The Issue The issue is whether Dr. Wise abused his position as a treating psychiatrist for five young women by using his influence over them to engage in sexual relationships with them in violation of Section 458.331(1)(k), Florida Statutes, (1979), [now codified as Section 458.331(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1987)] and whether he is therefore guilty of unprofessional or immoral conduct in violation of Section 458.1201(1), Florida Statutes, (1969) [now codified as Section 458.329, Florida Statutes, (1987)]. If Dr. Wise is guilty of any of these activities, he would also be guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(x), Florida Statutes (1987), which proscribes the violation of any portion of Chapter 458. Sexual misconduct with patients would also constitute gross or repeated malpractice, which is forbidden by Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (1987).
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Dr. Wise has been a licensed medical doctor, holding license ME0008520. He has been licensed in Florida since 1957 and practices in the area of Adult and Child Psychiatry in Miami. He has been a board certified psychiatrist in since 1965. Patient L. H. From July 1969 through April 1971, Dr. Wise treated L.H, who was 21 years of age. When she began treatment, she was experiencing panic attacks and had other problems resulting from sexual molestation as a child, rape, alcoholism, and family problems. At first she had visited Dr. Wise weekly, but toward the end of her 1 1/2 years of therapy, she saw him every other week. L.H. alleges that shortly before she terminated her treatment with Dr. Wise she had a severe panic attack which caused her to telephone Dr. Wise, who then offered to provide therapy at Dr. Wise's apartment. When she arrived, she says Dr. Wise was in his bathrobe, took her to the bedroom, told her to place her hand on his penis and had sexual relations with her. She also maintains that Dr. Wise saw her on one other occasion in his office, when no sex occurred. L. H. said nothing about Dr. Wise's conduct at the time the incident was to have taken place. Fourteen years later, L.H. was seeing a psychologist in St. Louis, Missouri, Dr. Gertrude Williams. In the course of therapy with Dr. Williams, L.H. stated that she had sexual intercourse with Dr. Wise while she was his patient. This disclosure to Dr. Williams is consistent with the testimony L. H. gave at the final hearing. In October of 1985, L.H. filed a complaint against Dr. Wise with the South Florida Psychiatric Society alleging sexual misconduct, but after a two-day hearing a panel of twelve doctors found against L.H. and in favor of Dr. Wise. The testimony of L. H. was no more persuasive in this case than it was before the Psychiatric Society. In October, 1985, L.H. also filed a complaint which the Department investigated, but found the charges unsubstantiated. No disciplinary action was initiated against Dr. Wise at that time. The evidence in the instant case with respect to the allegations of misconduct by Dr. Wise with L.H. was not clearly convincing or persuasive. Patient S.P. Dr. Wise treated S.P. from July, 1980 through July, 1981 at his office in Miami. She was then approximately 19 years old and had complaints of nervousness, insomnia and hyperventilation. She saw Dr. Wise approximately two times per week (on Tuesdays and Thursdays) for therapy. Although originally seen in the morning, her appointments were changed to late in the afternoon. S.P. alleges that within two months after beginning treatment, while she was sitting on the couch during a therapy session, Dr. Wise got up from another couch, sat down next to her and began to kiss her. She also alleges that during subsequent visits Dr. Wise had sexual intercourse with her. S.P. filed a civil lawsuit for malpractice against Dr. Wise alleging the same sexual misconduct alleged here as the basis for her damage claim. After a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Wise. S.P.'s marriage failed while she was seeing Dr. Wise. She had often stayed out late, and told her husband that she was at therapy sessions with Dr. Wise. It is not clear whether these late night absences from home were actually the result of appointments with Dr. Wise or were the result of other appointments which she justified to her husband by claiming they were appointments with Dr. Wise. After terminating treatment with Dr. Wise, S.P. began seeing a Roman catholic priest who was also trained as a counselor. She told him that she had been seeing a local psychiatrist who, after a few sessions, had engaged in sexual intimacy with her. After moving back to her mother's home due to her breakup with her husband, S.P. also told her mother that she and Dr. Wise had been sexually intimate. These statements by S. P. were consistent with her testimony at final hearing; that the testimony is consistent, however, does not make it persuasive. Taken as a whole, the evidence that Dr. Wise may have engaged in a sexual relationship with S. P. is not clearly convincing. Patient L. M. Dr. Wise treated L.M. during the period from late 1972 through February of 1973. She was sixteen years old and was seeking to improve her relationship with her parents. She alleges that during one of her early visits Dr. Wise questioned her about the pimple on her forehead, and asked whether she had pimples on any other area of her body. She says she responded that she had a pimple on her back, and alleges that Dr. Wise then asked to see her back. When she lifted her pullover, she says Dr. Wise fondled her breasts briefly. Viewing the testimony of L.M. as a whole, the evidence is not clearly convincing that Dr. Wise ever fondled her breasts. Patient K. M. Dr. Wise treated K.M. from 1982, when she was 18 years old, until 1984. K. M. came to see Dr. Wise because of problems including an abortion she had when she was 15 years old, as well as a prior incestuous relationship with her brother. K.M. testified that she would go to Dr. Wise's office for treatment late in the evening, when they also would engage in sexual intercourse. She also testified that in 1985, after she terminated her therapeutic relation with Dr. Wise, she told her general practice physician, Dr. Peter Shea, during an office visit, that she had an affair with Dr. Wise. As with the foregoing witnesses, the statement made to Dr. Shea is consistent with K. M.'s testimony at final hearing, but that consistency does not enhance K. M.'s testimony. The testimony of K.M. concerning liaisons with Dr. Wise is not clearly convincing. Patient L. G. L.G. saw Dr. Wise beginning in April, 1974 when she was 21 years old. When she first came to Dr. Wise she complained of depression, unhappiness, and confusion. She told Dr. Wise that she was lonely and did not have a good relationship with men. Dr. Wise also treated L.G.'s sister, Joan. After about two months of seeing her on a weekly basis, L.G. alleges that Dr. Wise came over to the couch where she was sitting, embraced her, and during the course of the treatment, their physical relationship became more intimate. The intimacies were to have included oral sex which L.G. performed on Dr. Wise, which she thought was therapy for her psychological problems with sexual intimacy. L.G. terminated her relationship with Dr. Wise and began seeing a psychologist at the University of Miami, Edward Rappaport. During the course of treatment L.G. reported to Dr. Rappaport that she had been sexually involved with Dr. Wise. The testimony of L.G. at final hearing is consistent with the statement she made to Dr. Rappaport during therapy that Dr. Wise engaged in sex with her while she was seeing Dr. Wise for professional help. The consistency of the testimony does not make it persuasive. Considering the testimony of L.G. and Dr. Rappaport, the evidence offered to show that Dr. Wise had engaged in sexual intimacies with L.G. while she was seen as a patient is not clearly convincing.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a Final Order dismissing the second amended Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 22rd day of May, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22rd day of May, 1989. APPENDIX The following constitutes my rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1987). Rulings on Findings of Fact Proposed by the Department of Professional Regulation Covered in finding of fact 1. Covered in finding of fact 1. Accepted in findings of fact 2, 6, 10, 11 and 12. Covered in finding of fact 11. 6-7. Rejected for the reasons stated in finding of fact 11. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 9. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 11. 13 Covered in finding of fact 6. Covered in finding of fact 7, of the facts stated that are rejected. Rejected because the testimony of S.P. was not clearly convincing. Covered in finding of fact 9. Covered in finding of fact 9. The proposals concerning the telephone calls are rejected as unnecessary. Rejected because the testimony of S.P. was not clearly convincing. Covered in finding of fact 9. Rejected as subordinate to finding of fact 9. Rejected as subordinate to finding of fact 9. Covered in finding of fact 9. Covered in finding of fact 9. To the extent necessary, covered in finding of fact 24. The proposal concerning the telephone calls is rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. 26.-29. To the extent necessary, covered in finding of fact 10. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 13, although the proposals are rejected because L.G.'s testimony was not clearly convincing. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected because the testimony of L.G. is not clearly convincing. Rejected as unnecessary. 37.-38. To the extent necessary, covered in finding of fact 13. 39. Rejected as unnecessary. 40. Covered in finding of fact 13. 41.-42. Rejected because the testimony of L.G. was not clearly convincing. 43. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 3, although the proposed findings are rejected. Covered in finding of fact 3, although the proposed findings are rejected. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 4. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected because of the testimony of the complaining witnesses has not been clearly convincing. 50.-53. Rejected as unnecessary. 54. Rejected as unnecessary. Rulings on Findings of Fact Proposed By Dr. Wise Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 1. Covered in finding of fact 1. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 2 Covered in finding of fact 4. Covered in finding of fact 5. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 5. Covered in finding of fact 6. Covered in finding of fact 6. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 7. Covered in finding of fact 8. Covered in finding of fact 11. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 11. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in finding of fact 12. Covered in finding of fact 12. Covered in finding of fact 12, to the extent necessary. Covered in finding of fact 14. Covered in finding of fact 10. Covered in finding of fact 10. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 10. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Sewell, Esquire Law offices of Mark P. Lang 20 North Orange Avenue Suite 707 Post Office Box 2127 Orlando, FL 32802-2127 Jonathan King, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750 Kenneth D. Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750A =================================================================
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2009),1 by discriminating against Petitioner based on her gender and by allowing her to be sexually harassed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a for-profit Florida corporation owned by Robert J. Morrisseau, Sr. Even though he was Respondent's president, Mr. Morrisseau, Sr., was not usually involved in the company's day-to-day operations. Robert J. Morrisseau, Jr., is Respondent's vice- president. Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., was primarily responsible for the company's operation. He also served as crew supervisor. Most of Respondent's work, which involved installing carpeting and tile in commercial facilities, was performed in locations that required the work crew to travel. Respondent's crew often had to stay in motels. Respondent contracted with an employee leasing company to handle Respondent's payroll and workers' compensation administration. All employees filled out an application provided by the employee leasing company, but Respondent made all hiring and firing decisions. Respondent did not give its employees information regarding Respondent's human resource policies and procedures. Employees were not told what to do when they believed someone in the company was discriminating against them. Petitioner is a female who dated Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., in the fall of 2008. While they were dating, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., told Petitioner he would give her a job and teach her to lay tile. Petitioner and Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., stopped dating in December 2008. However, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., made good on his promise to Petitioner, hiring her as a laborer on January 26, 2009. In January 2009, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., wanted to reestablish a personal relationship with Petitioner. Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., hoped giving Petitioner a job would facilitate that goal. Petitioner was thankful for the job, but she did not want to date Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., again. At all times material here, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., was Petitioner's supervisor. He also employed and supervised Petitioner's sister and her boyfriend and Petitioner's daughter and her boyfriend. Off and on in January 2009 through March 2009, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., supervised a crew laying carpet and tile in Spanish Fort, Alabama. Petitioner and Petitioner's daughter and sister and their boyfriends were also part of the crew on at least two trips to Alabama. Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., rented three motel rooms for the Alabama job. He took one room with one bed. The other two rooms had two beds. On one occasion, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., told Petitioner she could sleep in the room with him or with her sister and the sister's boyfriend or the other male employees. On another occasion, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., told Petitioner she could sleep with her daughter and her daughter's boyfriend or the other male employees. On both occasions, Petitioner chose to sleep on the extra bed in a room with one of the couples. Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., never threatened Petitioner, directly or indirectly, with consequences if she did not choose to stay in his room. There is no evidence that Petitioner felt Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., was giving her a quid pro quo choice. Petitioner's job responsibilities included driving company vehicles, preparing floors for tile, and learning to lay tile. She was not expected to carry 40-foot rolls of carpet or to carry heavy loads of tile up three flights of stairs. However, Petitioner was willing to help any way she could. One time in Alabama, Petitioner and her daughter were on their knees, preparing a floor for tile. Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., took pictures of the women from the back and made a comment about the daughter's backside, stating it was as big as a man's. Respondent also had a job in Daytona Beach, Florida. Petitioner was part of the crew that worked in Daytona Beach, along with Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., and several male employees during the weeks of February 27, 2009, and March 2, 2009. Once again, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., rented three motel rooms. He gave Petitioner the option of staying in the room with him or with the other men. Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., did not think anything of asking Petitioner if she wanted to stay in the room with him because he and Petitioner had stayed in the same hotel room previously on other occasions. During the weeks of February 27, 2009, and March 2, 2009, Petitioner elected to stay in the room with her co-workers rather than in the room with Mr. Morrisseau, Jr. There is no evidence that Petitioner believed Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., was giving her a quid pro quo choice. On one trip to Daytona Beach, Florida, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., and another male employee bought cocaine and brought it back to the motel. Petitioner does not deny that she used some of the cocaine that night. The next morning, the crew, including Petitioner, went back to work at 7:30 a.m. On March 11, 2009, Respondent fired Petitioner. During the hearing, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., testified that he did not fire Petitioner because she used drugs in Daytona Beach. This testimony is contrary to a statement made by Mr. Morrisseau, Sr., in an e-mail dated December 7, 2009. During the hearing, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., testified that Petitioner was not fired because she was a woman and inadequate to perform the work. However, Petitioner and other employees heard Mr. Morrisseau, Sr., and Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., state that Petitioner and her daughter, as females, were inadequate for the job and/or that women did not need to work out of town. According to Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., he fired Petitioner because, after returning from Daytona Beach, Petitioner's work was not satisfactory. He claims that she failed to report for work because she was using illegal drugs with her boyfriend. He also claims that Petitioner was fighting with other employees, referring to an alleged altercation between Petitioner and her daughter. Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., admitted during the hearing that he had no first-hand knowledge that Petitioner continued to use drugs after returning from Daytona Beach. He did not see Petitioner fighting with other employees. Mr. Morrisseau, Sr., testified at hearing that he had no issue with Petitioner's work the one weekend he went to the Alabama job. According to Mr. Morrisseau, Sr., Petitioner "worked her little tail off" that weekend. The reason Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., gave for terminating Petitioner's employment is not credible. The most persuasive evidence indicates that Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., terminated Petitioner's employment because she was a woman and, in his opinion, inadequate to do the job. Respondent also fired Petitioner's daughter on March 11, 2009. However, Respondent rehired the daughter on March 20, 2009. The daughter worked for Respondent until the company went out of business in June 2009. The jobs in Alabama and Florida were not done properly. Mr. Morrisseau, Sr., had to bring in another company to redo and complete at least five jobs. Mr. Morrisseau, Sr., closed down the business and let all employees go in June 2009. Petitioner was unemployed from March 11, 2009, through January 1, 2010. She is entitled to lost wages for that period of time. However, Petitioner failed to present any evidence regarding the amount of lost wages during the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order, directing Respondent to cease violating Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 2010.
Findings Of Fact Having listened to the testimony and considered the evidence presented in this cause, it is found as follows: Dr. Richard M. Dunham is licensed to practice psychology in the State of Florida by the State Board of Examiners of Psychology. Dr. Dunham is primarily employed as a tenured professor on the faculty of Florida State University. Dr. Dunham is not trying to build a private practice, and over a two or three month period may see three to four people professionally. In connection with this limited private practice he maintains an office in his home in Wakulla County and did so at all times pertinent to this cause. It was Dr. Dunham's usual practice to see patients for counseling in his home, rather than in his office on the University campus or some other place. In 1973, Dr. Dunham was acquainted, through his service in the United States Naval Reserve, with Dan Holsenbeck, then the husband of Judy Holsenbeck. He was likewise acquainted with Judy Holsenbeck. Dr. Glenn King, a clinical psychologist with the Auburn University Clinic, counseled Mrs. Holsenbeck on October 23, 1973, in Auburn, Alabama. Over the next five or six weeks, he saw her a total of five times for counseling, the last session being November 5, 1973. She related to Dr. King that she was concerned because she was sexually attracted to other men and she was unable, to achieve orgasm during intercourse with her husband. Further, she was depressed because she felt she could not be faithful to her husband. Dr. King counseled her and found her to have a passive aggressive personality disorder with depressive features. In early December, 1973, Mrs. Holsenbeck moved to Tallahassee, Florida. Through her husband's contact with Dr. Dunham, she met with him in his office on the FSU campus sometime around December 20, 1973, to discuss her psychological problems and to seek counseling. Dr. Dunham suggested several other psychologists whom she could consult, and, in the alternative, offered to take Mrs. Holsenbeck as a patient himself. Mrs. Holsenbeck requested Dr. Dunham to take her as patient, to which request he acceded. The psychological problems Mrs. Holsenbeck related to Dr. Dunham for which she sought counseling, involved her sexual activity and were similar in nature to those related to Dr. King at Auburn. After the initial meeting on or about December 20, 1973, Dr. Dunham saw Mrs. Holsenbeck as a patient on five separate occasions. These were as follows: December 27, 1973; January 1, 1974; January 17, 1974; February 6, 1974; and February 28, 1974, which meeting Mrs. Holsenbeck recalls occurring on March 6, 1974. Each of these meetings was a counseling session and took place at the home of Dr. Dunham in Wakulla County. It was alleged that in the course of the counseling sessions on January 17, 1974, and February 6, 1974, Dr. Dunham engaged in sexual intercourse and other sexual activities with Mrs. Holsenbeck. It was further alleged, that at the last counseling session, which occurred on February 28, 1974, Dr. Dunham made sexual advances toward Mrs. Holsenbeck, which were rebuffed. No one other than Dr. Dunham and Mrs. Holsenbeck were present in the home of Dr. Dunham at the time of the counseling sessions on January 17, 1974, and February 6, 1974. Similarly, no one other than Dr. Dunham and Mrs. Holsenbeck were present at the inception of the last counseling session. However, Mrs. Dunham, Dr. Dunham's wife of 7 or 8 years, came home during that counselling session. Mrs. Dunham was aware of Mrs. Holsenbeck's presence in the house and was not aware of any sexual activity or problem between Dr. Dunham and Mrs. Holsenbeck at that time. The counseling sessions on January 17, 1974, and February 6, 1974, took place at approximately 9:00 a.m. and lasted from one hour to one and one-half hours. The last counseling session occurred in the early evening. In December of 1973, and continuing through the date of the last counseling session, Mrs. Holsenbeck worked in a race relations program headed by Dr. Dunham at F.S.U. Mrs. Holsenbeck was very dissatisfied and eventually withdrew from it in the spring of 1974. On April 18, 1974, Dr. King contacted Mrs. Holsenbeck, at the request of her husband, whereupon Mrs. Holsenbeck alleged that Dr. Dunham had made certain sexual advances toward her during the course of his treatment of her. After a further meeting with Mrs. Holsenbeck, Dr. King told her that Dr. Dunham's alleged conduct was a serious breach of ethics and asked her if she would lodge a complaint against Dr. Dunham. Thereafter, Dr. King put Mrs. Holsenbeck in touch with Dr. Wallace Kennedy, also of the FSU faculty, and under whom Dr. King had studied. Dr. King had Mrs. Holsenbeck contact Dr. Kennedy so that her allegations might be conducted to the Florida State Board of Examiners of Psychology for action by them. There was evidence presented of a serious professional and, perhaps, personal disagreement between Dr. Dunham and Dr. Kennedy, who are both in the same psychology department at FSU. This disagreement arose long before December, 1973. Both the Petitioner, Florida State Board of Examiners of Psychology and the Respondent, Dr. Richard Dunham, agree that acts of the nature alleged constitute a serious ethical breach warranting suspension or revocation of a license to practice psychology. It was not proved by clear and convincing evidence that Dr. Richard Dunham made sexual advances toward, nor engaged in sexual activities with Mrs. Holsenbeck at any time. It is a very unwise practice on the part of Dr. Dunham to counsel patients in the privacy of his own home with no one else present, particularly when such a patient is a female manifesting sexual problems. Had Dr. Dunham been more circumspect concerning this practice, there would probably have been no opportunity for charges such as those presented herein.
Recommendation There having been no finding of fact that the Respondent, Dr. Richard Dunham, engaged in the alleged activities of misconduct, it is hereby recommended that the Florida State Board or Examiners of Psychology take no action against the Respondent and dismiss the charges herein. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of September, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHRIS H. BENTLEY, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of September, 1975. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald C. LaFace, Esquire W. Dexter Douglass, Esquire P. O. Box 1752 Douglass & Powell Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Post Office Box 1674 Attorney for Petitioner Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Attorney for Respondent
The Issue The issues presented by this case concern the question of whether the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner, Edward G. LeGer, through available sex offender programs administered by the Respondent. See Section 917.20, Florida Statutes (1977).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner submitted a "Petition for Administrative Determination" to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The Petition was received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on November 9, 1981, as transmitted by the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The Department had requested the Division to conduct a formal hearing in keeping with Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The hearing was conducted on December 16, 1981. In the course of the final hearing the Petitioner testified and offered as witnesses, Larry Carroll and James Thaddeus Rogers, participants in the sex offender program at Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida. The Petitioner submitted two exhibits, composite in nature, which were admitted. Respondent called as witnesses, Robert Alcorn, Clinical Director for the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program at Florida State Hospital; Michael Pomeroy, Clinical Psychologist at Florida State Hospital and Connie Smith, Clinical Social Worker at Florida State Hospital. Respondent presented no exhibits. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner has been in the custody of the Respondent, in keeping with the orders of Court and the authority of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1977). During that time, the Petitioner has resided at the Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida, where he has undergone treatment in the hospital program for the benefit of mentally disordered sex offenders. Although the Petitioner has been subjected to a full range of treatment opportunities, his progress in the recognition of and ability to deal with the underlying conditions which caused him to be placed in this program have reached their zenith. In the face of these circumstances, the Respondent has made a preliminary determination that it has exhausted treatment for the Petitioner, through the program in which he is enrolled. Additionally, it has been concluded that similar programs within the State of Florida do not offer other opportunities for progress. These opinions were made known to the Petitioner and when confronted with this information, the Petitioner requested the formal hearing which is the subject of this Recommended Order. LeGer was committed to the custody of the Respondent on February 27, 1979, the Court having found him to be a mentally disordered sex offender within the meaning of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1977). He was received into the program at the Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida, on April 23, 1979, and has undergone treatment beginning on that date. The objectives of the treatment program were to deal with LeGer's long standing sexual deviation, which specific condition is pedophilia and his associated difficulty with chronic alcoholism, until he no longer evidenced himself to be a menace to society in terms of sexual "acting out" or until it was concluded that he could no longer be treated for these difficulties. (The patient also had undergone treatment as a sex offender in the 1960's.) The program at Florida State Hospital has as its central focus the utilization of group therapy with adjunctive programs in recreational and occupational therapy, and this treatment regime relies heavily on a patient's self-motivation. Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 1 is constituted of a series of progress reports or clinical summaries of Petitioner's condition during the course of his treatment. As can be seen, the patient has made significant progress in dealing with his condition of alcoholism and his general conduct and demeanor has been exemplary; however, he has gained little insight into his sexual condition of pedophilia. This is borne out by the patient's beliefs that the staff session of September 16, 1981, in which he expressed his firm belief that he had reached maximum benefits from the treatment program and felt that he was no longer a risk to commit the sexual offenses, in that he was aware of the consequences of his deviant behavior for himself and others. This belief is erroneous, in that the staff report and the testimony given by staff members in the course of the hearing lead to the conclusion that the patient has not gained sufficient insight and understanding as to his deviant sexual behavior, sufficient to deter him from committing future sexual offenses. Michael Pomeroy, the patient's primary therapist from May, 1980, through mid-January, 1981, by his testimony, established the fact that the Petitioner had never been open enough with Pomeroy for Pomeroy to gain an understanding about what the patient's underlying problems were. It was through the witness Pomeroy's review of the history of the case that Pomeroy learned of the patient's problems with alcoholism and pedophilia related to young females. Pomeroy correctly describes the patient's participation in the program to be superficial, with the exception of the alcoholic rehabilitation aspects of the treatment and care. In dealing with Pomeroy, the patient was evasive and his behavior evidenced a manipulative demeanor (con or criminal attitude). In dealing with the question of his sexual problem, the patient simply would tell Pomeroy that he, the patient, wanted treatment. Pomeroy found the patient to be of the persuasion that the patient did not feel that he had a problem other than alcoholism, which had been overcome, and having overcome the alcoholism, all other problems were taken care of. Pomeroy found LeGer to have no understanding of what caused him to do his sexual acting out or what to do about that acting out in the future. These attitudes by the patient continued through the time of the final hearing, according to Pomeroy. In view of the lack of insight and no clear changes in attitude during the course of treatment and the resulting belief by the Petitioner that he does not have a problem of sexual deviance, Pomeroy's testimony establishes the fact that the Respondent is unable to treat the patient's pedophilia and the fact that his condition of pedophilia still presents a danger to society. Connie Smith, the patient's therapist from January, 1981, to the present, identified the most recent analysis by the staff of the problems presented by the patient's clinical profile. Those problems are: (1) gaining insight and understanding into deviant sexual behavior; (2) defensiveness and evasiveness with regard to relating feedback about himself and events directly related to his sexual problems; (3) exploring his needs to be over attentive to the needs and problems of others; and (4) exploring his dependence on alcohol. In these areas, Smith has found that the patient has not progressed in dealing with his sexual deviation and tends to over exaggerate his progress in that area. LeGer tells the therapist that he will do what she wishes him to do to participate in the program; however, he does not believe that he needs the therapy. (This comports with the testimony which LeGer gave in the course of the hearing. Notwithstanding this belief, he stated that he wanted to stay six months more in the program and that he would have done better had the therapy been more intense. The witnesses Carroll and Rogers agreed with this latter remark by the Petitioner and also expressed a belief that the patient had successfully completed the program, opinions not supported by the other evidence and not accepted by this Hearing Officer.) According to Smith, when LeGer has occasionally discussed the event which placed him in the program on this occasion, i.e., sexual battery on a minor female, he has discussed it in a superficial way and tended to place some blame on the victim. Finally, Smith agrees with Pomeroy's perception that the patient does not have sufficient insight into his problem and continues to meet the definition of a sex offender within the meaning of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes, and will not make progress by additional stay in the program. These perceptions are well founded. The Clinical Director of the Florida State Hospital Sex Offender Program, Robert H. Alcorn, presented the Petitioner's situation through a staffing conference of program officials in the other sex offender programs offered by the Respondent. This occurred on November 2, 1981, and it was the feeling of the other program officials that they would not be able to assist the Petitioner further, and in that sense, as in the situation at Florida State Hospital, had exhausted treatment for the Petitioner's underlying sexual deviance. The Respondent has exhausted all appropriate treatment for the patient's sexual problem, but that treatment has not been totally successful and the patient continues to be a sexual menace and there is a likelihood that the patient would commit other sexual crimes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services finding that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for Edward G. LeGer in its sex offender programs and that said Edward G. LeGer be returned to the committing court for further disposition. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of January, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward G. LeGer Florida State Hospital Chattahoochee, Florida 32324 Ted Mack, Esquire Florida State Hospital Chattahoochee, Florida 32324
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner has been the subject of an unlawful employment practice based on gender or handicap.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a licensed Registered Nurse. He was hired by Respondent on April 4, 1997, in its medical facility at Gulf Coast Correctional facility. In 2000, Petitioner's supervisor was Pamela Spears, R.N. At some point, Nurse Spears became friends with Chris Miles, a Licensed Practical Nurse, who worked on Petitioner's shift. Nurse Spears would sometimes talk with this L.P.N. in her office. Somehow, Petitioner felt his authority as the shift nurse was undermined by this relationship. It was not clear from the record what the basis of Petitioner's belief was, but his belief seemed to be related to the fact that Petitioner had to wait to speak with Nurse Spears. On May 5, 2000, Petitioner complained to Nurse Miles that he felt she was being treated with favoritism by Nurse Spears. Apparently, the discussion caused an uproar at the shift change and there was some agreement to swap shifts among the nurses to allow things to cool off. Around May 10, 2000, Nurse Odom filed sexual harassment charges against Petitioner for alleged comments and jokes of a sexual nature ("spanking the monkey", "choking the chicken", cross-dressing inuendos, use of handcuffs during sex, going to naked bars). In addition Nurse Miles filed a hostile work environment complaint against Petitioner because he allegedly threatened to spread rumors about her. Nurse Miles’ complaint did not involve sexual harassment. Nurse Nowak filed a sexual harassment complaint against Petitioner, but withdrew her complaint, indicating that she did not have a complaint with Petitioner and that she felt pressure to file her complaint. Nurse Spears did not file any complaint against Petitioner. Petitioner testified these nurses had been pressured into filing their complaints. However, he had no independent personal knowledge of such pressure and other than hearsay, offered no evidence of such pressure. Respondent, also did not offer any evidence demonstrating that such behavior was sexually harassing, as opposed to simply vengeful and petty behavior by a supervisor. On August 15, 2001, Dr. Gilo in front of co-workers and staff, called Petitioner, who is obese, a “fat lazy bum.” Petitioner filed a hostile work environment complaint against Dr. Gilo and an incident report was filed. The evidence demonstrated that Dr. Gilo was known for demeaning or belittling everyone and having a harsh manner. The comment was not related to any of the earlier complaints of the nurses, but to Dr. Gilo's irritation towards Petitioner for calling him at home. There was no evidence that demonstrated this comment constituted discrimination or harassment based on Petitioner's obesity. Likewise, there was no evidence that Petitioner's obesity was a handicap or viewed as a handicap by his employer. Respondent pursuant to its policy on sexual harassment complaints investigated the complaints. Several witness/co- worker statements were taken during the investigation that indicated Mr. Clardy, along with other employees, had made some statements or jokes of a sexual nature. The investigation took a considerable period of time. Again the record was not clear as to what caused the length of the investigation or whether the length of the investigation was unusual. However, on February 8, 2002, as a result of the investigation, Petitioner received a written reprimand for unspecified sexual jokes or comments. Petitioner filed a grievance regarding the reprimand. The grievance was denied in both Step 1 and Step 2 of the grievance process. There was no evidence that demonstrated either the undertaking of this investigation or the investigation itself constituted sexual harassment. However, on June 10, 2002, Petitioner filed a sexual harassment complaint against Respondent, the complaining nurses and Dr. Gilo for gender and disability discrimination. As with the nurses' complaints, the Respondent, pursuant to its policy, investigated Petitioner's complaints.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order affirming its decision that Petitioner is not eligible for services. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of March, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ronald J. Clardy 115 Sioux Trail Crawfordville, Florida 32327 Joshua E. Laws, Esquire Florida Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue The issue in this case is whether there is just cause, within the meaning of Section 231.36(1), Florida Statutes (1999), to terminate Respondent's employment as a non-instructional employee for alleged sexual harassment of a co-worker. (All chapter and section references are to Florida Statutes (1999) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has employed Respondent as a maintenance worker at Yulee Primary School in Yulee, Florida (the "school") for approximately 18 years. Petitioner has employed Ms. Joyce Sullivan as a food service worker for approximately three years. Respondent and Ms. Sullivan are co-workers. Respondent has no supervisory authority over Ms. Sullivan, has no authority to discipline Ms. Sullivan, and has no authority to affect the conditions of employment for Ms. Sullivan. The material facts in this case transpired over approximately ten minutes during work hours on April 6, 2000. Respondent approached Ms. Sullivan in the back kitchen of the school cafeteria shortly after breakfast and asked to speak to her privately. Ms. Sullivan agreed, and the two moved to the adjacent serving area near the checkout counter in the cafeteria. Respondent asked Ms. Sullivan to pose for pictures that would be nude, semi-nude, or partially clothed and that Respondent would enter into a contest on the internet. Respondent explained that the pictures would not identify Ms. Sullivan because the pictures would be taken from the neck down and that Ms. Sullivan could wear a bikini, a thong, or a bra. Ms. Sullivan asked Respondent what he was talking about. Respondent assured Ms. Sullivan that she would not be identified because the pictures would not identify Ms. Sullivan's face. Ms. Sullivan told Respondent that he was crazy. The entire conversation lasted approximately three minutes. Ms. Sullivan left Respondent and walked to the cash register to "ring up" the school principal who purchased some food. Ms. Sullivan went to an office in the back of the cafeteria with Ms. Sullivan's assistant manager. Respondent went to the back room and told Ms. Sullivan that he would show her some pictures on his computer. Respondent exited the room through the back door of the room to retrieve a laptop computer. Ms. Sullivan and her assistant manager went outside the back room and discussed the situation. Ms. Sullivan was embarrassed. After four or five minutes, Respondent returned to the back room and placed the laptop on the desk in front of Ms. Sullivan. The assistant manager was in the same room at another desk engaged in a telephone conversation. It took about 1.5 minutes for Respondent to turn on the laptop and display some pictures. The pictures included pictures of partially clad women and topless women. The situation terminated after 1.5 minutes when the assistant manager ended her telephone conversation, a child asked Ms. Sullivan to "ring up" some papers, and Ms. Sullivan's manager approached the room. Respondent changed the computer screen to a picture of his daughter and began talking to Ms. Sullivan's manager. Respondent left the school with the computer. Ms. Sullivan reported the incident to her manager, but Ms. Sullivan did not file a complaint for sexual harassment or state to her manager that she had been sexually harassed. Ms. Sullivan's manager relayed the information to Respondent's supervisor who discussed the matter with Respondent. Respondent admitted to the facts and expressed regret. Respondent's manager relayed the information to the Superintendent. The Superintendent investigated the matter and determined that Respondent had engaged in sexual harassment. The Superintendent based his determination on the definition of sexual harassment in the Board's Official Rule 3.54I.C. Rule 3.54I.C., in relevant part, states that sexual harassment consists of: . . . unwelcomed sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other inappropriate oral, written or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: . . . such conduct substantially interferes with an employee's work performance . . . or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work . . . environment. Respondent's request for Ms. Sullivan to pose for sexually revealing pictures was either an unwelcomed sexual advance, request for sexual favor, or other inappropriate oral or written conduct of a sexual nature within the meaning of Rule 3.54I.C. Respondent's conduct substantially interfered with Ms. Sullivan's work performance or created an offensive work environment. The Superintendent testified during cross-examination that he would not have determined that Respondent engaged in sexual harassment if Ms. Sullivan had not said no to Respondent's request. A preponderance of the evidence fails to show that Ms. Sullivan expressly said "no" when asked pose or view pictures. However, a preponderance of the evidence shows that Ms. Sullivan was embarrassed and that the entire episode was unwelcomed and offensive within the meaning of Rule 3.54I.C. Respondent has no previous discipline history. Article VII of the collective bargaining agreement between the Board and its employees prescribes progressive discipline procedures for this case. Except in unusual circumstances, employment can be terminated only after an oral warning for a first offense, a reprimand for a second offense, a written warning for a third offense, and suspension for a fourth offense.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of sexual harassment and suspending Respondent from employment for the time of the current suspension. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry W. Whitmore, Chief Bureau of Educator Standards Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Suite 224E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael H. Olenick General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. John L. Ruiz, Superintendent Nassau County School Board 1201 Atlantic Avenue Fernandina Beach, Florida 32304 Brent P. Abner, Esquire Suite F 4741 Atlantic Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Brian T. Hayes, Esquire 245 East Washington Street Monticello, Florida 32344 Martha F. Dekle, Esquire 806 G Street Post Office Box 1644 Jacksonville, Florida 32207
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, an osteopathic physician who had a year-long consensual affair with one of his patients, committed sexual misconduct in the practice of osteopathic medicine; and if so, whether Petitioner should impose discipline on Respondent's license within the applicable penalty guidelines or take some other action.
Findings Of Fact Respondent David Simon, D.O. ("Simon"), is a family practitioner who was, at all times relevant to this case, licensed as an osteopathic physician in the state of Florida. His office was located in Palm Beach County, where he practiced medicine from 1985 through the events at issue and beyond, until at least the date of the final hearing. Petitioner Department of Health (the "Department") has regulatory jurisdiction over licensed osteopathic physicians such as Simon. In particular, the Department is authorized to file and prosecute an administrative complaint against a physician, as it has done in this instance, when a panel of the Board of Osteopathic Medicine has found that probable cause exists to suspect that the physician has committed a disciplinable offense. In May 2005, a 30-something year-old woman named C.K. became a regular patient of Simon's. As C.K.'s primary care physician from 2005 until the end of 2011, Simon treated C.K. for a variety of physical and psychological disorders. The nature and quality of Simon's medical care of C.K. are not in dispute, the Department having neither alleged nor proved that Simon's treatment of C.K. ever fell below the applicable standard of care, or that Simon's medical records failed to justify any course of treatment he undertook for her benefit. In or around November 2010, while their otherwise unremarkable physician-patient relationship remained intact, Simon and C.K. entered into a mutually consensual sexual relationship. This affair had its genesis in a discussion between Simon and C.K. that occurred on October 12, 2010, during an office visit. While being seen that day, C.K. expressed concern about having been exposed recently to sexually transmitted diseases as a result of experiences which she not only related in some detail to Simon, but also corroborated with photographic evidence stored in her cell phone. In view of these disclosures, Simon lost his professional detachment and entered into a flirtatious conversation of a personal, even intimate, nature with C.K. that was outside the scope of his examination or treatment of C.K. as a patient. C.K. was a willing participant in the non-clinical sexual banter which ensued. Some days or weeks later (the precise date is unavailable), C.K. stopped by Simon's office on a Friday afternoon after business hours, when Simon was there alone. The two resumed their previous, personal conversation, and C.K. proposed that they have sexual relations with one another, a suggestion to which Simon responded positively. Within weeks afterwards, Simon called C.K., and they made arrangements to meet privately after hours at his office, which they later did, as mentioned above, sometime in November 2010. Beginning with that visit, and continuing for about one year, Simon and C.K. met once or twice a month in Simon's office, alone, to engage in sexual activity.2/ Simon used his cell phone to call or text C.K. to schedule these trysts. C.K. consented to the sexual activity with Simon. She was, however, incapable of giving free, full, and informed consent to such activity with her physician.3/ Because C.K. was, at all relevant times, a competent adult, the undersigned infers that her incapacity to freely give fully informed consent stemmed from Simon's powerful influence over her as a patient of his. C.K. and Simon did not have sexual relations during, or as part of, any visit that C.K. made to Simon's office for the purpose of seeking medical advice or care. In other words, doctor's appointments did not provide occasions, or serve as cover, for intimate rendezvous. There is no persuasive evidence that Simon ever tried to convince C.K. that their sexual encounters would be therapeutic or were somehow part of a course of purported medical treatment or examination. Rather, Simon testified credibly (and it is found) that he and C.K. kept their personal and professional relationships separate and distinct.4/ The Department has made much of the type of sexual acts that Simon and C.K. engaged in. Simon described their behavior, somewhat euphemistically, as "sexually adventurous." The Department, in contrast, has implied that Simon is a paraphiliac or pervert, a contention which the undersigned rejects as not just unsupported, but disproved by the evidence. Although at least some of the sexual conduct in question might fairly be dubbed unconventional, more important is that every interaction between these adults took place in private, within the context of mutual consent. There is, moreover, no clear and convincing proof in this record of sexual violence or aggression, nor any evidence of actual injury, damage, or harm. For reasons that will be discussed, the undersigned has concluded that the details of Simon and C.K.'s sexual encounters are irrelevant to the charges at hand; thus, no additional findings about the specific sexual activities are necessary. Simon's liaison with C.K. lasted until late December 2011, at which time C.K. abruptly terminated the relationship. The evidence fails to establish C.K.'s reasons for doing so. Thus, the circumstances surrounding the end of the affair, of which scant evidence was presented in any event, are irrelevant. In the wake of the break up, Simon's affair with C.K. became a matter of public knowledge, gaining him the sort of notoriety few physicians would covet. Facing personal disaster and professional ruin, Simon sought counseling from Helen Virginia Bush, a specialist in sex therapy who is licensed both as a clinical social worker and as a marriage and family therapist. Ms. Bush counseled Simon on subjects such as professional boundaries and erotic transference. At her urging, Simon attended and successfully completed the PBI Professional Boundaries Course, a nationally recognized program for doctors and others at risk of developing inappropriate personal relationships with patients or clients. Ms. Bush testified credibly that in her opinion, which the undersigned accepts, Simon is unlikely to enter into another sexual relationship with a patient or attempt to do so. Simon shares office space and staff with Mary Scanlon, D.O., a physician who, like Simon, specializes in family medicine. Although she has an independent practice, Dr. Scanlon works in close proximity to Simon, whom she met in 2000 during her residency when Simon was the attending physician. Dr. Scanlon believes Simon to be an excellent physician from whom she has learned much about practicing medicine, and her credible testimony that Simon's patients hold him in high regard and have largely stood by him throughout this scandal is accepted. Dr. Scanlon was an effective character witness for Simon who favorably impressed the undersigned with her earnest and forthright demeanor. That she has elected to continue practicing in the office she shares with Simon despite the public disclosure of Simon's disgraceful dalliance with C.K. (which she in no way condoned or tried to excuse), even though she is not contractually bound to stay there, manifests genuine support of and respect for Simon, and tells the undersigned—— more persuasively than any testimony——that his career is worth saving. This is the first time that any disciplinary action has been taken against Simon's medical license. Ultimate Factual Determinations The evidence establishes, clearly and convincingly, that Simon exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship, albeit probably unwittingly, for purposes of engaging C.K. in sexual activity. This ultimate finding is based in part on an inference which follows from the presumed fact of C.K.'s incapacity to consent to sexual activity with Simon, but also on other circumstances, the most salient of which are that the initial steps toward the affair were taken during a medical examination, and that all of the sexual activity at issue occurred in the doctor's office. It is therefore determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Simon is guilty of engaging in sexual misconduct with a patient, as more fully defined in section 459.0141, Florida Statutes, which is a disciplinable offense punishable under section 459.015(1)(l).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Osteopathic Medicine enter a final order finding Simon guilty of committing sexual misconduct with a patient, which is punishable under section 459.015(1)(l), Florida Statutes. Because this is Simon's first such offense, it is further RECOMMENDED that Simon be placed on probation for two years subject to such reasonable terms and conditions as the board deems appropriate, and that an administrative fine of $10,000 be imposed. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 2014.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner has presented clear and convincing evidence that he is of good moral character so as to receive an exemption from disqualification from employment with children or adults who are developmentally disabled, under Section 397.451, Florida Statutes (1995).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner seeks an exemption for employment in a position of special trust for which a security background check is required under Florida law. In 1977, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to a misdemeanor sexual assault for fondling an adolescent. He was sentenced to probation. Petitioner was 22 years old at the time. In 1986, Petitioner pled guilty to a felony sexual assault of a 15 year old boy, in the state of New Hampshire. Petitioner was 31 years old at the time. After serving 2 years of a 3~ to 7 year sentence, Petitioner was released from prison in 1989. Petitioner successfully completed parole and was released in March, 1993. Petitioner has not been arrested for any crime since 1986. Petitioner stated he received therapy in prison in a sexual offender program. However, Petitioner presented no evidence of attending a sexual offender program while in prison or afterwards, nor did he submit records of his treatment while in prison. Petitioner explained the circumstances surrounding the 1986 conviction for sexual assault. While working as an athletic trainer, Petitioner took advantage of a situation while he was performing massage therapy on a fifteen year old boy, he fondled and performed oral sex on the boy. Petitioner stated the victim consented, as much as a 15 year old can consent. Petitioner did not explain the circumstances surrounding the 1977 incident. Petitioner did not express remorse for any sexual misconduct that he committed other than the 1986 offense. He addressed his 1977 charge only to say that had he received more than a slap on the wrist, the 1986 sexual assault might not have occurred. Petitioner stated he was sexually abused as a child. In 1993, Petitioner received a Masters Degree in social work from Salem State College in Massachusetts. Petitioner explained he studied for his masters in social work because he would no longer be eligible for licensure as an athletic trainer. Petitioner stated it would not be appropriate for him to put his hands on adults or children, which is necessary as an athletic trainer. He feels it wouldn't be appropriate for him to be in a position where he could possibly be aroused by an adult, an adolescent or a child. Although Petitioner states he has never been aroused or interested in anyone other than what would be considered a mature adolescent or an adult. Petitioner is licensed as an independent clinical social worker in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. In 1994, Petitioner moved to Florida to work for the Indian River Memorial Hospital in Vero Beach in the psychiatric unit of the Center for Emotional and Behavioral Health. Petitioner has been denied a license as a clinical social worker in Florida based on his history of sexual misconduct. As a result of his denial of a license, Petitioner must perform his duties under the supervision of another licensed clinical social worker. Working under someone else's supervision means he may continue to work with clients in group or individual therapy. Kathy Palezuelos, a licensed clinical social worker, has known Petitioner for two and a half years. They worked together at the Center for Emotional and Behavioral Health. She was qualified as an expert in the area of clinical social work. Ms. Palezuelos performed a mental health status examination on Petitioner on May 2, 1996. She discussed his homosexuality and the sexual offense at the time she did the mental status exam. Ms. Palezuelos described herself as more a friend than a colleague. They only worked together about six months. She was sometimes present while he did therapy if they were doing group therapy. He trained her when she first came on the job. Petitioner did not inform her of his past criminal history while they worked together. At the Center for Emotional and Behavioral Health supervision was structured loosely where the therapists would give each other feedback after presenting cases. Sara Billings is a licensed clinical social worker. She was qualified as an expert in the area of clinical social work. Ms. Billings met Petitioner in January, 1994, at the Center for Emotional and Behavioral Health. She has supervised Petitioner since that time. Ms. Billings worked with Petitioner for two years before he disclosed his criminal history involving sexual assaults. During those two years Petitioner did therapy on children as well as adults. In January, 1995, she asked Petitioner to join her in her private practice in Melbourne, Florida. Ms. Billings is not present while Petitioner does therapy. She did not feel the children being treated and their parents should be told about Petitioner's criminal history. A child is anyone under the age of 18. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fourth Edition (DSM IV) is an accepted textbook for practicing psychologists. DSM IV states that guidelines for pedophilia are an age difference of 5 plus years between the offender and the victim. Ms. Billings admitted Petitioner meets the criteria for a pedophile as set forth in the DSM IV. However, she does not believe he is a pedophile because the child Respondent molested was as physically mature as an adult. She bases this opinion on what Petitioner has related to her about his case. Dr. Deborah Day is a licensed clinical psychologist, licensed mental health counselor and a certified family mediator. Her specialty is clinical and forensic psychology specializing in physical and sexual abuse. She was the consultant for the Child Protection Team and the Sexual Abuse Treatment Program. She is presently on the Board of the Sexual Abuse Treatment Program. She has dealt with approximately 1000 cases involving sexual abuse. She was qualified as an expert in the area of sex offenders and sexual abuse. Dr. Day reviewed a file provided by the Respondent that included the mental health status exam and copies of the Petitioner's criminal records. The issues presented in the file are issues she commonly deals with in her practice. Petitioner has not provided sufficient information to make an assessment on whether he is a risk to re-offend. The Mental Status Exam only addresses current levels of functioning. Full responsibility in the course of treatment for a sex offender means getting past the defense mechanisms offenders use initially in treatment in order to keep their ego safe. Full responsibility for a person's conduct is saying the child or adolescent had nothing to do the adult's conduct. The offenders' responsibility was solely to say "no". Most homosexuals are not pedophiles. Homosexuals generally either withhold their sexuality or they hide it from the general public. A sex offender with a history of being molested as a child is common. A convicted sexual offender who has applied to work with children in a therapeutic relationship is a risk to the offender and the child. It sets up a trusting relationship where boundaries have to be closely monitored. Petitioner's statement that he was confused about his homosexuality in 1986, when he sexually assaulted the 15-year old boy, is minimization, rationalization and demonstrates a superficial understanding of what really happened. It is denial for a convicted sexual offender to say he is not aroused by children. There has to be sexual attraction if you sexually abuse a child. Petitioner will be able to continue to work as a social worker and a therapist as long as his clients are adults. Whether or not he discloses his past to adult patients is an ethical matter and not one for the present case. Petitioner has not testified with candor as to his past conduct. Moreover, Petitioner made conflicting statements and rationalizations with respect to the circumstances surrounding the crimes. He has not produced treatment records to support his claim that he received treatment in a sexual offender program. Petitioner has not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that he is rehabilitated and will not present a danger to children or disabled adults.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's request for an exemption be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of March, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Paul 537 Wilson Avenue Satellite Beach, Florida 32937 Carmen Muniz Sierra, Esquire District 7 Legal Office Department of Children and Families 400 West Robinson Street, Suite S-1106 Orlando, Florida 32801 Gregory D. Venz Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard, Room 204-X Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard Doran General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Fort Myers Broadcasting Company (FMBC or Respondent) committed an unlawful employment practice against Jaziah Rivera (Ms. Rivera or Petitioner) on the basis of her sex and in retaliation for engaging in a protected activity, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA).
Findings Of Fact FMBC operates in an office building located at 2824 Palm Beach Boulevard, Fort Myers, Florida. For at least 20 years prior to September 2018, FMBC outsourced its cleaning needs. In or around August 2018, a management team at FMBC met to discuss its custodial services. The team included Joseph Schwartzel, Jim Schwartzel, Mark Gilson (Mr. Gilson), and Mr. Mayne. Joseph Schwartzel is the general manager of FMBC, and has served in that role for approximately 25 years. Jim Schwartzel, Mr. Gilson, and Mr. Mayne are all senior managers who report directly to Joseph Schwartzel. After the discussion, the management team decided to terminate FMBC’s contract for outside custodial services and hire an in-house custodian. General Manager Joseph Schwartzel was the final decision maker on this matter. In September 2018, FMBC hired Ms. Rivera as a full-time custodial worker. Ms. Rivera was the first in-house custodian hired by FMBC in its history. Her job duties included generalized cleaning like sweeping, mopping, taking out the trash, dusting, restocking supplies in the bathrooms, and vacuuming. Ms. Rivera reported directly to Mr. Mayne, who served as FMBC’s Chief Engineer. During Ms. Rivera’s entire time at FMBC, Mr. Mayne was her direct supervisor. Ms. Rivera’s weekly scheduled hours were Monday through Friday, 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. She sometimes altered those hours and worked from 10:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. Ms. Rivera testified that she would sometimes work “after hours or on the weekend” if she had to make up missed time. FMBC received complaints from employees that some areas at FMBC were not being stocked/cleaned properly or in a timely fashion. Mr. Mayne spoke to Ms. Rivera about the complaints. Ms. Rivera complained to Mr. Mayne that the amount of cleaning she was required to complete was too much for one person and that she needed assistance. In or around December 2018, FMBC hired an in-house, part-time custodial worker to assist Ms. Rivera with the cleaning duties. The part-time custodian was quickly relieved of her duties, because she proved to be unreliable. In April 2019, Ms. Rivera complained that she was experiencing back pain and was unable to take out the trash. She provided FMBC with a doctor’s note which stated that she was not allowed to lift items that weighed more than 15 pounds. FMBC proposed several accommodations to assist Ms. Rivera in taking out the trash, including providing a rolling bin to push the trash to the dumpster. On several occasions, Mr. Mayne also provided two to three non- custodial employees, from the engineering department, to assist Ms. Rivera with taking out the trash. In April 2019, FMBC hired another part-time employee, Imari Porter (Ms. Porter), to help Ms. Rivera with the cleaning duties. Ms. Porter is Ms. Rivera’s sister. In April 2019, FMBC’s upper management team—Joseph Schwartzel, Jim Schwartzel, Mr. Gilson, and Mr. Mayne—met several times over a two- week period to discuss its custodial needs. The team made the decision to eliminate the full-time and part-time in-house custodian positions and return to outsourcing the custodial services. As the general manager, Joseph Schwartzel was, again, the final decision maker. Joseph Schwartzel testified about the reasoning behind FMBC’s decision to move back to its out-sourced custodial services model. He stated as follows: Well, basically, I think, we discovered that we had made a mistake trying to have an in-house custodial position. We thought it was a good idea to begin with as we could have someone work during the day when most the employees were there and provide cleaning services while people were at the office. And if there were spills or things like that, there would be someone immediately available to try and remedy the situation. So it sounded good. What we didn’t realize is how difficult it would be to cover if someone wasn’t there. If they were out sick, if they were on vacation, things of that nature. In Ms. Rivera’s case, where she had a health issue, all of a sudden we were scrambling, trying to figure out how to get the facility cleaned. And we didn’t have anyone else that could do that on the long- term basis. So it became very problematic. Thus, instead of, you know, having an in-house custodial position, we elected to go back to a third party to do it. On April 22, 2019, FMBC terminated Ms. Porter, less than one month after hiring her. The next day, on April 23, 2019, Mr. Mayne and Karen Seiferth (FMBC’s human resources manager) met with Ms. Rivera. Mr. Mayne terminated Ms. Rivera. FMBC immediately returned to its past arrangement of outsourcing its cleaning needs—on April 23, 2019, the same day Ms. Rivera was terminated, FMBC signed a contract with ABC International Cleaning Service. As of the date of the final hearing, FMBC continued to outsource its cleaning and still contracts with ABC International Cleaning Service. Sexual Harassment Allegations Ms. Rivera testified that Mr. Mayne sexually harassed her during her entire period of employment with FMBC. Ms. Rivera testified that Mr. Mayne subjected her to sexual harassment in the following ways: by staring at Ms. Rivera and looking at her body parts, as if he was “undressing [her] with his eyes”; brushing past her on one occasion, causing his leg to “graze” her buttocks; and making comments about her khaki pants and her buttocks being “big.” Ms. Rivera also testified that Mr. Mayne frequently asked her “to go out for drinks” and that she perceived those invitations as sexual advances. Ms. Rivera testified that she rejected Mr. Mayne’s advances, but did not complain about his behavior to anyone at FMBC. Ms. Rivera alleges that she was terminated for refusing to engage in a sexual relationship with Mr. Mayne. Ms. Rivera claims that after she was fired, Mr. Mayne sent her inappropriate sexual messages, pictures, and a video through social media. It is undisputed that, to the extent this claim is true, it happened well after Ms. Rivera was terminated from FMBC. Ms. Rivera submitted a Technical Assistance Questionnaire (TAQ), dated April 9, 2020, to FCHR, which initiated an investigation into her complaints against FMBC. In the TAQ, Ms. Rivera set out the events that occurred during her time at FMBC that she believed to be discriminatory. The majority of Ms. Rivera’s complaint was based on what appears to be allegations of disability discrimination. The only mention of sexual harassment was at the conclusion of her statement. Therein, she stated: “Now present day Mike Mayne is harrassing me by pursuing me thru social media planforms, sending inappropriate images (private part) to try to get me to engage is some type of sexual relationship & offering support to me.” (errors in original). Ms. Rivera’s allegations that Mr. Mayne was sexually harassing her through social media were described as occurring “now” in the “present day,” which, at that time, would have been nearly a year after she was terminated from FMBC. Ultimate Findings of Fact Ms. Rivera’s testimony that Mr. Mayne sexually harassed her while she worked at FMBC is not credible. Ms. Rivera failed to prove that Mr. Mayne sexually harassed her at work, that she was subjected to a hostile work environment, or that she was terminated for not acquiescing to quid pro quo sexual harassment. Accordingly, Ms. Rivera failed to meet her burden of proving that FMBC committed an unlawful employment action against her in violation of the FCRA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Ms. Rivera’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of May, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JODI-ANN V. LIVINGSTONE Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of May, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Zandro E. Palma, Esquire Zandro E. Palma, P.A. Suite 1500 9100 South Dadeland Boulevard Miami, Florida 33156 Suzanne M. Boy, Esquire Boy Agnew Potanovic, PLLC 4415 Metro Parkway, Suite 110 Fort Myers, Florida 33916-9408 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
