Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral testimony and the documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner, L. L. Hiers was a "producer" of agricultural products in the state of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent, Jay Nichols, Inc. (Nichols) was a licensed "dealer in agricultural products" as defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes, issued license number 1547 by the Department, and bonded by U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (Fidelity) for the sum of $50,000.00 bond number 790103-10-115-88-1, with an effective date of March 22, 2988 and a termination date of March 22, 1989. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Nichols was authorized to do business in the state of Florida. The Complaint was timely filed by Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes. Prior to Petitioner selling or delivering any watermelons (melons) to Nichols, Petitioner and Nichols agreed verbally that: (a) Petitioner would sell Nichols melons on a per pound basis at a price to be quoted by Nichols on the day of shipment, (b) Petitioner would harvest and load the melons on trucks furnished by Nichols (c) a weight ticket with the weight of the truck before and after loading would be furnished to Petitioner; (d) Nichols or its agent in the field would have the authority to reject melons at the place of shipment (loading) which did not meet the quality or grade contracted for by Nichols; (e) the melons were to be of U.S. No. 1 grade and; (f) settlement was to be made within a reasonable time after shipment. Although Nichols assisted Petitioner in obtaining the crew to harvest and load the melons, Petitioner had authority over the crew and was responsible for paying the crew. On a daily basis, Petitioner would contact Nichols and obtain the price being paid for melons that day. The price was marked in the field book with the net weight of each load. Nichols contends that the price quoted each day was the general price melons were bringing on the market that day, but the price to be paid Petitioner was the price Nichols received for the melons at their destination minus a 1 cent per pound commission for Nichols, taking into consideration freight, if any. Nichols was not acting at Petitioner's agent in the sale of the melons for the account of the petitioner on a net return basis nor was Nichols acting as a negotiating broker between the Petitioner and the buyer. Nichols did not make the type of accounting to Petitioner as required by Section 604.22, Florida Statutes, had Nichols been Petitioner's agent. The prices quoted by Nichols to Petitioner each day was the agreed upon price to be paid for melons shipped that day subject to any adjustment for failure of the melons to meet the quality or grade contracted for by Nichols. On June 10, 1988, Petitioner contacted Nichols and was informed that the price to be paid for melons shipped that day was 6 cents per pound. This price was recorded in the field book with the net weight of each truckload of melons shipped that day. Petitioner shipped 4 loads of melons on June 10, 1988 but only 3 loads are in dispute, as follows: (a) load no. 10891 weighing 45,830 lbs. for which Nichols paid 3 cents per pound; (b) load no. 10892 weighing 43,950 lbs. for which Nichols paid 5 cents per pound and; (c) load 10893 weighing 47,190 lbs. for which Nichols paid 5 cents per pound. On June 22, 1988, Petitioner contacted Nichols and was informed that the price to be paid ford melons shipped that day was 5.25 cents per pound. This price was recorded in the field book with the net weight the loads shipped that day. Only load no. 10174 weighing 44,550 lbs. for which Nichols paid 3 cents per pound is in dispute. On June 23, 1988, Petitioner contacted Nichols and was informed that the price to be paid for melons shipped that day was 5.5 cents per pound. This price was recorded in the field book with the net weight of the loads shipped that day. Two loads were shipped, but only load no. 11227 weighing 48,490 pounds for which Nichols paid 5 cents per lbs. is in dispute. The differences in the price paid for each load and the agreed upon price are as follows: (a) load no. 10891-$1324.90; (b) load no. 10892-$479.50; (c) load no. 10893-$471.90; (d) load no. 11174-$891.00 and; (c) load no. 11227- $242.45. The total amount in dispute is $3,419.75. Nichols contends that load no. 10891 was rejected because it failed to pass government inspection due to quality, and that the quality of load nos. 10982, 10893, 1174 and 1122 was poor, resulting in a lower price than the price agreed upon. There was insufficient evidence to support this contention. Nichols has refused to pay Petitioner the difference between the agreed upon price for load nos. 10891, 10892, 10893, 11174 and 11227 and the price paid by Nichols as indicated on the settlement sheet. The difference is $3,419.75, and is owed to Petitioner by Nichols.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Jay Nichols, Inc. be ordered to pay to Petitioner, L. L. Hiers the sum of $3,419.75. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent, Jay Nichols, Inc. fails to timely pay Petitioner, L. L. Hiers as ordered, then Respondent, U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. be ordered to pay the Department as required by section 604.21, Florida Statutes, and that the Department reimburse the Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes. Respectfully submitted and entered this 20th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Carl Hiers, Qualified Representative Route 5, Box 339 Dunnellon, Florida 32630 Steve Nichols, Vice President Jay Nichols, Inc. Qualified Representative Post Office Box 1705 Lakeland, Florida 33802 Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Mallory Horne, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 513 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Ben Pridgeon, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture Lab Complex Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1650 U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. Post Office Box 1138 Baltimore, MD 21203
The Issue The dispute here involves the alleged non-payment for watermelons that the Petitioner claims to have sold to the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The case is being considered in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 604, Florida Statutes, which establishes the apparatus for settling disputes between Florida produce farmers and dealers who are involved with the farmers' products. Lyman Walker, a Florida farmer, contends by his complaint that five loads of watermelons grown and harvested in Florida, were sold directly to Mr. Pagano & Sons, Inc., in the person of Maurice Pagano, on the following dates, by the following types; in the following weight amounts; at the following price per pound, and for the following total price per load: June 2, 1977, small Charleston Gray Watermelons, 51,550 lbs. at .03-1/2, totaling $1,804.00 June 2, 1977, Charleston Grey Watermelons, 47,440 lbs. at .03-1/2, totaling $1,660 June 7, 1977, Charleston Grey Watermelons, 47,850 lbs. at .02, totaling $957 June 7, 1977, Charleston Gray Watermelons, 49,190 lbs. at .02, totaling $983 June 8, 1977, Charleston Grey Watermelons, approximately 46,000 lbs. at .02, totaling $920 Total for all loads $6,325. An examination of the testimony offered in the course of the hearing, supports the Petitioner's contention. The facts in this case also show that Maurice Pagan, acting in behalf of the Respondent gave money to the Petitioner for having the watermelons loaded for shipment. That amount was $2,500, and when deducted from the $6,325 total price leaves a balance owing to the Petitioner of $3,825. The Respondent has not paid the $3,825 which it agreed to pay to the Petitioner and under the facts of the agreement it is obligated to pay the Petitioner. One final matter should be dealt with and that pertains to the approximation of the weight of the June 8, 1977, load. The figure used is an approximation, because the Respondent's representative at the loading in Florida, Phil Pepper, took that load away and failed to return the weight ticket. This caused the Petitioner to have to approximate the weight and the approximation is accepted in determining the amount which the Respondent owes the Petitioner.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent be required to pay the Petitioner $3,825 for watermelons it purchased from the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jon D. Caminez, Esquire 1030 East Lafayette Street Suite 101 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Maurice Pagano 59 Brooklyn Terminal Market Brooklyn, New York 11236 L. Earl Peterson, Chief Bureau of License and Bond Division of Marketing Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Has Respondent VBJ Packing, Inc. (Respondent) paid Petitioner, Chastain- Bishop Farms (Petitioner) in full for watermelons represented by Respondent's load numbers 3002 and 3004 purchased from Petitioner during the 1995 watermelon season?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was a "producer" of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes. Watermelons come within the definition of "agricultural products" as defined in Section 604.15(3), Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed as a "dealer in agricultural products" as defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent was issued license number 8887 by the Department which is supported by Bond Number 137743741 in the amount of $75,000 written by Respondent Continental Casualty Company (Continental), as surety, with an inception date of January 1, 1995, and an expiration date of December 31, 1995. The Complaint was timely filed by Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes. Sometime during the week prior to Monday, May 8, 1995, Petitioner and Respondent entered into a verbal agreement which contained the following terms: (a) Petitioner would sell Respondent a semi-trailer load of medium size melons of good quality to be harvested and loaded by Petitioner onto a semi-trailer furnished by Respondent; (b) Respondent would have the right and opportunity to inspect the melons before or during loading; (c) Respondent would pay Petitioner fifteen cents ($0.15) per pound for the melons loaded onto the trailer; (d) upon delivery at Petitioner's farm, the melons became Respondent's property and Petitioner had no further obligation to Respondent concerning the melons; and (e) settlement was to be made by Respondent within a reasonable time. Subsequent to the above agreement, Petitioner sold and Respondent bought, a second semi-trailer load of melons to be delivered under the same terms and conditions as agreed in the above verbal agreement. On Friday, May 5, 1995, Respondent's agent, Robert Allen and T. J. Chastain, a partner in Chastain-Bishop Farms, had a disagreement concerning Eddie Idlette, Respondent's inspector, being on the Petitioner's farm. Because of an incident in the past involving Idlette and Petitioner, Chastain did not want Idlette on Petitioner's farm and made this known to Allen. As result of this disagreement, Idlette left the Petitioner's farm and was not present on Monday or Tuesday, May 8 & 9, 1995, to inspect the two loads of melons. Allen testified that Chastain also excluded him from Petitioner's farm at this time, and that Chastain told him that neither he nor Idlette needed to be present during the loading of the melons because Chastain "would stand behind the loads". However, the more credible evidence shows that Chastain did not prevent Allen from inspecting the melons on Monday or Tuesday, May 8 & 9, 1995, or tell Allen that he "would stand behind the loads". Furthermore, there is credible evidence to show that Allen was present at Petitioner's farm on Monday and Tuesday, May 8 & 9, 1995, and he either inspected, or had the opportunity to inspect, the two loads of melons, notwithstanding Allen's testimony or Respondent's exhibit 6 to the contrary. Petitioner did not advise Respondent, at any time pertinent to the sale of the melons, that Petitioner would give Respondent "full market protection" on the melons. Furthermore, Petitioner did not agree, at any time pertinent to the sale of the melons, for Respondent to handle the melons "on account" for Petitioner. The more credible evidence supports Petitioner's contention that the melons were purchased by Respondent with title to the melons passing to Respondent upon delivery at Petitioner's farm, subject to inspection or the opportunity to inspect before loading and delivery. On Monday, May 8, 1995, Petitioner loaded Respondent's first semi- trailer with a State of Georgia tag number CX9379, with 2,280 medium size Sangria melons of good quality weighing 46,800 pounds and identified as Respondent's load number 3002. Respondent accepted load 3002 for shipment to its customer. Using the agreed upon price of fifteen cents ($0.15) per pound times 46,800 pounds, the Respondent owed Petitioner $7,020.00 for load number 3002. On Tuesday, May 9, 1995, Petitioner loaded Respondent's second semi- trailer with a State of New Jersey tag number TAB4020, with 2,331 medium size Sangria melons of good quality weighing 46,620 pounds and identified as Respondent's load number 3004. Respondent accepted load 3004 for shipment to its customer. Using the agreed upon price of fifteen cents ($0.15) per pound times 46,620 pounds, the Respondent owed Petitioner $6,9993.00 for load number 3004. The combined total amount owed to Petitioner by Respondent for load numbers 3002 and 3004 was $14,013.00. Respondent shipped load 3002 to E. W. Kean Co, Inc. (Kean). Upon receiving load 3002, Kean allegedly found problems with the melons. Respondent allowed Kean to handled the melons on account for Respondent. Kean sold the melons for $6,804.05 or 14.5 cents per pound. After Kean's deduction for handling, Kean paid Respondent $6,112.05 or 13.02 cents per pound. In accounting to Petitioner, Respondent made further deductions for handling and freight, and offered Petitioner $3,641.24 or 7.8 cents per pound for the melons on load 3002. Respondent shipped load 3004 to Mada Fruit Sales (Mada). Upon receiving load 3004, Mada allegedly found problems with the melons. By letter dated June 8, 1995 (Respondent's exhibit 4), Mada grudgingly agreed to pay the freight plus 10 cents per pound for the melons. Mada paid Respondent $4,662.00 for load 3004, and after Respondent deducted its commission of $466.20, offered Petitioner $4,195.80 or nine cents per pound for the melons on load 3004. By check number 18922 dated May 28, 1995, Respondent paid Petitioner $7,760.08. Respondent contends that this amount was offered to Kye Bishop in full settlement for loads 3002 and 3004, and that after Bishop consulted with Chastain, Bishop on behalf of Petitioner, accepted this amount in full settlement for loads 3002 and 3004. Bishop contends that he turned down the $7,760.08 as settlement in full but took the $7,760.08 as partial payment and proceeded to file a complaint with the Department against Respondent's bond for the difference. There is nothing written on the check to indicate that by accepting and cashing the check Petitioner acknowledged that it was payment in full for load numbers 3002 and 3004. The more credible evidence shows that Bishop did not accept the check in the amount of $7,760.08 as payment in full for loads 3002 and 3004 but only as partial payment, notwithstanding the testimony of Allen to the contrary. There was an assessment charge of $62.72 which Petitioner agrees that it owes and should be deducted from any monies owed to Petitioner by Respondent. Initially, Respondent owed Petitioner $14,013.00. However, substracting the partial payment of $7,760.08 and the assessment of $62.72 from the $14,013.00 leaves a balance owed Petitioner by Respondent of $6,190.20
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order granting the Petitioner relief by ordering Respondent VBJ Packing, Inc. to pay Petitioner the sum of $6,190.20. RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of May, 1996, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-4226A The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Proposed findings of fact 1(a) through 1(i) are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 16. Respondent VBJ Packing, Inc's Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed finding of fact 1 is covered in the Conclusion of Law. Proposed finding of fact 2 is adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 16. Proposed finding of fact 3, 6, 7 and 8 10, are not supported by evidence in the record. As to proposed finding of fact 4, Petitioner and Respondent VBJ Packing, Inc. agreed that Petitioner would sell and Respondent would pay $0.15 per pound for medium size melons. Otherwise proposed finding of fact is not supported by evidence in the record. See Findings of Fact 4, 7 and 8. As to proposed finding of fact 5, Respondent sold the loads. Otherwise proposed finding of fact 5 is not supported by evidence in the record. Respondent Continental elected not to file any proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo Building Lakeland, Florida 32399-0800 David K. Oaks, Esquire David Oaks, P.A. 252 W. Marion Avenue Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Mark A. Sessums, Esquire Frost, O'Toole & Saunders, P.A. Post Office Box 2188 Bartow, Florida 33831-2188
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to payment in connection with the sale of watermelons in June, 1992.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner grows watermelons. He has only done business with Respondent Jim Rash, Inc. (Respondent) in 1991 and 1992. In both of those years, Petitioner was responsible for the hiring of the crews to pick the melons and load the trailers. Respondent obtained receivers who supplied the trailers and then drove them to the markets, which are typically up north. In 1991, Respondent paid for two of the seven loads at the weighing scales and the remainder a few days later. It is unclear whether the latter payment was made before the shipments were received by the wholesalers and retailers from the shippers or receivers. In 1991, as in 1992, the parties maintained no documentation indicating when Respondent became liable for payment to Petitioner. The parties agree that the subject sale was not a sale on consignment. The price of the watermelons was fixed. Petitioner testified that the sale was to Respondent and complete once the weighing was completed and the final price could be calculated. Petitioner might allow a few days to pass before payment, but this, according to Petitioner, was only a convenience to Respondent. Respondent's representative testified that the role of Respondent was to find receivers who shipped the melons to wholesale or retail markets. If the melons were rejected there, then Petitioner was not due payment for the rejected melons. Perhaps the major problem for the parties is that 1992, unlike 1991, was a poor year for watermelon sellers. Unfortunately, the parties did not document which of them was to bear the risk of loss due to poor market conditions, or even due to substandard watermelons in terms of size or quality. Although the loading was performed by persons hired by Petitioner, Jim Rash, who died in December, 1992, supervised the loading of the melons at Petitioner's farm. He could note size discrepancies relatively easily. Although Respondent's representative testified that his late brother accepted the melons under protest, this testimony is not credited. Without Petitioner's consent, Mr. Rash evidently decided to market the melons as a premium, relatively small variety known as Sangrias, which they are not. However, Petitioner admitted that he should not be paid for watermelons that are of substandard quality. He did so when he admitted that Respondent's claim on spoiled or overripe watermelons would be a different matter if he had had a USDA inspector certify that the melons were bad. Although Mr. Rash took some field samples, he could not have as readily determined the condition of the watermelons as he could have determined their size. Petitioner has proved that Respondent was liable for payment of all melons loaded on the trailers except for those that were of deficient quality. In this case, between June 22 and 28, 1992, Petitioner sold nine loads to Respondent under the above-described terms. The total due Petitioner was $18,802.20, of which Respondent paid all but $5175.80. The only load that was rejected due to the watermelons' condition, rather than size, was the one in which Petitioner was underpaid by $2240.80. The purchaser in Chicago rejected these watermelons on June 26, 1992--two days after Petitioner sold them--because they were overripe and bruised.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order determining that Respondent owes Petitioner the sum of $2935. ENTERED on March 30, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Sonny Chesnut, pro se Route 1, Box 658 Bonifay, FL 32421 Earl M. Rash Post Office Box 1180 Dundee, FL 33838 Legal Department Fidelity & Deposit of Maryland Post Office Box 1227 Baltimore, MD 21203
The Issue Whether or not Petitioners (complainants) are entitled to recover $10,258.98, or any part thereof against Respondent dealer and his surety company.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners are growers of watermelons and qualify as "producers" under Section 604.15(5) F.S. Respondent Eddie D. Griffin d/b/a Quality Brokerage is a broker-shipper of watermelons and qualifies as a "dealer" under Section 604.15(1) F.S. Respondent United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company is surety for Respondent Griffin d/b/a Quality Brokerage. This cause is governed by the claims made in the amended complaint. (Exhibit P-13) That amended complaint sets out the parameters of the claimed amounts as follows: AGREED PRICE PAID PRICE DIFFERENCE CLAIMED 6-13-92 Inv.#573 45,429 lbs. Jub. melons @ .04/lb.$1,816.80 (paid on 41,720 lbs.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 9.08 1,107.72 950.46 157.26 6-14-92 Inv.#586 48,060 lbs. Jub. melons @ .05/lb. 2,403.00 (paid @ .04/lb.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 9.61 1,693.39 1,202.79 490.60 6-14-92 Inv.#587 50,610 lbs. Jub. melons @ .05/lb. 2,530.50 (paid @ .04/lb.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 10.12 1,820.38 1,304.28 516.10 6-15-92 Inv.#592 44,800 lbs. Crim. melons @ .05/lb. 2,240.00 (paid @ .04/lb.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 8.96 1,531.04 1,153.04 378.00 6-15-92 Inv.#593 46,340 lbs. Crim. melons @ .05/lb. 2,317.00 (paid @ .04/lb.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 9.27 1,607.73 1,144.33 463.40 6-16-92 Inv.#598 47,170 lbs. Crim. melons @ .05/lb. 2,358.50 (paid @ .04/lb.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 9.43 1,649.07 1,177.37 471.70 6-16-92 Inv.#607 48,320 lbs. Crim. melons @ .05/lb. 2,416.00 (paid @ .04/lb.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 9.66 1,706.34 1,223.14 483.20 6-17-92 Inv.#628 1/ 40,890 lbs. Jub. melons @ .05/lb. 2,044.50 (no inv.# provided producer) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 8.18 1,336.32 .00 1,336.32 6-17-92 Inv.#626 36,690 lbs. Jub. melons @ .05/lb. 1,834.50 (paid on 27,890 lbs.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 7.34 1,127.16 688.92 438.24 6-17-92 Inv.#627 37,300 lbs. Jub. melons @ .05/lb. 1,865.00 (paid on 30,500 lbs.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 7.46 1,157.54 818.90 338.64 6-17-92 Inv.#642 43,350 lbs. Job. melons @ .05/lb. 2,167.50 (paid @ .04/lb.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 8.67 1,458.83 1,025.33 433.50 6-18-92 Inv.#643 44,150 lbs. Crim. melons @ .05/lb. 2,207.50 (paid @ .04/lb.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 8.83 1,498.67 1,057.17 441.50 6-18-92 Inv.#644 45,060 lbs. Crim. melons @ .05/lb. 2,253.00 Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 9.01 1,543.99 .00 1,543.99 6-18-92 Inv.#646 43,180 lbs. Crim. melons @ .05/lb. 2,159.00 (paid on 38,380 lbs.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 8.64 1,450.36 1,211.32 239.04 6-18-92 Inv.645 47,070 lbs. Jub. melons @ .05/lb. 2,353.50 Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 9.41 1,644.09 .00 1,644.09 6-19-92 Inv.#663 43,520 lbs. Crim. melons @ .05/lb. 2,176.00 (paid @ .04/lb.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 8.70 1,467.30 1,032.10 435.20 6-19-92 Inv.#685 44,820 Crim. melons lbs. @ .05/lb. 2,241.00 Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 8.96 1,532.04 1,083.84 448.20 TOTAL DUE $10,258.98 The amended complaint admits that Respondent's deductions for advances and NWPB were appropriate on each load/invoice, and these are not in contention. The amended complaint admits that Respondent has already made the payments to Petitioners, which are indicated. It is only the claimed shortfall on each load that is at issue. At formal hearing, Petitioners discussed a load they claimed they had delivered to Respondent on 6-20-92. They had neither receipts, weight tickets, nor settlement sheets, (invoices) nor payment from Respondent on this load. This "lost load," as the parties described it, is not named in the amended complaint. Therefore, no findings of fact can be made thereon, due to lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner's Exhibit 1 appears to apply to loads 560, 561, 562, and 563, all loads occurring on 6-11-92. That date and those load numbers also are not listed in the amended complaint. Accordingly, no findings of fact will be made with regard to loads 560, 561, 562 or 563, due to lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners delineated two theories of recovery as to the seventeen claims actually named in the amended complaint. Petitioners claimed the right to recover from Respondents due to Respondent dealer's failure to pay for all or some of the poundage delivered by Petitioners to Respondent dealer on the following loads: 6-13-92 #573, 6-17-92 #628, 6-17-92 #626, 6-17-92 #627, 6-18-92 #644, 6-18-92 #646, 6-18-92 #645, 6- 19-92 #685. Petitioners claim the right to recover from Respondents due to Respondent dealer's failure to pay per pound at the rate of one cent below the "wire price" per pound on the following loads: 6-14-92 #586, 6-14-92 #587, 6- 15-92 #592, 6-15-92 #593, 6-16-92 #598, 6-16-92 #607, 6-17-92 #642, 6-18-92 #643, and 6-19-92 #663. For 6-15-92 18-24 lb. average 4.50 - 5.00 cents, few 6.00 26-32 lb. average 4.50 - 5.00 cents, few 6.00 For 6-16-92 18-24 lb. average 5.00 - 6.00 cents 26-32 lb. average 5.00 - 6.00 cents For 6-17-92 18-24 lb. average 6.00 cents, few higher and lower 26-32 lb. average 6.00 cents, few higher and lower For 6-18-92 18-24 lb. average 6.00 - 6.50 cents, "Wire prices" are printed in "spread" form. Evidence was presented (Composite Exhibit P-14), and the parties are agreed, that the following were the "wire prices" at certain times material. Otherwise, there is no evidence in this record concerning amounts or dates of "wire prices." mostly 6.00, few higher 26-32 lb. average 6.00 - 6.50 cents, mostly 6.00, few higher and lower For 6-19-92 18-24 lb. average 6.00 - 6.50 cents, mostly 6.00, few higher 26-32 lb. average 6.00 - 6.50 cents mostly 6.00, few higher and lower Since no "wire prices" were proven up for the days involved in loads 586, and 587, Petitioners are not entitled to recover on their theory of entitlement for those loads. Upon the allegations of the amended complaint and the "wire prices" proven, it appears that Petitioners have already received payment from Respondent dealer at one cent (or better) below the proven low-end "wire price" on loads 592, 593, 598, and 607. Therefore, Petitioners are not entitled to recover on their theory of entitlement for those loads. Petitioners (grower-producers) believed that they had negotiated an oral contract with Respondent dealer to the effect that the dealer would pay Petitioners at the rate of one cent below the "wire price" per pound on those days that Respondent took delivery from them of their watermelons. Respondent testified contrariwise that although such an arrangement was discussed, the parties' final oral agreement was concluded in terms of an excellent quality of every melon, and after negotiations were completed, the dealer understood that the price he was to pay the producers was just the same price per pound he paid all his other producers on any given day. In determining the daily uniform price per pound, Respondent admitted that he used the "wire price" as a guideline, but never explained exactly how the "wire price" constituted a guideline. The Petitioners and Respondent dealer had dealt with one another over a period of years. In past years they had discussed what was to occur if any loads were refused, in whole or in part, by retail buyers at their ultimate destinations. Over the years, the parties had agreed that for loads involving a "small deduct," that is, a small amount of refused melons, Respondent had unilateral authority to informally agree to dump the bad melons or take whatever he could get for the load and pass on the monetary loss to Petitioners. Petitioners conceded that the discretion to take or not take such losses always had been entirely that of Respondent during the parties' several years of past dealing, and that before 1992, whenever an ultimate recipient had refused melons, the "deduct" had been "worked out" this way with no prior notice to Petitioners. In short, by Petitioners' own evidence, it appears that up until the loads at issue in 1992, Petitioners had always simply accepted the Respondent's calculations concerning refusals for quality without requiring proof by way of a federal inspection. Mr. Randal Roberts Sr. testified that in his opinion, any "deduct" over 300 pounds was not "small." However, no evidence defining an industry standard for the relative terms of "small deducts" or "large deducts" was introduced. In light of the parties' standard arrangement over the whole course of their business dealings, it is deemed that Respondent continued to be within his rights in 1992 to unilaterally decide which melons to pay Petitioners for and which melons not to pay Petitioners for where quality became an issue between himself and the ultimate recipients. Petitioners estimated that on a scale of one to ten, the melons they had delivered to Respondent dealer in 1992 were "about a seven" when they delivered them to him, even though Respondent's agents culled out the really bad melons. It may be inferred therefrom that the loads were no better and were probably in worse condition when they reached their ultimate destinations. Respondent testified that he had dumped all or part of the remaining loads in question or reduced the price per pound from that of the "wire price" due to the poor quality of the melons based on complaints or refusals by the recipients when the melons reached their ultimate destinations. These are loads 573, 628, 626, 627, 644, 646, 645, 685, 642, 643, and 663. Although Petitioners adamantly denied that they had ever agreed to rely on federal inspections to determine which melons were bad and which were good, Respondent had gotten federal inspection sheets (R-2) to support his decision to dump all or part of loads 628, 643, 645, 663, and 685. Respondent dealer introduced his business journal (R-3) to show that load 643 was "bad" and load 644 was "dumped" due to poor quality. Respondent dealer introduced his contemporaneous business journal (R- 3) to show that except for loads 607, 643, 644, 663, and 685 he had paid as much to Petitioners per pound as to anyone else on the respective days he had taken delivery. On those loads he had paid Petitioners less than some other producers whom he dealt with on those days, but contended that he had reduced the price per pound paid to Petitioners on those days on the basis of poor quality, too. Nonetheless, 607 was paid at least at one cent below the "wire price" (See Finding of Fact 14), 643 was shown bad by inspection, 644 was dumped in its entirety per the dealer's journal, and 663 and 685 were shown bad by inspection. Upon the foregoing, it is determined that Respondent was within the parameters of his standard dealings with Petitioners where he reduced the price per pound of loads 643 and 663 on the basis of quality, just as he was within his clear unilateral authority and discretion to dump or discard whole melons from loads 628, 644, 645, and 685. After accounting for the foregoing loads, that leaves only loads 573, 626, 627, and 646 left in issue as to poundage and only load 642, (for which Respondent paid 4 cents per pound instead of one cent below the "spread" of the "wire price" for that day) at issue as to price per pound. As to each of these loads, Respondent produced business records wherein he had made contemporaneous notations concerning the quality complaints and/or number of melons rejected by the ultimate recipients. (R-2) Respondent did not pay Petitioners anything on load 645 because of freight deductions and Respondent also made freight deductions on some other invoices. There is no evidence in this record regarding how the parties had negotiated who would bear the ultimate cost of the freight. However, the Petitioners have not proven any entitlement to recover these charges which Respondent advanced and paid. Likewise, Petitioners also have not set out any trail by which the undersigned can trace any mathematical errors on any loads/settlement sheets to the Respondent dealer over Petitioners. Under the parties' standard mode of doing business, Respondent had clear unilateral authority and discretion to dump or discard whole melons for quality and pay Petitioners nothing for the whole melons dumped or discarded in loads 573, 626, 627, and 646. Upon the foregoing, it is determined that Respondent was also within the parameters of his standard dealings with Petitioners in not paying full negotiated price per pound on load 642 where some lesser price per pound could be negotiated with the ultimate recipient as to quality.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture enter a final order dismissing all named claims against Respondents. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of July, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 1993.
Findings Of Fact In the summer of 1986, petitioner, Leo R. Fleming, as the agent for a Mr. Griffin, entered into an agreement with Jimmy Davis, representing D & M Pecan Company, to sell an unspecified amount of watermelons to D & M at the "ground" price which was to be determined daily. The parties also agreed to "joint" the melons, meaning that D & M and Mr. Griffin would split whatever profit or loss was made on the sale of the watermelons. Under the terms of the agreement D & M supplied the trucks and petitioner was responsible for harvesting and loading the melons on the trucks. Fifteen loads of watermelons were loaded and sold to D & M between June 28 and July 2, 1986. On June 28, 1986, D & M paid petitioner $3,000 as an advance on the watermelons so that the field crew could be paid. On June 30, 1986, D & M paid $5,000 and on July 2, 1986, D & M paid $3,000. None of the monies paid to petitioner between June 28 and July 2 were for specific loads or lots of melons, but were advances to be credited against the total amount that was ultimately owed to petitioner. From the first day of loading, June 28, 1986, D & M experienced problems with the melons loaded by petitioner. Mr. Davis would call petitioner the night before the loading to advise him as to the type and size of melon that was to be put on each truck to be loaded the following day. However, petitioner would get the orders confused, which resulted in the trucks being loaded with a different size and type of watermelon than was ordered. D & M usually did not discover the problem until the trucks reached their destination. On a few occasions, the discrepancies were discovered when petitioner called back in after the trucks had left the field to report the amount of melons put on each truck. In any event, the failure to load the right melons on the trucks caused D & M to have to find other buyers and reroute the trucks or reduce the price of the melons delivered. On July 12, 1986, petitioner and Mr. Davis met in Cordele, Georgia, for the purpose of determining the amount owed by D & M for the watermelons. Petitioner brought typed invoices with him which reflected the type of watermelon, the number of pounds shipped, and ground price per pound for each lot or load. However, due to the problems with the wrong melons being loaded, the parties agreed to reduce the price per pound on those loads which had not been loaded as ordered. The adjusted price agreed upon was written on the original invoices and the typed price was marked through. No adjustment was made for the lots that were loaded properly. Lot 621 was not included in the negotiations because petitioner did not present an invoice for that lot and neither party at that time knew what had happened to that truck. However, the parties did agree to settle the other 14 loads for a total price of $25,783.60. (See Appendix A which lists the invoiced price and negotiated price per load.) D & M deducted $10,000 from that total for the advances that had been made and gave petitioner a check for $15,783.60. 1/ The stamp marks on the back of the check reveal that the check was deposited by petitioner on or before July 14, 1986. On July 15, 1986, petitioner wrote a check to the grower for the watermelons. The amount of the check was based on the negotiated price minus petitioner's commission and the cost of the harvesters. This amount is reflected on the original invoices. (P.Ex.1) However, Mr. Griffin did not accept the changes in the price and insisted upon payment from petitioner based on the original invoiced amount. Petitioner then paid Mr. Griffin based on the original invoiced amount "for keeping him from going to the PACA." (T-30) Thereafter, on August 6, 1986, petitioner sent D & M a statement reflecting a balance due based on the original invoiced amounts. From thee evidence presented, it is clear that on July 12, 1986, the parties reached an agreement concerning the full amount to be paid for all the loads of watermelons purchased by D & M except for the load labelled Lot No. 621. D & M admits that it owes petitioner for Lot No. 621, but it contends that it only owes $1,898.40 for that load, whereas the invoice indicates that $2,133.90 is owed. Mr. Davis explained that D & M should not have to pay $2,133.90 for that load because that was the total amount it was able to get for the load. In other words, if D & M paid the full invoiced amount, it would not make a profit. Nevertheless, the original agreement of the parties was that D & M would pay ground price for the melons. D & M paid full invoice price on the melons that were correctly loaded and paid an agreed upon adjusted price for the melons that were not loaded as ordered. D & M failed to present any evidence establishing that Lot No. 621 consisted of melons that were not of the type and size ordered. Therefore, D & M owes petitioner $2,133.90 for Lot 621.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture directing respondent to pay petitioner the sum of $2,133.90 within 15 days after the final order is entered. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 1988.
The Issue Whether the Respondent owes the Petitioner money for watermelons purchased from Petitioner. The factual issues are whether the contract between the parties limited the warrantee of merchantability, and whether melons were of good quality on arrival, and, if not, who was responsible for the failure to meet quality standards.
Findings Of Fact During the 1996 season, the Petitioner contracted with Respondent to sell several loads of watermelons. The claim identified the various loads of melons by date and weight as follows: DATE POUNDS PRICE CLAIM 6/23 44,010 $.04 $1760 6/25 40,300 $.04 $1612 6/25 40,260 $.04 $1610 6/25 41,640 $.04 $1666 6/26 15,750 $.04 $ 600 The Respondent used file numbers to identify the loads which were purchased from Petitioner. These were co-related with the Petitioner’s information by date. The Respondent reduced the amount remitted to the Petitioner on the following loads due to shrinkage (loss of weight during transit) and loss of decayed melons on file number 96057. The Petitioner stated at hearing that, while he had added them to the claim, the differences between his claims and Respondent’s accounting were within the shrinkage and loss limits. The Respondent owed the Petitioner $4,832 on the following: DATE FILE NO. WEIGHT PAID 6/23 96055 43,659 $1746 6/25 96056 39,240 $1570 6/25 96057 38,080 $1516 The controversy between the parties centered upon file numbers 96058 and 96065. Both parties agree regarding the weight of the melons shipped and the price per pound. File number 96058 consisted of 41,640 pounds of melons sold at $.04 per pound. The shipment was sold to Provigo Distribution, Inc. on June 25, and the melons were to be Peewee sized melons (melons weighing 14-17 pounds). The Petitioner loaded the melons on a truck provided by Provigo, and Respondent did not have a person present to inspect the load when it was loaded. The Petitioner asserts that title to the melons transferred when they were loaded on the truck, and that Respondent was liable for the product thereafter. The Respondent acknowledges that it accepted title for the melons when loaded on the truck at the field, but that terms also provided that the melons would be of a specified size and would be of good quality upon delivery. There was no written contract limiting the warrantee of merchantability. Provigo refused acceptance of the melons because they were too big. The melons were around 21 pounds or small mediums (18-24 pounds). When the Respondent sought to sell the melons to another buyer, the buyer had the melons inspected, and 57 percent of the melons were rejected: 15 percent for sunburn, 7 percent for bruising, 10 percent for whitish pink flesh, and 25 percent as overripe. The Respondent introduced a copy of the documents showing the original sale price to Provigo, rejection, inspection and accounting upon resale. The Respondent had sold the melons related to file number 96058 to Provigo for $.06 a pound with Provigo paying the freight. The Respondent would have made $2498.40 on the sale to Provigo. Upon rejection, the Respondent was responsible to Provigo for the transportation costs ($.05 per pound) for the entire load or $2082. The Respondent obtained $613.84 from the sale of the melons after their rejection. File number 96065 related to a partial load which Petitioner had sold on June 26th to Respondent in response to Respondent’s request for Peewee size melons. Petitioner was only able to supply a partial load of 15,750 pounds. These were moved on June 26th from Florida to Georgia, where on June 27th, the truck was finished off with large melons from another farmer. The Respondent had an agent who was in Georgia where the melons were shipped immediately in order to add additional melons to the load. This agent had the authority to purchase melons and cull melons for Respondent, and was in contact with Respondent during the period the truck carrying Petitioner’s melons was waiting. The agent also knew the load was to be shipped to Canada for sale. Respondent’s agent in Georgia saw that the Peewees loaded from Petitioner were spotted, leaking, and decayed prior to loading the large melons. These melons were shipped to Canada at a cost of $.05 a pound for a total of $1138 where the Peewees from Respondent were rejected because of decay. Their condition was such that they could not be given away, and a disposal charge of $350 was charged to Respondent. The Respondent in rendering an accounting of the transaction to Petitioner charged Petitioner $1138 for the transportation of the 15,750 pounds of melons to Canada and $350 for their disposal.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a final order finding that the Respondent owes the Petitioner a total of $2523 and providing Respondent a reasonable amount of time to produce proof of payment of this amount to Petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of May, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Bo Bass, President Bass Farms, Inc. 2829 Southwest SR 45 Newberry, FL 32669 H. Joseph Heidrich 260 Maitland Avenue, Number 1000 Atlamont Springs, FL 32701 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Richard Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810
The Issue Whether Respondent, L. A. Wroten Company, Inc., is indebted to Petitioner for agricultural products (watermelons) purchased by Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings. Respondent L. A. Wroten Company, Inc., is a licensed dealer in agricultural products. During times relevant, Respondent had a bond posted through Cincinnati Insurance Company as surety. During times material, Respondent employed Grady Smith as a field representative. As such, Smith had authority to, and on numerous occasions, purchased watermelons on behalf of Respondent. Petitioner is a producer of agricultural products, specifically watermelons. Petitioner has been growing melons for approximately 30 years. Petitioner has known Smith for the duration of his production of agricultural products and has had business dealings with Smith as a representative of Respondent Wroten on numerous occasions during the past two years. During May and June of 1992, Petitioner sold 21 loads of melons to Respondent Wroten. Four of those loads are at issue in this case. (The remaining 17 loads Smith purchased from Petitioner as representative of Respondent, are not at issue herein.) On June 11 and 12, 1992, Smith, acting as representative of Respondent Wroten, agreed to buy the loads of melons in controversy here. Smith purchased Sangria watermelons at four and one-half cents per pound. When the loads were loaded, graded and weighed, Smith was on hand and the totals were as follows: Load #6149 44,460 pounds x 4-1/2 cents = $2,000.70 Load #6351 43,870 pounds x 4-1/2 cents = $1,974.15 Load #5898 49,140 pounds x 4-1/2 cents = $2,211.30 Load #5900 43,660 pounds x 4-1/2 cents = $1,964.70 The total agreed price for the melons at issue was $8,150.85. Respondent Wroten has previously paid Petitioner $4,456.13 of the amount due which, when deducted from the amount claimed together with $45.71 in melon promotion fees, leaves a balance claimed by Petitioner in the amount of $3,649.01. Beginning in 1991 and continuing through 1992, Petitioner and Smith, as representative of Respondent Wroten, agreed to the sale of melons under an understanding that the transaction was F.O.B. at Coleman, Florida, acceptance final at shipping point. This agreement included an understanding that Respondent would provide a trailer to haul the melons and would pay all transportation charges. Pursuant to the parties' agreement, payment for the melons was due "when they moved over the scales", i.e., as soon as the trucks were loaded and weighed or on the following day. Finally, the understanding and agreement between the parties was that the title and risk of loss to the melons passed to Respondent Wroten on the day of shipment. The growers receipt submitted in evidence clearly showed the essential terms of the agreement and contained no language which would indicate that the sale was conditioned in any manner respecting Respondent Wroten's claim that Petitioner agreed to "ride the load". The admitted growers receipts and other testimony supports Petitioner's claim that Respondent's representative Smith offered the same terms to other producers and growers in the area. The referenced understanding/agreement was the focal point of the terms under which Petitioner conducted business with representative Smith. Although the growers receipt did not contain a price for the melons, Petitioner's president, Greg Bigham, credibly testified that the agreed price between Bigham and Smith was 4 1/2 cents per pound. Further, Respondent offered no testimony and presented no documentary evidence establishing that the price was other than as stated by Bigham. Respondent Wroten contests that it owes the sum claimed by Petitioner based on a phone conversation allegedly had between Lee Wroten and Greg Bigham in which it is contended that Bigham agreed to bear the risk of loss of the melons to their ultimate destination. This method of sale in the industry is known as offering "protection" or "riding-the-load". Bigham acknowledged a phone conversation respecting loads of royal sweet melons which had been previously rejected by Respondent Wroten, however he did not agree to offer "protection" or otherwise "ride-the-load" as to the Sangria melons questioned here. Likewise, Smith could not remember telling Bigham that the terms of sale had changed nor did he attempt to confirm that Petitioner was required to assume the risk of loss for the Sangria melons. Likewise, the growers receipts issued thereafter to Petitioner contained no changed conditions or restrictions respecting the terms of sale. Even assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner offered protection or otherwise agreed to "ride the load", Respondent offered no credible evidence to establish that the melons were either defective or that there was any other fault with the melons when shipped or upon arrival at destination which would somehow require that a set off be issued to Respondent. As stated, Smith was present on June 11 and 12, 1992 and witnessed the loading and graded the melons as they were being placed on the trailers provided by Respondent Wroten. Smith, while inspecting and grading the melons, eliminated those melons which were not acceptable to him. After the melons were loaded, Smith, acting as representative of Respondent, accepted the load and observed the weighing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order requiring that: Respondent L. A. Wroten Company, Inc., pay to Petitioner the sum of $3,649.01. In the event that Respondent, L. A. Wroten Company, Inc., fails to timely pay Petitioner the sum of $3649.01 as ordered, that the Respondent Cincinnati Insurance, as surety, be ordered to pay the Department a like sum as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes and that the Department timely reimburse Petitioner in accordance with that subsection. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1993. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Paragraph 6, adopted in part, Paragraph 9, Recommended Order. Paragraph 7, rejected as argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence J. Marchbanks, Esquire MARCHBANKS DAIELLO & LEIDER 4800 North Federal Highway #101-E Boca Raton, Florida 33431 Don Davis L.A. Wroten Company, Inc. Post Office Box 2437 Lakeland, Florida 33806 Richard Tritschler, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol - Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol - Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 0810
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Triple M Packing, Inc. (Triple M) is in the business of selling produce, particularly tomatoes from its principal business address of Post Office Box 1358, Quincy, Florida. The Respondent, Fair Chester Tomato Packers, Inc. (Fair Chester), is primarily engaged in the business of packaging, distributing and brokering tomatoes in the New York City metropolitan area. It purchases produce from various sellers around the country in tomato-producing areas for resale at markets in the New York City area. Since it is a licensed agricultural dealer, the Respondent is required under the pertinent provisions of Chapter 604, Florida Statutes, to file a surety bond with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department), designed to guarantee payment of any indebtedness to persons selling agricultural products to the bonded dealer to whom the dealer fails to make accounting and payment. Fair Chester has thus obtained a 50,000 surety bond which is underwritten by its Co-Respondent, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company (Hartford). During the 1984 growing season, the Petitioner sold certain shipments of tomatoes to the Respondent for a price of $12,276. Thereafter, curing middle-to-late 1984, the Respondent Fair Chester, found itself in straitened financial circumstances such that it was unable to pay its various trade creditors, including the Petitioner. In view of this, various creditors at the behest of a lawyer retained by Fair Chester, eventually entered into a composition agreement, whereby the unsecured trade creditors agreed to settle, release and discharge in full their claims against Fair Chester on the condition that each creditor signing that agreement be paid thirty-three and one-third percent of its claim. It was determined that the composition agreement would be operative if the trade creditors representing 95 percent or more in dollar amount of all unsecured debts accepted the terms and provisions of that composition agreement on or before November 13, 1984. All the Respondent's unsecured trade creditors were contacted and ultimately those representing more than 95 percent of the outstanding creditor claims against Respondent accepted the terms and provisions of the composition agreement by the deadline. A document indicating acceptance by the Petitioner was signed by one Robert Elliott, purportedly on behalf of the Petitioner, Triple M Packing, Inc. In this connection, by letter of November 13, 1984 (Respondent's Exhibit 4) Attorney Howard of the firm of Glass and Howard, representing the Respondent, wrote each trade creditor advising them that the required acceptance by 95 percent of the creditors had been achieved, including the acceptance of the agreement signed and stamped "received November 8, 1984" by Robert Elliott, sales manager of Triple M. In conjunction with its letter of November 13, 1984, Glass and Howard transmitted Fair Chester's check for one-third of the indebtedness due Triple M or $4,092. The Petitioner's principal officer, its president, Kent Manley, who testified at hearing, acknowledged that he received that letter and check, but he retained it without depositing it or otherwise negotiating it. In the meantime, on October 29, 1984 a complaint was executed and filed by Triple M Packing, Inc. by its president, Kent Manley, alleging that $12,276 worth of tomatoes had been sold to Respondent on June 13, 1984 and that payment had not been received. The purported acceptance of the composition agreement executed by Robert Elliott, sales manager, was not executed until November 8, 1984 and the check for $4,092 in partial payment of the Triple M claim was not posted until November 13, 1984. Mr. Manley's testimony was unrefuted and established that indeed Mr. Elliott was a commissioned salesman for Triple M, was not an officer or director of the company and had no authority to bind the company by his execution of the composition of creditors agreement. Mr. Manley acted in a manner consistent with Elliott's status as a commissioned salesman without authority to bind the Petitioner corporation since, upon his receipt of the "one- third settlement" check with its accompanying letter, he did not negotiate it, but rather pursued his complaint before the Department. In fact, in response to the Department's letter of December 20, 1984 inquiring why the complaint was being prosecuted in view of the purported settlement agreement, Mr. Manley on behalf of Triple M Packing, Inc. by letter of December 28, 1984, responded to Mr. Bissett, of the Department, that he continued to hold the check and was not accepting it as a final settlement. Thus, in view of the fact that the complaint was filed and served before notice that 95 percent of the creditors had entered into the composition agreement and never withdrawn, in view of the fact that on the face of the complaint Robert C. Elliott is represented as a salesman indeed, for an entity known as "Garguilo, Inc.," and in view of the fact that Mr. Manley as president of Triple M, retained the check without negotiating it and availing himself of its proceeds, rather indicating to the Department his wish to pursue the complaint without accepting the check as settlement, it has not been established that the Respondent, Fair Chester, was ever the recipient of any representation by Manley, or any other officer or director of the Petitioner corporation, that it would accept and enter into the above-referenced composition of creditors agreement. It was not proven that Triple M Packing, Inc. nor Mr. Manley or any other officer and director either signed or executed the composition agreement or authorized its execution by Robert C. Elliott. Respondent's position that Mr. Manley and Triple M acquiesced in the execution of the settlement agreement by Elliott and the payment of the one-third settlement amount by the subject check has not been established, especially in view of the fact that the complaint was filed after Attorney Howard notified Triple M of Respondent's settlement offer and prior to notice to Triple M that the settlement agreement had been consummated by 95 percent of the creditors and prior to the sending of the subject check to Triple M. Mr. Manley then within a reasonable time thereafter, on December 28, 1984, affirmed his earlier position that the entire indebtedness was due and that the settlement had not been accepted.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, the evidence of record and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That Fair Chester Tomato Packers, Inc. pay Triple M Packing Company, Inc. $12,276. In the event that principal fails to or is unable to pay that indebtedness, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company should pay that amount out of the surety bond posted with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of September, 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida. Hearings Hearings 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Kent Manley, Jr. Post Office Box 1358 Quincy, Florida 32351 P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 16th day of September, Arthur Slavin, Esquire BLUM, HAIMOFF, GERSEN, LIPSON, GARLEY & NIEDERGANG 270 Madison Avenue New York, New York 10016 Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Joe W. Kight Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =========================================================== ======
Findings Of Fact In 1983 William Lovett, Jr., Complainant, planted 65 acres of water melons, most of which were bought by Doyle L. Wadsworth, Respondent, either for himself or for William Manis Company. The only entity for which Respondent acted as agent was the Manis Company, for whom he has bought melons as its agent for many years. On behalf of himself or Manis, Respondent, in 1983, purchased melons from Complainant on June 16, 17, 20, 23, 24, 27, and 29. Complainant's melons were bought at prices ranging from seven cents to ten cents per pound. The melons were paid for by check signed by Respondent, dated zero to five days after the invoice date, on either Respondent's checking account at the Barnett Bank of Brandon or on Manis Company's account at Sun Bank of Tampa. Total payments to Complainant for these melons were $285,104.25 (Exhibits 2 and 3). Complainant and Respondent had met shortly before the 1983 water melon season through a mutual friend. Wadsworth agreed to buy water melons from Lovett, not to act as his broker. The grower had the water melons harvested, the buyer provided trucks and trailers to pick up the melons at the field, and the sale occurred when the melons were loaded. Wadsworth testified that he explained to Lovett that he buys melons on a load basis which he has done for many years, that he does not act as a broker to sell the melons, and that once the melons are loaded they are the responsibility of the then-owner, Wadsworth. 1983 was a good year for water melons and Wadwsorth bought nearly all of Lovett's production. Lovett asked Wadsworth if he would handle his melons if Lovett planted a crop in 1984 and Wadsworth agreed. Wadsworth also told Lovett that he preferred "grays," which Lovett planted. Lovett understood that Wadsworth had agreed to buy all of his water melons except for those Lovett sold independently, and to pay the prevailing prices. Wadsworth had no such understanding. Lovett's primary occupation is doctor of veterinary medicine and he relied on others for harvesting information. For reasons not fully explained at the hearing, the harvesting of Lovett's 1984 crop of water melons was a little late. Accordingly, any further delays resulted in overripe or sunburned water melons. The first harvesting of Lovett's melons occurred on Saturday, June 2, 1984, and Wadsworth bought 46,480 pounds at 3-1/2 cents per pound on behalf of Manis Company. Harvesting next occurred Monday, June 4, 1984, when Wadsworth bought 40,680 pounds for Manis and just over 100,000 pounds for himself. Payment for these water melons was made June 5, 1984, by a check in the amount of $3,050.60 on the Manis bank and $3,626.70 00 Wadsworth's bank. During the loading on June 4 a large number of water melons were discarded as culls. This made the task of grading and overseeing the grading much more onerous, and Wadsworth advised Lovett he would not be buying any more water melons from him that season. Lovett came to Wadsworth's motel to persuade him to do otherwise, but without success. Lovett asked Wadsworth if he could refer him to someone else to handle his melons, which request Wadsworth declined. Lovett subsequently obtained the services of a broker to handle his water melons but the additional delay in getting the crop harvested and the extra brokerage cost he incurred resulted in less income to Lovett than he would have received had Wadsworth bought all of Lovett's melons. Conflicting evidence was presented regarding the condition of the water melons grown by Lovett in 1984. Lovett's witnesses described the field as the finest ever seen, while Wadsworth testified that recent excess rainfall left part of the field wet, and some vines were wilting. All witnesses agreed that there were a large number of culls discarded from the water melons graded No. 1 on the first harvesting. In view of the recommended disposition of this case, a definitive finding of fact on this issue is unnecessary.
