The Issue Whether Respondent Richardson’s application for a wetlands resource permit to construct a private road and bridge through wetlands should be denied for failing to provide mitigation to offset the impacts to existing wetlands. Whether Respondent Richardson had provided the Department with reasonable assurance that he or she owns or has sufficient authorization to use certain land in mitigation to offset the wetland impacts.
Findings Of Fact In January of 1990, John Richardson applied to the Department for a wetland resource (dredge and fill) permit under Section 403.918, Florida Statutes to construct a private road and bridge through wetlands. The proposed project would impact 0.032 acres of wetland. The proposed project is not located in an Outstanding Florida Water (OFW). The proposed project would adversely affect the following: the conservation of fish and wildlife; the fishing, recreational values, and marine productivity in the vicinity of the proposed project; and the current condition and relative value of functions being performed by the wetlands impacted by the project. The proposed project would be permanent in nature. The proposed project would not meet the criteria of Section 403.918(2)(a) Florida Statutes, without mitigation adequate to offset the impacts to wetlands. To provide adequate mitigation for the proposed project, Respondent John Richardson proposed to create and preserve 0.029 acres of new wetlands and preserve 4.35 acres of existing wetlands. The preservation would consist of granting to the Department a perpetual conservation easement over the mitigation wetlands. Respondent John Richardson represented to the Department that he was the record owner or had permission to use the land that he offered for mitigation. The Department reasonably relied on that representation. The mitigation proposed by Respondent John Richardson would be adequate to offset the impacts to wetlands resulting from the proposed project. On March 4, 1992, the Department issued to John Richardson a wetlands resource permit for the proposed project. The Department was not aware, before it issued this permit, that John Richardson might not own or have permission to use the mitigation land. The Department was substantially justified in issuing the permit to John Richardson on March 4, 1992. Specific conditions 28-31 of that permit required Respondent John Richardson to grant the Department a conservation easement over the mitigation land within thirty days after issuance of the permit. Respondent John Richardson failed to grant the Department the required conservation easement, and failed to publish notice of the Department’s action. On July 22, 1996, Petitioners filed a timely petition with the Department challenging the Department’s issuance of the March 4, 1992, permit to Respondent John Richardson. On September 11, 1996, Janet Richardson filed an application with the Department for transfer of the March 4, 1992, permit to her following the dissolution of marriage with John Richardson. By letter dated October 11, 1996, the Department requested Janet Richardson to provide additional documentation to show that she either owns the mitigation land or has permission to use that land. Janet Richardson was required to provide a legal survey drawing depicting the mitigation land, property records showing ownership of that land, and a notarized statement from the land owner authorizing her to use that land. The Department specifically advised Janet Richardson that it could not approve the proposed project if she failed to submit this requested documentation to the Department prior to the final hearing. Janet Richardson failed to provide the requested documentation by the date of the final hearing in this matter, or subsequently. As of November 6, 1996, no work had begun on the proposed project. At the hearing, the Department adequately explained its change in position from deciding to issue the permit (on March 4, 1992) and proposing denial of the permit (on November 6, 1996). The Department relies on an applicant’s representations regarding ownership of or right to use land unless a problem is brought to the Department’s attention. In this case, the Department was not aware that there was a problem with the applicant’s right to use the mitigation land until the petition was filed with the Department on July 22, 1996. Janet Richardson failed to provide proof that she either owns or is authorized to use the land to mitigate the impacts to wetlands from the proposed project. Without such proof, Janet Richardson failed to prove that she could mitigate those same impacts from the proposed project.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a Final Order denying Respondent Richardson’s request for a wetlands resource permit for the proposed project.ONE AND ORDERED this 17th day of December, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Stauffer Post Office Box 97 Aripeka, Florida 34679-097 Cy Plata Post Office Box 64 Aripeka, Florida 34679 Steven McCallum Post Office Box 484 Aripeka, Florida 34679 Leslie Neumann Post Office Box 738 Aripeka, Florida 34679 John Richardson 700 West Broad Street Brooksville, Florida 34607 Janet Richardson 1603 Osowaw Boulevard Springhill, Florida 34607 Thomas I. Mayton, Jr., Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Perry Odom, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Virgina B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue Whether Resolution No. P64-96 of the Monroe County Planning Commission should be affirmed, reversed or modified?
The Issue Whether the City of Miramar Comprehensive Plan Amendment, adopted by Ordinance No. 1901 on October 17, 2018, is “in compliance,” as that term is defined in section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2018).1/
Findings Of Fact The Parties and Standing Petitioners own and reside on property located at 17428 Southwest 36th Street in Miramar, Florida. Petitioners submitted oral and written comments, recommendations, or objections to the City during the period of time between, and including appearances at, the transmittal hearing and the adoption of the Plan Amendment. Petitioners’ house is approximately 430 feet north of the property subject to the Plan Amendment (the “Subject Property”). Petitioners’ property is separated from the Subject Property by a residential canal, approximately 100 feet of wetland or marsh area, and a City street right-of-way. The residential canal is owned and controlled by Petitioners’ homeowner’s association. From the backyard of their home, Petitioners enjoy observing and photographing birds and wildlife that utilize the canal, including birds that can be seen from Petitioners’ property in the trees on the Subject Property and flying between the properties. The City is a Florida municipal corporation with the duty and authority to adopt and amend a comprehensive plan, pursuant to section 163.3167. Univision is a Delaware limited liability company authorized to transact business in Florida. Its principal business address is 500 Frank West Burr Boulevard, Teaneck, New Jersey 07666. Univision is the owner of the Subject Property. Lennar is a Florida limited liability company, whose principal business address is 700 Northwest 107th Avenue, Suite 400, Miami, Florida 33172. Lennar is under contract to purchase the Subject Property. Existing Conditions The Subject Property is approximately 120 gross acres of mostly undeveloped property. The Subject Property contains 102.2 acres of wetlands and 15.5 acres of uplands. At least 80 percent of the wetlands are covered by Melaleuca trees, which is an invasive species. Melaleuca is listed by federal and state agencies as a noxious weed, making it illegal to possess, sell, cultivate, or transport in Florida. The uplands on the Subject Property are limited to areas previously developed with radio transmission towers, a control room, and filled roadways connecting the on-site improvements. The improvements, with the exception of the fill roads, were removed in approximately 2017. The radio towers were secured by guy wires anchored by concrete blocks. The areas of the Subject Property underneath the guy wires were maintained to prevent vegetation from growing up into the guy wires. The areas where the concrete supports have been removed are wet, and the areas that were beneath the former guy wires contain fewer Melaleuca and some native vegetation, like sawgrass and ferns. However, the upland areas are also currently growing exotic grasses and Australian Pine, which are also invasive species. The Subject Property is currently designated on the City’s Future Land Use Map (“FLUM”) as “Rural.” Pursuant to the City’s Comprehensive Plan, the Rural land use category allows the following types of development: (1) residential development at a density of one dwelling unit per 2.5 gross acres (1du/2.5 acres); (2) agricultural and related uses, including crops, groves, horse and cattle ranches, private game preserves, fish breeding areas, and tree and plant nurseries; (3) parks; (4) police and fire stations, libraries, and civic centers; (5) special residential facilities, such as group homes; and (6) public utilities, including wastewater pumping stations, electrical utility substations, and telecommunications transmission facilities. The Plan Amendment The Plan Amendment changes the FLUM designation of the Subject Property from Rural to “Irregular (3.21) Residential,” which allows residential development at a density of 3.21du/acre.4/ Lennar proposes to develop 385 units on the property-- the maximum allowable under the Plan Amendment. Under Lennar’s development proposal, all of the on- site wetlands will be impacted. The Plan Amendment Process Broward County municipalities have a unique plan amendment review process. Each amendment to a municipal comprehensive plan must be consistent with, and incorporated into, the Broward County Land Use Plan (“BCLUP”). This Plan Amendment, as with all other municipal amendments, was reviewed and approved through both the County’s and City’s approval process. The Board of County Commissioners held an adoption public hearing on March 20, 2018, and approved Ordinance No. 2018-12, amending the BCLUP to change the County FLUM designation of the Subject Property from Agriculture to Irregular (3.21) Residential. On October 17, 2018, the City Commission held a duly advertised second public hearing, wherein the City voted to adopt the Plan Amendment. Lennar Permitting Lennar pursued permitting of its proposed development of the Subject Property during the Plan Amendment review process. On or about September 11, 2018, the Broward County Environmental Protection and Growth Management Department (“EPGMD”) issued an environmental resource license (“ERL”) for the proposed development. The ERL is based on Lennar’s site plan for the site, not the Plan Amendment. The ERL recognizes that the impacts on the Subject Property wetlands are unavoidable and determines that off-site mitigation is required to address any impacts on those wetlands. On or about September 11, 2018, the South Florida Water Management District issued an environmental resource permit (“ERP”) for the proposed development. The ERP is based on Lennar’s site plan and other required documents, not the Plan Amendment. The ERP provides that off-site mitigation is required to address any impacts on the Subject Property wetlands. On or about December 14, 2018, the Army Corps of Engineers (“ACOE”) issued a permit for the development proposed, based upon Lennar’s site plan and other required documents. The ACOE permit provides that off-site mitigation is required to address any impacts on the Subject Property wetlands. Petitioners’ Challenge Section 163.3177(2) directs that “the several elements of the comprehensive plan shall be consistent,” in furtherance of the major objective of the planning process to coordinate the elements of the local comprehensive plan. Petitioners allege the Plan Amendment is not “in compliance” because it creates internal inconsistencies with the existing Comprehensive Plan. Petitioners’ challenge rests on four provisions of the Comprehensive Plan: Future Land Use Element (“FLUE”) Goal (unnumbered), FLUE Policies 3.5 and 6.10, and Conservation Element Policy 7.3 (“CE Policy 7.3”). FLUE Goal (unnumbered) The City’s Comprehensive Plan contains one overarching goal for the FLUE, which reads as follows: Maintain a long-range future land use pattern which promotes orderly and well- managed growth and development of the community, producing quality neighborhoods, enhancing the city’s aesthetic appeal, conserving the natural environment and open space, supporting a vibrant economic tax base, and minimizing risks to the public’s health, safety, and welfare. (emphasis added). The goal is the singular goal for the overall FLUE, which includes 12 different objectives and many more policies for each objective. The purpose of the goal is to set the initial framework; it is a very broad statement setting the direction for the City’s long-term goals, but does not provide any measurable standards or specifics regarding implementation. Petitioners’ challenge focuses on the underlined phrase, and argues that the Plan Amendment is internally inconsistent with the goal’s direction to “conserv[e] the natural environment and open space.” The Subject Property is not currently designated as either “Recreation and Open Space” or “Conservation.” The Subject Property is private property that, by virtue of its land use designation, has always been intended for development as one of the uses allowable within the Rural land use category. Further, Eric Silva, the Director of the City’s Community and Economic Development Department, testified that the goal’s direction of “conserving the natural environment and open space” relates only to those areas that have been designated by the City, or another agency, for protection. The Recreation and Open Space Element (“ROS Element”) sets forth the specific objectives and policies to accomplish the City’s goal to “[p]rovide adequate and accessible parks and facilities to meet the recreation needs of all current and future Miramar residents.” In the ROS Element, the City has established a level of service standard of four acres of park and open space for each 1,000 City residents. Petitioners introduced no evidence that the Plan Amendment would diminish the amount of land designated for open space in the City, or otherwise impede the City’s progress toward the adopted standard. To the contrary, Mr. Silva testified that the City has over 300 extra acres of park space and that this Plan Amendment will not impact the City’s adopted level of service for parks and open space. Likewise, Petitioners introduced no evidence to support a finding that the Plan Amendment would reduce the amount of land designated for “Conservation” in the City. Rather, Petitioners argue that the Subject Property should be converted to a nature preserve, or otherwise placed in conservation use. The issue in this case is not whether the City should designate the Subject Property for a different use, but whether the designation the City proposes is consistent with the comprehensive plan. Petitioners did not prove the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with the FLUE Goal. FLUE Policy 3.5 Petitioners next contend the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with FLUE Policy 3.5, which directs the City to “[c]onsider the cumulative and long-term effects of decisions regarding amendments to the Land Use Plan Map and revisions to the Future Land Use Element.” Petitioners’ concerns here are similar to those with the FLUE Goal--the Plan Amendment will reduce green space and open space, which could be preserved under the existing Rural designation. Petitioners’ expert witness conceded that it is impossible to determine that the City did not consider the cumulative and long-term effects of the Plan Amendment. Moreover, the City introduced abundant evidence that it considered, during the lengthy Plan Amendment process, all impacts of the Plan Amendment on the City’s resources and infrastructure. Petitioners did not prove the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with FLUE Policy 3.5. FLUE Policy 6.10 Next, Petitioners argue the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with FLUE Policy 6.10, which states, “The City shall consider the impacts of land use plan amendments on wetland and native upland resources, and minimize those impacts to the maximum extent practicable.” Here, Petitioners focus on the density allowed under the Plan Amendment. Petitioners argue that the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with this policy because it allows development of 385 units, which will maximize, rather than minimize, impacts to the on-site wetlands. Petitioners argue that the residential density allowed under the existing Rural designation would yield development of only 48 units, which would provide for conservation of at least some of the wetlands on site, thereby minimizing the wetland impact. Petitioners’ argument ignores the fact that the Rural designation allows other types of non-residential development that may be as intense as residential, such as a civic center or fire station, or uses that require fewer improvements, but have a destructive effect on wetlands, such as horse or cattle ranches. The issue of whether the Plan Amendment minimizes impacts to wetlands is not determined by the mathematical function 48 units < 385 units. Instead, the determination hinges on the meaning of “minimizing impacts” in the City’s Comprehensive Plan. Under the City’s Comprehensive Plan, impact of development on wetlands must be considered in partnership with the County, and is dependent upon the value assigned to those wetlands, pursuant to the wetlands benefit index (“WBI”), as set forth in the Conservation Element. Based on the following relevant analysis, the Petitioners did not prove the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with FLUE Policy 6.10. CE Policy 7.3 Finally, Petitioners challenge the Plan Amendment as internally inconsistent with CE Policy 7.3, which reads as follows: The City shall distribute land uses in a manner that avoids or minimizes to the greatest degree practicable, the effect and impact on wetlands in coordination with Broward County. Those land uses identified below as being incompatible with the protection and conservation of wetlands and wetland functions shall be directed away from wetlands, or when compatible land uses are allowed to occur, shall be mitigated or enhanced, or both, to compensate for loss of wetland functions in accordance with Broward County Code of Ordinances, Chapter 27, Article XI, Aquatic and Wetland Resource Protection. Compatibility of Land UsesRelative to the Wetland Benefit Index (WBI) Wetland Benefit Index Land Use Compatibility 1. Wetlands with a WBI value greater than or equal to 0.80 1. There is a rebuttable presumption that all land uses except for conservation uses are incompatible. 2. Wetlands with a WBI value less than 0.80 2. All land uses are compatible, provided that the wetland impact compensation requirements of Chapter 27, Article XI, are satisfied. Source: Broward County Code of Ordinances, Chapter 27, Article XI, Aquatic and Wetland Resource Protection CE Policy 7.3 is more specific than FLUE Policy 6.10 regarding the City’s direction to minimize impacts of development on wetlands. Petitioners’ planning expert opined that the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with this policy because it does not “avoid or minimize” the impact of wetlands at all, much less “to the greatest degree practicable,” as directed by the policy. Petitioners’ expert based his entire argument solely on the first sentence of the policy. Petitioners’ planning expert explained, incredulously, that, in his opinion, the rest of the policy “doesn’t matter.”5/ The opinion of Petitioners’ expert was not persuasive. The Policy must be read in its entirety; and, when read as such, the Plan Amendment is consistent with the policy. The first sentence of the policy is precatory and direction-setting. It states the City’s intent to distribute land uses in a way that minimizes wetland impacts. The following sentences describe in more detail how that direction will be accomplished, and specifically reference the incorporated chart. The policy provides that land uses identified in the chart as incompatible with wetland protection “shall be directed away from wetlands.” By contrast, the policy provides that for land uses identified as compatible, wetland impacts “shall be mitigated . . . in accordance with the Broward County Code of Ordinances, Chapter 27.” It is undisputed that the wetlands on the Subject Property have a WBI value of less than .80. Pursuant to the chart, then, all uses of the Subject Property are compatible with the wetlands on-site, as long as the wetland impact compensation requirements of the Broward County Code are followed. The policy clearly provides that no development, regardless of density or intensity, must be directed away from the wetlands on the Subject Property. If the WBI value of the on-site wetlands was .80 or higher, pursuant to this policy, Petitioners’ position that the Subject Property should be placed in Conservation use would be presumed correct, although rebuttable. To that end, Petitioners introduced expert opinion testimony as to the quality of the wetland areas on-site which were previously maintained by the property owner--namely the areas under the guy wires. In the opinion of Petitioners’ wetlands expert, the on-site wetlands could be restored to higher quality if the Melaleuca trees were removed and the stumps sprayed to prevent regrowth. Petitioners’ argument is irrelevant to a determination of whether the Plan Amendment is consistent with this policy. Having established that the WBI value of the on-site wetlands is below .80, the issue of whether the on-site wetlands could be restored is irrelevant. Chapter 27 of the Broward County Code governs application for, and issuance of, an ERL for wetland alteration. On September 11, 2018, Broward County issued an ERL to Lennar for its proposed development of the Subject Property. Petitioner introduced no evidence to support a finding that the provisions of Chapter 27 were not satisfied by the County in issuing the ERL. Petitioners did not prove the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with CE Policy 7.3.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Economic Opportunity enter a final order determining that the Plan Amendment adopted by City of Miramar Ordinance 1901, on October 7, 2018, is “in compliance,” as that term is defined by section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of June, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 2019.
The Issue This proceeding concerns a Consent Order entered into by the Department of Environmental regulation (DER), and James and Patricia Gratzer (Gratzers) regarding an allegedly unpermitted fill in Winter Springs, Florida. The ultimate issue for determination is whether DER abused its discretion in resolving the alleged violations by entering into the subject Consent Order.
Findings Of Fact In the fall of 1990, the Gratzers purchased a 4.35 acre lot located at 216 Stoner Road in Winter Springs, Florida. At the time of purchase, the Gratzers planned to divide the lot and build a residence on the two acre parcel. In preparation for construction of their new home, the Gratzers approached the Winter Springs City Council to subdivide the property and to approve of use of the fill road as ingress and egress for both lots. In February of 1991, the Gratzers and their builder obtained the proper building permits from the County and septic tank permits from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Construction began on the residence on April 9, 1992 when the Gratzers' builder brought in several trucks of dirt to the end of the existing fill road to begin the house pad. At the time the Gratzers began construction on the subject lot, they had no idea or reason to believe that they were about to build in jurisdictional wetlands of the State of Florida. On approximately April 14, 1992, the Gratzers were first made aware that they may have problems with potential wetlands on the property when an officer of the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission visiting the site instructed the builders to halt construction, pending a review by DER. As a result of the site visit, the Gratzers investigated further with DER employees the potential wetlands on their property. They also sought the advice of an attorney and his environmental consultant regarding possible ways to solve DER's concerns. On approximately April 26, 1991, an employee of DER visited the site and made an initial determination that the property was a jurisdictional wetland subject to permitting by DER. Under present rules the Gratzer property, with exception of the filled access road, would all be in DER jurisdictional wetlands if only the natural vegetation were considered. Upon being informed of DER's initial determination, the Gratzers hired an engineer from Boyer-Singleton & Associates to make an engineering determination as to the extent of jurisdictional wetlands based upon a ten-year backstop. A ten-year backstop is a method provided by statute to determine the ultimate landward extent of DER's vegetational jurisdictional line. It is a hydrological calculation to determine water elevation levels in a certain area, subject to the ten-year recurrent storm event. By rule and statute, DER's jurisdiction over wetlands effectively stops at the upper end or limit of the ten-year flood elevation line. Claude Cassagnol, of Boyer-Singleton and Associates, an expert in hydrology, reviewed available materials, visited the site and made an initial determination of the ten-year backstop on the Gratzers' property, and ultimately mapped out his conclusions on a plat. Mr. Cassagnol's hydrological study, and his review of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) materials, led him to conclude that the ten-year backstop would leave the Gratzer's house pad out of any DER jurisdictional wetlands. As a result of his study, Cassagnol forwarded several letters to George Baragona of DER requesting that Mr. Baragona, an expert hydrologist, review his determination and ratify his conclusions. The Gratzers, on advice of counsel, allowed their building contractor to complete compaction of the house pad and begin preparations to pour the house floor. The septic tank contractor for the Gratzers completed installation of the tank and drain field prior to July 1st. After the Gratzers had recommenced construction, on approximately July 10, 1992, DER, issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) which ultimately formed the basis for the Consent Order in this case. The Gratzers immediately ceased further construction on the property and sought further negotiations with DER. Shortly after the NOV was issued, George Baragona reviewed the information, studies and plats submitted by Mr. Cassagnol regarding the ten-year backstop. Baragona made a determination of the ten-year backstop at a point more landward than Cassagnol's. It appears from the plat submitted at hearing, that Baragona's ten- year backstop line runs along the base of the fill roadway; his testimony, however, indicated that his backstop line dipped in and out near the roadway, and he simply chose the baseline of the fill road as his "worst case scenario". Baragona, because of the house pad, was required to extrapolate a line through the house pad, resulting in approximately half of the house pad area being in jurisdictional wetlands. The result of further negotiations between the parties was the Consent Order which is the subject matter of this proceeding. As settlement, the Gratzers agreed to Baragona's "worst case scenario" ten-year backstop, placing approximately half of the house pad was in DER jurisdictional wetlands. As part of the settlement, the Gratzers agreed to, and have paid, a fine of $1,400.00 to DER and have granted a conservation easement over a large portion of the remainder of their property, resulting in an 11.6 to 1 ratio of conservation easement to impacted wetlands, slightly above DER's guideline 10 to 1 ratio. In investigating the alleged violations at the subject property, DER reviewed the cumulative impacts of the project and determined that they were not great, in light of the surrounding area and its already high level of development. In making this determination, DER reviewed property lists, maps and other facts to determine the level of current development. In reviewing the alleged violations, DER also considered whether or not this project would have been able to get a permit had the Gratzers sought a permit prior to any construction. It was DER's determination that the project would have been permittable under the criteria in Chapter 403, in conjunction with the mitigation offered at the site. Finally, in its review and study of the alleged violations, DER determined there was no evidence that this project would have any adverse impact on water quality. DER made a determination that this was a "low to medium" violation, and that the impacts were properly addressed through the Consent Order which imposed the $1,400.00 fine and secured the conservation easement. Fill Road Issue A small road or driveway existed on the site at the time the Gratzers purchased the property, extending from Stoner Road from the south, to the center of their property. Although Baragona indicated the DER modelled backstop line did not always extend to the driveway, he said it sometimes appeared to "bump up" to the eastern edge of the driveway. Baragona could not say with absolute certainty where the 10 year backstop would be on the east side of the site if the driveway were not present. The type of wetland vegetation on the Gratzer property would be considered jurisdictional wetland vegetation under rules adopted pursuant to the 1984 Warren F. Henderson Wetlands Act (Section 403.91, et seq.), but would not be considered jurisdictional wetland vegetation under rules applicable prior to October 1, 1984. If the driveway on the Gratzer property was installed prior to October 1, 1984, it is legal, but if it was installed after that date it is illegal because there is no evidence it ever was properly permitted. DER does not allow illegally filled areas to cut off the extent of its wetland jurisdiction. Therefore, if the driveway on the Gratzer property were placed in DER jurisdictional wetlands without a permit, the road itself could not act as a 10 year backstop cutting off DER wetland jurisdiction to the west. There was conflicting evidence as to when the driveway was placed on the property. James Hartman, who sold the property to the Gratzers, testified he built the driveway in 1978 and 1979. William Kuyper, an expert in aerial photography interpretation, testified that based on his review of aerial photos, the road had been placed on site sometime between January 6, 1986, and March, 1989. The weight of the evidence indicates the driveway was probably placed on site before October 1, 1984, and therefore did not require a DER permit. First, the former landowner's testimony that he built the road in 1978 and 1979, must be considered more reliable than an interpretation of aerial photos taken from 12,000 feet in the air, in spite of the expertise of the photographic interpreter. A possible explanation for why the driveway "appeared" in the 1989 aerial photo but not in the 1986 aerial photo is that the road may have been disturbed, or new fill put on the road sometime between 1986 and 1989, causing the road to be more visible in 1989. Even if the 10 year backstop were to be determined without the driveway present, it would not be significantly different. While DER's 10 year backstop line "bumps up" against the road in places, it does not "bump up" in other places along the driveway, but in order to be conservative the line was placed along with driveway in all areas. The modelled location of the line north of the housepad where there is no driveway is consistent with where the line is modelled south of the housepad where the driveway is located. The Society and its Concerns The Society's corporate status was not controverted. CFWS members have been patrolling the Lake Jessup/Gee Creek area and other wetland areas and have found what they believe are violations of the law and rules intended to protect wetland resources. Although neither Michael Mingea nor his expert witness have been on the Gratzer property, they have been in the immediate area and are concerned about the cumulative impact of small dredging projects, like the Gratzers, which projects are routinely reported to DER by the Society. Beginning in May 1991, the Society corresponded regularly with Secretary Browner at DER and Secretary Williams at the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) and their respective staffs, regarding what the Society perceived were violations occurring through lax enforcement. The Society believed, though review of HRS and DER files, that the Gratzers' project included a septic tank placed in jurisdictional wetlands. This was not established; rather, the septic tank was erroneously placed inside a setback line, but outside the jurisdictional line, and a variance was readily obtained from HRS. DER does not have direct jurisdiction over septic tank permits and HRS' authority is derived from the statutes, not from DER. The Society's position regarding the Gratzer project is based in substantial part on its assertion that the fill road was illegally placed and that DER's jurisdiction extended through the entire property. The Society, however, did not rebut the sound evidence by George Baragona of the 10-year backstop. Nor did it present competent evidence of any alleged water quality violations. Only one other actual violation of permit requirements was established, and DER has required the developer to move the project from jurisdictional wetlands.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, recommended that the Consent Order that is the subject of this proceeding be adopted as Final Agency Action. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-0104 The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by Petitioners: 1.-3. Adopted in preliminary statement and paragraph 19. 4. Adopted in substance in paragraph 5. 5.-6. Rejected as unnecessary. 7.-8. Adopted in substance in paragraph 14. 9.-12. Rejected as unnecessary. 13. Adopted in part in paragraph 20, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 14.-16. Rejected as unnecessary. 17.-18. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 19. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence. 20.-22. Rejected as unnecessary. 23.-25. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 26. Rejected as unnecessary. 27.-30. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 31.-32. Rejected as summary of testimony or argument, rather than findings of fact. 33.-34. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 35.-36. Rejected as unnecessary. 37. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. [Section VI, pp 19-22 includes unnumbered paragraphs summarizing testimony, rather than findings of fact]. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael W. Mingea, President Central Florida Wetlands Society P.O. Box 2826 Orlando, FL 32802 Rex D. Ware, Esquire P.O. Box 1794 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Douglas H. MacLaughlin, Esquire DER-Twin Towers Office Bldg. 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Carol Browner, Secretary DER-Twin Towers Office Bldg. 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, Esq. DER-Twin Towers Ofc. Bldg. 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399
Conclusions An Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings has entered an Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File in this proceeding. A copy of the Order is attached to this Final Order as Exhibit A.
Other Judicial Opinions REVIEW OF THIS FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.030(b)(1)(C) AND 9.110. TO INITIATE AN APPEAL OF THIS ORDER, A NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT’S AGENCY CLERK, 2555 SHUMARD OAK BOULEVARD, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-2100, WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DAY THIS ORDER IS FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE FORM PRESCRIBED BY FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.900(a). A COPY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL AND MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE FILING FEE SPECIFIED IN SECTION 35.22(3), FLORIDA STATUTES. YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS NOT TIMELY FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK AND THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL. MEDIATION UNDER SECTION 120.573, FLA. STAT., IS NOT AVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUES RESOLVED BY THIS ORDER. FINAL ORDER NO. DCA 11-GM-145 CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that the original of the foregoing has been filed with the undersigned Agency Clerk of the Department of Community Affairs, and that true and correct copies have been furnished by U.S. Mail to each of the persons listed below on this day of » 2011. By U.S. Mail The Honorable Bram D. E. Canter Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 By Electronic Mail Catherine D. Reischmann, Esq. Debra S. Babb-Nutcher, Esq. Gregg A. Johnson, Esq. Brown, Garganese, Weiss & D’agresta, P.A. 111 N. Orange Ave., Ste. 2000 Orlando, Florida 32802 creischmann@orlandolaw.net dbabb@orlandolaw.net gjohnson@orlandolaw.net Reginald L. Bouthillier, Jr., Esquire Greenberg Traurig, P.A. 101 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301-7742 bouthillierr@gtlaw.com \ Paula Ford tga Agency Clerk Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Blvd Tallahassee Florida 32399-2100 Thomas W. Reese, Esquire 2951 61st Avenue South St. Petersburg, Florida 33712-4539 twreeseesq@aol.com Marcia Parker Tjoflat, Esq. Pappas, Metcalf, Jenks & Miller, P.A. 245 Riverside Ave., Ste. 400 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 mpt@papmet.com M. Lynn Pappas, Esq. Pappas, Metcalf, Jenks & Miller, P.A. 245 Riverside Ave., Ste. 400 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Ipappas@papmet.com Linda Loomis Shelley, Esq. Fowler White Boggs & Banker, PA. P.O. Box 11240 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ishelley@fowlerwhite.com Lynette Nort, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Lynette.Norr@dca.state.fl.us FINAL ORDER NO. DCA 11-GM-145
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether four agency memoranda describing policy on mitigation for dredge and fill projects are unpromulgated rules and were relied on by the agency in violation of Section 120.535(1), F.S. During the hearing, and afterwards in writing, Petitioner sought leave to amend its pleadings to incorporate other policies allegedly relied on by the agency in the process of the dredge and fill application review. That request was denied in an order entered on August 23, 1993. Those policies are addressed in the recommended order in DOAH #93-3367.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, SIP Properties Limited Partnership (SIP) is the record owner of the parcel at issue, approximately thirty-five (35) acres located in the southwest area of Orlando, Orange County, Florida. SIP proposes to prepare the site for commercial and office use by developing the site into separate parcels or lots with proposed uses such as restaurant or fast food establishments, offices and retail stores. Development of the site requires the construction of compensating storage ponds that will act as retention/detention ponds and filling the site. The proposed improvements will result in the filling of 7.47 acres and dredging of 0.42 acres of wetlands claimed to be jurisdictional by DEP. Based on statements made to SIP by staff regarding department "mitigation policies" applicable to SIP's dredge and fill permit application, SIP believed that department policy memoranda were applied during permit review. SIP attached these various memoranda regarding mitigation to its Petition for Administrative Determination of Violation of Rulemaking Requirement dated May 27, 1993, and identified these memoranda as nonrule policies utilized by the department. The department retains on file and makes available for use by its staff the identified memoranda. However, in this case the department did not rely on or apply the mitigation guidelines contained in the memoranda in SIP's Petition. Instead, it applied Part III of Chapter 17-3120, F.A.C. In Part III of Chapter 17-312, F.A.C., the agency has adopted rules addressing the mitigation issues contained in the memoranda in SIP's Petition. For example, the agency has adopted guidelines in rule 17-312.340(2), F.A.C., for applying ratios when mitigation involves creation of state waters, as in this case. The department presently relies on these rules when reviewing mitigation plans, and does not rely on the policy memos referenced in the petition. Determining the mitigation needed to successfully offset impacts from a project is difficult and depends on many factors, including hydrology, soils, planting methods, and monitoring plans. Determining what is needed to reasonably assure successful mitigation must be done on a case by case basis. Not enough is known about the subject to apply any particular set of directions and expect success. DEP is presently in the process of developing rules to further address most aspects of mitigation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Environmental Protection issue its Final Order granting SIP's dredge and fill permit #48-2086169, with the mitigation proposed by the applicant, and establishing an expiration date and monitoring and evaluation plan for determining success of the mitigation as provided in rules 17-312.320 and 17-312.350, F.A.C. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 11th day of January, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 1994. APPENDIX The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1.-3. Adopted in paragraph 2. 4.-6. Adopted in paragraph 7. 7.-8. Rejected as unnecessary. 9. Adopted in paragraph 8. 10.-11. Adopted in substance in paragraph 9. 12. Adopted in substance in paragraph 10. 13.-16. Rejected as unnecessary Adopted in paragraphs 11 and 12. Rejected as unnecessary. 19.-21. Adopted in substance in paragraph 13. 22.-23. Adopted in substance in paragraph 14. 24.-25. Adopted in paragraph 15. Adopted in paragraph 16. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Adopted in paragraph 16. Substantially rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Adopted in part in paragraph 17, otherwise rejected as immaterial. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in paragraph 18. Rejected as immaterial. The agency witnesses established that the vegetation along the canal evidences the physical connection and there is evidence that water flows from the site into the canal. Rejected as unsubstantiated by reliable competent evidence. Adopted in substance in paragraph 22. 36.-40. Rejected as unsupported by reliable competent evidence. Rejected as immaterial. Rejected as unsupported by the weight of evidence. Rejected as unnecessary, and as to characterization of merely "relic" wetlands, unsupported by the weight of evidence. Rejected (the conclusion of jurisdictional limit) as unsupported by the greater weight of evidence. 45.-53. Rejected as immaterial or unnecessary. 54.-56. Adopted in paragraphs 33 and 34. 57. Adopted, as to the limited function, in paragraphs 22 and 23. 58. Adopted in paragraph 26. 59.-60. Adopted in paragraph 23. 61. Rejected, as to the absolute conclusion of "no function", as contrary to the greater weight of evidence. 62. Adopted in paragraph 25. 63.-64. Adopted in paragraph 26. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 30. Adopted in paragraph 34. Adopted in substance in paragraph 31. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 30 and 34. Adopted in paragraph 31. 71.-73. Adopted in paragraph 33. 74.-77. Rejected as unnecessary. 78.-79. Adopted in paragraph 31. 80.-81. Adopted in paragraph 35. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 33. 84.-90. Rejected as unnecessary. Respondent's Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraph 15. 2.-3. Adopted in paragraph 16. 4.-5. Adopted in paragraph 17. Adopted in paragraph 15. Adopted in paragraph 17. Adopted in paragraph 16. Rejected as unnecessary and as to "binding" effect, unsupported by the weight of evidence. Adopted in paragraph 19. 11.-15. Adopted in substance in paragraph 21. 16. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence and inconsistent with proposed findings #18 with regard to the constant level in the canal. 17.-18. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 21 and 23. 19.-21. Adopted in paragraphs 19 and 20. 22.-26. Adopted in summary in paragraph 21. Adopted in paragraph 27. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 1 and 2. Adopted in paragraph 2. Adopted in part in paragraph 16. That the forests are "healthy and viable" is rejected as unsupported by the weight of evidence. Adopted in substance in paragraph 17. Adopted in part in paragraph 25; otherwise rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 33.-34. Adopted in part in paragraph 27; otherwise rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 35.-37. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 38.-43. Rejected as unnecessary. 44. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. The stormwater management plan and mitigation will restore the stormwater treatment functions. 45.-47. Adopted in substance in paragraph 30. Rejected as substantially contrary to the greater weight of evidence (as to the negative impact). Adopted in part, as to water quality problems generally, but rejected as to the ultimate conclusion, as contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Rejected as unnecessary. 51.-52. Adopted in summary in paragraph 31. 53.-54. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 55. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Kenneth Plante, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Ronald M. Schirtzer, Esquire Martha H. Formella, Esquire R. Duke Woodson, Esquire FOLEY & LARDNER 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1800 Orlando, Florida 32801 Douglas H. MacLaughlin, Esquire John L. Chaves, Esquire Rosanne G. Capeless, Certified Legal Intern Department of Environmental Protection Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
Findings Of Fact Maurice Fox ("Developer" or "Respondent" hereafter) filed his original application for approval of a development of regional impact with the Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners in April, 1974. An extensive application was filed. Personnel from the staff of the County's Planning, Building, and Zoning Department discussed the application with the Respondent and his representatives, and the staff's recommendations were presented to the Planning Commission and to the Board of County Commissioners. The Respondent made presentations to the South Florida Regional Planing Council, and to the Board of County Commissioners. The Board received input from the Respondent, from the South Florida Regional Planning Council, from its own staff, from the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, and from the Flood Control District, which is now the South Florida Water Management District. Palm Beach County was, at that time, a member of the South Florida Regional Planning Council. The Council recommended that the Board of County Commissioners deny the application for development order, maintaining that the proposed development conflicted with the county land use plan, would stimulate excessive migration into the region, would cause an excessive burden upon transportation facilities, did not adequately provide for solid waste disposal, could have an adverse impact upon water quality in the region, and would eliminate a significant habitat for wildlife including several threatened or endangered species. The Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission opposed the proposed project because of its potentially adverse impact upon the wildlife habitat. The Flood Control District considered that the lake system proposed to be operated in conjunction with the development could be maintained in such a way as to negate adverse impacts upon water quality of the region, and did not oppose the project. The County's Planning, Building, and Zoning Department recommended that the development order be issued, and the County Planning Commission concurred. By resolution number R74-700, the County Commission approved the application for development order subject to three conditions on September 3, 1974. This proceeding ensued. During the pendency of this proceeding, Palm Beach County withdrew from membership in the South Florida Regional Planning Council. The County joined the Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council (TCRPC). Since it was granted status as an intervenor, TCRPC has been functioning as the appellant. The South Florida Council has withdrawn from the proceeding. TCRPC has contended that the Board of County Commissioners did not adequately consider the environmental consequences of the proposed development. This contention is not supported by the evidence. The Board of County Commissioners did not have before it all of the evidence that is now before the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, but it did have adequate information from which it could assess the environmental impacts of the proposed development, and weigh these impacts against potential advantages and disadvantages of the development. Whether the County Commission made a correct assessment of the ecological consequences of the proposed development is an issue for this appeal. The thought processes by which members of the Commission made the determination are not issues in this proceeding. Maurice Fox acquired the property which is the subject of this proceeding, and which has come to be known as the Fox Property, in 1954. The Fox Property lies in Palm Beach County, and is bordered on the east by State Road 7 as it is presently constructed and as it is proposed for extension. The property will run three lineal miles along State Road 7 when State Road 7 is completed. Okeechobee Road runs through the southern section of the property. The property has roughly a rectangular configuration, and consists of 1705 net acres apart from the rights of way of Okeechobee Road and State Road 7. The proposed development is a retirement community. It would contain 10,004 living units with a population cap of 18,416 persons. Dwelling units would be dispersed in forty five residential pods, some bordering on a lake, others on a golf course. There would be single and mixed story clusters. The maximum rise would be four stories. Two golf courses are proposed for construction, along with a 406-acre lake for sailing, boating, and fishing. A fourteen mile bicycle path that would not cross any roads is proposed for construction around the lake. There would be tennis courts, and at least one swimming pool for each building pod. The main social club would be located on the lake. Each golf course would have a club house. There would be a total of 1028 acres of open space, with approximately fourteen acres preserved in a natural condition. Three church sites have been set aside, along with a four and one half acre civic center, which would include a fire station, security facility, and municipal services. A commercial facility on a twenty five and one half acre tract is planned, with smaller convenience centers located at each of the golf club houses. The most significant feature of the development is a proposed center for geriatric medicine, which would be located on the southeast corner of the property. The center would be owned by a non profit corporation, and would be operated for the public benefit. The Respondent proposes to donate the land for the center. The center would have the following facilities: (a) A medical clinic with group practices of physicians; (b) Emergency facilities and rehabilitation services as a part of the clinic; (c) A retirement hotel for physically or mentally disabled persons who do not require complete nursing care; (d) A nursing home, and facilities that would provide in home services designed to keep older persons in their homes; (e) A nursing school, or continuing education facility that would provide training for staff for the center, and for other facilities. The center would have a significant research function, allowing a group of older persons to be studied over a period of years. The development would be constructed in four essentially, equal phases. Phases for construction of the geriatrics center have not yet been detailed. Local and state licensing would be required in order to operate many of the proposed functions of the center, and planning for construction of the center would need to be coordinated on an on going basis with the development of the retirement community. No evidence was offered that would specifically compare the proposed retirement community with other such communities. It is apparent, however, that the proposed community would provide a desirable place to live. All residences would border either a lake or golf course, and good recreational facilities would be immediately accessible to all residents. The project has been designed in order to maintain open spaces, with as much as seventy five, percent of the area remaining open. The primary benefit that the development would offer is the proposed center for geriatric medicine. The center is a primary altruistic goal of the Developer. The Developer has consulted eminent experts about the proposed center, and the center could provide a means for conducting significant research into illnesses of the elderly, and as a facility for training persons to treat illnesses of the elderly. Florida has a particular need for such an institute, and none of the medical schools in the state presently provide it. Although much is known about the needs for medical care of the elderly, a broader treatment concept has not been adequately developed. Old people are constantly fearful of becoming dependent, and they dread loneliness and bereavement. They have anxiety about spending their last days in a nursing home. The proposed center would address these problems by recruiting sensitive health care personnel, and providing a total care program for residents of the proposed community. Elderly persons require a continuum of care. Institutionalization of older people should be deferred as long as possible. There is a need to develop health services that can be delivered directly to the home. When it becomes necessary to institutionalize older persons, the proposed geriatrics center would accomplish it in a facility near to where they have lived, and to where their friends continue to live. Persons too fragile to stay in their own homes could live in the proposed hotel, and maintain personal relationships and community activities. Such a center as is being proposed would not have to be constructed in connection with a housing project, but it would be helpful to do so. Study would be facilitated due to the ready availability of a group of appropriate persons. The research that could be conducted could provide vital information about diseases of the aged. Some evidence was offered that tends to show that the Respondent may have some difficulty in obtaining all of the pertinent licenses that he will require in order to operate all facets of the proposed center. The evidence does not establish that the center is an impractical goal, but that ongoing planning that accounts for needs of the entire region is necessary. The Developer's motivations are clearly good. He is in part motivated by his own experience in dealing with an aged mother. He is not interested in developing the retirement community unless the center for geriatric medicine can also be developed. With appropriate planning the facility can become a reality, and would be a significant benefit to Palm Beach County, the region, the State of Florida, and indeed to society as a whole. The Fox Property is presently undeveloped. Human activities have had an effect on the property, but the property remains in an essentially natural condition. The property has been diked on all four sides by persons other than the Respondent. These dikes effect the flow of water across the property. While the evidence does not conclusively reveal whether the property has become drier or wetter as a result of human activity surrounding it, the present state of the property leads to a finding that its condition has not changed drastically in many years. The property may now be wetter than it was at some given instant in the past, or it may be drier. What is apparent is that the property has consistently maintained a degree of wetness that would support submerged or emergent vegetation, and that it has provided habitat for wildlife that thrive in transitional areas. Expert witnesses, who testified at the hearing, agreed as to the present characteristics of the property, but their testimony conflicted sharply in characterizing the condition as wet or dry, or as high quality or low quality wildlife habitat. Ecologists have reached no unanimous consensus in defining the term "wetland". The most generally accepted definition has been proposed by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service of the United States Department of the Interior in a "Draft of Interim Classification of Wetlands and Aquatic Habitats in the United States." The definition is as follows: Wetland is land where an excess of water is the dominant factor determining the nature of soil development and the types of plant and animal communities living at the soil surface,. It spans a continuum of environ- ments where terrestrial and aquatic systems intergrade. For the purpose of this classification system, wetland is defined more specifically as land where the water table is at, near, or above the land surface long enough each year to promote the formation of hydric soils and to support the growth of hydrophytes, as long as other environmental conditions are favorable. Permanent flooded lands lying beyond the deep water boundary of wetlands are referred to as aquatic habitats. The definition is compatible with the definition developed by other entities including the United States Corps of Engineers. The definition is also compatible with the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation system of classifying areas as submerged, transitional, and upland. Transitional areas within the Department of Environmental Regulation criteria would be classified as wetlands under the Fish and Wildlife Service definition. Wetlands have commonly recognized ecological values. These values are applicable to all wetlands, varying in quantitative and qualitative degree. In order of importance these values are as follows: First, wetlands provide habitat for an enormous array of plant and animal species, which cannot survive without such a habitat. Many endangered and threatened species require wetland habitats. They have become endangered or threatened because their realm has been diminished. Second, wetlands serve to remove and store excesses of certain elements from the environment. As a result of agricultural activities and as a result of large scale usage of fossil fuels, nitrogen and sulfates have become generally excessive in the environment. Wetlands serve a filtering and storage function for these potential pollutants. Third, wetlands serve an important water quality function. In periods of heavy rainfall wetlands serve to store and slowly release waters. Wetland vegetation serves to filter excess nutrients, from rainfall and from runoff, especially phosphorus and nitrogen. Fourth, wetlands are extremely productive in biological terms. Wetland vegetation takes in nutrients, and causes a net production of oxygen in the process of respiration. On a global, and even on a local scale, wetlands can thus be very important to air quality. Fifth, wetlands have an important impact upon the climate. Stored water in wetland areas maintains a warmer climate in areas surrounding the wetland. Wetlands also serve to fuel rainfall in an area. These wetland attributes apply to all wetlands in varying degrees, and do not apply as profoundly to other ecosystems. In addition to these values, wetlands serve an important food producing function since they serve as breeding grounds for fish, have important esthetic and recreational value, and have research and educational importance. Preservation of wetland areas has become an important environmental concern because there has been a very large loss of wetland areas to development. It has been estimated that more than one third of all wetlands in the United States, and more than half of the wetlands in Florida have been drained. Utilizing the Fish and Wildlife Service definition, from 900 to 1400 acres of the 1705 acre Fox Property can be classified as wetland. Only approximately 60 acres of the tract is aquatic, in other words wet at all times. Other areas are, however, sufficiently dominated by an excess of water to fall within the Fish and Wildlife definition. The Fox Property is not without human influence. The dikes which surround the property have effected the flow of water. "All terrain vehicles" have crossed the area and left their tracks. In some locations this vehicle use has been sufficiently significant that trails have been identified. There has been considerable hunting in the area. Some trash has been dumped, particularly in the areas adjacent to Okeechobee Boulevard. Trees have been removed, and potholes left in their place. In the area south of Okeechobee Boulevard it is apparent that there was considerable agricultural usage in the past which has affected the land. It is also apparent that there has been burning, although not to the extent that the ecological viability of the area has been violated. Exotic pest plants have infiltrated portions of the property. Melaleuca is the most dramatic of these. In small areas of the property melaleuca has become the dominant vegetation. Over a period of time melaleuca will tend to dry out a wetland, but the process is a lengthy one, which may take centuries to complete. Large airplanes fly low over the property disturbing the area with loud noises. Despite these intrusions, the Fox Property is dominated primarily by natural as opposed to human caused conditions. Nine hundred to fourteen hundred acres of the Fox Property display high or moderate wetland values. The remainder of the property displays low wetland values. Some parts of the property display outstanding wetland values. The most significant wetland attribute displayed by the Fox Property is the wildlife habitat that it provides. The habitat on the property is quite varied, and that contributes to its importance for wildlife. Several species on the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission "Threatened Species List" were actually observed on the property. These are the American alligator, the Florida great white heron, the osprey, the southeastern kestrel, the audubon's caracara, and the Florida sandhill crane. Several species on the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission "Species of Special Concern List" were also observed. Wildlife on this list are considered to be not as threatened with extinction as those on the "Threatened Species List", but nonetheless of concern. Observed were the little blue heron, the great egret, the snowy egret, the white ibis, the Cooper's Hawk, and the roundtail muskrat. Several other species on these lists thrive in such habitats as the Fox Property, and potentially could be there. The Florida Endangered Species List promulgated by the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission constitutes species, that are in eminent danger of becoming extinct. None of these species were actually observed on the Fox Property, but the Fox Property provides viable habitat for the wood stork, the Florida Everglade kite, the red cockaded woodpecker, the, Florida grasshopper sparrow, and, the Florida panther. The Everglade kite, the red cockaded woodpecker, and the Florida panther are also on the Federal Endangered Species List. It is because of loss of habitat that these species are of concern, or are threatened, or are endangered. The Fox Property lies adjacent to a wetland area known as the Loxahatchee Slough. This is a major north south surface water drainage basin in eastern Palm Beach, County. Surface water moves across the Slough to the north, feeding the Loxahatchee River, or to the south into what is known as Conservation Area One within the Loxahatchee Preserve. The Fox property is in effect the western boundary of the Slough. The Loxahatchee Slough is a wetlands ecosystem. The Slough, and the National Wildlife Refuge, which surrounds and encompasses it, amount to 145,635 acres. This is primarily wetland. There are other viable wetland areas in the vicinity of the Fox Property which encompass as much as 850,000 acres. The fact that extensive wetlands are near to the Fox Property does not, however, lessen the wetland values of the Fox Property. In fact, the adjoining wetlands augment the wetland values that can be ascribed to the Fox Property, especially in terms of the property's importance to endangered wildlife. The proposed development would include a lake with an area of more than 490 acres. The lake system would provide viable habitat for the Florida alligator, but not for the other species discussed above, except perhaps as an occasional feeding area. These species are becoming scarce because their available habitat is shrinking. They are reclusive, and do not flourish in human residential areas. If the proposed development is approved, the Fox Property will effectively be obliterated as a viable wildlife habitat for many species, including some whose existence is threatened. The proposed lake system would also not perform other important wetland functions to the extent that the Fox Property now does so. The TCRPC has contended that the proposed development would have an adverse impact upon water quality in the region. This contention has not been supported by the evidence. It is apparent that the lake system will not serve the water purifying function that the Fox Property as a viable wet land presently serves. It does appear from the evidence, however, that the lake system can be maintained in such a manner as to not cause an adverse impact upon water quality. One witness testified that the lake is likely to suffer from algal blooms in part because it would be overloaded with phosphorus. This testimony did not, however, consider the effect that the swale system proposed by the Developer will have in filtering phosphorus from runoff which will enter the lake system. The testimony reveals that artificial lakes in the South Florida area have frequently been plagued with poor water quality. It is apparent that if the proposed lake were not properly maintained, its water quality could seriously deteriorate. With proper management, however, good water quality could be maintained. The evidence presented respecting the impact of the proposed development in environmental terms related solely to the proposed development. Whether less ambitious developments could be undertaken on the property without damaging the wildlife habitat or the wetland values was not addressed, and would not have been relevant.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Environmental Protection is the state agency responsible for permitting involving water quality and the dredging and filling of wetlands as defined in Chapter 403, Florida Statutes. Petitioner, Stephen J. Dibbs, owns 20.03 acres of land located at the southeast corner of the intersection of Dale Mabry Highway with Hoedt Road, north of Tampa in Hillsborough County, Florida. The property consists of 11.27 acres of non-jurisdictional uplands and 8.76 acres of forested jurisdictional wetlands which divide the property somewhat diagonally in a northwest to southeast direction. There are uplands along the entire western boundary of the property along Dale Mabry Highway and Zambito Road, as well as in the southwestern portion of the property. The property is surrounded by commercial, residential and multifamily development and is zoned by Hillsborough County for commercial use. The deeper portions of the wetlands area are dominated by cypress trees and the transitional wetlands areas include laurel oak, American elm, red maple and dahoon holly. These wetlands currently provide habitat for fish and other wildlife and provide for water storage and treatment. This is a high quality forested wetlands which performs the valuable wetlands functions outlined above. It is subject to the Department's permitting procedures. Mr. Dibbs purchased the property in 1989 knowing at the time of purchase that jurisdictional wetlands were located thereon as defined by a previously conducted Departmental jurisdiction determination. He also knew that at the time of purchase there was no vehicular access/egress to the property via Hoedt Road. On April 26, 1994, Mr. Dibbs submitted a revision to his previously submitted application No. 292103383 for a permit to fill a portion of the wetlands on his property described above. Thereafter, on August 19, 1994, the Department issued its Intent to deny the requested permit and on August 31, 1994, Mr. Dibbs filed a timely Petition to contest the agency action. The parties agree, and it is found, that: The subject project does not occur within an Outstanding Florida Water. The project will not negatively impact any threatened or endangered species. The project will not adversely affect navigation or the flow of water or cause harmful erosion or shoaling. The project will not adversely affect significant historical and archaeological resources, Mr. Dibbs proposes to fill 2.014 acres of wetlands located at the western end of his property. The impacts to this filled parcel will be permanent in nature. The project, as originally envisioned in the March, 1992 application by Mr. Dibbs, called for the filling of approximately 4 acres of wetlands for a large commercial development and a "Par 3" golf course. In the permitting process, the Department must first determine if the project is in the public interest, and the cumulative impact of the proposed project is a part of that public interest determination. Efforts at minimization of the proposed project's impact on the wetlands are made at that time and the applicant's proposal for mitigation cannot be considered until he has established he cannot otherwise meet the statutory standards by minimizing the proposed impacts to wetlands by avoiding them or by reducing the amount of wetlands area impacted. In the course of negotiations with and at the request of the Department, Mr. Dibbs modified the project to eliminate the golf course and reduce the size of the commercial development, which resulted in a decrease in the amount of fill from approximately 4 acres to the presently sought 2.014 acres. As a part of the permitting process, and in support of mitigation efforts, the Department suggested five modifications to Mr. Dibbs which it felt would make the project permittable. These were: Further minimization of wetlands impacts by a re-orientation of buildings, roads and parking areas/spaces or a reduction in the number of commercial sites to allow the remaining operations to be better fitted into available uplands with less spill-over into wetlands. Limitation of impact to the fringe areas of the wetlands rather than the interior. Investigating the feasibility of moving the Pier One Import or any other facility back from Dale Mabry and turning Chick-Fil-A and China Coast sideways to lesser their direct impacts. Maintain the concept of vertical retaining wall use along the wetlands construction line as proposed. Mitigate for the reduced wetlands encroach- ments at a creation ratio of 1.5:1 with tree spade transplants at 15 foot centers, interplanted with 3 gallon or larger pot plants to create a 10'X10' overall plant spacing, and the dedication of the mitigation area and all remaining wetlands to the Department in a perpetual conservation easement. Of these proposals, the vertical retaining wall, (4), and the submission of a mitigation plan, (5), were part of Petitioner's April, 1994 modification. There remains, however, some resistance to the dedication of the wetlands and mitigation area by a perpetual easement. The Department admits that the turning of the Chick-Fil-A and China Coast facilities sideways is not practicable. Since the remaining suggestions essentially involve eliminating two of the four commercial sites, Mr. Dibbs, determining that such action would render the development economically infeasible, rejected those suggestions. The Department suggested modifications to the Dibbs project which limited the wetlands fill to approximately 0.5 to 0.7 acres by having only two restaurants with a truck access from Hoedt Road. While there is an issue as to the economic viability of the Department's suggestion, that suggestion is practicable from an engineering standpoint, notwithstanding the opinion of Mr. Mai, Petitioner's expert. It would also meet both the parking requirements of the Hillsborough County Land Development Code and the corporate requirements of General Mills, the owner of such mid-priced sit-down restaurants as Olive Garden and China Coast, as proposed here. Nonetheless, after Petitioner's initial application was filed in 1992, consistent with the Department's mitigation suggestions, Mr. Dibbs did make certain modifications to the proposed project in an effort to minimize its impact on the environment. This accounted for the elimination of the previously considered miniature golf course and a reduction in size of the development which reduced the required amount of fill from 4 acres to 2.014 acres. The project, as described in the current application under consideration, is what Petitioner considers the smallest the project can be made and still be economically feasible. As presently envisioned by Petitioner, the development project will encompass approximately 8 acres and will include four (4) freestanding commercial facilities, including two sit-down restaurants, an Olive Garden Restaurant and a China Coast Restaurant; a fast food restaurant, Chick-Fil-A; and a retail facility, Pier One Imports, all along the western boundary of the property fronting Dale Mabry Highway and Zambito Road. The Chick-Fil-A would be located in the northwest corner of the development almost entirely on what is presently forested wetlands. The Pier One Imports store would be on what is presently forested wetlands, south of the Chick-Fil-A and north of the China Coast restaurant which, itself, would involve some impacts to forested wetlands. The Olive Garden restaurant would be located on the southwest corner of the property south of the China Coast. It is the only building in the proposed development which would not involve some wetlands impact. Due to the length of time involved so far in obtaining permits for the development, both Pier One and General Mills, the parent for China Coast and Olive Garden, have withdrawn their agreements with Mr. Dibbs to utilize his property though they remain interested in them. At one point, General Mills offered Petitioner $1.6 million for the Olive Garden and China Coast properties. Mr. Dibbs has entered discussions with other prospective tenants but all have space requirements similar to those envisioned in the present planned development. He has found, generally, a greater demand for space than there are sites available. These space requirements convince him that the minimum encroachment that would satisfy his development plans is the 2.014 acres proposed. Any further reduction in encroachment would result in a need to change the development proposal which, Mr. Dibbs claims, would negate the economic viability of the development. In order for minimization to be effective and not inappropriate, it must result in the applicant still having a project which is economically viable. Economic viability means that the estimated value of the project as completed under minimization would be equal to or exceed its estimated cost. The Department's evidence tends to indicate that a project limited to an Olive Garden restaurant and a China Coast restaurant would be economically viable. Further, the Department contends that same evidence indicates that a commercial project limited to the two out parcels, at the southern portion of the project site would also be economically viable and profitable, if not as profitable as Petitioner originally anticipated. That contention has not been shown to be so. Dr. William C. Weaver, Barnett Professor of real estate and business valuation at the University of Florida and a forensic economist, utilizing figures provided by Petitioner, by deposition indicated that Petitioner had, as of the date of the testimony, incurred development costs totaling $746,000. Weaver also estimated that fill costs for the project as modified would be an additional $100,000. Wetlands replacement and monitoring, (mitigation) would cost an additional $100,000, and the cost of obtaining access to Hoedt Road would be an additional $100,000. For the purposes of calculating a rate of return, Dr. Weaver assumed the development would be limited to the two parcels on the southern portion of the site, with access to Hoedt Road down the length of the site in some manner. These sites, he concluded, have a present value of $850,000 even though not all costs have as yet been incurred. Future development of the two parcels would, in Weaver's estimation, result in a value for the project of $1.6 million. The rate of return, then, with a present value of $850,000 and a future value of $1.6 million, would be approximately 9.5 percent to 10 percent. If an additional sum of $200,000 for fill and mitigation is figured in, Dr. Weaver opines the Petitioner's rate of return would still be in the 9.5 percent to 10 percent range. Accepting Dr. Weaver's analysis and the cost estimates on which it is based, for the purpose of argument, then the project, modified as proposed by the Department, would be profitable. It should be noted here that the cost figures utilized by Dr. Weaver in his calculation were those provided by Petitioner. There is a high demand for commercial property in the vicinity of Petitioner's proposed project. Petitioner's site is one of the few remaining undeveloped parcels in the north Dale Mabry corridor, a high per capita income area which constitutes a market area encompassing a three to five mile radius from the property. Even with Pier One and General Mills pulling out, there is evidence that another restaurant chain, Golden Corral, has offered to construct a restaurant on the southern portion of the property. The western edge of the property, for the most part, abuts Dale Mabry Highway with the exception of a small section to the south which abuts Zambito Road. Zambito Road, a two-lane, county maintained, road extends northward from Ehrlich Road to a point where it merges with the northbound lanes of Dale Mabry Highway, at that point a twelve lane divided state highway. Vehicular access and egress to and from the proposed project would be, in part, via Zambito Road. Northbound traffic on Dale Mabry could enter the project by turning right, an access presently approved by the Department of Transportation. As presently designed and approved, however, the Dale Mabry entrance would be a narrow and difficult access for service vehicles. Patrons could exit the project into the northbound lane of Dale Mabry only by a right hand turn, and only if a change in permitting by the Department of Transportation would allow access onto Dale Mabry. That access would not involve any wetlands impact and this proposal is the subject of a current application to the Florida Department of Transportation on which administrative hearing is currently pending. If and when approved, any access or egress from or to Dale Mabry, calls for a fifty foot turning radius. Another source of access to and egress from the project can be via Hoedt Road, a two lane road maintained by the county, which runs east and west north of Petitioner's property line and to which Petitioner currently has no legal right to vehicular access. The intersection of Hoedt Road and Dale Mabry Highway is controlled by a signal light and is located to the north of the northwest corner of the proposed development. Petitioner expects to purchase rights to vehicular access to his development from Hoedt Road from the owner of the narrow strip which runs between the road and the northern boundary of the property. The proposed access-egress point would be located along the northern property line approximately 230 feet due east of the Hoedt/Dale Mabry intersection. Through this access, a customer traveling north on Dale Mabry could enter the development by turning right onto Hoedt Road while a customer travelling south on Dale Mabry would do so by turning left, (east), onto Hoedt Road. In both cases, the customer would then turn right, (south), into the development. A customer leaving the development via the northern access would turn either north or south onto Dale Mabry at its intersection with Hoedt Road. The Hoedt Road access point would be the primary means of access-egress for semi-trailers/commercial vehicles servicing the businesses in the development. The existing site plan provides for these vehicles to proceed directly behind the buildings for service. A third access-egress point exists or could exist off of Zambito Road at the southwest corner of the property. A customer northbound on Zambito Road could make a right turn into the proposed development or could exit the development by turning either left or right onto Zambito, the former heading south on Zambito and the latter travelling north a short distance to where Zambito joins with Dale Mabry. This access could, with modification of the development plan, allow a semi-trailer to enter and exit the site from onto Zambito Road to provide service to the businesses situated on the site. Mr. Dibbs finds this an unacceptable arrangement, however. He claims the Zambito Road entrance is a difficult intersection since it is not served by a traffic signal. As currently designed, the existing plan calls for a total of 430 parking spaces while the county only requires a minimum of 344 spaces for the four businesses. The parking scheme as proposed was considered necessary to meet the requirements expressed by Mr. Dibbs' proposed tenants. It is likely that other, substitute, tenants would have similar parking requirements. The Department has proposed a modification to Petitioner's development plan which would eliminate approximately 30 parking spaces proposed. This would still provide a number of parking spaces sufficient to meet both the county's minimum requirements and the reasonable requirements of proposed tenants. The Department has suggested that access to the development by commercial vehicles be by the Hoedt Road entrance. It would modify the access road in such a way that it would "snake" around the existing wetlands. This would, however, result in a commingling of semi trucks, smaller delivery vehicle, and customer vehicles within the interior of the development and this would not be desirable either from a safety or a business standpoint. Ease of access, as opposed to mere access, has, in the past, been considered by the Department as a valid evaluator of practicability. For this reason, and based on many of the access considerations mentioned above, Petitioner's engineering expert, Mr. Mai, considered that access from Hoedt Road must, of necessity, be straight in to the back of the buildings, and, assuming there are to be the four buildings as proposed, this position is unrebutted by the Department. Elimination of the Hoedt Road access would be impractical. Another factor to be considered on the issue of the economic practicability of minimization is that of visibility. Commercial enterprises generally must be visible to draw customers so as to be economically viable. Dale Mabry Highway is a high volume thoroughfare. The businesses on the development, medium price sit-down restaurants and an import store, all of a chain variety, cater not only to a destination oriented clientele but also to a spontaneous clientele as well. It is imperative, therefore, that these businesses be able to be seen from Dale Mabry. Petitioner claims that the elimination of the two northern commercial sites as a part of minimization would adversely affect the visibility of the two remaining sites. First, he claims, the cypress stand in the northwest portion of the wetlands would interfere with the vision of those coming down from the north. He also asserts that potential customers proceeding in a southerly direction on Dale Mabry would not be able to see the remaining businesses in enough time to make an entrance choice at Hoedt Road. They would, therefore, have to proceed south on Dale Mabry for a significant distance to the next signal, turn east and proceed to Zambito Road, and turn north again to come up Zambito Road to either an access point on the far south end of the property or to the turn right off the northbound lane of Dale Mabry. Taken together, these factors and the reduction in the number of businesses on the development site would discourage customer use, and in the opinion of Petitioner's economist and development consultant, would result in the two remaining businesses not surviving more than one year. This point appears well taken. The Department has also suggested that Petitioner replace pavement parking at the site with grassed parking; grade the landscape strips and parking medians for storm water treatment; utilize porous concrete for parking; utilize vertical as opposed to sloped retaining walls: and provide mitigation at a 1.5:1 ratio. The use of grassed parking was rejected on the basis of a safety hazard to women wearing high heeled shoes. The other suggestions were accepted by Petitioner. Some consideration was given to the fact that the property owned by Mr. Dibbs at this site includes 5.12 acres of uplands at the northeast corner of the property of which at least one acre would be needed for the proposed use as the mitigation area. The northern property line runs almost due east 1309.04 feet. The most westward point of the northeast uplands crosses the northern property line just about half way back from Dale Mabry Highway. The uplands in question is currently zoned for one single family home per acre but if re-zoned might provide for two homes per acre. The surrounding land use, however, makes re-zoning unlikely. In addition, access to that property is unavailable unless a road were to be built across the wetlands from Dale Mabry. The cost of this road construction, the additional land needed for mitigation of the wetlands used for the road, and the cost of development infrastructure would make it impracticable to use the back uplands for anything. The term "economic justification" as construed by the Department includes the access, visibility and parking consideration previously discussed in addition to other regulatory requirements and like issues. The Department has taken the position that any type of economic return on investment or cost benefit analysis is not an appropriate consideration in a permitting decision. Petitioner contends that the additional minimization suggestions proposed by the Department, when considered in the context of engineering, safety, design and development, and the minimal potentiality for continued viability of any business located on the property encumbered by those suggestions, are not practicable. The failure of the Department to consult with its staff economist regarding this project, and the paucity of demonstrated departmental familiarity or experience with economics, at least among permitting personnel, may lend some credence to this argument. The Department has, until now, followed a policy of consistency in treating applications similar to the instant application. Generally, requests for minimization include such items as vertical retaining walls, use of porous concrete, bridges, culverts and other matters, all of which fall short of requiring actual redesign of the proposed project. In the instant case, the Department proposes the elimination of approximately 50 percent of the project as minimization before considering mitigation. Turning to the issue of mitigation, notwithstanding the predictions of success by Petitioner, it appears that only the smallest part of any mitigation attempted is successful in the long run, and that for the most part, wetlands lost through dredging and filling is not replaced. Nonetheless, the parties, including the Department, continue to work within the fiction that mitigation can compensate for the destruction of existing wetlands when an applicant is otherwise unable to meet the criteria set forth in the statute. There can be little doubt that this project, as applied for, may adversely affect habitat and their wetlands functions of storm water attenuation, treatment and storage. It is of a permanent nature. The purpose of mitigation is to offset the impact of development. Whereas here the Department has indicated that only 3.021 acres of mitigation wetlands need be created to offset the 2.014 acres of wetlands destroyed, a 1.5:1 ratio, Petitioner proposed to create 4.49 acres of new wetlands, a 2.25:1 ratio without the suggested conservation easement. The proposal submitted by Petitioner, he believes, will be successful. This remains to be seen and success is not at all guaranteed. Presuming success, however, for the sake of discussion, the mitigation site will be directly adjacent to and contiguous to existing wetlands and immediately will be come a part of and subject to Department wetlands regulatory jurisdiction. If successful, the proposed mitigation would offset the adverse impacts of the project. Still another area for consideration is that concerning storm water runoff. Storm water is currently collected from Dale Mabry Highway and drains into a ditch paralleling Petitioner's highway frontage. From there, the water ultimately flows into the wetlands on his property. The current Department of Transportation system affords no treatment to the storm water before it is released onto the Petitioner's property. This storm water can reasonably be expected to contain oils, greases and other contaminants. Petitioner has proposed to include in his project a system designed to treat this highway runoff and improve its quality before it is released into the waters of the state. This system will treat the water by percolate, removing approximately 80 percent of the pollutants. In addition to treating and improving storm water runoff, the system proposed by Mr. Dibbs should provide a higher degree of water storage than currently exists for a net improvement to the environment over existing conditions. Taken together, Petitioner contends the above matters indicate there will be no adverse cumulative impacts resulting from the granting of the permit. There is some indication that the higher mitigation ratio offered by Petitioner could become a precedent for other similar projects. If that were to be the case, the resulting cumulative impact would be a positive rather than negative factor. Nonetheless, it is clear that future applications must stand on their own merit and independently stand the scrutiny of the cumulative impact test, as must the instant application. Turning to the conservation easement suggested by the Department as a condition of approval, the agency contends such an easement would allow it to reduce its requirement for mitigation from a 1.5:1 ratio to a 1:1 ratio. The Department has held in the past, it is suggested, that an applicant's agreement to provide more than the minimum acceptable mitigation can justify the lack of an easement. Mr. Dibbs contends here, and it would so appear, that his agreement to provide more than the required amount of mitigation, when coupled with the fact that the mitigated area will be a part of the Department's wetlands permitting jurisdiction, obviates any need to provide a conservation easement either to offset any adverse impact or to protect against adverse cumulative impact of the project.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Permit No. 292103383, to dredge and fill 2.014 acres of jurisdictional wetlands in Hillsborough County, Florida be issued to Petitioner herein, Stephen J. Dibbs, subject to mitigation herein at a rate of no less than 1.5:1 and under such lawful and pertinent conditions as may be specified by the Department. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of February, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of February, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: - 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. 7. - 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. 12. & 13. Accepted and incorporated herein. 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. Accepted and incorporated herein. 16. - 18. Accepted and incorporated herein. 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. 20. Accepted and incorporated herein. First two sentences accepted. Balance is restatement of testimony. & 23. Accepted. Not a Finding of Fact but more a comment on the evidence. 25. & 26. Accepted and incorporated herein. 27. Accepted. 28. & 29. Accepted and incorporated herein. 30. Not a Finding of Fact but a comment on the evidence. 31. & 32. Accepted. 33. Accepted and incorporated herein. 34. - 36. Accepted. 37. Accepted. 38. - 40. Accepted and incorporated herein. 41. More a Conclusion of Law than a Finding of Fact. 42. Accepted and incorporated herein. 43. - 45. Accepted. 46. Accepted and incorporated herein. 47. More a Conclusion of Law than a Finding of Fact. 48. & 49. Accepted and incorporated herein. 50. - 53. Accepted and incorporated herein. 54. More a Conclusion of Law than a Finding of Fact. 55. - 57. Accepted. 58. Accepted and incorporated herein. 59. More a Conclusion of Law than a Finding of Fact. 60. & 61. Accepted but redundant. 62. Not a Finding of fact but a Conclusion of Law. 63. - 65. Accepted but redundant. 66. Accepted and incorporated herein. 67. - 69. Accepted. 70. - 74. Accepted. 75. - 81. Accepted and incorporated herein in substance. 82. & 83. Accepted. 84. - 88. Accepted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: 1. - 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. 10. & 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. 12. - 15. Accepted. 16. - 18. Accepted and incorporated herein. 19. - 26. Accepted and incorporated herein. 27. - 30. Accepted and incorporated herein. 31. - 34. Accepted and incorporated herein. 35. - 39. Accepted. 40. - 48. Accepted and incorporated herein. 49. & 50. Accepted and incorporated herein. 51. & 52. Accepted. 53. - 60. Accepted. 61. - 64. Accepted and incorporated herein. 65. Rejected as contra to the better evidence. 66. - 69. Accepted and incorporated herein. 70. Rejected as contra to the better evidence. 71. & 72. Accepted. 73. - 75. Accepted. 76. - 81. Accepted. 82. - 87. Accepted 88. Accepted and incorporated herein. 89. & 90. Accepted and incorporated herein. 91. & 92. Rejected as contra to the better evidence. 93. Accepted and incorporated herein. 94. - 96. Accepted and incorporated herein. 97. & 98. Accepted. 99. Accepted and incorporated herein. 100. & 101. 102. Rejected. Accepted as Department's definition. 103. Not proven. 104. - 106. Not relevant to ultimate issue. 107. 120. - - 119. 124. Not a proper Finding of Fact but a restatement the testimony of a witness. Accepted as stipulated facts. of FOR THE INTERVENOR: Noted. Accepted. - 9. Accepted. - 14. Accepted. Not a proper Finding of Fact but a conclusion as to the legal sufficiency of the evidence. - 21. Accepted as statements of the Department's non-Rule policy. 22. - 24. Accepted and incorporated herein. 25. Accepted. 26. Accepted. 27. & 28. Accepted. 29. Rejected. 30. & 31. Accepted. 32. Accepted. 33. Rejected. 34. Accepted. 35. Not proven. Accepted. Accepted. & 39. Rejected. Accepted as the witness' opinion. Accepted. - 45. Accepted and incorporated herein. 46. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: E. Gary Early, Esquire Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, P.A. 216 South Monroe Street, Suite 200 P.O. Box 10555 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2555 John W. Wilcox, Esquire Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, P.A. Post Office Box 3273 Tampa, Florida 33601-3273 W. Douglas Beason, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Thomas W. Reese, Esquire 2951 61st Avenue South St. Petersburg, Florida 33712 Virigina B. Wetherell Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Kenneth Plante General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
The Issue The issue is whether St. Johns County Comprehensive Plan Policies E.2.2.5, E.2.2.10, E.2.2.13, E.2.2.17, and D.2.3.4 adopted by Ordinance No. 2003-31 on March 25, 2003, are in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background The County's current Plan was adopted in 1990. At that time, the County adopted a minimum buffer between wetlands and "natural drainage courses" of 25 feet. During the preparation of its Evaluation Appraisal Report (an update to the Plan) in 1999, the County directed its staff to initiate a study of wetlands and upland buffers. After a Request for Proposals was issued, the County eventually contracted with Jones, Edmunds & Associates (JEA) to prepare a study of the available science concerning upland buffers and develop a wetland buffer plan which would protect environmentally sensitive lands from development activities. In conducting this study, JEA relied upon its own personnel, County staff, and outside consultants. In August 1999, JEA completed and submitted to the County a "Background Report in Support of Development of Wetland Buffer Zone Ordinance" (Background Report). In January 2000, JEA completed and submitted to the County a final report entitled "Calculating Buffer Zone Widths for Protection of Wetlands and Other Environmentally Sensitive Lands in St. Johns County" (Final Report). The Final Report generally provided a methodology for calculating buffer widths based on vegetation and groundwater drawdown and recommended that the County adopt a 300-foot buffer around all wetlands in the County. In response to the Final Report, on May 10, 2000, the County adopted various amendments to its wetland buffer provisions, including a new Policy E.2.2.5(a)(1)(c) which required that it adopt Land Development Regulations (LDRs) pertaining to wetlands within two years "after completion of the consultant's wetland buffer study," or by January 2002. In February 2000, the County also created a volunteer working group (Working Group) made up of County staff, biologists, environmental scientists, and representatives of environmental organizations and landowners, to review data and analysis related to wetland buffers, including the JEA Final Report. That group held at least nineteen meetings between February 2000 and May 2001, and it analyzed scientific and technical data and expert testimony from various federal and state agencies. On July 24, 2001, the County staff recommended that the County adopt new LDRs which identified upland buffer zones and required wetland buffers ranging from 50 to 150 feet, depending on the sensitivity of the area; however, this recommendation was rejected by a 3-2 vote. When the County failed to adopt new wetland buffer regulations within the two year period, as required by the Plan, on June 11, 2002, Petitioners filed a complaint with the Department under Section 163.3202, Florida Statutes (2001), seeking enforcement of Policy E.2.2.5(a)(1)(c). After the Department made a determination that the County had failed to amend its LDRs, as required by the Plan, on October 16, 2002, the County submitted to the Department for its compliance review a package of proposed amendments, including amendments to Policies E.2.2.5, E.2.2.10, E.2.2.13, and E.2.2.17. On December 20, 2002, the Department issued its Objections, Recommendations, and Comments Report (ORC), which raised objections to Policies E.2.2.5, E.2.2.10, and E.2.2.13. More specifically, the ORC raised the following two issues: The amendments establishing averaging of buffers do not provide a predictable standard for buffering. In particular there is no minimum buffer width [Issue 1]. Additionally, the amendment is not supported by data and analysis demonstrating the proposed minimum and averaging is adequate to protect the resources referenced in the County. Therefore, the amendment has not demonstrated consistency with requirements to protect natural resources including upland habitat and wetlands [Issue 2]. In response to the ORC, on March 25, 2003, the County adopted Ordinance No. 2003-31, which made changes to Policies E.2.2.5 and D.3.2.4. The Ordinance also readopted (without further change) Policies E.2.2.10, E.2.2.13, and E.2.2.17, which had been previously submitted to the Department on October 16, 2002. Policies E.2.2.5, E.2.2.10, E.2.2.13, and E.2.2.17 are found in the Conservation/Coastal Management Element of the Plan while Policy D.3.2.4 is found in the Stormwater Management Sub-Element of the Infrastructure Element of the Plan. As noted above, while the County made further amendments to Policy E.2.2.5(a)(1)(a) and (b), which addressed the minimum buffer issue raised in the ORC, it did not make any changes (e.g., altering the width of the buffers) which addressed the issue of whether the buffers were adequate in size to protect the natural resources. Finally, for the purpose of providing "clarification and consistency" with other provisions within the Plan, the County also made minor modifications to Policy D.3.2.4. In very broad terms, Ordinance No. 2003-31 added a requirement that the LDRs address "wetland buffer averaging" and establish a variance procedure. It also deleted the requirement that the wetland buffer regulations be amended within two years after the completion of the consultant's study. On May 21, 2003, the Department published its Notice of Intent to Find Amendment in Compliance in a local newspaper. In making this determination, the Department concluded that it was legally prohibited by Section 163.3184(6)(c), Florida Statutes, from compelling the County to adopt larger upland buffers. That statute provides that when a state agency, here the St. Johns River Water Management District (District), has implemented a permitting program, "the [Department] shall not require a local government to duplicate or exceed that permitting program in its comprehensive plan." On June 3, 2003, Petitioners filed their Petition contending that the amendments were not in compliance for numerous reasons. As set forth in the parties' Pre-Hearing Stipulation, Petitioners contend that there was insufficient data and analyses to support the amendments in violation of Sections 163.3177(8) and (10)(e), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rules 9J-5.005(1)(c), (2)(a) and (b), 9J-5.006(2)(b) and (c), 9J-5.012(2), and 9J-5.013(1); that the amendment is not in compliance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.013(2)(b)(4), (c)(5) and (6), and (3); that the amendment is not in compliance with Section 163.3177(6)(d), Florida Statutes; that the amendment to Policy E.2.2.10(b) is not in compliance because it is a self-amending policy; that the amendment to Policy E.2.2.5(a)(1) is not in compliance because it fails to provide a clear, predictable standard for variances; that the amendment is internally inconsistent with Future Land Use Element Goal A.1 and Objective A.1.1, Conservation Goal E.2, Objective E.2.2, and associated Policies E.2.2.4, E.2.2(c),3 E.2.2.8, E.2.2.9, E.2.2.10, E.2.2.17, and E.2.2.18; that the amendment is internally inconsistent with Conservation Objectives E.2.3 and E.2.8 and Policies E.2.3.7, E.2.8.7, and E.2.8.8; and that the amendment is inconsistent with the following portions of the State Comprehensive Plan: Section 187.201(8)(b)10. and 12., (10)(b)1., 3., and 7., and (26)(b)7., Florida Statutes. The Parties The County is the local government responsible for adopting a Plan and amendments thereto. FWF is a not-for-profit corporation whose purpose, according to its president, is "conservation and natural resources and education." FWF submitted objections to the County prior to the adoption of the challenged amendments. Although FWF's offices are located in Tallahassee, it currently has 173 members who reside within the County. FWF does not assert that it resides or owns property or a business within the County; however, FWF does contend that it has standing to participate in this proceeding on the theory that it operates a business within the County. Besides making comments, recommendations, and objections to local governments regarding growth management issues, the evidence shows that the organization (primarily if not wholly from its Tallahassee office) collects dues from its members; periodically sends members a newsletter providing information on conservation issues; organizes and takes field trips; issues press releases; occasionally makes presentations to the public; and provides information to the news media concerning conservation-related issues. The organization also has a web site with a "merchandise store," which sells merchandise (more than likely to members but also to the public) from its Tallahassee office. However, the sale of merchandise is only incidental to the primary purpose described above by its president. FWF does not maintain an office in the County; it does not have an occupational license to engage in a business; it has no employees in the County; it has no telephone listing in the County; it has not filed any tangible personal property tax returns or requested exemptions from the County Tax Collector; it holds no formal meetings within the County; and its president could not recall when or if merchandise was sold by the Tallahassee office (via the web site) to a County resident within the last 12 months. It is fair to find from the evidence that FWF does not operate a business within the County. FMI is a not-for-profit Florida corporation (created in 1997) whose principal address is 201 Owens Avenue, St. Augustine, Florida. (That address is also the address of a charter member, Patrick Hamilton.) FMI submitted objections to the County prior to the adoption of the challenged amendments. According to Mr. Hamilton, the purpose of the organization is to "preserve and protect the Matanzas River Basin [which runs north-south along the eastern part of the County] and the lands that affect it." The organization has members who reside within the County, although the exact number is not of record. Like FWF, FMI does not reside or own property or a business within the County; however, FMI contends that it is an affected person because it operates a business within the County. To substantiate this assertion, FMI presented evidence that it collects dues from its members; sends newsletters to its members; prepares and submits objections, recommendations, and comments to the County regarding growth management issues; hires attorneys and consultants to represent its interests in environmental and land use matters; provides educational information to local news media; has been involved in various projects over the years (such as seeking to have Highway A1A designated as a state scenic highway and providing input to the State on the purchase of lands for conservation purposes); takes occasional field trips; and conducts meetings within the County. FMI maintains a bank account but has no office. (When meetings are held, it generally uses the office or home of one of its members.) There is no evidence that FMI has a telephone listing, an occupational license to engage in any type of business, or any full or part-time employees. Even though FMI engages in a number of commendable activities, it is fair to infer from the evidence that FMI is not engaged in a "business" within the County, as that word is commonly understood. The parties have stipulated that DDI is a Florida corporation that owns property and operates a business in the County, and that it submitted oral and written comments to the County prior to the adoption of the plan amendments. These stipulated facts establish that DDI is an affected person within the meaning of Section 163.3184(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The Amendments Although a local government is not required by statute or rule to adopt buffers in a comprehensive plan, in the 1990 Plan, the County established a 25-foot buffer between developed areas and natural drainage courses as a protective measure for wetlands and other environmentally sensitive lands. The primary purpose of implementing wetland buffers is, of course, to protect water quality. When the Plan was updated in 2000, the County adopted its current regulation to provide a 50-foot upland buffer adjacent to the contiguous wetlands associated with the Guana, Tolomato, Matanzas, and St. Johns Rivers. For all other contiguous wetlands in the County, the Plan required a 25-foot buffer. The update also required that both the Plan and the LDRs be amended within two years after completion of the JEA's study of wetland buffers. There are three accepted strategies in comprehensive planning used by local governments for protecting wetlands. The first approach is a mapping strategy, where the local government performs an assessment of wetlands and environmentally sensitive lands and reflects those areas on a map. Alternatively, a local government may choose to rely on policies incorporated into the text of its comprehensive plan. Or, the local government may choose a combination of the first two strategies that would involve both mapping and policies to guide land uses for the wetland areas. The County's choice appears to be a combination of the first two strategies. In broad terms, the 2003 text amendments to Policies E.2.2.5(a)(1)(a) and (b), E.2.2.13(b), and D.3.2.4 relate to a system of "wetland buffers" as one of the County's strategies for protection of wetlands and other environmentally sensitive lands, while the amendments to Policies E.2.2.10 and E.2.2.17 relate to another proposed strategy, the use of Environmentally Sensitive Overlay Zone (ESOZ) regulations. More specifically, Policy E.2.2.5(a)(1), as amended, reads as follows: E.2.2.5. The County shall protect Environmentally Sensitive Lands (ESLs) through the establishment of Land Development Regulations (LDRs) which address the alternative types of protection for each type of Environmentally Sensitive Land. Adoption and implementation of the Land Development Regulations shall, at a minimum, address the following issues: For Wetlands, Outstanding Florida Waters (OFW), and Estuaries: establish and maintain buffers between the wetlands/OFW/estuaries and upland development as stated in the County's Land Development Regulations (LDRs), and as follows: A minimum natural vegetative upland buffer of 25 f[ee]t shall be required and maintained between the developed areas and the contiguous wetlands to protect the water quality of the wetlands, except where buffer averaging may allow less than the required minimum of 25 feet in certain locations while achieving a greater buffer width or where a variance is granted. Except where a variance is granted, no buffer shall be reduced to less than 10 feet except in circumstances where an unavoidable wetland impact occurs such as but not limited to a road crossing. Such wetland buffer shall be measured from the jurisdictional wetland line as determined by the SJRWMD and FDEP. [A] minimum of a 50 f[oo]t natural vegetative upland buffer shall be required and maintained between the development area and the St. Johns, Matanzas, Guana and Tolomato Rivers and their associated tributaries, streams, and other interconnecting water bodies, except where buffer averaging may allow less than the required minimum 50 feet in certain locations while achieving a greater buffer width or where a variance is granted. Except where a variance is granted, no buffer shall be reduced to less than 25 feet except in circumstances where an unavoidable wetland impact occurs such as but not limited to a road crossing. Such wetland buffer shall be measured from the jurisdictional wetland line as determined by the SJRWMD and FDEP. In addition, the County deleted subparagraph (a)(1)(c), which required that it adopt LDR wetland requirements within two years after completion of the consultant's wetland buffer study. As amended, Policy E.2.2.10(b) reads as follows: E.2.2.10. By December 2005 or sooner, the County shall develop and adopt guidelines and standards for the preservation and conservation of wetlands through various land development techniques including, but not limited to, the following: * * * (b) The County shall protect wetlands, uplands[,] and their associated wildlife habitats through the implementation of natural vegetative buffers, the preservation of Significant Natural Communities Habitat, and the protection of Listed Species within St. Johns County as provided in the County Land Development Regulations. The County also deleted reference in the Policy to an ESOZ ordinance and the requirement that it adopt ESOZ regulations within two years after the completion of the consultant's wetland buffer study. As amended, Policy E.2.2.13(a) reads as follows: By December 1999, the County shall develop and adopt guidelines and standards for the preservation and conservation of uplands through various land development techniques as follows: St. Johns County shall require a buffer zone adjacent to the wetlands and open water habitats on all new development sites as specified in the LDRs and [P]olicy E.2.2.5. In addition, the County deleted language which required that it adopt "new wetland buffer regulations" within two years after completion of the consultant's wetland buffer study. As amended, Policy E.2.2.17 reads in relevant part as follows E.2.2.17. By 2005 or sooner, the County shall consider adoption of an Environmentally Sensitive Overlay Zone (ESOZ) for areas designated on the Environmentally Sensitive Lands Map. The ESOZ shall establish standards and procedures to address the following: (list of criteria omitted) The amendment also deleted language requiring that the County adopt an ESOZ ordinance within two years after the completion of the consultant's wetland buffer study and by 2005 adopt LDRs for the ESOZ. Finally, as amended, Policy D.3.2.4 reads as follows: D.3.2.4. The County shall require a vegetative buffer between contiguous wetlands and developed areas to protect the water quality of the drainage course as established in the County Land Development Regulations and Policy E.2.2.5 of this Comprehensive Plan. This amendment merely eliminated reference to a "minimum 25- foot" vegetative buffer and added language that the buffer provisions in Policy E.2.2.5 would now apply. Prior to the 2003 amendments, the wetland buffer averaging and variance provisions were not included in the Plan, but instead were established in the County's LDRs. The amendments conform the Plan policies to the County's existing practices for averaging and variances. The changes to Policy E.2.2.5(a)(1)(a) and (b) require that the County's LDRs address wetland buffer averaging by only allowing buffers to fall below the established minimums if an overall greater buffer width is achieved. (In other words, the County must maintain 25 and 50-foot natural vegetative buffers around wetlands and wetlands associated with certain rivers, respectively; however, through an averaging process, the buffers may average 25 and 50 feet, rather than be a static 25 and 50 feet around the entire wetland.) Averaging allows the County to consider site-specific conditions, thereby providing better protection and conservation of wildlife and resource protection. Similarly, the change to the Policy requires that the LDRs address variances to the wetland buffer requirement. Variance procedures follow those previously set out in the County's LDRs. (The record shows that in the last four years, the County has never granted a variance to reduce or eliminate a buffer.) Before the amendments to Policies E.2.2.10(b) and E.2.2.17, those Policies required LDRs which would establish standards for certain identified environmental features, such as shellfish harvesting, water quality, flood plain capacity, and water dependent wildlife, through the use of a zoning overlay, that is, an ESOZ. The amendments changed the policy from mandatory establishment of an ESOZ in the LDRs to a discretionary act. (Policy E.2.2.17 now provides that "[b]y 2005 or sooner, the County shall consider adoption of an [ESOZ] ") The original ESOZ provision was placed in the Plan during the Plan update in 1999-2000 as a strategy to protect environmentally sensitive lands. Since that time, the County has determined that other types of protection strategies may protect environmentally sensitive lands as well as or better than an ESOZ. The County intends to conduct a study of the ESOZ to determine whether or not it is a preferred strategy for environmental protection. The amendments are designed to provide the County with flexibility to rely on other strategies if they provide a better way to achieve the same result. Since adoption of the ESOZ policy, the County has instituted new regulations, adopted further protective measures, established regulatory programs, and hired additional personnel for the purpose of protecting the natural resources in the County. If these (and other) measures address the issues that the ESOZ would address, there is no need to duplicate the other natural resource protection programs. If the Plan as a whole protects environmentally sensitive lands, then the change to the ESOZ Policies will not reduce protection of natural resources in the County. The ESOZ is designed to establish standards and procedures to address shellfish harvesting areas; surface water quality; flood storage and flood plain capacity; wetland dependent wildlife and other endangered species; environmental scenic views and vistas; provisions for development mitigation, revegetation, buffering, and setback measures within the ESOZ; and provisions for building and development practices and techniques which protect the integrity of the ESOZ. There are, however, numerous other Plan provisions which address these same areas of concern. The County will analyze these policies and other possible protection measures to determine whether an ESOZ is the preferred alternative. Accordingly, the more persuasive evidence establishes that the amendments to Policies E.2.2.10(b) and E.2.2.17 do not reduce the protection currently afforded environmentally sensitive lands by the Plan. Wetland Data and Analysis The JEA Background Report compiled a literature review of the basic principles of buffer zones, set forth the ecological benefits of buffer zones, and compiled a summary of various buffer ordinances adopted by counties throughout the State. The JEA Final Report provided a methodology for calculating buffer widths based on vegetation and groundwater drawdown and recommended that a 300-foot wetland buffer be preserved adjacent to all wetlands in order to provide protection to water quality, water quantity, and wildlife habitat. With regard to water quality, buffers are primarily beneficial for protecting against the effects of sedimentation and turbidity. However, methods other than buffers can be implemented which can be equally effective in reducing sediment transport. In other words, a 300-foot buffer is not always necessary to prevent sediment transport. Based upon information presented to the Working Group over an 18-month period after the Final Report was submitted, the County determined that, through its Environmental Resource Permit program, the District effectively regulates activities which can cause sedimentation and turbidity, and that additional buffer widths were not needed to protect against sedimentation and turbidity. The County is not required to duplicate or exceed the requirements of a state or regional agency's permitting program. With regard to water quantity, the Final Report and Working Group considered the extent to which wetland buffers may provide the benefit of protecting against adverse effects of groundwater drawdown. Based on evidence presented to the Working Group, the County determined that adequate measures were in place (through District oversight and permitting requirements) to prevent adverse groundwater effects, and that additional buffers were not needed to address this issue. As to the habitat protection issue, the Final Report recommended a 300-foot wetland buffer to protect those species "that require a wide surrounding upland area," but also stated that, based on unspecified "policy decisions," a wetland buffer of less than 300 feet can provide protection to wetlands. The Final Report's recommendation was based on the assumption that the spatial requirements for various wildlife species present in the County ranged from 20 to 6,336 feet. There was no evidence, however, of a direct correlation between spatial requirements and the upland habitat needs of the studied species. Also, the Final Report does not contain any data and analysis of the upland habitat needs of the species. The methodology used by JEA in reaching a wetland buffer recommendation was not professionally acceptable. First, although the Final Report contains several tables purportedly summarizing "recommended buffer widths," citing several scientific studies to support those conclusions, those studies do not support the JEA conclusions. That is to say, the studies cited in the Final Report as the basis for buffer width recommendations are neither consistent with, nor support, the buffer widths contained in the Final Report. Similarly, although the recommendations in the Final Report are based upon Appendix A attached thereto ("Species List of Wetland-Dependent Wildlife Habitat"), Appendix A does not relate to the upland habitat needs for a species. In other words, there is no direct correlation between the spatial requirements as shown in Appendix A and the upland habitat needs of the listed species. Based upon the spatial requirements JEA listed for each species, JEA then plotted an algebraic curve correlating the number of species with the spatial requirements. Without explaining the reasons, JEA then decided to protect 50 percent of the species in a given type of habitat and, referring to the curve, determined that a 300-foot buffer would be necessary to protect the 50 percent. However, this is not a professionally acceptable methodology for the following reasons: the underlying studies were not necessarily representative of the habitat needs of the species in the County; the spatial requirements did not necessarily correlate with actual upland habitat requirements; and JEA erroneously translated spatial requirements from water's edge or width of forest needed as being the upland habitat needs from wetlands edge. The evidence supports a finding that this is not a professionally acceptable methodology for determining buffer widths. In summary, the County and DDI established that the JEA Background and Final Reports are not based on the best available relevant data and analyses for determining appropriate buffer widths. Besides the questions raised about the acceptability of the methodology used in reaching the 300- foot buffer recommendation, the County determined that other types of regulations could and do provide the same or better resource protection. As a result of the Working Group process, the County received extensive additional scientific and technical information regarding buffers, including the water quality benefits of buffers; the effectiveness of current regulatory programs of the District in protecting water quality; the effectiveness of the District's programs for protecting against adverse groundwater drawdown; and the relative effectiveness of wetland buffers in protecting wildlife habitat. Petitioners' Objections Petitioners' objections are grouped into six broad categories: that the amendments are not supported by adequate data and analyses; that the amendments are not in compliance with Section 163.3177(6)(d), Florida Statutes, and numerous portions of Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.013 (which pertains to the Conservation Element); that the amendment to Policy E.2.2.10(b) is a self-amending policy; that Policy E.2.2.5(a)(1) fails to provide a clear, predictable standard for variances; that the amendments conflict with other Plan provisions; and that the amendments are inconsistent with six provisions within the State Comprehensive Plan, as established in Chapter 187, Florida Statutes. These objections will be discussed separately below. Data and analyses While the JEA Final Report was original data collected by the County, there is no credible evidence that it is either the best available data or based on a professionally accepted methodology. (See Findings of Fact 32-40.) The County conducted an additional 18 months of extensive data gathering and analyses of the issues addressed in the Final Report. The amendments were consistent with, and an appropriate reaction to, the results of that data and analyses and are based upon the best available, appropriate scientific data gathered using a professionally acceptable methodology. The more persuasive evidence supports a finding that Petitioners have failed to establish beyond fair debate that the amendments are not based upon relevant and appropriate data and analyses. Inconsistency with a statute and rule Petitioners next contend that the amendments are not in compliance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J- 5.013(3)(b), which addresses the protection and conservation of wetlands, and reads as follows: Future land uses which are incompatible with the protection and conservation of wetland functions shall be directed away from wetlands. The type, intensity or density, extent, distribution and location of allowable land uses and the types, values, functions, sizes, conditions and locations of wetlands are land use factors which shall be considered when directing incompatible land uses away from wetlands. Land uses shall be distributed in a manner that minimizes the effect and impact on wetlands. The protection and conservation of wetlands by the direction of incompatible land uses away from wetlands shall occur in combination with other goals, objectives and policies in the comprehensive plan. Where incompatible land uses are allowed to occur, mitigation shall be considered as one means to compensate for loss of wetland functions. The County has adopted a three-tiered approach to satisfy this rule. First, the Future Land Use Map directs intensities away from significant water bodies. Second, lower land use densities have been adopted in coastal areas. Third, numerous policies require site-specific review of, and protection for, environmentally sensitive lands. This approach has previously been found to be in compliance, and it is a land use planning type of approach recognized by the Department. Petitioners did not establish beyond fair debate that the amendments are not in compliance with this rule. Petitioners next contend that the amendments are not in compliance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J- 5.013(2)(b)4., which requires that a plan's Conservation Element contain one or more specific objectives which "[c]onserve, appropriately use and protect fisheries, wildlife, wildlife habitat[,] and marine habitat." As noted above, with the additional provisions for averaging and variances, the wetland buffer distance requirements remain the same, and they are desirable from a land planning perspective. In addition, the change to the ESOZ provision does not reduce any current provisions in the Plan. Petitioners did not establish beyond fair debate that the amendments are not in compliance with this rule. Petitioners further contend that the amendments are not in compliance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J- 5.013(2)(c)3., 5., and 6., which requires that a plan's Conservation Element contain at least one policy for each objective which addresses protection of native vegetative communities from destruction by development activities; restriction of activities known to adversely affect the survival of endangered and threatened wildlife; and protection and conservation of the natural functions of existing soils, fisheries, wildlife habitats, rivers, bays, lakes, floodplains, and wetlands. The evidence clearly demonstrates that such policies exist in the Plan, and that there is nothing in the amendments that is inconsistent with, or will override or prevent implementation of, these policies. Accordingly, Petitioners did not establish beyond fair debate that the amendments do not comply with this rule. Petitioners next contend that the amendments are not in compliance with Section 163.3177(6)(d), Florida Statutes, which requires that a plan must contain a Conservation Element for the "conservation, use, and protection of natural resources" in the area, including "air, water, water recharge areas, wetlands, waterwells, estuarine marshes, soils, beaches, shores, flood plains, rivers, bays, lakes, harbors, forests, fisheries and wildlife, marine habitat, minerals, and other natural and environmental resources." The parties have stipulated that prior to the adoption of the amendments, the County's Plan was in compliance. The more persuasive evidence is that the amendments will not reduce the conservation, use, and protection measures of the Plan. Therefore, Petitioners have not established beyond fair debate that the amendments are not in compliance with this statute. Self-amending policy Petitioners contend that the amendment to Policy E.2.2.10(b) is a self-amending policy. A self-amending policy is "one which changes as the result of an event that is unknown and unspecified at the time the policy is adopted." Palm Bch. County Bd. of County Comm. et al. v. Town of Jupiter and Dep't of Comm. Affrs., DOAH Case No. 95-5930GM (Div. Admin. Hrgs. Jan. 24, 1997; Admin. Comm. Oct. 21, 1997). However, a policy is not self-amending if it sets out a clear general policy and specific conditions for changing that policy. Id. Comprehensive plans need not include the implementing regulations, but rather should provide meaningful guidelines for the content of more detailed LDRs. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 9J-5.005(6)("It is not the intent of this chapter to require the inclusion of implementing regulations in the comprehensive plan ") Policy E.2.2.10(b) establishes a clear general policy to preserve and conserve wetlands through specific programs. Specific conditions for each program are set forth elsewhere in the Plan, including Policy E.2.2.5(a)(1) (natural vegetative upland buffers); Policy E.2.2.13 (significant natural communities habitat); and Objective E.2.8 (threatened and endangered species) and related policies. All of these are implemented in the planning process, as required by Policy E.2.2.7. In combination, these policies establish clear policy direction and guidelines for developing future LDRs. Therefore, it is found that Policy E.2.2.10(b) is consistent with other policies, and Petitioners have not established beyond fair debate that the Policy is self-amending.4 Does Policy E.2.2.5 have a clear, predictable standard? Petitioners contend that Policy E.2.2.5(a)(1) is not in compliance because it fails to provide a clear, predictable standard for variances. They go on to assert that because there is no predictable standard in the Policy, it essentially equates to a form of a self-amending policy. Variances are special exceptions to regulations and allow a non-conforming use in order to alleviate undue burden or unnecessary hardship. See, e.g., Troup v. Bird, 53 So. 2d 717, 720-22 (Fla. 1951). They must be "consistent or in harmony with, or not subversive or in derogation of, the spirit, intent, purpose or general plan of such regulations." Id. at 721. Policy E.2.2.5 merely requires that variances must be established in the LDRs. While the more specific standards and procedures for granting variances will be incorporated into the LDRs, the testimony corroborates that variances can only be approved when "an unavoidable wetland impact occurs such as but not limited to a road crossing," and that in no circumstance can the buffer width be totally eliminated. Further, the variance must be unavoidable, and it cannot be inconsistent with the overall objectives of the Plan or LDRs. Therefore, Petitioners have failed to show beyond fair debate that the amendment does not establish a sufficiently clear general policy direction or that the policy is self-amending. Conflicts with other provisions in the Plan Petitioners next contend that the amendments as a whole, or amendments pertaining to a single policy, conflict with various Goals, Objectives, and Policies within the Plan, including Goal A.1, Objective A.1.1, Goal E.2, Objective E.2.2, Policies E.2.2.4, E.2.2.5(c), E.2.2.8, E.2.2.9, E.2.2.10, E.2.2.17, E.2.2.18, Objective E.2.3, Policy E.2.3.7, Objective E.2.8, Policy E.2.8.7, and Policy E.2.8.8. If goals, objectives, and policies do not conflict, then they are considered consistent. Goal A.1 in the Land Use Element is the County's overall guiding principle for managing growth and development in a responsible manner, and it requires the County to balance several interests, including encouraging/accommodating land uses which make the County a viable community; creating a sound economic base; offering diverse opportunities for a wide variety of living, working, shopping, and leisure activities; and minimizing adverse impacts on the natural environment. The more persuasive evidence supports a finding that the amendments do not conflict with this guiding principle. Objective A.1.1 in the Land Use Element requires that the County designate future land uses based upon environmental conditions and constraints. Through testimony, the County established that its approach is to direct incompatible land uses away from environmentally sensitive lands, limit the types of land uses adjacent to significant water bodies, reduce land use densities in coastal areas, and require environmental analysis and protection on a site-by- site basis. The challenged amendments are consistent with that approach. In combination with other provisions of the Plan, they also address the issues required by Objective A.1.1: vegetation; wildlife; aquifer recharge; and the like. Petitioners have failed to establish beyond fair debate that the amendments are inconsistent with Objective A.1.1. Goal E.2 in the Conservation Sub-Element of the Conservation/Coastal Management Element of the Plan requires conservation, use, and protection of natural resources to ensure availability for existing and future generations. Objective E.2.2 requires protection of various natural resources to provide for maintenance of environmental quality and wildlife habitat. Policy E.2.2.4 requires identification of native vegetative communities and their associated wildlife species. The County has identified those resources and protected some of those resources through land acquisition. Policy E.2.2.5(c) requires that criteria be established in the LDRs for listed species protection. The County has implemented such criteria and measures for protection of listed species. Policy E.2.2.8. requires that various habitat measures be implemented; these measures have been implemented and continue to be implemented. Policy E.2.2.9 requires the adoption of guidelines and standards for wildlife corridors through such measures as Planned Unit Development regulations and optional density bonuses. The County has adopted such measures. Policy E.2.2.10 was amended in part and requires guidelines and standards for the preservation and conservation of wetlands through various land development techniques. This Policy serves as a summary of measures that have been implemented by the County. Policy E.2.2.17 is another amended policy related to the ESOZ. As previously discussed, the Policy was changed from requiring mandatory adoption of an ESOZ in the LDRs to requiring the County to consider adoption of an ESOZ. The County is re-evaluating its prior decision to use the ESOZ as a primary measure to provide protection of environmentally sensitive lands. The amendment allows the County the flexibility to adopt different measures if they are found to be preferable. Finally, Policy E.2.2.18 requires the County to investigate certain Outstanding Florida Water designations. This Policy is unrelated to the amendments and is therefore irrelevant to this proceeding. Petitioners have not established beyond fair debate that the amendments will impact or otherwise conflict with the cited Goal, Objective, or Policies. Objective E.2.3 pertains to surface water quality and requires maintenance of surface water quality. Underlying Policy E.2.3.7 requires restriction of land uses which adversely affect the quality and quantity of water resources. The amendments do not lessen the protections afforded by the Plan. Likewise, the County has implemented numerous other Policies to protect water quality, such as Policies D.3.2.1, D.3.1.8, and E.2.6.1, and the more persuasive evidence supports a finding that the amendments will not adversely affect those provisions. Again, Petitioners have not established beyond fair debate that the amendments are inconsistent with this Objective and Policy. Objective E.2.8, which relates to threatened and endangered species, protects habitat of populations of existing listed species. Policy E.2.8.7 thereunder relates to land use classifications adjacent to certain environmentally sensitive areas. The amendments do not change or reduce the protection afforded by that Policy. Policy E.2.8.8 requires the County to assist state agencies in preparing a wildlife corridor plan and to determine, after completion of the JEA study, whether changes to the wetland buffers are necessary and appropriate. The evidence shows that the County considered the JEA study and related data and analysis and determined that changes to the buffer dimensions were not needed or appropriate, but that clarification of the averaging and variance procedures were. The amendments do not change or reduce the protections established by that Policy. Petitioners have not established beyond fair debate that the amendments are inconsistent with this Objective and those two Policies. Finally, Petitioners have alleged in very general terms that the amendments are inconsistent with a number of provisions of the State Comprehensive Plan, as codified in Section 187.201, Florida Statutes. They include subparagraphs (8)(b)10. and 12.; (10)(b)1., 3., and 7.; and (26)(b)7. Section 187.201(8)(b)10., Florida Statutes, sets as state policy the protection of "surface and groundwater quality and quantity in the state." Because the evidence clearly establishes that the amendments do not adversely impact the Plan's provisions to protect water quality and quantity, Petitioners have failed to establish beyond fair debate that the amendments are inconsistent with this statute. Section 187.201(8)(b)12., Florida Statutes, sets as state policy the elimination of discharge of inadequately treated wastewater and stormwater runoff into waters of the state. For the reasons previously found, Petitioners have failed to establish beyond fair debate that the amendments are inconsistent with this statute. Section 187.201(10(b)1., Florida Statutes, sets as state policy conservation of certain natural resources, including wetlands and wildlife, to maintain listed functional values. For the reasons previously found, Petitioners have failed to establish beyond fair debate that the amendments are inconsistent with this statute. Section 187.201(10)(b)3., Florida Statutes, sets state policy prohibiting the destruction of endangered species and protection of their habitats. For the reasons previously found, Petitioners have failed to establish beyond fair debate that the amendments are inconsistent with this statute. Section 187.201(10(b)7., Florida Statutes, sets as state policy the protection and restoration of the "ecological functions of wetland systems to ensure their long term environmental, economic and recreational value." For reasons previously found, Petitioners have failed to show beyond fair debate that the amendments are inconsistent with the statute. Finally, Section 187.201(26)(b)7., Florida Statutes, sets as state policy the development of local plans that "implement and accurately reflect state goals and policies and address problems, issues and conditions that are of particular concern in a region." Petitioners have failed to show beyond fair debate that the amendments are inconsistent with the goals and policies of this statute.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining that the St. Johns County plan amendments adopted by Ordinance No. 2003-31 on March 25, 2003, are in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 2004.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent Charles Dolby violated certain rules of the Department of Environmental Protection (Department) related to activities in wetlands in the Department’s Notice of Violation, Orders for Corrective Action, and Administrative Penalty Assessment (NOV); whether Respondent is liable for the administrative fines and investigative costs assessed by the Department; whether mitigation of the administrative fines is appropriate; and whether Respondent should be required to take the corrective action described in the NOV.
Findings Of Fact The Department is a state agency charged with the power and duty to administer and enforce the provisions of Chapters 373 and 403, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated in Florida Administrative Code Title 62, that regulate activities in wetlands. Respondent is the owner of the real property (Parcel ID #N29A012) located at Tract 12, County Road 652A, Bushnell, Sumter County, Florida (“the property”). Mr. Dolby has owned the property since June 9, 2005. In the period from February 2006 to June 2006, Respondent conducted activities on the property which he referred to as “clearing.” He did not have a permit from the Department to conduct the activities. Count I of the NOV charges Respondent with violating Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-343.050(1), for dredging in wetlands without an environmental resource permit from the Department. Count II of the NOV charges Respondent with violating Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-343.050(1) for filling in wetlands without an environmental resource permit from the Department. The Department demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that wetlands exist on Respondent’s property and that .33 acres of the wetlands were dredged and .22 acres of the wetlands were filled. Respondent did not present competent evidence to rebut the Department’s evidence of the existence of wetlands on his property. Instead, Respondent presented evidence about unusually heavy rainfall in 2005 and about a “plugged” culvert under the road near his property, presumably to prove that the wet conditions on his property were caused by unusual flooding events and were temporary. The conditions that created a particular wetland are usually not relevant to the determination of whether a permit is required for dredging and filling activities in the wetland. Moreover, the more persuasive evidence presented in this case shows that the wetlands on Respondent’s property are part of a larger wetland system that has existed for many years. For example, the hydric soils in the wetlands on Respondent’s property are the result of long-term natural processes, not an ephemeral condition. Respondent did not claim or present evidence which showed that his activities on the property qualified for an exemption from the requirement to obtain a permit for activities in wetlands. Respondent testified that he was told by an employee of Sumter County that he did not need a permit to clear his property. Respondent did not make clear whether the County employee said that the County did not require a permit for clearing, or whether the County employee said the Department did not require a permit for clearing. It was probably the former. Furthermore, Respondent did not say that he told the County employee that he was going to be clearing in wetlands. The evidence presented by Respondent is insufficient to demonstrate that Respondent’s ignorance of the Department’s permitting rules was reasonable or that the circumstances justify a reduction of the penalty. Count III of the NOV charges Respondent with liability for the Department’s investigative costs. The Department’s employee, Brian Brown, testified that he spent at least 40 hours on investigation and enforcement tasks, during which time he was paid approximately $22.50 per hour. Therefore, the $500 sought by the Department in Count III of the NOV is less than the actual costs incurred by the Department.
