The Issue Whether Appellant should be granted variances in setback lines to allow construction of a retail store on a lot at the northeast corner of the intersection of Papaya Street and Gulfview Boulevard on Clearwater Beach, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Appellant purchased the property at 24 Papaya Street in Clearwater Beach (lots 29-32, inclusive, Clearwater Beach Park) approximately two years ago. The only inquiry made of zoning officials regarding use of the property, other than zoning, was what part of the lot could be covered with a building. This lot is nearly square but is nonstandard in both width and depth to construct a building without a variance. These variances were granted at the initial variance request heard in December 1992. Appellant proposes to construct a retail store containing some 4700 square feet of floor space. To erect a building of this size on the lot a variance of 3 percent to allow 48 percent coverage of the lot was required. This variance was granted by the Board; however, without the variances in setback on the four sides of the parcel, this 3 percent variance in lot coverage is useless to the Appellant. This lot currently has four old buildings with a combined total of 2723 square feet. The largest is nearly square and contains approximately 1120 square feet. There are rental apartments in some, if not all, of these buildings. It is proposed to remove these buildings, if the permit to construct the proposed store is granted. The existing buildings are nonconforming and three are between 2 to 4 feet of the lot lines on the north, east and south sides of the property. The property is zoned CR-28 (Resort Commercial) and the proposed use is authorized in this zoning classification. The plans are and the applicant proposes to provide the required parking spaces for this establishment under the proposed structure. Appellant presented evidence that adjacent properties were built to the lot line with no setback. Most of these buildings were erected before setbacks were required in this area and are grandfathered in so long as the structures remain. In 1986 the Development Code Adjustment Board granted setback variances on all four sides of the property across Gulfview Boulevard from Appellant's property. That parcel was also nonstandard and even smaller than the parcel of land here involved. Because of the size of the property the Board found a hardship existed and without the requested variances the property had little value. One significant difference in these two parcels is that one had been owned by one family since 1932 while the instant parcel was required circa 1990. Further, evidence was presented that being one block east of Mandalay Avenue, the main traveled beach road, the proposed structure needs to be seen from Mandalay to attract pedestrian traffic. The building just west of Appellant's lot is built to the lot line and partially blocks the view of Appellant's property from Mandalay. The use of the property sought here is consistent with the Comprehensive Land Use Plan and no protest to the granting of the variances requested were received from adjacent property owners. Razing the existing structures and erecting the proposed store in which the applicant intends to sell upscale beach wear would improve the appearance of the neighborhood.
The Issue Whether the Respondent is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealings by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence and breach of trust in a business transaction based on representations or remarks made by the Respondent to Mr. and Mrs. Springer.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this matter, Respondent, Irene H. Pieragowski, was a licensed real estate salesman employed by Geiger Real Estate Corporation. At some time prior to May 5, 1986, Respondent obtained a listing agreement from William and Beverly Walker to sell certain real property owned by the Walkers which consisted of two and one-half acres improved by a single-family residence. On the Sunday before May 5, 1986, Respondent held an open house at the property. The house had been advertised, and the ad indicated that the property was a single-family residence located on a two and one-half acre tract. Joseph and Ceresa Springer saw the home advertised in a real estate booklet. When they called about the home they were advised of the open house and decided to attend. The Springers were the first people to arrive at the open house. Respondent was late getting there, and she was moving about trying to open the house during the time the Springers were there. Respondent put information about the house on a counter. The information included a survey of the property and three deeds. Respondent explained that the initial acre was given to Mrs. Walker by Mr. Mickler, her father, and the house was built on that original acre. Subsequently, Mr. Mickler deeded to Mrs. Walker an additional one-half acre which was located in front of the home, and another acre located behind the house. Respondent explained that the house had been originally offered for sale with just one and a half acres of land, but, since the house had not sold, the additional acre of land had been included and the price had been lowered by $10,000. Respondent then proceeded to move about the house opening the windows and blinds. At some point, Mrs. Springer and Respondent were at the back of the house. Mrs. Springer was looking out the window and asked how far back the property went. Respondent stated that it went back to the pasture and noted that the property in the back was the extra acre. When Mrs. Springer saw how much property there was, she asked the Respondent, "Can you build back there," Respondent replied, "Yes." Mrs. Springer then mentioned that her daughter and son-in-law were going to be moving from Mobile, Alabama to the Tampa area. The entire conversation between Respondent and the Springers at the open house lasted from 5-10 minutes. The Springers did not express any real interest in the property, and Respondent got involved with other people that were at the open house. When the Springers left the open house, Mrs. Springer was very excited about the property. She knew that her daughter and son-in-law would need a place to live when they moved to the Tampa area, and Mrs. Springer thought that it would ideal for them to build a house on the back acre of the property they had just seen. That night, the Springers called their daughter, and told her about the house and the possibility of the daughter and son-in-law building their home on the additional acre of land. Prior to the open house, the Springers had been working with Les Hammond, a real estate salesman, in an effort to find a home. They had not been satisfied with the homes they had seen which were located on smaller residential lots. The home from which they had just moved was located on two acres of land which had been given to the Springers by Mr. Springer's mother. The two acres were part of a 16-acre tract owned by Mr. Springer's mother. Therefore, the Springers were looking for a home located on a greater amount of land than the normal subdivision lot. At the same time they were looking for a home for themselves, they also had been keeping an eye out for property for their daughter and son-in-law. However, until the open house, the Springers had not been looking for adjoining property or for a house that had additional acreage that could be used by the daughter and son-in-law to build their own residence. After the open house, Mr. Springer called Mr. Hammond, who was considered by the Springers to be "their" real estate agent. Mr. Springer explained that they had found a house that they liked and asked Mr. Hammond if he could show them the house again. Mr. Hammond called Geiger Realty and got the key. Mr. Hammond took the Springers to the property the next day, May 5, 1986. At that time, the Springers explained to Mr. Hammond that a real plus on the house was that another residence could be built on the back acre of land. Mr. Hammond was made fully aware of the Springers' plan to have their daughter and son-in-law build a home on the back acre. The Springers and Mr. Hammond also discussed the work that would have to be done on the house and the repairs that would be necessary. After the Springers and Mr. Hammond left the home they went back to his office and the Springers decided to make an offer on the property. Mr. Hammond prepared the sales contract. The Sales Contract contained the following provision: VII. RESTRICTIONS, EASEMENTS, LIMITATIONS: The Buyer shall take title subject to: Zoning, restrictions, prohibitions and other requirements imposed by governmental authority; Restrictions and matters appearing on the plat or otherwise common to the subdivision ... provided, however, that none of the foregoing shall prevent use of the Property for the purpose of AAR. The language is part of a standard form contract; however, Mr. Hammond inserted the letters AAR, which referred to the zoning of the property, in the blank space after "purpose of." The zoning designation AAR allows one house per 5 acres. Prior to preparing the offer, Mr. Hammond was not aware of the zoning on the property so he called the Respondent who advised him that the property was zoned AAR. Mr. Hammond did not advise the Springers that the zoning would only allow one house per five acres, and he put nothing in the contract which conditioned the offer upon the Springers being able to build a second home on the property. Mr. Hammond explained that he just assumed that another house could be built on the property, notwithstanding the zoning designation, because the Springers had told him that Respondent had told them that another house could be built on the back acre. He also relied on the fact that there were other homes built on one acre plot in that area and that the original house had been built on an acre and a half. Later that night, Mr. Hammond called Respondent and said that the sales offer had been completed and asked when it could be presented to the sellers. Respondent and Mr. Hammond agreed that Respondent would go to Mr. Hammond's office and they would present the offer to the Walkers by telephone conference call. Respondent began the call stating that an offer had been on the property, and Mr. Hammond then explained the terms of the offer. During the conversation, Mr. Hammond did not mention that the Springers had any intention to build a second residence on the property. Further, Mr. Hammond did not advise Respondent of the Springers' intentions or that the Springers had attended her open house. Respondent had no way of knowing that the people who were making the offer were people she had seen at the open house. The Walkers accepted the offer, and on July 26, 1986 the sales transaction closed. Respondent attended the closing as did the Springers. It was the first time that she realized the Springers were people that she had seen at the open house. She had not seen them or spoken to them since the open house. There were no discussions about the viability of building a second residence on the property between the Respondent and the Springers or Mr. Hammond until after the transaction had closed. Mr. Hammond and his daughter Kathy Hamm, who is also a real estate salesperson and works with her father, testified that prior to the closing, Mr. Hammond called Respondent concerning the zoning, and she confirmed that an additional residence could be built on the property. However, Respondent testified that the only conversation she had with Mr. Hammond concerning the zoning occurred after the closing when the Springers learned that the existing zoning classification did not permit building a house on the rear acre. Respondent's testimony is more credible considering the prior inconsistent statement made by Mr. Hammond when his deposition was taken, and his vague recollection of the alleged telephone conversation. The testimony of the witnesses regarding what was said at the closing was also contradictory. Ms. Walker, Ms. Alday, the closing agent, and the Respondent each testified that there was no conversation at the closing regarding constructing another house on the property. However, Ms. Hamm and Mr. Hammond testified that Mr. Springer asked Respondent about building another house on the property and Respondent responded that they could. Neither Mr. Springer nor Mrs. Springer recalled asking any question about building on the property, but testified that Respondent simply announced "and you can build on that property, too." Considering the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses, I find the testimony of the Respondent and Ms. Walker to be the most reliable. Ms. Walker sat next to respondent during the closing and left the room with the Respondent. Ms. Walker was in a position to hear anything that Respondent may have said, and Ms. Walker was quite certain that nothing was mentioned about building anything on the back acre of the property. After the closing, Mr. Springer and his son-in-law talked to Hillsborough County building officials about obtaining a permit to construct a residence on the back acre of land and discovered that the zoning of the property was such that another residence could not be built on the property. There was no evidence presented that there were any other limitations on building on the back of the property. Indeed, on the night of the closing, Mr. Springer advised Mr. Mickler that he was thinking about building a garage/workshop in the back to house his antique automobiles. There was no evidence presented to suggest that he could not have built the garage behind the house. The Respondent never marketed the property as being anything other than a single family residence and did not misrepresent its zoning limitations. The Springers simply assumed that the extra acre could be used for a second residence. The Springers never asked the Respondent whether a second residence could build on the rear acre, and she never told them that another residence could be built on the property. Although Respondent indicated to Ms. Springer at the open house that they could "build" in the back of the house, there was no intent on Respondent's part to mislead the Springers into believing that a second home could be built on the property. Ms. Springer admitted that she did not tell Respondent that what she was thinking of building was another house. Further, the Springers apparently were not certain that another house could be built on the property when they first told Mr. Hammond about the house. When Mr. Springer was asked what he mentioned to Mr. Hammond about the property, Mr. Springer replied, "Well, that we liked it okay and it was nice that there was an extra acre that we probably could build on. He was aware of our intentions." (e.s.)(T-26) Therefore, it does not appear that the Springer's relied on Respondent's comment at the open house as establishing that a second home could be built on the property. Indeed, the Springers relied on Mr. Hammond to take care of their interests, and he was the only one who knew what their plans were. Finally, Mr. Springer stated that even if he had known that another residence could not be built on the property, he didn't know whether that knowledge would have kept him from purchasing the property.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent. DONE and ORDERED this 24th day of October, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-3992 Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Rejected, to the degree that it states that Mr. Hammond was advised by Respondent that a second single-family residence could be constructed on the property, by contrary finding based on the evidence. Accepted. Rejected, as not supported by the evidence. Accepted. Rejected for the reasons previously stated. Rejected as immaterial since Respondent was unaware that the Springers' desired to build a second residence on the property. Rejected, to the extent it indicates that Respondent was aware of the Springers' plan, as contrary to the evidence. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1.-7. Accepted, generally. Accepted to the degree it constitutes a finding of fact. Accepted, generally. Accepted, generally. Rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire DPR-Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 323802 A. J. Musial, Jr., Esquire Urban Centre, Suite 750 4830 West Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33609 Lawrence A. Gonzalez Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Darlene F. Keller Acting Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue Whether Respondent Banta is guilty of dishonest dealing, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in a business transaction, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, (1993). Whether Respondent is guilty of operating as a real estate broker without a valid and current license, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1993). Whether Respondent is guilty of failing to provide written agency disclosure to a party in a real property transaction, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(q) and (1)(e), Florida Statutes (1993) and Rule 61J2-10.033, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida. Respondent is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0165881. As of March 31, 1992, the Respondent failed to renew his real estate broker’s license, for the 2-year period of April 1, 1992 to March 31, 1994. Renewal would have consisted of completing the required continuing education, paying the required fee, and sending the required form to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation. The Respondent’s license was delinquent after March 31, 1992. As of March 31, 1994, the Respondent had not renewed his broker’s license and his license remained delinquent. On May 9, 1994, the Respondent renewed his license, in order to make a claim for a commission. As of March 31, 1996, the Respondent failed to renew his license again. His license was delinquent after March 31, 1996, and was delinquent as of the hearing date. The Respondent operated as a real estate broker during the period of approximately February 1993 through May 1994, specifically including a period when his license was delinquent as “involuntary inactive.” Sam Morrow is a licensed real estate broker and is a real estate developer and home builder. Effective February 10, 1993, Respondent entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement with Florida’s Preferred Homes, Inc. (FPH), a company in which Morrow is a principal. Respondent was originally retained on a fixed salary basis for an indefinite term to assist in finishing a number of low-income housing tax credit apartment applications for tax credits. At the request of Morrow, Respondent assumed other duties. Respondent represented FPH, and other business entities of which Morrow was the principal, in other business dealing from February 10, 1993 through May 24, 1994, when Respondent was terminated. The Respondent received a fixed salary throughout the period of his association with Morrow with the promise of additional undefined compensation in the future. For the purposes of this matter, Respondent was an employee of FPH and was supervised by Morrow. Respondent’s association with Morrow was not an exclusive employment agreement. During this same period in February 1993, Morrow became engaged in a transaction involving affordable housing. The transaction involved the purchase of land, by a purchasing entity, the Community Housing Trust, Inc., a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation, from the seller, Rouse Road Corporation. After this purchase the property was to be transferred to another corporation, of which Morrow was to be the principal along with another business partner, and affordable housing units would be constructed upon the land and then sold to the public. The structure of the purchasing and developing entities was complex, involving various public and private entities, including Orange County. Morrow was a principal and the overall coordinator of the entire project which came to be known as the Oak Grove Circle project. There was no specific agreement for the Respondent to receive any particular additional compensation for the Respondent’s services in the affordable housing project. Respondent was familiar with the property that the Rouse Road Corporation had for sale and brought it to the attention of Community Housing Trust, as a prospective purchaser. This particular property was suitable for purchase and development as an affordable housing project. Respondent facilitated the purchase and prepared the contract for sale and purchase which was executed by the parties: Community Housing Trust, as purchaser, and Rouse Road Corporation, as seller. The contract was executed on March 5, 1993 for the property later known as the Oak Grove Circle property. Respondent represented neither the purchaser nor the seller in the transaction. He considered himself a transactional broker. The contract indicates on its face that Respondent, J. Scott Banta, is the real estate broker in the transaction. The contract called for the payment of a 10% commission to the Respondent. Respondent was not at any time prior to or during the purchase and sale transaction, either an agent, employee, independent contractor or representative of the seller, Rouse Road Corporation. Respondent was not at any time prior to or during the purchase and sale transaction, either an agent, employee, independent contractor or representative of the purchaser, Community Housing Trust, Inc. In September 1993, Morrow formed a Florida corporation known as FPH Venture 2, Inc. He was the sole incorporator. During this period in the fall of 1993, certain negotiations took place regarding the structure and goals of FPH Venture 2, Inc. The principals of the firm were to be Sam Morrow and Long Farms North. All of the prospective partners agreed that because of the need for cash equity, the real estate commission on the Oak Grove Circle property would remain in the FPH Venture 2 proposed project. For this consideration Respondent expected to be a principal also. The goals for the FPH Venture 2 project were set out in some detail in a memorandum developed by the prospective venturers and typed by Respondent. Respondent was included as one of the principals. The goals memorandum provides that the 10% commission payable to Respondent on the Oak Grove Circle purchase and sale would be assigned by Respondent to FPH Venture 2 “for cash flow and total profit benefits.” Respondent’s understanding of the proposed FPH Venture 2 project was that he was to receive a one-third ownership participation in FPH Venture 2, Inc., which was to have included the proposed Oak Grove Circle project and another proposed project in Lakeland, Florida, in exchange for the prospective commission. The terms of Respondent’s proposed participation in FPH Venture 2 were never reduced to any form of written agreement. Nor was Respondent ever made a principal in the company or issued any stock, or otherwise given anything to evidence his interest in the proposed venture. The closing of the purchase and sale of the property, later known as the Oak Grove Circle property, as anticipated by the contract for sale and purchase, was consummated on May 19, 1994. James L. Bishop, vice-president of Community Housing Trust, Inc., executed the settlement statement which provided for payment of $28,000 real estate commission to J. Scott Banta from the seller’s proceeds of closing. The commission check was delivered to Respondent at the closing without objection. On the day after closing of the Oak Grove Circle purchase and sale, May 20, 1994, Respondent gave Morrow a memorandum suggesting a procedure for payment of the $28,000 commission into FPH Venture 2, Inc. On May 24, 1994, the matter culminated in a conversation between Respondent Banta and Morrow. Respondent requested Morrow reduce their agreement regarding his proposed participation in FPH Venture 2, Inc., to writing. Morrow refused to do so, and at 4:45 p.m. on the same day, terminated Respondent’s employment, stopped payment on Respondent’s consulting fee check for the prior week and changed the locks on his office with Respondent’s personal property still inside. Respondent has retained the commission from the sale of the Oak Grove Circle property. Morrow’s account of this business relationship with Respondent and the agreed disposition of the proceeds of the commission is not credible.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent be found guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(e) and (1)(q) and be found not guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1993). It is further recommended that Respondent be fined the sum of $1,000 and that his license be suspended for a period of three months, subject to reinstatement upon such reasonable conditions as the Florida Real Estate Commission shall require. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of January, 1997, at Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven D. Fieldman, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Hurston Building - North Tower, Suite N308 Orlando, Florida 32801 Allen C.D. Scott, II, Esquire Scott & Scott, P.A. 99 Orange Street St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Lynda L. Goodgame, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Henry M. Solares Division Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Hurston Building - North Tower, Suite N308 Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue Whether Hellender violated the provisions of Section 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Hellender is a registered real estate broker holding license number 0038269 issued by the Florida Real Estate Commission. Hellender had a listing for the sale of real property owned by Horace E. and Margaret C. Young. An offer to lease with option to purchase was made by Richard W. and Diane B. Milligan through their realtor, Susan Seligman, who was in contact with Seligman several times November 26 concerning the availability of the property and terms of the lease-purchase agreement. Both the Youngs and the Milligans did not live in the Orlando area where the two realtors and property were located. Susan Seligman, a broker-salesperson, presented Ralph E. Hellender with a Contract for Sale and Purchase when she met with Hellender between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. on the evening of November 26, 1976. This offer, which was received into evidence as Exhibit 1, expired at 12:00 noon on November 27. Hellender took the contract and indicated that he would communicate the offer to the Youngs. Susan Seligman did not accompany Hellender to communicate the offer as is the general custom, because she needed to pick up her children from a football game that evening. Mrs. Ingrid Hellender, a broker salesperson, received a call later on the evening of November 26, 1976, from Susan Seligman. The general topic of the call was the fact that the contract which Seligman had given Mr. Hellender earlier that evening provided for conventional financing of the purchase, and Seligman had second thoughts about the Milligans' desires on financing. She requested that she be given the opportunity to check with the Milligans to determine whether they intended to use conventional or FHA financing. At this point a conflict developed in the testimony of Mrs. Seligman and Mrs. Hellender regarding whether Mrs. Seligman requested that Mr. Hellender hold the contract or whether Mrs. Seligman requested that he present the offer with reservations concerning the nature of the financing. In any event, Mrs. Hellender advised her husband to hold the contract. Similarly, a conflict exists in Mr. Hellender's and Mrs. Seligman's testimony concerning whether Hellender said that the offer has been accepted by the Youngs. Mrs. Seligman stated that Mr. Hellender advised her on November 27, 1976, that the Youngs had accepted the offer. Hellender stated that he did not present the offer and therefore there was no basis for him to communicate an acceptance to Mrs. Seligman and did not communicate an acceptance to her. It should be particularly noted that Mrs. Seligman stated that on November 27 she had Mr. Hellender agreed that the Milligans should execute a new contract on Hellender's forms when the Milligans were to be in Orlando on December 1, 1976. It is also noted that Mrs. Seligman did not request telegraphic confirmation of the acceptance by the Youngs of the offer which she initially submitted to Mr. Hellender, although telegraphic confirmation is the generally accepted practice when dealing with an out-of-city seller and was not standard practice in the real estate firm with which Mrs. Seligman worked. The Hearing Officer discounts the testimony of Mrs. Seligman that Hellender told her the Youngs had accepted the offer because she did not request written confirmation of the acceptance, and because Mrs. Seligman stated that a second written offer was to be prepared on December 1, 1976. All the realtors who testified stated that it was the custom to obtain telegraphic confirmation of an offer from an out-of-town seller. Mr. Seligman, the broker for Mrs. Seligman's company, stated this was the general procedure for his company. Although the record is unclear whether Mrs. Seligman talked with Mr. Hellender before noon or after noon, she was aware the offer expired at noon November 27 and she did not press for written confirmation of acceptance before noon. Instead, she agreed to the preparation of a second offer is totally contrary and repugnant to any theory of acceptance of the first offer. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that there was no acceptance of the first offer communicated by Hellender to Mrs. Seligman. Mrs. Seligman may have formed the opinion that there was an acceptance because Mr. Hellender agreed to the terms presented in the first offer, but her agreement to a second offer to be prepared is in fact and law inconsistent with any assertion that the first offer was accepted. Mrs. Seligman stated, that it is clear from the actions of Mr. Hellender, that they expected a second contract to be presented in behalf of the Milligans. This explains his call to Mrs. Seligman advising her on December 5 that there was activity of the property. It also explains why December 6 he did accept a second offer on the property which was presented by Joe Deligna which he and Delinga communicated to the Youngs together as is the general custom after no offer was presented by the Milligans on December 1. Lastly, it explains why Hellender contacted Mrs. Seligman immediately after the Youngs had accepted the offer by the Maccagnanos and confirmed it telegraphically.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission take no action against the registration of Ralph E. Hellender. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of March, 1978. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce I. Kamelhair, Esq. 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Mark A. Koteen, Esq. Post Office Box 3431 Orlando, Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact Talbott and Drake, Inc. is and was at all times alleged herein a registered real estate broker corporation. William F. Talbott is now and was at all times alleged herein a registered real estate broker and active firm member of Talbott and Drake, Inc. Paul P. Drake is now and was at all times alleged herein a registered real estate broker and active firm member of Talbott and Drake, Inc. Helen C. Drake is now and was at all times alleged herein a registered real estate broker and active firm member of Talbott and Drake, Inc. On or about January 18, 1977, William F. Talbott, on behalf of Talbott and Drake, Inc., negotiated a contract for sale and purchase between the High Ridge Water Company -- John H. McGeary, Jr., sellers, and William Montaltos and Genevieve L. Montaltos, his wife, buyers, for the purchase of lot in a new housing area known as River Forest in the Boca Raton area, Palm Beach County. A copy of said contract, Petitioner's Exhibit 1, is received into the record pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties. Said contract, Petitioner's Exhibit 1, was subject to the declarations of restrictions filed by High Ridge Water Company as seller on June 28, 1976, wherein, in Paragraph 7, the developer retained the right to approve or disapprove the plans and specifications for the construction of any structure, building, fence, wall or sign in the River Forest area. A copy of said declarations of restrictions is received into the record as Petitioner's Exhibit 2, pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties. As a part of the restrictions and provisions of the contract, the purchasers, Mr. and Mrs. Montaltos, were required to use a builder selected from a list of designated builders, approved and designated by Talbott and Drake, Inc. and the High Ridge Water Company. Mr. and Mrs. Montaltos decided to build on the subject property and contacted numerous builders designated by Talbott and Drake, Inc. to submit the bids for the construction of a home on the property. On or about June 9, 1976, the McGeary partnership, as developer of the River Forest area, entered into a joint venture agreement with Group Six Developers Collaborative, Inc., whereby Group Six Developers Collaborative, Inc. purchased lots in the River Forest area and agreed to pay Talbott and Drake, Inc. a five-percent commission on all homes constructed on said lots by Group Six Developers Collaborative, Inc. in the River Forest area. A copy of said joint venture agreement is received into the record as Petitioner's Exhibit 3 pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 recites on the first page of said agreement as follows: WITNESSETH: WHEREAS, by that certain Purchase Agreement intended to be executed this date, BUILDER (Group Six Collaborative, Inc.) is agreeing to purchase certain real property as set forth herein, a copy of which Purchase Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 1; . . . (emphasis added) WHEREAS, the parties hereto are desirous of forming a joint venture for the purpose of finan- cing, constructing and selling single family residences upon the property described in Exhibit 1; NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the pro- mises and of the mutual covenants of the parties hereto, and for other good and valuable considera- tion, the parties agree as follows: 9. BROKER. The parties agree that TALBOTT AND DRAKE, INC., a Florida real estate brokerage corporation, shall have an exclusive listing agree- ment with BUILDER, as owner and joint venturer, for the sale of residences to be constructed pursuant to this Agreement, a copy of which Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 2. As a commission for their services, which shall include but not be limited to, advertising, manning model houses, showing receiving of deposits, qualifying prospects, assisting in obtaining financing for purchasers, they shall receive five percent (5 percent) of the pur- chase price, according to the provisions contained in Exhibit 2. The joint venture agreement, Petitioner's Exhibit 3, is clearly limited to houses to be constructed on the lots purchased from the McGeary partnership. The agreement does not constitute an agreement to pay Talbott and Drake, Inc. a fee of five percent of the construction cost of any custom home built by one of the designated builders on a lot purchased by an individual. When Mr. and Mrs. Montaltos received the bid statement from Group Six Developers Collaborative, Inc. there was noted thereon: "Add Real Estate Commission as per Talbott and Drake contract." A copy of said bid statement is received into the record as Petitioner's Exhibit 4 pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties. Although Mr. and Mrs. Montaltos were informed that Talbott and Drake, Inc. was to be paid a ten-percent commission by the seller on the sale of the property to Mr. and Mrs. Montaltos, they were at no time informed directly by the Respondents that the builders on the "approved list" were required to pay a five-percent commission to Talbott and Drake, Inc., nor that the said five- percent commission would be passed on to Mr. and Mrs. Montaltos when they contracted with an "approved" builder to construct a home on the subject property. On or about February 4, 1977, William F. Talbott, on behalf of Talbott and Drake, Inc., negotiated the contract for sale and purchase between High Ridge Water Company, as seller, and Donald James Kostuch and Mary Louise Kostuch, his wife, buyers, for purchase of a lot in the River Forest area of Palm Beach County. A copy of said contract is received into the record as Petitioner's Exhibit 5 pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties. Mr. and Mrs. Kostuch were required by the contract to select a builder from an approved list of designated builders approved and supplied by Talbott and Drake, Inc. and seller, High Ridge Water Company. Mr. and Mrs. Kostuch selected Snow Realty and Construction, Inc. from the list supplied by Talbott and Drake, Inc. Snow Realty and Construction, Inc. had an agreement with the McGeary partnership and Talbott and Drake, Inc. similar to that outlined in the joint venture agreement between the McGeary partnership in Group Six Developers Collaborative, Inc., Petitioner's Exhibit 3, whereby Snow Realty and Construction, Inc. agreed to pay Talbott and Drake, Inc. a five-percent commission on any residence that Snow Realty and Construction, Inc. built in the River Forest area. The bid supplied by Snow Realty and Construction, Inc. on March 7, 1977, to Talbott and Drake, Inc. contained a listing of real estate commission to Talbott and Drake, Inc. in the amount of $3,652. A copy of said bid statement is received into the record as Petitioner's Exhibit 6 pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties. The Kostuchs were advised of a five-percent fee to be paid by the builder by a salesman working for another broker who first introduced the Kostuchs to the real property in River Forest. The salesman advised the Kostuchs prior to their entry into the contract for the purchase of the lot in River Forest in which they agreed to limit their choice of builder to one approved by the McGeary partnership and Talbott and Drake, Inc. This disclosure would be sufficient to comply with the provisions of Rule 21V-10.13, Florida Administrative Code, because the fee was revealed by a salesperson involved in the transaction prior to the execution of the contract under which the favor, if any, was granted. Talbott and Drake, Inc., in addition to performing services as listing agent for the sale of homes in River Forest, also functioned as the prime developer in this project pursuant to an agreement with High Ridge Water Company and the McGeary partnership. Regarding the Montaltos' transaction, the limitation of the owners to the use of one of the approved builders constitutes the granting or placement of favor, because it narrows the competition to one of five builders out of all the builders available in the Fort Lauderdale area. The affidavits introduced indicate that, notwithstanding the absence of a written agreement, the designated builders had agreed to pay to Talbott and Drake, Inc. a fee of five percent of the cost of construction of any custom home as compensation for the efforts of Talbott and Drake, Inc. in developing the property. While compensation for these services is reasonable, it still constitutes a fee to be paid Talbott and Drake, Inc. from one of the five designated builders who would benefit from the contract. The potential adverse effect of this arrangement was to transfer a cost generally allocated to the cost of the lot to the cost of the house. Therefore, people shopping for a lot could be misled in the comparison of similar lots in different subdivisions in the absence of being advised of the fee to be paid by the builders to Talbott and Drake, Inc. However, the evidence shows no attempt to keep this fee a secret and thereby mislead buyers. The existence of such a fee is referred to in sales literature prepared by Talbott and Drake, Inc. The Kostuchs were advised of the fee by a participating salesman for another real estate company. The builders set out the fee as a separate cost item as opposed to absorbing it in general costs within their bids. While the Respondents could not produce evidence that the Montaltos' had been advised of the existence of the fee, and the Montaltos' testified that they had not been advised, this appears to be an isolated incident as opposed to a course of conduct. Notwithstanding proof of the above, no evidence is presented that the Montaltos' contracted with a designated builder to build their house, and that a designated builder paid a fee to Talbott and Drake, Inc. To the contrary, the testimony of William Talbott was that the Montaltos' had breached the terms of their contract regarding the use of a designated builder.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission issue a letter of reprimand to Talbott and Drake, Inc. which, in fairness to the Respondents, should set out the specifics of the violation and to further apprise other registrants of the potential dangers of such fee arrangement. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Charles M. Holcomb, Esquire 653 Brevard Avenue Post Office Box 1657 Cocoa, Florida 32922
The Issue Whether Petitioner has been subjected to an unlawful housing practice by Respondent, as alleged in the Housing Discrimination Complaint filed by Petitioner on April 9, 2003.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Ruby Jewell Perl, moved into Grand Oaks Villas in October 1999. She signed a lease for a two-bedroom apartment. After moving into the apartment, she made application for and received public assistance in renting the apartment in April 2000. Grand Oaks Villas is an apartment complex located in Pensacola, Florida. Many of the residents are retired. The lease between Petitioner and Grand Oaks Villas, signed in April 2000, reflected that a portion of the rent would be paid by the Public Housing Assistance Program. The lease, which was for Apartment 13A, requires a 30-day written notice for termination of the lease after the initial year of the lease. The lease reflects that Petitioner paid a security deposit of $200 in April 2000. Respondent, Jabari Abdulsamad, took ownership of Grand Oak Villas in June 2001. He became the owner/manager of the apartment complex. At some point in early April 2002, Petitioner began discussions with Mr. Abdulsamad regarding the amount of rent she was paying for the two-bedroom apartment and the possibility of moving to a one-bedroom apartment. Petitioner was exploring these options because the amount of rent for the two-bedroom apartment was more than she could afford. Initially, Mr. Abdulsamad showed a one-bedroom apartment to Petitioner. There is conflicting evidence as to whether he actually made an offer to Petitioner to move into a one-bedroom apartment for $485 per month. There is no disagreement, however, that Mr. Abdulsamad insisted that Petitioner put her request to transfer to a one-bedroom apartment in writing. There is no evidence that Petitioner put such a request in writing. In late April 2002, Petitioner and Respondents entered into an amendment to the lease in which Petitioner’s portion of the rent for her two-bedroom apartment was to be $326 per month, and the remaining rent of $249 per month was to be paid by the Public Housing Assistance Program, effective May 1, 2002. In late October 2002, Petitioner gave Mr. Abdulsamad two written notices of intent to vacate the apartment in 30 days. One notice was handwritten; one notice was on a form. On November 5, 2002, Mr. Abdulsamad wrote to Petitioner demanding payment of her portion of the rent for November. The letter stated that the housing authority paid their part, in full, but that she owed the balance of $153.26. The letter notified Petitioner that he would file eviction papers the following day if the rent was not paid in full. An eviction action was filed resulting in court costs of $104.87. Petitioner paid the outstanding rent into the court registry and vacated the property. Mr. Abdulsamad deducted the court costs out of the $200 security deposit and refunded the difference of $95.13 to Petitioner. Despite the eviction and legal matters surrounding the eviction, Petitioner’s main complaint regarding her charge of discrimination apparently stems from her desire to move from a two-bedroom apartment to a one-bedroom apartment. She was very upset about Mr. Abdulsamad’s insistent requests that she put her requests in writing and felt she was not treated fairly. Additionally, there were disputes regarding pet deposits and the ownership of the washer and dryer in her apartment. However, these and many other matters raised in the hearing concerned business issues, rather than discrimination issues, and are outside the scope of this proceeding.2/ Miriam Lewis also resided at Grand Oaks Villas. When she initially moved into Grand Oaks Villas, she was shown a one- bedroom apartment and wished to move into it. She was told it was already rented to a tenant receiving public housing assistance. Consequently, she moved into a two-bedroom apartment. She eventually transferred into a one-bedroom apartment. She described Mr. Abdulsamad as very cooperative regarding her transfer from a two-bedroom to a one-bedroom apartment. From the weight of the testimony, it is apparent that there is a great deal of friction among residents of Grand Oaks Villas. However, the testimony in the record, while establishing that there are a number of disgruntled tenants at Grand Oaks Villas, did not establish that Mr. Abdulsamad discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her gender. There is insufficient evidence in the record that a male was offered a one-bedroom apartment at the time Petitioner desired to rent one or that a male was offered more favorable rent or other conditions of tenancy.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 2004.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Pierson is the owner of a parcel of land located at 7 Heilwood Street, Clearwater Beach, Florida. This parcel consists of the North 1/2 of Lot 2 and all of Lot 3 in Block 6, Revised Map of Clearwater Beach, according to the plat thereof as recorded in Plat Book 11, page 5, of the Public Records of Pinellas County, Florida. The westwardly portion of the parcel is beach front property on a coastal barrier island. When the subdivision known as Clearwater Beach Subdivision was platted, fifteen lots were placed in Block 6. The three beachfront lots were smaller in area than the other twelve lots which were uniform in size and shape. However, when Lot 2 was divided and the northern half went to Lot 3 and the southern half to Lot 1, fourteen similar parcels were created in Block 6. Pierson purchased the parcel in question as unimproved property in Clearwater Beach Subdivision in 1962. This was nine years prior to the creation of Coastal Construction Control Lines by the Florida Legislature. The establishment of the Coastal Construction Control Line for Clearwater Beach in 1977, caused building setbacks previously established by the City of Clearwater for this unimproved parcel to become even further restricted. The Coastal Construction Control Line deleted the seaward 5/8ths of the Pierson property on which a building could have been erected previously on Clearwater Beach. Few parcels on this island were impacted as severely as Respondent Pierson's by the creation of the Coastal Construction Control Line because most of these parcels already contained permanent improvements. This parcel remained vacant until Respondent Pierson erected a duplex in 1986. This improvement was constructed according to the Land Development Code in effect at the time with the following exceptions: A variance of zero setback from the Coastal Construction Control Line and a 6 foot height variance to permit construction of a building 31 feet in height were granted by the Board. At the time the variances were granted, Respondent had the option to build either a duplex or a triplex at the site. Respondent seeks to expand this structure and to convert it into a triplex. In order to complete the planned expansion, a variance of 18 feet was requested from the Board to allow construction 7 feet from the Heilwood Street right-of-way. Currently, the Code requires a 25 feet setback from a street right-of-way. In addition, a variance of two feet from the eastward property boundary was requested to allow construction up to 6 feet from this side property line. Code provisions require an 8 feet setback. The existing structure is 6 feet from this side property line. The proposed addition to the current structure would continue with that eastern setback of 6 feet to the north, with an additional 25 feet of structure extending towards Heilwood Street. The expansion of the building to the west would terminate at the Coastal Construction Control Line. The property is zoned RM-20 with a land use plan designation as high density residential developed. The parcel is 95.12 feet in length and 87 feet in width, an area of 8,242.38 square feet. Ordinarily, a parcel with these dimensions is of sufficient size to build the structure proposed by Respondent Pierson without violating the street right-of-way setback and the side property line setback mandated by the Code. In this case, setback variances are required to complete the triplex because of the Coastal Construction Control Line's location on the parcel. In his application for variance, together with evidence presented, Respondent Pierson contends that the variance request arises from a condition unique to the property. The "unique" condition being that he did not build what he now wants to build on the property before the land use restrictions currently in place limited development of the parcel to such an extent. All other lot owners in the locale chose to develop their lots earlier than Respondent did, under less restrictive conditions. As a result, Respondent Pierson's duplex is setback further from Heilwood Street than the other buildings. Deciding when and what to build as a real property improvement is part of real estate ownership. Now that Respondent Pierson wants to change his previous development decision to reflect his current intended property use, he wants the same setback benefits as those acquired by other property owners on Heilwood Street who developed their parcels during past time periods with less restrictive setbacks. The Coastal Construction Control Line and the building setbacks have been placed on the property because of legitimate state and local concerns. A driveway was placed by Respondent Pierson in front of the duplex as it faces the water at the end of a dead-end street. The location of this driveway and the existing setback of the duplex from the road beyond all of the other property setbacks on this street, make this portion of Respondent's property a convenient area for traveling cars to turn around or to park while using the beach. Respondent Pierson contends that the variances he has requested will discourage the use of his land as a turnaround area, because it would be clear to those attempting to use his driveway that they were trespassing. His primary interest is to maintain his private interests in the property which should go beyond those currently enjoyed by the public. It is a desire for these rights that control his request for the variances as opposed to a desire to secure a greater financial return. The variances granted by the Board will not be materially detrimental or injurious to the Vasilaros property. The variances, however, could impair the present value of the Petitioner's property because the expansion of the Pierson duplex into a triplex would block a large amount of the Gulf view the Vasilaros building was designed to acquire. Petitioners' lot is in the same subdivision as the parcel owned by Respondent Pierson. Even before the Vasilaros lot was improved, the landowners knew or should have known that another parcel separated this lot from the beach. Respondent Pierson is under no statutory or contractual obligation to restrict his land use to allow Petitioners a view. The variances granted would result in a nonconforming building. All of the other structures in the immediate vicinity are nonconforming because these structures were built before current zoning regulations were adopted. Respondent Pierson seeks to blend with the neighborhood on the street and to have the same nonconforming advantages. Respondent Pierson could convert the current structure into a triplex. The apartments would be much smaller than the ones contemplated in the proposed plan. He seeks to create the third apartment for his own retirement home. On August 22, 1991, the Board granted a variance of 15 feet to permit construction of a triplex 10 feet from a street right-of-way and a second variance of 2 feet to allow construction up to 6 feet from the side property line to the south because the Board found that the applicant has substantially met all the standards for approval, as listed in Section 137.012(d) of the Land Development Code. More specifically, the Board found: a) The variances arise from a condition which is unique to the property and not caused by the applicant; b) The Coastal Construction Control Line restricts the use of two- thirds of the property, allowing only 19 percent use, c) The particular physical surroundings, shape, or topographical conditions involved and the strict application of the provisions of this Development Code would result in unnecessary hardship upon the applicant; and d) The variances granted are the minimum necessary to overcome the hardship created by the minimal use of the property subject to the requisite building permit being obtained within six months from the date of this public hearing.
Recommendation Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the variances granted by the Board be set aside and the application for the variances submitted be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of February, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: JOHN T BLAKELY ESQ PO BOX 1368 CLEARWATER FL 34617 GEORGE W GREER ESQ 600 CLEVELAND ST - STE 685 CLEARWATER FL 34616 MILES LANCE ESQ PO BOX 4748 CLEARWATER FL 34618 CINDIE GOUDEAU/CITY CLERK CITY OF CLEARWATER PO BOX 4748 CLEARWATER FL 34618 MICHAEL WRIGHT/CITY MANAGER CITY OF CLEARWATER 112 S OSCEOLA AVE CLEARWATER FL 34618 VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of February, 1992.
The Issue Issues presented here concerned the entitlement of Respondent, Russell D. Horn, Sr., to be granted an environmental permit by Respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation, to build a boat stall on an existing dock in Putnam County, Florida. The boat stall's dimensions are ten feet wide by twenty feet deep and the construction would be on the St. Johns River.
Findings Of Fact On July 13, 1981, Russell D. Horn, Sr., who has a residence in Putnam County, Florida, bade application to the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, for the necessary permits to construct a boat stall ten feet wide by twenty feet deep at the site of an existing dock. A copy of the application may be found as Respondent Horn's Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. The dock where Horn applied to build the boat slip is found in the St. Johns River, a navigable water body and waters of the State of Florida in Putnam County, Florida. The application form which was executed by Horn required him to indicate the name of adjacent property owners to the property at which the dock site was located, both upland and adjacent to the uplands. See Rule 17- 4.28(11)(c), Florida Administrative Code. To accomplish this task, the applicant utilized a sketch which he had been provided when he purchased his homesite in the area and indicated to the Department that the adjoining landowners were Milton Kilis and Robert Michal. In fact, Robert Michal was not an adjacent landowner. The adjacent landowner, Milton G. Kilis, wrote to advise the Department that he had no objection to the construction of the boat slip. This correspondence was dated September 11, 1981. A copy of that correspondence may be found as Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 3 admitted into evidence. After reviewing the initial application, additional information was requested by a document entitled "Completeness Summary" which was addressed from the Department to the Applicant Horn. A copy of this "Completeness Summary" requesting additional information may be found as Department's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. Through this summary, Horn was requested to provide written authorization from the dock owners. It was also requested that Respondent provide an affidavit of ownership of the upland property adjacent to the dock site. Horn received permission to construct from Frank Scussell and William A. Reaves, persons he understood to be the dock owners. See Respondent Horn's Exhibit No. 3 admitted into evidence. Horn misunderstood the question related to ownership of upland property and provided a mortgage deed with its attendant description of his home site property in Putnam County, which is at a different location from that of the upland property adjacent to the dock. A copy of that deed and other matters may be found as Respondent Horn's Exhibit No. 4 admitted into evidence. Department of Environmental Regulation reviewing authorities wrote on the "Completeness Summary" form, Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 1, indicating that the task of seeking written authorization from the dock owners had been achieved and that the affidavit of ownership of upland property owners was satisfactory. In fact, all adjacent property owners had not been notified of the pendency of the application request through the process of Horn's advising the Respondent agency of the names of all adjacent property owners to the uplands and the affidavit of ownership of the upland property owner at the dock site was not filed. During the review process, permission was given by the Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, for the construction of the boat slip. A copy of this permission, by letter dated August 31, 1981, is Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. The Department of Environmental Regulation reviewed the permit application and prepared an application appraisal, which may be found as Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 5 admitted into evidence. The findings made by that application appraisal related to application review are found to be accurate. In particular the permit application appraisal indicated that the boat slip would be located at the waterward end of the existing dock structure, which existing dock structure accommodated four boats. The appraisal found that the project was located in South Putnam County in the town of Georgetown on the St. Johns River. The permit appraisal found that the project site would be located in the littoral zone of the river about one hundred feet waterward of the mean high water line. No littoral growth was seen at the depth of the proposed construction. Tapegrass, Mexican waterlily and cattail were present near the shore. Several large hardwood swamp trees were present at the shoreline. The project was found to be located in a Water Class III and adjacent waters were Class III according to the appraisal, no significant immediate or long-term adverse environmental impacts were to be expected to occur due to the completion of the boat slip. Horn was subsequently given a construction permit to add the boat stall to the existing dock. A copy of that permit may be found as Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 6 admitted into evidence. The only specific conditions related to that matter pertain to the necessity for the utilization of turbidity curtains throughout the project for purposes of containing the turbidity that might exceed State water quality standards, The permit was issued on September 22, 1981. After receiving the permit, sometime around October 20, 1981, Horn purchased the necessary lumber to construct the stall and on October 24, 1981, went to the dock site to begin the installation of pilings related to the construction of the boat stall. While placing the pilings on October 24, 1981, an adjoining property owner and Petitioner in this cause, Marshall Wolfe, stood on his dock, that is, Wolfe's dock, and hailed to Horn to stop building. Horn did not know Wolfe before that time and did not know that Wolfe, not Michal, was the adjacent property owner on that side of the dock. On October 28, 1981, Marshall Wolfe and his wife, Ann Wolfe, wrote to the Department in the person of G. Doug Dutton, Subdistrict Manager, and indicated that they were opposed to the issuance of the permit, which is under the number of the permit issued to Respondent, and requested a hearing on the question of the issuance. A copy of that correspondence may be found as Department's Exhibit No. 7 admitted into evidence. On the same date, October 28, 1981, Horn was contacted by the Department of Environmental Regulation and advised of the Wolfe complaint and Horn was told that he would receive a cease and desist order from the Department of Environmental Regulation. On October 30, 1981, Horn returned to the construction site and found four of his neighbors finishing the construction of the stall. In fact, the neighbors did conclude the construction and the boat slip remains in place. A cease and desist letter was mailed on November 2, 1981; however, this letter was not received by Horn immediately. Horn did subsequently learn of the contents of the letter some time in November or December, 1981. A copy of the cease and desist letter may be found as Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 8 admitted into evidence. On December 13, 1981, an attempt was made at the instigation of Department officials for the Petitioners and Respondent Horn to resolve the controversy. This effort was unsuccessful. As a consequence, a formal hearing was necessary in keeping with the request of the Department that the Division of Administrative Hearings conduct a Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, formal hearing. This request had been made on November 12, 1981, and an initial hearings had been scheduled for February 11, 1982, following consultation between the various parties and the Hearing Officer. At the initial hearing session on February 11, 1982, which was to be held in Palatka, Florida, counsel for Department indicated that the upland property was not owned by Horn and that easement rights to that property were unclear. In view of this fact the hearing was continued until the ostensible upland property owner could be notified of the pendency of the issuance of an environmental permit and be allowed to participate. Notification was subsequently provided by an Intent to Issue Statement, a copy of which may be found as Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 9 admitted into evidence. This notification was through the Department at the instigation of the Hearing Officer. The date of notification was February 12, 1982. An order was entered on March 17, 1982, which allowed the intervention of St. Johns Crescent Lakesites, Inc. into the proceedings and that party, in the person of its counsel, Lauren E. Merriam, III, Esquire, participated in the April 15, 1982 hearing. St. Johns Crescent Lakesites, Inc. is the owner of the upland property adjacent to the dock in which Horn had constructed the boat slip. No indication was given that any easement rights were ever granted by that corporation to grant access to the boat slip from the adjacent property. The overall dock area, in terms of square feet, is between 500 and 1000 square feet. Other than the permit application made by Horn, no other permission has been received by the Department to construct the other features of the dock. A further appraisal of the project site subsequent to the September 18, 1981, appraisal has been made. That appraisal was made by the field inspector for the Department. This appraisal by Melvin Rechtor agrees with the project appraisal made by the first field inspector, John Hendricks. The testimony of Melvin Rechtor on environmental impacts of the project are accepted as accurate. Rechtor's testimony established that the project would have an insignificant impact on water quality considerations and would not adversely affect the species or the conservation of fish, marine and wildlife or other natural resources. Rechtor's testimony established that there would be no unreasonable interference with waterward access of adjacent property owners. Rechtor's testimony also established that there would be no navigational hazard nor interference with fishing and swimming by persons using the river.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Laurel Oaks Apartments ("Laurel Oaks"), discriminated against Petitioner, Lawrence Jacobs, Jr., on the basis of his race in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 22-year-old African-American male. At all times relevant hereto, Petitioner was residing at Laurel Oaks in Temple Terrace, Florida. Petitioner co-habited at Laurel Oaks with a woman, Sade Newton. Petitioner and Newton were expecting a child during the time they resided at Laurel Oaks. Laurel Oaks Apartments is the Respondent. It is a large apartment complex comprised of several buildings. Approximately 70 to 75 percent of the residents of Laurel Oaks are minorities. Petitioner moved into Laurel Oaks on or about November 3, 2009. Petitioner and Newton signed an Apartment Lease Contract (the "Lease") on that date. Petitioner was assigned apartment number 8704 (the "Initial Unit") at a rental fee of $589.00 per month. The term of the Lease was one year. Almost immediately upon taking possession of the Initial Unit, Petitioner began to have some sort of confrontation with a neighboring tenant and his family (hereinafter referred to as the "Neighbor"). Specifically, Petitioner felt that the Neighbor's children were too loud, and that they were disrupting Petitioner's quiet enjoyment of his residence. Petitioner and the Neighbor argued numerous times, and Petitioner reported these arguments to Respondent. Upon receiving Petitioner's complaints about the Neighbor, Respondent offered to let Petitioner out of his Lease or move him to another apartment. In fact, Respondent agreed to allow Petitioner to move into an upgraded apartment with no increase in the rental fee. Respondent also agreed to waive the transfer fee normally associated with moving from one apartment to another. Petitioner believes that Respondent was dilatory in helping him move to a different apartment. However, there is no evidence to support that contention. The assistant community manager, Makell, indicated that she provided Petitioner with four possible options for moving. Some of the units she offered were undergoing painting or repairs and were not immediately available. Makell remembers only one telephone call from Petitioner concerning his potential interest in one of the available units. Petitioner remembers calling regularly to inquire about the units. Makell also remembers Petitioner ultimately asking for a specific apartment, number 8716 (the "Second Unit"). Petitioner and Newton signed a new lease (referred to herein as the "New Lease") for the Second Unit on February 8, 2010, and moved in on that date. The New Lease was also for a term of one year. The Second Unit was an upgrade from the Initial Unit, but Petitioner was not charged a higher rental fee. The Second Unit was, inexplicably, directly "across the way"1 from the apartment where the Neighbor resided. The evidence as to why Petitioner chose that unit or why he agreed to move into that unit was contradictory and confusing. Nonetheless, it is clear that Petitioner at some point voluntarily moved into the Second Unit. Shortly after Petitioner and Newton moved into the Second Unit, they had some sort of domestic squabble. Newton was pregnant with Petitioner's child, and there were some tensions between them. As a result of the squabble, someone called the police. When the police arrived, they talked with Petitioner and Newton for about an hour and then arrested Newton for domestic violence. Petitioner believes Newton had to be arrested pursuant to police policy, i.e., once the police are called to investigate domestic violence, they have to arrest one of the parties. There was no persuasive, non-hearsay evidence to confirm that such a policy exists. All charges against Newton were apparently dropped. However, the significance of Newton's arrest is that it constituted a breach of the New Lease. Paragraph 28 of the New Lease prohibits conduct which infringes on the quiet enjoyment of the apartment complex by other tenants. As a result, Laurel Oaks gave Petitioner and Newton a "Seven Day Notice of Noncompliance Without Opportunity to Cure" (the "Notice"), which effectively evicted them from the Second Unit. Petitioner does not deny that the New Lease was breached; he admitted so in a letter to Respondent dated May 12, 2010, about a week after the domestic violence arrest occurred. In his letter, Petitioner asks Respondent to reconsider its decision to uphold the provision in the New Lease and to rescind the Notice. Despite Petitioner's plea, Respondent stood by its Notice, and Petitioner was forced to move out of the apartment. At some point thereafter, Petitioner and a representative from Laurel Oaks did a "walk-through" of the Second Unit. A tenant who defaulted under a Laurel Oaks lease would normally be liable for any damages and for all rent that came due until the unit was re-leased. Laurel Oaks suggested at the time of the walk-through that Petitioner would receive a prorated refund for the current month (May) and would not be charged for the remainder of the Lease term. However, Petitioner, thereafter, got into an argument with the community manager, Heckinger, and Heckinger decided to pursue all allowable charges against Petitioner. As a result, when Petitioner received his ultimate receipt from Laurel Oaks, it included a demand for payment in the amount of $589.00 for termination of the Lease, forfeiture of Petitioner's $99.00 security deposit, and the remaining May rent amount ($114.00). Petitioner believes Heckinger and other employees of Laurel Oaks did not take him as seriously as other tenants. He believes Heckinger was "nasty" to him, but not to other tenants. Petitioner believes his request to move to a different apartment was not responded to in a timely fashion. Petitioner provided no evidence that any other residents were, in fact, treated differently than he was treated. There was no evidence presented that persons of color, including Petitioner, were treated differently than similarly situated persons. There was no persuasive evidence that any person affiliated with Laurel Oaks treated Petitioner badly or discriminated against him in any fashion. Laurel Oaks actually did more for Petitioner than was required or mandated by the Lease or by law. Petitioner was given the benefit of the doubt, was provided extra accommodation for his problems, and was treated appropriately. Petitioner also admitted that he did not believe the Laurel Oaks employees were racist.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations denying Petitioner, Lawrence Jacob, Jr.'s, Petition for Relief in full. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of December, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 2010.
