The Issue Whether Petitioner, White Rock Quarries (“White Rock”), is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees to be paid by Respondents, Dorothy Brown-Alfaro and Amilcar Alfaro (“Respondents” or “Ms. Alfaro”), pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes, and an award of attorney’s fees and taxable costs to be paid by Respondents pursuant to section 552.40(9), Florida Statutes; and, if so, the amount of attorney’s fees and taxable costs to which White Rock is entitled.
Findings Of Fact White Rock engages in construction materials mining activities in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Specifically, White Rock utilizes explosives to procure construction materials (i.e., limestone) from quarries that are located in northwest Miami-Dade County, Florida. Respondents reside in a single-family, one-story home located at 14699 Southwest 47th Street, Miramar, Broward County, Florida 33027. Respondents are the third owners of the home, which was built in 1981. Respondents have resided in the home since 1998. The home is approximately 3,000 square feet “under air,” and is composed of concrete block with stucco finishes, a shallow slab-on-grade foundation system, wood-framed interior walls, and ceramic tile flooring. The subject quarries are located within various geographic areas identified by different sections in close proximity to Respondents’ home. Of particular relevance to the instant matter are sections 7, 6, and 4/5. Section 7 is approximately 2.6 or 2.7 miles from Respondents’ home. Section 6 is approximately 2.3 or 2.4 miles from Respondents’ home. Section 4/5 is approximately 1.6 miles from Respondents’ home.1/ In the underlying case, Respondents asserted that White Rock’s quarrying activities caused damages to their home. Respondents alleged damages centered on “cracks” that exist throughout the home--specifically, cracks throughout the tile flooring inside the home; cracks on the cement flooring of the garage; cracks in the interior and exterior walls and ceilings; cracks in the semi-circular, stamp-concrete driveway and patio; and cracks around the surface of the windows. It is undisputed that cracks exist throughout Respondents’ home and that Respondents’ home is damaged because of the cracks. However, the issues to be determined in the underlying proceeding were whether the cracks were caused by White Rock’s blasting activities, and, if so, the amount Respondents should be compensated for the damages. Section 552.40(1) provides, in pertinent part, that: A person may initiate an administrative proceeding to recover damages resulting from the use of explosives in connection with construction mining materials mining activities by filing a petition with the Division of Administrative Hearings by electronic means through the division’s website on a form provided by it . . . . Pursuant to section 552.40(2)(c) and (d), the petition must include: The approximate time, date, and place of the use of explosives which is alleged to have resulted in damage to the petitioner; and A description of the damage caused and the amount sought for recovery. On December 14, 2015, Respondents’ former counsel filed an Amended Petition Under the Florida Construction Materials Mining Activities Administrative Recovery Act. In the amended petition prepared and filed by Respondents’ former counsel pursuant to sections 552.40(1) and (2), Respondents claimed they were entitled to the following items of damages caused by White Rock’s blasting activities: Floor ($24,000) Foundation ($100,000) Walls ($50,000) Ceiling ($20,000) Patio ($50,000) Driveway ($75,000) Windows ($45,000)2/ The final hearing in the underlying proceeding lasted two days. At that hearing, Respondent Dorothy Brown-Alfaro (who appeared pro se at the final hearing), presented photographs and a home inspection report showing cracks throughout the home. She described new, worsening, and expanding cracks throughout the home resulting from White Rock’s blasting activities. In addition, Ms. Alfaro submitted into evidence a blasting log, which documented the date, time, and intensity of White Rock’s ongoing blasting activities since 1999 Respondents claimed they felt at their home. The blasting log was also an exhibit to Respondents’ amended petition. At the hearing, Ms. Alfaro testified to White Rock’s frequent blasting and the effects on her home from the blasts. According to Ms. Alfaro, when White Rock’s blasting activities occur, the house “sways,” “everything shakes,” and “the entire structure of my house moves.” According to Ms. Alfaro, “when it shakes, my ceiling, my roof, my walls, my floor, everything shakes.” She testified that items fall off the shelves and she described the feeling from the blasts as a “vibration similar to an earthquake.” Ms. Alfaro presented the additional testimony of Barbara Hagan, Paul Ingelmo, and Ismailia Rashid. Mr. Ingelmo is a structural engineer who performed a visual inspection of Respondents’ residence. Ms. Rashid is a general and roofing contractor. Neither Mr. Ingelmo, Ms. Rashid, nor Ms. Hagan could opine that the damages to Respondents’ home were caused by White Rock’s blasting activities. Ms. Alfaro is an electrical contractor. She is not a licensed general contractor or structural engineer. At hearing, Ms. Alfaro conceded that she does not have experience as a general contractor or seismologist. She has not had any training in seismology or blasting activities. The undersigned found Ms. Alfaro’s testimony regarding the purported cause of the cracks not to be credited or persuasive. Ms. Alfaro regularly provides construction estimates in her business. Ms. Alfaro testified that the damages she requested in the amended petition were based upon her estimate of the repair costs she would incur to correct the damages caused by White Rock’s blasting activities. She testified, without objection, that she obtained material costs and calculated the amount of materials needed (i.e. per cubic yard of concrete and drywall) and labor to complete the repairs. In response to the evidence presented by Ms. Alfaro at the hearing, White Rock presented the testimony of Jeffrey A. Straw, a seismologist; David L. Teasdale, a civil structural engineer; and Michael Schraeger, a general contractor and building inspector. As a seismologist, Mr. Straw was responsible for monitoring the impacts and vibration from White Rock’s blasting activities and analyzing their effects on structures. At the hearing, he described the concept of peak particle velocity (“PPV”), the speed at which a particle of ground oscillates as the vibration wave moves through the ground following a blast. Mr. Straw testified that according to seismographs located within the vicinity of Respondents’ home, at no time have any of White Rock’s blasting activities reached or exceeded the PPV limit of 0.5 inch per second established by the state of Florida. Mr. Straw also visited Respondents’ home twice: in April 2006 and January 2016. On both occasions, Mr. Straw brought a camera and notepad with him to catalog the defects identified by Respondents. Mr. Straw took extensive and comprehensive photographs detailing the cracks throughout Respondents’ home and driveway. Mr. Straw also testified that 90 percent of the alleged defects he observed in 2016 were items that he also observed in some format in 2006.3/ While at Respondents’ home in January 2016, Mr. Straw experienced the effects of a blast. He described it as “[r]elatively minor based on blasts that I felt,” and indicated the blast lasted about three to five seconds at most. However, Mr. Straw further testified that he could feel the impact of the blast under his feet, and he could hear it, “there was some general vibration of the structure,” and some “dish rattling.” Mr. Teasdale is extensively familiar with seismographs and has extensive experience installing and using them. At the hearing, he was accepted by the undersigned as an expert in structural behavior from ground motion and normal service loads, the influence of construction practices and environmental conditions on building features, soils and hardscape, the causes and conditions documented at Respondents’ residence, and lot features including the suitability of existing safe blasting standards in the state of Florida. Mr. Teasdale explained the substantial differences between an earthquake and quarry blasting. Mr. Teasdale testified that for blasting to cause damage to a structure, distortion must occur. According to Mr. Teasdale, distortion occurs where the foundation of a structure is accelerated laterally and causes the under part of the building to lag in response, which causes the building to shift back and forth and mimic a parallelogram shape. He explained that when distortion occurs, cracks will emanate from the corner of the walls and that those cracks will be mirrored on the opposite walls (inside and outside the structure). Mr. Teasdale testified there was no damage to the foundation of Respondents’ home, and the foundation and floor of a home would not experience distortion at 0.5 PPV or below because those limits are too low to produce the energy necessary to cause a structure to become mobilized. According to Mr. Teasdale, Respondents’ home exhibited a variety of horizontal and vertical cracks and separations in the finishes, which are typical of environmental stresses in those materials. Mr. Teasdale also testified that distortion causes diagonal cracks, while thermal environmental stresses cause cracks vertically and horizontally. He explained that cracks caused by environmental conditions do not correlate on the inside and outside, while cracks caused by distortion do correlate on the inside and outside. He emphasized that the absence of corresponding cracks on the inside and outside of the structure generally precludes blasting as the cause of damages. Mr. Teasdale explained that from the moment the concrete is cast, it begins to shrink and develop cracks. Mr. Teasdale further explained that stucco, which is essentially the same material as concrete, is also prone to cracks due to normal environmental conditions. Based on his review and analysis of Respondents’ home, Mr. Teasdale concluded that he would exclude blasting to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty as the cause of damages to Respondents’ home. Mr. Schraeger has been licensed as a general contractor for 22 years and specializes in repairs, remodeling, and renovations of commercial and residential structures. He has 20 years of experience performing inspections of buildings relating to determination of material, construction failure, and defects. At the hearing, Mr. Schraeger was accepted by the undersigned as an expert in construction practices and environmental effects on materials and structures. Mr. Schraeger inspected Respondents’ home in 2006 and 2016. He testified that 90 to 95 percent of the alleged defects he observed in the home in 2016 existed when he inspected the home in 2006. Mr. Schraeger testified that the cracks that he observed on the tile floor inside Respondents’ home are very typical in a South Florida home because concrete typically cracks within all concrete structures. These types of cracks can be caused by poor installation of the tile or shrinkage of the monolithic slab over time. He opined there was no evidence of foundation damage. Mr. Schraeger further testified that in his professional opinion, some of the cracks in Respondents’ home are the result of poor construction practices. For example, he explained that most of the cracks in the interior of the home are due to poor construction practices because of the use of an inappropriate method for finishing the joints in the drywall. During his 2016 inspection, Mr. Schraeger observed tape on some of the joints, which either had no joint compound under them, or the tape was applied after the compound started to dry, causing a bond failure. Some of the cracks generating from the corners of openings appeared to be from improperly secured corner bead. During his 2016 inspection, Mr. Schraeger also observed a crack in the master bedroom approximately eight feet in length, which appeared to be a joint in the drywall. This was apparent to Mr. Schraeger because the crack was visible on both sides of the joint tape, which had failed. According to Mr. Schraeger, the cause of this failure was moisture from a roof leak. Staining due to moisture on the ceiling in the area and a repair of the roof above this area indicated a previous leak. Notably, other areas of the home indicated roof leaks, including stains on the ceiling of the office area and staining around the skylight in the hallway. Mr. Schraeger further testified that the patio tile and driveway lack sufficient control joints, thereby making the stamped-concrete driveway and patio prone to crack. Mr. Schraeger also identified issues of poor maintenance by Respondents. For example, he noted that the caulking around the windows was brittle and almost nonexistent. At the hearing, Mrs. Alfaro acknowledged that in the 17 years she has owned the home, the windows have never been re-caulked. According to Mr. Schraeger, several cracks were observed on the stucco exterior walls of the home. With the exception of a severe crack on the wing wall on the rear of the patio, he opined that all of the cracks in the exterior walls of the home were attributed to common aesthetic cracks caused by the lack of control joints, dissimilar materials, bond failure, and improper maintenance. According to Mr. Schraeger, the crack on the wing wall of the patio, which ran along the bottom of a large tie beam, was attributable to poor construction methods. At the hearing, Mr. Schraeger disputed Ms. Alfaro’s cost of repair testimony. However, Mr. Schraeger was not asked to give an expert opinion regarding the amount of damages, and he provided only “ballpark” or “rough” estimates of the cost of repair. For example, Mr. Schraeger testified that the cost to repair the flooring would be “approximately $11,000.”4/ As to the foundation, he estimated the cost to be $0.00 because he found no damage. As to the walls, Mr. Schraeger estimated a figure of $16,000. As to the ceiling, Mr. Schraeger estimated a figure of $5,000. As to the patio, Mr. Schraeger estimated a figure “well within the high end of six thousand.” As to the driveway, Mr. Schraeger estimated a range between “roughly” $17,000 and $20,000--the high end of the range resulting from “material fluctuation” construction costs. As to the windows, Mr. Schraeger estimated $12,000. Clearly, Mr. Schraeger acknowledged there are actual damages throughout much of the home, and there are actual costs associated with the repair of the damages. That the parties disagreed as to the amount of damages as to each item of alleged damages does not mean that the amount of damages claimed was unsupported by the material facts necessary to establish the claim. In sum, based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, the undersigned found that Respondents failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the damages to their home were caused by White Rock’s blasting activities. Rather, the preponderance of the evidence presented at hearing established that the damages to Respondents’ home were not caused by White Rock’s blasting activities. In reaching this conclusion, the undersigned credited and found persuasive the testimony of Mr. Straw, Mr. Teasdale, and Mr. Schraeger. Although the undersigned was not persuaded in the underlying case by the evidence presented by Respondents, this does not mean that Respondents’ claims were not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the claims. There was competent, substantial evidence introduced by Respondents at hearing showing that: (1) Respondents’ home was in close proximity to White Rock’s frequent blasting activities; (2) when the blasting occurs, the house “sways,” “everything shakes,” “the entire structure of [the] house moves,” items fall off the shelf, and Ms. Alfaro feels a vibration similar to an earthquake; and (3) there are cracks throughout the home--some of the cracks are new, worsening, and have expanded as a result of White Rock’s frequent blasting activities. White Rock is the prevailing party in Dorothy Brown- Alfaro and Amilcar Alfaro v. White Rock Quarries, DOAH Case No. 15-6014CM. However, White Rock has failed to establish it is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to sections 57.105 and 552.40(9). On page 16 of its proposed final order, White Rock also claims it is entitled to recover taxable costs under section 552.40(9), totaling $9,287, as the prevailing party in the underlying case. The amount of taxable costs claimed is based on Exhibits 12A through 12G. In Respondents’ Proposed Final Order, Respondents do not dispute that White Rock is entitled to “recover costs totaling $9,287.15 (all the costs claimed except for the cost of lunches totaling $62.65) as costs reasonably necessary to defend the claims asserted in the underlying case.” The undersigned has examined White Rock’s Exhibits 12A through 12G, which constitute the universe of taxable costs sought, and the total of the costs is $9,287. There is no cost of lunches included within Exhibits 12A through 12G. All of the costs identified in Exhibits 12A through 12G are taxable costs or incidental administrative costs directly associated with the case, and therefore, are recoverable under section 552.40.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner herein, Kristina V. Tignor, took the Professional Engineers Examination for the State of Florida in Orlando on April 9 and 10, 1987. On July 22, 1987 she was advised by the Department of Professional Regulation's Office of Examination Services that she had failed the examination and was given a cummulative score of principles and practice of 69.1 percent. In her initial request for review and reconsideration, Petitioner objected to the points assigned to her solutions for three problems on the test, Numbers 425, 421, and 124. She contended that as a working engineer, certain criteria and assumptions must be made in approaching any engineering problem and, because the portion of the examination in issue is graded subjectively, her answered should be reconsidered and evaluated in that light. At the hearing, Petitioner contested only the grading of questions number 124 and 421, thereby accepting the grade given for question 425. With regard to Question 124, Ms. Tignor was awarded a score of 5 on her solution to this problem. The National Council of Engineering Examiners, in its Standard Scoring Plan Outline awards a "qualified" evaluation to scores from 10 down to 6 on this question. Scores from 5 to 0 are rated, "unqualified." A score of 5 indicates the applicant has failed to demonstrate adequate knowledge in one aspect of one category. Specifically, a rating of 5 in this question indicates that the examinee displayed an inadequate knowledge of weight/volume and concrete mix design. Her computations were displayed and an incomplete or erroneous solution was arrived at which gave a generally unrealistic result. Dr. Bruce A. Suprenant a civil engineer registered in four states and who teaches engineering at the University of South Florida, reviewed the question, the Petitioner's solution, the solution proposed by the examiners, and the grading scheme for this problem and found a number of illogical items in Petitioner's solution which, to him, were difficult to understand. He found several items which had no basis and which were possibly assumed. As to Part a of Petitioner's answer, a mixture of answers, (correction for moisture), which should have been in Part b, was located in Part a. As to density, the value used by Petitioner does not appear to be reasonable based on information provided in the problem. In Dr. Suprenant's opinion, there are at least three approaches to this problem. One is the water/cement ration method. Another is the weight method. The third is the absolute volume method. The water/cement ratio method would be difficult to apply here and neither Petitioner nor the examiners used it. As to the weight method, much the same problem exists. There is insufficient information provided to satisfactorily apply this method and while the examiners did not use it, Petitioner did. Petitioner's answer has a correction for moisture in the absolute volume method on the first page of the solution form at the top. The calculations by Petitioner are assumed information not known, (volume). In addition the correction for moisture in the second part of page one is included on the top of page two. It is not a part of the solution for subpart a and should not be there. Petitioner used 150 pounds per cubic foot for concrete density in her solution and this choice is not explained. Most publications utilized by engineers suggest using tables which were not provided to the examinees and it is, therefore, illogical to assume concrete density with no history for that assumption. Petitioner's answer of 5.41 cubic yards is only slightly off the suggested answer of 5.44 cubic yards but the fact that the answers are close does not justify her assumption. It might well not come so close in other cases. As to Part b of the question calling for the water/cement ratio, the corrections for moisture of fine and coarse aggregate on page one are acceptable. On the second page, a problem arises in when the correction for moisture should decrease. Petitioner got the right factor but applied it in the wrong manner. As a result, her answer to Part b of the examination question is wrong. Her answer was 4.40 as opposed to the correct answer of 4.34. This small degree of error can be attributed to the smallness of the amount in question. Were the amounts greater, the error would be greater. As to part c of the question, which deals with the cement factor in a yard of concrete, Petitioner's approach of dividing sacks of cubic yards is correct, but the cubic yard content was determined from Part a of the question, and Dr. Suprenant does not agree with how she got her solution. He therefore questions her carryover. The standard weight of a sack of concrete is 94 pounds. The individual grading Petitioner's response to Question 124 indicates she displayed inadequate knowledge and reached a solution which gives "unrealistic results." Dr. Suprenant agrees, contending that Petitioner's performance in regard to this question indicates inadequate knowledge of weight/volume relationship. She made inadequate assumptions in formulating her answer to the question. The fact that in this problem she arrived at a solution close to the correct one does not indicate that in other problems, she would achieve the same closeness using the same procedure. In his opinion, Petitioner showed some confusion regarding the basis for solving this problem and Dr. Suprenant believes that a grade of 5 as awarded by the examiner is correct. Petitioner questioned the fact that the various technical weights and volumes, such as 94 pounds in a sack of concrete, 8.33 pounds for a gallon of water, and 27 cubic feet in a cubic yard do not appear in the problem statement. This, in the opinion of Dr. Suprenant, compounds the gravity of Petitioner's deficiency. They are routine "givens" generally accepted in the practice by engineers and it would be difficult to assume that anyone familiar with the practice of engineering would use different "givens" for these specifics. Petitioner's employer, Mr. Bishop, himself a registered civil engineer in Florida since 1958, also reviewed Petitioner's solution to Question 124. He admits that on the first page of the answer sheet, Petitioner began solving the problem in an inappropriate way. Her calculations for moisture content were correct, however. On the second paged the correction factor was put in with the wrong sign and the aggregate was given the wrong factor. As a result, the answer was off. In his practice, however, the error committed by Petitioner in these regards is both minimal and acceptable. Her choice of 150 pounds per square foot is reasonable and produced a close result, and while it is true that if the project were of a greater scale, the error might be significant for a test question, as here, the error, in his opinion, is insignificant. He feels much the same way regarding the error in Part c of the examination question. While the factors used by petitioner were wrong, the process used was correct and the answer was not unreasonably incorrect for a test solution. In an examination situation, the calculations are not being done on a continuous basis, and he feels the grade of 5 awarded is unduly harsh since the error was numerical rather than operational. In his opinion, a more reasonable grade would have been a 6 or 7. Petitioner began her solution to this problem by using one similar to that used by the examiners in their publications. Shortly, however, she realized she would not get the answer she needed by doing so and abandoned her solution. She forgot to cross it out, however, and now recognizes she should have done so. She thereafter began to accomplish a series of new calculations on the first page of the answer sheet but did not necessarily utilize that data for her solution to Part a. She admits she made an error in calculation for moisture on the second page. In that calculation, she used the study manual and admits now that she should have cited the figure she used. As to Parts b and c, her use of some figures from Part a may have thrown her answer off somewhat. However, the 5 awarded her, indicating her solution was unrealistic, is, in her opinion unfair as she considers her answer to be quite realistic. The problem did not state what solution method to use and she feels her use of givens from recognized manuals such as the 150 pounds, should not be held against her. 94 pounds for a sack of cement used by the grader was also not given and her use of other accepted numbers should not, she contends, be held against her. Petitioner believes a grade of 7 would more accurately describe the quality of her answer. A 7 means that the examinee obtained an appropriate solution but chose a less than optimum approach. The solution is, therefore, awkward but nonetheless resonable. Ms. Tignor believes that while her approach may have been awkward, she achieved reasonable solution demonstrated by the fact that it was only slightly off the correct figure. Therefore, she believes a grade of 6 would be appropriate. This examination was an open book examination and Petitioner had her manuals with her. She could have easily determined the appropriate weights an "givens" from these manuals without choosing those she used. Ms. Tignor's conclusions that her results are realistic are contradicted by the Board's expert. Realistic results are, in engineering practice, not only the figure reached but also the method used in arriving at that figure. Here, though Petitioner's results are close, the approach utilized in arriving at her solution is unrealistic. Her approach showed an inadequate knowledge of weight/volume and calculations. Consequently it is found the grade is valid and was not arbitrarily assigned. According to the Standard Scoring Plan Outline, each score from 10 through 6 has an indispensable criteria that all categories must be satisfied. Since Ms. Tignor's examination response did not satisfy all categories, the best she can be given is a 5 and that award appears to be justified by the evidence presented. Question 421 was a four part drainage problem. Petitioner used as a part of her solution calculations based on a 100 year storm and this was determined by the examiners to be inappropriate. Ms. Tignor was awarded a grade of 8 and contends she was not given appropriate credit. She relates that even Mr. Smith, the Executive Director of the Board of Professional Engineers, advised her she may not have been given full credit for her answer. She was given full credit for Part a but lost two points for part c which included a calculation error to which Petitioner admits. She contends however, it was so minor, only one point should have been deducted. Were Petitioner to receive an additional one point on this question, she would pass the examination which she failed by only one point. However, this issue must be resolved on the basis of lawfully admitted evidence and Mr. Smith's comment, being unsupported hearsay evidence, cannot itself sustain the rasing of the grade. The Standard Scoring Plan Outline for this question reflects that to receive an 8, the examinee must demonstrate that all categories are satisfied, that errors are attributable to misread tables or calculating devices, and that errors would be corrected by routine checking. The results must be reasonable if not correct. For a 9, the examinee must demonstrate that all categories are satisfied; that a correct solution is arrived at but the examinee has been excessively conservative in the choice of working values; and that examinee's presentation is lacking in completeness or equations diagrams or orderly steps in solution, etc. Subqualifications for a 9 indicates that the answer is correct but that the organization of the solution is not logical. One error in calculation in any of the Parts from a to d, which does not affect the other parts of the solution, is acceptable. Mr. Kenneth Weldon, the Assistant State Drainage Engineer for the Department of Transportation, an expert in the area of drainage to which this problem relates, reviewed the question and the Petitioner's answer thereto and would award a grade of 8 to her answer. He found various numerical mathematical errors which led to the wrong solution. In addition, Petitioner made various assumptions that, though supposedly supported, were, he felt, in error through her misinterpretation. In general, none of the actual solutions she arrived at were correct. Specifically, that portion of the problem to determine the cross sectional area of the waterway for establishing normal depth flow was done incorrectly. Because the Petitioner used incorrect equations throughout the problem, the depth flow computed is high. Petitioner did no analysis to determine whether or not any of the several situations relating to flow control were pertinent. Mr. Weldon initially felt Petitioner's answer to the question merited a grade of 6. This means that the examinee knew all the proper steps but failed to interpret some of the criteria properly. He could not award her a grade of 9 which would indicate all categories were satisfied and the solution was correct, if conservative. Petitioner's solutions were incorrect. He subsequently changed his award to an 8, however, on the basis that the Petitioner's errors were attributable to a misread table or calculating device and would be corrected by routine checking. The result was reasonable, though not correct. Mr. Weldon did not like this question even though he believed it appropriate for a one-hour exam. As written, it involves establishing and making judgements beyond what someone minimally competent would be expected to do. It requires materials that are beyond what are normally available to someone taking the exam. However, Petitioner failed to make proper provision to protect herself in a case where the question is inappropriate or incomplete. If she felt something was wrong with the question, she should have clearly stated the assumption she was making to solve the problem. This was her responsibility and she failed to do so. In Mr. Weldon's opinion, Petitioner's answer might merit a grade slightly higher but not significantly higher. His reasoning is that Petitioner misinterpreted the criteria she stated for writing the problem. Her comment that the Department of Transportation uses 100 year storm criteria was incorrect even though that statement is made in outdated Department of Transportation publications. The basis for her answer is not well established or correct, or based on engineering calculations or judgement, and at best he could award no more than an 8.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered affirming the score awarded to Petitioner on questions 124 and 421, respectively, of the Civil Engineering Examination administered to her in April, 1987. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of June, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-5110 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. For the Petitioner None For the Respondent Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated except for the characterization of several assumptions as guesses. No evidence exists to support such a characterization even though they are incorrect. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Kristina V. Tignor, pro se 2160 North Oval Drive Sarasota, Florida 34239 H. Reynolds Sampson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Allen R. Smith, Jr. Executive Director DPR, Board of Professional Engineers 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to credit for answers scored as incorrect on questions she challenged on the March 2001 Practice of Geology and Fundamentals of Geology Examinations.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence and the testimony of witnesses presented and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: In March 2001, Petitioner, Susan Sitkoff, took the Practice of Geology and the Fundamentals of Geology examinations; these are multiple-choice examinations up to four hours in length. These written licensure examinations are designed to assess a candidate's knowledge and skills to practice professional geology. The National Association of State Boards of Geology ("the Association") provides these national examinations which are used by Respondent and its Board of Professional Geologists for licensure examinations. In addition to providing the actual examinations, the Association conducts analyses to ensure examination validity. In order to ensure test fairness and quality, the Association follows Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing (1999), published by the American Educational Research Association, the American Psychological Association, and the National Council on Measurement in Education. Test questions are written and reviewed by panels of subject matter experts who are professional geologists. Statistical analyses are reviewed by the subject matter experts so that any substandard test questions can be eliminated before generating candidates' final scores. These statistical analyses also validate the individual examination questions and answers. Each test question is submitted to four reviews by the panels of subject matter experts. These reviews ensure that each question: (1) has one correct or best answer; (2) is related to the practice of the profession; (3) is related to public protection; (4) possesses language that is clear and direct; (5) is written at an entry-level of difficulty; (6) adequately describes a problem or situation; and (7) is free of trickery. On the March 2001 examinations, nationwide (23 states), 462 candidates completed the Fundamentals of Geology examination and 372 completed the Practice of Geology examination. The examination results and a variety of statistical analyses were reviewed by a panel of subject matter experts on April 6 and 7, 2001. The reviews indicated that the examinations performed very well and exhibited a high degree of internal consistency. Petitioner was notified by the Bureau of Testing, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, on May 18, 2001, that she had earned a failing score of 67 percent on the Fundamentals of Geology examination, and a failing score of 68 percent on the Practice of Geology examination. A score of 70 percent was required to pass each examination section. On August 6, 2001, Petitioner reviewed her examination in Orlando, Florida. By letter to the Bureau of Testing, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, dated August 16, 2001, Petitioner formally filed her petition for a formal hearing to challenge her examination results. After initially indicating that she would challenge 52 questions, Petitioner came to the hearing to challenge 17 questions. Petitioner challenged questions 21, 35, 53, and 60 on the Fundamentals of Geology examination. At the hearing, Petitioner withdrew her challenge to questions 26, 78, 79, 91, and 98 on the Fundamentals of Geology examination. Petitioner challenged questions 62 and 71 on the Practice of Geology examination. At the hearing, Petitioner withdrew her challenge to questions 15, 26, 31, 53, 57, and 68 on the Practice of Geology examination. In the discussion related to the challenge of question 21 on the Fundamentals of Geology examination, Petitioner indicated that she believed "b," "c," and "d" were all correct answers. She answered "c." Respondent indicated that "b" was the correct answer. Petitioner’s expert witness opined that answer "c" was not the most correct answer. Regarding question 35 on the Fundamentals of Geology examination, Petitioner's expert witness opined that "d" (Petitioner's answer) was a misleading, but agreed that a careful reading indicated that "c" was the correct answer. Respondent's expert witnesses opined that this question was not a “trick question” [or answer] but rather used a distractor answer to deter candidates without the necessary knowledge to answer the question. Seventy-two percent of the candidates answered this question correctly on the examination. There was an in-depth discussion of the answers to question 53 on the Fundamentals of Geology examination. Petitioner submitted that her answer, "b," was the more correct answer. Petitioner's expert opined that "a," "b," and "c" were all correct answers. Respondent's expert geologist opined that only "c" was the correct answer. The testimony revealed that 51 percent of the candidates taking the examination answered "b," a higher ratio than for the correct answer "c." Respondent's expert psychometrician, Dr. Warner, indicated that the panels of subject matter experts had specifically reviewed this question due to the fact that more candidates chose the "distractor" answer than the "correct" answer. The panels of subject matter experts confirmed that "c" was the correct answer. Question 60 on the Fundamentals of Geology examination involved a diagram, which Petitioner felt was unclear in that she was unable to determine if it was a plane view or a top view. She answered "c"; the offered "correct" answer was "a." Respondent's expert geologist reported that the diagram in the question was, in fact, a structure contour map on the top of a limestone bed and the diagrams revealed a single bed. Seventy- seven percent of the candidates answered the question correctly. Petitioner indicated that she did not believe there was a correct answer to question 62 on the Practice of Geology examination and further stated that "unless you work with inclinometers for a living it would be difficult to answer this question correctly." Petitioner's expert indicated that he did not have much experience in the area. Respondent's expert geologist opined that "c," not "d," as selected by Petitioner, was the correct answer. He also indicated that he confirmed his opinion with another expert geologist from the panel of subject matter experts. Question 71 on the Practice of Geology examination addresses federal regulations in the assessment of environmental sites. Petitioner indicated that "anyone doing a Phase I [environmental assessment] would have used the ASTM guidelines" which, unfortunately, guided her to an incorrect answer involving an “ASTM circular.” Petitioner conceded that, “. . . they put federal regulations in here which would exclude that answer.” In no instance during her presentation did Petitioner demonstrate that any examination question she challenged or the "correct" answer, as offered by Respondent, was faulty, arbitrarily or capriciously worded or graded, or that she was inappropriately denied credit for any answer she gave.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered confirming Petitioner’s examination score and dismissing her challenge. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _____ JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Sitkoff 14024 Colonial Grand Boulevard Apartment 708 Orlando, Florida 32837 Charles F. Tunnicliff, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Sherry Landrum, Executive Director Board of Professional Geologists Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to be licensed as a Professional Surveyor and Mapper, under Subsections 472.013, 472.015, or 472.041, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has provided to the Board of Professional Surveyors and Mappers numerous letters and other documents, and a check for the sum of $100 dollars as an application fee for temporary registration as a professional surveyor and mapper. Petitioner has attempted to apply for licensure, under the revised Chapter 472, Florida Statutes , individually and has sought the issuance of a Certificate of Authorization for his business concern: "Mt. Dora Mapping." Petitioner failed to complete an application for licensure on a form provided by the Respondent. Petitioner has failed to provide the correct information necessary for an application to be evaluated under any of the subsections appearing in Chapter 472, Florida Statutes. Petitioner chose not to testify at the formal hearing or otherwise provide any new evidence to be considered by this tribunal, other than documents previously submitted to the Board.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's application for licensure as a professional surveyor and mapper be DENIED, without prejudice to reapply. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert B. Curtis 940 Gorham Street Mount Dora, Florida 32757 Lealand L. McCharen, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Angel Gonzalez Executive Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue for determination is whether John Morse is entitled to licensure as a geologist under the provisions of section 492.105, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact John G. Morse graduated from Ohio State University in 1966 with a B. S. degree in physics. He later attended the University of Arizona, and in 1976 was awarded a M. S. degree with a major in hydrology. Morse's degree was obtained from the University's College of Earth Sciences, which unlike many similar institutions, has a separate Department of Hydrology, focussing on fluids, and a Department of Geology, focussing on minerals. The courses which Morse presents for the educational requirements for a geologist license are as follows (all from the University of Arizona): Course Title Hours Physical Geology 3 Hydrology 3 Dynamics of Flow Systems of the Earth (A & B) 6 Hydrogeology 3 Geomathematics 3 Aquifer Mechanics 3 Advanced Topics in Hydrology 3 Advanced Topics in Hydrology 3 Analysis of Hydrologic Systems 3 30 All, with the possible exception of physical geology, were upper division courses and all were successfully completed by Morse. All of the courses, with the exception of physical geology and geomathematics, were offered in the Department of Hydrology. The hydrology courses, comprising Morse's primary area of concentration, involve the study of the movement of fluids through the earth, in the earth and on the surface of the earth. Since graduation, Morse has engaged in responsible, professional work related to hydrology and hydrogeology, including work in Carlsbad, New Mexico, related to nuclear waste storage. Since July 1988, he has been employed in Florida by Jammal and Associates, an engineering firm in Winter Park. As Senior Hydrogeologist he is responsible for directing and conducting geoenvironmental studies. Morse contends that most geologists in Florida are engaged in the area of water supply development and contamination assessment and that there is substantial overlap and cross-over between geologists and groundwater hydrologists. The Florida Legislature created the Board of Professional Geologists within the Department of Professional Regulation in 1987. Morse filed his application in May 1988, well within the one-year deadline for non-examination licensure. The Board denied his application on September 13, 1988, citing the provisions of subsection 492.105 (1)(d) 1. and 2., Florida Statutes. The application committee identified only two geology courses in Morse's academic transcript: physical geology and geomathematics, a 6-hour total. Dr. Anthony Randazzo is chair of the application committee. He is also a professor and chair of the University of Florida's Department of Geology, which department also includes courses in hydrology. Two applicants, other than Morse, with degrees in hydrology from the University of Arizona, were granted licensure as geologists because they had sufficient geology courses in addition to their hydrology courses. Hydrology is an important field related to geology but it is not the discipline itself. A hydrologist might be aware of the dynamics of flow systems, but a professional would need some knowledge of the nature of the rocks through which the fluid flows in order to seal work as a geologist. The University of Arizona makes a specific distinction between geology and hydrology. The University of Florida includes hydrogeology courses in its Geology Department curricula, but basic geology courses: physical geology, paleontology, field camp, minerology, and the like, are required for a degree in geology.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner's application for licensure as a geologist in the State of Florida be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of May 1989 in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Joaquin Fraxedas, Esquire Two South Orange Plaza Orlando, Florida 32801 Clark R. Jennings, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Suite 1603, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Kenneth D. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to participate in the Reimbursement Program established under the State Underground Petroleum Environmental Response (SUPER) Act of 1986 for the petroleum terminal owned by Gulf Products Division of BP Oil Company at Port Everglades, Florida.
Findings Of Fact The State Underground Petroleum Environmental Response (SUPER) Act of 1986 provides for the expeditious cleanup of sites contaminated as the result of storage of petroleum or petroleum products. The Reimbursement Program, found in Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes, provides for reimbursement of the allowable costs of site rehabilitation contaminated as a result of a discharge related to the storage of petroleum or petroleum products from a storage tank, or its integral piping or dispensing system. The Reimbursement Program does not provide for reimbursement of cleanup costs for discharges related to the transportation or disposal of petroleum or petroleum products. The site at issue in this proceeding is a terminal facility used for the storage of petroleum and petroleum product located at 1500 Southeast 26th Street, Port Everglades, Florida. This facility is referred to as Gulf Facility No. 46888 and DER Facility No. 068732278 (Gulf Terminal). The subject terminal facility is one of fourteen petroleum storage terminals located at Port Everglades, Florida. Petroleum and petroleum products come to the terminal by ship and are pumped from the ship through permanent pipelines to the large aboveground storage tanks located at the facility. The petroleum and petroleum products are stored in these large tanks until it is time for the product to be distributed to the end user. The Gulf Terminal contains eighteen storage tanks whose total capacity is 650,000 barrels of petroleum or petroleum products. These tanks vary in size, with the smallest having a capacity of 10,000 barrels and the largest having a capacity of 80,000 barrels. One barrel equals 42 gallons. The primary activity of the terminals at Port Everglades is to store petroleum or petroleum products. None of the terminals at Port Everglades, including the Gulf Terminal, refines or produces petroleum or petroleum products. Operation of this facility began in 1946. Petitioner, as the successor to the Gulf Oil Corporation, owned and operated the facility until February 1, 1985, when it sold the facility to BP Oil, Inc. As the previous owner of the facility, Petitioner performed an environmental audit which revealed petroleum hydrocarbon contamination at the site. Petitioner is responsible for the cleanup and is entitled to reimbursement of the allowable costs of the cleanup if the site is eligible to participate in the reimbursement program. Any contamination of the soil and groundwater at the site was caused by discharges of petroleum or petroleum products, water contaminated with petroleum or petroleum product or sludges which consist predominately of petroleum or petroleum product constituents. Based on hydrogeological assessment information, Petitioner determined that response action, including ground water cleanup activities, was required at the site. Petitioner hired independent contractors to conduct the response action. In 1986, Petitioner designed a recovery system for petroleum and petroleum product and a ground water treatment system at the site. Through February, 1989, the recovery system had recovered over 12,000 gallons of petroleum or petroleum products, which constitutes the recovery of between 60%- 70% of the total amount in the ground. Through November 1989, Petitioner had expended in excess of $560,000 on its response action at the Gulf Terminal. Petitioner advised Respondent of its response action at the site by letter dated January 6, 1988. Petitioner submitted documentation to Respondent concerning hydrogeological assessment at the site which included field and laboratory work and investigation performed for the site from 1984 to the present. Pursuant to the requirements of SUPER Act, Petitioner notified Respondent of its intention to seek reimbursement for money spent conducting response action in accordance with Chapter 17-70, Florida Administrative Code, with regard to petroleum and petroleum product contamination at the site. Petitioner's notice to Respondent was timely and was procedurally correct. On July 13, 1989, Respondent issued its Order of Determination of Ineligibility concerning Petitioner's request for reimbursement. As stated in this order the initial basis for Respondent's denial of eligibility was: The determination is based on the fact that the contamination was not related to the storage of petroleum or petroleum products. Sources of contamination at this site include tanker trucks, an oil/water separator, a holding pond, and crude oil and tank-bottom sludge disposal pit. These items are not petroleum storage systems as defined in Section 376.301 F.S. therefore (sic), this site is not eligible for reimbursement under the SUPER Act. ... Respondent clarified its Order of Ineligibility by a Notice to Amend and Clarify dated November 14, 1989, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: The notice of denial provides that the site is being denied due to the fact that the disclosed sources of contamination are not petroleum storage systems. One of the criteria for being a petroleum storage system is that it be used or intended to be used for storage of petroleum or petroleum product. It is the criteria that the Department contends is not met in this case; i.e., that the discharges were not intended for storage. Section 376.3071(4), Florida Statutes, specifically limits the use of the Environmental Protection Trust Fund to incidents of inland contamination related to storage of petroleum or petroleum product. * * * The Department recently became aware that prior to 1983, contaminated water was disposed of directly from tanks at the site with no pretreatment by an oil/water separator. As with the disposal of oil and sludge to a pit, the act of intentionally disposing of contaminants to the ground is not "related to storage" as required by Chapter 376, Florida Statutes. * * * Wherefore, The State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation hereby requests that the Hearing Officer allow for the amendment of the notice of denial of eligibility to include the following basis for denial: Contamination at the site is related to the disposal of petroleum or petroleum product, or water contaminated with petroleum or petroleum products. Disposal activities including the intentional discharge and disposal of contaminated water and/or fuel from tanks, oil water separators and sump areas, the intentional discharge and disposal of contaminated water to a percolation pond, the intentional discharge and disposal of oil and sludge to a disposal pit, and the intentional discharge and disposal of fuel to the ground at the loading rack. Among the causes of contamination of the Gulf Terminal are accidental overfills of tanks and leaks from an integral pipeline. Absent any other source of contamination, the discharges that occurred at the Gulf Terminal due to these causes would be eligible for the reimbursement. Respondent has determined, however, that the following additional sources of contamination render the entire response action ineligible for reimbursement: Discharges of dissolved hydrocarbon molecules contained in water which accumulated in storage tanks; Discharges of petroleum or petroleum products at the loading rack at the terminal; and The discharge of crude oil and of crude oil tank bottoms. TANK OVERFILL During the operation of the Gulf Terminal, petroleum and petroleum products have been accidentally discharged onto the ground. In 1955, an unknown quantity of petroleum or petroleum products was accidentally discharged onto the ground in the areas of tanks 104 and 105 as a result of these tanks being over- filled. Following this massive spill, between 5,000 - 10,000 barrels of product was recovered, while an unknown quantity could not be recovered. PIPELINE LEAK Since 1955, approximately 15,000 additional barrels of petroleum or petroleum products were leaked from an underground pipeline that is integral to the storage system in an area between the loading rack and tank 101, extending toward the west to between tanks 110 and 102. This is the vicinity where the heaviest free floating petroleum contamination exists. DISCHARGE OF CONTAMINATED WATER Florida has adopted the standard code for the design of aboveground storage tanks prepared by the American Petroleum Institute (API-650). The tanks at the Gulf Terminal are in compliance with API-650. The accumulation of water in storage tanks is a problem associated with the storage of petroleum or petroleum products in the storage tanks at the Gulf Terminal and at the other terminals at Port Everglades. Water accumulates in the storage tanks from rainfall and from condensation. The records of the US Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration for Station 08063163 (Fort Lauderdale, Florida) accurately depict the rainfall levels at the terminal facility. The total annual rainfall levels are as follows: 1980, 69.67 inches; 1981, 57.9 inches; 1982, 82.92 inches; 1983 75.16 inches; 1984, 59.4 inches; 1985, 63.74 inches; 1986, 64.14 inches, 1987, 58.50 inches; 1988 40.66 inches. Because water is heavier than petroleum and petroleum products, the water accumulates at the bottom of the tanks. It is essential to the proper storage of the petroleum or petroleum products that the water be removed for at least three reasons. First, if the water is not removed, the tanks would eventually become filled with water instead of product. Second, the product contaminated by water, particularly fuel for motor vehicles and aircraft, would not meet specifications. Third, water in the tanks speeds the corrosion of the tank. In order to remove this water that accumulates at the bottom of the storage tanks, a water draw-off mechanism located at the bottom of the tank is a design feature of API-650. When water accumulates in the bottom of the tank, the water is drained out through the water draw-off mechanism. The storage tanks located at the Gulf Terminal are equipped with such a water draw-off mechanism. Throughout the existence of the facility, accumulated water in the tanks has been controlled by discharging the water through the water draw-off mechanism. From 1948 to 1980, water was drained out of the tanks through the water draw-off mechanism and on to the ground. Beginning in 1980, the water was taken from the tanks through the water draw-off mechanism and piped to a catch basin where an effort was made to recover petroleum product by skimming the water before the water was discharged into the ground. Since 1985, the water taken from the tanks through the water draw-off mechanism has been treated by an oil/water separator which effectively removes all petroleum product before the water is discharged. The purpose of the oil/water separator is to separate petroleum product from water so that the petroleum product can be returned to the storage tank and the water can be discharged. This process serves to prevent the discharge of petroleum product. Up to 1988, the discharges to the ground from the oil/water separator at the Gulf Terminal accumulated in a holding pond. In 1988, the holding pond was eliminated and the water discharges from the oil/water separator were routed to a holding tank prior to treatment by an air stripper and subsequent discharge into the canal adjacent to the property. At all times since 1983, the water drawn out of the tanks has been the subject of permits issued by Respondent which approve the use of the oil/water separator. While it is necessary for the operation of the storage tanks that water be drawn from the tanks, it is not necessary for the operation of the storage tanks for the contaminated water to be discharged onto the ground. The purpose of discharging the water was to dispose of it. There was no intent to recover the contaminated water after it was discharged. Any water coming out of a storage tank is contaminated with dissolved petroleum. It may have solids in it and floating residue or product on it. Between 1946 and 1980, when this water from the storage tanks was discharged to the ground, any contaminates in the water would be discharged along with it. Water has been drained from tanks numbered 101, 106, 109, 110, 111, 112 113, and 114 on a daily basis. The other tanks are drained after a rainfall. An average of one or two inches of water was drained off each time it rained. Following a rainfall, in excess of 30 barrels of water would be drained from the smaller tanks, while approximately 300 barrels of water would be drained from the larger tanks. The discharge of the water drawn from the storage tanks contributed to the contamination of the groundwater at the Gulf Terminal. This type contamination exists in almost all areas of the site. Petitioner was unable to distinguish the contamination to the groundwater caused by the discharge of contaminated water drawn from the storage tanks from contamination to the groundwater which resulted from other causes. Petitioner failed to establish that the contribution to this contamination to the groundwater by the discharge of the contaminated water drawn from the storage tanks was insignificant. THE LOADING RACK The loading rack at the Gulf Terminal is the apparatus by which the petroleum in the storage tanks is dispensed to tanker truck for distribution to consumers. The loading rack is a series of dispensers which operate much like at a service station except that it fuels tanker trucks rather than automobiles. The loading rack is connected by permanent integral piping to the storage tanks. The purpose of the loading rack is to load the transport trucks. Without the storage tanks at the terminal, there would be no need for a loading rack. Over the years, discharges have occurred in the loading rack, usually as the result of human error. Occasional overfills in the 10-15 gallon range have occurred while a truck was being filled. This type discharge is analogous to a spill which occurs at a service station when an automobile is being fueled and the fuel splashes back or overfills the automobile's fuel tank. The supervisor of Respondent's Reimbursement Section testified that this type discharge, absent other causes, would probably be eligible for reimbursement. This testimony conflicts with the official position taken by Respondent in this proceeding that the cleanup caused by the operation of the loading rack is ineligible for reimbursement. In other incidents, small amounts of product ranging from a teacup to less than a gallon, were occasionally discharged while a truck was being drained of one type of product so that the truck could transport another type of product. The loading rack is an integral part of the storage system because without a means of moving the product out of storage and into the distribution system, the storage tanks could not provide a meaningful function. The discharges which occurred at the loading rack during the course of both loading and unloading trucks are insignificant when compared with the other sources of contamination at the site. TANK BOTTOMS In 1956, a storage tank was emptied for the purpose of switching product from crude oil to diesel fuel. At the time the change in product was made, approximately 1000 barrels of sludge and crude oil were disposed of in a pit adjacent to tank 101. Also disposed of was the tank bottom, a hard tar residue which formed at the bottom of the tank. Oil occasionally oozes to the surface in the vicinity of the pit adjacent to tank 101, but the area around the sludge pit has not been found to be contaminated, and the tank bottom has remained a hardened mass. Each tank on the site also had a pit alongside the tank where a tank bottom was disposed. Although it was necessary to remove the sludge and the tank bottoms to be able to properly operate the storage tanks, it was not necessary for the operation of the storage tanks to dump the sludge and the tank bottoms onto the ground or into the pits. The purpose of discharging the crude oil sludge and the tank bottoms was to dispose of them. There was no intent to recover the crude oil sludge or the tank bottoms water after they were discharged. CONTAMINATION PHASES The contamination at the site exists in three phases, floating petroleum product contamination, dissolved petroleum groundwater contamination, and sludge contamination. The contamination in the form of floating petroleum was caused by discharges of petroleum or petroleum products following the tank overfills, the pipeline leaks, and spills at the loading rack. The dissolved groundwater contamination was caused by two primary sources. First, the dissolved groundwater contamination was caused by floating petroleum product coming into contact with groundwater. Upon such contact, molecules from the floating petroleum would dissolve into the water, causing contamination. Second, the dissolved groundwater contamination was caused by the discharge of the contaminated water that had been drawn off from the storage tanks. Petitioner was unable to distinguish the dissolved groundwater contamination that was caused by accidental discharges of product from the contamination caused by the discharge of the contaminated water. Petitioner was also unable to establish that the dissolved groundwater contamination caused by the contaminated water was insignificant. The sludge contamination was caused by the discharge of crude oil and crude oil tank bottoms. CLEANUP The sludge contamination is capable of being cleaned up separately from the free floating petroleum contamination and the groundwater contamination at the site. The sludge contamination is separate and distinct from the other contamination at the site both as to the location of the contamination and as to the methods that would be employed to clean up that type of contamination. Free floating petroleum contamination is recovered by drawing down the water level in a well by use of a pump so that a cone of depression is created. The cone of depression is a funnel shaped depression that causes the surface of the underground water table to bend down towards the well in all directions. The free floating petroleum which flows on top of the underground water surface is then recovered by use of a second pump. The free floating petroleum is then pumped into a holding tank where the recovery of free floating petroleum is completed. The recovery of free floating petroleum contamination is usually more expensive to accomplish than groundwater cleanup because more equipment is required. Groundwater cleanup usually takes a longer period of time to accomplish than does free floating product cleanup. The same or a similar well used to recover the free floating petroleum can also be used for the cleanup of contaminated groundwater. The contaminated groundwater is pumped from the well into an oil/water separator where the water and dissolved petroleum is separated, water is taken off the bottom, put through an air stripper, and is returned to the ground through an infiltration unit. Respondent has previously found sites eligible for the reimbursement program even though those sites experienced discharges which alone would render a site ineligible for the reimbursement program. The basis for finding these sites eligible was that the ineligible discharges had become indistinguishable from the eligible discharges and were insignificant by comparison. Petitioner has complied with all procedural requirements for seeking eligibility contained in Section 376.3701, Florida Statutes. Respondent has not been denied access to the Gulf Terminal. Respondent has made no determination that there has been gross negligence in the maintenance of the petroleum storage system locate at the Gulf Terminal. Petitioner has not willfully concealed the existence of a serious discharge at the Gulf Terminal. Petitioner has not falsified any inventory records maintained with respect to the Gulf Terminal. Petitioner has not caused any intentional damage to the Gulf Terminal. The Gulf Terminal is not owned by the federal government. Petitioner's challenge to Respondent's order of ineligibility was filed in a timely manner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is Recommended that Respondent enter a final order which determines that the subject site is eligible to participate in the reimbursement program for the cleanup of the free floating petroleum contamination, but that the subject site is ineligible to participate in the reimbursement program for the cleanup of the sludge contamination and for the cleanup of the groundwater contamination. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE 89-4521 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner in its Supplemental Proposed Recommended Order. The proposed findings contained in paragraphs 1-16, 18-25, 27-30, 33, 36-42, 44, 47-50, and 53-54 of the Supplemental Proposed Recommended Order are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings contained in paragraphs 17, 31-32, 46, and 51-52 of the Supplemental Proposed Recommended Order are rejected as being contrary to the findings made and to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings contained in paragraph 26 of the Supplemental Proposed Recommended Order are adopted in part and are rejected in part as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings contained in paragraph 34 of the Supplemental Proposed Recommended Order are rejected as not being established by the greater weight of the evidence. The testimony cited by Petitioner in support of these proposed findings do not establish the proposed findings. The proposed findings conflict with the contents of the Report of Ground-Water Quality Assessment accepted into evidence as Respondent's Exhibit 1. The proposed findings contained in paragraphs 35 , 43, and 45 of the Supplemental Proposed Recommended Order are rejected to the extent the proposed findings conflict with the findings made and the conclusions reached. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact contained in Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order and in Respondent's Supplemental Proposed Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-5, 7-19, 23, 25-31, 33-34, 39- 52, 55-68, and 70-72 of Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order are adopted in material part. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 6, 20-22, 24, 32, 35-38, and 69 of Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made or to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 53 and 54 of Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order are rejected because the testimony referred to by Respondent in support of the proposed findings relates to amounts discharged following rainfalls, not amounts discharged daily. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-14 of Respondent's Supplemental Proposed Recommended Order are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made or to the conclusions reached. COPIES FURNISHED: E. Gray Early, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Robert W. Wells, Esquire Ignacio E. Sanchez, Esquire KELLEY, DRYE & WARREN 2400 Miami Center 201 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Dale H. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
The Issue Whether Petitioner Carl Cadwell should have been suspended without pay for one week for falsification of records and for insubordination.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Cadwell was employed as a field inspector by the Bureau of Geology on or about August 1, 1975. He was notified that he was suspended from his employment from the close of business on Friday, April 30, 1976 for a period of one week. He was directed to reimburse the Department of Natural Resources in the amount of $10 for per diem travel expense for the fourth quarter of November 18, 1975 and for the first quarter of November 19, 1975. Mr. Cadwell was notified previous to his assignment to the Bureau's Mineral Resource and Mining Investigation Project that he would be required to travel a great deal. He accepted employment with the Bureau of Geology and was assigned to the Mines and Mine Reclamation Section and to the Mineral Resources and Mining Investigation Project. Previous to April 1976, he requested a transfer from the Project because of the amount of travel involved but was not reassigned. There was no attempt on the part of Mr. Cadwell to cover his whereabouts at the time covered in the additional per diem request. He made credit card telephone calls during the period and documented his travel. Mr. Cadwell signed the voucher requesting the additional $10 per diem to which he was not entitled and he does not deny that he signed the request or now claim entitlement. Mr. J. William Yon, Jr., Mr. Cadwell's supervisor, prepared a summary of the Mineral Resources and Mining Inventory Project including instructions that each mining operation inventory be visited in order to complete the mineral commodity information form for each mine. Mr. Yon discussed the report with Mr. Cadwell before Mr. Cadwell began inventorying mines in Dade and Monroe Counties. Sufficient and clear job instruction and supervision were provided. In November of 1975, the decision was made to inventory Northwest rather than South Florida mines to correlate the mineral inventory to the collection geologic service data by the Bureau. Mr. Cadwell was reassigned to Northwest Florida and instructed to inventory mines in Bay County. Mr. Cadwell went to Bay, Washington and Holmes Counties to inventory mines, on November 17 to 21, 1975. On or about November 26, 1975, Mr. Yon, Mr. Cadwell's supervisor, examined the mineral commodity forms completed by Mr. Cadwell while in Bay, Washington and Holmes Counties November 17 to 21, 1975. The mineral data contained on the forms were inadequate and inaccurate. Mr. Cadwell stated that he had the mineral data in his field notes which Mr. Yon examined and also found inadequate. Mr. Cadwell stated that the people in charge of the mines were not there when he visited the mines and that he could not update the data. Mr. Cadwell did not complete the form on the mine near Ebro, Florida, stating to Mr. Yon that he could not locate the mine. Subsequent to the visit by Petitioner to Bay, Washington and Holmes Counties, an investigation was begun concerning Mr. Cadwell's phone calls during the time, which were compared to his statements on his travel vouchers. On or about December 16, 1975, Mr. Yon, Mr. Cadwell and Mr. Walter Smith, a geologist, went to Bay, Washington, and Escambia Counties at which time they visited several mines Mr. Cadwell had previously inventoried. On that field trip they had difficulty locating the mines Mr. Cadwell was supposed to have inventoried on November 17-21, 1975. Mr. Cadwell stated that he had not visited two of the mines. After the conclusion of the trip, Mr. Yon, in a memorandum stated Mr. Cadwell did not personally visit several of the mines he had inventoried. On or about January 5, 1976, Mr. Yon compared and evaluated Mr. Cadwell's mineral data collected November 17-21, 1975 in light of the field trip of December 16-17, 1975. In a memorandum dated January 7, 1976, Mr. Yon noted a conference with Mr. Cadwell and Mr. Ernest W. Bishop, a geologist, in which Mr. Cadwell was advised that his data collected November 17-21, 1975 was unsatisfactory and that mineral data must be collected by visiting each mine and not by telephone. The Hearing Officer further finds: That Mr. Cadwell is guilty of negligently filing official reports, including travel vouchers and state automobile records. That his request for per diem which is a subject of this hearing was careless and erroneous but not fraudulent. That Petitioner's use of a credit card rather than the prepaid Wat or SunCom system shows a blatant disregard for expense to the State. That Petitioner did not enjoy the travel entailed in his position, although he was on notice of the extensive travel entailed before he accepted employment. That the information required by the project to which Mr. Cadwell was assigned entailed both travel and a careful filing of reports, a fact of employment known by Petitioner. That Petitioner did not fully and completely file reports required for the Natural Resources and Mining Investigation project, and as a result, new information had to be gathered by others on the project including the mines in the three counties Mr. Cadwell was assigned to visit in Northwest Florida, at a great expense in time and money to the State. That Petitioner knew or should have known the information he was to gather for the project entailed full reporting and personal visits to each mine.
Recommendation Dismiss the charge of falsification of records, accept reimbursement for unearned per diem, and affirm charge of insubordination. DONE and ORDERED this 3rd day of December, 1976 in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Ben Thompson, Esquire Mrs. Dorothy Roberts 836 E. Lafayette Street Appeals Coordinator Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Career Service Commission Room 530 Carlton Building J. W. Pierce, Esquire Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Crown Building 202 Blount Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Kent A. Zaiser, Esquire Assistant Department Attorney Department of Natural Resources Room 631 Crown Building 202 Bouunt Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The issue is whether the application of Petroleum Products Corporation for reimbursement of the cost of assessment and clean-up of soil and groundwater contamination at its site in Broward County, Florida, under the State Underground Petroleum Environmental Response Act of 1986 should be granted.
Findings Of Fact The Legislature provided a system for the clean-up of sites contaminated as the result of the storage of petroleum or petroleum products in the State Underground Petroleum Environmental Response Act of 1986 (Super Act), Chapter 86-159, Laws of Florida, codified primarily as Section 376.3071, Florida Statutes. The Super Act contains a reimbursement program funded by the Inland Protection Trust Fund. Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes, permits reimbursement of allowable costs for the rehabilitation of sites contaminated from discharges related to the storage of petroleum or petroleum products. Petroleum Products Corporation owns a parcel of land located at 3130 Southwest 17th Street, Pembroke Park, Florida. From 1959 to 1970 Petroleum Products Corporation operated a facility on that land which collected used oil from service stations and automobile dealerships, processed it, and sold it either as fuel oil or lubricating oil. About 90% of 150,000 gallons of used oil processed monthly at the facility was sold as fuel; the remaining oil was sold as lubricating oil, but even when sold as lubricating oil, it was sometimes burned as fuel because re-refined oil makes good fuel. The storage tanks were located on the southeastern portion of the property, near Carolina Road. The facility used a two-phase distillation process. Used oil was distilled to remove water, after which it could be sold as fuel oil. If processed in the second phase, for sale as lubricating oil, it was distilled further, and treated with sulfuric acid and clay to remove additives and residue, and change color. This phase produced a waste consisting of acid/clay sludge. This sludge is generally very black, and has a pH of approximately 3. It is very viscous, and has the consistency of roofing cement; laymen would describe it as tar. It does not flow easily, but is liquid enough to be pumped. This processing also occurred in the southeast part of the property. While the recycling facility produced lubricating oil using the acid/clay treatment from 1959 to 1970, the acid sludge was hauled to a municipal dump, or placed in pits dug into the ground on the north and east of the plant site. When the pits were dug, they were dug below the water level, and there was water in the pits before the sludge was dumped in them. The disposal of sludge in pits on the recycling site was a prevailing industry practice, and violated no regulatory requirements at the time. Operators considered on-site disposal of sludge preferable to hauling sludge to a landfill. During periods of heavy rain, some of the sludge may have overflown the pits and spread to nearby land, where it would become mixed with the surface soil. Petroleum Products Corporation ceased making lubricating oil in 1970, but continued to process used oil into fuel oil. The local Broward County Pollution Control Agency asked Petroleum Products Corporation to remove the acid/clay sludge from its property, and to refill the pits with other fill material. Petroleum Products Corporation acceeded to this request, and a great volume of sludge, perhaps hundreds of thousands of gallons, was removed from the pits, which were then refilled under the supervision of the Broward County Pollution Authority. Receipts Petroleum Products Corporation produced at the hearing, or thereafter from the custody of the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, show that more than 150 truck loads of sludge were removed and hauled to landfills operated by Metropolitan Dade County or by the City of Surfside. Some pockets of the sludge remain at the site of the pits because they were not completely emptied. The backfill was clean fill, and the area was then bulldozed so that warehouses could be constructed in the area. This filling and bulldozing changed the contour of the land from what it had been in the past. The Department contends that much of the sludge was spread out over an extended area of the site, and not removed to landfills. The evidence is persuasive that almost all of the sludge from the pits was removed to landfills. The testimony of Mr. Blair denying that the sludge was spread was credible. In addition, on-site spreading of the sludge would have been impracticable. As a tar-like substance, if spread out, it would have been tracked everywhere. It would stick to the tracks or wheels of any vehicles operating on the surface, and was so acidic it would burn or irritate the skin of anyone who came in contact with it. It would be extremely difficult to perform maintenance on equipment used to spread the sludge because of the need to clean the sludge off, so that the mechanic would not be burned. In addition, there are a large number of receipts evidencing the systematic hauling of the sludge to landfills. The logic of Mr. McDonnell's testimony is persuasive: If you have the alternate, which they obviously did, of hauling it away and simply dumping it, no one would go out and deliberately choose to do a very difficult job [spreading the sludge over the property] where there is an easy alternative available to them. (Tr. 285) Although the facility ceased its re-refining of lubricating oil in 1970, it continued to collect, process, and sell used oil as a fuel until 1984. About 150,000 gallons per month of used oil were processed and sold as fuel. The oil was typically crank case engine oil which contained the substances normally found in used oil of that type. There is no persuasive evidence that Petroleum Product Corporation ever received any hazardous waste, or mixed used oil with any hazardous waste. Used oil is not listed as a hazardous waste by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency or by the Department. The used oil collected and recycled at Petroleum Product's facility was pumped into and stored in above-ground storage tanks. There were, over time, from 10 to 25 tanks, which ranged in size from 12,000 to 20,000 gallons. Normally, the facility stored between 400,000 and 500,000 gallons of used oil. Occasionally, the facility also received virgin oil, but it was processed quickly or sold because of its higher value. At the peak of its operation, the facility had 25 to 35 storage tanks. Recycling operations had slim profit margins and were small operations. Storage tanks, pumps, and other equipment were bought used, often from other businesses dealing in virgin petroleum products. That used equipment was often rusty or deteriorating. Tank bottoms could have holes in them as the result of rust from standing water; tanks were sometimes riveted, and would have side or bottom leaks. The tanks had virtually no overfill protection. When oil was pumped in, it would overflow from the top and run down the sides. Operators were typically not careful with the oil, because it had a very low value, about 2 to 5 cents a gallon. A spill of a few thousand gallons was regarded as an inconsequential matter. The pumps used in storing oil often had leaks in packing seals, or had screw joints which would leak. Tank valves, also usually bought as used equipment, were often installed without new stem packing, and also would leak during operation. Almost no preventive maintenance was done, because it was not cost-effective to do so. Equipment was repaired only if its current state of repair interfered with operations, which usually meant that leaks were not repaired until they created a fire hazard. Leaks and spills from used oil storage tanks, including their pumps, valves, and piping, were common. A great volume of used oil leaked or spilled from Petroleum Products Corporation's tanks, pumps, and piping over its 25 year operation. There were also large oil spills resulting from four or five major fires at the facility in the 1960s. The fire in 1963, which may have been the result of vandalism, caused 40,000 to 60,000 gallons of use oil to spill from storage tanks; 8 or 10 tanks were destroyed. There were no dikes, so that the oil flowed freely. When firemen used water on the fire, the oil was absorbed into the soil. Another major fire occurred in October, 1966 in which three oil storage tanks collapsed spilling about 50,000 gallons of oil. Another 25 foot high oil tank collapsed on a firetruck. There is no way to know, with certainty, the volume of used oil, virgin oil, and lubricating oil which spilled or leaked into the ground on the site. It is reasonable to believe that 9 to 12 gallons of oil would have leaked or spilled each day at the facility, which would have resulted in spill of over 100,000 gallons of oil. This estimate, made by Mr. McDonnell, is credible and is conservative, given the volume of oil also spilled during the fires. Petroleum Products Corporation does not contend that the leaks and spills from process tanks, rather than from storage tanks, are eligible for reimbursement of site assessment and cleanup costs. Oil leaked from both, however, and once in the ground, the oils are indistinguishable. Due to the capacity of the tanks and the years they were in use, however, it is reasonable to assume that 15% or less of the leaks and spills were attributable to process tanks. After processing, most of the oil was burned as fuel. Some was used as a lubricant. The only difference between used oil sold as fuel or lubricant was that the lubricating oil had the additives removed and the color changed. Both burn well. There is an insufficient basis in this record to justify the Department's interpretation excluding this site from eligibility for cleanup because oil processing ocurred at the site to produce lubricating oil. Section 376.3071 does not disqualify all or part of a site from eligibility for cleanup reimbursement because a portion of the used oil stored there was ultimately used as lubricants. In 1984 a Department investigator asked Petroleum Products Corporation to install exploratory wells to determine whether there was contamination at the site. Petroleum Products engaged the firm of Dames & Moore to undertake a preliminary investigation, which revealed that there was groundwater contamination in the form of floating hydrocarbons. On April 1, 1985, the United States Environmental Protection Agency and Petroleum Products Corporation entered into a consent order agreement which required the removal of 17 above-ground tanks leaking used oil into the ground, which constituted a continuing source of contamination. Petroleum Products Corporation contracted with Conversion Technology Corporation to recover and recycle the oil and wastes, with Waldron's tank cleaning services to clean the empty tanks and drum the sludge, with Cuyahoga Wrecking Service to make the tanks inoperable, and with Seven & Seven Transporters to remove the waste to a disposal facility. The employee of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency who was in charge of the site commended Petroleum Products Corporation for its cleanup effort, and wrote as the OSC [on- scene coordinator] for this EPA-monitored cleanup I may say that [Petroleum Products Corporation] exemplified industrial cooperation and responsibility in combating the vexing problem of hazardous waste management. (Petitioner's Exhibit 9) Petroleum Products Corporation cooperated with the Environmental Protection Agency and with the Department in determining how to deal with the contamination. It has already spent approximately $150,000 to perform remedial action. Contamination at the site is of three types: oil floating in the groundwater, soil contamination, and groundwater contamination. It is not possible to clean any individual phase of the contamination without affecting the other phases. Attempts at remediation must be monitored to prevent an influx of organic contaminants into the aquifer. Similarly, the cost related to the cleanup of an individual phase of contamination cannot be isolated because of the inter-related nature of the cleanup phases. The creation of a cone of groundwater depression is necessary for any recovery of the free or floating oil. The cost of recovery of the free product cannot be separated from groundwater cleanup because it is necessary to treat large quantities of groundwater involved in creating a cone of depression. To the extent that a proportion of the cost might be estimated, the cost associated with the recovery of free product would be a minor portion of the overall cleanup. There is currently a free product recovery effort in place at the site, which is intended to prevent further migration of the product off-site. This ongoing action is not considered an element of the site cleanup. The most feasible method of cleanup for the free product will involve the excavation of the soils to create a trench. The free product and ground water will be recovered as they flow into the trench. During October and November of 1984, Environmental Science and Engineering, Inc., a consulting firm working under contract with the Department, assessed the extent of free floating oil in the groundwater under the Petroleum Product Corporation's site. Those consultants found a free floating layer of oil from 5" to 30" thick under approximately one-half of the one acre site Petitioner still owns. The free product generally mirrors the location of the former recycling facility and its storage tanks. The viscosity of the free product is comparable to about 40-weight engine oil. Environmental Science and Engineering estimates that the floating layer of oil contains 20,000 to 60,000 gallons of recoverable petroleum product. The direction of ground water flow and the migration of contaminants off-site is to the east or southeast. The soil above the oil layer has been saturated with oil because of the fluctuations of the layer with movement of the water table as the area experiences heavy rains or dry spells. Wells drilled in the location of the former sludge lagoons to the north and east of the plant site reveal a heavy slightly liquid type of sludge. The oil in the lagoon sites is immobile, and no free product collects in the wells after 24 hours. One sample collected in the mason jar shows a slight degree of oil separation after 24 hours. This anecdotal evidence of separation is not very informative, and is not persuasive that oil separates from the remaining sludge on-site. See, Finding 32, below. A second assessment of soil and groundwater contamination was done by another consulting firm under contract with the Department, Ecology and Environment, Inc. That study showed free floating product at the site. The only calculation of the amount of free floating oil was that done by Environmental Science and Engineering, Inc., see, Finding 29, estimating that there would be 20,000 to 60,000 gallons of recoverable oil. That calculation understates the amount of oil in the ground. The estimate given by George McDonnell of 103,000 gallons is more persuasive. It is consistent that the large amounts of oil which leaked or spilled at the site over a 25 year period. It is unlikely that any appreciable portion of the approximately 103,000 gallons of floating oil has its genesis in the separation of oil from the acid/clay sludge which had been disposed in the two lagoons for the following reasons: Oil associated with acid/sludge would be quite acidic, and have a pH between 2 and 4. The pH scale is not a linear scale, so differences in pH are quite dramatic as the pH values change. Samples of free product shows a uniform pH of approximately 6 or 7. In almost all 31 monitoring or observation wells the pH is consistent with the characteristics of used oil, (a pH of 6 or 7), not the pH of sludge (a pH of 2 to 4). The only sample which disclosed a low pH was that taken in monitoring well number 3 which was located in the former sludge lagoon site. The groundwater flows to the east or southeast. This does not explain the presence of free product to the west and southwest of the sludge pits nor the absence of free product to the east of the pits. The viscosity of the oil is similar to that of 40-weight engine oil and not highly viscous, as the tar-like sludge would be. The oil in the sludge pits is basically immobile and no free product surfaced in the monitoring well after waiting 24 hours. The pH of the free product is nearly neutral. The Department believes that the sludge was mixed with lime rock or fill and spread over the site to increase the pH of the oil. This is unpersuasive. Mixing with lime rock would increase the pH of the sludge (tend to bring it towards neutral) but it would not cause the dramatic lowering of acidity which would bring the sludge to a pH of 6 or 7. In addition, the viscosity of the sludge would not be so changed by mixing the sludge with fill that its viscosity would become similar to that of 40-weight engine oil. To believe that the free product results from sludge disposal rather than leaks ignores the normal operating practice of used oil recovery facilities in the late 50s and 60s where spills from storage tanks, pumps, and piping were very common. Little of the free product has been recovered through the current remediation efforts. If not recovered, over time the approximately 103,000 gallons of floating oil will spread to adjacent property. To recover this oil by conventional trench or well recovery operations will probably cost $250,000 or more. The capital cost of the groundwater recovery/discharge system, with monitoring wells, will be about $85,000; cost of operating and maintenance are approximately $180,000. The firm of Ecology & Environment, Inc., collected soil samples at 56 locations in two phases in its remedial investigation. Forty-six of the samples were taken at shallow depths (27 at 8 inches, 19 at approximately 10 inches); 10 more samples were taken in the old disposal pit sites at depths between 0 and 35 feet). The two primary classes of contaminants found in the soil were lead and organics (hydrocarbons associated with petroleum products). Both contaminants are found in used oil. The lead and organic contaminants were found in the shallow soils over the southern half of the site. Very little contamination was found beyond the main area of site activity. The soil contamination was concentrated in the plant and former disposal pit areas. Samples with high lead concentrations were found in the former disposal pit sites. Contamination extended to a depth of 25 feet in one soil sample from a former pit, where oily plastic sludge was found with fine sand or clay. The two former pit sites are the only places with documented contamination below a 10 foot depth. Although the organic contamination extended laterally further than the lead contamination, Environment & Ecology concluded that the wider distribution did not reflect contamination from Petroleum Product Corporation's activities. The general area has long been the site of commercial and industrial activities, and there are many other possible sources for contamination including a firing range, which would have been disposing of lead bullets fired at the range, a generator plant, and a former spray-painting facility. Solvents and other chemicals used in these activities would contribute to soil and groundwater contamination. The consultants had been told by area businesses that small scale dumping of industrial chemicals in the vicinity has been common. Soil samples revealed a "great deal of heterogeneity." There was no uniform distribution of soils in the shallow zone. This probably occurs because after the reprocessing operations ended in 1970, the land was cleared and filled, so that many of the warehouses now in the area could be constructed. Most of the upper 8 to 10 feet is fill material. The ground water was monitored by installing 38 wells on the site, most of which were screened at depths of 10 to 12 feet. Five intermediate wells with depths of 50 feet and two deep wells of 100 to 200 feet were also installed. Every sample exhibited a pH of between 6.4 and 7.4. The primary contaminants were lead, organics, and chromium. The evidence does not indicate the source of the chromium. It is unrelated to Petroleum Product Corporation's activities. The groundwater contamination, both metal and organic, was only in the shallow zone. It extends laterally roughly to the same extent of the shallow contamination found in the soil. This suggests that the contaminants in the soil migrated due to seepage from rainfall or fluctuation in the water table into the groundwater. The water table is about five feet below the land surface. The Department has argued that the contaminants in the soil and groundwater were caused by mixing and spreading of the sludge material during the early 1970s over the surface of the area. This hypothesis has already been rejected for the reason stated in Findings 7 and 8, above. It is more likely that the soil contamination resulted from frequent spills and leaks of oil from storage tanks years ago. The soil contaminants are those found in used oil. The area generally is flat. There was no impediment to oil spills flowing over a large surface area, following the contour of the land at that time. Depending on the method used to clean up the site, the cost of rehabilitating the area will range between two and forty-six million dollars. It will cost over one million dollars to recover and treat contaminated groundwater. Approximately 110,000 cubic yards of contaminated soil must be removed and treated, the majority of that coming from the area outside the former sludge pits. The presence of contamination at the site is to be expected, given the site's former use. All of the 8 turnpike facilities and 8 maintenance yards operated by the Florida Department of Transportation report petroleum contamination from tanks, and the Department of Transportation has estimated cleanup cost will range from $20 to $30 million, although DER believes the cost may be $5 million. The cleanup will be funded by the Inland Protection Trust Fund, as would the reimbursement in this case. The cost of rehabilitation is in the range of estimates that the Department has received for other petroleum contamination sites. In summary, the Petitioner's site is contaminated primarily from leak and spills of used and virgin oils processed or unprocessed and from storage tanks, pumps and integral piping. Small spills were continuous and some associated with fires were massive. The only portion of the site not contaminated due to leaks and spills is the residual soil and groundwater contamination from the sludge disposal pits, which is a small part of the overall contamination.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Petroleum Products Corporation fo eligibility to participate in the cleanup program funded by the Inland Protection Trust Fund be granted. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of July, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX Rulings on Findings of Fact proposed the Petitioner: As will be obvious, the proposed order submitted by Petroleum Products Corporation comported closely with the Hearing Officer's view of the evidence, and with some modification was essentially adopted as proposed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9 and 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10, to the extent necessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 16. Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as unnecessary and subordinate. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 28. Adopted in Finding of Fact 29. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 31. Adopted in Findings of Fact 31 and 32. Adopted in Finding of Fact 33 Rejected as repetitious of Finding of Fact 6. Rejected, see Findings of Fact 25 and 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 36. Adopted in Finding of Fact 37. Adopted in Finding of Fact 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. Adopted in Finding of Fact 40. Adopted in Finding of Fact 41. The spreading theory is rejected in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. See also the stipulation of the parties entered as Exhibit 22. Rejected as unnecessary. Rulings on Findings of Fact proposed by the Department. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted as modified in Finding of Fact 2. Discussed in the Conclusions of Law, see page 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Implicit in Findings of Fact 3 and 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Rejected as unsupported by the transcript references given. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5 Rejected as unnecessary. Generally rejected; see Finding of Fact 6 concerning the filling of the disposal pits. While some pockets of sludge remain at the site of the pits, the volume is difficult to determine. In an absolute sense, those pockets may contain a substantial amount of sludge, but on a comparative basis, by far the greatest part of the sludge was removed. Rejected as unnecessary. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 32(1), but see the final sentence of (1). Generally adopted in Findings of Fact 25, 28, and 34. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 28, since the recycling facility and storage tanks were on the southern part of the property. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Implicit in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Rejected because the process tanks necessarily store the product being processed, serving as a vessel to contain the product. Rejected, see Finding of Fact 3 with respect to the turnover in the volume of used oil processed at the facility. Only about 10 percent of the oil was reprocessed as lubricating oil. This is more significant than the volume of the tanks. See also Tr. 24 with respect to the storage capacity, and Finding of Fact 11. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected because the surficial drainage has probably been changed by the filling and regrading of the property in preparation for building the warehouses. See Finding of Fact 6. The current surficial flow says little about the flow when the facility operated in the late 1950's and throughout the 1960's. Adopted in Findings of Fact 15 through 19. Adopted in Findings of Fact 17 and 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Generally rejected, the evidence is persuasive that about 50,000 gallons of oil were lost in the 1966 fire. (See Tr. 36-37.) Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Rejected, the free product covers approximately one-half acre. Rejected, the more persuasive evidence is the 103,000 gallons estimated by Mr. McDonnell. See Finding of Fact 31. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. See Findings of Fact 28 and 34. Rejected because it is unlikely that sludges are separating in the former sludge lagoon. See Finding of Fact 30. The source of the oil is more likely the substantial loss of oil which occurred from the fires and from leaks over the years which is now floating above the ground water. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 28. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 28. Rejected as unpersuasive. Rejected, the source of the free product is not leaching from the disposal pit, but the oil from over flows and leaks during operation as well as large inundations during fires. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Rejected, see Finding of Fact 30. Rejected because oil does not separate from the sludge. Rejected for the reason given for rejecting Finding of Fact 63. Rejected, the seepage is not the result of separation in the disposal pits, but from the plume of free product in the ground above the ground water. Rejected as unnecessary, but the similarity of the oil seeping from the sludge pit area to waste oil is consistent with its source as leaks and spills inicident to fires. Rejected because the sludge does not separate. Rejected because the sludge does not separate. Rejected because the sludge does not separate, see Finding of Fact 30. Rejected as unnecessary; obviously as there is no more storage, so there is no more source for leaks or spills. 71-73. Discussed in Finding of Fact 30. Rejected because liquid product will not accumulate. Rejected because the sludge does not separate. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32(1). Adopted in Finding of Fact 32(5). Adopted in Finding of Fact 32(1). Rejected for the reason stated in Finding of Fact 32(5). Rejected for the reason stated in Finding of Fact 32(5). Rejected as unnecessary and for the reason stated in Finding of Fact 32(5). Adopted in Finding of Fact 32(1), which is consistent with the source of the free product being used oil rather than separation from sludge remaining onsite. 83-84. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected because the testimony of Mr. McDonnell has been accepted. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Rejected as redundant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Implicit in the finding that lead is a contaminant found in used oil. See Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Rejected as unnecessary. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 35. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary; see also, Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32(1). Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary, although there were disposal pits in the north and eastern parts of the property. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34 with respect to location, but the testimony with respect to spreading of the sludge is rejected. See Finding of Fact 7. It is unlikely that sludge was spread over the site. The more likely explanation for the appearance of sludge in the lithologic logs for the southern end of the site is that the disposal lagoons periodically overflowed after heavy rains and provided a mechanism for the active transport of sludge out of the disposal pits into some areas on the southern end of the site. Apparently the northern area now occupied by the warehouses was higher, because no sludge was found in observation wells 4, 5 and 19. Rejected, page 41 of DER's Exhibit 3 shows no sludge at observation well 5, which the proposed finding implies. 107-112. Generally rejected because the testimony with respect to the surface flow from the tank area being to the south is rejected because the grading of the property as the warehouses were built likely changed the contour of the land. Mr. Levin's testimony was not particularly strong; for example, at page 25 of his prefiled direct testimony he states, "And for the shallow soil contamination I would still have to lean towards the fact that the materials were mixed and spread." 113-114. The sludge contamination is not the predominant or source of contamination. Rather, it is the oils which floated across the land and were carried into the soil and resulted from the leaks and spills. 115-120. Generally accepted in Finding of Fact 36, although subordinate to that finding. 121. Generally accepted, although the soil contamination by lead is attributable to leaks and spills from the used oil. 122-124. Rejected as unnecessary. Accepted in Finding of Fact 25. Accepted in Finding of Fact 38. 127-128. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 36, especially the last sentence, and 38. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 39. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 39, especially the last sentence. Rejected as unnecessary. 132-134. Accepted in Finding of Fact 39. 135. Rejected because the soil contamination is the result of leaks and spills of oil. 136-137. Rejected, it is more likely that the neutral pH of the ground water is the result of the essentially neutral contaminant, the used oil. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary, although consistent with Finding of Fact 39 that the lateral extent of ground water contamination mirrors the soil contamination which has resulted from leaks and spills. 140-141. The predominant source of contamination is leaks and spills. 142. Rejected, the area affected by the leaks and spills is large, due especially to the fires and consequent loss of large amounts of oil from tanks. See Finding of Fact 41. 143-144. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 145. Although true, not relevant. 146-148. Rejected, whether the Environmental Protection Agency is correct or not in its assessment is not at issue here. This site was contaminated by used oil. 149-150. Although true, not relevant. Implicitly accepted in that no finding with respect to "bias" has been made. Rejected as legal argument. Rejected because the predominate source of contamination is an eligible source. Rejected, but the source here falls within the statutory directive. Rejected. The site here is predominantly contaminated by used oil, which is eligible. The eligible portion is not a minor part of the entire of the contamination. COPIES FURNISHED: R. L. Caleen, Jr., Esquire OERTEL, HOFFMAN, FERNANDEZ & COLE Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6507 Gary Early, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Dale H. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a rancher who obtained cattle grazing rights to property owned by Florida Power and Light Company (FP&L) in Lee County, Florida. Essentially, Respondent became a tenant on the FP&L property pursuant to the terms of a contract or "license" entered into by FP&L and Respondent. The license was in effect between May 1, 1980 and April 30, 1986, when FP&L evicted Respondent from the property. After his entry onto the FP&L property in 1980, Respondent undertook several projects to improve the land for cattle grazing. One such project involved the filling of a ditch dug by FP&L to build a power line access road. This ditch is water-filled much of the time and drains into the Caloosahatchee River, a Class III Florida Water Body. Respondent did not seek a dredge and fill permit for the ditch project. As "fill" he arranged for the dumping of waste tires over about a one year period. He intended to cover the tires with dirt but lacked sufficient financial resources to complete the project. At present, the tires are strewn over a distance of about 2,000 feet in this ditch, and are "migrating" downstream. Tire cleanup and disposal costs will be substantial and are estimated by FP&L at $130,000. Respondent refuses to remove these tires and contends that he would be financially unable to do so even if he were willing to remove them. He believes the tires should remain in place and be covered with dirt as he originally intended. Petitioner learned of the tire-filled ditch on July 6, 1984, and has thereafter sought to force Respondent to remove these tires without success. 1/ Prior to DER involvement, FP&L became aware of Respondent's fill activities and instructed him to complete the project by relocating some of the tires and covering them with dirt. After DER became involved, FP&L changed its instructions to Respondent and required him to remove the tires as ordered by DER. When he failed to do so, FP&L evicted him. FP&L and Respondent are in disagreement as to the terms of the license and are apparently in litigation over Respondent's eviction. For purposes of the instant proceedings, however, FP&L was aware of the tire dumping project while it was under way and did nothing to stop it prior to action by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order: Directing Respondent, within sixty days of the effective date of the Final Order, to remove and transfer all tires from the subject property to a DER approved sanitary landfill or a DER approved incinerator, or properly recycle the tires in a DER approved manner. Within seven days thereafter, Respondent is required to submit landfill, incinerator, or recycling receipts to DER as proof of proper disposal. Pursuant to Section 403.141(1), F.S., Respondent is directed to pay $145.92 to DER for expenses of the State in tracing, controlling, and abating this source of pollution. Payment is to be made by certified check to the "Pollution Recovery Fund," delivered to the South Florida District Office, 2269 Bay Street, Fort Myers, Florida 33901, within ten days of the effective date of the Final Order. It is further RECOMMENDED: That any civil enforcement suit filed pursuant to Section 120.69, 403.121 or 403.131, F.S., join Florida Power and Light Company as a Party Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of September, 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1985.
