The Issue The issue in this case is whether there is just cause, within the meaning of Section 231.36(1), Florida Statutes (1999), to terminate Respondent's employment as a non-instructional employee for alleged sexual harassment of a co-worker. (All chapter and section references are to Florida Statutes (1999) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has employed Respondent as a maintenance worker at Yulee Primary School in Yulee, Florida (the "school") for approximately 18 years. Petitioner has employed Ms. Joyce Sullivan as a food service worker for approximately three years. Respondent and Ms. Sullivan are co-workers. Respondent has no supervisory authority over Ms. Sullivan, has no authority to discipline Ms. Sullivan, and has no authority to affect the conditions of employment for Ms. Sullivan. The material facts in this case transpired over approximately ten minutes during work hours on April 6, 2000. Respondent approached Ms. Sullivan in the back kitchen of the school cafeteria shortly after breakfast and asked to speak to her privately. Ms. Sullivan agreed, and the two moved to the adjacent serving area near the checkout counter in the cafeteria. Respondent asked Ms. Sullivan to pose for pictures that would be nude, semi-nude, or partially clothed and that Respondent would enter into a contest on the internet. Respondent explained that the pictures would not identify Ms. Sullivan because the pictures would be taken from the neck down and that Ms. Sullivan could wear a bikini, a thong, or a bra. Ms. Sullivan asked Respondent what he was talking about. Respondent assured Ms. Sullivan that she would not be identified because the pictures would not identify Ms. Sullivan's face. Ms. Sullivan told Respondent that he was crazy. The entire conversation lasted approximately three minutes. Ms. Sullivan left Respondent and walked to the cash register to "ring up" the school principal who purchased some food. Ms. Sullivan went to an office in the back of the cafeteria with Ms. Sullivan's assistant manager. Respondent went to the back room and told Ms. Sullivan that he would show her some pictures on his computer. Respondent exited the room through the back door of the room to retrieve a laptop computer. Ms. Sullivan and her assistant manager went outside the back room and discussed the situation. Ms. Sullivan was embarrassed. After four or five minutes, Respondent returned to the back room and placed the laptop on the desk in front of Ms. Sullivan. The assistant manager was in the same room at another desk engaged in a telephone conversation. It took about 1.5 minutes for Respondent to turn on the laptop and display some pictures. The pictures included pictures of partially clad women and topless women. The situation terminated after 1.5 minutes when the assistant manager ended her telephone conversation, a child asked Ms. Sullivan to "ring up" some papers, and Ms. Sullivan's manager approached the room. Respondent changed the computer screen to a picture of his daughter and began talking to Ms. Sullivan's manager. Respondent left the school with the computer. Ms. Sullivan reported the incident to her manager, but Ms. Sullivan did not file a complaint for sexual harassment or state to her manager that she had been sexually harassed. Ms. Sullivan's manager relayed the information to Respondent's supervisor who discussed the matter with Respondent. Respondent admitted to the facts and expressed regret. Respondent's manager relayed the information to the Superintendent. The Superintendent investigated the matter and determined that Respondent had engaged in sexual harassment. The Superintendent based his determination on the definition of sexual harassment in the Board's Official Rule 3.54I.C. Rule 3.54I.C., in relevant part, states that sexual harassment consists of: . . . unwelcomed sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other inappropriate oral, written or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: . . . such conduct substantially interferes with an employee's work performance . . . or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work . . . environment. Respondent's request for Ms. Sullivan to pose for sexually revealing pictures was either an unwelcomed sexual advance, request for sexual favor, or other inappropriate oral or written conduct of a sexual nature within the meaning of Rule 3.54I.C. Respondent's conduct substantially interfered with Ms. Sullivan's work performance or created an offensive work environment. The Superintendent testified during cross-examination that he would not have determined that Respondent engaged in sexual harassment if Ms. Sullivan had not said no to Respondent's request. A preponderance of the evidence fails to show that Ms. Sullivan expressly said "no" when asked pose or view pictures. However, a preponderance of the evidence shows that Ms. Sullivan was embarrassed and that the entire episode was unwelcomed and offensive within the meaning of Rule 3.54I.C. Respondent has no previous discipline history. Article VII of the collective bargaining agreement between the Board and its employees prescribes progressive discipline procedures for this case. Except in unusual circumstances, employment can be terminated only after an oral warning for a first offense, a reprimand for a second offense, a written warning for a third offense, and suspension for a fourth offense.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of sexual harassment and suspending Respondent from employment for the time of the current suspension. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry W. Whitmore, Chief Bureau of Educator Standards Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Suite 224E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael H. Olenick General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. John L. Ruiz, Superintendent Nassau County School Board 1201 Atlantic Avenue Fernandina Beach, Florida 32304 Brent P. Abner, Esquire Suite F 4741 Atlantic Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Brian T. Hayes, Esquire 245 East Washington Street Monticello, Florida 32344 Martha F. Dekle, Esquire 806 G Street Post Office Box 1644 Jacksonville, Florida 32207
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Paul Rancourt (Mr. Rancourt), established through clear and convincing evidence his actual innocence, thereby entitling him to compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act, chapter 961, Florida Statutes (2011).1/
Findings Of Fact Before discussing the findings from the administrative hearing, it is appropriate to set out the procedural history of the criminal proceedings. On December 18, 1996, the State charged Mr. Rancourt and Daniel McLean (Mr. McLean) with the kidnapping and three counts of sexual battery of A.S., which occurred on October 31, 1996. On July 27 through July 30, 1998, the State tried Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean together. The jury convicted both men, and the trial court sentenced Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean to life imprisonment on each count with the sentences to run concurrently. On April 5, 2000, the Second District Court of Appeal issued an opinion overturning Mr. McLean's conviction based on trial errors. McLean v. State, 754 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). The appellate court reversed Mr. McLean's conviction for kidnapping because it found that the State "failed to prove [McLean] intended the kidnapping to occur, or that he performed any action that assisted in the kidnapping." Id. at 180. Further, the appellate court found that the trial court erred in two key evidentiary rulings. First, the trial court erred in allowing the State to elicit testimony from the medical provider who examined A.S. following the assault. The disputed question was: "[d]id she act in any way inconsistent with the way a rape victim would act?" Id. at 181. The appellate court found that the prejudicial effect of the expert testimony substantially outweighed its probative value. Id. Second, the trial court erred in excluding testimony under the Rape Shield Statute.3/ Id. Specifically, the trial court erred in not allowing Mr. McLean's attorney to cross-examine the medical provider about whether or not the A.S.'s soreness in her vulva area was due to the fact that she had not had sexual intercourse in the past year, as opposed to a sexual battery. Id. The appellate court found that this question went to a key issue of whether the sexual contact was consensual. The appellate court found the exclusion of this testimony was not harmless error; and thus, reversed Mr. McLean's convictions and sentences, and ordered a retrial. On January 5, 2001, Mr. McLean, pursuant to a plea agreement, pled nolo contendere to one count of sexual battery, section 794.011, Florida Statutes (1996). Based on the plea agreement, Mr. McLean was sentenced to 64 and one-half months’ incarceration, which reflected his time served, and two years’ probation. On June 14, 2000, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed Mr. Rancourt's convictions for sexual battery and kidnapping, and his life sentences. Rancourt v. State, 766 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). In affirming Mr. Rancourt's conviction, the appellate court found that trial counsel had failed to preserve the issues concerning the medical expert's opinion vouching for the victim's credibility and the exclusion of the medical testimony under the Rape Shield Statute. On September 13, 2000, the appellate court issued its mandate. On September 10, 2002, Mr. Rancourt filed a post- conviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Notably, Mr. Rancourt's post-conviction motion alleged, in part, his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the evidentiary issues that had formed the basis of Mr. McLean's reversal. On November 3, 2003, the circuit court entered an order vacating Mr. Rancourt's convictions and sentences "after considering the Motion and applicable law, and upon agreement of both parties[.]" The order directed that a new trial be held. On September 27, 2005, the State re-tried Mr. Rancourt for sexual battery and kidnapping. The jury convicted Mr. Rancourt of the lesser-included offense of battery, section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1996), a first-degree misdemeanor. Consequently, the trial court sentenced Mr. Rancourt to one year in the Polk County jail with credit for time served. On June 25, 2010, Mr. Rancourt filed the Amended Petition for Determination of Wrongfully Incarcerated Person, which is the subject of this hearing. Mr. Rancourt has not been convicted of any other felony in any jurisdiction. At the time of these events, Mr. Rancourt was a 32-year- old man, and A.S. was a 19-year-old freshman at Florida Southern College. Mr. Rancourt, in offering proof of actual innocence, testified on his own behalf that the sexual encounter that occurred between him and A.S. was consensual. Mr. Rancourt's testimony on December 8, 2011, was consistent with the testimony that he had provided in his two criminal trials. Transcripts of Mr. Rancourt's prior testimony at the criminal proceedings were admitted into evidence. Mr. Rancourt's testimony at the hearing concerning his meeting A.S. and the subsequent sexual encounter was not believable. Specifically, the undersigned did not find Mr. Rancourt's description of how a young woman, whom he had never spoken too, would at the closing of the bar grab him at the door as patrons attempted to leave the bar, and give him a "deep french kiss." Further, it was incredulous that after asking him for a ride back to her dorm room that A.S., while in the back seat of the car, would engage in a series of intimate gestures towards himself and his best friend, Mr. McLean. Finally, it was not credible that A.S. and Mr. Rancourt engaged in a consensual sexual encounter as described by Mr. Rancourt on the lawn of a home off a dark street. The conclusion that Mr. Rancourt's description of the events is not credible is further bolstered by the testimony showing A.S.'s actions immediately after the sexual encounter, and Mr. Rancourt's untruthful responses to the police investigation following the events. Mr. Rancourt also offered Mr. McLean, who testified that he witnessed A.S. acting as a "willing participant" in the sexual encounter with Mr. Rancourt. Further, Mr. McLean offered testimony that he did not engage in any sexual relations with A.S., and that he only pled to the sexual battery charge in order to avoid the risk of receiving another lengthy sentence. Next, Mr. Rancourt brought forward the testimony of Brandon Perron (Mr. Perron), a private investigator, and introduced into evidence copies of Mr. Perron's investigative reports. The record shows that Mr. Perron prepared these reports as part of Mr. Rancourt's post-conviction efforts. The reports and Mr. Perron's testimony show that he identified many factual issues regarding Mr. Rancourt's convictions. Specifically, Mr. Perron raised issues concerning discrepancies in A.S.'s statements, testimony, and her motivations to lie concerning the events of October 31, 1996; discrepancies in witnesses' statements to the police investigator and testimony; poor and prejudicial police investigative techniques that overlooked potentially exonerating evidence showing that the sexual encounter was consensual; and defense counsel's failure to conduct an adequate investigation into potential witnesses. Although Mr. Perron was a persuasive witness for showing potential problems with the State's criminal case against Mr. Rancourt, Mr. Perron's testimony did not establish Mr. Rancourt's actual innocence. Mr. Rancourt's final witness was his aunt, Barbara Hoffman (Ms. Hoffman). In October 1996, Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean were living with Ms. Hoffman while they sought employment. Ms. Hoffman's testimony concerned Mr. Rancourt's character and her opinion that he was not capable of committing a crime. Further, she testified about the day that law enforcement officers went to her home to ask Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean to come in for questioning. She testified that the detective investigating the events had prejudged Mr. Rancourt to be guilty of rape. The purpose of this testimony appeared to show that statements given by Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean to the police may not have been voluntary. It is noteworthy that neither Mr. Rancourt nor Mr. McLean was arrested; thus, the questioning was non-custodial. Moreover, Ms. Hoffman's testimony was marginally relevant in that it did not bring forward any fact showing that Mr. Rancourt was actually innocent of the sexual battery and kidnapping charges. The State introduced evidence showing that the sexual encounter was not consensual. A.S.'s trial testimony shows that she consistently testified that the sexual encounter was not consensual. In addition to A.S.'s trial testimony, the State introduced trial testimony of Angie Wren (Ms. Wren) and Issac McKeithan (Mr. McKeithan). The criminal trial transcript shows that Ms. Wren and Mr. McKeithan drove upon A.S. shortly after the event and saw a car quickly drive away from the area where A.S. was standing. Ms. Wren testified that A.S. was hysterical and crying, and "she just didn't look like she had been through anything good, that's for sure." A.S. reported to Ms. Wren and Mr. McKeithan that she had been raped. Ms. Wren and Mr. McKeithan drove A.S. to the Lakeland Police Department immediately, and the attack was reported. This testimony shows that A.S. contended that she had been raped moments after the sexual encounter. Further, a review of the criminal proceedings shows that the State brought forward medical testimony showing bruises on A.S.'s arms. A.S. had testified that, before the attack, she did not have the bruises. Finally, the criminal trial transcripts and testimony given at the December 8 through 9, 2011, hearing showed that Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean had provided false statements, and changed the story given to the officer conducting the investigation. Specifically, the trial transcripts, and Mr. Rancourt's testimony on December 8, 2011, showed that he told the investigator at first that he did not engage in sexual relations with A.S., then changed his story to claim that he and A.S. had sex in the vehicle, and then changed his story, yet again, to state that he and A.S. had consensual sex on the front yard of a home off a dark street. During his testimony on December 8, 2011, Mr. Rancourt acknowledged that the statements he gave about not having sex with A.S. and then having sex in the vehicle were false. Similarly, Mr. McLean, when asked if he and Mr. Rancourt had sex, informed the officer "no." Mr. McLean testified that he answered that way because he contended that he had not had sex with A.S. This parsing of words was not credible. The undersigned found these acknowledged false statements, made at the time of the investigation, persuasive evidence that Mr. Rancourt's explanation of the night was not credible.
Recommendation Based on the record in this proceeding and the above Findings of Fact, it is RECOMMENDED that an order be entered by the Circuit Judge determining that Mr. Rancourt has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence, denying Mr. Rancourt's claim for compensation, and dismissing his Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of March, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March, 2012.
The Issue The central issue in these cases is whether Respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaints; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine in Florida. Respondent, Beltran Pages, M.D., was, at all times material hereto, a physician licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida having been issued license number ME0036079. Respondent is a board certified psychiatrist who has practiced in the Palm Beach County area since July, 1981. Respondent left private practice in September, 1985, and is currently employed at the South Florida Evaluation and Treatment Center, an HRS facility for the criminally insane. During the period February, 1982 through September, 1982, Respondent treated Lynn Harrington (now Lynn DeGrado) at his Boca Raton office which was located in the Weir Plaza Building. This office space was shared with a Dr. Cohn. The Boca Raton office consisted of a waiting area, a hallway with bathroom, and two physician offices. The walls in this facility were not sound proof and noises could be heard, if not distinguished, between the rooms. Mrs. Harrington had a regular Tuesday appointment at 10:00 a.m. During these weekly visits Mrs. Harrington discussed her marital difficulties with Respondent. One of the problems was an affair Mrs. Harrington was having which she did not want to abandon. Mrs. Harrington did not find her husband sexually attractive and, while she hoped the sessions with Respondent would enable her to rehabilitate her marriage, the Harringtons eventually divorced. During the latter months of the marriage, Pat Harrington became aware of his wife's infidelity. Mr. Harrington felt that Respondent had misrepresented progress being made to save the Harrington marriage. Mr. Harrington amended his petition for dissolution of marriage to claim Mrs. Harrington was an unfit mother. In a sworn statement taken October 27, 1982, Mrs. Harrington claimed she and Respondent had had sexual relations during the course of her treatment. This sworn statement was given in connection with a settlement of the dissolution issues. The statement was not to be used in court since the parties had resolved all their differences regarding the children. Later, Mr. Harrington sued Respondent in a civil suit for damages in connection with the claimed sexual conduct. This suit was later dismissed by the court. During the course of treatment with Mrs. Harrington, Respondent had many frank, open conversations of a sexual nature with her. These conversations included discussions of Mrs. Harrington's affair and her fantasies. During this time the Respondent did not engage in sexual intercourse with Lynn Harrington. Mrs. Harrington's testimony that she and Respondent had engaged in sexual intercourse was not credible. Mrs. Harrington was unable to describe with any detail any incident or time during which such conduct occurred. During the period June, 1983 through November, 1984, Respondent treated Lorry Thomas at his Delray Beach office on Linton Boulevard. The walls in Respondent's Delray Beach office were sound proof. Lorry Thomas came to Respondent with a history of depression. In addition to prescribing medications for her, Respondent saw Mrs. Thomas on a weekly basis. During these sessions Respondent and Mrs. Thomas engaged in frank, open discussions of a sexual nature. These discussions led to further activities which ultimately resulted in Respondent and Mrs. Thomas engaging in sexual intercourse. The Respondent engaged in sexual intercourse with Lorry Thomas during the time she was being treated as his patient. Following the sessions with Respondent, Lorry Thomas would often emerge to the outer office in a rumpled, upset condition. This condition was observed by Respondent's receptionist/secretary, Jolene Stratton. When Mrs. Thomas determined she could not continue as both a patient and a lover, she elected to cancel appointments in an effort to continue seeing Respondent. During the course of her treatment with Respondent, Mrs. Thomas was married and living with her husband, Mike. When Mike was transferred to California, Mrs. Thomas moved there also but continued written or telephone communications with Respondent. In December, 1984, Lorry Thomas went to see a clinical psychologist in Santa Clara, California, named Jean Bayard. Mrs. Thomas complained of a despair in her life and an uneasy feeling regarding her marriage. During the course of her discussions with Dr. Bayard, Mrs. Thomas disclosed her past sexual relationship with Respondent. On one occasion Respondent "made a pass" at and kissed Ms. Stratton. This incident occurred when they were viewing pictures in a magazine featuring nude females. Respondent's denial of the sexual relationship with Lorry Thomas was not credible. It is improper for a physician to engage in sexual intercourse with a patient during that patient's treatment. Such conduct is contrary to acceptable standards for psychiatrists.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Professional Regulations, Board of Medicine enter a Final Order dismissing Administrative Complaint (#30291), Case No. 87-4157. It is further recommended that a final order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint (#70999) , Case No. 87-1882, imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $5000, suspending Respondent's license for six months, and placing Respondent on probation for a period of two years with appropriate supervision and restriction, and requiring such continuing education programs as the Board may deem appropriate. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 31st day of May, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 87-1182, 87-4157 Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 are accepted. Paragraph 4(a) is rejected as argumentative. Paragraph 4(b) is rejected as argumentative. To the extent paragraph 5 finds Respondent and Lorry Thomas engaged In sexual Intercourse during the time she was in treatment such paragraph is accepted. Otherwise, the paragraph is rejected as unsupported by the record ("wide variety of sexual activity") or argumentative. Paragraph 6 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 7 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. With regard to paragraph 8, only to the extent that Respondent and Lorry Thomas engaged in sexual intercourse during the time she underwent treatment is the paragraph accepted. As a matter of law, there would be a presumption she was not consenting. Otherwise, paragraph 8 is rejected as contrary to the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: William O'Neil, Esquire Jon King, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Harry D. Dennis, Jr., Esquire 1401 East Atlantic Boulevard Pompano Beach, Florida 33060 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether just cause exists within the meaning of Section 231.36(1), Florida Statutes (2000), to discipline the Respondent for alleged sexual harassment as a result of inappropriate touching.
Findings Of Fact The Nassau County School Board (Petitioner) employed the Respondent as a fifth-grade teacher. The Petitioner took the action giving rise to this dispute and formal proceeding, that is, it suspended and then terminated the Respondent from his teaching position. The Petitioner referred this matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a formal proceeding and hearing. The Respondent Bernice Lamar Miles is an annual contract teacher, employed as such by the Petitioner at times pertinent hereto. He was employed at Emma Love Hardee Elementary School and had been employed there for approximately four years. A.P., C.B., J.P., and S.A., at all times pertinent hereto were students in the fifth grade, with Ms. Helen Edenfield as their primary teacher, at Emma Love Hardee Elementary School. During the fall semester of 2000 the Respondent taught approximately 540 students including those four, teaching them art and physical education. During the fall semester of 2000 the Respondent was scheduled to be the cafeteria monitor between 11:50 a.m., to 12:20 p.m. His duties, as cafeteria monitor, were to ensure the smooth transition of classes of students to and from the cafeteria. In doing so he attempted to maintain order, but typically permitted a more relaxed atmosphere than was the case in the typical classroom situation. There were at least ten other teachers and/or teacher's aides in the cafeteria eating with their classes or picking up or leaving their classes at the cafeteria on that date, between the times of 12:15 p.m. and 12:30 p.m. Between the times of 12:20 p.m. and 12:25 p.m., there were at least six teachers and/or teacher's aides in the cafeteria. There would also typically be some parents, food servers and/or custodians present during these time periods in the cafeteria. Also, on November 20, 2000, between the times of 12:20 p.m. and 12:25 p.m., there were approximately 200 students present in the cafeteria with classes entering or leaving the cafeteria about every five minutes. On November 20, 2000, there were no physical obstructions in the cafeteria that would interfere with any person's direct line of sight towards the stage where A.P., C.B., and the Respondent were standing at the relevant time. The Respondent's Exhibit A accurately depicts a general diagram of the cafeteria and was used for that demonstrative purpose at hearing. Ms. Edenfield's class was in the cafeteria on November 20, 2000, and she was scheduled to pick them up to return to the classroom at 12:25 p.m. The Respondent, therefore, called Ms. Edenfield's class to stand by the stage after they had finished eating lunch to await Ms. Edenfield coming to pick them up. While standing in front of the stage A.P., a fifth- grade student, called the Respondent over to ask him a question. On that date the Respondent did not know the first or last names of either A.P. or C.B. The Respondent, standing near both near A.P. and C.B., spoke to them about the cold weather that day and their decision to eat lunch outside without wearing warmer clothing. He typically speaks to students in the lunchroom and jokes with them, as it is a more relaxed atmosphere than in the classrooms. The Respondent typically is animated when he converses with people. It is quite common for him to touch an individual, either male or female while conversing with them. He speaks in this manner with both male and female and adults and children alike. This manner in which the Respondent makes physical contact with teachers or students while conversing with them is innocuous and has no inappropriate intent. The Respondent does not remember coming into physical contact with either A.P. or C.B. in the cafeteria on November 20, 2000. He did not touch either of them in an inappropriate manner on that date. He merely touched the students, if at all, in an effort to determine if they were cold from being outside without a jacket or sweater or possibly touched A.P. in an effort to fix her collar or neckline, which was askew. Although A.P. and C.B. were standing beside each other within arms length of each other on this occasion when they described the Respondent touching them, neither of these students witnessed the Respondent's alleged touching of the other. S.A. was also a student of the Respondent's in his art and physical education classes in the Fall semester of 2000. She was in the same class as A.P., C.B. and J.P. S.A. has never been touched inappropriately by the Respondent and has never witnessed the Respondent touch anyone in an inappropriate manner. S.A. was present in the cafeteria on November 20, 2000. At the time of the alleged inappropriate touching of A.P. and C.B., S.A. was standing in line next to A.P. and C.B. S.A. observed the Respondent come into physical contact with A.P. in the vicinity of her neckline and witnessed the Respondent fix A.P.'s collar which was askew. S.A. did not observe the Respondent touch C.B. at all. When Ms. Edenfield arrived to retrieve her class from the cafeteria at approximately 12:25 p.m., that day, the Respondent was standing at the microphone. The cafeteria, with approximately 200 students present, including Ms. Edenfield's class, appeared to her as it typically does. Just as the school day ended on November 20, 2000, A.P. reported to Ms. Edenfield that the Respondent had grasped the front of her shirt. A.P. demonstrated the touching with both hands to Ms. Edenfield, grasping the front neckline of her shirt and pulling outward. C.B. did not report any touching by the Respondent to Ms. Edenfield that day. Ms. Edenfield had A.P. go to the principal's office and report the alleged incident to Ms. Grondin, the principal. Ms. Edenfield later learned that C.B. must have accompanied A.P. to see Ms. Grondin. In any event, at least, she observed A.P. and C.B. later, back in the room, working together on a draft of a statement of what allegedly occurred between the Respondent and A.P. in the cafeteria. C.B., at some point later, apparently reported an alleged touching by the Respondent involving his putting his hand approximately half its length into the front of her shirt and purportedly incidentally touching the strap of her bra. S.A. who was standing at arm's length distance and who saw the Respondent straighten the collar of A.P., saw no touching at all of C.B. on the occasion in question in the cafeteria. J.P. was also a student in Ms. Edenfield's class, and in the Respondent's class, during the Fall semester of 2000. During that time prior to Thanksgiving, or prior to the November 20, 2000, alleged incident, J.P. contends that the Respondent touched her from four to six times on her back with his hand going inside her shirt. J.P. stated that when the Respondent patted her on the back he would occasionally remark that her art work was good and make other comments of that nature. J.P. testified, on cross-examination, that the alleged placing of the Respondent's hand inside her shirt did not occur on each of those occasions and then abruptly changed her testimony, upon re-direct, to state that the Respondent put his hand inside her shirt on every occasion. J.P. did not report the alleged inappropriate touching incidents immediately after they occurred. J.P. talked with A.P. on November 20, 2000, when A.P. contended that the Respondent had touched her. On the evening of November 20, 2000, A.P.'s mother called J.P.'s mother regarding A.P.'s allegations. Following that conversation, J.P.'s mother woke J.P. up to speak with her about the Respondent. The next morning, prompted by and accompanied by her parents, J.P. complained to Ms. Grondin, the school principal, about the Respondent's alleged inappropriate touching of her. The Respondent frequently patted students on the back for the purpose of consolation, encouragement or in a congratulatory manner. The Respondent pats the back of both male and female students many times a day. When the Respondent patted J.P. on the back, he would praise her regarding the quality of her art work and make other congratulatory comments to her. The Respondent has no memory of ever placing his hand on J.P.'s front or back in which any part of his hand protruded beneath her clothing. He never intentionally came into contact with the bare skin on J.P.'s back. It is determined that the Respondent did not touch J.P. in an inappropriate manner during the fall semester of 2000. If he did touch J.P. it was in an innocuous manner in which he touches all his students male and female. The testimony by J.P. that the Respondent put his hand beneath her cloths or inside her shirt is not persuasive and is not credible. None of the three complainants' academic performance appeared to have suffered during the time of and as a result of the alleged conduct of the Respondent. In fact, J.P. was a straight "A" student, while A.P. and C.B. were straight "A" students or "A/B" honor roll students. There is no evidence of any conduct or attitude on the part of the three complainants, before the proceeding, which would indicate that they were upset or nervous concerning any attitude or conduct on the part of the Respondent. The School Board maintains a policy prohibiting sexual harassment. Section 3.54 of the Nassau County School Board Rules contains that policy. The policy defines "Sexual Harassment" as: Consisting of unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other inappropriate oral, written or physical conduct of a sexual nature when . . . such conduct substantially interferes with . . . a student's work performance or creates an intimidating hostile or offensive . . . school environment. The Respondent was disciplined by the Board for violating its sexual harassment policy, Section 3.54. Specifically, the "inappropriate touching" alleged in the letter of suspension of November 22, 2000, referred to the prohibited "inappropriate touching" in the Board policy which is designated the prohibition of sexual harassment. Dr. Ruis, the superintendent, opined that the alleged touching by the Respondent was inappropriate based upon his interpretation of the sexual harassment policy of the School Board. His interpretation did not take into account any intent requirement which the Board policy itself does require. His opinion that the touching, if it occurred, was inappropriate and that the Respondent had lost effectiveness based upon the incident becoming public knowledge is wholly dependent upon the complete accuracy of the students' allegations and his interpretation of the School Board policy which will be treated in the Conclusions of Law below. It is determined that the testimony offered by J.P., A.P. and C.B., is not persuasive. It was not preponderantly demonstrated by their testimony that the touchings or all of them even occurred at all, aside from the one occasion when the Respondent straightened A.P.'s collar, which testimony was corroborated by the testimony of J.A. Moreover, even if some of the touchings occurred, it was not shown that they were inappropriate or had any sexual intent or motive because, for one thing, testimony concerning whether the Respondent's hand was beneath any of the complaining witnesses' clothing or not or the degree to which it purportedly was, was contradictory and, under the totality of the circumstances found above is simply not credible and persuasive. Consequently, to the extent that any touching occurred at all, it was not shown to be other than a mere innocent, innocuous pat on the back, or similar touching, with no sexual intent, motive or overtones associated with it. Given the totality of the circumstances established by the above Findings of Fact, as to where and under what conditions all of the touchings occurred, if at all, and particularly those described by J.P. and C.B. as purportedly having occurred on their persons at the dates, times and places described in their testimony, it is determined that, if any touching occurred at all, it was innocuous, innocent and of a non-sexual intent, and nature. Therefore, it was not inappropriate.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the School Board of Nassau County dismissing the complaint against the Respondent and reinstating the Respondent to his former position without diminution or loss in pay, benefits or other emoluments of his former position. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. Michael Ruff Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary F. Aspros, Esquire Meyer and Brooks, P.A. 2544 Blairstone Pines Drive Post Office Box 1547 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Brian T. Hayes, Esquire Brian T. Hayes, P.A. 245 East Washington Street Monticello, Florida 32344 John L. Ruis, Ed.D Superintendent of Schools Nassau County School District 1201 Atlantic Avenue Fernandina Beach, Florida 32034 Honorable Charlie Crist Commission of Education The Capitol, Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Petitioner was subjected to race and gender discrimination, sexual harassment/hostile work environment, and retaliation, as alleged in her Petition for Relief.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner, a 36-year-old Caucasian female, was employed by Respondent as a sales associate. She first worked for Respondent at its Sebastian, Florida, store where she started in June 2006. She voluntarily resigned from the Sebastian store in October 2006 and was hired by Respondent's Merritt Island, Florida, store one week later. Respondent owns and operates an appliance retail store in Central Florida. Respondent employs more than 15 people. At some time during Petitioner's employment, John Barnaba, an operations manager who rotated among several stores, said things to her that she found "unacceptable." For example, "You would look good on my Harley," "You look like a biker chick," and "You must be anorexic." He also clapped his hands behind her and said, "hurry, hurry, hurry." She reported Mr. Barnaba's conduct to Phil Roundy, her manager and manager of the Merritt Island store, who said "That's just the way he is," or words to that effect. She was unaware of any other action undertaken by Mr. Roundy regarding her complaint. In January 2007, Petitioner began a voluntary sexual relationship with Mr. Roundy, which involved at some point, Petitioner and Mr. Roundy living together. This relationship lasted until April 29, 2007, when the parties separated. She and Mr. Roundy "got back together in May, about a week after her termination." Mr. Roundy did not sexually harass Petitioner based on the voluntary nature of their relationship, nor did he sexually harass Petitioner between April 29 and May 18, 2007. After Petitioner and Mr. Roundy separated, he started treating her "differently." She reports that he became critical of her and would not assist her. Respondent has published an "information resource for common questions and concerns" titled, "Associate Handbook" that addresses sexual harassment and presents a grievance procedure for employees who believe they have been subjected to unfair treatment. It contemplates reporting the unfair treatment to (1) "your immediate manager"; (2) the store manager; or (3) "[s]hould the problem, however, be of a nature which you do not feel free to discuss with your manager, you are encouraged to discuss the problem in confidence directly with Human Resources." Petitioner requested a transfer to another store on May 1, 2007. She requested the transfer before Mr. Roundy started treating her "differently." She called Human Resources on May 9 and 15, 2007; it is unclear as to whether she called to check on the requested transfer or to report the alleged sexual harassment. She did not timely pursue any recourse suggested in the Associate Handbook. On May 9, 2007, Mr. Barnaba, the operations manager mentioned above, authored an email that characterized several of Petitioner's activities of that work day as "completely unprofessional and insubordinate." The following day, Mr. Roundy emailed his supervisor that Petitioner had gone through his private, business-related emails and discovered Mr. Barnaba's May 9, 2007, email. He also related several incidents that he thought unprofessional and that reflected bad customer service. He advised that Petitioner accused Barnaba and himself of conspiring to try to terminate her. Petitioner was scheduled to work on May 16 and 17, 2007, but did not report to work. She was scheduled to work on May 18, 2007; as a result, Kevin Draco, a risk manager for Respondent, went to the Merritt Island store to interview her. When Petitioner did not appear, management made the decision to terminate Petitioner for "absenteeism."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of April, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Maurice Arcadier, Esquire 2815 West New Haven Avenue, Suite 303 Melbourne, Florida 32904 Christopher J. Coleman, Esquire Schillinger & Coleman, P.A. 1311 Bedford Drive, Suite 1 Melbourne, Florida 32940
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Andrew Anthony Taylor (“Petitioner”), timely filed a petition under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Act, chapter 961, Florida Statutes (2016)(“the Act”); and, if so, whether Petitioner demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, his actual innocence, thereby entitling him to monetary compensation under the Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner seeks compensation pursuant to the Act after serving a prison term of 25 years for the sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, C.J. The jury verdict was vacated after C.J., in 2014, recanted her accusation that Petitioner sexually abused her in 1990, when she was eight years old. The undersigned will begin with a discussion of the events in 1990, when C.J. first reported the allegation of sexual abuse against Petitioner to Dr. Valerie Rao, a rape treatment medical examiner. On the evening of March 10, 1990, C.J. was brought to the Jackson Memorial Hospital Roxcy Bolton Rape Treatment Center by her mother and grandmother, at which time C.J. came under the care of Dr. Rao. Dr. Rao obtained a detailed history from C.J., during which C.J. reported that she had been sexually abused by her stepfather, “Andrew,” at two different locations--her old house and her new house. According to C.J., the most recent sexual encounter was when she was awoken by Petitioner on “Friday night,” March 8, 1990, and told to get up and go to her mother’s bed. C.J. did so, and Petitioner then told her to take off her pajamas, which she did. According to C.J., Petitioner got on top of her, put his “private part” in her, began kissing her, and put his mouth on her “private part.” C.J. also stated Petitioner made her touch his “private part,” and that he touched her in the anal area. C.J. also stated Petitioner often put his “private part” in her mouth. C.J. also stated Petitioner told her that if she told anyone, he would kill her. After obtaining the history, Dr. Rao examined C.J. and observed multiple bruises on her right arm and thighs, and abrasions on her back and on her left breast. The bruises and abrasions were caused when C.J.’s mother beat her with a baseball bat after C.J. told her mother of Petitioner’s sexual abuse. Dr. Rao immediately reported the mother to law enforcement, and C.J.’s mother was arrested at the rape treatment center for aggravated child abuse. Dr. Rao conducted a vaginal examination of C.J. and used a colposcope to observe and document the status of C.J.’s hymen. Dr. Rao observed and documented several healed tears of the hymen, which made the opening of C.J.’s hymen bigger than it should be for a child of her age. According to Dr. Rao, C.J. did not show any natural signs of progression of the hymen tissue that might be present due to a child approaching puberty. Dr. Rao persuasively and credibly testified at hearing that C.J.’s history was consistent with her physical examination. According to Dr. Rao, the healed tears could have resulted from Respondent “trying to push his penis into her” consistent with C.J.’s history. Dr. Rao acknowledged the tears also could have been caused by a finger, a pencil, or any object that is bigger than the opening of the hymen. However, no evidence was presented at hearing indicating that a finger, pencil, or any other object was placed in the opening of C.J.’s hymen. Dr. Rao further acknowledged there was no physical evidence that she could discern or collect that identified Petitioner as the assailant in this case. However, in 1990, obtaining DNA samples and the gathering of other types of physical evidence in an effort to specifically identify perpetrators of sexual abuse were not as advanced and reliable as it is today. Following Dr. Rao’s examination on March 10, 1990, C.J. was separated from her mother, and her mother no longer had custody of her. C.J. lived with her maternal great grandmother, and without her mother in her life, until she was 16 years old. On March 27, 1990, Mercy Restani, a trained interviewer who was employed by the Dade County Children’s Center within the office of the State Attorney, interviewed C.J. at the children’s center. C.J. provided a detailed history to Ms. Restani. C.J. told Ms. Restani that the sexual abuse by Petitioner happened in the old house and at the new house. C.J. told Ms. Restani that Petitioner would get her out of her bedroom and take her into her mother’s bedroom. C.J. told Ms. Restani that Petitioner would touch her “pocketbook” (the child’s word for a vagina) with his “private” (the child’s word for penis). C.J. told Dr. Restani that Petitioner got on top of her, that he moved very fast, and that it hurt when he did so. C.J. said Petitioner touched her breasts, put his mouth on her “pocketbook,” and his “private” in her mouth. C.J. also told Ms. Restani that Petitioner told her he would kill her if she told anyone. Ms. Restani asked C.J. if she had told her mother or anyone about what had happened to her. C.J. told Ms. Restani that she did not tell her mother because she was afraid. C.J. told Ms. Restani that her mother “had been asking her for several days if Andrew had been messing with her.” When C.J. eventually told her mother what had happened, C.J. said her mother beat her with a baseball bat. On April 3, 1990, C.J. was interviewed by a clinical forensic psychologist, Manuel E. Alvarez, Ph.D. The purpose of the interview was to assess C.J.’s current mental status and emotional therapeutic needs. According to Dr. Alvarez, C.J. was able to distinguish between the truth and a lie. C.J. had the intelligence to comprehend what had happened to her, to be able to relate it to others, and she was competent to testify. C.J. provided a detailed history to Dr. Alvarez. Dr. Alvarez observed that C.J. was able to provide a synopsis of her living arrangements at the time of the incidents. C.J. identified her stepfather, “Andrew,” as the perpetrator of the sexual abuse. C.J. told Dr. Alvarez it occurred at the old house and current house. C.J. told Dr. Alvarez it occurred when Petitioner would wake her, take her into the room, and tell her to get onto the bed. C.J. was reluctant to verbally tell Dr. Alvarez what Petitioner did to her, but C.J. wrote it down on a piece of paper (Petitioner’s Exhibit 4) in her own handwriting: He would get on me. He would start moving fast on me. He would take out his private part. On my private part and In my mouth. C.J. also told Dr. Alvarez that after the incidents, Petitioner threatened to kill her if she told anyone about it. On April 5, 1990, C.J. executed an affidavit, attesting to the fact of her name, that she was eight years old, that she lived with her mother and Petitioner at a specific street address in Dade County, Florida, and that: Early in the morning on Friday, March 9, 1990, Andrew woke me up and took me to his bedroom. Andrew told me to take off my panties. He touched my breasts. He put his private part into my pocketbook. It hurt. He kissed me on my mouth and on my pocketbook. He had done this before. He told me he would kill me if I told. My mother asked me if anyone was messing with me. For several days I wouldn’t tell her. When I did tell her what Andrew did, she beat me with a baseball bat. In August 1990, C.J.’s mother entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of aggravated child abuse against C.J. She was adjudicated guilty, sentenced to community control, and ordered not to have any contact with C.J. until approved by the court. On October 22, 1990, C.J. gave a videotaped deposition in Petitioner’s criminal case, in which she provided details of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. In the deposition, C.J. described how Petitioner woke her up, took her to her mother’s room, touched her “pocketbook” with his mouth, and placed his “wee-wee” in her “pocketbook.” C.J. testified he moved his body around while putting his “wee-wee” in her “pocketbook,” and that it hurt when he did so. She testified that on another evening, Petitioner woke her up again, took her to her mother’s room, and touched her “pocketbook” with his hand moving up and down as he did so. She testified it happened at the new house and at the old house. Petitioner’s criminal jury trial was held in March 1991, before the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, in the case of State of Florida v. Andrew Anthony Taylor, Case No. F90-009928. At Petitioner’s criminal trial, C.J. testified via closed circuit television that Petitioner came to her bedroom, woke her up, and took her to her mother’s room. C.J. testified that she was wearing pajamas and panties and that Petitioner removed them. Using anatomically correct dolls, C.J. showed the jury that Petitioner touched her vagina with his hand and put his mouth on her breasts. She further indicated that Petitioner put his mouth on her vagina and demonstrated how he put his penis in her mouth and vagina. C.J. testified that it hurt when Petitioner placed his penis in her “private part.” She testified she did not tell her mother about this that night because Petitioner said he would do something bad to her. C.J. testified that another incident occurred that same week where Petitioner did the same things to her. C.J. also testified Petitioner put something “greasy” on his “private part” before he put his “private part” in her “private part.” C.J. indicated Petitioner’s sexual abuse of her also occurred at the old house. C.J. testified that when she told her mother about Petitioner’s sexual abuse of her after the last incident, her mother became upset and hurt her. C.J. testified that when she told Dr. Rao she got all the bruises when her mother hit her with a baseball bat, it was the first time her mother ever hit her with a bat. C.J. testified she has not been able to live with or have contact with her mom since her mother hurt her. C.J.’s mother did not testify at the criminal trial against Petitioner because she had an open warrant for her arrest at the time for violating her community control. Petitioner testified at his criminal trial. Although Petitioner denied he sexually abused C.J., he acknowledged that he was C.J.’s stepfather; he married C.J.’s mother in 1989; he had a son with C.J.’s mother in 1998; he was having an extramarital affair with another woman; and while he divided his time between Maryland and Miami because of work, he was sleeping in the same home as C.J. during the timeframe that C.J. indicated she had been sexually abused by him. Following the criminal trial, Petitioner was convicted on March 15, 1991, of three counts of capital sexual battery and one count of lewd and lascivious behavior for the sexual abuse of C.J. Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison on the three capital offenses. The judgment and sentences were per curiam affirmed on appeal in Taylor v. State, 610 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). After reporting the incidents of sexual abuse, C.J. went through counseling two times per week for several years. At no time did C.J. tell any therapists that she was not sexually abused by Petitioner. In 2006, C.J. was approached at her grandmother’s home by a male private investigator for Petitioner. The investigator wanted to ask C.J. questions about what happened with Petitioner, but C.J. refused to speak with the investigator. In either late 2013 or early 2014, C.J. was again approached by a private investigator for Petitioner, this time a female who came to C.J.’s place of employment (“Walmart”). The investigator wanted to ask C.J. if anything had happened with Petitioner. In response, C.J. immediately told her “no.” The investigator then gave C.J. a card, and C.J. told the investigator she would call her in couple of weeks. On February 17, 2014, C.J. executed an affidavit formally recanting the accusation that Petitioner sexually abused her when she was eight years old. In this affidavit, C.J. asserted now, at the age of 32, that she made the allegation because her mother was either drunk or high on drugs who would ask her “if anybody touched me inappropriately.” C.J. asserted that late one night after telling her mother that nobody touched me, her mother beat her with a baseball bat and started yelling, “did Andrew touch you.” C.J. asserted that after telling her mother no, her mother began to beat her and beat her for hours. C.J. asserted that after an extensive beating, she told her mother that “Andrew” had touched her so that she would stop beating her, and after telling her that Andrew touched her, the beating stopped. However, by this time, C.J. had developed a close relationship with her half-brother Andrew Taylor, Jr. C.J. further asserted: A while back, I began to talk with my half- brother, Andrew Jr., and would see him interacting with his own son. This started me thinking about what I had done and only I knew the real truth that Andrew was innocent. My conscience started bothering me every time I would see Andrew, Jr. playing and interacting with his son and it got to the point where I couldn’t sleep and hardly eat. I finally called my half-brother, Andrew Jr., and told him I needed to meet with him and explain what had happened regarding his father. I told Andrew Jr. that his father never touched me or bothered me sexually and that I was so sorry for his dad not being in his life because of what I did. I asked Andrew Jr. to forgive me and he agreed. I also asked Andrew Jr. what I should do and who I could write in order to correct this situation. Investigator Jeannie Rogers came to see me a few months ago and spoke to me about coming forward. I have finally gotten the courage to stand up and do what is right. On June 23, 2014, Petitioner filed a Motion for Post- Conviction Relief Based on Newly Discovered Evidence in Case No. F90-009928. The newly discovered evidence was C.J.’s recantation of the sexual abuse allegation against Petitioner. On April 2, 2015, an evidentiary hearing was held on the motion before Circuit Court Judge Diane Ward. At the hearing before Judge Ward, Petitioner presented the live testimony of C.J., who testified she made up the allegation that Petitioner sexually abused her because her mother beat her with a baseball bat to make her provide a false allegation against Petitioner. C.J. testified she told her mother Petitioner sexually abused her because she wanted the beating to stop. However, C.J. also testified when she told her mother that Petitioner sexually abused her, the beating did not stop, and her mother continued to beat her with the baseball bat for not telling her about the sexual abuse sooner. During the hearing before Judge Ward, C.J. acknowledged she provided specific details of sexual abuse by Petitioner to Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, Dr. Alvarez, and in her prior testimony in the underlying criminal proceedings involving Petitioner. C.J. was asked how she could have had such knowledge of sexual activity as an eight year old in order to provide the details that she did to Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, Dr. Alvarez, and in her testimony in the underlying criminal proceedings. In response, C.J. testified she came up with the details by watching cable television and walking in on her mother and Petitioner while they were having sex. At the hearing before Judge Ward, Respondent presented the live testimony of C.J.’s mother, who acknowledged she was a cocaine addict in March 1990. C.J.’s mother testified on direct examination that she recalled an incident in which she had returned home one night on March 5, 1990, and found C.J. lying in bed with her hands covering her front “private parts.” She testified that she could smell a “sexual scent” in the room and that she asked C.J. “what was wrong.” She testified C.J. did not indicate anything was wrong, but she was still suspicious something was wrong because of the sexual odor in the room. C.J.’s mother testified that due to this suspicion, she asked C.J. a second time on March 9, 1990, if “anyone had been messing with her.” According to C.J.’s mother, C.J. indicated this time that Petitioner “[h]ad been bothering her,” which meant that he had been sexually molesting her. C.J.’s mother testified on direct examination that when C.J. began telling her specific details of the abuse by Petitioner, she became irate and beat C.J. with a baseball bat. However, C.J.’s mother’s testimony as to when she began to beat C.J. with a baseball bat is inconsistent. C.J. and her mother acknowledged their relationship over the past several years has been good, and there is no current animosity between them. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, Judge Ward orally announced her ruling that C.J.’s change in testimony is newly discovered evidence. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ward specifically found C.J.’s testimony “reliable and credible.” Judge Ward commented she “had the opportunity to view her, and observe her during the testimony, and as well as consider any motive that she had for the recantation of her testimony.” On the other hand, Judge Ward specifically found the live testimony of C.J.’s mother to be “incredible.” In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ward commented that at the time of the events, she was by her own admission using drugs, and she had a poor recollection of the events, which is attributable to her drug use rather than to the passage of time. Judge Ward further stated: There were multiple lengthy pauses between the attorney’s questions and her answers where she seemed to be searching in her memory for answers. The Court observed that she seemed very hesitant and unsure of her own recollection of the events, and I further find that this is attributable to her extensive drug use, and that, and her intoxication on drugs at the time that this occurred. With regards to the beating, but with a baseball bat, although at some times she did acknowledge, did state that she beat her child with the baseball bat after she implicated the Defendant in the sexual assault, there were times that she said that she couldn’t recall and it could have been before she implicated her. And this is the most damaging testimony you could possibly have given the fact that there was no direct evidence otherwise implicating the Defendant as the person who sexually assaulted her. She did have six healed tears on her hymen which could have occurred at any time, and been caused by any other person. There was no DNA, blood evidence, semen, eyewitnesses, or a confession, so the only evidence that the State had, or the strongest evidence that the State had was the victim’s testimony, which was obviously obtained through a beating with a baseball bat by her mother when she was a very tiny child. The pictures of her are very sad at such a young age. There is no doubt that if a jury were to hear that the victim, hear from the victim that the Defendant was not the person that sexually abused her, and that she lied because her mother beat her with a baseball bat when she was eight years old, would have produced an, could have, would have produced an acquittal on retrial, and that the Defendant would probably be acquitted on retrial, so based on the foregoing I’m going to grant the motion for post-conviction relief. We need to schedule it for trial now. I think it has to be set in ninety days; isn’t that correct? Okay, I’ll answer my own question yes. Pet. Ex. 14, pp. 245-247. On April 2, 2015, a written order was entered vacating the finding of guilt, judgment, and sentence, and a hearing was scheduled for April 10, 2015, at which time a new trial date would be set. On April 10, 2015, the State announced a nolle prose of all criminal charges against Petitioner. On June 30, 2015, Petitioner timely filed a Petition to Establish Wrongful Incarceration in Case No. F90-009928. On July 31, 2015, Respondent filed a response contesting the petition. After the filing of the initial petition, a grand jury returned an indictment recharging Petitioner for the same crimes. C.J. was notified of the grand jury proceeding, but she did not appear or request a continuance. After the criminal case was re-filed, Respondent and Petitioner were unable to reach a settlement. On December 12, 2016, the second set of charges were nolle prossed. On January 25, 2017, Petitioner filed an amended petition. On March 17, 2017, pursuant to section 961.03(4)(a), Judge Ward issued an “Order Finding That Defendant Was a ‘Wrongfully Incarcerated Person’ and Is ‘Eligible for Compensation’ Pursuant to Section 961.03, Florida Statutes.” Judge Ward held that the petition was timely filed and that Petitioner met his burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, his “actual innocence” of the charges. Central to Judge Ward’s conclusion that C.J.’s recantation is reliable and that Petitioner met his burden of establishing his actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence is that she had the opportunity to observe C.J. and her mother’s demeanor when they testified live at the April 2, 2015, evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief. Judge Ward’s findings are largely based on credibility assessments of C.J. and her mother based on observations of their demeanor while testifying. In concluding that Petitioner established his “actual innocence” by a preponderance of the evidence, Judge Ward relied on the evidence presented at the April 2, 2015, evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief. In the instant proceeding, however, Petitioner failed to meet his burden of establishing his actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. Whether Petitioner is actually innocent turns on whether Petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence that C.J.’s recantation is reliable. The evidence presented in this case does not clearly and convincingly establish the reliability of C.J.’s recantation. To begin with, C.J. consistently provided details about sexual conduct perpetrated against her by Petitioner in her visits with Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, and Dr. Alvarez, and in her prior deposition and trial testimony in the underlying criminal proceeding against Petitioner. C.J. gave details about how Petitioner would wake her up and take her to another room. She gave details about oral sex by Petitioner on herself and that she performed on Petitioner. She gave details about Petitioner using a lubricant on his penis. She gave details about how he would place his penis in her vagina and move up and down really fast. She said it hurt when he did so. Dr. Rao persuasively and credibly testified that the injuries to C.J.’s hymen were consistent with her history. C.J. consistently stated in 1990 and 1991 that her mother beat her with a baseball bat after she told her of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. Over 20 years later, C.J.’s story changed, and she stated that her mother beat her with a baseball bat before she told her of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. In her recantation affidavit, C.J. stated that after telling her mother that Petitioner touched her, the beating stopped. However, in the hearing before Judge Ward, C.J. testified that her mother continued to beat her with the baseball bat after she told her about the abuse for not telling her about the abuse sooner. From March 10, 1990, when C.J. was removed from her mother until she was 16 years old, C.J. had many opportunities to come forward and recant the allegation of abuse against Petitioner. During this time, there was no reason for C.J. to fear her mother because her mother was not in C.J.’s life. Subsequently, C.J. and her mother developed a good relationship. However, Petitioner waited almost 24 years to recant. C.J. recanted after developing a relationship with her half-brother, Andrew Taylor, Jr. When Andrew Taylor, Jr., turned 18 years old, he began a relationship with his father, Petitioner. Prior to recanting, C.J. regretted her half-brother did not get to spend quality time with Petitioner because Petitioner was in prison. C.J.’s development of a relationship with her half-brother and her desire that he have a strong relationship with Petitioner could be a motive for her recantation. C.J. did not appear before the grand jury, she did not request a continuance, and she was not called as a witness at either of the hearings in the instant matter. The undersigned lacked the opportunity to observe C.J.’s demeanor because she was not called to testify as a live witness. However, the undersigned had the opportunity to observe C.J.’s demeanor while testifying in her videotaped deposition in 1990, at which time she testified credibly and persuasively to facts demonstrating that Petitioner sexually abused her. Petitioner was called as a witness at the August 8, 2017, hearing, at which he was simply asked on direct examination if he ever molested C.J., to which he responded no. Petitioner’s testimony at the hearing was unpersuasive.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether Respondent’s license as a psychologist in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein the Board of Psychology was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing and professional discipline of psychologists in Florida. Respondent is and has been licensed as a psychologist in Florida and is subject to the jurisdiction of the Board of Psychology. During the period April 11, 1995, through August 7, 1995, Respondent was employed as a psychologist at the University of South Florida Counseling Center for Human Development. In that capacity, Respondent saw the Complainant, K.R., on several occasions and established a psychologist-client relationship with her. At the initial visit of K.R. to his office, Respondent conducted an initial intake evaluation of her and, in his client notes, defined the goal of his continued treatment of her as being to assist Ms. K.R. in stabilizing her depression; and to clarify her needs and patterns with regard to her career and relationships. Upon completing the intake evaluation of K.R., Respondent referred her to himself as treating therapist, and between the initial meeting and the end of August 1995, met with her approximately thirteen times. Review of Respondent’s notes regarding his sessions with K.R. reveals that they discussed her relationship with her parents; her relationships with men; her ability to deal with her emotions, her anxiety, and depression. K.R. relates that during many of their sessions, Respondent told her she had nice legs and was very sexy. He also told her of his personal life, including his dissatisfaction with his marriage, and it appears that he met with her outside his professional office on a purely social basis. K.R. claims Respondent told her not to tell anyone about their friendship outside the clinic. The relationship between Respondent and K.R. culminated in their engaging in sexual intercourse which resulted in her becoming pregnant. The pregnancy was subsequently aborted. As a result of their relationship, K.R. filed a complaint against Respondent with the Board of Psychology relating the sexual nature of their relationship. Subsequent to the filing of K.R.’s complaint against Respondent, and the Agency For Health Care Administration’s (Agency) filing of an Administrative Complaint against him, the Agency deposed Dr. George J. Rockwell, Jr., a retired psychologist with a specialty in school psychology. Dr. Rockwell did not meet with Respondent or speak with him in any capacity. He examined the file collected in this case regarding the allegations against Respondent, and from his review of all the material, concluded that Respondent had established a psychologist/patient relationship with K.R. This relationship involves trust and the generation in the patient of a basic belief that the psychologist has the skills and knowledge that would assist the patient in dealing with whatever problems he or she has. The patient develops the ability to talk to a non- critical, non-judgmental person in an effort to help him or her deal with their problems or concerns. The psychologist has the responsibility to create an emotionally safe environment for the patient. In this process the patient is often made vulnerable. The patient must be open with the psychologist and feel comfortable in sharing emotions and incidents which he or she would most likely not be able to share with others. It is without question a special relationship, and in Dr. Rockwell’s opinion, it is unlikely that a patient will work with a psychologist and not form that special relationship. This special relationship places upon the psychologist special responsibilities toward the patient. These include abiding by the laws and rules relating to the practice of psychology; having respect for the patient; and keeping all matters confided by the patient confidential. In addition, the psychologist has the responsibility to comport himself or herself in a manner so as to maintain a professional relationship and distance with the patient. Specifically, sexual relationships between a psychologist and his or her patient are normally prohibited as being beyond boundaries that should not be crossed. It is the psychologist’s responsibility to set the limits on behavior so as to prevent an inappropriate relationship from developing. This applies even if the patient initiates sexual advances. These advances would not excuse the psychologist from professional responsibility toward the patient. In the event the psychologist detects what appear to be inappropriate sexual advances from the patient, the psychologist had a duty to discuss this with the patient; talk about the nature of the psychologist/patient relationship; and explain that such a relationship would not be appropriate. The constrictors on the professional are even more specific in the event the psychologist finds himself or herself sexually attracted to the patient. Under no circumstances should the professional act on those feelings, but should evaluate the situation to ensure that those feelings are in no way interfering with the therapeutic relationship. There is absolutely no situation which Dr. Rockwell can think of in which it would be appropriate for a therapist to engage in sexual relations with a patient, either during or after termination of a therapy session. Inappropriate sexual contact between a therapist and a patient can have severe and deleterious effects on a patient. These might include feelings of guilt and depression, based on the patient’s belief that the inappropriate behavior was his or her fault. The patient might also feel embarrassment and be reluctant to undergo further treatment. Further, the patient would most likely lose trust in the involved therapist and potential other therapists. Dr. Rockwell concluded that notwithstanding Respondent’s contention that he saw K.R. solely for the purpose of career counseling, and at no time entered a psychologist/patient relationship with her, Respondent’s clinical notes regarding K.R. clearly indicate a professional psychologist/patient relationship was formed. An independent review of the records supports that conclusion, and it is so found. Even were the counseling limited solely to career counseling, it would still constitute counseling, the conduct of which is covered by the standards of the profession. Here, however, Dr. Rockwell is convinced that Respondent’s conduct toward K.R., as alleged, constituted sexual misconduct in the practice of psychological counseling which fell below the minimum standards of performance and professional activities when measured against generally prevailing peer performance. It is so found.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Psychology enter a final order in this matter finding Respondent guilty of all Counts in the Administrative Complaint, and revoking his license to practice psychology in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Maureen L. Holz, Esquire Williams & Holz, P.A. 211 East Virginia Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 O. C. Allen, Qualified Representative 314 West Jefferson Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Dr. Kaye Howerton, Executive Director Board of Psychology 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Amy M. Jones, Acting General Counsel Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner based on her sex in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), and by retaliating against her contrary to Section 760.10(7), Florida Statutes (2008).
Findings Of Fact Respondent hired Petitioner as Finance Director in September 2005. Petitioner took the position during a very challenging time because the budget was immediately due, an audit was six months past due, and allegations of embezzlement had been lodged against the former finance director. Petitioner successfully managed these challenges. Petitioner reported directly to the City Manager. The City Manager reported to the City Commissioners. The City Manager directed the day-to-day supervision and management of Petitioner and other department heads. Bill Veach was the City Manager when Respondent hired Petitioner. Mr. Veach gave Petitioner excellent performance evaluations. Additionally, Randy Bush, City Commissioner from 2002 to 2006, and Bob Mish, City Commissioner from 2004 to 2006, commended Petitioner for her work. At the time of the hearing, Ron Vath had been a City Commissioner for eight years. Mr. Vath frequently went to the City Hall to pick up his mail. He often asked Petitioner to compile information or answer questions related to finance matters, especially during budget time. Initially, Mr. Vath was satisfied with Petitioner's work performance. In addition to seeking financial information from Petitioner, Mr. Vath made inappropriate sexual comments to Petitioner. For instance, Mr. Vath would look at Petitioner and say "yum yum." He commented on Petitioner's clothes as being sexy and told her that she "had very nice looking legs." On one occasion, Mr. Vath and Petitioner were standing near the copy machine. Mr. Vath stated in a very low tone, "I don't know what's been going on with my mind lately, it could be the new medication I'm on, but I've been having very erotic dreams lately and you've been in some of them." Sometime in June or July 2006, Mr. Vath was in or near Petitioner's office cubicle discussing some figures. When Mr. Vath became very quiet, Petitioner inquired if he was okay. Mr. Vath then leaned across Petitioner's desk, looked her straight in the eye, and said, "I'm okay, but I have a very big hard on right now." Petitioner pushed her chair away from her desk and told Mr. Vath, "You need to go home and take that up with your wife." After Mr. Vath's inappropriate comment, Petitioner saw James Ramer, Respondent's Water Plant Superintendent. Petitioner told Mr. Ramer that Mr. Vath had made a pass at her. Roger Free was Respondent's Chief of Police until September 2007. Petitioner told Chief Free about Mr. Vath's "hard on" comment. Chief Free advised Petitioner to follow Respondent's procedures and talk to Mr. Veach. A couple of days later, Petitioner verbally reported Mr. Vath's "hard on" comment to Mr. Veach. Mr. Veach suggested that Petitioner file a complaint. Petitioner told Mr. Veach that she did not want to file a written complaint because it might cause her trouble. Mr. Veach honored her request and did not make a written record of the complaint or perform any type of investigation. Bernard Murphy became Interim City Manager in September 2006. When he took the position, Petitioner was introduced to him as "someone people liked and could do good work." In November 2006, Petitioner told Mr. Murphy about Mr. Vath's "hard on" comment. Once again Petitioner decided that she did not want to make a formal complaint followed by an investigation. Mr. Murphy did not make a written record of the allegations, but he told Petitioner to let him know if it happened again. Petitioner requested that Mr. Murphy keep her concern about Mr. Vath's comment confidential. Mr. Murphy honored that request until he learned that Petitioner was telling other city employees and city commissioners. Mr. Murphy then questioned Mr. Vath, who denied making the inappropriate comment. Mr. Vath's attitude toward Petitioner immediately changed. He continued to question Petitioner about her work and to complain to Mr. Murphy about her job performance. However, Petitioner did not experience anymore specific instances of sexually inappropriate comments from Mr. Vath. At all times relevant here, Elizabeth Kania was Mr. Murphy's assistant/human resource director. Months after the incident occurred, Petitioner told Ms. Kania, in an informal conversation, about Mr. Vath's "hard on" comment. Petitioner told Ms. Kania that Petitioner would not report it unless it happened again. Petitioner complained on a regular basis to Ms. Kania about Mr. Vath's questions and requests for additional financial information that added to Petitioner's workload. Elizabeth Mathis was Respondent's utility services manager. Petitioner supervised Ms. Mathis whose workspace was approximately three feet from Petitioner's cubicle. At some point in time, Petitioner told Ms. Mathis about Mr. Vath's sexually inappropriate comment. Kathleen Doyle served as an accountant under Petitioner's supervision. Petitioner complained to Ms. Doyle about one sexually inappropriate comment by Mr. Vath. Ms. Doyle also observed that Petitioner took offense to Mr. Vath's questions. Mr. Murphy, Petitioner, and other members of Petitioner's staff often told off-color jokes to each other. They occasionally used vulgar language and made profane statements in the work place. As a participant in this type of inappropriate office behavior, Petitioner was in no position to complain. Occasionally, Mr. Murphy made specific inappropriate comments that Petitioner never complained of until she resigned. For example, he referred to his former assistant as having big tits. He also stated that his dermatologist was sexy and that a woman in a bathing suit outside his window was attractive. After returning from a humanitarian mission to India, Mr. Murphy stated that Indian women were sensual. These comments occurred over a period of many months. Initially, Petitioner and Mr. Murphy were on a first name basis. However, as time went on, Mr. Murphy began to have justifiable concerns about Petitioner's work performance. At times, Mr. Murphy would become angry and raise his voice at Petitioner. On another occasion, Mr. Murphy inappropriately used his finger to "flip a bird" at Petitioner as he walked off after a disagreement about Petitioner's work. However, there is no persuasive evidence that Mr. Murphy's inappropriate conduct was in retaliation for Petitioner's allegations against Mr. Vath. Mr. Murphy's only formal disciplinary action against Petitioner concerned an attendance issue. He gave Petitioner a written reprimand on April 8, 2008, because she misrepresented the reason for taking sick leave. Petitioner admits that she was not absent on April 7, 2008 due to illness. Instead, Petitioner was in Savannah, Georgia, interviewing for the position that she presently holds. The greater weight of the evidence refutes Petitioner's claim that she was constructively discharged. Petitioner first reported her allegation of sexually offensive behavior against Mr. Murphy in her resignation letter dated April 22, 2008. Specifically, Petitioner claimed that Mr. Murphy spoke about women as being "sensual" and that he made comments about bodily characteristics of women. Petitioner complained about Mr. Murphy's management style of verbal abuse as being belittling, demeaning, and offending. City Commissioner Jane Mealy investigated the complaints contained in Petitioner's resignation letter. Ms. Mealy was unable to substantiate the allegations of sexually inappropriate and harassing behavior. Petitioner had been looking for another job for over one and one-half years because of her low tolerance to criticism. Petitioner resigned her employment with Respondent only after she received an offer of employment from her current employer, Chatham Area Transit Authority. At all relevant times, Petitioner was aware of Respondent's sexual harassment policy. The policy defines sexual harassment as "[u]nwelcome sexual advances of whatever nature, requests for sexual favors or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature." See Section 2-200, Personnel Code of City of Flagler Beach (Personnel Code). Section 2-202 of the Personnel Code states as follows: The city shares a common belief that each employee should be able to work in an environment free of discrimination, and any form of harassment, based on race, color, religion, age, sex, pregnancy, national origin, handicap or marital status. To help assure that none of our employees feel that they are being subjected to harassment and in order to create a comfortable work environment, the city prohibits any offensive physical written or spoken conduct regarding any of these items, including conduct of a sexual nature. This includes: Unwelcome or unwanted advances, including sexual advances. Unwelcome requests or demands for favors, including sexual favors. Verbal or visual abuse or kidding that is oriented toward a prohibited form of harassment, including that which is sexually oriented and considered unwelcome. Any type of sexually oriented conduct or other prohibited form of harassment that would unreasonably interfere with work performance. Creating a work environment that is intimidating, hostile, abusive or offensive because of unwelcome or unwanted conversation, suggestions, requests, demands, physical contact or attentions, whether sexually oriented or other related to a prohibited form of harassment. If an employee believes that he or she is being subjected to any of these forms of harassment, or believes that he or she is being discriminated against because other employees are receiving favored treatment in exchange for sexual favors, he or she must bring this to the attention of appropriate persons in management. The very nature of harassment makes it virtually impossible to detect unless the person being harassed registers his or her discontent with the city's representative. Consequently, in order for the city to deal with the problem, the employee must report such offensive conduct or situation to the city manager. A record of the complaint and the findings will become a part of the file and will be maintained separately from the employee's personnel file. It is understood that any person electing to utilize this complaint resolution procedure will be treated courteously, the problem handled swiftly and confidentially, and the registering of a complaint will in no way be used against the employee, nor will it have an adverse impact on the individual's employment status.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael H. Bowling, Esquire Bell, Roper & Kohlmyer, P.A. 2707 East Jefferson Street Orlando, Florida 32803 Thomas A. Delegal, III, Esquire Delegal Law Offices, P.A. 424 East Monroe Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an act of discrimination or sexual harassment against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed as a payroll, accounts-payable clerk for Respondent's furniture store from May 23, 2001 until May 20, 2002. Respondent operates a furniture store located at 6886 North 9th Avenue, Pensacola, Florida 32504-7358. Five months after commencing her employment with Respondent, Petitioner began to look for a new job. Petitioner believes that Mr. Alan Reese, Respondent's office manager and Petitioner's direct supervisor, began to follow her home in August 2001. Petitioner believes that, after ceasing to follow her when she confronted him about it, Mr. Reese began to follow her home again two months later. Petitioner accused Mr. Reese of following her home on numerous occasions, peeking into her windows, and sitting in his car and watching her while she tended to her garden. Petitioner was permitted to come to work late during October 2001, on occasion, when she was looking for a new place to live. Petitioner did not get along with Serita Coefield, her fellow accounting clerk at the furniture store. They often had disputes over the handling of invoices. In May of 2002, Petitioner met with Barbara Hoard, the Escambia County/Pensacola Human Resource Coordinator, to discuss the alleged harassment by Mr. Reese. Ms. Hoard told her to inform her employer in writing of her concerns and explained the availability of filing a complaint with the FCHR or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. On May 15, 2002, Petitioner delivered a memo to Mr. Reese in which she accused him of following her home, touching her improperly in the workplace, and asking her questions about her personal life. She also sent, by certified mail, a copy of the memo to Elmer Githens, Respondent's president. After receiving the memo, Mr. Githens conferred with Mr. Reese, then issued a memo to Petitioner on May 17, 2002, in which he set forth her work schedule for the dates of April 29 through May 16, 2002. Petitioner's regular work hours were supposed to be 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., with an hour for lunch. The May 17 memo, which was based upon Petitioner's actual time cards, showed that her start time at work ranged from 8:18 a.m. to 11:38 a.m. and her end time ranged from 4:01 p.m. to 6:12 p.m. Petitioner clocked in for a full eight- hour workday on only four of fourteen days during the time period reflected in the memo. Later in the day on May 17, 2002, Mr. Githens issued a second memo to Petitioner in which he noted that Petitioner had yelled at him when he gave her the first memo, and accused Serita Coefield of "being out to get her." The memo further stated that Petitioner "has alienated every one [she] works with due to [her] attitude." The memo continued with a discussion of Petitioner's work hours which were to be 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. with at least a 30-minute lunch break every day. Petitioner was informed that this was her final warning about her tardiness and her inability to get along with her co-workers. The memo concluded with the words "[t]he next time you will be dismissed." On Monday, May 20, 2002, Petitioner's next workday, Petitioner clocked in at 10:37 a.m. She was given a memo that day dismissing her for "willful misconduct after receiving ample warnings that termination of your employment was imminent if you continued present behavior of coming to work late, not putting lunch on your time card, clocking out after 5pm without permission and causing disturbances with fellow employees for no reason." Petitioner claims that, on the day she was fired, she arrived at Respondent's parking lot at 8:00 a.m., but sat in her car because she was having a "panic attack" due to her belief that Mr. Reese was continuing to stalk her. Both Petitioner and Mr. Reese live east of Respondent and travel, at least part of the way, in the same direction and on the same roads to go home after work. Mr. Reese denies knowing the location of Petitioner's home. Mr. Reese has never been to Petitioner's home. Mr. Reese admits he drove home in the same direction as Petitioner on numerous occasions since she drove along one of the routes he routinely took home. No one witnessed the alleged stalking of Petitioner by Mr. Reese. Petitioner claims to have contacted the police by telephone, but never filed a police report concerning the alleged stalking by Mr. Reese.
Recommendation is, Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's claim for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 2005.
