The Issue The issues in this case are whether the Respondent committed violations alleged in an Administrative Complaint and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, Respondent was employed by Petitioner as a school psychologist. At all times material to this case, Respondent was a member of the Classroom Teachers Association (CTA) Bargaining Unit. At all times material to this case, Respondent was receiving benefits under a valid claim for Workers' Compensation benefits arising from an accident on January 7, 2000. In conjunction with investigations as to Respondent's eligibility for Workers' Compensation benefits, video surveillance of Respondent's activities was conducted on several occasions. At the beginning of the 1999-2000 school year, Dr. Laakso worked for Petitioner as a school psychologist in Area 3, and was assigned to Palm Beach Lakes High School, Forest Hill High School, and Conniston Middle School. His immediate supervisor was Mary Kate Boyle, the Area 3 Exceptional Student Education (ESE) Team Leader. On January 7, 2000, Dr. Laakso was working in his car while parked in the Palm Beach Lakes High School parking lot, and when exiting the car, hit his head on the door jamb causing a compression of his spine. He then received a second injury to his back while pulling psychological testing kits out of his car. Dr. Laakso submitted this injury to Petitioner as a workers' compensation injury, and it was covered as such. Christopher Brown, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon and one of Dr. Laakso's workers' compensation physicians, treated Dr. Laakso. On February 8, 2000, Dr. Brown placed Dr. Laakso on a "no-work" status. Dr. Laakso suffers from cervical spinal stenosis, which is a narrowing of the spinal canal. Because Dr. Laakso had underlying spinal stenosis secondary to arthritis, combined with disc herniations, his orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Brown, diagnosed Dr. Laakso's stenosis as severe. Also on February 8, 2000, Ms. Boyle held an investigative meeting with Respondent and his then-attorney, Stephen Fried, to discuss Respondent's continued absences since January 7, 2000 (the date of Respondent's workers' compensation injury) and his work status. In a letter to Dr. Laakso dated February 9, 2000, Ms. Boyle explained what her expectations were with regard to Respondent's absence and work status. On February 9, 2000, Dr. Laakso requested unpaid sick leave for January 11, 2000 to May 31, 2000, which the School Board granted. In March of 2000, Dr. Laakso was released back to light duty work, with restrictions. Some of the physical restrictions placed on Dr. Laakso's activities included no overhead use of the right upper extremity and no heavy use of the right upper extremity greater than 5 pounds. In addition, Dr. Laakso was told to be careful and to try not to hurt himself. Dr. Brown also imposed a 10 mile driving restriction on Dr. Laakso because Dr. Brown believed Dr. Laakso's spinal stenosis placed him at increased risk if he hit his head or was in a car accident. Dr. Laakso argued against the driving restriction because he was capable of driving and believed that the restriction would "mess things up" if he was unable to use his car. Dr. Laakso neither asked for the driving restriction nor represented that he needed the restriction.4 Dr. Laakso conveyed the driving restrictions to both Ms. Boyle and Linda Meyers in Risk Management. On March 21, 2000, Dr. Laakso was given a light duty placement in which he was assigned to Atlantic High School watching the school's security cameras. This assignment was for Dr. Laakso's regularly scheduled 7.5 hours a day, and was within the physical and driving restrictions imposed by Dr. Brown. While on light duty assignment at Atlantic High School, Dr. Laakso reported to Assistant Principal, Marshall Bellin. Dr. Laakso also submitted his time sheets to Mr. Bellin for Mr. Bellin's verification and signature. After Mr. Bellin signed the light duty time sheets, Dr. Laakso faxed them to Ms. Boyle for payroll purposes. Around this time period, in approximately April of 2000, the third party administrator, FARA, who handles the School Board's Workers' Compensation claims, hired private investigator Richard Mains to conduct surveillance of Dr. Laakso. Mains observed Dr. Laakso at various times from April 3, 2000 through October 2, 2000. Mains documented Respondent's driving to and from his Matlacha home and the activities in which he engaged while there. Mains did not know whether Dr. Laakso was taking pain or anti-inflammatory medication, or whether Dr. Laakso was under the influence of these types of medications at the times Mains observed him. On May 17, 2000, Ms. Boyle held another investigative meeting regarding Respondent's absences while on light duty. The minutes from that meeting indicate that Ms. Boyle expressed her concern to Dr. Laakso regarding his absences, discussed his light duty assignment at Atlantic High School, and directed him to call her beeper if he was going to be absent. He was also directed to provide a doctor's note if he was absent. Dr. Laakso remained in the light duty assignment at Atlantic High School for the remainder of the 1999-2000 school year. On Wednesday, August 9, 2000, the first day of the 2000-2001 school year, Dr. Laakso again reported to Atlantic High School to resume his light duty placement. On August 15, 2000, Marshall Bellin signed Respondent's light duty sign-in sheet, which covered Dr. Laakso's work attendance for August 9, 10, 11, and 14, 2000. Around August 14 or 15, 2000, Dr. Laakso received verbal notification that because his driving restriction had been lifted, he was being taken off light duty assignment and was to report to Area 3. Prior to this verbal notification, Dr. Laakso had not been advised by his physicians that his driving restriction had been lifted. However, he subsequently learned through someone at the Risk Management Department that, in fact, the driving restriction had been lifted. Upon hearing the news, Dr. Laakso contacted Dr. Brown. When he went to see Dr. Brown, Dr. Brown explained to Respondent that the Board had sent him a questionnaire asking whether he believed that Dr. Laakso could drive a car as opposed to whether he should drive a car. Dr. Brown further explained that he responded that Dr. Laakso could drive a car, but felt he had made a mistake as he felt it was still dangerous for Dr. Laakso to drive. Accordingly, on August 17, 2000, Dr. Brown reinstated Dr. Laakso's driving restriction of no more than 10 minutes. On August 17, 2000, Dr. Laakso sent a memo to Ms. Boyle indicating that his driving restriction had been reinstated. A copy of the note from Dr. Brown was attached to this memo. Because of her continuing concern regarding Respondent's absences, on October 2, 2000, Ms. Boyle held another "investigative meeting" regarding Dr. Laakso's absences. This meeting resulted in Boyle's issuing Dr. Laakso a written reprimand for unacceptable and unexcused absences, failure to call in intended absences as required, and insubordination. The written reprimand specifically addressed Dr. Laakso's absences on August 9, 10, 11, 22, and September 20, 27, 28, and 29. Ms. Boyle believed her issuance of the written reprimand dated October 2, 2000, was consistent with the progressive discipline policy. At the time that Ms. Boyle wrote the reprimand, she also notified the District's Professional Standards Department and requested a formal investigation of Respondent's absences. Ms. Boyle then contacted Ray Miller in Professional Standards to be sure that she was following appropriate procedure. In October of 2000, Ray Miller received Respondent's case for investigation, and the investigation was assigned case number 101. Specifically, Miller investigated allegations involving Respondent's misuse of leave, unauthorized absence, failure to call in and report absences as required, and insubordination for the time period of January 2000 through December 2000. At the time of his interview with Respondent, Miller had a surveillance video and a report of Respondent's activities for April of 2000. Respondent neither denied that he was the subject of the video nor that he failed to report and call in his absences. Shortly before December 4, 2000, Miller signed off on the investigative report for case number 101, and on December 4, 2000, Paul Lachance issued a letter to Dr. Laakso indicating that the investigation was complete, and that a determination of probable cause had been made. The investigative report was then reviewed by the Case Management Review Committee to determine whether there was just cause to recommend discipline and, if so, provide a discipline recommendation. The Committee found just cause and recommended Dr. Laakso's termination. A number of meetings were held in December 2000 with representatives of Petitioner, Dr. Laakso, and his then- attorney, Mr. Fried. As a result of these meetings, an informal settlement was reached; Dr. Laakso's employment was not terminated, but rather he was transferred to the Area 1 ESE office. By a letter to the file dated January 8, 2001, Paul Lachance, Director of Professional Standards, administratively closed case number 01-101 against Dr. Laakso with "no action." While assigned to Area 1, Dr. Laakso was under the supervision of Area 1 ESE Team Leader, Paul Sayrs. As supervisor, Mr. Sayrs was responsible for keeping track of Respondent's attendance. Accordingly, Sayrs directed Respondent to call and notify secretary Judy Fabris if he was going to be absent, who in turn would notify Mr. Sayrs. While assigned to Area 1, Dr. Laakso missed work for several days in January and February 2001, and was also out for most of March and April 2001. On April 4, 2001, Mr. Sayrs sent Dr. Laakso a letter listing the dates of his absences and directing him to submit a doctor's note for the dates listed, as well as for any future absences. The next day, April 5, 2001, Mr. Sayrs sent another letter to Dr. Laakso advising him he was currently absent without approved leave. Mr. Sayrs advised Respondent further that due to an absence of correspondence from Respondent, Mr. Sayrs would assume Respondent had decided to discontinue working for Petitioner and Respondent's name would be submitted to the School Board for acceptance of Respondent's resignation. Dr. Laakso immediately contacted Dr. Sachs regarding Mr. Sayrs' request for medical documentation, but was unable to get an appointment with Dr. Sachs until April 20th. However, prior to his April 20th appointment, Dr. Laakso forwarded to Dr. Sachs a copy of the District's letter, which indicated he would be terminated if he did not provide the requested documentation prior to his appointment on April 20th. In response, Dr. Sachs accounted for Dr. Laakso's absences, noting they were due to his symptoms and cervical condition. Additionally, Dr. Laakso followed through by faxing his Request for Leave of Absence without Pay form with his signature, dated April 18, 2001, directly to Dr. Sachs for his signature. The leave was ultimately granted retroactive to March 8, 2001, prior to Dr. Laakso's being terminated by the District. On April 18, 2001, Dr. Laakso sent a handwritten note to Dan McGrath explaining his absences. Dr. Laakso attached to his note to Mr. McGrath two documents from Dr. Sachs, one dated April 15, 2001, and the other dated April 6, 2000. On May 18, 2001, Paul Sayrs evaluated Dr. Laakso's performance. The evaluation sheet indicated that Dr. Laakso was "presently on a medical leave of absence." Dr. Laakso has a second home in Matlacha, located on the other side of Cape Coral. Matlacha is located in the Fort Myers area and is approximately 150 miles from the West Palm Beach area, roughly a three-hour trip using country roads. Because he had not been feeling well, Dr. Laakso had not been taking care of his property in Matlacha. As a result, he received notices from the county telling him he needed to clear up the property or face a potential daily fine of $225. Specifically, the county informed Dr. Laakso that he needed to mow the grass, move a boat, register a pickup truck, and park the truck somewhere where it was not in open view. He asked for an extension in which to do these things, which was granted. However, the county advised Dr. Laakso that if he did not get the work done by the date established, the daily fine would be imposed. Although while at his Matlacha home Dr. Laakso did work outside of the restrictions imposed on him by his physician, he could work for 20 or 30 minutes and then go inside and rest, unlike when he was at work for the School Board, which required he work a full eight-hour day. While he was on his Matlacha property, he continued his daily swimming as part of his physical therapy, which he had discussed with, and received approval for, from Dr. Brown. At no time did Dr. Laakso attempt to hide the fact that he drove to the Matlacha property or that he worked in his yard while there. In fact, he disclosed this information when deposed in his workers' compensation case, and he discussed it with his doctor. While the doctor did not give Dr. Laakso permission for this type of conduct, Dr. Laakso did discuss it with him.5 Following the closing of the first investigation numbered 101, the office of Professional Standards received a memo from Diane Howard, Director of Risk Management, dated January 9, 2001. Ms. Howard was requesting a reinvestigation of Dr. Laakso's absences. In response to this memo, Miller did not interview Respondent, but instead viewed surveillance videotapes from August 11 through October 1 or 2, 2000. In addition to the videos, Miller reviewed memos from Nancy Patrick, Mary Kate Boyle, and Paul Sayrs. Miller testified that the difference between this investigation and the previous one was that it involved a different period of time, both for the videos and regarding issues of Respondent's attendance in January, February, and March of 2001. The allegations against Respondent for this investigation were that he was obtaining leave due to sickness or illness and that he was performing actions that were inconsistent with his alleged illness or sickness. This second investigation followed the same pattern as the first and was sent to the Committee for review. The Committee again recommended Dr. Laakso's termination. Dr. Laakso timely requested an administrative hearing, and these proceedings followed. The collective bargaining agreement describes procedures for discipline of employees, including this: Without the consent of the employee and the Association, disciplinary action may not be taken against an employee except for just cause, and this must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence which supports the recommended disciplinary action. The collective bargaining agreement also requires progressive discipline (reprimand through dismissal) . . . [e]xcept in cases which clearly constitute a real and immediate danger to the district or the actions/inactions of the employee constitute such clearly flagrant and purposeful violations of reasonable school rules and regulations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered in this case dismissing all charges in the Administrative Compliant, reinstating Respondent to his position of employment with the School Board, and providing Respondent with such back pay and attendant benefits as are authorized by law. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 2003.
The Issue Whether the respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated December 19, 1995, and, if so, the penalty which should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission is the state agency responsible for certifying and revoking the certification of correctional officers. Section 943.12(3), Florida Statutes. Ms. Davis was certified by the Commission on May 18, 1993, and was issued Corrections Certificate Number 137735. She is currently certified as a corrections officer. Incident at the Royal Palm Beach K-Mart. In the Administrative Complaint, the Commission charged that On or about September 16, 1994, the Respondent, Dorothy B. Davis, did knowingly obtain, use, or did endeavor to obtain or to use a bread maker and a breadmixer of the value of $300.00 or more, the property of K-Mart, with the intent to either temporarily or permanently deprive the owner of a right to the property to her own use. On the morning of September 16, 1994, Timothy Meyers, a K-Mart employee of 16 years, was working as manager of the Royal Palm Beach K-Mart. Mr. Meyers observed Ms. Davis in the kitchen appliance aisle of the store with a shopping cart containing a Black and Decker bread maker and a Kitchen Aide mixer. The bread maker was priced at about $160.00 and the mixer at about $200.00. Moments later, Mr. Meyers observed another woman and a man push a shopping cart into the kitchen appliance aisle and, without looking at the various models available, put into their cart the same model Black and Decker bread maker and the same model Kitchen Aide mixer that Ms. Davis had in her cart. Mr. Meyers found it unusual that a shopper would choose these items without looking at the prices or at the other models available because the items were so expensive. Consequently, he followed the couple to the front of the store, where he observed them pay for the two items with cash. Mr. Meyers observed the couple leave the store by the front exit and put the bread maker and the mixer into a blue Ford Bronco. The man handed the woman what appeared to be the sales receipt for the bread maker and the mixer, and he then got into the Bronco and drove to the west side of the shopping center parking lot. Mr. Meyers observed the woman return to the store. She located Ms. Davis and handed her a piece of paper which Mr. Meyers believed was the receipt for the bread maker and the mixer. Mr. Meyers observed Ms. Davis push the cart containing the Black and Decker bread maker and the Kitchen Aide mixer toward the garden center, which is located on the east side of the store and has a separate exit and check-out register. He asked another store employee to follow Ms. Davis, and he went out the front exit to a location where he could observe the garden center exit but could neither see inside the garden center nor be seen by someone inside the store. When Mr. Meyers saw Ms. Davis push the cart containing the bread maker and the mixer through the garden center exit and onto the ramp leading into the parking lot, he stepped out and stopped her. He asked her if she had paid for the items in her cart at the front register, and she said yes and handed him a receipt for items of the same make and model as those she had in her cart. Mr. Meyers looked at the receipt, told Ms. Davis that she had not paid for the items, and told the cashier in the garden center to call the police. At this point, Ms. Davis left the cart on the sidewalk and walked away. Although Mr. Meyers told her to stop, she continued walking until she reached the Taco Bell restaurant located on the east side of the parking lot, about two hundred feet from the K-Mart store, where she waited until the police arrived. The K-Mart cash register detail tapes, which are the records of every transaction at the store, were checked and showed that, on the morning of September 16, 1994, only one Black and Decker bread maker and one Kitchen Aide mixer were sold. The evidence presented is clear and convincing that, on September 16, 1994, Ms. Davis took property belonging to K-Mart out of the store without paying for it. The property was valued at more than $300. These acts fall within the definition of grand theft found in section 812.014(1) and (2)(c)1, Florida Statutes, which constitutes a third degree felony pursuant to section 812.014(2)(c)1. Incidents involving Sandra Carey. In its Administrative Complaint, the Commission alleged that On or about October 18, 1994, Respondent, Dorothy B. Davis, did unlawfully commit a battery upon Sandra Carey, by actually touching or striking her or intentionally causing bodily harm to her against her will. On or about October 26, 1994, Respondent, Dorothy B. Davis, did unlaw- fully commit an assault upon Sandra Carey, by threatening by word or act to do violence to said person, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and by doing an act which created a well- founded fear in Sandra Carey that said violence was imminent, by swerving toward her with deadly weapon, to wit: a motor vehicle. On or between October 20 and October 26, 1994, Respondent Dorothy B. Davis, did unlawfully commit an assault upon Sandra Carey, by threatening by word or act to do violence to said person, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and by doing an act which created a well-founded fear in Sandra Carey that said violence was imminent, by throwing at her or in her direction a deadly weapon, to wit: beer bottles. On or between October 20 and October 26, 1994, Respondent Dorothy B. Davis, did knowingly use intimidation or physical force, threats, or attempts thereto, or offered pecuniary benefit or gain to Sandra Carey with intent to influence that person’s testimony or to cause or induce that person to withhold testimony from an official proceeding or be absent from an official proceeding to which such person has been summoned by legal process. On or between October 20 and October 26, 1994, Respondent, Dorothy B. Davis, did unlawfully, with intent to place Sandra Carey in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury, willfully and maliciously, follow or harass said person and make a credible threat, by assaulting her with a motor vehicle, throwing beer bottles at her, and/or making verbal threats of bodily harm, which caused said person substantial emotional distress and served no legitimate purpose. (The allegations in the Administrative Complaint are set out in paragraph form for clarity.) On October 18, 1994, in Belle Glade, Florida, a fight took place in or near a grocery store parking lot in the 400 block of Southwest Avenue B Place between an unidentified man and a woman named Shirkia Webb. Ms. Webb was apparently not the winner of this fight, and the fight apparently ended when Ms. Webb was knocked to the ground. Ms. Davis drove into the parking lot at about the time Ms. Webb was knocked to the ground. She was driving her Ford Bronco, and her children, including her seven- month-old baby, were in the back seat. When Ms. Davis stopped the car and opened the door, Ms. Webb ran over to her and began talking to her. Ms. Davis then left her children in the vehicle and walked into the grocery store, leaving the keys in the ignition. While Ms. Davis was in the grocery store, Ms. Webb got into the Bronco and ran it into the vehicle owned by the unidentified man with whom she had been fighting. This vehicle was apparently parked in the grocery store parking lot at the time. When Ms. Davis came out of the grocery store, a crowd of people had gathered. She saw that her Bronco had been involved in an accident, and she learned that Ms. Webb had been driving the vehicle. She spoke with one of the police officers on the scene and told him that Ms. Webb had stolen her Bronco with her children inside. She later filed grand theft charges against Ms. Webb. Ms. Carey either overheard Ms. Davis telling the police officer that Ms. Webb had stolen her Bronco or someone told Ms. Carey that Ms. Davis had done so. Ms. Carey then went to one of the police officers and told him that Ms. Davis had given Ms. Webb her Bronco knowing that Ms. Webb intended to use it to hit the man’s vehicle. Someone in the crowd told Ms. Davis what Ms. Carey told the police officers. Ms. Davis was upset at the time because her children were in the Bronco when Ms. Webb hit the other vehicle. When she learned that Ms. Carey told the police that she had given Ms. Webb permission to drive the Bronco, she rushed up to Ms. Carey and struck her in the chest, yelling at her to stop telling lies. This incident was observed by several police officers, and Ms. Davis does not deny that she struck Ms. Carey on this occasion. On October 20, 1994, Ms. Davis was driving her Bronco down 5th Street in Belle Glade, and she speeded up when she saw Ms. Carey crossing the street ahead of her. Ms. Carey was carrying her child, whom she had just picked up from the baby sitter, and she hurried across the street because she believed Ms. Davis would hit her if she did not move out of the way of the Bronco. Ms. Carey reported this incident to the police on October 20. In a second incident, Ms. Carey was at the Glades Wash House when Ms. Davis pulled up in her Bronco and told Ms. Carey she was going to “mess her up” for telling the police that she had given Ms. Webb permission to drive her Bronco during the altercation which took place on October Ms. Carey reported this incident to the police on October 21, 1994. On October 26, 1994, Ms. Davis was driving her Bronco on 4th Street in Belle Glade and she swerved toward Ms. Carey as she was walking along the side of the road. Ms. Carey moved out of the way to avoid being hit; Ms. Davis was laughing as she drove past Ms. Carey. Ms. Carey reported this incident to the police on October 26, 1994. Ms. Carey feared that Ms. Davis would hurt her or her baby, and she experienced some emotional distress until after the October 26 incident. After this incident, she did not think about it anymore and went on with her life because she had no further contact or problem with Ms. Davis. The evidence presented is clear and convincing that Ms. Davis struck Ms. Carey in the chest on October 18, 1994. This act falls within the definition of battery found in section 784.03(1), Florida Statutes, which constitutes a first degree misdemeanor pursuant to section 784.03(2). The evidence presented is clear and convincing that Ms. Davis threatened Ms. Carey with bodily harm both by trying to run her down on the street on October 20 and October 26 and by her words at the wash house on October These threats fall within the definition of assault found in section 784.011(1), Florida Statutes, which constitutes a second degree misdemeanor pursuant to section 784.011(2).1
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, issue a final order finding that Dorothy B. Davis has failed to maintain good moral character and revoking her certification as a corrections officer. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of February, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 1997.
Findings Of Fact Peter P. Sedler, at all times material to the complaint, has been licensed as a real estate broker, holding license 0079017. He was last licensed as a broker c/o Marshall & Sedler, Inc., 7771 St. Andrews, Lake Worth, Florida 33467. Marshall & Sedler, Inc., at all times relevant to the complaint, had been registered as a Florida real estate broker, holding license 0250511, its last licensed address was 7771 St. Andrews, Lake Worth, Florida 33467. Peter P. Sedler was the qualifying broker and officer for Marshall & Sedler, Inc. On about July 3, 1987, Tom Teixeira was employed as a salesman by Cartier Realty, of 11852 42nd Road North, Royal Palm Beach, Florida. Cartier Realty had solicited, through a direct mailing, listings for property in the Royal Palm Beach area. Ms. Mary Myers, an older woman of about 70 years of age, responded to the advertisement, and gave Mr. Teixeira an open listing for real property which she owned. While Mr. Teixeira placed a Cartier Realty "For Sale" sign on the property, the sign was somehow removed shortly thereafter, and no party dealing with Ms. Myers during the months of July, August and September of 1987 would have been placed on notice that Cartier Realty had any listing on the property. Mr. Sedler had nothing to do with the disappearance of the sign. Ms. Myers had originally acquired the property from her daughter. Long before Ms. Myers gave a listing to Cartier Realty, William Kemp and his wife Gina DiPace Kemp had told Ms. Myers that they were interested in purchasing the property, which is adjacent to the home of Mr. and Mrs. Kemp. When Mr. and Mrs. Kemp first contacted Ms. Myers, she had wanted to keep the property, in the belief that she might eventually convey it back to her daughter. Mr. Teixeira brought to Ms. Myers an offer from David R. and Maureen C. Rose to purchase the land for $11,900. Ms. Myers did not accept that offer, but the Roses accepted Ms. Myers' counteroffer on July 24, 1987, to sell it for $12,300. The sale was contingent upon the buyers obtaining financing; they applied for a loan, and ordered both an appraisal and a survey. The closing was to be held by September 1, 1987. (Contract, paragraph VI.) The closing date passed, without the buyers obtaining the necessary financing, so the contract was no longer effective. On about September 8, 1987, Mr. Teixeira attempted to contact Ms. Myers. He had obtained no written extension of the contract but hoped the sale might yet close. Ms. Myers told Teixeira that she was still willing to sell the property to Mr. and Mrs. Rose. In the meantime, Mr. and Mrs. Kemp became aware that Ms. Myers wanted to sell the property, because they noticed Mr. and Mrs. Rose coming to look at the land, and had engaged them in conversation. Ms. Kemp then contacted Ms. Myers to remind her that they were still willing to purchase the property, and also to say that they would offer more than the current offer on the property. On about September 11, 1987, Ms. Kemp contacted Cartier Realty to say that she also wished to make an offer on the Myers' lot. For a reason which was never adequately explained at the hearing, Teixeira, who should have been working on behalf of the seller, refused to take the offer, even though it was for a higher price. After this rebuff by Teixeira, Ms. Kemp contacted Marshall & Sedler, Inc., in order to try to find a broker who would convey their offer to Ms. Myers and spoke with Patricia Marshall, Ms. Marshall referred her to her partner, Peter Sedler. The Kemps told Sedler that Ms. Myers had told them that she had received a $9,000 offer on the lot. Why Ms. Myers told the Kemps that the Rose offer was $9,000 is not clear, for the actual offer had been $12,300, but Sedler did not know this. There was no listing of the lot in the local board of realtors multiple listing service book, and Mr. Sedler found the address of Ms. Myers through the public records. Mr. Sedler knew from his conversations with Ms. Kemp that Cartier Realty had some involvement with an offer on the property. He called Cartier Realty and tried to speak with the broker handling the matter. He spoke with a man named Tom, who he thought was a brother of the owner of Cartier Realty, Pete Cartier. Mr. Sedler actually talked with Tom Teixeira. Sedler believed he was dealt with rudely by Teixeira, who had hung up on him. Sedler then called Pete Cartier directly to find out whether there was an outstanding contract on the property, and Cartier told Sedler that he would call Sedler back. When Cartier called Sedler, Cartier warned Sedler that he should stay out of the deal. Mr. Sedler became suspicious about Cartier Realty's failure to bring a higher offer to the attention of the seller, and on September 16, 1987, filed a complaint against Tom Cartier with the Lake Worth Board of Realtors. Mr. Sedler then traveled to Pompano Beach to meet with Ms. Myers at her home, and brought with him a contract for sale and purchase of the property, already signed by the Kemps and dated September 14, 1987. While at the door, Ms. Myers asked Peter Sedler if he was "Tom." Ms. Myers knew that she had been dealing with a "Tom" at Cartier Realty, but all her dealings were on the phone, and she did not know what Tom Teixeira looked like. Sedler replied "Yes, but you can call me Pete." Sedler merely intended the comment as humor. At that time Sedler gave Ms. Myers his pink business card and specifically identified himself as Pete Sedler of Marshall & Sedler, Inc. Mr. Sedler asked Ms. Myers if she had any paperwork, such as the prior contract for the sale of the lot which had expired on September 1, 1987, but she did not. While Sedler was with Ms. Myers, she agreed to sell the property to the Kemps for $12,500 and signed the Kemp contract. The Kemps had put the purchase price of $12,500 into the Marshall & Sedler escrow account. Three days later, on September 18, 1987, Mr. Sedler, in the company of his wife Bonnie, presented a post-dated check to Ms. Myers in the amount of $11,020, the net amount due to Ms. Myers for the lot, based on the purchase price of $12,500. When they met this second time he introduced himself again as Pete Sedler and offered Ms. Myers his card for a second time. The post-dated check was conditioned by an endorsement making it good upon a determination that the title to the lot was good. A quit claim deed to Mr. and Mrs. Kemp was executed by Ms. Myers and witnessed by Bonnie Sedler. The post-dated check was given to Ms. Myers because she was about to leave on vacation. The check was given as a sort of security for good title, in return for the quit claim deed which closed the transaction. Mr. Sedler had structured the transaction in this way because he was concerned that someone at Cartier Realty might also attempt to purchase the property from Ms. Myers on behalf of one of their clients. At that time, Mr. Sedler held the reasonable belief that no other party had a subsisting contract to purchase the property from Ms. Myers. Sedler had no reason to believe the Roses would or could pay more for the property than the Kemps offered. Ms. Myers knew that Tom Teixeira from the Cartier realty firm represented a distinct business entity from Marshall & Sedler or Pete Sedler. After a title search showed that Ms. Myers had clear title to the property, the check which Mr. Sedler had given to Ms. Myers on September 18, 1987, with the restrictive endorsement was replaced. Later Mr. and Mrs. Rose tried to close their purchase, but found they could not. Ms. Myers had failed to inform them of the sale she made to the Kemps through Mr. Sedler. Mr. Teixeira, in retribution, filed an ethics complaint about Mr. Sedler with the West Palm Beach Board of Realtors.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Administrative Complaint against Peter P. Sedler and Marshall & Sedler, Inc., be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 14th day of March, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-6183 Rulings on findings proposed by the Department: 1. Rejected as unnecessary. 2 and 3. Adopted in Finding 1. 4 - 6. Adopted in Finding 2. Adopted in Finding 3. Adopted in Finding 3. Implicit in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 6. Implicit in Finding 6. This does not mean that the contract subsisted, however. Rejected. Ms. Myers was willing to sell the property to Mr. and Mrs. Rose after the contract expired, but she was not under any obligation to do so. Adopted in Finding 7. Rejected, because there was no pending contract. Teixeira never obtained a written extension of the closing date and Ms. Myers was free to sell elsewhere. Rejected. No one could have truthfully told Sedler there was a pending contract. None existed. Rejected, because Mr. Sedler had no reason to believe that there was a subsisting contract for the sale of the property; there was none. Admission number 20 is not to the contrary. Adopted in Findings 10 and 11. Rejected. See, Findings 9 and 10. Rejected as unpersuasive. Rejected as cumulative to Finding 9. Adopted in Finding 14. Adopted in Finding 11. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Frank W. Weathers, Esquire Frank W. Weathers, P.A. Post Office Box 3967 Lantana, Florida 33465-3967 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Mr. Schrier holds a Florida teaching certificate, No. 586600, which is valid through June 30, 1992, and covers the areas of drivers education, social studies, history, and physical education. Mr. Schrier was employed as a teacher at Palm Beach Lakes Community High School beginning in 1988 by the School Board of Palm Beach County. On September 29, 1988, a newly registered student was assigned to a world history class taught by Mr. Schrier and was given a note to take to Mr. Schrier explaining that she would be an additional student in the class. Mr. Schrier refused to admit the black female student to his class saying that his class was already too large. The student came back to the school office and she was sent back with another note instructing Mr. Schrier to admit the student, but he once again refused. On the third occasion, the student was accompanied to Mr. Schrier's class by the Vice Principal, Glen Heyward, and once again, Mr. Schrier, in the presence of the student, refused to admit the student to the class on the grounds that he already had too many students and that there were too many black students already in the class. All the students heard these comments, which were wholly inappropriate. Eventually the student was assigned to another class, which was already larger than Mr. Schrier's class. His comments had made it untenable for that student to be assigned to Mr. Schrier's class. As the result of the incident, Mr. Schrier received a written reprimand from the Principal of Palm Beach Lakes Community High School on October 10, 1988. Mr. Schrier had a history of difficulty in controlling the conduct of students in his class. It was common for students to be eating, talking or engaged in other acts of misbehavior while he was attempting to teach. On about October 31, 1990, during Mr. Schrier's second period world history class, a number of students were failing to pay attention or otherwise misbehaving and, in general, the class was loud and unruly. In the course of attempting to restore order, Mr. Schrier said to this integrated class that the black students should act like white students. All students had been unruly and it was simply not true that the black students were the only students misbehaving. This comment upset both the black students and the white students and they began to wad paper and throw it at him and to yell at him, which caused him to panic and to push a buzzer to summon the deans from the school office. The deans attempted to restore order and Mr. Schrier was unable to complete that class. Parents of both black and white students learned of the incident and objected to their children being taught by Mr. Schrier on account of his inappropriate racial remark. Black students in his class were both embarrassed and angry about his disparaging comment. As a result of disciplinary action taken against him by the School Board of Palm Beach County, Mr. Schrier's actions became generally known in the community through a story which appeared in the Palm Beach Post. It is inappropriate for a teacher to tell black students to act like white students. Discipline is imposed on the basis of misconduct, not on the basis of race. Mr. Schrier's statement embarrassed and disparaged the students and created a poor learning environment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Richard Schrier, be found guilty of violating Section 231.28(1)(h), Florida Statutes, and Rules 6B-1.006(3)(a) and 6B- 1.006(3)(e), Florida Administrative Code. It is further recommended that the Education Practices Commission issue a letter of reprimand to the Respondent, impose an administrative fine of $500 and that the Respondent shall be placed on two years probation with the Education Practices Commission. The terms of the probation shall include the requirement that the Respondent: Shall immediately contact the Education Practices Commission upon any reemployment in the teaching profession within the State of Florida, indicating the name and address of the school at which he is employed, as well as the name, address and telephone number of his immediate supervisor. Shall make arrangements for his immediate supervisor to provide the Education Practices Commission with quarterly reports of his performance, including, but not limited to, compliance with school rules and school district regulations and any disciplinary actions imposed upon the Respondent. Shall make arrangements for his immediate supervisor to provide the Education Practices Commission with a true and accurate copy of each written performance evaluation prepared by his supervisor, within ten days of its issuance. Shall satisfactorily perform his assigned duties in a competent professional manner. Shall violate no law and shall fully comply with all district and school board regulations, school rules, and State Board of Education Rule 6B-1.006. During the period of probation shall successfully complete two college courses or the equivalent in- service training courses in the areas of cultural awareness and classroom management, with progress and completion to be monitored by the Education Practices Commission. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of June 1992. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Margaret E. O'Sullivan, Esquire Professional Practices Services 352 Florida Education Center 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Mr. Richard E. Schrier Apartment 116 500 North Congress Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Karen Barr Wilde Executive Director 301 Florida Education Center 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Sydney H. McKenzie General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, PL-08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact Petitioner corporation came into existence in April 1989. From that time until the present, Petitioner corporation has had possession or control of several beach concessionaire spots in Volusia County. Respondent Department of Revenue audited Petitioner for the five year period of November 1, 1985 through December 31, 1990. Petitioner had never obtained the certificate or receipt contemplated by Section 212.10(1) F.S., so Respondent's audit and assessment held Petitioner liable for all sales tax due from all predecessor owners. In response to the Notice of Intent to Audit, Petitioner made available for inspection all of its business records. Petitioner's records were found by the auditor to be both adequate and accurate for the period of time that Petitioner corporation had been in existence, with certain exceptions which included assigning the wrong tax rate on certain items. Respondent's auditor pointed out errors in collection and remittance of the tax by Petitioner during the period of April 1989 to the end of the audit period and Petitioner remitted the tax due with respect to each subject of the error. Respondent reviewed Petitioner's records and used such records to arrive at its estimate of Petitioner's tax liability. In assessing Petitioner's tax liability, Respondent's auditor, Albert E. Seyforth, projected backwards using all records provided by Petitioner to reach an estimate or projection of what the predecessor owners/sellers should have been paying in tax. To make this backwards projection, he worked from the Petitioner's current figures substantiated by their records which he deemed adequate and accurate for the period of April 1989 to the end of the audit period. Petitioner's records already indicated that two of the spots acquired by Petitioner were no longer actively utilized. He treated the Volusia County transfer fee and license fee as taxable rights in real estate pursuant to Rule 12A-1.070 F.A.C. He made allowance for Petitioner's misapplication of a sales tax rate. He calculated a 24-month projection rather than an 18-month projection to give Petitioner taxpayer the benefit of the doubt. He then applied an adjustment by allowing an arbitrary percentage reduction on compensable versus noncompensable units and allowing for market conditions, differences in inventory, or pricing. In applying this percentage reduction factor, he accepted Petitioner's oral unquantified anecdotal representations that (1) beach business overall had gotten progressively worse over the five- year audit period (which would lower sales figures) and (2) that Petitioner's current corporate operation which had eliminated business at certain spots and which was otherwise more efficient, was more profitable than prior businesses. (This latter assumption would raise sale figures). The percentage reduction factor the auditor devised was an arbitrary 25 percent because Petitioner did not provide any quantifiable way to measure its anecdotal oral representations on the foregoing business trends. The auditor did not accept or consider Petitioner's oral representations as to how many units Petitioner acquired from each seller because Petitioner produced no adequate "paper trail" to back up their oral representations as to what was acquired and because all concerned considered the concession business one in which physical inventory at each "spot" changed from day to day. Upon presentation of prior taxpayer identification numbers, Respondent gave Petitioner credit against the figure obtained by the foregoing methodology for prior taxes paid under those prior taxpayer identification numbers during the audit period. The foregoing assessment methodology, including credits, which was devised by Mr. Seyforth, was accepted as "reasonable" by Mr. Seyforth's superior auditor, Mr. Samuel B. Eckhardt, Jr. In approving Mr. Seyforth's methodology, Mr. Eckhardt considered two other standard methods of assessing business trends which could have been used instead of using an arbitrary 25 percent reduction factor. One alternative method would have been to assemble and apply information concerning the ramp toll census to the beach in each of the audit years. The other alternative method would have been to somehow devise a hotel/motel occupancy census and apply that information. Nonetheless, Mr. Eckhardt determined that the methodology applied by Mr. Seyforth and described in Finding of Fact 5 and the deduction of taxes actually paid as described in Finding of Fact 6 was appropriate and reasonable. At formal hearing, Petitioner did not affirmatively demonstrate how a formula for business trends on the beach could be more accurately derived from either the toll ramp census or the hotel/motel occupancy rate method. Specifically, it was not shown how the toll ramp census would relate number of cars to number of people to number of purchasers of concession products or how the hotel/motel occupancy rate would accurately reflect number of purchasers of concession products. While the 25 percent reduction figure utilized by the auditor might be "arbitrary," Petitioner did not affirmatively demonstrate how either of the alternative methods would be either more accurate or would lower the assessment figure. Petitioner presented evidence that Volusia County has always regarded the County's charge of seven percent of the purchase price on the transfer of a concession as an administrative fee. This fee was a negotiated charge agreed upon by the concessionaires, as a group. It was based on earlier such fees. However, Messrs. Seyforth and Eckhardt, on behalf of the Respondent state agency regarded this fee as a "lease or license of real property," pursuant to agency interpretation of Rule 12A-1.070 F.A.C. and treated it as such. Petitioner presented evidence that the license fee paid annually to Volusia County by each concessionaire in the amount of ten percent of gross sales or $1,000.00, whichever is greater, has always been regarded by Volusia County as a regulatory fee for use of a certain beach location and is utilized by Volusia County in lieu of occupational license fees, garbage disposal charges, and charges for other goods and services provided to the concessionaire. These services included licensed concessionaires having the right to ask Beach Rangers to move trespassing concessionaires out of the respective license-holders' assigned territories. Messrs. Seyforth and Eckhardt, on behalf of Respondent state agency regarded this fee as a "lease or license of real property" pursuant to agency interpretation of Rule 12A-1.070 F.A.C. and treated it as such. Petitioner presented evidence that it had acquired beach spots 128 and 130 and paid the Volusia County annual license fee on each but did not operate them in order to render Petitioner's entire "multi-spot operation" more efficient and profitable. Any physical business assets acquired at these locations were transferred to other spots. The license fee continued to be paid for these spots' respective locations, so as to eliminate competition. This factor was built into the agency's calculations, but Petitioner contended that the auditor's using a backward projection on these spots was unreasonable because it assigned a 75 percent profit to them which had never existed. Contrary to Petitioner's assertion, it is found that the auditor's 25 percent reduction figure lumped the unquantified increased efficiency of the whole of Petitioner's operation in with the unquantified decrease in beach traffic and thus made a reasonable adjustment for these unoperated "spots." Petitioner also contended that when it acquired beach concession spots 128 and 130 no "stock of goods" was also acquired, but Petitioner produced no "paper trail" to prove no goods were acquired. Petitioner also admitted to paying to acquire the "business" at each location and that in so doing Petitioner either directly or indirectly acquired the license to operate (or not operate) each of these spots. Section 212.10 F.S. is phrased in the disjunctive, "business or stock of goods." Petitioner produced certain books and records at deposition which were derived from the preincorporation proprietorship of Petitioner corporation's principals, and, presumably, the proprietorship/spot acquired from Mr. Harold S. Lloyd's parents, and the auditors dismissed these as inadequate. These particular records were not introduced at formal hearing. The only records of any prior owners of beach spots acquired by Petitioner which were introduced at formal hearing were certain documents from John Bowes and Richard Ruich. Mr. Bowes' records (Petitioner's Exhibit 2) are merely totals for various types of rentals and sales and are not adequate for the agency's detailed accounting procedures. They do not comply with the Unified Beach Code, and Mr. Bowes own accountant found them inadequate for federal income tax purposes. No expert witness credibly stated that they were adequate for assessment purposes. Mr. Bowes' records do not contain any prior taxpayer identification number which potentially could be linked to prior taxes paid so as to offset the assessment against Petitioner. Mr. Ruich's records (Petitioner's Exhibits 3 and 4) consisted only of monthly sales tax reports, called "DR-15's." No expert witness credibly stated that they were adequate for assessment purposes. The agency does not accept DR- 15's as proof of tax liability, but Mr. Ruich's DR-15's do contain Mr. Ruich's taxpayer identification numbers, 74-16-044761-07 and 74-16-038917-07. The record is not clear whether Petitioner was given credit for the taxes actually paid by Mr. Ruich under these taxpayer identification numbers. Since Respondent has established the precedent in this case for giving credit to Petitioner for taxes actually paid under predecessor taxpayer numbers during the audit period, Mr. Ruich's taxes actually paid during the audit period should be calculated and deducted from the assessment against Petitioner, if that has not already been done. Richard Ruich executed a sales agreement and an indemnification agreement in the sale of his business to Petitioner.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining the subject audit and assessment against Petitioner, less credit to Petitioner for prior tax paid, if any, during the audit period by predecessor in interest Ruich, Taxpayer I.D. Nos. 74-16-044761-07 and 74-16-038917-07, if credit therefore has not previously been afforded to Petitioner. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of April, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 92-2348 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59 (2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF) Petitioner's PFOF: 1 Accepted so far as it goes. Covered in Findings of Facts 4, 14. 2-4 Accepted but not dispositive, ultimate, or material, Covered in Findings of Facts 4-6, 14-17. 18,25,27-28 Accepted. Covered in Findings of Facts 5-12, 14. 5 Accepted but subordinate. Covered in Findings of Fact 14-17. 6-7,11-13 Rejected as stated because as stated it does not reflect the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. Covered in Findings of Facts 5-9. 8,14,21-23 Rejected as out of context and misleading. Not supported by the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. 9,10,24,26 Rejected as stated because as stated it does not reflect the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole, and because it attempts to state a Conclusion of Law. Covered in Findings of Fact 5-11, 14-17, and Conclusions of Law. 15-17,19-20,29-30 Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Respondent's PFOF: 1-11 Accepted except where subordinate unnecessary, or cumulative. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, Esquire General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Michael L. Brewer, Esquire 500 Canal Street New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32168 Leland L. McCharen, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Tax Section Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the Respondent, Robert Dugger, committed the violations alleged in an Amended Administrative Complaint, DPBR Case Number 2002-007094, filed by the Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation on April 11, 2006, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of community association management pursuant to Chapters 455 and 468, Florida Statutes. (Stipulated Fact). Robert Dugger, is and was at the times material to this proceeding a licensed Florida Community Association Manager (hereinafter referred to as a “CAM”), having been issued license number CAM 1148. (Stipulated Fact). At the times material to this proceeding, Mr. Dugger’s address of record was 7401 Beach View Drive, North Bay Village, Florida 33141. Miramar Gardens. At the times material to this proceeding, Mr. Dugger was employed by Timberlake Group, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as “Timberlake”). In his capacity with Timberlake, Mr. Dugger served as the CAM for 30 homeowners’ associations. In particular, Mr. Dugger served as the CAM for Miramar Gardens Townhouse Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the “Association”). (Stipulated Fact). The Association is made up of approximately 350 homeowner members. The Association was initially created by the Miramar Gardens Townhouse Homeowners Association, Inc., Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions adopted on or about December 16, 1975. By-Laws for the Association were also adopted on December 16, 1975. Article X of the By-Laws provides the following homeowners’ rights concerning the books and records of the Association: The books, records and papers of the Association shall at all times, during reasonable business hours, be subject to inspection by any Member. The Declaration, the Articles and these By-Laws shall be available for inspection by any Member at the principal office of the Association, where copies may be purchased at reasonable cost. Prior to 2001, the Association, along with Vista Verde Townhome Homeowners Association (hereinafter referred to as “Vista Verde”), an adjacent community association, had been placed in receivership and was managed by a civilian board. These events came about due to the dismal state the two communities were in. Crime was rampant, there were no street signs or lights, common areas and alleys were unkempt, there were abandoned vehicles, and the associations for both areas were essentially non-existent. Miami-Dade County had taken over ownership of many homes in the community by foreclosure. Mr. Dugger became involved early with the reorganization and revitalization of the Association and Vista Verde. In 1997, Mr. Dugger was appointed by the receiver as the CAM for the Association and Vista Verde. At the end of 2000, the Association was ready to govern itself. Toward that end, on or about December 21, 2000, the Association and Timberlake, entered into a Management Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “Management Agreement”). Pursuant to the Management Agreement, Timberlake was designated as the “Exclusive Managing Agent” for the Association commencing January 1, 2001. Among the duties assumed by Timberlake, are the following: 2) MAINTENANCE OF ASSOCIATION FILES: The Manager will collect, organize and maintain in the office of the Manager, all Association information, including but not limited to the Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws, Declaration of, [sic] Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, site plans, owner lists, correspondence, rules and regulations, blue prints, specifications, corporate minutes, all maintenance and service contracts in effect and the necessary administrative financial information related to the Association. 8) ASSISTANCE TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS: The Manager will provide administrative support services to the Board of Directors, to include notifying Directors of Board meetings, circulating minutes of the preceding meeting, as prepared by the Secretary . . . . Timberlake has continued to provide the services of Mr. Dugger as CAM since 2001. During his tenure, street signs and lights have been installed, the common areas have been cleared, and the community has greatly improved. Proposed findings of fact 14 through 19 of Mr. Dugger’s Proposed Recommended Order generally describe Mr. Dugger’s efforts as CAM, the improvement of the community, and Mr. Dugger’s reputation as CAM. Count I: Criminal Violations. During 2003, Mr. Dugger served as a city commissioner for the City of North Bay Village, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the “Village”). On or about December 12, 2003, Mr. Dugger was charged with eight criminal violations in an Information issued in case number F03-33076, in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida. The alleged violations arose out of Mr. Dugger’s activities as a city commissioner for the Village. Two of the criminal charges, Counts 2 and 8, are of pertinence to this matter: (a) Count 2 alleges a violation of Section 2-11.1(d), Miami-Dade County Code, and Section 125.69, Florida Statutes; and (b) Count 8 alleges a violation of Section 2-11.1(i), Miami-Dade County Code, and Section 125.69, Florida Statutes. As to Count 2 of the Information, it was more specifically alleged, in pertinent part, as follows: . . . ROBERT A. DUGGER SR., on or about April 08, 2003, in the County and State aforesaid, being a member of THE NORTH BAY VILLAGE COMMISSION, in Miami-Dade County, did vote on a matter presented to said COMMISSION, to wit: ITEM 7A, AN ORDINANCE AMENDING SECTION 152.029 OF THE NORTH BAY VILLAGE CODE OF ORDINANCES (FIRST READING), when said defendant would or might, directly or indirectly, profit or be enhanced by this action of said COMMISSION on said matter, in violation of Miami-Dade County Code s.2.11.1(d) and s. 125.69, Fla. Stat. . . . As to Count 8 of the Information, it was more specifically alleged, in pertinent part, as follows: . . . ROBERT A. DUGGER SR., on or about July 01, 2003, in the County and State aforesaid, being a MUNICIAL OFFICAL to wit: MEMBER OF THE NORTH BAY VILLAGE COMMISSION, in Miami-Dade County, did fail to comply with the financial disclosure requirements of Chapter 112 (Part III) of the Florida Statutes by failing to DISCLOSE ALL LIABILITIES IN PART E. OF FORM 1 STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL INTERESTS FOR 2002, filed with the City Clerk of THE CITY OF NORTH BAY VILLAGE, in violation of Miami-Dade County Code s. 2-11.1(i) and s. 125.69, Fla. Stat. . . . Counts 2 and 8 were based upon the following allegations of the Complaint/Arrest Affidavit: Robert A. Dugger was elected Village Commissioner for the City of North Bay Village on November 19, 2002. On September 21, 2002, Mr. Robert Dugger filed his Statement of Financial Interest for the calendar year 2001, as required by Miami- Dade County ordinance. In Part E of the Statement of Financial Interest (this section is designated for Liabilities – major debts-and asks for the name and address of creditor), Mr. Dugger marked N/A in this section. Commissioner Robert Dugger has substantial indebtedness to Al Coletta that was incurred when Al Coletta assumed the mortgage on one of Dugger’s properties and paid off the mortgage on another. Rachael Dugger admitted these debts under oath during her sworn statement. Commissioner Dugger failed to report these debts on his Statement of Financial Interest. Additionally, on March 15, 2001, a Summary Final Judgement of Foreclosure was ordered and adjudged on behalf International Financial Bank, against Tomin Incorporated, and Robert Dugger and Rachael Dugger personally, in the amount of $1,154,427.50. Following the Judgement on March 15, 2001, title of the property in question was acquire by International Finance Bank on Mary [sic] 2, 2001 and sold to a third party on June 1, 2001. The sale amount of the property was $750,000. A short fall of $404,427.50 remained after the sale and is still unpaid. Commissioner Dugger also failed to report this debt on his Statement of Financial Interest for the year 2001. . . . . Based on Commissioner Robert Dugger’s indebtedness to Al Coletta, he had a Conflict of Interest by voting on matters involving Al Coletta, that came before the North Bay Village Commission, each vote is a separate violation of the Miami-Dade Code, Section 2-11.1(d), a second [degree] misdemeanor. Commissioner Dugger violated the aforementioned Section 2-11.1(d), of the Miami-Dade Code on the following occasions: April 8, 2002, Item 7A, Page 7 of the Regular City Commission Meeting Minutes: A zoning amendment concerning property owned by Al Coletta. Page 14 of the Regular City Commission Meeting Minutes, Commissioner Dugger voted – yes, for approval of the ordinance. . . . . . . . . This action is in violation of Miami-Dade Code, Section 2-11.1(d), a second-degree misdemeanor . . . . Additionally, Commissioner Dugger is in violation of Section 2-11.1(i)(3), Miami- Dade County Conflict of Interest and Code of Ethics Ordinance. This Section required that candidates for County and municipal office must comply with the filing requirements, under Chapter 112, Florida State Statutes. This is a second-degree misdemeanor. . . . Section 2-11.1(d) of the Miami-Dade County Code, prohibits, in pertinent part, the following: Additionally, no person included in the term defined in subsection (b)(1) shall vote on or participate in any way in any matter presented to the Board of County Commissioners if said person has any of the following relationships with any of the persons or entities which would be or might be directly or indirectly affected by any action of the Board of County Commissioners: (i) officer, director, partner, of counsel, consultant, employee, fiduciary or beneficiary; or (ii) stockholder, bondholder, debtor, or creditor, if in any instance the transaction or matter would affect the person defined in subsection (b)(a) in a manner distinct from the manner in which it would affect the public generally. . . . Section 2-11.1(i)(3), of the Miami-Dade County Code, requires that candidates for County and municipal elective office meet the filing requirements of Chapter 112, Part III, Florida Statutes, “at the same time that candidate files qualifying papers.” Section 125.69, Florida Statutes, which provides procedures for the prosecution of county ordinances, states that they are to be prosecuted “in the same manner as misdemeanors are prosecuted.” On July 29, 2005, Mr. Dugger entered a plea of nolo contendere to Counts 2 and 8 of the Information, in case number F03-33076, both second-degree misdemeanor violations of Section 2-11.1 of the Miami-Dade County Code, and Section 125.69, Florida Statutes. (Stipulation of Fact). Mr. Dugger was adjudicated guilty of the violations alleged in Counts 2 and 8, and was ordered to pay $468.00 in fines and costs. Mr. Dugger was, therefore, adjudicated guilty of having voted on a matter in which he had a conflict of interest because the matter involved an individual to whom he was indebted; and of having failed to fully disclose liabilities on financial disclosure forms he was required to file pursuant to Florida law at the time he qualified to run for public office. Neither of the convictions directly involved Mr. Dugger’s practice as a CAM. Nor has the Department made such an argument. Instead, the Department presented expert testimony in support of its position that at least one of the convictions relates to Mr. Dugger’s ability to practice as a CAM. That testimony was convincing. All CAMs are involved in a fiduciary relationship with the associations they manage. It takes little expert testimony to support a finding that such a fiduciary relationship requires trust and integrity. CAMs must be trusted to handle association money, maintain the records of the association, and to deal on behalf of the association with potential and existing vendors. The association must be able to assume that a CAM will fully disclose any possible conflict the CAM may have with the association’s vendors. Mr. Dugger is responsible for billing, writing checks, paying insurance premiums, and maintaining a payment book for the Association. Paragraph 10 of the Management Agreement specifically provides that Timberlake “shall provide financial management services to the Association . . . .” Paragraph D(11)(a) authorizes Timberlake to “solicit and analyze bids for necessary insurance coverage.” Mr. Dugger has similar responsibilities with Vista Verde. Clearly, the Association must be able to trust that Mr. Dugger will carry out all these duties without having any conflict of interest. The Association must be able to assume that Mr. Dugger is acting in its best interest and not his own. In his defense as to the voting of interest conflict charge, Mr. Dugger, prior to the pertinent vote, made disclosure of his relationship with Mr. Coletta, the owner of the property which was the subject of the vote, to the attorney for the City of the Village. The Department failed to prove that Mr. Dugger did not make full disclosure. Mr. Dugger was advised that no conflict existed. Mr. Dugger cast his vote after receiving this advice. Subsequent to the vote, Mr. Dugger sought an opinion from the Miami-Dade County Commission on Ethics & Public Trust (hereinafter referred to as the “Commission”). The Commission, like the city attorney, opined in writing that no conflict of interest existed. Mr. Dugger entered his plea on the two charges in order to avoid the cost of litigation. The evidence, however, failed to prove why prosecutors agreed to accept a plea on only two of the eight counts. Count IV: Alleged Denial of Access to the Records of the Association. During 2003, Miryam Ruiz lived in Miramar Gardens Township and was a member of the Association. While she had been in arrears for 2001 and 2002, presumably in her association dues, she became current when she paid all outstanding dues in March 2003. On March 14, 2003, during normal business hours, Ms. Ruiz went to the office of Timberlake and requested that she be allowed to inspect certain records of the Association. She made her request verbally and in writing, leaving Petitioner’s Exhibit 13 with a Timberlake employee, apparently the receptionist, which listed the documents she wanted to inspect. She was told by the receptionist that she could not see the documents until she had made an appointment to do so. By letter dated Thursday, March 27, 2003, Ms. Ruiz was informed by Mr. Dugger’s wife, Rachel, that Ms. Ruiz could review the documents. She was also told that, “[i]f you would like, call us to make an appointment at your convenience.” On the morning of Monday, March 31, 2003, not having received Ms. Dugger’s March 27th letter, Ms. Ruiz sent a letter by facsimile to Timberlake stating that she would be at the office at 11:00 a.m. that morning to “pick up” the documents. When Ms. Ruiz arrived at the Timberlake office at 11:00 a.m. she was again told that she could not review the documents because she had no appointment. Ms. Ruiz left the office. Later that day, Ms. Ruiz sent a second facsimile letter addressed to Ms. Dugger. Ms. Ruiz ended the letter by informing Ms. Dugger that she would be at the office the next day, April 1, 2003, “for the inspection and copying of records at 9:30 a.m.” On April 1, 2003, Ms. Ruiz returned to the Timberlake office and was again told that the records were not available because no appointment had been made. Ms. Ruiz told the receptionist that she would return on Friday, April 4, 2003, at 9:30 a.m. to inspect the documents. In a letter to Ms. Dugger dated April 1, 2003, she stated that she was confirming the date and time. The evidence failed to prove whether the letter was received prior to April 4, 2003. When Ms. Ruiz arrived at the Timberlake office on April 4, 2003, she was again denied access to the documents and was told by Ms. Dugger that she had no appointment because the date and time suggested by Ms. Ruiz had not been confirmed by Timberlake. Ms. Ruiz left the office. The following day, April 5, 2003, Ms. Ruiz sent a letter by certified mail addressed to Mr. Dugger describing the events leading up to that moment and asking what it would take for her to be allowed to inspect the records. Mr. Dugger did not respond to this letter. In response to Ms. Ruiz’ April 5th letter, a letter dated April 22, 2003, was sent by Ms. Dugger. That letter indicated that the records would be available for inspection at 1:00 p.m. on Tuesday, May 6, 2003. The letter, which was postmarked May 2, 2003, ten days after the date of the letter, was not received by Ms. Ruiz prior to May 6th. Sometime during the month of May 2003, approximately two months after first attempting to review the records of the Association, Ms. Ruiz was finally allowed to inspect the records. Ms. Ruiz, without doubt, had the right to review the records of the Association she had requested. Pursuant to the Management Agreement, Mr. Dugger was required to collect, organize and maintain the records of the Association. The Management Agreement also required that Mr. Dugger was to assist the Board of Directors in their enforcement of the provisions of the “Association documents and rules and regulations ” Pursuant to Article X of the By-Laws of the Association, also quoted, supra, gives Association members the right to inspect and copy all Association documents The right to inspect association documents is not an unfettered one. In light of the duty and responsibility of a CAM to “maintain” records, it is not unreasonable for a CAM to set reasonable safeguards for a member’s review of those records. The Department did not produce evidence to refute the evidence presented by Mr. Dugger concerning the reasonableness of a CAM insisting on being present during the inspection of documents. The evidence also failed to prove that, given the fact that Mr. Dugger is the CAM for as many as 30 associations, he is not always available at his office to supervise a review of documents. The procedure followed with regard to reviews of the Association’s had been announced at an Association meeting. Members were told that anyone who wished to review records could contact the Timberlake office and make an appointment so Mr. Dugger could be present during an inspection, or that a copy of a document could be obtained upon payment for the document. It is clear that not all of the requests to Timberlake made by Ms. Ruiz were totally reasonable: (a) her first request on April 14, 2003, was without any notice; (b) her notice of March 31, 2003, gave only three hours notice; (c) her request for review on April 1, 2003, gave only one day notice; and (d) her request for review on April 4, 2003, gave only 3 days notice. While Ms. Ruiz eventually was allowed to review the documents, it took approximately two months after her initial request had been made. It is also clear that, although she did not always give reasonable notice for appointments she announced, Mr. Dugger (and his employees) could and should have done more to remedy the situation. Mr. Dugger first became aware of the request on March 14, 2003. It took 13 days to respond to that request. When Ms. Ruiz mailed a certified letter to Mr. Dugger dated April 5, 2003, it was not until May 2, almost a month later that a letter in response to that letter was post-marked. Based upon the foregoing, while neither Ms. Ruiz nor Mr. Dugger did much to ameliorate the situation, for at least part of the two months it took Ms. Ruiz to obtain access to the records of the Association, Mr. Dugger “denied” Ms. Ruiz access to the records of the Association. Count VI: Alleged Failure to Maintain Association Records. Pursuant to the Management Agreement entered into by Mr. Dugger with Miramar Gardens, at paragraph D(2), quoted, supra, Mr. Dugger agreed to collect, organize, and maintain all Association documents in the offices of Timberlake. Beginning in 2001, the minutes of meetings of the Association (held jointly with the meeting of Vista Verde) were usually taken by Claudette Brinson, president of the Association. On occasions, they were taken by others. Minutes taken by Ms. Brinson were written by hand and, after the meeting, were taken home with her. On some occasions, Ms. Brinson would ensure that her hand-written minutes were typed at various locations, including Mr. Dugger’s office. When typed at Mr. Dugger’s office, a copy was retained by Mr. Dugger and maintained with the records of the Association. Ms. Brinson’s testimony at hearing as to whether Mr. Dugger was given a copy of all minutes was in conflict. She initially testified that she had provided him with a copy of all minutes. When recalled by Mr. Dugger, she testified that on some occasions, when she did not have the minutes typed at Mr. Dugger’s office, while maintaining a copy at her home, she did not always provide him with a copy. While the latter testimony was more convincing and has been credited, the bottom line is that Mr. Dugger did not maintain a copy of the minutes from all meetings of the Association. At hearing, Mr. Dugger admitted that when he was served an Investigative Subpoena Duces Tecum issued by the Department on or about August 30, 2004, he realized that he did not have all the records the subpoena sought. In particular, Mr. Dugger did not have all of the documents requested in item number 5 of the subpoena: “[t]he minutes of all meetings of the board of directors and of the members of Miramar Gardens Townhouse Homeowners Association, Inc.” Mr. Dugger, therefore, contacted Ms. Brinson and asked her if she could provide a copy of the minutes of Association meetings that he did not have. She was not able to do so within the time Mr. Dugger had to respond to the subpoena. In a letter to the Department dated September 17, 2004, Mr. Dugger indicted the following with regard to the minutes requested in item number 5 of the subpoena: “The Minutes in our possession. Original minute meetings are in the hands of the Receiver, which were retained for his records. Some additional minutes are in the hands of Board members, which we will attempt to locate.” During calendar year 2002, minutes had been kept for meetings held during February, March, April, May, June, July, October, and December. During calendar year 2003, minutes had been kept for meetings held during January, February, March, May, June, July, August, September, October, and November. Finally, during calendar year 2004, minutes were kept for meetings held in January, February, March, April, July, August and September. Mr. Dugger at the time of responding to the Department’s subpoena did not have minutes for all of these meetings. For example, for 2002 he only had minutes for the meetings held in February, March, and June, and for 2003, he only had minutes for the meetings held in January and December. While Ms. Brinson adequately explained why she was not always able to provide a copy of meeting minutes to Mr. Dugger, Mr. Dugger did not provide an adequate explanation as to why he had not made sure that he obtained a copy of all minutes so that he could fulfill his obligation under the Management Agreement. No evidence was presented to suggest that Mr. Dugger’s failure to maintain all minutes was the result of bad faith or any intent on the part of Mr. Dugger to circumvent the rules of the Department or the requirements of the Management Agreement. Prior Discipline Against Mr. Dugger’s CAM License. Mr. Dugger’s CAM license was disciplined in DBPR Case Number 00-02226, pursuant to a Stipulation entered into by the Department and Mr. Dugger which was accepted by Final Order entered on April 9, 2001. The Stipulation provides that Mr. Dugger “neither admits or denies the . . . facts alleged in the Administrative Complaint ”
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order finding that Mr. Dugger committed the violations described in this Recommended Order and imposing the following penalties: A stayed suspension of his license for six months, with the stay being lifted should Mr. Dugger be found to have committed any additional violation with regard to his CAM license within two years of the issuance of the final order in this case; An administrative fine in the amount of $1,500.00; Attendance at continuing education classes in records maintenance in an amount to be determined by the Department; and Payment of the costs of this matter. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Tunnicliff, Esquire Department of Business & Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Philip F. Monte, Esquire Department of Business & Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 42 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 E. Gary Early, Esquire Messer, Caparello & Self, P.A. 2618 Centennial Place Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Ned Luczynski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Anthony B. Spivey, Executive Director Regulatory Council of Community Association of Managers Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
