Findings Of Fact On August 22, 29, and September 5, 1994, Respondent, School Board of Dade County (School Board), advertised for bids for Project No. KS-0004, Roof Repair/Replacement and Asbestos Removal at American Senior High School. The advertisement stated that "The mechanical and electrical trades have been set aside to be performed by a minority-owned and operated firm." The advertisement made no mention of any requirement that the set-asides were to be performed by minority-owned and operated firms certified by Dade County Public School/Division of Business Development and Assistance (DBDA). The bid and contract documents which were delivered to all interested bidders including Petitioner, Murton Roofing Corporation (Murton), contained page 00030-2 providing various definitions, including the definition of "minority owned and operated business participation" as follows: MINORITY OWNED AND OPERATED BUSINESS PARTICIPATION - This bid is limited to those individuals and businesses (51 percent) owned and controlled by African-American, Hispanics, and Women which are so listed by the Dade County Public Schools/Division of Business Development & Assistance prior to bidding, or to provide sufficient data to verify and certify such ownership and control at the time of the bid. Award will be made to the low bidder meeting this and other project specifications and requirements. Page 00030-2 had been included in the project specifications section dealing with legal advertisements. By addendum issued September 8, 1994, the School Board deleted this page from the bid documents. Section I A of the Special Provisions, page 1 defines Minority/Women Business Enterprises as follows: Any legal entity which is organized to engage in commercial transactions and which is at least 51 percent owned and controlled by minority persons. Minority person means a person who is a citizen or lawful permanent resident of the United States and who is: An African American, a person having origins in any of the black racial groups of Africa; An hispanic, a person of Spanish or Portuguese culture including, but not limited to persons with origins in Mexico, South America, Central America or the Caribbean Islands regardless of race. A woman. The Project Manual defines a "M/WBE Certification Application" as a "statement signed by an M/WBE contractor, containing certain information with respect to the ownership and control of the firm (See Attachment B-FM 3920)." Page 16 of the Project Manual states that "[a]t any time there is a change in ownership or control of the firm, the M/WBE shall, immediately following the change, submit a new M/WBE Certification Application." Page 2 of Section 1 A of the Special Provisions provides: A subcontractor is qualified to do specific work if it meets all of the following criteria: It has or is able to obtain any and all bonds, insurance and licenses required to do such work; It has the necessary experience, financial ability, organization, technical qualifications, skill and facilities to do such work; It is able to comply with the performance schedule reasonably needed for such work; It does not have an unsatisfactory record of integrity, judgment or performance; It is able to meet the applicable equal employment opportunity requirement if stipulated; and It is not otherwise ineligible to perform such work under applicable law and regulations. Nothing delineated herein shall be interpreted to waive the requirement that the Subcontractor be legally licensed and certified at the time it is scheduled to perform such work. Section III, titled Bid Documents, Section III A, Submittals, states: As a condition of responsiveness, all bid submittals shall contain the documents and information required below. Non-submittals or incomplete submittals shall be cause for finding a Bidder nonresponsive and for the contract not to be awarded to the Bidder. Failure to submit completed forms and other required information, within the time period specified, can neither be cured by supplementary submittals and testimony at hearings, nor shall the nonresponsiveness of the bid be waived, negotiated or compromised. In its bid, Murton listed Goral Enterprises (Goral) as the subcontractor for the mechanical work on the project. Murton indicated on the subcontractor list that Goral was a woman business enterprise. At the time that Murton submitted its bid, Goral was not certified as a M/WBE by DBDA and Murton did not submit with its bid an application from Goral for certification as a M/WBE by DBDA. Goral was certified as a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) by Metropolitan Dade County's Department of Business and Economic Development. Murton relied on Goral's DBE certification to met the M/WBE requirements of the project specifications. The DBE program is a separate program from the School Board's M/WBE program. The School Board does not give reciprocity to contractors who are certified as DBE's for acceptance in the School Board M/WBE program. Goral had been denied certification as an MBE by the Commission on Minority Economic and Business Development approximately two weeks prior to Murton submitting its bid for the project. The project specifications do not state that a contractor certified as a DBE will be deemed to meet the criteria of a M/WBE. Intervenor, A-1 Duran Roofing, Inc., also submitted a bid on the project; however, its bid was rejected as nonresponsive. By letter dated October 13, 1994, the School Board advised Murton that it was not in compliance with the special provisions of the project specifications because Goral was neither certified as a M/WBE nor had certification pending; therefore Goral could not be used to meet the M/WBE requirements for the mechanical work on the project. By letter dated October 14, 1994, Murton requested a meeting with the Contract Administrator to discuss the Notice of Noncompliance issued the day before. A meeting was held on October 18, 1994. On October 21, 1994, the School Board issued a Final Notice of Noncompliance. On October 26, 1994, the School Board issued a Revised Final Notice of Noncompliance, wherein it inaccurately stated that the legal advertisement required that the M/WBE's be certified by the DBDA at the time of submittal or that the bid submittal contain sufficient data to verify and certify M/WBE qualification. However, the Revised Final Notice of Noncompliance also stated that the bid document when read as a whole required that the M/WBE be either certified or pending certification at the time of bid submittal or that a certification application be submitted with the bid. The notice stated that Goral did not meet the requirements of the bid documents for a M/WBE. Murton requested an appeals hearing before the Certification Appeals Committee (Committee). The hearing was convened on October 26, 1994, at which time it became apparent to the Committee that the October 21, 1994 letter contained an error in that the paragraph stating that M/WBE's must be certified by the DBDA prior to bidding or provide sufficient data to verify or certify such ownership and control at the time of bid had not in fact appeared in the advertisement and the second page of the advertisement in the project manual which represented that this language had been a part of the advertisement had been removed by addendum. The meeting was recessed in order to review and obtain clarification of documentation presented by Murton. The Committee reconvened on November 15, 1994. At that time, upon reviewing the project manual and other documentation, the Committee determined that the language remaining in the Project Manual, read as a whole, did require DBDA certification and voted to uphold the determination of noncompliance. The School Board has interpreted similar project specifications to require that the proposed M/WBE be certified by DBDA at the time of bid submittal or that the bidder submit sufficient data with the bid to be able to determine whether the entity qualifies as a M/WBE. Such data is to be submitted on the application form contained in the project specifications as Attachment B- FM 3920, which is the form used by DBDA for application for certification as a M/WBE. The School Board has on numerous occasions rejected bidders for failure to submit either currently certified M/WBE's as subcontractors or for failure to submit an application for DBDA certification for the subcontractor with the bid. School Board Rule 6Gx13-3G-1.02 delineates the objectives for its M/WBE program. The rule states that the program's objectives may be accomplished by affirmative actions which include set aside contracts, subcontracting goals, prime contracting and designated scopes of work. In the instant case the School Board had designated certain portions of the work of the project to be performed by M/WBE firms. School Board Rule 6Gx13-3G-1.02 IV. provides: In order to ensure that business firms seeking to participate in the M/WBE Program are at least fifty-one (51) percent legitimately owned, operated and controlled by minorities, each M/WBE firm shall be required to be certified as to its minority ownership at the time of each bid award. Such certification shall be on the basis of a completed M/WBE Certification Application with supporting documentation, submitted by the firm, sworn to by an officer of the firm, invest- igated and verified by the Division of Business Development and Assistance, prior to any contract award. The School Board desires to rebid the project. On January 9, 1995, the School Board placed a new legal advertisement for bid on the project, specifically indicating that it would require and accept only DBDA certified M/WBE's.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Murton Roofing Corporation's Petition and rejecting all bids for the project and rebidding the project. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-6919 To comply with the requirement of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-5: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 6: Accepted that Goral was certified as a DBE but rejected that DBE certification meant that Goral was qualified as a M/WBE. Paragraphs 7-11: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 12: Accepted that that portion was deleted, but rejected to the extent that it implies that section was the only portion of the bid documents relied upon by the School Board. Paragraphs 13-15: Rejected as not necessary. Paragraph 16: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 17: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 18: Accepted to the extent that that was his testimony. Paragraphs 19-22: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 23-24: Rejecting as constituting argument. Paragraphs 25-26: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 27: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 28: There is no paragraph 28. Paragraph 29: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 30-31: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-3: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 4: The first two paragraphs are rejected as unnecessary. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 5-10: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 11-12: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 13: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 14: The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The second sentence is accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Vincent F. Vaccarella, Esquire Elder & Kurzman Grand Bay Plaza, Suite 702 2665 South Bayshore Drive Coconut Grove, Florida 33133 Phillis O. Douglas Board Attorney Dade County Public Schools School Board Administration Building 1450 Northeast Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33132 Steven M. Rosen, Esquire 5601 Building 5601 Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33137 Octavio J. Visiedo, Superintendent Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, #403 Mimai, Florida 33132-1308 Frank T. Brogan Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact DOT issued a request for proposals (RFP) entitled Business Area Analysis in the Functional Area of Production Management, with proposals due on November 15, 1991. Eight proposals were timely filed. The RFP contains criteria for evaluating the proposals, including factors to be considered and available points to be awarded. Evaluation of the proposals was broken down into two parts, a technical review and a price review. The technical part was further broken down into evaluation of the Management Plan, worth up to 30 points, and of the Technical Plan, also worth 30 points. The price or cost review was worth 40 points. The technical review was also broken down into sub-parts based on the criteria contained in the RFP. The technical portion of the proposals was performed by a five-member committee, comprised of William Conner, James Dolson, Jr., Rebecca Clemens, Mavis Georgalis, and Paul Benner. All eight proposals were accepted by DOT as responsive and were furnished to each committee member for independent review and evaluation as required by the RFP. Following the independent evaluations, the committee met and discussed the proposals. While there was no requirement to do so, some committee members changed scores based on considerations raised in this discussion. However the changes were minor and did not alter the final result of the committee's ranking and award of points to the various proposals. The committee ranked the Price Waterhouse proposal highest on the technical portion, giving it a total of 48.2 points out of a possible 60. It ranked Jorgensen second, giving it a total of 43.8 points out of that possible 60. The cost or price portion of the proposals was reviewed separately by Charles Johnson of the Contractual Services Office of DOT. Jorgensen was the lowest bidder and received the maximum available points of 40. Price bid the third highest price and received 29.50 points. When the points from the separate evaluations were totaled, Jorgensen received a total of 83.6 points and Price received a total of 77.7. Jorgensen was first and Price was second. On November 22, 1991, DOT posted the bid tabulations and indicated its intent to award the contract to Jorgensen. Price timely filed its initial protest and its formal protest. Read as a whole, the RFP requires that the proposed team members from each bidder have qualifications and substantial experience in the functional area of production management and also in the development of information systems. There is no requirement that all proposed team members have experience in both areas. A team which contains different members with expertise in each of the required areas is sufficient to be responsive to the RFP. The committee used solely the criteria in the RFP to evaluate the proposals. Petitioner singles out various sentences from the RFP to support its argument that each member of the team must have significant experience in development of business information systems, however in doing so it overlooks other requirements and it fails to read the RFP as a whole. Hence, all of Petitioner's proposed facts relating to this argument are rejected as irrelevant. Price also argues that the fact that Jorgensen's proposed team does not have a full-time member makes Jorgensen's proposal unresponsive, unworkable, and fatally flawed. This argument is also rejected along with those facts alleged in support of the argument. The RFP nowhere requires that one or more members of the proposed team be full-time. While the committee had some concerns about the lack of a full-time member on Jorgensen's proposed team, the points awarded reflect the extent of that concern. At no time did the committee intend that the points awarded on the proposals be contingent on Jorgensen changing its staffing pattern to include a full-time person. It was assumed by the committee, DOT, and both Price and Jorgensen that the actual staffing would be subject to adjustment after the contract was awarded and during the performance of the contract to reflect needs as they arose. Any negotiation of staffing patterns would occur after the bid award and the bid award would not be contingent on such negotiations. At no time prior to the posting of the bid tabulations and intent to award to Jorgensen did anyone from DOT contact Jorgensen to solicit a change in its proposed personnel allocation. Hence no unfair advantage was afforded to Jorgensen over Price.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order awarding the contract in RFP-DOT-91/92-9005 to Roy Jorgensen and Associates, Inc., and denying the protest filed by Price Waterhouse. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1992. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 91-7998BID The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Price Waterhouse Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(1), 3(11), 4(8), and 13(13). Proposed findings of fact 2, 5-8, 11, 12, 14-18, 56, 57, and 59 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Proposed findings of fact 9, 10, 28-31, and 37-55 are unsupported by the competent and substantial evidence. For most of these proposals, the only record support is found in isolated words and statements which have been taken out of context or distorted. The greater weight of the credible evidence does not support these proposals. Proposed findings of fact 19-27, 32-36, and 58 are irrelevant. See Findings of Fact 16 and 17. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Department of Transportation 1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-3(1-3), 4(3), 5(4), 4(5&6), 5(6), 6&7(8), 8-12(9-13), 13(15), 14&15(14), 16(18), and 17(21). [Note: there are two paragraphs 4 and 5.] COPIES FURNISHED: Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Susan P. Stephens Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Steven W. Huss Attorney at Law 1017-C Thomasville Road Tallahassee, FL 32303 William C. Grenke Vice President Roy Jorgensen & Associates, Inc. 3735 Buckeystown Pike Buckeystown, MD 21717
The Issue Whether Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent improperly evaluated the bids submitted in response to an Invitation to Bid (ITB) on Lease No. 590:2251. Whether Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that under the facts and circumstances of this case, Lease No. 590:2251 should be awarded to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Background HRS advertised an Invitation to Bid (ITB) on Lease Number 590:2251 on September 24, 1990 and October 1, 1990. The ITB was for approximately 37,888 square feet of existing office space for the HRS Office of Disability Determinations (ODD). The lease is for a term of five years, commencing on April 1, 1991. The ODD is presently, and was at the time of the bid submittal, housed in Petitioner's facility, the City Centre Building (City Centre) at 227 North Bronough Street, Tallahassee, Florida. The current agreement between HRS and the Petitioner involves two separate leases due to expire on March 31, 1991. The ODD has been housed in City Centre for approximately four and one-half years. HRS is combining the space now under two leases into one lease. Lease NO. 590:2251 is to house three program offices for the ODD: Central Area I, Central Area III, and the Tallahassee area. Prior to the bid being advertised, Charles Phillips, Director of the ODD, did not want to exercise the option to renew the HRS leases for space in City Centre. The Evaluation Committee HRS formed an Evaluation Committee to evaluate bids received in response to the ITB. Members of the committee were Bill Odom, Lucretia Young, Karen Gunter, and Dorea Sowinski. Ms. Sowinski served as the chairperson of the committee. All members of the Evaluation Committee were aware of concerns Mr. Phillips had with the City Centre prior to beginning the process evaluating the bids at issue in this case. Bill Odom, Lucretia Young and Karen Gunter are ODD area program administrators for the Tallahassee Area, Central Area I, and Central Area III, respectively. Dorea Sowinski is the Operations Management Consultant for the ODD and, as such, she handles purchasing and leasing for ODD. HRS held a pre-bid conference on October 5, 1990. Before the pre-bid conference, Linda Treml, the bid officer, and Dorea Sowinski discussed who would be on the Evaluation Committee. At the pre-bid conference, Ms. Treml identified the members of the Evaluation Committee. Voting was not discussed at the pre-bid conference. The ITB After the pre-bid conference, Linda Treml and Dorea Sowinski made changes to the ITB and issued the ITB to prospective bidders. The HRS manual on procurement of leased space, HRSM 70- 1, lists bid evaluation criteria that can be used. The evaluation criteria which can be used includes relocation costs. Relocation costs were not included among the criteria in the ITB. The failure to include relocation costs in the criteria for the evaluations of this bid in no way prejudiced the interests of the Intervenor. Any competitive advantage which may have been conferred as a result of this omission benefits the Intervenor. The Bid Opening HRS received two bids in response to the ITB. The Petitioner's bid offered space in City Centre. The only other bid was from Intervenor (Devoe Moore). Devoe Moore's bid offered space at the Fort Knox Center, 2729 Fort Knox Road, Tallahassee, Florida. The bids were opened on November 2, 1990. Petitioner's bid offered space at a lower rental rate for each of the five years of the lease term. Petitioner's bid was the low bid. Both bids were responsive. The bid officer, Linda Treml, was not present at the bid opening due to a family emergency. In Ms. Treml's absence, her supervisor, Ken McLane, conducted the bid opening. Mr. McLane does not normally attend bid openings. Instructions to the Evaluation Committee Before the Evaluation Committee met to evaluate the bids, Mr. McLane gave the committee instructions. Mr. McLane specifically instructed the Evaluation Committee that the chairperson would not evaluate the bids and would not vote. Ms. Sowinski questioned Mr. McLane regarding his instruction that the chairperson not vote at the time his instructions were given. Ms. Sowinski objected to not voting on the basis that, as committee chairperson on prior evaluation committees, she had always voted. In reply to Ms. Sowinski's questions, Mr. McLane indicated that in case of a tie in the number of points awarded each bidder, the chairperson would be the deciding vote. At the final hearing in this case, Mr. McLane testified that this was the only time he had instructed an evaluation committee chairperson not to evaluate bids and that the instructions he gave this Evaluation Committee in this regard were a mistake on his part. Mr. McLane testified that he was aware of no authority on which he based his decision that the chairperson would not participate in the evaluation. The other three members of the Evaluation Committee understood throughout the process that Ms. Sowinski would not vote unless there was a tie. The Original Bid Evaluations On November 15, 1990, three members of the Evaluation Committee filled out an evaluation sheet on each of the bids, assigning certain points to each of the evaluation criteria. As part of the evaluation process, the three members of the committee who had been instructed to evaluate the bids did so secretly and without consultation with other committee members regarding points assigned. The three voting members gave their evaluations to Ms. Sowinski, the committee chairperson. Ms. Sowinski saw the points that all the other Evaluation Committee members assigned to the various criteria for each building reflected in the bids. On November 15, 1990, Ms. Sowinski totalled the points assigned on each evaluation sheet and announced that the City Centre Building had received the most points. When the evaluation sheets of each of the three committee members who voted on November 15, 1990 were tallied, City Centre had 252 points and the Devoe Moore property (Fort Knox Center) had 245.6 points. More points meant a better bid. The Evaluation Committee was never reconvened. No testimony in the final hearing in this case indicates that any irregularity which may have occurred during the evaluation of the bids and assignment of points by Odom, Young, and Gunter had any material affect on the outcome or resulted in any prejudice to HRS or the Intervenor.1 The Phillips Memorandum Dorea Sowinski advised Charles Phillips, Director of ODD, of the result of the three member committee evaluation. Ms. Sowinski also showed Mr. Phillips a draft of her memorandum which stated that the Evaluation Committee recommended that the lease be awarded to the City Centre Building. After consulting HRS staff in facilities services, Ms. Sowinski suggested that Charles Phillips write a memo. Mr. Phillips wrote a memorandum to Ms. Sowinski dated November 16, 1990. This memo expressed Mr. Phillips' thoughts and comments regarding the City Centre Building and expressed his wishes that the memo be included in the recommendation. Details of the substance of Mr. Phillips' memo are further discussed (infra). The Submission of the Original Recommendation Ms. Sowinski wrote a memorandum dated November 19, 1990, to Ken McLane, recommending that the bid be awarded to Petitioner and that the ODD offices of HRS remain in the City Centre Building. Ms. Sowinski attached Mr. Phillips' November 16, 1990 memorandum and the evaluation sheets of the three other members of the Evaluation Committee to her memo. This accomplished the forwarding of the Evaluation Committee recommendation. The Change in Evaluation Procedure Ms. Treml returned to work on November 19, 1990, and reviewed the bid package for the lease at issue. Ms. Treml testified that she noted that only three members of the committee evaluated the bids and called Dorea Sowinski. Ms. Sowinski informed Ms. Treml that Mr. McLane had instructed her not to vote. Ms. Treml then set up a meeting with Mr. McLane. It was Ms. Treml's view that not allowing the chairperson of the Evaluation Committee to vote contradicted the HRS lease manual. Ms. Treml's view regarding the contradiction stems from her reading of HRS Manual 70-1 on page 5-18, which states: When all committee members have individually evaluated each proposal the entire evaluation committee will meet to review the individual evaluations and jointly develop a committee recommendation of the lowest and best bid based on the overall scores. The provision of HRS Manual 70-1 in question does not contain the word "vote" (although under the evaluation procedure in this case, the application of evaluation criteria and assignment of points amounts to a "vote"). The provision does not mention chairperson or the role of such a person. A specific finding is made that the material aspects of this provision of HRS Manual 70-1 which are important to resolving the disputed facts in this case are that committee members independently evaluate prior to the meeting of the entire committee and prior to the development of a committee recommendation. During her meeting with Mr. McLane, Ms. Treml expressed concern to Mr. McLane that evaluation committee chairpersons consistently voted and that she needed the evaluations of all committee members in order to complete the process. During this meeting, Mr. McLane and Ms. Treml decided to send the evaluations back and to request that Ms. Sowinski conduct an evaluation. The Second Evaluation On November 27, 1990, Dorea Sowinski filled out an evaluation sheet like the ones the other members of the Evaluation Committee filled out on November 15, 1990. Ms. Sowinski filled out her evaluation sheet after having seen how many points each previous evaluator had assigned to each bidder for each of the criteria. Ms. Sowinski testified that she left the evaluations of the other committee members at her office while she conducted her evaluations at her home. She testified that she had not looked at the other evaluations since the date she tallied them and that she did not remember what the totals those evaluations were. Ms. Sowinski also testified that she did not know the difference between the points already assigned and did not know what it would take to shift the vote from City Centre to Fort Knox. To the extent that the testimony regarding Ms. Sowinski's recollection of the original bid evaluations is offered to establish Ms. Sowinski's independence in conducting this evaluation, the testimony is not convincing. Careful consideration of the facts and circumstances established in this case results in a specific finding that Ms. Sowinski's evaluation of the bids was not independent. Ms. Sowinski prepared an evaluation total cover sheet for the original three evaluations when she forwarded the evaluation favoring City Centre. She testified that she no longer has the evaluation sheet from the first (three person) evaluation and believes she "put it in the recycle bin." The evaluations cover sheet which Ms. Sowinski recycled contained a specific listing of the points given each criteria based on the evaluations of the other three committee members. At the time she prepared her evaluation sheet, Ms. Sowinski was aware of the November 16th Phillips' memo and was aware that Mr. Phillips did not want to stay in City Centre. In substance, the Phillips memorandum expresses his concerns regarding the high crime rate and problems with transients in the area of the City Centre Building. In addition, the memo outlines problems with the past history of building management at City Centre and states that, since "the owners of the City Centre have filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy," Mr. Phillips does not believe there will be an improvement in maintenance. The memo also mentions Mr. Phillips' concerns regarding structural problems with the building and its parking garage. Ms. Sowinski's evaluation of the City Centre Building is the only evaluation in this case which mentions "Chapter 11 bankruptcy." The evaluation sheet that Ms. Sowinski filled out changed the total points for each building to 327 for City Centre and 329.8 points for Fort Knox. A memorandum from Dorea Sowinski to Linda Treml dated November 30, 1990, recommended the Fort Knox property for the lease award. Ms. Sowinski did not reconvene the Evaluation Committee to consider anything further regarding the bids before issuing the November 30, 1990 memorandum with the recommendation reversing the prior recommendation submitted on November 19, 1990. On December 13, 1990, Ken McLane signed letters for Linda Treml to both bidders advising that HRS intended to award Lease No. 590:2251 to Devoe Moore for the Fort Knox property. In consideration of all the facts and circumstances in this case, the actions of HRS in changing the original bid evaluations by instructing Ms. Sowinski to conduct an after the fact evaluation amounts to a failure to adhere to the evaluation criteria that it created thereby undermining the integrity of the bid process. The actions of HRS in this regard were arbitrary and capricious. The actions of HRS in allowing the original bid recommendation to be reversed based upon the tainted evaluations conducted by Ms. Sowinski amounts to a discriminatory standard of review of the bids. The action of HRS in this regard was also arbitrary and capricious. The Testimony of Petitioner's Expert At the final hearing in this case, Petitioner offered the testimony of Mary Goodman, Chief of the Bureau of Property Management of the Florida Department of General Services (DGS). DGS is responsible for promulgating rules for evaluating bids for leases such as the one at issue in this proceeding. Section 255.249(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1990 Supp.). Ms. Goodman has been the Bureau Chief of the DGS Bureau of Property for over nineteen years and has been involved in State property management for over thirty years. Ms. Goodman is the only witness in this proceeding offered as qualified to provide opinions regarding State procurement of leased space and the appropriate procedures to be followed in such procurement. Based upon her qualifications, Ms. Goodman was accepted as an expert witness and her testimony is relied upon as helpful in making findings of fact 44 through 62 in this Recommended Order. When evaluating bids in the public procurement process, agencies should form an evaluation committee, and members of that committee should evaluate proposals received independently. The term "individually," as used in the HRS Manual 70- 1 at pages 5-18, is synonymous with "independently." In the public procurement process, the requirement that evaluations of bids be performed independently means that the committee chair or a bid officer instructs the committee as to their responsibilities and provides the committee with evaluation criteria and with instructions as to assignment of points. Each committee member then assigns points as set forth in the criteria without consulting with other members. In this manner each committee member obtains the total points assigned each responsive bid. Ms. Goodman knows of nothing that would authorize the chairperson or any member of an evaluation committee to fill out an evaluation form after seeing the evaluation forms filled out by other members. To do so would not amount to an "independent evaluation" and would violate State policy because the requirement of independence would not be met. Ms. Goodman is aware of no policy manual, rule, or statute that would prohibit the chairperson of an evaluation committee from acting as bid officer and refraining from voting when other members vote. Typically in the public procurement process, an evaluation committee consists of three members with a committee chair as a nonvoter and guider. If three members of an evaluation committee make an evaluation, and a fourth member is asked to also make an evaluation, if the fourth member has previously had access to the other three evaluations and knows what such evaluations contain, the fourth member cannot make an independent, unbiased and unprejudiced evaluation. The results of an evaluation committee's voting is called a recommendation because of the organizational structure within a department. In most state agencies, there is an oversight person who looks at the committee recommendation to determine that the committee did in fact make an independent evaluation and that the recommendation complies with applicable statutes and rules. Even though a reviewing authority may override the committee recommendation, such authority must stay within the bid criteria. Once instructions have been given to an evaluation committee and action has been taken pursuant to such instructions, a change or rescission of previous instructions should be based on just cause; reasons that are not arbitrary, capricious, prejudiced or biased. Based upon the assumption that "the chairperson has always voted," no sufficient good reason or justification exists to warrant a change in instructions to allow a committee chairperson to vote after the committee has been instructed that the chair would not vote, and the committee has done its job and forwarded its recommendation based upon the prior instructions. The purpose in providing in the rules that an evaluation committee be formed to evaluate bids is to make evaluations impartial, unbiased, and to provide integrity in the process of public procurement of leased space. Normally, the evaluation committee recommendation is followed by the agency head. Under the facts proved in this proceeding, the change in instructions previously given the Evaluation Committee occurred after the committee had completed its evaluation and submitted its recommendation based on the prior instructions. The rescission of the prior instruction on voting by the chairperson resulted in the fourth committee member evaluating the bids and scoring_ criteria points after that member had reviewed the other evaluations, tallied the original evaluations points and prepared the original recommendation. The resulting second and different recommendation changed the results of the process such that the low bidder, originally awarded the most points by the committee, lost the bid recommendation because the scoring change resulted in a different point total. The procedure thus applied in this case was arbitrary and capricious. In the bid evaluation process in this case, relocation costs, the financial condition of the bidders, and structural engineering analysis were not included in the criteria for evaluating responsive bids. None of the evaluation criteria in the ITB for this bid pertain to or encompass past performance by a bidder. Typically, State agencies do not include past performance in bid evaluation criteria and, if such criteria was included, the ITB should require every bidder to provide documentation of past performance in any leased space offered and some criteria should be established by which the submission could be evaluated.2 None of the evaluation criteria in the ITB for this bid would allow an evaluation committee to consider Chapter 11 status in a bankruptcy proceeding. The State of Florida has had a number of leases where lessors have gone into bankruptcy, mortgage foreclosures and some instances where Savings and Loans have taken over and then gone defunct. The State has leased from receivers, including receivers in-bankruptcy. Absent a specific statement in the ITB that no bid would be received or considered from a property owner involved in reorganization proceedings, the agency should not take such matters into consideration in evaluating bids. Structural condition of the building may be considered under "physical characteristics" in the evaluation criteria but where, as in this case, the lease agreement requires any facility being offered to be kept in compliance with all existing building codes, it should be assumed that all bids declared responsive meet that requirement. Under the evaluation criteria established by HRS in this case, it is not permissible to consider the area of town the building is in as long as the building is within geographic boundaries established in the ITB. The Sowinski Evaluation of the City Centre Building Ms. Sowinski attached a typed sheet to the evaluation sheet which she filled out for her evaluation of City Centre. This attachment explains her evaluation and assignment of points. The written instructions to the Evaluation Committee require such an explanation of points in two areas of Item 2 in the evaluation criteria, both relating to the location of the space bid. (Pet. Composite Dep. Ex. 20) The Evaluation Criteria score sheet was used by all committee members including Ms. Sowinski. The portions of the score sheet at issue in this proceeding are under item 2(a) and (c). Item 2(a) calls for an evaluation of "The effect of environmental factors, including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it, on operations planned for the requested space." Ms. Sowinski deducted six of a possible twelve points under item 2(a). Ms. Sowinski indicates in her explanation under Item 2(a) that she deducted points for building location for the following reasons: City Centre is located in one of the highest rated crime areas of Tallahassee. (Ms. Sowinski also outlines problems with harassment by transients, car burglary and vandalism in and around the building.) The past performance of building management. (Problems listed include poor response to tenant needs in the past.) As part of her Item 2(a) explanation, Ms. Sowinski also states that the building owners are in "Chapter 11 bankruptcy" and that she questions the owners' financial resources to maintain the building. Ms. Sowinski testified that she did not deduct points for this; however, on the basis of the evaluation sheet there is no way to make an objective distinction in this regard. Ms. Sowinski attaches an engineering report from April 1990 to her explanation. This report addresses structural problems. As part of her Item 2(a) explanation, Ms. Sowinski also notes such problems are being corrected. Item 2(c) on the Evaluation Criteria score sheets calls for an evaluation of the "Character of adjacent properties compatible with office use." Ms. Sowinski deducted four out of eight possible points under Item 2(c). In her explanation of points deducted under Item 2(c), Ms. Sowinski states that the deductions are based on the fact that the bus station is located across the street, there is a Salvation Army housing unit nearby and that these factors contribute to the transient problems in the area. The written instructions to the Evaluation Committee note that scoring pursuant to Item 2, "Location," is subjective. Therefore, evaluators are instructed to provide an explanation less than the maximum points are given for each weighting factor in that category. In assigning evaluation criteria points under Item 2(a), the evaluator's consideration of "physical characteristics of the building and area surrounding it" is limited to factors which have an effect on the operations planned for the requested space. If an evaluator assigned less than the maximum available points under Item 2(a) to a building based upon "crime rate" and/or "problems with transients" in the area of the building, then the evaluator, pursuant to the written instructions, must explain how such factors have or would have a negative effect on the operation of the ODD. Ms. Sowinski's explanation under Item 2 (a) fails to provide sufficient information in this regard to reasonably justify the deduction of six out of a possible twelve points that were available to City Centre in this category. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, such action was unreasonable.3 Pursuant to the wording of Item 2(c), evaluators are limited to considerations of how the "character of adjacent properties" might not be "compatible with office use" when assigning less than the maximum points allowable in this category. If an evaluator assigned less than the maximum available points under Item 2(c) to a building based upon such factors as the proximity of a bus station and/or a "Salvation Army housing unit," then, based upon the written instructions given, the evaluator must explain how such factors are incompatible with office use. Ms. Sowinski's explanation, which states that the bus station and housing units "account for a large portion of the transient population, which is a direct cause for many of the problems in the area" does not sufficiently explain how the character of these adjacent properties are so incompatible with ODD "office use" as to warrant the deduction of four out of a possible eight points that were available to City Centre. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, such action was unreasonable. Ms. Sowinski's evaluation of the City Centre bid was not reasonably based on the evaluation criteria HRS established. Therefore, even if Ms. Sowinski's evaluation of these bids was not tainted, her evaluation of the City Centre bid was materially improper. De novo Application of Evaluation Criteria to These Bids Item 1 (Associated Fiscal Costs) is, as noted in the written instructions to the Evaluation Committee, objectively based upon present value methodology computations. All bid evaluations in the record are consistent. In each evaluation, City Centre, the low bidder, receives the maximum of 40 points and Fort Knox receives 36.2. Points awarded pursuant to Item 1 on the Evaluation Sheet are not at issue. Therefore, in a de novo evaluation, City Centre is awarded 40 points and Fort Knox receives 36.2 points under Item 1. The Evaluation Criteria Score Sheet lists Item 3(a) as "Facility, Susceptibility of the design of the space offered to efficient layout and good utilization, which will be determined by evaluation committee." As noted in the written instructions to the committee, this item is subjective and an explanation of the assignment of fewer than allowed points is required. Item 3(a) is not at issue, and the maximum 13 points are awarded each building for the purpose of the de novo evaluation. The remainder of Item 3 is not in issue and is objective. All evaluations in the record award 6 points to City Centre and 8 points to Fort Knox. In the de novo evaluations, the same approach is taken. The application criteria in dispute in this case are those listed on the Evaluation Criteria Score Sheets under Item 2, Location, specifically 2(a) "The effect of environmental factors, including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it, on operations planned for the requested space" and 2(c) "Character of adjacent properties compatible with office use." Based upon the facts proved in this case, an independent review of the evaluation criteria and other appropriate exhibits, both the City Centre and Fort Knox buildings should receive the maximum allowed points in Items 2(a) and 2 (c). Therefore, each building is awarded twelve points in Item 2(a) and eight points in Item 2(c). The application of a de novo evaluation of the bids in this case, as described above, results in total scores of 87 for City Centre and 85.2 for Fort Knox. No party in this case, to and including the final hearing has contended that the votes of Mr. Odom, Ms. Young or Ms. Gunter were affected by any irregularity or argued that these evaluations should be discarded or ignored. None of the parties make such a contention in their proposed recommended orders and made no proposed findings of fact in this regard.4 Petitioner has proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the original recommendation, based upon the evaluation by Mr. Odom, Ms. Young and Ms. Gunter was in material compliance with the ITB as well as applicable statutes and rules. Petitioner is therefore entitled to the award of Lease NO. 590:2251 as provided in the original Evaluation Committee Recommendation. A de novo evaluation of the bids in this case proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Petitioner submitted the lowest and best bid. Petitioner is entitled to the award of Lease No. 590:2251 as provided in the original Evaluation Committee order.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the evidence of record, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent HRS enter a Final Order awarding Lease No. 590:2251 to Petitioner. It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent return the cash bond posted by Petitioner pursuant to Section 255.25(3)(c), Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 21st day of March, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES W. YORK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 1991.
Findings Of Fact The underlying case for which attorneys fees in the undisputed amount of $2,775.00 are sought involved a 1992 application by Union Trucking, Inc. for recertification by the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) as a disadvantaged business enterprise (DBE). Union Trucking, Inc. had originally been certified by FDOT in 1988, and upon successive applications for certification, had been recertified by FDOT in 1989, 1990 and 1991. Recertification was applied for on July 20, 1992 and denied on December 14, 1992. A request for formal hearing followed on January 15, 1993 and the case proceeded before the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) until FDOT recertified Union Trucking, Inc. on October 15, 1993. On November 17, 1993, DOAH hearing officer P. Michael Ruff entered an order relinquishing jurisdiction, which resulted in FDOT's December 17, 1993 final order. FDOT's final order was entered on the grounds that certification had been granted, did not alter the recertification terms, and dismissed the request for formal hearing. On February 14, 1994, less than sixty days after entry of the FDOT final order, Petitioner filed its original "Application for Award of Attorneys Fees Pursuant to F.S. 57.111," hereafter "petition." On March 2, 1994, FDOT filed a response, which, although no motion to dismiss was filed, addressed assorted insufficiencies of the petition. FDOT's response did not raise any timeliness bar. An order of dismissal with leave to amend within fifteen days was entered by the undersigned hearing officer on April 21, 1994. The amended petition was filed May 11, 1994, and FDOT filed its response on May 26, 1994, still not asserting any timeliness bar. At formal hearing, the parties stipulated that the only issue for consideration was whether or not FDOT had been substantially justified in denying the 1992 recertification. Otherwise, it was undisputed that Petitioner is a small business party; that FDOT was not merely a nominal party; that the employment, amount of fee, and hours worked by Petitioner's counsel were as stated in the pleadings, and that there were no "unusual circumstances" as contemplated within the applicable statute and rule. The undersigned hearing officer suggested that the parties include in their post-hearing proposals arguments directed to timeliness, vel non, of the attorney's fee and costs petition, and thus, whether or not DOAH has jurisdiction of this case. With regard to the "substantial justification" issue, it is necessary to review the DBE process since 1991. Union Trucking, Inc.'s 1991 application for recertification was received by FDOT on April 30, 1991. Documents submitted to FDOT by Union Trucking, Inc. in conjunction with the 1991 application revealed that Petitioner corporation had undergone an ownership change on April 1, 1991, approximately 29 days prior to submittal of the 1991 application, which ownership change had transferred 49 percent of Union Trucking, Inc.'s corporate stock from Denise Willis to Robin P. Wilson; that the new owner, Robin P. Wilson, did not list any employment on her resume other than at Pritchett Trucking, Inc.; that Union Trucking, Inc. had a business relationship with Pritchett Trucking, Inc.; and that the new 49 percent owner of Union Trucking, Inc., Robin P. Wilson, is the daughter of Marvin Pritchett, owner of Pritchett Trucking, Inc. Marvin Pritchett is a white American male. Robin Pritchett Wilson is a white American female. Denise Willis, who previously owned the 49 percent of Union Trucking, Inc. stock which was transferred to Robin Wilson is also a white American female, and the stepdaughter of Marvin Pritchett. From Union Trucking, Inc.'s inception and at all times material, 51 percent of Union Trucking, Inc.'s stock has been owned by Warren Lee, a black American male. At all times material, Union Trucking, Inc. has been 100 percent owned by disadvantaged classes (female and black). At all times material, FDOT did not break down its disadvantaged certifications as to "black" versus "female" for purposes of categorizing DBE status, but only looked to whether or not at least 51 percent of the stock was owned by a member(s) of a disadvantaged class. FDOT has no rule specifically requiring that all owners work in the business, only that day to day control be in the hands of the disadvantaged class. FDOT conducted an on-site visit to Union Trucking, Inc. on July 22, 1991, at which time FDOT requested additional information as to Robin Wilson's employment with Union Trucking, Inc. and was notified that Robin Wilson spent approximately one to two hours per day working for Union Trucking, Inc. FDOT also inquired about Union Trucking Inc.'s business relationship with Pritchett Trucking, Inc. and received the explanation that the relationship was "like any lease owner with the company they lease with." DBE personnel at FDOT did not understand what this response meant, but they did not inquire further in 1991. Instead, the FDOT DBE certification committee voted to recertify Union Trucking, Inc. with a special monitor, because there were undefined "concerns" and unidentified "feelings" about the eligibility of Union Trucking, Inc. At formal hearing, FDOT personnel were very clear that recertification in 1991 with a "special monitor" meant that when Union Trucking, Inc. came up for recertification in 1992, an on-site review must be conducted. Prior to receiving Union Trucking, Inc.'s July 20, 1992 application for recertification, FDOT was notified by the Department of General Services (DGS) that DGS also had "concerns" about Union Trucking, Inc. On September 10, 1992, DGS notified FDOT that DGS had denied Union Trucking, Inc.'s application to DGS for Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) certification, that the DGS denial had been upheld at a DOAH hearing, and that FDOT would be provided a copy of the DOAH hearing officer's recommended order. FDOT subsequently received a copy of that recommended order which had been entered September 9, 1992. FDOT's Minority Programs Office Manager testified that, in his opinion, the recommended order in the DGS case (Exhibit DOT 9) "verified" the FDOT "concerns" expressed during the 1991 FDOT recertification process, but he defined those concerns as independent financing. The FDOT DBE certification committee chairperson testified that the recommended order addressed concerns expressed during the 1991 FDOT recertification process, but he defined the concerns differently, as lack of independency from familial relationships, i.e. control, and financial relationships of family corporations. Both men considered FDOT's and DGS' rules to be substantially similar. In fact, the September 9, 1992 recommended order to DGS involved a different agency (DGS) than FDOT, a different statute (Section 287.0943 F.S.) than the one authorizing FDOT's DBE program and different rules (Rules 13A- 2.005(4)(a) and (b) and 13A-4 F.A.C.) than the ones administered by FDOT. FDOT is required to operate under Section 337.135 F.S. and administer Rules 14-78.002 and 14-78.005 F.A.C. Also, the recommended order focused on a legal conclusion that Union Trucking, Inc. was financially dependent, or at least at the time of its corporate "start-up" in 1986 was financially dependent, upon Pritchett Trucking, Inc. The recommended order stated, in pertinent part, as follows: . . . co-owner of the applicant is Pritchett's daughter and a natural subject of his goodwill and generosity, such a relationship is prohibited by the statute, [referring to Section 287.0943 F.S.] Similarly, her service as a director of Pritchett corporation, carrying on Union's business from her desk at Pritchett Trucking is natural, but estab- lishes a prohibited relationship. [Bracketed material added her for clarification]. Upon receipt of the DGS recommended order, FDOT did not seek further explanatory information from the applicant, as was FDOT's standard procedure under its normal operation. Further, FDOT did not follow its own specially prescribed procedure for certified DBEs with "special monitor" status, in that FDOT did not conduct a new 1992 on-site review. Instead, two months later, FDOT sent its December 14, 1992 denial letter. The FDOT employee who prepared the letter testified that the letter denial was based on her review of all the information already in FDOT's DBE file on Union Trucking, Inc., upon the audio tape of the old 1991 on-site review interview, and upon corporate records of the Secretary of State. The FDOT letter, however, closely tracked the DGS recommended order but denied recertification by FDOT on the basis of FDOT Rules 14-78.005(7)(c)1. and 2.c. and 14-78.005(7)(a) F.A.C. It also stated that Union Trucking, Inc. was not an independent business entity or a small business concern and that there was an "affiliate" relationship under FDOT rules due to "Susan [sic] Wilson." It renamed Robin Wilson and also extrapolated a great deal of financial information that appears to come directly from the DGS recommended order. As a result of FDOT's denial of its 1992 recertification application, Union Trucking, Inc. requested a formal hearing. During the progress of that case before DOAH, FDOT received a copy of an affidavit by Robin Wilson in which she stated that Union Trucking, Inc. only purchased parts and fuel from Pritchett Trucking because Pritchett's Lake Butler terminal was the least expensive and most convenient source. Ms. Wilson also stated that Union Trucking, Inc. had not received any loans from her father's companies in four to five years, and that there were no current outstanding loans. In an effort to negotiate the issues and resolve matters without formal hearing before DOAH, FDOT finally conducted an on-site review in July 1993. Documentation was provided by Union Trucking, Inc. to show that all recent transactions with any of Marvin Pritchett's companies were properly invoiced "arm's length" transactions and that Union Trucking, Inc. dealt with many other companies as well; that Union Trucking, Inc.'s old debts to Marvin Pritchett's companies had been retired with zero balances prior to Union Trucking, Inc.'s 1992 recertification application to FDOT; and that Union Trucking, Inc. had three trucks and trailers normally being used full-time in its business. Random samplings by FDOT's consultant during this on-site review confirmed the information in the possession of FDOT prior to the 1992 application for recertification, most of which had been provided and was already in FDOT's possession as early as April 30, 1991. If FDOT had inquired concerning any loans at the time it received the recommended order in September 1992, it would have determined that all loans to Union Trucking, Inc. from any of Marvin Pritchett's various enterprises had been paid off prior to Union Trucking, Inc.'s 1992 recertification application to FDOT. FDOT's consultant's report after the 1993 on-site review determined that there currently were no "affiliated" firms under FDOT rules. It also appears from the report that FDOT then accepted that Robin Wilson split her time between office management for Union Trucking, Inc., running her own company named "Robin Pritchett Trucking Inc.," and working for her father's "[Marvin] Pritchett Trucking Inc." Having clarified these matters, FDOT no longer had problems or concerns with such an arrangement. Union Trucking, Inc.'s records on file for contract work with FDOT through other contractors also reflected use of owned trucks and drivers employed by Union Trucking, Inc. FDOT then recertified Petitioner effective October 15, 1993. At the attorney's fee and costs hearing herein, FDOT presented evidence that it did not have the correct location address for Union Trucking, Inc. when its personnel went to the July 1993 on-site review. This evidence does not justify FDOT's 1992 denial. Union Trucking, Inc.'s corporate office had moved a few weeks previous to the 1993 on-site review. Since Union Trucking, Inc. and its lawyer had been in constant communication with FDOT during the litigation phase of the recertification denial case, consistently urging an on-site inspection, any failure by Union Trucking, Inc. to clarify the geographical relocation of its office in 1993 was either an oversight or an innocent miscommunication. This change of address was not noted in Union Trucking, Inc.'s 1992 reapplication because the move had not yet occurred when that reapplication was submitted in July of 1992. Obviously, FDOT did not use the 1993 failure to notify the agency of a change of address as a reason to deny recertification in 1992, and FDOT also did not consider it a sufficiently serious flaw to withhold recertification after the July 1993 on-site review. FDOT also presented evidence that Robin Wilson did not tell the agency that she owned 100 percent of another corporate entity, "Robin Pritchett (her maiden name) Trucking, Inc." until the July 1993 on-site review. FDOT's two on- site reviewers concurred that "Robin Pritchett Trucking," consisting of one truck, which was sporadically used to haul wood chips, was never any cause for FDOT's concern. Apparently, FDOT considers hauling wood products to be an entirely different industry than the hauling of highway aggregates, which is the type of work done on FDOT contracts and the type of work done by Union Trucking, Inc. While Robin Pritchett Wilson's "affiliation" with her own independent corporation, "Robin Pritchett Trucking, Inc.," possibly was the type of "affiliation" which she should have disclosed, pursuant to FDOT's DBE rule, on Union Trucking Inc.'s 1992 application for recertification by FDOT as a DBE, it is clear that FDOT did not know of this nondisclosure when the agency denied recertification in December 1992. FDOT did not deny recertification at that time for that reason. FDOT also did not consider such nondisclosure to be a sufficiently serious flaw so as to withhold recertification after the disclosure at the July 1993 on-site review. Also, FDOT never asserted that its personnel had been confused in 1992 between "Robin Pritchett Trucking, Inc." and "[Marvin] Pritchett Trucking, Inc." Therefore, this late disclosure does not justify FDOT's 1992 denial of certification. In its July 1993 on-site review, FDOT investigated but found no barrier to recertifying Union Trucking, Inc. under the statutes and rules FDOT administers. There were no barriers related to familial relationships, related to Robin Wilson's being an owner of her own corporation, related to her being a director of any corporation, related to her owning a nominal number of stock shares in Marvin Pritchett's several businesses, related to her use of Pritchett's desk or office equipment, related to Pritchett loans to Union Trucking, Inc., related to Mr. Lee's use of a special account, or related to any other factual reason cited in either FDOT's December 14, 1992 denial letter or the September 9, 1992 recommended order affecting DGS. Nonetheless, FDOT's consultant's closing comments in the 1993 on-site report sum up FDOT's continuing overall approach to Union Trucking, Inc., both before the 1993 on-site review and thereafter. This approach is to "continue to question" successful DBEs whose principals have successful families and successful corporate investments. He wrote: Because of the close family relationships and multiple companies owned or operated, this firm will continue to be questioned as to eligibility for the DBE program. Any concerns I have remaining can only be resolved through the actual job perform- ance and compliance on future projects. I strongly recommend a continued compliance report be addressed with detailed concerns to support the next certif- ication provided the firm is recertified.
Findings Of Fact Respondent HRS published ITB 590:2306 for existing rental space in the central area of Brooksville, Florida. The bid solicitation specified a bid opening time and date of 2:00 p.m. July 17, 1991. Petitioner and Intervenor timely submitted sealed bids. They were the only two bidders. Neither they nor anyone else timely filed any protest of the bid specifications, and therefore the specifications are not subject to attack in this proceeding. Petitioner received a notice of intent to award the bid for lease 590:2306 to Intervenor by letter from Respondent dated August 27, 1991 and timely filed its notice of intent to protest and formal bid protest. Petitioner accordingly has standing to bring this proceeding. Intervenor is the intended awardee and as such has standing to intervene. Petitioner submitted the property located at 7348 Broad Street, Brooksville, Florida, and showed in his bid submittal form that his proposed property contained 22,500 net square feet, with future expansion of 2,100 square feet available. When Petitioner submitted his bid, it included a floor plan, site plan, and a PUR 7068 form. A PUR 7068 form is a "Public Entity Crime Certification Statement," a sworn statement under Section 287.133(a) F.S. The ITB included two separate requirements for bidders to establish that they have control over the property that they submit to HRS. HRS' purposes in requiring bidders to demonstrate control are to prevent bids based on total speculation, to establish a reasonable expectation that the bidder can meet his obligations if awarded the bid, and to establish a reasonable expectation that the property can be occupied on time. Item 1 on page 3 provides as follows: Control of property - This pertains to both the structure(s) and proposed parking areas. To submit a responsive bid, a prospective lessor must meet one of the following qualifications: a.) Be the owner of record of the facility and parking areas (submit copy of deed). b.) Be the lessee of space being proposed and present with bid, a copy of lease with documen- tation of authorization to sublease the facility and parking areas through the base lease term and all renewal option periods. c.) Submit documentation of an option to purchase the facility and/or parking areas. d.) Submit documentation of an option to lease the facility with authorization to in turn, sublease. Any lease must encompass the entire time period of the basic lease and any renewal option periods as required the state. e.) Submit form PUR. 7068 Sworn Statement of Public Entity Crimes (Attachment H). Page 12 provides, in part, as follows: In order for a bid proposal to be accepted the items 1 through 6 must be included in the bid proposal. Items 7 through 11 must be included, if applicable. [Items 11 and 13 state:] 11. Documentation showing bidder as controller of property. 13. Public Enemy [sic] Crime Certification Statement A pre-bid conference attended by Petitioner made clear that evidence of control and the PUR 7068 form were two different items. Petitioner testified that he attached the PUR 7068 form as his sole basis for evidencing control of the building and parking spaces he submitted for lease, and acknowledged that, in fact, the form did not provide any information with regard to his control of the buildings or parking spaces offered for lease. Petitioner's assertion that his name on some of his site plans, etc. constitutes evidence of control is not persuasive. Such assertion is not in line with the ITB requirements or even common sense. Petitioner Proctor owned the buildings he offered HRS in his bid submittal. Petitioner offered multiple buildings separated by parking areas and driveways. The property offered by Petitioner was to have built an awning- covered walkway between buildings but the walkway would have to be placed through the driveway area of the property. The expansion area for Petitioner's property designated in its bid submittal was composed of approximately 10 gated warehouse units which would be converted to office space. Petitioner had leased a portion of the same premises to HRS for 15 years, and HRS was still leasing that portion at the time of the bid opening. At the time of the bid opening, another portion of the property Petitioner proposed to be leased to HRS was also already rented to other tenants, including a lease to the Florida Department of Labor which was not scheduled to expire until December 31, 1991, one day prior to HRS' proposed first day of occupancy under the ITB. The space leased to the Department of Labor would require some renovation for HRS' use, at least to connect it on the interior with the rest of the building. The remainder of the second, adjacent, building to be rented under Petitioner's bid would require more extensive renovation to create office spaces to meet HRS' needs. In addition to the Department of Labor, Petitioner was also renting space in the second building to a beauty salon, a book store, an office supply store, a clothing store, and a barber at the time of bid submittal and opening and at the time of the formal hearing. These latter tenants were on month-to-month leases. In order to ensure that there would be time for necessary renovations before January 1, 1992 and further to ensure that the property would be available for occupancy on January 1, 1992, the ITB required in the following unequivocal language that all bidders file tenant acknowledgments of the bid/proposed lease with their bid submittal: Existing Tenants: If the offered space or any portion thereof (including parking areas) is at present occupied or will be covered by an active lease(s) at the stated availability date, written documentation by the tenant indicating acknowledgment of the bid and ability to vacate premises by the proposed date must be included with the bid submittal. [Emphasis added] Petitioner submitted no tenant acknowledgments from any of his tenants with his bid to HRS. Even though Petitioner failed to submit evidence of control in the form of a deed and further failed to submit the required acknowledgments from tenants occupying the premises on the bid date, HRS did not immediately disqualify Petitioner's bid as nonresponsive. Instead, HRS evaluated Petitioner's bid simultaneously with Intervenor TCC's bid. HRS relied on old leases in its files and actual knowledge that monthly rent was paid to Petitioner for its own currently leased space, and HRS ignored the absence of tenant acknowledgments with Petitioner's bid. HRS followed this course of action despite the requirement of the ITB on page 7, item 1 under EVALUATION OF BIDS which unequivocally provides: Bids received are first evaluated to determine technical responsiveness. This includes submittal on bid submittal forms, inclusion of required information, data, attachments, signatures and notarization, etc. Non responsive [sic] bids will be withdrawn from further consideration. The portion of the ITB designated, Documents Required To Be Submitted With Bid Submittal For Existing Buildings on page 12, item 4. required bidders to submit "Scale Floor Plans showing present configurations with dimensions." Page 3 of 22, Item 9.(b) further required that, as a part of the bid submittal, bidders were to provide "A scaled (1/16" or 1/8" or 1/4" = 1'0") floor plan showing present configuration with measurements." Contrary to the ITB requirement, Petitioner submitted a floor plan scaled at 1/20" = 1', which also failed to reflect the present configurations with all measurements. Petitioner's scaled floor plan submitted with his bid was prepared prior to the present addition to one building and contained a hand- drawn configuration without accurate measurements for the northwest corner of one building. The term of the lease as shown on the ITB and Bid Submittal Form was 9 and one-half years with an option to renew for 2-5 year renewal periods. At the time of the bid opening on July 17, 1991, the bid submitted by Petitioner failed to have any proposed rental rates shown for "Renewal Options: Option II years 1 through 5." HRS permitted Petitioner to correct or supplement its bid after the bid opening (same date and place) to cover this material omission. Page 6, item 4 of the ITB provided for the property owner or other bidding entity to sign the bid submission. The pertinent part states: 4. Each bid submitted shall be signed by the owner(s) corporate officers, or legal representative(s). The corporate, trade, or partnership title must be either stamped or typewritten beside the actual signature(s). If the Bid Submittal is signed by an Agent, written evidence from the owner of record of his/her authority must accompany the proposal. ALL BID SUBMITTAL SIGNATURES MUST BE WITNESSED BY TWO PERSONS. [Emphasis appears in ITB] Petitioner Proctor signed his bid submittal in proper person. TCC's bid submittal was signed by Sharon K. Lane, "Executive Director," of TCC Number 3 Ltd. Inc., Intervenor herein. At all times material, TCC Number 3 Ltd. Inc. has been a Florida corporation. At the time of the bid opening, Ms. Lane was TCC's sole shareholder and "all officers." At the time of formal hearing, Ms. Lane remained the sole shareholder, but others had assumed some of the corporate offices. Her status at the time of the bid submittal was sufficient for her to bid on behalf of the TCC corporation and to execute the PUR 7068 form on that corporation's behalf. Intervenor TCC submitted the required PUR 7068 form, but TCC submitted as sole evidence of control an undated, unrecorded "Contract for Sale and Purchase" by and between Hernando Plaza Ltd. as Seller and Intervenor TCC as Buyer, for the property which Intervenor was offering for lease to HRS. The best date assignable to this document is April 29, 1991. It was executed on behalf of Hernando Plaza Ltd. by Edward M. Strawgate and Harold Brown representing themselves as general partners of the limited partnership. TCC's obligation to proceed to closing under the foregoing contract was contingent upon TCC's securing an anchor tenant. However, the contract requires TCC to take steps to secure an anchor tenant. By its terms, TCC may purchase the property with or without an anchor tenant, but the contract requires TCC, in seeking an anchor tenant, to set time limits for the lease arrangement with the proposed anchor tenant which do not necessarily accord with the timing of HRS' bid process. HRS accepted TCC's contract to purchase from Hernando Plaza Ltd., as evidence of TCC's control of the premises offered by TCC for lease, believing it to constitute an option to purchase and the necessary evidence of control as required by the ITB. (See, Finding of Fact 6, supra.) At the time of the bid opening, HRS had no reliable information as to what entity actually owned the property offered by TCC, and TCC had not disclosed to HRS that its contract to purchase the property was with a legal entity other than the record title owner of the property, which record title owner was and is the Victor and Lillian Brown Foundation (Brown Foundation). See, infra. Up to that date, at least, Hernando Plaza Ltd. had represented itself to TCC as the owner of the property. The ITB did not require that an abstract of title be submitted with the bid, and HRS normally does not require an abstract from successful bidders, although the ITB contains provisions for future disclosure from successful bidders. (See, ITB item 5 under Requirements for Bidders to Submit Bids.) Absent some reason to "go behind" facial evidence of control, HRS attempts to protect itself by requiring successful bidders to put up an irrevocable letter of credit for one-half of one percent of the proposed lease rental obligation over the basic lease term as a penalty in the event a successful bidder cannot perform. (See, ITB page 4, item 10.) Hernando Plaza Ltd.'s certificate from the Florida Secretary of State expired December 31, 1981. That fact was advertised and the certificate cancelled July 16, 1982. At that time, Edward M. Strawgate was listed as a general partner and Harold Brown was listed as a limited partner of Hernando Plaza Ltd. Hernando Plaza Ltd. had been administratively dissolved for failure to file its annual report. Subsequent to the time that Intervenor submitted its bid proposal, but prior to formal hearing, Hernando Plaza Ltd. was reinstated by the Florida Secretary of State. Once reinstated, the limited partnership's ability to act related back and validated its prior actions. At all times material, the record title of the property offered by Intervenor TCC for lease to HRS was owned by "Harold Brown, Lillian Brown and Muriel Kahr as Trustees of the Victor and Lillian Brown Foundation." This title is derived from a recorded June 30, 1967 warranty deed from Hernando Plaza Ltd., which deed was admitted in evidence at formal hearing. The warranty deed was not attached to TCC's bid submittal. Neither TCC, the corporation, nor Sharon K. Lane, individually, held any authority as agent to submit a bid to HRS on behalf of the record title owner, the Brown Foundation. There is also in evidence a recorded December 18, 1985 Amendment to Lease between the Brown Foundation and City National Bank. That Amendment to Lease also was not attached to TCC's bid submittal to evidence control of the premises TCC was offering to lease to HRS. That Amendment to Lease also recites that Hernando Plaza Ltd. leased back the subject property from the Brown Foundation by a lease dated June 30, 1967. The June 30, 1967 lease was not recorded, was not part of TCC's bid submittal, and is not in evidence. The December 18, 1985 Amendment to Lease goes on to recite that Hernando Plaza Ltd. has assigned its lessee interest under the June 30, 1967 lease to City National Bank by a March 14, 1978 assignment. There is also in evidence a recorded March 14, 1978 "Assignment of Lessee's Interest in Lease from Hernando Plaza Ltd. to City National Bank." This assignment was not part of TCC's bid submittal. The December 18, 1985 Amendment to Lease goes on to further recite that the Brown Foundation has "agreed to give and grant to [Hernando Plaza Ltd.] an option to purchase the property." The remainder of the December 18, 1985 Amendment to Lease details the terms or conditions of the option to purchase granted by the Brown Foundation to Hernando Plaza. For instance, in order to exercise that option to purchase the subject property from the Brown Foundation, Hernando Plaza Ltd., among other requirements, would have to demonstrate that all the terms of the unrecorded June 30, 1967 lease are "in good standing." One may reasonably infer that "in good standing" would at a bare minimum mean that the rents under the lease are paid current at the time the option is exercised, but what the other terms of the lease might be are subject to pure conjecture. TCC's bid submittal did not include documentation that the June 30, 1967 lease was "in good standing." There is also in evidence a recorded June 7, 1989 Trustee's Deed (quitclaim deed of the trustee's interest) from City National Bank's successor bank/trustee to Hernando Plaza Ltd. The Trustee's Deed also was not attached to TCC's bid submittal. On the date of bid submittal/opening neither TCC, the corporation, nor Sharon K. Lane, individually, held any authority as agent to submit a bid on behalf of Hernando Plaza Ltd. or City National Bank's successor. At formal hearing, TCC submitted an October 24, 1991 written hearsay statement by Harold Brown as Trustee of the Brown Foundation to the effect that Hernando Plaza Ltd.'s December 18, 1985 option to purchase the property from the Brown Foundation was "in full force and effect" and that the June 30, 1967 lease back from the Brown Foundation to Hernando Plaza Ltd. was "in full force and effect and that the lessee is in good standing thereunder." Assuming these items may be considered in this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.58 (1) F.S. as supplementing or explaining direct evidence, they still do not clarify in any way what all the terms of the unrecorded 1967 lease are or that those terms will remain in good standing on the date in the future that Hernando Plaza Ltd. elects to exercise its option, if it elects to exercise its option to purchase the property from the Brown Foundation so that Hernando Plaza Ltd. may, in turn, convey the property to TCC, pursuant to Hernando Plaza Ltd. and TCC's April 29, 1991 contract for sale and purchase. Oddly enough, there is further explanatory hearsay that on October 24, 1991, Harold Brown was a trustee of the Brown Foundation and that he also was the sole limited partner of Hernando Plaza Ltd., although TCC's contract with Hernando Plaza for sale and purchase previously indicated Harold Brown was one of two general partners. Hernando Plaza Ltd.'s option to purchase the property from the Brown Foundation must be exercised by Hernando Plaza Ltd. before Hernando Plaza Ltd. can honor its contract to purchase/sell to TCC. Since there is no record evidence that the June 30, 1967 lease from the Brown Foundation as lessor to Hernando Plaza Ltd. as lessee will be in good standing on whatever future date Hernando Plaza Ltd. attempts to exercise its option with the Brown Foundation, one may only speculate both as to when and if TCC will be able to purchase the property from Hernando Plaza Ltd. TCC has only an option to become owner of the subject property at some unspecified date conditioned upon Hernando Plaza Ltd.'s first successfully exercising its option from the Brown Foundation and further conditioned upon all the terms of TCC's contract with Hernando Plaza Ltd. Apparently, TCC's only recourse to enforce its contract with Hernando Plaza Ltd. is a Circuit Court action for specific performance. TCC also submitted a site plan and floor plan with its bid submittal. The ITB required that offices on outside walls must provide windows. TCC's plans did not reflect windows in two sides of the building, but given HRS' retaining the right to partially design and locate its own halls and offices during the building's renovation, TCC's failure to show windows in the two outside walls is not, in and of itself, a material, disqualifying deviation from the ITB so as to unilaterally render TCC's bid nonresponsive. HRS staff member Donald J. Cerlanek prepared a bid synopsis of each bid. This involved completing a form from the HRS leasing manual which illustrates the characteristics of each of the bids. The bid requirements included evaluation criteria and a maximum amount of points which could be awarded for each criteria item. Five HRS bid evaluation committee members executed no conflict of interest forms. These were: Thomas C. Little Jr., David Thomley, Sylvia Smoot, Harvey Whitesides, and Mary Hawks. All committee members were given copies of the bid synopsis form to use in evaluating the properties submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor. Some of the committee members did not obtain or review the actual bid submissions of each of the bidders, but all of them had access to the bid submissions and read the bid synopsis forms for both Petitioner's and Intervenor's bid submittals. The bid evaluation committee members, except for Mary Hawks, made site visits to the properties submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor. Ms. Hawks essentially acted only as a facilitator or conduit for the evaluations of the other four evaluators as set out infra. The four site evaluators took notes regarding each location. The four site evaluators each assigned numerical weights to each item of evaluation criteria except for the rent and renewal rent portions of the evaluation criteria. Although on their site visits some committee members visiting TCC's site may have seen a color version of an artist's rendering of what TCC's project could look like after renovation was complete, a black and white version of the same artist's rendering was attached to TCC's bid submittal to which all committee members had access, and it is found that this situation in and of itself presented no false or misleading information nor constituted any prejudice to a fair bid process/evaluation. Likewise, although some evaluators discussed expansion prospects with TCC's and/or Proctor's on-site representatives, the evidence is credible and persuasive that each evaluator who visited the sites assessed the projects' respective expansion prospects substantially upon what they saw on each site and had experienced in Proctor's existing facility. The points awarded and reasons for the recommendations of each evaluator who visited the sites were reasonably based on specific needs of HRS. These specific needs of HRS were reasonably articulated by the two evaluators who made on-site inspections and who also testified at formal hearing and were reasonably set out in writing in the written notes of the two other evaluators who did not testify. Thomas C. Little, Jr., testified that he found the Intervenor's property superior as a result of the security problems at Petitioner's locations, the closer proximity of the courthouse, hospital, and health department to Intervenor's property and the superiority of a single building offered by Intervenor versus multiple buildings offered by Petitioner. Additionally, he found the esthetics of Petitioner's buildings lacking and expansion offered by Petitioner limited and was concerned that HRS would outgrow the space due to the fact that their service area is one of the most rapidly growing in Florida. His contemporaneous notes were to the same effect. Sylvia Smoot, also a member of the evaluation committee, testified that she found Intervenor's facility superior based on its proximity to the courthouse, hospitals, and other key locations, and its flexibility of design and concentration of space in one building. She further found Petitioner's location lacking as a result of the three separate buildings, its limited expansion room, and the necessity for redirecting clients between buildings, and the difficulty for elderly and handicapped clients accessing Petitioner's building. Her contemporaneous notes were to the same effect. Evaluators Whitesides and Thomley made substantially similar contemporaneous notes justifying their scoring of the two bidders. Three of the four site evaluators met as a group following the site visits and discussed the properties submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor. All four of the site evaluators made recommendations to accept the property for lease proposed by Intervenor, but they did not all confer and jointly develop a single recommendation to the facilities manager. The points assigned by each of the four site evaluators for the properties proposed by Petitioner and Intervenor were as follows: Evaluation Committee TCC Number Member's Names Proctor's Points 3's Points Thomley 75 98 Little 78 93 Whitesides 74 95 Smoot 80 91 307 377 The rent portion of the evaluation criteria was ascertained by applying present value methodology as set forth in the HRS leasing manual to the annual rents offered by the bidders. The discount factor was 8.32 percent. The present value of Proctor's bid was $1,934,038 and the present value of TCC's bid was $2,028,316. The leasing manual is considered advisory only. It advises present values be made, a determination of the difference in amounts be calculated and a comparison of the difference be made to determine a percentage. Thereafter, the percentage is applied to the maximum amount of points allocated for rent in the evaluation criteria. The lowest present value receives the maximum number of points allocated, and, thus, Proctor was awarded 35 points. TCC received 33 points, based upon the fact that its present value of rent was close to the present value submitted by Proctor. No penalty is imposed to a bidder whose rental amounts is higher than the lowest bidder. No benefit is conferred upon the lowest cost bidder over the next lowest bidder. Mary Hawks, Manager for Administrative Services, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, received each of the individual evaluation recommendations from Thomley, Little, Whitesides and Smoot. As a result of travel restrictions placed on the HRS, the four site evaluators and Ms. Hawks, who was also a fifth committee member, did not meet as a group following the site visits although three of the four site evaluators did meet collectively following the site visits. (See Finding of Fact 43-44, supra.) The committee members could have met by telephone conference call but Mary Hawks found it unnecessary to do so because there was such a clear evaluation in favor of Intervenor based on the total composite evaluation scores of 377 for Intervenor and only 307 for Petitioner, out of a total of 400 points. She assigned no points herself but approved their recommendations and forwarded a single recommendation in favor of TCC for ultimate approval by HRS management. Mary Hawks had spoken to the evaluation committee members subsequent to the evaluation and no member had expressed any reservation regarding his/her evaluation or a need to meet to discuss anything additional regarding the bid evaluation. The HRS Intent to Award to TCC subsequently issued. The evaluation process and formula for rent evaluation are not among the more commonly used methods but were reasonable and rational and fairly applied to the bids in this case. No conflict of interest in the evaluation committee members was demonstrated by Petitioner in these proceedings.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order finding that: The bid of TCC Number 3 Ltd. is nonresponsive; The bid of Derick Proctor is nonresponsive; Declining to award the bid for Lease No. 590:2306 to either bidder. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of December, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-5963BID The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Proctor's 74 PFOF: The following PFOF are accepted, except to the extent they are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found in the recommended order (RO). Unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative material has not been utilized: 1-3, sentence 1 of PFOF 4, 5-6, 9, 11-12, sentence 1 of PFOF 13, sentence 1 of PFOF 16, 17-26, sentence 1 of PFOF 29, 30-33, 35-36, sentences 1 and 4 of PFOF 38, 39-41, 44-54, 56-57, 60-61, 63. The following PFOF are rejected because they are not FOF as framed but constitute a proposed conclusion of law (PCOL) or are rejected because they constitute mere legal argument: sentences 2 and 3 of PFOF 4, sentence 2 of PFOF 16, 34, 43. The following PFOF are rejected because, as framed, they constitute mere recitation of isolated, unreconciled testimony or other record evidence or are not supported by the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. However, the subject matter is covered in the RO as proven and supported by the competent, substantial evidence in the record: 10, sentence 2 of PFOF 13, 14- 15, sentence 2 of PFOF 29, sentences 2 and 3 of PFOF 38, 55, 58. PFOF 7-8 are accepted as modified because parts are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found and other parts are mere recitations of unreconciled portions of the record and legal argument. The following PFOF are accepted in part but not utilized because parts are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found, and other parts are rejected as immaterial to the dispositive issues herein, although correctly quoted from the record: 68-73. The following PFOF are rejected as immaterial or not dispositive: 27-28, 37, 42, 59, 62, 65, 67, 74. The following PFOF are covered in preliminary material: 64, 66. HRS 21 PFOF: The following PFOF are accepted except to the extent they are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found in the RO. Material unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative has not been utilized: 1-4, 6-8, 11-12, 16-19. The following PFOF are rejected because they are not FOF as framed but constitute PCOL or are rejected because they constitute mere legal argument: 5, 9-10, 14-15, 21. The following PFOF are rejected because, as framed, they constitute mere recitation of isolated, unreconciled testimony or other record evidence or are not supported by the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. However, the subject matter is covered in the RO as proven and supported by the competent, substantial evidence in the record: 20. PFOF 13 is accepted as modified to correctly reflect the credible record evidence as a whole. TCC Number 3 75 PFOF: The following PFOF are accepted except to the extent they are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found in the RO. Material unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative has not been utilized: 1-31, 34-38, 42- 45, 47-48, 56, 58-60, 64-69, 71-75. The following PFOF are rejected because they are not FOF as framed but constitute PCOL or are rejected because they constitute mere legal argument: 32. The following PFOF are rejected because, as framed, they constitute mere recitation of isolated, unreconciled testimony or other record evidence or are not supported by the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. However, the subject matter is covered in the RO as proven and supported by the competent, substantial evidence in the record: 33, 40-41, 53-55, 57, 61-63, 70. The following PFOF are rejected as immaterial or as not dispositive: 39, 46, 49, 51-52. PFOF 50 is not a sentence, but the subject matter is covered in the RO as understood. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas V. Infantino, Esquire Infantino & Berman Post Office Drawer 30 Winter Park, FL 32790 Ralph McMurphy, Esquire HRS District 3 Legal Office 1000 Northeast 16th Avenue Gainesville, FL 32609 B. Gray Gibbs, Esquire Sam Power, Clerk Bette B. Lehmberg, Esquire Department of Health and Suite 800 Rehabilitative Services One 4th Street North 1323 Winewood Boulevard St. Petersburg, FL 33701 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Asphalt Pavers, Inc., was one of several bidders on DOT Project No. 09010-3518, a federal aid highway project in Highlands County, Florida. The bid specifications include a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) goal of 10%. The bid packet provided to the bidders by FDOT includes a "Utilization Affirmative Action Certification", to be signed by the bidder, with a prominently displayed notice that DBE utilization forms reflecting full compliance with the contract goal must accompany the bid, or documentation must be included to demonstrate good faith efforts to meet the goals. The notice further states that failure to submit these items will be just cause to consider the bid nonresponsive. (Pet. Ex. #1) Section 2-5.3.2 of the Special Provisions of the bid specifications lists the forms to be attached to the bid submission, which forms include a utilization summary and DBE utilization forms. (Pet. Ex. #1, p. 138) Asphalt Pavers, Inc., submitted the lowest bid, at $2,402,747.90. The next lowest bidder was Weekley Asphalt Paving, at $2,406,484.55. The bids for this project, and several others, were opened on January 23, 1991, in the FDOT auditorium in Tallahassee, Florida. The occasion was unusual as Governor Chiles attended and read one of the bids. The staff was excited to have the Governor show up and express some interest in the transportation industry. Although bids were not accepted after the posted deadline, the opening was delayed about a half hour, or until 11:00 a.m., to allow the Governor to arrive. All other routine procedures were followed. These are the routine procedures: At the deadline, bids are collected from the contract management office of DOT and from the mailroom and are carried to the auditorium, where they are stacked on a table. As they are opened, the envelope is checked for loose papers. If any are found, they are placed inside the bid packet. The empty envelopes are placed in a separate pile. The two DOT employees opening bids then check to see if bid bonds are included in the packets. Another crew starts checking the packets to see if the bidders have acknowledged receipt of addenda (revisions in the specifications that are sent out after the project is advertised). If the acknowledgment form is not included, the bidder is contacted at the bid opening, if a representative is present, or later, if necessary, to see if the addenda were received. When the bids have been checked for bonds and acknowledgment forms, they are moved to the front of the auditorium, where they are stacked again. The bid amount from the face of each packet is read aloud, and the packets are placed in boxes. The bids are then wheeled on a cart to the Contracts Administration office. The auditorium area is checked for debris or loose papers. The bids are stacked again in the Contracts Administration office along a counter, and an employee is posted to watch them until staff from the Minority Programs Office comes down to check for DBE compliance. In this case, Howard Knight, an operations and management consultant with the Minority Programs Office, and his supervisor, arrived around 1:30 p.m. on the day of the letting. They commenced checking the bids to see if the DBE's were certified, to see if the summary DBE sheet and DBE utilization forms were attached, and to see if the total amount of the DBE subcontracts met the established goal. The first packet that Howard Knight checked was Asphalt Pavers'. He found the summary form listing four DBE subcontracts and the amounts for each; and he found three utilization forms conforming to three of the DBE subcontractors. The fourth form referenced on the summary sheet, for H.S. Thompson, was missing. Knight told his supervisor, who told him to check again. He checked the packet page by page and passed it to the supervisor, who did the same thing. When neither found the form, Knight computed the DBE total without H.S. Thompson's subcontract amount, resulting in a DBE participation rate of less than 10%. At the hearing Mr. Knight could not state what information is provided on the utilization form that is not also on the summary. In fact, the summary lists the name of each DBE subcontractor and the dollar amount for each, with a space for total and a space to indicate how many DBE utilization forms are attached. The separate utilization forms (one for each DBE subcontractor) provide the name and address of the DBE, a brief description of the work to be done, and the amount to be paid. The form includes a signature space for the prime and for the subcontractor, although the subcontractor is not required to sign. The summary form and the separate utilization forms are found as the last pages in the bid packet. In this case Asphalt Pavers' bid is comprised of 133 sheets (not including the H.S. Thompson form) stapled together in a packet approximately 3/4 inches thick. Asphalt Pavers' bid was reviewed by the Minority Programs Office and DOT's Good Faith Efforts Review Committee who found that no documentation was included as to good faith effort to achieve the DBE goal, since the bidder believed that he had met the goal. The bid was thus determined to be nonresponsive, and notice to award to the next lowest bidder, Weekley Asphalt Paving, was posted on March 4, 1991. Asphalt Pavers, Inc., proposal was prepared by Jennings Clay Dumas, an employee of Asphalt Pavers, Inc., who has been preparing bid proposals for work let by FDOT since 1953. In the last two years Dumas has prepared at least 20 bids for his company for FDOT projects, about one per month. Dumas prepared the bid in issue using the original packet received from FDOT. Only one blank utilization form was provided in the packet, but Asphalt Pavers had four separate DBE subcontractors, so three additional pages had to be added. Dumas accomplished this by folding back the staples, punching the additional forms into the back of the proposal, and folding the staples in place. H.S. Thompson is an approved DBE subcontractor who provided a quote of $27,650.00 to Asphalt Pavers and to another bidder in this letting. Jennings Clay Dumas completed the DBE summary form listing the four subcontractors, including H.S. Thompson, and completed four utilization forms, including the one for H.S. Thompson which was affixed as the last sheet in the packet. The packet was inserted into the envelope by Mr. Dumas, and was carried by him to the letting on January 23, 1991, where he sealed it and handed it to the FDOT representative. The total amount of DBE participation in Asphalt Pavers' bid was $240,519.70, including H.S. Thompson's subcontract. This meets the 10% DBE goal. It is virtually impossible to determine what happened to the H.S. Thompson utilization form in the Asphalt Pavers bid packet. Jennings Clay Dumas' testimony that it was included in the packet when he placed it in the envelope is credible. So also is the testimony of the various FDOT employees regarding their careful procedures to avoid loss of documents. Nonetheless, while several FDOT employees handled the bids, opened, stacked and checked them, not one who testified could specifically remember opening the Asphalt Pavers' bid; and it was not until the packets were moved at least twice that the DBE forms were checked and the H.S. Thompson form was not found. It is significant to note that at the hearing other pieces of the original Asphalt Pavers' bid packet were falling out of the staple. The H.S. Thompson form was lost, and it is more likely this occurred after the packet was opened by FDOT than before it was sealed in the envelope by Jennings Clay Dumas. At the same letting, but for a different project, another bid was rejected for failure to include a DBE utilization form. That bidder, Overstreet Paving Company, also contends that the form was submitted with its packet, and its separate bid protest is the subject of DOAH Case #91-2123BID. At the Contracts Administration Office, where the bid packets are set out for review by the Minority Programs Office staff, Overstreet's packet was stacked next to Asphalt Pavings' packet. These two cases are the only incidents of lost forms in the experience of FDOT's witnesses. For the subsequent February 1991 letting, FDOT determined that certain DBE information could be submitted within two days of the bid letting, rather than with the bid proposal. Only documentation that the DBE goal is met, that certified DBE's would be used and the amount of participation by each had to be included with the proposal. This is reflected in a memo dated February 20, 1991, to Juanita Moore, Manager, Minority Programs Office, from Tereasa Stewart, Director of Administration. (Pet. Ex. #2) Later, FDOT amended its DBE Rule 14-78.003(2)(b), F.A.C. to modify the requirement that all DBE documentation had to be included at bid opening.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Department of Transportation enter its final order GRANTING the protest of Petitioner and awarding the bid in project #09010-3518 to Asphalt Pavers, Inc. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 10th day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of May, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1. Adopted in paragraph 4. 2. Adopted in paragraph 3. 3. Adopted in paragraph 4. 4.- 5. Adopted in paragraph 10. 6.- 8. Adopted in paragraph 11. 9.-11. Adopted in paragraph 12. 12. Adopted in paragraph 13. 13. Adopted in paragraph 11. 14.-15. Adopted in paragraph 12. 16. Adopted in paragraph 14. (same finding as paragraph 2, above) Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 16. Adopted in summary form in paragraph 16. 21.-22. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 15. Adopted in paragraph 6 and 7. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 8. Adopted in substance in paragraph 14. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 5. Respondent's Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraphs 1 and 2. Adopted in summary in paragraph 2. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in part (as to lowest bid) in paragraph 3, otherwise rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence (as to the 10% goal requirement). 5.- 8. Adopted in summary in paragraphs 4 and 5. 9.-11. Adopted in paragraphs 7 and 8. 12.-13. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in paragraph 4. The "normal routine" was at least disturbed by the delay in the reading of the bids and by the excitement generated by the Governor's presence. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben G. Watts, Secretary Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58 Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Dept. of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 W. Crit Smith, Esquire Smith & Thompson, P.A. 1530 Metropolitan Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32308 Susan P. Stephens, Esquire Mark Hankins, Esquire Dept. of Transportation 605 Suwannee St., M.S. 58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
The Issue The issues to be considered in the course of this Recommended Order concern the question of whether Baxter's Asphalt & Concrete, Inc. or White Construction Company, Inc. should be accepted as a successful bidder on State Project No. 53050-3514, Jackson County, Florida, as advertised by the State of Florida, Department of Transportation.
Findings Of Fact The State of Florida, Department of Transportation, (DOT), advertised for bids on State Project No. 53050-3514, Jackson County, Florida. This was a project in which DOT had determined that 10 percent of the funding within the State Department of Transportation Trust Fund, as allotted for the project, would be devoted to economically disadvantaged individuals, also referred to as Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (DBE). This decision was in keeping with Section 339.081, Florida Statutes. Consequently, interested bidders were called upon to submit bids reflecting a DBE participation of a minimum of 10 percent of the bid submitted. Baxter's Asphalt & Concrete, Inc. (Baxter) and White Construction Company, Inc. (White) responded to the bid opportunity. The bids were opened on July 25, 1984, and Baxter's bid was the apparent low bid. The bid amount was $882,641.25. White was the second low bidder offering a bid of $928,353. Both bids were within the DOT estimate of construction costs. When the bids were reviewed, Baxter's bid was rejected by DOT based upon the belief that the bid failed to meet the DBE 10 percent requirement or to offer explanation of good faith attempts by Baxter to comply with the DBE contract requirement amount. See Section 14-78.03(2)(b)4., Florida Administrative Code. No other claim of error was made by DOT on the subject of the acceptability of the Baxter bid. The White bid is conforming. In preparing the bid, bidders are required to use DBE Utilization Form No. 1 to reflect the amount of DBE participation as a percentage of the overall bid estimate. In submitting its form as part of its bid blank, Baxter indicated that the total project cost was $884,000, and indicated that Ozark Striping, a DBE subcontractor, would be given $20,000 of that work or 3 percent, and that Glenn Powell, DBE subcontractor, would be afforded 7 percent of the total contract in the amount of $55,000. The total percentage according to Baxter is 10 percent, thus meeting the required DBE participation. This form is found as part of the joint Exhibit No. 1 offered by the parties. In fact, the Ozark Striping participation was 2.26 percent, and the Glenn Powell participation was 6.22 percent, for a total of 8.48 percent of the estimate reflected in the Form No. 1. Contrasted against the actual estimate of $882,641.25, these projections constitute 8.49 percent of that estimate. Thus, they are less than the 10 percent required. Given the fact that this DBE projection is less than the 10 percent, and in the absence of any attempt to offer a good faith explanation why Baxter failed to comply with the requirement, the bid was rejected for this irregularity. The Contract Awards Committee of DOT, when confronted with the irregularity of the Baxter bid, then determined to recommend the rejection of all bids. This was in keeping with the fact that the difference between the unsuccessful apparent low bid, with irregularities, and the second low bid exceeded 1 percent of the contract amount. At the time of this decision to reject all bids, DOT felt that the difference would justify re-advertising the bids. That policy position had been abandoned at the point of final hearing in this cause, wherein DOT expressed the opinion that it would be better served to accept the bid of White, and not re-advertise, again for cost reasons. In the face of the initial action to reject all bids and in accordance with Section 120.53, Florida Statutes, Baxter and White appealed that decision and by that appeal requested recognition as a successful bidder. This led to the present Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes hearing. Baxter has never attempted to offer a good faith explanation of its non-compliance. It chooses to proceed on the theory that the mistake in computation can be rectified by allowing Baxter to submit a supplemental Form No. 1, bringing its total above the DBE requirement. In its contention, Baxter indicates that Glenn Powell could have provided $126,000 of the DBE goal, which is in excess of the 10 percent requirement. Baxter also alludes to the fact that it had contacted other DBE enterprises, such as Oglesby and Hogg, Michael Grassing, and J.E. Hill. All told, Baxter indicates that if given the opportunity, it would allow $146,000 of DBE participation to include $126,000 by Glenn Powell, and $20,000 by Ozark. This comment is suspect, given the lack of compliance in the initial bid response, and the realization that within that bid response on the item related to Glenn Powell, the original amount of work attributed to Glenn Powell was $100,000, and was struck through in favor of the $55,000, leaving a fair inference that Baxter was attempting to meet the DBE goal with a projection as close to the 10 percent as could be achieved. They fell short because in adding the $20,000 for Ozark, and the $55,000 for Glenn Powell, the addition in the Form No. 1 showed $85,000, which is more than 10 percent of the $884,000 shown on the form, when in fact the two amounts were $75,000, and less than the 10 percent required. Baxter characterizes its mistake in computation as a technical error, which can be remedied without harm to the bid process. The Baxter position must be examined in the context of action by DOT relating to compliance with DBE requirements. Prior to June 1984, a time before the subject July 25, 1984 bid opening, bidders had been allowed to amend the Form No. 1 to show compliance with the DBE requirements or demonstrate good faith efforts of compliance. That amendment as to compliance through listing of the DBE subcontractors or submission of good faith effort documentation had to be offered within 10 days per former Section 14-78.03, Florida Administrative Code. Beginning with the June 1984 bid-lettings, all documentation had to be submitted with the bid, reflecting compliance or describing good faith efforts at compliance per Section 14-78.03(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code, effective May 1984. This change was brought about to prevent the apparent low bidder, as indicated at the point of bid-letting, from shopping the quotations by the DBE's found in its original quote against other quotes from DBE's not listed in the bid documents initially submitted, and by amendment to the DBE statement prejudicing the former DBE group. The change was also made to avoid the possibility that the apparent low bidder could evade his bid by rendering it non-conforming, in the sense of refusing to submit the required documentation of compliance with DBE requirements or to the offer of a good faith explanation of non-compliance after the bid-letting. The change of May 1984, removed the possibility of bid shopping and bid avoidance. Both versions of Section 14-78.03, Florida Administrative Code, pre and post May 1984, indicate that failure to satisfy the DBE requirements or offer a showing of a good faith attempt at compliance, would result in the contractor's bid being deemed non-responsive, and cause its rejection. Baxter has been able to comply with the DBE goals of DOT in its bidding prior to the present controversy.
Findings Of Fact Prior to June, 1988, HRS determined that it needed 32,000 square feet of office space to house some of its indigent social services for southern Escambia County. Since the desired office space is greater than 2,000 square feet HRS was required to competitively bid lease number 590:1984. Towards that end, Respondent prepared an Invitation to Bid and a bid submittal package. The package contained various bid specifications, bid evaluation criteria and the numerical weight assigned to each of those criteria. Specific areas of importance to Respondent in the selection of its office space were: client safety one building to house all its units employee morale moving costs traffic flow within the building public access Many of the above areas were important to HRS since the agency would render indigent services to approximately 17,000 people a month, many of whom are handicapped or lack good mobility due to age or infirmity. Employee morale was important because of high employee burn out due to rendering aid to so many people who have so little and supplying a pleasant environment conducive to the work of the employees. Moving costs were important should HRS be required to find other space to operate in while necessary remodeling took place in the selected building, or be required to incur the expense of moving to a new building. 1/ All of the above areas were covered by one of Respondent's weighted bid evaluation criteria. The District Administrator of HRS, Chelene Schembera, is ultimately responsible for bidding, selection and leasing of all HRS facilities within District I, including Escambia County, Florida. In order to accomplish this task, Ms. Schembera appointed a bid evaluation committee to review and grade the responsive bids under the criteria established in the bid package, and to recommend to her the committee's choice of the lowest and best bid. Ms. Schembera's purpose in establishing the bid evaluation committee was to secure a cross section of input from people who had a variety of backgrounds and knowledge that would be material in evaluating the office space under the uses for which it was intended and the relative public worth of the work space. Ms. Schembera appointed individual who were familiar with the type of work to be done in the proposed space, as well as a persons familiar with the bid process. Ms. Schembera assigned to serve on the committee Charles Bates, Deputy District Administrator; Jim Peters, to provide a fiscal and overall administrative perspective as well as bid expertise; two citizens from the District Advisory Council to assure objectivity and to look at the properties from the perspective of a private citizen; Mamun Rashied, a program manager; Darlene McFarland, a program manager; Cherie Neal, a unit supervisor and program worker; and Stacey Cassidy, a clerical employee. Ms. Schembera did not personally know Cherie Neal or Stacey Cassidy. These staff members were designated by the supervisors upon Ms. Schembera's direction that she wanted persons who were both intelligent and respected by their peers. One private citizen member of the committee did not participate. The committee as constituted showed a great deal of thought on Ms. Schembera's part to ensure the objectivity of the bid process she was engaging in and to ensure the maximum amount of input from persons who had experience relevant to the overall review of the proposed real estate and to the decision they were being asked to make. The selection of the bid evaluation committee members was neither an arbitrary nor capricious act on Ms. Schembera's part. In fact, the evidence demonstrated the merit in constituting the committee as she did for the input she sought. The bid evaluation committee members, minus Mr. Bates, were briefed on their duties by Joe Pastucha, Facilities Services Manager. Mr. Pastucha is part of the staff responsible for the bid process at HRS. He provided these committee members with the weighted bid evaluation criteria found at page 15 in the bid package. He also gave the committee members a copy of Chapter 5 of the HRS manual containing guidelines for the bid process. His verbal instructions on specific procedures to follow in the evaluation process were limited since he did not wish to improperly influence the committee members. On July 20, 1988, HRS received three bids responding to its invitation to bid on Lease Number 590:1984. Bid A was submitted by Phillips and Company, the apparent second lowest bidder and Intervenor in this case. Its property consisted of one multi-story building located at 1740 North Palafox Street, Pensacola, Florida. Bid B was not responsive and therefore was not considered by HRS and is not a part of this litigation. Bid C was submitted by Petitioner Carmon S. Boone, and was the apparent low bid. Mr. Boone's property consisted of two buildings located at 401 and 411 North Baylen Street, Pensacola, Florida. The Boone property is the present location of Respondent's offices. Both Bid A and Bid C were within the mandatory geographical area designated in the bid package. Once the bids were received the bid evaluation committee began its work. The committee members, minus Mr. Bates, visited the Phillips property. However, the members did not visit the Boone property. There was no need. Four of the members currently worked at the Boone property and the other members had previously visited the Boone property on various other occasions. Mr. Bates was likewise already familiar with both properties. All members were sufficiently familiar with the cogent aspects of each property to allow them to make a rational decision. The bid evaluation committee, minus Mr. Bates, met as a group to evaluate each property in accordance with the weighted bid evaluation criteria. Each individual scored their sheets separately and the general consensus was supportive of recommending the Phillips property. Five committee members scored Mr. Phillips' property higher than the Boone property. The one exception was Mr. Peters who felt that HRS could not support a bid awarded for other than monetary reasons, i.e., he felt the lowest bid had to be accepted. Mr. Bates later reviewed all the bid synopsis sheets of the committee members and discussed the bid award with Mr. Peters and Mr. Pastucha. Mr. Bates felt that the Phillips property was the lowest and best bid. At about the same time, the staff responsible for providing technical assistance to the committee and the District Administrator were made aware that the general consensus of the committee was leaning towards the second lowest bidder, Phillips and Company, as the lowest and best bid. The staff members, one of whom was a bid committee member, disagreed with the award of the bid to Phillips and Company because the Boone property was the lower bid. The staff members sought to head off the committee's intended recommendation. The staff personnel held a meeting with some of the committee members in order to get them to join in a recommendation to Ms. Schembera of the Boone property. Mr. Boone was invited and attended the meeting. He was allowed to improperly bolster his bid by agreeing to convert the two buildings to one and other lesser additions. /2 The potential decision was discussed, but no committee member changed his or her mind. However, through a total lack of communication, a run away staff somehow rationalized themselves into a position of being authorized to submit a letter for Ms. Schembera's signature which awarded the Boone property the lease. Ms. Schembera became aware of her staff's attempt to subvert the bid process she had established. She refused to sign the letter submitted by the staff. She removed the staff member of the committee as a voting member. The staff member had supported the Boone property. She also removed a committee member who supported the Phillips property as a voting member. Ms. Schembera feared that her staff had improperly influenced this member to such an extent that his objectivity had been affected. Both members could still participate in committee discussions. Ms. Schembera thereby reasonably ensured the ongoing objectivity of the bid evaluation committee. The committee was reconvened, minus one member. It recommended the Phillips and Company property. Every reason given by the individual committee members for distinguishing and preferring one bid over another were rational and reasonable considerations and were covered by the bid evaluation criteria. Each individual member gave a rational and reasonable basis for the scoring he or she used on the bid synopsis score sheets. The scoring was done by each member after discussion of the two buildings and without influence from the other committee members. In essence, the committee felt that the Phillips property was the better property for the money. The Phillips property allowed working units to be located in one area with each such unit having its own access. It provided flat safe parking areas and sidewalks, bigger and more elevators, wide halls and windows which presented a bright, happy and pleasant working environment. The Boone property was in two buildings which could not accommodate co-located working units with their own access no matter how much remodeling took place. Parking and sidewalks are on a hill which is slippery when wet. It had one small elevator and narrow halls which did not adequately accommodate more than one wheel chair, and one ground floor where no windows could ever be remodeled into the building leaving a dark, dingy and unpleasant environment. Importantly, every committee member except for the staff member came to the conclusion that the Phillips and Company property was the lowest and best bid. There is no statutory or rule requirement that one scoring method be preferred over another. The only requirement is that the method be rational and reasonable especially where highly subjective, but legitimate criteria are involved in the selection of a particular piece of property. On these facts, the individual scoring methods used by the individual committee members were not arbitrary and capricious, but were very rational and reasonably related to the relative importance the committee members gave the above factors. After reviewing and considering information from the bid evaluation committee, the information on the bid synopsis sheet, and the oral recommendations of Mr. Bates, Mr. Peters and Mr. Pastucha, Ms. Schembera concluded that the Phillips property was vastly better, even considering costs. She found it to be materially superior in terms of construction, organization, client accessibility, handicap accessibility, repairability (in terms of walls), and maneuverability for clients and staff. She felt the Phillips' building's qualities would offer more "humanity" to the process of serving the Department's clients. Additional facts she considered when making her decision included the morale of the staff and their productivity; the ability of staff and clients to conduct their business in a reasonably pleasant, comfortable, safe, and easy to understand and comprehend environment; and the desire to provide a minimally adequate work space. In addition to other monetary costs, she considered energy costs and life cycle costs as reflected on the bid synopsis sheet. The bid synopsis sheet defined minimal energy and life cycle costs to be anything less than 55 BTU's per square feet per year. In this case, the Boone property reflected 39.5 BTU's per square feet and the Phillips property reflected 53.5 BTU's per square feet. Both properties were under the 55 BTU cutoff established by HRS. Translated into monetary figures (life cycle costs) the Boone property reflected a cost of $26,735.00 and the Phillips property reflected a cost of $41,160.00. It was the difference between the energy figures which caught Ms. Schembera's eye. In her layman's opinion, it was incomprehensible that the two buildings would have such a wide divergence of energy costs. /3 She learned from her staff that the information used to compute these costs was supplied by the bidders who had vested interests in the outcome. Ms. Schembera concluded the cost difference was minimal and not of overriding concern in relation to the physical characteristics of the two buildings and how they compared to each other. She quite correctly felt the two buildings were not comparable. In essence, the two buildings' differences in design location and construction rendered neither building comparable to the other building as a like facility under Section 255.254, Florida Statutes. 4/ Based on that information she gave the energy figures relatively little weight. More importantly, however, before the final bid award was made by HRS, the Division of General Services within HRS in its failsafe role in reviewing bids considered the life cycle cost figures of the two bids. The minimal language of Section 255.254, Florida Statutes, has been interpreted by HRS to mean that anything under 55 BTU's is minimal and except in one instance not applicable here, numerical differences under 55 BTU's are immaterial. The Division, without getting into the issue of the likeness of the facilities, concluded that both bids met the Department's interpretation of the "minimal" language of Section 255.254, Florida Statutes, and the relative numerical difference in the energy costs was immaterial. Ms. Schembera is entitled to rely on other more expert HRS Division staff to ensure a proper analysis of highly technical bid specifications such as the energy cost analysis required under Section 255.254, Florida Statutes. It does not matter that the review took place after Ms. Schembera had made her preliminary decision. What is important is that the review be made either personal or vicariously through staff before the final award is made. A proper review of energy costs was, therefore, made by Respondent before the final award was made. Likewise, Ms. Schembera's ultimate decision that the buildings were not comparable like facilities was a proper review of energy costs even though that conclusion was arrived at through a layman's unsophisticated, but more accurate intuition and common sense. To that extent, the energy cost data had no impact on the ultimate choice made by the District Administrator and were properly considered by the District Administrator. 5/ A letter for Ms. Schembera's signature adopting the committee's recommendation was drafted by Mr. Pastucha. The letter was signed and sent to the Department's Division of General Services for review. The District was requested to provide additional justification for its choice by the Department's Division of General Services. Mr. Rashied was directed to draft the response. He simply reorganized the original memorandum into a format more compatible with the Division's direction, clarified a few points and without significantly changing the content, submitted the response as directed. The Division acquiesced in Ms. Schembera's decision.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order dismissing Case NO. 88-4900BID, and awarding lease number 590:1984 to Phillips and Company as the lowest and best bidder. DONE and ORDERED this 5th day of January, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 1988.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, E. J. Strickland Construction, Inc. (Petitioner), submitted to Respondent, Department of Transportation (Department), a bid on State Project No. 75030- 3518. Petitioner's was the lowest bid received by the Department. Petitioner's bid failed to meet the D.B.E. goals on State Project No. 75030-3518. The D.B.E. goal was 12 percent; under Petitioner's bid, only .04 percent of the contract would be performed by economically disadvantaged business enterprises. The only effort Petitioner made to secure bids of certified D.B.E. contractors to incorporate in its bid to the Department was to run a legal advertisement in the Orlando Sentinel on January 18, 19 and 20, 1986. The Department was scheduled to open all bids on January 22, 1986. Petitioner documented only the advertisements and the fact that it incorporated the only response to the advertisements in its bid in an effort to demonstrate good faith effort to meet the D.B.E. goals. 2/ There is no evidence that Petitioner acted with specific discriminatory intent in preparing its bid on State Project No. 75030-3518. Petitioner proved that it acted in this case precisely as it acted in the only other Department job on which it bid. In that case, Petitioner ordered from the Department plans and specifications and was sent plans, specifications and a bid package and was placed on the Department's list of prospective bidders. In accordance with the custom in the industry, the Florida Transportation Builders Association (FTBA) obtained from the Department the list of prospective bidders as of ten days before the bid letting date and distributed the list to its members. In accordance with the custom in the industry, several DBE and WBE contractors contacted Petitioner, verified that Petitioner was bidding on the project and submitted proposals for inclusion in Petitioner's bid. In that way, Petitioner received enough response from certified DBE and WBE contractors to meet the DBE and WBE goals on the job. In this case, in accordance with the Department's normal practice, the Department only sent Petitioner plans and specifications in response to Petitioner's December 30, 1985 request for plans and specifications. Also, since Petitioner did not specifically request a bid package, the Department did not include Petitioner on its list of prospective bidders. For that reason, no FTBA members, including the certified DBE contractor who bid on Petitioner's previous job with the Department, received notice that Petitioner was a prospective bidder on State Project No. 75030-3518. Had Petitioner been included on the FTBA list, Petitioner probably would have received enough response from certified DBE contractors to meet the DBE goals on this job, too. All four of the other bidders on State Project No. 75030-3518 met the DBE goals. One of them relied entirely on the FTBA list to notify prospective certified DBE contractors. One of them -- including the next lowest bidder, Cone Constructors, Inc. -- also sent a written request for a proposal to Pary, Inc., the same certified DBE contractor who previously had contracted with Petitioner on a Department job that was still ongoing. Another of the bidders on State Project No. 75030-3518 telephoned Pary, Inc., and asked for a proposal. Petitioner is not a member of the FTBA and did not inquire whether it was listed as a prospective bidder on the FTBA list. Petitioner did not make any effort to use the Department's DBE directory to directly contact certified DBE contractors concerning the job. Petitioner did not even contact Pary, Inc., to request a bid although Pary, Inc., was working for Petitioner at the time and had not responded to Petitioner concerning State Project No. 75030-3518. Petitioner's small effort to meet the DBE goals on State Project No. 75030-3518 did not rise to the level of good faith efforts. The evidence that Petitioner acted in this case precisely as it acted in the only other Department job on which it bid does not prove that Petitioner made a good faith effort in this case. To the contrary, it proved only that Petitioner was lucky to meet the DBE goals on the prior contract.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Transportation, dismiss the bid protest of Petitioner, E. J. Strickland Construction, Inc., and award the contract in State Project No. 75030-3518 to the lowest responsive bidder, Cone Constructors, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of April, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 1986.
The Issue The issues to be considered here are those associated with the appropriate disposition of RFP-DOT-88-01 (the RFP), related to proposals received from Planning Research Corporation (PRC), AGS Information Services, Inc., (AGS), and which originally involved the proposal by Cubic Western Data, Inc., (Cubic).
Findings Of Fact THE RFP In October 1988 DOT put out a RFP requesting responses from 52 potential offerors. This solicitation garnered responses from three offerors, PRC, AGS, and Cubic. Those responses were received in March 1989. As described in the RFP, DOT desires to acquire a new barrier and ticket toll collection system which would automate the toll collection operations and retrieval of toll audit data, having in mind increased reliability and performance. This project is principally one which envisions the purchase of commodities. It also has associated service requirements. Those service items are principally involved with training and maintenance. This purchase would update technology in the existing toll system which is basically 1950's technology. The existing equipment presents maintenance problems and accounting problems. Those accounting problems are associated with an inaccurate portrayal of the monies collected and the monies that were not collected. The latter item is significant as it relates to the opportunity for potential theft of toll revenue by employees. In addition, there are problems with traffic counts. There are problems with report processing time for management and revenue reports. In the southern end of the turnpike there is the specific problem wherein the DOT is converting from a ticket type system to a coin operated system, and until the barrier type or coin collection equipment contemplated under the RFP is installed, the DOT will be manning those toll collection lanes that are designed for automatic or machine operation. Those lanes are manned by OPS personnel. A copy of the basic RFP may be found as PRC Exhibit 3 admitted into evidence. It does not contain addenda. Within the RFP is found a form which is entitled "State of Florida Request for Proposal Commodities Acknowledgment Form." Under General Conditions, at paragraph 5, it directs the offerors to submit any questions concerning the provisions and specifications in writing to DOT for receipt at a time no later than ten days prior to the proposed opening. It cautions the offerors that if they dispute the reasonableness, necessity, or competitiveness of the terms and conditions in the RFP or the contract award recommendation, to offer that opposition in accordance with Rule 13A-1.006, Florida Administrative Code, and within the time requirements of Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes. In that same form, paragraph 17 references the liability question and reminds the offerors that any contract resulting from this proposal is designed to hold and save the State of Florida harmless against claims by third parties that resulted based upon a contractor's breach of contract or negligence. Under Special Condition 2.04 DOT reserves the right to reject all proposals. It also speaks to the ability to waive minor irregularities which are seen as those variations from the terms and conditions of the RFP which are not price effective or advantageous to the offeror or beneficial in a way not enjoyed by other offerors or to the extent that the irregularities do not adversely impact the DOT. It reminds the offerors that departure from the RFP requirements other than minor variations cannot be waived. It further states that an offeror cannot modify its proposal after the opening. Special Condition 2.05 follows up the previous condition by stating that nonresponsive proposals will not be considered for the award. Proposals are seen as being subject to rejection in that they may be rejected if found irregular and not in conformance with the requirements and instructions set out in the RFP. Those items may be found to be irregular and nonresponsive in the instance of conditional proposals and indefinite or ambiguous proposals, among other things. Two Special Conditions which are involved with DOT's right to cancel the contract are as follows: Cancellation for Unappropriated Funds The performance by the Department of any of its obligations pursuant to this RFP is subject to and contingent upon the availability of monies lawfully appropriated for the purpose. If the Department deems at any time during the proceedings that funds are not available, the Department will notify the Proposers of such status, and all obligations of the parties, if any, shall end as cancelled by mutual consent. Cancellation for Other Causes A contract arising from this RFP may be cancelled by the Department at any time for failure of the Contractor to complete specified work in accordance with the provisions of the contract and this RFP. Cancellation for such cause shall occur immediately upon Contractor's receipt of written notification thereof from the Department to the Contractor by certified mail, return receipt request. Special Condition 2.12 identifies the terms of a general or prebid conference that calls for mandatory attendance of the offerors and indicates that the members of the Technical Review Committee will be available to respond to questions that the offerors have which relate to clarification of the details of the specifications. Affiliated with that section is Special Condition 2.13 which relates to the offerors' inquiries. It reminds those offerors to examine the RFP to determine whether the DOT requirements are clearly stated. It invites the offerors to state in writing any belief that the requirements of the RFP are restrictive to competition. If the offeror wishes to change any specification, it is required to identify that specification and describe why it is difficult to meet the specification and to give a detailed explanation of why the change is justified. The offeror in that instance also provides what is referred to as a recommended change to the specification. A suggested change must be received by the DOT no later than the date shown as the last date for inquiries and questions set out in the schedule of RFP events. Under the amended schedule of RFP events, the date for last inquiries and questions to the DOT was November 28, 1988. If an offeror failed to request the change by the deadline specified, the offeror is seen to accept the Department's specifications. The DOT is to decide which changes would be acceptable. If necessary, the DOT would issue an addendum reflecting acceptable changes to the RFP, as was done in the instances referred to before. Any changes through an addendum are sent to all offerors to make certain that the offerors are given the opportunity of making proposals that deal with a common set of specifications. Special Condition 3.04 identifies the fact that the price proposals would not be opened until after completion of the evaluation and rating of technical proposals. An offeror's price would not be considered if the technical proposal was rejected during the evaluation. Special Condition 4.01 identifies the stages of the evaluation process. The first stage examines the qualifications of all offerors. The second stage examines technical proposals. The third stage examines price proposals. The fourth stage looks at the remaining proposals in the review process and rates them to arrive at the best overall proposal. Special Condition 6.01.02 speaks to indemnification and states: The contractor shall indemnify, defend, save and hold harmless, the state, the Department and all of its officers, agents, or employees from all suits, actions, claims, demands, liabilities of any nature whatsoever arising out of, because of, or due to breach of, this Agreement by the Contractor, its subcontractors, agents or employees or due to any act or occurrence of omission or commission of the Contractor, its subcontractors, agents or employees. Neither the Contractor nor any of its subcontractors will be liable under this section for damages arising out of injury or damage to persons or property directly caused or resulting from the sole negligence of the Department or any of its officers, agents or employees. The parties agree that 1% of the total compensation [sic] to the Contractor for performance of this agreement is the specific consideration from the Department to the Contractor for the Contractor's indemnity agreement. Special Condition 6.01.03 deals with liabilities for wrongful or criminal act by the Contractor and its language is to this effect: The bond shall be subject to the additional obligation that the principal and surety executing the bond shall be liable to the State in any civil action which might be instituted by the Department or any officer of the State authorized in such cases, for double any amount in money or property the State might lose, or be overcharged, or otherwise be defrauded of by any wrongful or criminal act of the Contractor, his agent or his employees. The parties agree that 1% of the total compensation to the Contractor for performance of this agreement is the specific consideration from the Department to the Contractor for the Contractor's indemnity agreement. General Provision 5.07.02 deals with failure to remove and renew defective materials and work, and it states: Should the Contractor fail or refuse to remove and renew any defective materials used or work performed, or make necessary repairs in an acceptable manner and in accordance with the requirements of the specifications, within the time indicated in writing, the Engineer shall have the authority to cause the unacceptable or defective materials or work to be repaired, removed and renewed, as may be necessary; all at the Contractor's expense. Any expense incurred by the Department in making these repairs, removals, or renewals, which the Contractor has failed or refused to make, shall be paid for out of any monies due or which may become due the Contractor, or may be charged against the contract bond. Continued failure or refusal on the part of the Contractor to make any or all necessary repairs promptly, fully and in an acceptable manner shall be sufficient cause for the Department, at its option, to perform the work with its own organization, or to contract with any other individual, firm or corporation to perform the work. All costs and expenses incurred thereby shall be charged against the defaulting Contractor and the amount thereof deducted from any monies due or which may become due him, or shall be charged against the performance bond. Any work performed subsequent to forfeiture of the contract, as described in this section, shall not relieve the Contractor in any way of his responsibility for the work performed by him. Under General Provision 8.08 dealing with default and termination of contract, for reasons described, DOT has the right to take the contract work away from that Contractor and declare the contract in default within ten days of notice that the complained-of conditions have not been corrected. General Provision 8.09 speaks to the Department and states: Upon declaration of default the Department will have full power to appropriate or use any of all materials and equipment on the site which are suitable and acceptable, and may enter into an agreement with others for the completion of the work under the contract, or may use other methods which in the opinion of the Engineer are required for the completion of the work in an acceptable manner. All costs and charges incurred by the Department because of the Contractor's default, including the costs of completing the work under the contract, shall be charged against the Contractor. In case the expense so incurred by the Department is less than the sum which would have been payable under the contract if it had been completed by the defaulting Contractor, the defaulting Contractor shall be entitled to receive the difference. In case the expense exceeds the sum which would have been payable under the contract, then the Contractor and the surety shall be liable and shall pay the Department the amount of the excess. If after the ten calendar day notice period, and prior to any action by the Department to otherwise complete the work under the contract, the Contractor should establish his intent to prosecute the work in accordance with the Department's requirements. The Department may elect to permit the Contractor to resume the work, in which case any costs to the Department incurred by the delay, or from any reason attributable to the delay, will be deducted from any monies due or which may become due under the contract. General Provision 8.10 deals with the amount of liquidated damages and it states: Such liquidated damages shall be the amounts established in the following schedule which shall apply to each project and retainage. Daily Charge Per Original Contract Amount Calendar Day $50,000 and under ................. $ 200 over $50,000 but less than $250,000 ................... 300 $250,000 or more but less than $500,000 ........................ 400 $500,000 or more but less than $2,500,000 ...................... 550 $2,500,000 or more but less than $5,000,000 ...................... 650 $5,000,000 or more but less than $10,000,000 ..................... 750 $10,000,000 or more but less than $15,000,000 ................ 1,000 $15,000,000 or more but less than $20,000,000 ................ 1,250 $20,000,000 or over ............ 1,250 plus 0.005 percent per day for any amount over $20,000,000 Under the section in the RFP dealing with the Contract Agreement is found Section 14.00 which contains the language set out in Special Conditions 6.01.02 previously quoted. Under the Contract Agreement at Section 19.00 is found a statement of further emphasis about the ability of the DOT to proceed premised upon available funding wherein it is stated: The Department during any fiscal year, shall not expend money, incur any liability, or enter into any contract which, by its terms, involves the expenditure of money in excess of the amounts budgeted as available for expenditure during such fiscal year. Any contract, verbal or written, made in violation of this subsection shall be null and void, and no money shall be paid on such contract. The Department shall required a statement from the comptroller of the Department that funds are available prior to entering into any such contract or other binding commitment of funds. Nothing herein shall prevent the making of contracts for periods exceeding one year, but any contract so made shall be executory only for the value of the services to be rendered or agreed to be paid for in succeeding fiscal years, and shall be contingent upon an annual appropriate of the legislature. THE FIRST EVALUATION COMMITTEE: ITS DECISIONS The committee that was formed to evaluate the several responses had strong technical expertise and limited contractual or administrative experience. Its members were Debra Stemle, Deputy Director Office of Toll Operations; Richard Humphry, head of the facilities and equipment section with toll operations; Scott Love, a data processing manager in the Fort Lauderdale toll operation; Bernard Schmit, a toll technical supervisor; Herb Pressly, associated with the DOT information system and service office; and James Anderson, internal audit staff. Non-voting members included persons from the consulting groups, Post, Buckley, Shue, and Jernigan and Palmer and Associates. Woody Lawson from the DOT Office of Contractual Services served as a liaison to the evaluation committee to address contract questions should they arise. In the experience of DOT it is unusual to purchase commodities by use of an RFP. Moreover, it is unusual to have a commodities purchase in which the Purchasing Division within DOT is not involved. It was not involved on this occasion and the liaison and advisory functions concerning the purchase were through the Contractual Services Division. The evaluation committee began its work within a week of receipt of the proposals. After its first week of review it had made certain discoveries concerning the proposals that can be characterized as problem areas. Those discoveries are outlined in the memorandum prepared through the offices of Post, Buckley, Shue and Jernigan. The operative terms of that memorandum are based upon observations by the evaluation committee. A copy of that memorandum may be found as PRC Exhibit No. 4 admitted into evidence. Cubic's responsiveness was called to question for reasons outlined in the memorandum attachments. In addition, under paragraphs 21-27 attached to the memorandum, certain comments were offered about AGS and its suggestion of changes to the RFP filed with its proposal. A copy of those items that are alluded to in those paragraphs 21-27 may be found as PRC Exhibit No. 5 admitted into evidence. In the attachment to the memorandum, PRC 4, there were observations to the effect that AGS was taking exception to some of the terms of the RFP. Quoting from those paragraphs 21-27, they remarked: AGS - Special conditions Proposal Page No. FDOT TSC-1 Takes exception with RFP 2.008 Need Purchasing and Attorney's office to review. AGS - Special condition Proposal Page FDOT TSC-1 Request Addition to SEC. 2.09 AGS - Special Condition Proposal Pg FDOT TSC-1 Request changes in Section G.01.02 of RFP. [sic] AGS - Special Condition Proposal Pg. FDOT TSC-2 Request Changes in Section 6.01.03 of RFP. AGS - General Provisions Proposal Pg. FDOT TSC-2 Request Changes in Section 5.07.02 AGS - General provision Proposal pg FDOT - 2 Request changes - Section 8.08 Section 8.09 Section 8.10 Refer to Purchasing and Attorney AGS - Proposal Pg FDOT TSC-3 Request Contract Agreement Sec. 22.00 Sec. 14.00 Sec. 19.00 Go to cubic western data Vol 1 CWD Qualification Statement These relate back to sections within RFP already described. As can be seen the evaluation committee was persuaded that it needed the assistance of the Purchasing Division and attorneys within DOT to examine the problems with the AGS suggestions. This is somewhat misleading, because assistance was provided from contractual services, not purchasing. It also felt the need for consultation concerning the responsiveness of Cubic. Ms. Stemle's testimony describes the evaluation committee's reaction to the Cubic and AGS proposals as an attempt by Cubic to change the documentation of the DOT and for AGS to propose a language change to the contract document. In its effort to have the matters examined the evaluation committee contacted Woody Lawson and asked if the evaluation committee should have any real concern about Cubic and AGS. Lawson advised that the evaluation committee should move forward to examine the technical proposals of the three offerors and that the problems that had been seen in the responses might not in their own right constitute a matter of concern. The observation by Ms. Stemle was that this meant, if the proposals in their terms complied in all respects with the RFP, that DOT would be contracting with an offeror for what the RFP called for. This specifically refers to compliance with the technical aspects of the RFP. In essence, the method contemplated by Mr. Lawson's advice to the evaluation committee was one in which the issue of overall responsiveness in view of the problem language in the Cubic and AGS responses related to administrative or contractual requirements was set aside until the technical proposals could be examined. That examination revealed that the technical proposal by Cubic related back to the problems of changes to the contract format and caused the evaluation committee great concern about the responsiveness of Cubic. The technical aspects of AGS were not found to present sufficient problems, in the mind of the evaluation committee, to cause a re-examination of the contract or administrative issues that were addressed in the memorandum attachments within PRC No. 4 as they describe the suggestions in PRC No. 5 that had been promoted by AGS in its response. From Ms. Stemle's point of view, the, problems that existed with the AGS suggested contractual changes or administrative changes that could be addressed in the course of a negotiating phase leading to a contract should AGS be found to be the most advantageous offeror. Persons within DOT who might have a greater appreciation of the significance of the AGS suggestions, that is to say persons from the contracting services or legal arm within DOT did not make a critical examination of the AGS suggestions. By contrast to the circumstance with the AGS proposal, a meeting was convened to consider the responsiveness of Cubic following the assessment of its technical terms. Out of that meeting a decision was reached to reject the proposal of Cubic. These activities are described in the composite PRC No. 7, which includes a memorandum of May 16, 1989, concerning the meeting to discuss the responsiveness issue and a May 18, 1989 letter advising Cubic of the decision to reject its proposal. This decision was met with a protest filed by Cubic. The terms of that formal written protest are described in the Cubic Exhibit No. 3 admitted into evidence. That protest was voluntarily dismissed on July 31, 1989 as shown in Cubic's Exhibit No. 4 admitted into evidence. The case had been forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for consideration as Cubic Western Data, Petitioner vs. Department of Transportation, Respondent, DOAH Case No. 89-3852BID. With the advent of the notice of voluntary dismissal, the case was dismissed before the Division of Administrative Hearings by order, shown in Cubic Exhibit No. 5 admitted into evidence. Following the notice of voluntary dismissal of the Cubic protest the evaluation committee proceeded with the work of examining the remaining proposals and the office of contractual services opened the price proposals. The office of contractual services was made aware of the scoring in the technical aspects of the two remaining proposals and conducted the opening of the price proposals at a public session. The office of contractual services and the evaluation committee conducted independent examinations of the pricing. In doing this work those groups had an engineer's estimate of the cost which was based upon all unit rates which had been requested in the RFP. In effect, there was a comparison of the proposals against the engineer's estimate. The committee had in mind making certain that the pricing was in keeping with the technical proposal. Through this process DOT derived its proposal tabulation, a copy of which may be found as PRC Exhibit No. 8 admitted into evidence. It shows that out of a possible 2,000 points PRC achieved 1,830 and AGS 1,304. This document reminds those concerned that any intended award of the contract is contingent upon and subject to the Governor and Cabinet's approval under the authority of Section 287.073, Florida Statutes, and Rule 13N-1.005, Florida Administrative Code. This exhibit constituted a statement of the DOT intent to award to PRC. The bids had been opened on September 11, 1989, and the posting time ran from 8:00 a.m., November 21, 1989 until 8:00 a.m., November 28, 1989. CUBIC RETURNS Notwithstanding the voluntary dismissal of its challenge to the agency decision finding it unresponsive, as noticed July 31, 1989 and the resultant lack of involvement of Cubic in the review process associated with examination of the price quotation and comparison to the remaining offerors, Cubic attempted to resurrect its participation in the administrative process. This was done by a letter of protest on November 27, 1989, which may be seen as Cubic Exhibit No. 6 admitted into evidence, and a formal written protest dating from December 6, 1989, Cubic Exhibit No. 7 admitted into evidence. The case was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings and became Cubic Western Data, Petitioner vs. Department of Transportation, Respondent, and Planning and Research Corporation, Intervenor, DOAH Case No. 89-6926BID. On January 2, 1990, the Hearing Officer recommended the dismissal of the protest by Cubic and by Final Order of January 22, 1990, the Secretary of DOT dismissed the protest and ordered that the contract be awarded to PRC. That order did not contain the caveat found in the notice of intent to award tabulation that reminded interested persons that the decision was contingent upon approval by the Governor and Cabinet pursuant to Section 287.073, Florida Statutes, and Rule 13N-1.005, Florida Administrative Code. A copy of the Recommended Order and Final Order may be found as Cubic Exhibit No. 8 admitted into evidence. Having determined to award the contract to PRC and in anticipation of that outcome, DOT provided documentation to the Director of the Division of Purchasing of the Department of General Services in support of its choice on November 15, 1989. A copy of that information with a transmittal letter may be seen as PRC Exhibit No. 10 admitted into evidence. This was followed by a February 7, 1990 letter to the Director of the Division of Purchasing of the Department of General Services requesting that the item be agendaed before the Governor and Cabinet for its February 20, 1990 meeting. The letter mentioned the fact that court action which had been commenced by PRC attempting to prohibit the disclosure of the details of its proposal had been dismissed. Thus, the cabinet aides and the Governor and Cabinet would be able to examine the details of PRC's submission. The correspondence points out that the Cubic price proposal had never been examined by DOT and remained unopened. The correspondence; included a copy of the January 22, 1990 Final Order dismissing the Cubic protest. A copy of the February 7, 1990 correspondence was admitted as PRC Exhibit No. 1. The record does not reveal that the Governor and Cabinet sitting as the State of Florida, Department of General Services has ever acted to approve or disapprove the intended contract award to PRC. As of the week of the final hearing it was still a deferred agenda matter in front of that body. Secretary Benjamin J. Watts, agency head for DOT, had his first involvement in this case in the summer of 1989 at about the time Cubic brought its initial challenge to the decision finding it unresponsive. In the absence of the then Secretary Kaye Henderson he spoke with the General Counsel to DOT, Tom Bateman, and advised Bateman to make the decision that Secretary Henderson contemplated; that decision being one where the agency moved forward with the decision making process concerning this RFP. Following that circumstance Watts received a number of telephone calls from different offices or individuals in the legislature inquiring about whether the DOT properly reviewed this case and if Cubic had been treated fairly. Watts replied in the affirmative. Sometime around Christmas of 1989, Watts met with Cubic, PRC and AGS to discuss the pending case and upon the advice of an attorney within DOT, Bob Daniti, decided to leave matters to the Hearing Officer. This pertained to Cubic's existing case which was eventually dismissed on January 22, 1990. Watts then received a telephone call on February 14, 1990, from Brian Ballard of the Governor's office. Watts had a meeting with Ballard to describe Watts' impression of the case. Ballard requested that DOT do a side-by-side comparison of the proposals based upon information that Cubic had supplied Ballard and his office, according to Ballard. Watts is unaware of who Ballard may have met with from the Cubic firm. This inquiry by Ballard was made at a time beyond which DOT had declared its intention to award the contract by entry of its Final Order on January 22, 1990. From what Ballard said to Watts, Cubic had given Ballard two or three exhibits out of the proposal and highlighted certain areas and within those exhibits told Ballard that if Cubic is being declared unresponsive, then some of the other firms should have been found unresponsive as well. The opposition to the DOT choice to award to PRC as expressed by persons who communicated their point of view to Watts was not based upon any concerns as to the technical analysis. It was premised upon concerns about procedures. Ballard also informed Watts that he wanted the review done and a recommendation made about this matter on Monday following that Wednesday, which would have been February 19, 1990. As Ballard expressed it this would allow him to get back with Cubic on February 20, 1990. Watts responded to these instructions by telling a second committee which he selected on February 14, 1990 to make a further review and that he wished to have their recommendations by February 19, 1990, if possible. He told them that if that was not possible, then their reasons should be provided by the end of the upcoming weekend. In anticipation of the discussion with the Governor's office, Watts told his personnel that he wanted them to give him some estimate of how long it would take. If the review could not be completed by the designated time, Watts said that he intended to simply go back to Ballard and tell him that it was not possible to give an impression of this case by the deadline which Ballard had imposed. In furtherance of the instructions which he had been given by Ballard, Secretary Watts convened the second evaluation committee which was constituted of persons who had stronger grounding in administrative and contract matters. This group included George Lovett, the General Counsel for District V; John Ellis, Professional Services Coordinator in that same District; Brant Hargrove, General Counsel for District II; Nodrie Moses, from the procurement office; Jack Monpetit, Professional Services Coordinator, District II and Marly Eichhoefler, from the DOT Auditor's office. Secretary Watts issued a memorandum which gave a written indication of his intentions about the duties of the second evaluation committee. A copy of that memorandum may be found as DOT Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. He charged that group with the responsibility to review the RFP and all proposals, to include the Cubic proposal which had been rejected in the final order entered cutting off the participation of Cubic in the process. He told them to review and compare major elements of each proposal and determine how responsive each offeror had been in completing the RFP. He indicated that they should identify any problem areas, procedures, questions or etc. that revealed themselves. He allowed them to question the first review committee as well as others who had been involved in the process to gain information about background and technical matters, and provided a list of names of persons who could be contacted to include the members of the first evaluation committee. The Secretary did not intend that the second review committee look carefully at the technical side of the proposals. Being uncertain of their charge in that respect, the second evaluation committee came back to the Secretary early on in their review process and asked for clarification on that point and were told that they need not concern themselves with the particulars of the technical aspects of the proposals. It was not the intention of Secretary Watts that the second evaluation committee get involved in any in-depth discussion or analysis of the choices of the first evaluation committee or to offer a specific critique of the work done by that group. His intention was that the second evaluation committee operate independent of the activities of the first evaluation committee. Watts even went so far as to instruct his second evaluation committee not to ask questions of the first evaluation committee about what conclusions the initial group had reached and not to get information or documents from the first group that would reveal what the prior group had done. The second evaluation committee pursued its responsibilities for several days. On February 17, 1990, it wrote a memorandum to Secretary Watts with its recommendations. A copy of that memorandum may be found as DOT Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. The second evaluation committee did not draw any different conclusions about the responsiveness of the Cubic proposal, nor ascertain any impropriety in treatment that Cubic received in the evaluation process. It did determine that AGS was also nonresponsive for reasons that will be discussed more thoroughly. The evaluation of the PRC proposal by the second evaluation committee lead to the conclusion that the PRC proposal was responsive. That perception was held by the first evaluation committee as well. It is accepted here, together with the opinion of the unresponsiveness of Cubic. After receipt of the report from the second evaluation committee, Secretary Watts held an exit interview with those persons. In the course of that exit interview the conclusions reached by the second evaluation committee were explained to Watts. It was at that point that Watts gave this group some insight into the history of the case in terms of the contentions that had been made about DOT and its first assessment of these proposals. At this juncture, he asked the second evaluation committee if they discovered anything improper with the bidding or anything in the way of influencing that process, taken to mean improper influence. The second evaluation committee told him that there did not appear to be any impropriety or undue influence. That perception is in accord with the assessment of the present record, in that it has not been revealed that the DOT participated in any impropriety or was susceptible to undue influence in the process of the initial evaluation of the responses. Likewise, nothing in the activities of the second evaluation committee is seen to be inappropriate in terms of the portions of this project that they examined related to the administrative or contractual portion of the RFP. The conclusions that they reached are correct in academic terms. Their ability to proceed to evaluate as a jurisdictional matter is not acceptable for reasons that will be discussed in the conclusions of law. More particularly, the second evaluation committee in its exit conference with Secretary Watts told him that their impression of those persons that they had spoken with from the first evaluation committee did not lead them to conclude that there was any pressure on or undue bias exercised by that group. Secretary Watts described for the second evaluation committee what he called rumors around Tallahassee of political influence used to find Cubic nonresponsive and apparently the suggestion that this would work somehow to the advantage of PRC. Again, to the extent that form of commentary was being pursued, it does not comport with the facts in this case. The second evaluation committee in its conclusions about the work of the first evaluation committee determined that the first group had not spent as much time in analyzing procedural and administrative issues as the second group did and saw this as being the reason the first evaluation committee did not discover the unresponsive nature of the AGS proposal. The second evaluation committee did not look closely at the AGS technical proposals to see how those might have an influence on its proposed contract language. Nonetheless, explanation of the AGS bid with the suggested contractual arrangement which AGS has advanced (See PRC Exhibit No. 5), reveals that a consideration of the technical aspects of the AGS bid would not save the proposal from a declaration that it is unresponsive. With the determination that AGS was not responsive, DOT was left with one responsive offeror. Secretary Watts had a conversation with Ronnie Thomas, Director of Purchasing for the Department of General Services. The recommendation that Thomas made to Watts was to re-advertise in that there were three offerors basically capable of doing the work and it would be in the best interest of the taxpayers to re-advertise. The choice to re-advertise would be in lieu of the award of the contract to PRC. That contract would not be for a sole-source purchase. In would be under the guise of what is referred to in Section 287.062(2), Florida Statutes, as a negotiated purchase. In addition to discussing the situation with the second evaluation committee, Secretary Watts sought the advice of his legal staff. He decided to re-advertise because he felt that DOT had not followed its own procedures, as it relates to examination of the AGS proposal by the original evaluation committee and its failure to deal with the problems in that proposal. Under the circumstances, Watts did not believe that he would be able to support the decision to award to PRC, before the public and the Governor and Cabinet. In his mind this outweighed any decision in favor of PRC as being an arrangement that would be advantageous to the State. He believes that there is a benefit to be derived by competition, whether re-advertising leads to a better price advantage or not. Secretary Watts believes that even though the matter has been referred to the Governor and Cabinet for its decision, DOT has the ability to reject all proposals and re-advertise. On February 21, 1990, all three offerors were informed of the agency decision to reject all bids. The correspondence directed to PRC may be found as PRC Exhibit No. 9 admitted into evidence. The correspondence directed to Cubic may be found as Cubic Exhibit No. 9 admitted into evidence. In its operative terms, that correspondence is the same and in pertinent part states: Further review of the proposals submitted in response to RFP-DOT-88-01, Toll Collection System, revealed that the proposals submitted by AGS Information Services, Inc., and Cubic Western Data were non-responsive. In order to have competitive offers there must be two or more offers submitted by responsive and qualified offerors. As a result, we do not have two competitive proposals. The Department has determined that the commodities which were the subject of this request for proposals are available from more than a single source. Therefore, the Department has decided to withdraw its notice of intent to award RFP-DOT-88-01 to Planning Research Corporation, which was contingent on Governor and Cabinet approval. This letter is your notice of our decision to reject all proposals. It is our intent to issue a new Request for Proposals for a Toll collection System. On that same date an amended final order was issued signed by the same person who had authored the letter notifying the parties of the decision to reject all proposals, as designee of Watts. The amended final order in its substance is associated with DOAH Case No. 89-6926BID and differs from the January 22, 1990 final order to the extent of reminding those parties that the award to PRC is contingent upon approval by the Governor and Cabinet in accordance with Section 287.073, Florida Statutes and Rule 13N-1.005, Florida Administrative Code. Secretary Watts perceives the amended final order as establishing a correction to the January 22 order, concerning advice to the parties that the contract must be approved by the Governor and Cabinet. He does not perceive this as being a continuing statement of the intention to award to PRC in the face of a contradictory decision to reject all bids, as evidenced in the correspondence of that same date. The DOT estimate concerning the time necessary to re-advertise contemplates an intent to award by December 7, 1990, with no time allowance for a protest from a disappointed offeror. PROBLEMS WITH THE AGS PROPOSAL Based upon an examination of the testimony of Secretary Watts, Terry Cappellini, Director of Purchasing within DOT, and members of the second evaluation committee, together with an analysis of the overall record concerning the RFP language and policy matters associated with the RFP process, the AGS proposal is not responsive. As alluded to before, PRC Exhibit No. 5 sets out the suggestions which AGS had in mind when it submitted its proposal. It calls them exceptions. In Special Condition 2.08, the language of which is found at page 6, AGS has recommended insertion of additional language to the affect that: In the event the Department cancels for unappropriated funds this RFP or any contract entered into with Contractor pursuant thereto, the Department will, within 30 days of notification of such cancellation, pay Contractor for all work actually performed. Such payment shall be in accordance with the payment terms specified in the Contract between the Department and the Contractor. Similar language is contemplated as being added to Section 19.00 under the Contract Agreement which language in the Contract Agreement has been recited at page 11 in the recommended order. In describing the reasons for the suggested additional language AGS states that it is requiring assurance that if the RFP or any contract with DOT and AGS is cancelled because of a problem of funding, AGS insists on being paid for work that is actually performed. In furtherance of that arrangement it recommends insertion of the above-quoted language. With respect to Special Condition 2.09, which is quoted at page 6 in this recommended order, AGS vies for cancellation after allowing AGS a reasonable opportunity to remedy the problems contemplated, instead of the right to cancel immediately. It recommends the insertion of additional language to the affect: In the event the Department intends to cancel a contract arising from the RFP due to Contractor's alleged failure to complete specified work in accordance with the provisions of the contract or this RFP, the Department shall notify Contractor of such intention, identifying the alleged deficiency, and allow the Contractor a period of 30 calendar days form the date of such notice to remedy the deficiency. In the event Contractor fails to remedy the deficiency within such 30 day period, the Department may cancel the contract effective immediately. Related to Special Condition 6.01.02 dealing with indemnification, as related on page 8 in the recommended order, AGS states that it finds that the idea of indemnification associated with the sole negligence of the Department is not appropriate and would recommend that the word "sole" be substituted for by "or primary." A similar change is recommended for Section 14.00 under the Contract Agreement which has the same language as Special Condition 6.01.02. In discussing Special Condition 6.01.03, the text of which is found at page 8 in the recommended order, AGS attempts to clarify that the one percent reference at special Condition 6.01.03 is in addition to the one percent total compensation for performance that is set out in Special Condition 6.01.02 by the insertion of additional language in Special Condition 6.01.03 in this way: Section 6.01.03 specifies that 1% of total compensation to the Contractor is the agreed compensation for performance by Contractor of the Indemnity Agreement set forth therein. AGS would like to make clear that this 1% is in addition to the 1% of total compensation for performance of the Indemnity Agreement set forth in Section 6.01.02. Accordingly, AGS recommends insertion of the following additional language in Section 6.01.03: `This 1% in addition to 1% of total compensation specified in Section 6.01.02 above.' General Provision 5.07.02 is associated with the failure to the contractor to remove or renew defective materials and work, the text of which section is set out at page 9 of the recommended order. AGS expresses the belief that the contractor should be given a reasonable period of time to remove or renew before rights of the DOT are triggered. It recommends the insertion of language to the effect: The Department's rights under this Section shall be triggered only in the event Contractor fails to remove or renew defective material and/or work within a reasonable period of time from the date of request for such removal or renewal. Engineer and Contractor shall agree upon the duration of such time period on a case by case basis. By remarks directed to General Provision 8.08 of the General Provisions related to the 10 day grace period to cure the defaults, AGS states its belief that 30 days is more reasonable and requests that the grace period be extended to 30 days. In discussion of General Provision 8.09 dealing with the ability of the DOT to complete work after default, found at page 10 of the recommended order, AGS describes its belief that contract law and equitable considerations mandate that DOT is required to use its best efforts to mitigate damages and recommends insertion of the language to the effect: The Department shall use best efforts to mitigate damages in performing or arranging to have work performed as provided in this Section. Discussion is made by AGS of General Provision 8.10, which is described at page 11 in the recommended order. AGS believes that the schedule of liquidated damages should discharge the contractors liability for acts or admissions unless the law requires otherwise. AGS commends insertion language to the effect: Except as otherwise provided by law, payment by Contractor of liquidated damages in accordance with this schedule shall fully discharge Contractor's liability for acts or omissions giving rise to such damages. In discussing the Contract Agreement AGS requires the addition of a Section 22.00 which has this language: In no event will contractor be responsible for any special indirect, incidental or consequential damages resulting from loss of use or opportunity, data or profits arising out of or in connection with the use or performance of the products or services proposed to be delivered hereunder, even if contractor was informed, knew or should have known of the possibility of such damages. In no event will the liability of contractor in connection with the work proposed to be performed hereunder exceed amounts paid by the Department to contractor for such work. This limitation applies to all causes of action in the aggregate, including, without limitation, breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, strict liability and other unintentional torts. Finally, under the Contract Agreement is found this comment by AGS wherein it says: AGS requires that the contract define the work AGS will perform. We have priced the work with the understanding that our Technical Proposal defines the work. If we will be required to do work not defined, we will be willing to review our price proposal. In the provisions within the RFP that were referred to in the initial discussion of its terms, the offerors were given adequate opportunity to discuss and clarify those provisions which they did not understand or agree with. Absent success in the attempt to try to persuade DOT to change its position concerning those items within PRC 5 that AGS takes exception to, it had the ability to make a timely challenge to those terms and conditions. From the record, AGS did not attempt to persuade DOT to make changes nor did it pursue challenges to the terms and conditions excepted to. As a consequence, according to Special Condition 2.13, AGS has acquiesced in the terms and conditions. Absent a challenge within 72 hours of the date for submitting requested changes, which date according to PRC Exhibit No. 3 was November 28, 1988, no challenge may be pursued. To allow AGS to advance these recommendations and requirements set out in PRC 5 through the submission of its proposal, would be to condone a material departure from the requirements of the RFP. These items constitute other than minor irregularities which may not be waived. As described in Special Condition 2.04 these arrangements which AGS promotes could affect the price of the proposal and give the offeror an advantage over the other offerors, benefits not enjoyed by the competition. Of course Cubic sought similar advantage, so it is PRC who bore the brunt of these attempts by the competition. To allow AGS to require items or bargain for items in its favor that are not enjoyed by its competitors at a time beyond the acceptable place at which these adjustments could have been allowed or mandated by a decision honoring a challenge to the specifications, would be violative of Special Condition 2.13. It would also adversely impact the interest of the DOT described in Special Condition 2.04, in that the items which AGS would change are extremely important to DOT as a policy matter. These are items that DOT would not wish to surrender through negotiation. This speaks in particular to changes to Special Condition 2.08, General Condition 8.09, the addition of Section 22.00 under the Contract Agreement and the required deference to the technical proposals of AGS instead of the RFP. Moreover, under Special Condition 2.05 the AGS attempt constitutes a nonresponsive proposal in that it is a conditional proposal and is indefinite and ambiguous. Under the scheme contemplated by the RFP, it would be inappropriate to wait until the time of intended contract award to AGS, as hypothetical winner, before making the final decisions on the recommendations that AGS had made to change the terms of the RFP. Regardless, in those instances which have been identified wherein AGS required a certain outcome associated with the RFP terms, this potential bargaining session is not contemplated and a decision on responsiveness would have to be reached without regard for such a bargaining session. In either event, whether referring to the recommended changes or required changes, AGS did not pursue these matters appropriately and they are items which are material, which may not be waived as minor irregularities and which cause the AGS bid to be unresponsive. As generally described before, in the event changes are requested as contemplated by Special Condition 2.13, DOT determines if those changes are acceptable and to the extent that they are found to be acceptable they are incorporated as an addendum to the RFP, thus allowing all offerors the opportunity to submit proposals to the same controlling specifications. When AGS mandated a different set of requirements or requested them, it deprived the other offerors of the opportunity to submit proposals associated with the same specifications. This created an advantage and benefit for AGS not enjoyed by PRC. In summary, none of the items that the first evaluation committee and the second evaluation committee discovered about the PRC proposal constituted other than minor irregularities. As described by Terry Cappellini, who is the Manager of the Office of Contractual Services for DOT, the PRC proposal is advantageous to the state in the sense of being the high technical low priced proposal.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered leaving in place the final order dated January 22, 1990 as amended by the February 21, 1990 order, in which the decision was made to recommend the intended award of a contract to PRC to the Governor and Cabinet; which sets aside the decision to reject all proposals, takes the necessary action to arrange for the item to be agendaed before the Governor and Cabinet; and foregoes further action until the Governor and Cabinet has made its decision. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of May, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-1583BID The following discussion is given concerning the proposed facts of the parties. Petitioner's Facts Paragraph 1 Reference to a September 23, 1988 publication in the Florida Administrative Weekly is not necessary in that the start-up date of October, 1988 has been Established in the recommended order and that suffices. Otherwise this paragraph is subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 2 through 16 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 17 and 18 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 19 in its first and third sentence is subordinate to facts found. The second sentence is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 20 through 25 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 26 is contrary to facts found. Paragraphs 27 through 31 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 32 is subordinate to facts found except to the extent it suggests that the AGS proposal is responsive. In that way it is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 33 is subordinate to facts found with the exception that the problem with the AGS proposal in its suggestive contract language were not answered by the review. In Paragraph 34, the impression by the initial evaluation committee that the AGS problem areas could be worked out later was erroneous. The discussion in Paragraphs 35 through 39 concerning the ability of the agency to reconcile the problems with the change to the specified contract language and conditions contained within the RFP does not comport with the facts in the recommended order. The idea of default by an awardee and collection of the bid bond does not come into play because there is no opportunity to wait that long before resolving the issue of responsiveness of the offer concerning those contract terms and conditions set forth in the RFP. Paragraph 40 is subordinate to facts found. Concerning Paragraph 41, notwithstanding the fact that the agency has no specific policy about indemnification language, if an offeror wanted to modify the suggested language within the contracts and conditions found in the RFP it had to do so in accordance with the discussion in the recommended order. Concerning Paragraph 42, even though there is no definitional statement of what an additional proposal may be, this does not preclude the opportunity to examine that issue on a case by case basis. That was done here. The suggestion by Paragraph 43 that the proposed section 22.00 is other than part of a conditional proposal by AGS is rejected, as is the notion that this language in the proposed section 22.00, described by AGS as required, can be rejected at the time of a contract execution with AGS. It would be inappropriate to wait that long to decide the issue of the acceptability of that proposed section 22.00. That arrangement is not in keeping with the discussion in the recommended order. Paragraph 44 is accepted with the exception that AGS and the DOT could not consider contract changes at the time of potential contract award to AGS. Paragraphs 45 through 48 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 49 is contrary to facts found. Paragraphs 50 through 52 are subordinate to facts found. Concerning Paragraph 53, the only thing unique about the Cubic circumstance is its prior participation in the process. Paragraphs 54 through 56 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 57 is subordinate to facts found with the exception of the significance of the failure of the second evaluation team to appreciate that the first evaluation team had some knowledge of the problems of the AGS proposal. A clear impression of what was done by the first evaluation team would not appear to have promoted a different result in the analysis made by the second evaluation team. Paragraphs 58 through 60 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 61 is contrary to the impression described in the recommended order, in that both Cubic and AGS were unresponsive. The suggestion in Paragraph 62 that a complete evaluation of the technical matters would have caused a different impression of the problems with the AGS proposal is not accepted. Paragraphs 63 through 65 are contrary to facts found. Respondent's Facts These facts are subordinate to facts found. Intervenor's Facts Paragraphs 1 through 21 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 22 in the sense of suggesting immediate availability of John Berry to advise the first evaluation committee is not an accurate portrayal and it is that immediate advice which became significant in this case. That advise was provided by Woody Lawson. Paragraph 23 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 24 through 27 are subordinate to facts found. It is accepted that the original evaluation committee perceived the AGS proposed addition of section 22.00 in the Contract Agreement as a recommendation; however, the more pertinent concern was the overall attitude of the first evaluation committee and its actions pertaining to the entire set of issues that were described in PRC 5. Paragraphs 25 and 30 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 31 is accepted wherein it describes the lack of contact with the DOT legal office. It is not accepted where it suggests that there was not contact with the purchasing office as having any significance. It sufficed to contact the contractual services office for advice without resort to discussions with the purchasing office. Paragraphs 32 through 43 are subordinate to facts found. Concerning Paragraph 44 it is not considered unusual that in the posting of the proposals, there rating and the statement of intended contract award that mention would be made of the decision being contingent upon approval of the Governor and Cabinet. Paragraphs 45 through 52 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 53 is incomplete in its depiction of the reasons for the request of Watts to reevaluate responsiveness. A more complete explanation is set forth in the recommended order. Paragraphs 54 through 61 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 62 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 63 through 76 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 77 is contrary to the impression of what Secretary Watts concluded. The impression given and found as fact in the recommended order is that his principal concern with the activities of the first evaluation committee were those associated with the failure to ascertain the problems with the AGS proposal. In determining responsiveness the steps for that determination were identified in the RFP as being offeror qualification, responsibilities of the technical proposal, price responsiveness, followed by decision in a comparison of those offerors who had met those first three requirements. In that sense as described in the recommended order declarations regarding Cubic's responsiveness were not dependent on the impression of AGS and the declaration of non- responsiveness of AGS was not dependent on the treatment of Cubic. To the extent that Cubic by the report of those suggested facts is trying to describe some perceived unfairness in the treatment that Cubic received by either evaluation committee or anything that was done in the process in the review of Cubic's proposal, it is rejected as an inferential fact. Paragraph 78 is rejected for reasons as stated above. Paragraph 79 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 80 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 81 and 82 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 83 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 84 is subordinate to facts found with the exception of the statement by Secretary Watts with the ability to reject a contract award once it had been made. That circumstance does not exist here and is not reported factually. Paragraph 85 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 86 and 87 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 88 is rejected to the extent that it suggests that Secretary Watts could not defend the award to PRC. More properly stated he chose not to defend an award to PRC. Paragraphs 89 through 92 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 93 is rejected for reasons described in discussion of Paragraph 77. Paragraphs 94 through 97 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 98 is envisioned by the overall facts found in the recommended order. While the facts suggested in Paragraph 99 are acknowledged, they are not found to be necessary factual findings for the recommended order. Paragraphs 100 and 101 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S.-58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Deborah A. Getzoff, Esquire Hala Ayoub, Esquire Richard C. Bellak, Esquire Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal and Banker, P.A. 101 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Paul J. Martin, Esquire Susan P. Stephens, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S.-58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Frank A. Shepherd, Esquire Gary M. Pappas, Esquire Popham, Haik, Schnobrich and Kaufman, Ltd. 4100 One CenTrust Financial Center 100 Southeast Second Street Miami, FL 33131
