to Hatfield, who paid them. Sometime around the end of September 1989, Avery Wisdom complained to Bill Hatfield about what he thought was an excessive amount of repairs on his equipment. He felt Hatfield's workers were rough on the machines. He suggested several alternatives, including pulling the machines off the jobs and letting Hatfield provide his own machines. He also suggested that he could purchase new equipment and let Hatfield pay all its expenses over a period of time, ultimately buying the equipment, in a lease-purchase type of arrangement. Another suggestion was that he would get the equipment overhauled and let Hatfield pay all the repair bills. Suggestions one and two were apparently rejected, and it is not clear that suggestion three was formally accepted. Nothing was put in writing. Hatfield claims now that he offered to pay an additional 1/2 cent per square foot of sod for the use of the equipment. Avery Wisdom claims that he did raise the price of his sod, but that it was an across-the-board price increase for all of his customers due to increased costs of production, and not related to rental. The October 9, 1989 invoice #13290 from Hillside to Bill's Nursery reflects an increase of $2.00 per pallet of Bahia sod and $2.50 per pallet of Floratam sod, or 1/2 cent per square foot increase. Debra Ludewig, the bookkeeper and general office manager for Hatfield, asked Hatfield why the price" went up, and he told her it was for the equipment. Hillside continued to bill Hatfield for repairs on the equipment after October 1989. These repair costs are reflected on invoices to Bill's Landscaping and are backed up by separate special "repair order" forms itemizing each repair bill. The "special repair order" forms were also furnished to Bill's Landscaping. The repairs are listed on the invoices with a date, reference to the "special repair order" (SRO number), and a total cost which is calculated into the purchaser's running total at the bottom of the invoice. Payments were made on a continuing basis by Hatfield in varying amounts, and rarely in an exact amount to correspond to the total on an invoice. That is, Bill's Nursery maintained a running balance of its account with Hillside, sometimes totalling as much as $20,000.00. Each time she made a payment to Hillside, Debra Ludewig wrote the invoice number on the check. Sometimes more than one check would reflect a single invoice number. After October 1989, Debra Ludewig started deducting the repair bill portion of the invoices when she computed her payments to Hillside. She did this on her own initiative, without direction from Hatfield, because she understood that the 1/2 cent price increase was to cover the repairs. She did not question why the repair bills were being sent and were still being included on the invoices; she just deducted them without any notice to Hillside. In the meantime, the invoices kept coming from Hillside, showing the running balance on Hatfield's account. The top of the invoices reflected the prior outstanding balance, then payments since the last invoice, then additional charges for sod, then repair orders (if any), and then the total amount outstanding. It is clear from the invoices maintained by Hillside and provided to Hatfield, that Hillside was applying Hatfield's checks to the total outstanding balance, which balance included any repair bills, as well as sod delivered. On the other hand, the invoice numbers referenced on Hatfield's checks to Hillside substantiate that Ms. Ludewig was unilaterally deducting sums from certain invoices, which sums corresponded to the amounts being charged for repairs. It is not clear that Hillside was aware of the bookkeeping discrepancy, as nothing was said about deducting the repair bills until the parties' relationship came to an end in June 1990. Hatfield found a new sod producer, claiming that a customer complained about the quality of Hillside's sod. The total amount of repairs charged by Hillside to Hatfield between October 1, 1989, and June 1990, was $7150.25, compared to approximately $300,000.00 for sod,. The final invoice from Hillside to Bill's Landscaping reflected a total balance due of $13,872.59. This invoice #14070 is dated June 18, 1990. On June 21, 1990 and June 29, 1990, payments were made by Hatfield in the amounts of $3,000.70 and $4,641.00 respectively. This left a balance due of $6,230.89. Avery Wisdom concedes that this total should be adjusted: an invoice #13256 (9/22/89) charged $4.50 sales tax in error, and invoice #13406 (11/13/89) included a math error in the amount of $206.70. The proper adjusted total is $6,019.69. The last invoice to include repairs to equipment is dated April 16, 1990. After that date, according to invoices dated from April 23, 1990 to June 18, 1990, Hatfield purchased $39,943.98 in sod from Hillside. The most recent $6,019.69, therefore, is not attributable to repairs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter its final order finding Respondent indebted to Petitioner in the amount of $6,019.69 and requiring payment within fifteen (15) days after the order becomes final as provided in Section 604.21(7), F.S. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Avery P. Wisdom, President Hillside Sod Farms, Inc. 1620 E. State Road 46 Geneva, FL 32732 Bill Hatfield, President Bill Hatfield Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Bills Landscaping 1116 State Road 434 Winter Springs, FL 32708 Ohio Casualty Insurance Company 136 North Third Street Hamilton, OH 45025 Clinton H. Coulter, Jr., Senior Counsel Dept. of Agriculture & Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 The Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Dept. of Agriculture & Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Dept. of Agriculture & Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800
Findings Of Fact On August 6, 1986, an indemnity bond was executed between RAINMAKER as principal and FIDELITY as surety. The effective dates of the bond were from October 21, 1986, to October 20, 1987. The bond was required under Sections 604.15-604.30, Florida Statutes, in order for RAINMAKER to become licensed as a dealer in agricultural products in Florida. The purpose of the bond is to secure the faithful accounting for a payment to producers or their agents or representatives of the proceeds of all agricultural products handled or purchased by RAINMAKER. The Petitioner, SHAN-RON, is a corporation whose address is 276 Cypress Street, La Belle, Florida. Its purpose is to conduct business by finding buyers for sod located on acreage owned by various cattle ranchers in Lee County, Florida. This practice is commonly known as "bird dogging" in the agricultural trade. The way the business is conducted is as follows: SHAN-RON is contracted by sod installers to whom it sells sod in specific quantities for a fixed price. Once the oral agreement is made, SHAN-RON tells the sod installer where a sod field is located. At this point in the business transaction, the sod installer sends independent truck drivers to the designated sod field. If the sod installer is unable to locate truckers, he telephones a SHAN-RON field foreman. The foreman, as a courtesy, will check to see if any of the independent truckers currently as the sod field can haul a load for the sod installer. Once a trucker is located, employees from SHAN-RON mow the grass, cut the sod, and load it onto pallets owned by SHAN-RON. The truck is loaded with pallets by SHAN-RON employees and the driver is given two copies of the load ticket, one for him and one for the sod installer. The driver delivers the sod and pallets to the address placed upon the load tickets. Upon delivery, the driver has the responsibility to deliver the load ticket to the business office of the sod installer. If he does not deliver the ticket, he does not get paid for hauling the sod. Employees of the sod installer are usually at the delivery site. The sod is laid and the empty pallets are returned to the sod field by the truckers. Every Friday, a representative of SHAN-RON personally delivers a weekly bill to the sod installer in order to collect is owed. When the money is collected, the funds are divided between the rancher whose sod was sold and SHAN-RON. The accountability system used within the sod industry leaves room for a high margin of error at various stages. The SHAN-RON employees occasionally short pallet loads or two layers of sod. The truck drivers occasionally misnamed the sod installer to whom the sod is to be delivered. The truck drivers also occasionally do not take empty pallets under their control back to SHAN-RON. They sell the pallets and pocket the money. The sod installer is financially responsible for the pallet costs. RAINMAKER is a corporation whose address is Post Office Box 7385, Ft. Myers, Florida. The company is primarily in the business of installing sod. It transacted business with SHAN-RON between November 11, 1986, and January 8, 1987. At the time of these transactions, RAINMAKER was licensed as a dealer in agricultural products supported by surety bond number 974 52 23 in the amount of $13,500.00. SHAN-RON, through testimony and the introduction of its business records, proved a prima facie case that RAINMAKER owes $12,964.00 for the purchase of sod between November 11, 1986, and January 8, 1987. Both parties Stipulated that $4,000.00 has been paid on the balance of the account which should be deducted from the balance owed SHAN-RON. In rebuttal to SHAN-RON's presentation, RAINMAKER presented testimony and a business record summary which revealed that six invoices were improperly charged, against its account in the amount of $1,260.00. The record summary was based upon a comparison of load tickets against production records during the time period involved. In addition, RAINMAKER's records reveal that the two drivers, Stormy and Fred Bower, were not paid for delivering the sod to RAINMAKER under the load ticket presentation to the sod installer which was previously described as an accounting method within the business. Because RAINMAKER set forth the issue of delivery discrepancies in its answer to the complaint and competent evidence was presented, $1,260.00 should be deducted from the `balance owed. SHAN-RON presented testimony that it is customary for the company to spray the sod for pest control. RAINMAKER received defective sod from SHAN-RON which contained "Creeping Charlie" weeds during the time of the deliveries in dispute. SHAN-RON was timely notified of the problem, and toad RAINMAKER to have the sod sprayed. A copy of the invoice for $300.00 was sent to SHAN-RON and has not been paid. Although the issue was not raised in RAINMAKER's answer to the complaint, it is properly before the Hearing Officer because of RAINMAKER's timely notification and cure of the defect in the product. The $300.00 should be deducted from the amount owed. Testimony relating to possible sod shortages was rejected as no evidence was presented that shortages occurred in the orders for which SHAN-RON seeks payment. The customary procedure In the sod business for handling credits for shortages requires the buyer to notify the seller within a responsible length of time of the shortages. Such notification did not take place as to the orders in dispute. The amount owed to SHAN-RON by RAINMAKER is $7,404.00. It is officially noticed that SHAN-RON's complaint was originally filed with the department on June 19, 1987, within nine months from the date of sale.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Agriculture enter a final order requiring the Respondent RAINMAKER to make payment to the petitioner SHAN-RON in the amount of $7,404.00. In the event that RAINMAKER does not comply with the department's order within fifteen days from the date it final, FIDELITY should be ordered to provide payment and the conditions and provisions of the bond furnished to RAINMAKER. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of April, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of April, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Clinton H. Coutler, JR., Esquire Department of Agriculture Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Ben Pridgeon, Chief Bureau of License and Bond Department of Agriculture Lab Complex Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1650 Shan Ron Sod, Inc. 276 Cypress Street LaBELLE, FLORIDA 33935 Rainmaker Sod, Inc. 2290 Bruner Lane, South East Fort Myers, Florida 33912 Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland Post Office Box 1227 Baltimore, Maryland 21203 Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Robert Chastain General Counsel Department of Agriculture Mayo Building, Room 513 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue Whether or not, between the periods of January 1976 and August 1977, the licensees or their agents, servants or employees allowed the license premises to be kept, set up, maintained or operated for the purpose of prostitution, in violation of Section 509.032(1), Florida Statutes, and Section 796.07, Florida Statutes. Whether or not, between the periods of January 1976 and August 1977, Ulysses Brown, the licensee and/or operator of the licensed premises had been convicted of letting the premises for prostitution and keeping a disorderly place, thereby violating Section 509.261(4)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the notice to show cause, Alma Mae Young and Ulysses Brown were the holder of license No. 23-7079H held with the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Hotels and Restaurants. This license was held to do business as Young's Rooming House, located at 7000 N.W. 21st Avenue, Miami, Florida. The facts in this case show that on October 23, 1976, Officer Otis Chambers, of the Dade County Public Safety Department, Dade County, Florida, went to the licensed premises known as Young's Rooming House located at 7000 N.W. 21st Avenue, Miami, Florida. At that time, Officer Chambers was operating in the capacity of an undercover plainclothes officer investigating vice matters. He was in the company of a prostitute and when he approached the desk in the licensed premises, he spoke with the licensee, Ulysses Brown. In the conversation with Mr. Brown, he identified the woman in his company as being a prostitute, as shown by the remarks to Brown, and Brown acknowledged this information and rented a room to the officer. Subsequent to the events that transpired in the conversation between Officer Chambers and the licensee Brown, Brown was arrested and charged with violations of Section 796.06, Florida Statutes, which pertains to renting space for prostitution and with a violation of Section 796.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes, which is an allegation of receiving, offering or agreeing to receive, any person into any place, structure, building or conveyance with the purpose of prostitution or permitting any person to remain in those locales for such purpose. The licensee was found guilty of both offenses and placed on a period of probation for six months. Evidence of this finding by the Court may be seen as Exhibit No. 4 admitted into evidence. It was also shown in the course of the hearing that a number of complaints have been made by neighbors who live in the area of the licensed premises, to the effect that the licensed premises was a place in which prostitution was occurring; The comment was also made by these individuals that men and women were seen in the licensed premises who were not wearing clothes. The opinions were testified to by Officer John Wilson of the Dade County Public Safety Department who had spoken with a number of the residents of the area where the licensed premises is located. Although Ulysses Brown has claimed that he is no longer involved with the licensed premises, a recent inspection by Agent John H. McKinnon of the Division of Hotels and Restaurants reveals that Ulysses Brown is still working in the licensed premises. According to Brown, and in keeping with what the agent actually observed about the licensee's intention, Brown is to work and take care of the licensed premises and Young is to be the owner. Based upon the facts as reported, the Petitioner has brought two charges in the notice to show cause. The first charge alleges that between the periods of January 1976 and August 1977, the licensees, their agents, servants or employees, allowed the premises to be kept, set up, maintained or operated for the purpose of prostitution, in violation of Section 509.032(1), Florida Statutes, and Section 796.07, Florida Statutes. Section 509.032, Florida Statutes, states the duties of the Petitioner in the following language: 509.32 Duties.- (1) GENERAL.- The division shall carry out and execute all of the provisions of this chapter and all other laws now in force or which may hereafter be enacted relating to the inspection or regulation of public lodging and public food service establishments for the purpose of safe- guarding the public health, safety, and welfare. The division shall be responsible for ascertaining that no establishment licensed by it shall engage in any misleading advertising or unethical practices as defined by this chapter and all other laws now in force or which may hereafter be enacted. The division shall keep accurate account of all expenses arising out of the performance of its duties shall file monthly itemized statements of such ex- penses with the Department of Banking and Finance together with an account of all fees collected under the provisions of this chapter. A reading of this paragraph of this section leads to the conclusion that its purposes are to create the authority in the Petitioner to implement regulations to enforce the provisions of the overall Chapter 409, Florida Statutes. It is not read to be a substantive law which would empower the Petitioner to take action based upon the language of that section per se. Therefore, an violation of Section 796.07, Florida Statutes, would not promote the right to take action against the licensees under Section 509.032, Florida Statutes. The second count in the notice to show cause pertains to an allegation that between the periods of January 1976 and August 1977, the licensees and/or the operator, and in this instance that person is Ulysses Brown, has been convicted for letting the premises for prostitution and keeping a disorderly place which is in violation of Section 509.261(4)(a), Florida Statutes. That provision of the statutes reads as follows: 509.261 Revocation or suspension of licenses; fines; procedure.- (4)(a) Any person interested in the operation of any such establishment, whether owner or operator, has been convicted, within the last past 5 years in this state or any other state or the United States of soliciting for prostitution, pandering, letting premises for prostitution, keeping a disorderly place, illegally dealing in narcotics, or any other crime involving moral turpitude. The term "convicted" shall include an adjudication of guilt on a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or the forfeiture of a bond when charged with a crime. As stated before, Ulysses Brown, one of the licensees, was found guilty of Sections 796.06 and 796.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes. Those violations were established through an entry of the judgment finding the licensee guilty on January 20, 1977. That finding was reached within five years of the date of the action for suspension or revocation. This finding by the Court, coupled with the continued involvement by Ulysses Brown in the operation of the licensed premises and the background problems which have been prevalent in the licensed premises, would justify action being taken against both licensees, to-wit, Alma Mae Young and Ulysses Brown. The action spoken of was the right of action under Section 509.261(4)(a), Florida Statutes, and is the right of direct action against Ulysses Brown and a right of indirect action against Alma Mae Young for her knowledge, negligence or lack of due diligence in the operation of the licensed premises.
Recommendation It is recommended that the license held by the Respondents Alma Mae Young and Ulysses Brown to trade as Young's Rooming House located at 7000 N.W. 21st Avenue, Miami, Florida, license No. 23-7079H be revoked. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of April, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence D. Winson, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Johns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Alma Mae Young Ulysses Brown Youngs Rooming House 7000 N.W. 21st Avenue Miami, Florida
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was a producer of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes (1983) At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Gopherbroke was a licensed dealer in agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes (1983), issued license No. 4528 by the Department, and bonded by Hartford Insurance Company of the Southeast (Hartford) in the sum of $25,000. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Hartford was authorized to do business in the State of Florida. The complaint filed by Petitioner was timely filed in accordance with Section 604.21(1) Florida Statutes (1983). Prior to April 1, 1985, Petitioner and Robert Neill, President of Gopherbroke, verbally agreed for Respondent Gopherbroke to act as agent in the sale of certain zucchini squash produced by Petitioner in 1985 on a net return basis, i.e. Petitioner to receive the gross sale price of the squash minus a handling fee of $0.50 per carton and a sales commission of 1/ 6.5 per cent of the gross sales price. Between April 1, 1985 and April 12, 1985 Petitioner through Tommy York delivered to Respondent Gopherbroke 84, 107 and 19 cartons of small, medium and large zucchini squash respectively for a total of 210 cartons represented by receipt tickets numbers 276-282 issued by Respondent Gopherbroke. Petitioner and Tommy York (York) had an agreement whereby York would harvest, clean, grade, package and deliver the zucchini squash produced by Petitioner to Respondent Gopherbroke for a percentage of the net proceeds derived from the sale of the squash. Respondent Gopherbroke was not a party to the agreement between Petitioner and York and was not authorized to withhold any money derived from the sale of Petitioner's squash to be paid to York under York's agreement with Petitioner. The net return on the 210 cartons of zucchini squash referred to in paragraph 6 above was $698.17 of which Petitioner has received only $349.09, the balance of $349.08 was paid to York by Respondent Gopherbroke. After April 12, 1985 York was no longer involved in the harvesting of Petitioner's squash due to a disagreement between York and Petitioner. On April 15 and 17, 1985 Petitioner delivered 30, 62 and 3 cartons of small, medium and large zucchini squash, respectively to Respondent Gopherbroke. The net return on the 95 cartons of zucchini squash referred to in paragraph 10 above was $127.35 which has been paid to Petitioner in two separate checks. However, Petitioner was not paid for 5 cartons of medium zucchini squash that Respondent Gopherbroke shows on its exhibit 2 (4/19 - 8731) as being dumped and on 21 cartons of medium zucchini squash Respondent Gopherbroke shows on its exhibit 2 (4/17 - 87298) as open but later shows a gross sale of $47.25 with charges of $10.50 for handling and $3.07 commission and an adjustment of $43.29 for a minus net proceeds to Petitioner of $9.61. The evidence is clear that the zucchini squash delivered to Respondent Gopherbroke by Petitioner on April 15 and 17, 1985 were harvested, cleaned, graded and packaged by Petitioner and his family and were of good quality when delivered. Respondent Gopherbroke presented no testimony or documentary evidence to support the dumping of the 5 cartons of squash or any justification for the adjustment on the 21 cartons of squash. On at least one occasion, Petitioner advised Respondent Gopherbroke that it was not authorized to pay York any of moneys owed to Petitioner by Respondent Gopherbroke for zucchini squash delivered by York. The price of medium zucchini squash during the period that the 5 cartons were dumped was $2.00 per carton for a gross amount of $10.00 minus the handling fee of $2.50 for a net return of $7.50. A sales commission of $0.65 had been deducted in Respondent Gopherbroke's earlier calculation. Petitioner was not furnished an account of sales within 48 hours after Respondent Gopherbroke sold the squash and the earliest payment for the squash was made 9 days after Respondent Gopherbroke had collected for Petitioner's squash.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent Gopherbroke be ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $399.87. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent Gopherbroke fails to timely pay the Petitioner as ordered, then Respondent Hartford be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes 1983 and that the Department reimburse the Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983). Respectfully submitted and entered this 8th day of April, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day of April, 1986.
The Issue Whether Respondent, L.M.I. East, Incorporated d/b/a L.M.I. Landscapers, Inc. and its surety, Western Surety Company owes Petitioner $4,210.00 for East Palatka Holly Trees.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner A.D. Andrews, Inc. is a producer of agricultural products, pursuant to Section 604.15 (9), Florida Statutes. Respondent L.M.I. East, Incorporated d/b/a L.M.I. Landscapes, Inc. is a dealer in agricultural products pursuant to Section 604.15 (2), Florida Statutes. Respondent’s surety is Western Surety Company Teal Pomeroy, a salesman for Petitioner, and Pat Tronzano, Purchasing Manager for Respondent, have a business history representing their respective principals. All previous dealings have been satisfactory, and they share a mutual respect. While at a trade show in Orlando, Florida, Teal and Tronzano entered into an oral agreement for the sale of 31 East Palatka Holly bushes/trees (30 at the rate of $135.00 each, and one for $160.00) at a total price of $4,210.00, due from Respondent to Petitioner. Neither participant in this arrangement testified to any oral terms covering “point of sale” or a guarantee of any condition of the hollies at a final destination. Neither participant testified that a standard course of business on these issues had arisen between them as a result of their prior transactions. On October 9, 2007, Mr. Tronzano sent a third party freighter (trucker) to pick-up the hollies at Petitioner's nursery in Chiefland, Florida, and transport them, at Respondent’s expense, to Selena, Texas, for planting and landscaping by Respondent. Mr. Tronzano did not accompany the third party freighter to Petitioner's nursery or on the subsequent trip to Texas. He never saw the hollies in question prior to loading or while they were still on the truck after loading. The trucker selected by Respondent was one specially skilled in the transport of landscape plants, and Respondent has successfully used him for prior purchases and transports. The third party freight truck arrived at Petitioner’s Chiefland, Florida, nursery at approximately 11:00 a.m. on October 9, 2007, before all the hollies had been dug up. However, the trees that were ready to load and those that had to be dug up were loaded by Petitioner, and by 2:00 p.m., the truck, fully loaded, left Petitioner’s property. Petitioner’s invoice clearly states: ATTENTION: If these trees are not in satisfactory condition when received, do not accept them. We do not replace trees. Please note any discrepancies or problems with materials. The invoice does not show the trucker noted any problems with the hollies. The trucker also signed the delivery ticket under the statement, “I acknowledge that trees were received in good condition.” Approximately 48 hours later, Mr. Tronzano received a report from Texas that when the freighter delivered the hollies to the Selena, Texas site, some hollies were dead and other were dying. Mr. Tronzano did not personally witness anything at the final destination. Respondent's photographs in evidence, the date of which has not been automatically printed on them, show some trees which had already been unloaded in Texas with dried- out root balls. They show no trees with dried-out root balls still on the truck. All photographs show intact root balls, although they are dusty and some trees are clearly dead or dying. One tree is dead in a pot. Although it had taken Respondent’s trucker approximately 48 hours to get the hollies to their ultimate destination in Texas, the normal driving time is 16-20 hours. Because federal regulations require a period of rest for commercial drivers every eight hours, Respondent put forth the theory that because there had been a delay of three hours at Petitioner’s nursery while some hollies were dug up and loaded, the delaying effect of three hours snowballed to a total delay of as much as 22-28 hours for the truck’s arrival time at the final destination. This theory is speculative and unsubstantiated by the evidence. Despite some earlier attempts, Respondent did not notify Petitioner of the condition of the hollies at the final destination until October 15, 2007. Respondent concedes that 11 of the 131 hollies were accepted in good condition. Whether one of the survivors was the single holly tree sold for $160.00, is not in evidence. Respondent has not paid Petitioner for any of the hollies. Mr. Tronzano has not had a dry-out problem like this one in ten years. Respondent's second theory of why the hollies arrived at the Texas destination in poor shape is an assertion that the way Petitioner processed and handled the harvesting of the hollies adversely affected their health. Respondent speculates that Petitioner’s digging and immediately loading the just-dug hollies onto the truck sent by Respondent resulted in shock to the hollies’ root systems so that the root systems dried out. Mr. Teal and Mr. Tronzano agree that previous trees (not necessarily East Palatka hollies) sold by Petitioner to Respondent had been "pre-dug" and "staged" by Petitioner in anticipation of the arrival of the freighter. “Staging” means that Petitioner dug up the trees, put them on a trailer, and took them to a centralized loading area at the nursery for Respondent’s pick-up. According to Mr. Teal, the foregoing “pre-dig and stage” method prevents "double-handling" of trees, but many trees are dug up only when a truck arrives at the nursery to take them away. Mr. Teal was not present at the nursery on October 9, 2007, but opined that if the hollies on this occasion had been pre-watered, they would be unlikely to die of shock, despite being dug up and loaded right away. Moreover, the particular trees sold to Respondent came out of a field that Petitioner irrigates, so "dry out" should not have been a problem. Mary Andrews works in Petitioner's business office. She did not know about Respondent's order until the truck arrived on October 9, 2007, but she managed the "dig and load" within three hours of the truck’s arrival. She testified that Petitioner digs trees throughout the year so that when a truck arrives, the trees have not been sitting dry in a field for lengthy periods of time. Petitioner sold 3500 similar trees in the previous year without any dry-out problems. Petitioner had admitted in evidence, without objection, Florida Division of Forestry rainfall records for three locations near Petitioner's nursery. All three official records show six inches of rainfall for the week immediately preceding October 9, 2007. Petitioner maintains that the trucker should have watered the hollies en route. Respondent believes the trucker did water them, but the trucker did not testify, so there is no direct evidence that the trucker watered the hollies en route. The parties have tried to work this situation out, but their respective offers of compromise are not admissible herein, pursuant to Section 90.408, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered that Respondent L.M.I. East, Incorporated d/b/a L.M.I. Landscapers, Inc., shall pay Petitioner, A.D. Andrews Nursery, Inc., the sum of $4,210.00, and that if L.M.I. East, Incorporated d/b/a L.M.I. Landscapers, Inc., fails to pay Petitioner, A.D. Andrews Nursery, Inc., within 30 days of the final order, then Respondent, Western Surety Company, shall pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes, and that the Department reimburse Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Teal Pomeroy Qualified Representative A.D. Andrews Nursery, Inc. Post Office Box 1126 Chiefland, Florida 32644-1126 Pat Tronzano Qualified Representative L.M.I. East, Incorporated d/b/a L.M.I. Landscapers, Inc. 1437 Halsey Way Carrollton, Texas 75007-4410 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Charles H. Bronson Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Western Surety Company Post Office Box 5077 Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57117-5077
The Issue Whether Respondent, Garrison Irrigation, Inc., failed to pay amounts owing to Petitioner resulting from a verbal contract for four pallets of Bahia sod as set forth in the complaint dated July 20, 2004, and, if so, what amount Petitioner is entitled to recover.
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witness and her demeanor while testifying, the documents received into evidence, and the entire record of this proceeding, the following relevant and material findings of fact are determined: At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner, C.M. Payne and Son, Inc., was a producer of agricultural products as that term is defined in Subsection 604.15(5), Florida Statutes (2004). At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent, Garrison Irrigation, Inc. (Garrison), was licensed as a dealer in agriculture products as that term is defined in Subsection 604.15(1), Florida Statutes (2004). Respondent was licensed under number 13653, supported by Bond No. 929237754 in the amount of $10,000; written by Respondent, Continental Casualty Company, as Surety (Continental); Inception Date: December 4, 2003; Expiration Date: December 3, 2004; and Execution Date: December 4, 2003. At all times material, Continental is the surety which issued Garrison a surety bond. On January 23, 2004, Petitioner sold 16 pallets of Bahia sod to Garrison and, on Invoice 20027, billed Garrison a total of $599.20 for the 16 pallets of sod. On January 26, 2004, Petitioner sold 32 pallets of Bahia sod to Garrison and, on Invoice 20033, billed Garrison a total of $1,198.40 for the 32 pallets of sod. On January 27, 2004, Petitioner sold 16 pallets of Bahia sod to Garrison and, on Invoice 20039, billed Garrison a total of $599.20 for the 16 pallets of sod. On February 2, 2004, Petitioner sold 16 pallets of Bahia sod to Garrison and, on Invoice 20044, billed Garrison a total of $599.20 for the 16 pallets of sod. The terms of the sale between Petitioner and Garrison were for net payment for products sold within 30 days after the invoice date. Garrison did not appear at the hearing to contest or otherwise refute the charges alleged in Petitioner's complaint. Garrison is indebted to Petitioner in the amount of $2,996.00 for Bahia sod purchases from Petitioner on January 23, 26, and 27, 2004, and February 2, 2004. Garrison has failed to pay Petitioner for the sod purchases.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue its final order requiring that Respondent, Garrison Irrigation, Inc., pay to Petitioner, C. M. Payne and Son, Inc., the amount of $2,996.00 for the purchases of Bahia sod from Petitioner on January 23, 26, and 27, 2004, and February 2, 2004. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent, Garrison Irrigation, Inc., fails to comply with the order directing payment, the Department shall call upon the surety, Continental Casualty Company, to pay over to the Department from funds out of the surety certificate, the amount needed to satisfy the indebtedness. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2004.
The Issue Whether Respondent, L.A. Wroten Company, Inc., is indebted to Petitioner for agricultural products purchased by Respondent Wroten from the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings. Respondent, L.A. Wroten Company, Inc., is a Florida corporation and a licensed dealer in agricultural products. During times material, Respondent Wroten possessed a surety bond issued through Respondent, Cincinnati Insurance Company. During times material, Respondent Wroten employed Grady Smith as a field representative, who is authorized to and on numerous occasions, purchased watermelons on Respondent Wroten's behalf. Petitioner is a producer of agricultural products, specifically watermelons. Petitioner has been a producer of melons for approximately 30 years. Petitioner has known Grady Smith, Respondent Wroten's representative, in excess of ten years and has had business dealings with Smith as a representative of Respondent Wroten on several occasions during 1991 and 1992. During May and June 1992, Petitioner sold five (5) loads of watermelons to Respondent Wroten. At issue here is the fifth load Petitioner sold to Respondent Wroten on June 6, 1992. All five loads of melons sold by Petitioner to Respondent Wroten were loaded and shipped over a short period of time, to wit, May 30-June 6, 1992. All of the melons came from the same field. On June 6, 1992, Grady Smith, acting as a representative of Respondent Wroten, agreed to purchase a load of royal sweet watermelons from Petitioner at 4 per pound. The load of "royal sweets" consisted of the following melons: Load #6138 57,700 pounds x 4 cents = $2,308.00. Beginning in 1991 and continuing through 1992, Petitioner and Smith, acting on Respondent's behalf, agreed to the sale of melons under an understanding that the sale and purchase was F.O.B. at Coleman, Florida, acceptance final at shipping point. The agreement also included an understanding that the Respondent would provide the trailers and pay all transportation charges for the melons. Pursuant to the agreement, payment for the melons was due "when they moved over the scale", i.e., as soon as the trucks were loaded and weighed or within the following day. Finally, the agreement between the parties was that title and risk of loss to the melons passed to Respondent Wroten at the time of shipment. Respondent Wroten 's representative Smith offered other producers and growers in the area identical terms under which they conducted their business with Respondent Wroten. On June 6, 1992, the "royal sweet" melons in question were loaded on trailers provided by Respondent Wroten. Respondent Wroten's representative Smith was present in the field as the truck was loaded and he inspected and "graded" the melons as they were loaded. Any melons which were not deemed acceptable to Smith were taken from the conveyor belt so that they would not be loaded. When the trailer was loaded, representative Smith accepted the load and indicated that the melons "looked good to him". Respondent Wroten has not paid Petitioner any of the amount claimed to be due for the melons in question. Respondent Wroten contended that the melons were "overripe" when they reached their ultimate destination on June 9, 1992. 1/ There is an industry practice whereby the producer or seller agrees to accept the risk of loss until the produce reaches its final destination and the products are sold. This practice is referred to as offering "protection" or "ride-the-load". Petitioner did not offer to Respondent, in this instance, any protection or otherwise "ride-the-load".
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Department enter a final order requiring Respondent L.A. Wroten Company, Inc., be ordered to pay Petitioner the sum of $2,308.00. In the event that Respondent L.A. Wroten Company, Inc., fails to timely pay Petitioner as ordered, that Respondent Cincinnati Insurance Company be ordered to pay the Department the sum of $2,308.00 as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes and that the Department reimburse Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1993.
The Issue The ultimate issue for determination at formal hearing was whether Lester Towell Distributors, Inc., is indebted to Carol Vreeland for produce, i.e., squash, sold to Lester Towell Distributors by Carol Vreeland's son, Kurt Vreeland, as grower.
Findings Of Fact Richard Vreeland and Carol Vreeland (Petitioner) are husband and wife. Kurt Vreeland is their adult son. Kurt Vreeland did not appear at the hearing. In prior years before the incident in this case, Richard Vreeland had grown and sold produce. However, for the 1992 season, because of a neck injury, he had decided not to grow and sell produce. Kurt Vreeland who had no experience in the growing of produce convinced his parents to allow him to grow and sell the produce, i.e., squash. Petitioner and her husband agreed but placed certain conditions on their son. The conditions were that Kurt Vreeland would rent the land from his parents and that from the proceeds of the sale of the squash, he would reimburse his parents for the expenses they incurred in growing the produce and that Kurt Vreeland would receive the balance of the proceeds from the sale of the squash. The squash was grown on land owned by Petitioner and her husband. Supervision for the crop of squash was performed by Rodney Willis. Willis had an oral agreement with Kurt Vreeland to supervise the growing of the crop of squash, and in return Kurt Vreeland would pay him for his services and labor expenses that he, Willis, incurred. Willis was aware that the squash would be transported to Lester Towell Distributors, Inc. (Respondent) for sale. Willis has never received any payment from Kurt Vreeland for his services or the labor expenses that he incurred. Respondent is a company in the business of selling produce for growers at a commission plus expenses. On or about April 1, 1992, an individual who identified himself as Kurt Vreeland, offered to sell squash to Respondent. Respondent had no reason to doubt that the individual was Kurt Vreeland. No evidence was presented that the individual was not Kurt Vreeland. On April 14, 1992, a "Packing and Sales Agreement" (Agreement) was entered into by Kurt Vreeland and Respondent, represented by Fred Towell who is Respondent's President. On April 16, 1992, the Agreement was executed by them. In the Agreement, Kurt Vreeland was specifically referred to as "Grower," and Respondent, at times, as "Grower's Agent." The Agreement states in pertinent part: [W]hereas, Grower desires to retain LESTER TOWELL DISTRIBUTORS, INC. as its agent for the purpose of sale of the Grower's produce and for the performance of such other services in connection therewith as may be specifically set forth, and whereas, * * * Now, therefore, it is agreed as follows: FIRST: Grower hereby retains Grower's Agent during 1992 farm year and entrust him from time to time for the purpose of sale, with the possession and control of Grower's produce. SECOND: Prior to delivering any produce to the Grower's Agent, Grower will apprise Grower's Agent whether Grower has pledged any of the crop proceeds or granted a security interest therein to any third party and if so the name and address of such third party. Grower will, at all times during the term of this agreement, apprise Grower's Agent of any such additional liens placed on his crops as soon as such has occurred. Grower shall indemnify Grower's Agent from all losses and expenses, including reasonable attorney fees incurred by Grower's Agent caused by (1) failure of Grower to promptly furnish such information and (2) any misstatements with regard to the information provided. THIRD: Grower's Agent shall receive at LESTER TOWELL DISTRIBUTORS, INC. located at 900 Lester Towell Blvd., in Belle Glade, Florida 33430, Growers, produce for the purpose of shipping and selling the same at the ten percent (10 percent) of sales charge established between the Grower and Grower's Agent which shall only be changed by mutual agreement. Grower's Agent shall be respon- sible for the INVOICING AND ACCOUNTING of all Grower's produce received by and or sold by Grower's Agent. * * * SIXTH: Accounting and/or payment shall be made to Grower within sixty (60) business days from the date Grower's produce is deliv- ered and sold on the terms accepted, but only on the basis of the actual final selling price. By the execution of this agreement, Grower permits that there may be deducted from the actual selling price all actual ex- penses as described in paragraphs Fourth and Fifth, and the agreed upon charges set forth in paragraph Third. * * * GENERAL CONDITIONS AND STATEMENTS UNDER THE PERISHABLES AGRICULTURAL COMMODI- TIES ACT, 7 U.S.C. S499 (a)et seq AND REGU- LATIONS OF THE AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICUL- TURE, IT IS REQUIRED THAT THERE BE MADE A STATEMENT OF THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GROWER'S AGENT WILL HANDLE PRODUCE FOR THE GROWER. THE FOLLOWING IS THAT AGREE- MENT BETWEEN THE GROWER AND THE GROWER'S AGENT, TOGETHER WITH THE CONTRACT TERMS OF THIS DOCUMENT. * * * 2. Grower shall haul and deliver all produce to Grower's Agent packing house at Grower's expense. Produce must be delivered either in crates, Grower's pallet box or such other containers as have been agreed to by the Grower's Agent. * * * Grower's Agent shall issue receipts to Grower for all produce received. A lot num- ber or other positive means of identification shall be assigned by Grower's Agent to each lot in order to segregate the various lots of produce received from different Growers for similar produce being handled at the same time, and each lot shall be so identified and segregated throughout all operations con- ducted by Grower's Agent. At the end of April 1992 or first of May 1992, Petitioner telephoned Respondent notifying Respondent that checks for the sale of the produce should be made payable to Petitioner and Kurt Vreeland. Petitioner spoke with Margaret Jeanne "Jeannie" Woodward. Petitioner was assured by Ms. Woodward that the checks would be made payable to Petitioner and her son. What Ms. Woodward had agreed to do was contrary to Respondent's standard operating procedure which was to issue checks for the sale of produce only to persons with whom Respondent had entered into a contract. In April 1992, Respondent sold squash supplied to it by Kurt Vreeland. On or about May 4, 1992, a check for squash sold was issued by Respondent and made payable to Petitioner and Kurt Vreeland and was mailed to an address other than Petitioner's address. The check was prepared and signed by Ms. Woodward. On or about May 19, 1992, Kurt Vreeland and another person appeared at Respondent's place of business, requesting another check, indicating that he had never received the original check. Ms. Woodward attempted to issue the check payable to Petitioner and Kurt Vreeland, but he objected, insisting that the check be made payable only to him, since the contract was with him and no one else. Ms. Woodward complied with the demand and issued another check payable only to Kurt Vreeland. Ms. Woodward complied with Kurt Vreeland's demand because: 1) The contract was in fact with Kurt Vreeland and no one else; 2) Respondent's standard operating procedure was to issue checks only to persons with whom Respondent had entered into a contract; and 3) Kurt Vreeland was demanding that Respondent comply with the contract that he, and only he, receive payment. On the same day the new check was issued, it was cashed at Respondent's bank, showing an endorsement by Kurt Vreeland. Subsequently, after not receiving any money from Respondent, Petitioner telephoned Respondent. Ms. Woodward notified Petitioner that the checks could only be made payable to Kurt Vreeland because the contract for sale of the squash was with him only. Further, Petitioner was informed by Ms. Woodward that she must present proof to Respondent that she, not Kurt Vreeland, owns the produce. This was the first time that Ms. Woodward had experienced this type of situation and was not sure what kind of evidence or proof Petitioner would need to submit. Petitioner and her husband telephoned Respondent several times attempting to convince Respondent that they, not their son, Kurt Vreeland, owned the produce and that checks should be made payable to Petitioner and her son. However, their efforts were to no avail. On May 9, 1992, Petitioner mailed a letter to Respondent, by certified mail, reiterating that the produce was owned by her and checks should be made payable to her and her son. Respondent received the certified letter on May 21, 1992. On May 19, 1992, prior to receiving Petitioner's certified letter, Respondent issued to Kurt Vreeland another check in the amount of $3,346.20 for the sale of additional squash delivered by Kurt Vreeland to Respondent. The check was prepared and signed on behalf of Respondent by Ms. Woodward. That same day, the check was cashed at Respondent's bank, showing an endorsement by Kurt Vreeland. After mailing the certified letter, Petitioner and her husband believed that the matter, regarding the checks, had been resolved, but shortly discovered that they were mistaken. Merchants to whom their son had written checks and with whom Petitioner and her husband did business, were complaining to Petitioner and her husband that their son's checks had been returned for insufficient funds. This new development caused Petitioner and her husband to again contact Respondent by telephone. At that time, Respondent informed Petitioner and her husband of the check issued on May 19, 1992, made payable only to Kurt Vreeland, reiterating that the contract was only with their son. Further, Respondent informed them that Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) had verbally made a claim on the proceeds from the squash on behalf of Kurt Vreeland's ex-wife for his children and that Respondent was not complying with HRS' request either because it had shown no proof that the ex-wife was entitled to the proceeds. On June 19, 1992, Ms. Woodward issued to Kurt Vreeland a check in the amount of $1,774.35 for more squash that it had sold in May 1992 on behalf of Kurt Vreeland. That same day, the check was cashed at Respondent's bank, showing an endorsement by Kurt Vreeland. Before the June 19, 1992 check was issued, Petitioner and her husband made numerous telephone calls to Respondent attempting to convince Respondent to make the checks payable to Petitioner and her son, Kurt Vreeland. Again, all to no avail. After the June 19, 1992 check, Kurt Vreeland did not provide Respondent with any more squash for it to sell. Consequently, no further checks were issued. At one point in time, out of frustration, Respondent requested Petitioner and her husband to remove some remaining squash that had been brought to Respondent by Kurt Vreeland. However, the squash was not removed. At all times material hereto, Petitioner and her husband were aware of the different periods that their son removed squash from the land to take to Respondent for sale. At all times material hereto, at no time did Kurt Vreeland inform Respondent that either Petitioner or her husband had ownership in the squash. Neither Petitioner nor her husband have received any money from their son, Kurt Vreeland, for the expenses they incurred with the 1992 crop of squash, nor for rent of their land to grow the produce.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services issue a final order dismissing Petitioner's complaint. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of August 1993. ERROLL H. POWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of August, 1993.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for a pari-mutuel occupational license as a harness driver should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency which is charged with the administration and regulation of the pari-mutuel wagering industry in the State of Florida. On October 29, 1992, Petitioner applied to Respondent for a pari-mutuel occupational license as a harness driver. On January 22, 1993, Respondent denied Petitioner's application. /1 Respondent relies on the provisions of Section 550.10(5), Florida Statutes, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (5) The division may deny, revoke, or suspend any occupational license when the applicant therefor or holder thereof shall accumulate unpaid obligations or default in obligations, or issue drafts or checks that are dishonored or for which payment is refused without reasonable cause, when such unpaid obligations, defaults, or dishonored or refused drafts or checks directly relate to the sport of jai-alai or racing being conducted at a pari-mutuel facility within this state. Millpond Equine Clinic, a veterinary clinic, has two outstanding accounts that were opened by Petitioner. One of those two accounts was opened in Petitioner's individual name. For ease of reference, this account will be referred to as the first Millpond account. There has been no payment on that account since October 8, 1991, and there was, at the time of the formal hearing, an outstanding balance in that account in the amount of $104.00. The first Millpond account was for services directly related to the sport of racing being conducted at a pari-mutuel facility within the State of Florida. The second Millpond account opened by Petitioner was opened in the name of Miracle Shoe in care of Petitioner. There was no evidence that Miracle Shoe was a corporation at any time this account was opened. For ease of reference, this account will be referred to as the second Millpond account. This account shows an outstanding balance in the amount of $300.00. There has been no payment on the second account since May 20, 1988. The second Millpond account was for services directly related to the sport of racing being conducted at a pari-mutuel facility within the State of Florida. Miracle Shoe is a plastic horseshoe that Petitioner has attempted to develop for a number of years. Petitioner hopes to market this product to owners and trainers of horses, including race horses, in Florida and elsewhere. Petitioner formed a series of companies ostensibly for the purpose of developing and marketing Miracle Shoe. Three of the corporations formed by Petitioner were Equine Concepts, Inc., Equine Technology, Inc., and Equine Innovations, Inc. At the time of the formal hearing, two of the three corporations, Equine Concepts, Inc. and Equine Innovations, Inc. had no assets and had been dissolved as corporations by the State of Florida. Investors were attracted to these corporations through newspaper advertisements. Investors typically paid $10,000 for a 10 percent share of the corporate stock and were made officers or directors of the corporation. Petitioner thereafter treated corporate funds from the investors as his own and paid his personal expenses from these corporate funds. On at least one occasion, Petitioner formed a new corporation, which he referred to as a "clean" corporation to attract new investors. Petitioner wrote worthless bank checks on his various corporate accounts and accumulated unpaid bills in the name of these corporations. /2 Petitioner and several of the investors in Petitioner's companies attended horse shows in Germany and Kentucky to promote the Miracle Shoe. Part of the marketing strategy was for Petitioner to try to make a favorable impression on the owners and trainers of race horses. One of the reasons Petitioner sought licensure as a harness driver in the State of Florida was to gain access to pari-mutuel grounds to facilitate the marketing of the Miracle Shoe.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a harness driver. DONE AND ORDERED this 26th day of July, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26 day of July, 1993.
