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RASHMI JAKOTIA (KING COLE MOTEL) vs CITY OF CLEARWATER AND ANTONIOS MARKOPOULOS, 93-001474 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida Mar. 12, 1993 Number: 93-001474 Latest Update: Jun. 07, 1993

Findings Of Fact Ramchandra Jakhotia and Rashmi Jakhotia, his wife, acquired the King Cole Motel at 401 East Shore Drive, Clearwater, Florida in 1983 and have owned the property since that time. At the time of acquisition and for some time prior thereto the property included a commercial marina with 22 slips. In 1985 the City of Clearwater revised its Development Code effective October 13, 1985 and, incident thereto, effective July 7, 1988, enacted Section 114.05, Live-Aboard Vessels as Ordinance 4597, Clearwater City Code. That enactment provided, in part, that: Prohibited; exceptions: It shall be unlawful for any person to moor any live-aboard vessel at any location within or upon the navigable waters in the City for any period of time in excess of seventy-two (72) hours, except as follows: At a marina facility for which conditional use approval has been obtained, or a marina facility in existence as of October 13, 1985 for which conditional use approval would otherwise be required;... In January 1986 a survey was taken of all marinas within the City of Clearwater to determine the number of live aboard vessels coming within the purview of the revised Development Code. At this survey eight live aboard vessels were occupying berths at the King Cole Motel marina and this was the number determined to be grandfathered for which no conditional use approval would be required. In 1988 King Cole Motel applied for conditional authorization to utilize 14 additional berths for live aboard vessels. This conditional use was approved subject to the applicant installing a pump-out facility and meeting the parking requirements. Although the parking requirements for a commercial marina, i.e., 0.5 parking space per slip, is the same as the parking requirement at marinas for live aboard vessels, the latter generally place a greater demand on parking spaces than does non-live aboard vessels. To change the approved use from commercial marina without live aboards to live aboards is a change in the use and requires conditional use approval. Before conditional use approval can be granted the applicant must comply with all code requirements, such as required parking spaces, at the time of the change in use. At the time Appellant acquired the King Cole Motel the 22 commercial slips were grandfathered as an authorized use without any parking being provided. Accordingly, as a 22-slip commercial marina Appellant did not have to provide parking. When the eight slips used for live aboards were counted in 1986 they too were grandfathered in without the need for parking spaces. However, when Appellant applied in 1988 for authorization to use 14 other slips for live aboard vessels, the code required the applicant to provide seven parking spaces. To his credit Appellant obtained the use of seven parking spaces down the road from the marina but those spaces were not contiguous to Appellants' marina as required by the code. Therefore, Appellants' use of the additional slips for live aboards did not meet the parking requirement in his conditional use approval. In 1992 Appellant applied for a variance of the seven parking spaces required to allow the use of these additional slips by live aboard vessels. This hearing was held before the Development Code Adjustment Board on February 11, 1993 and it is from the denial of this variance that this appeal is taken. The Board denied the variance requested because the Appellant failed to demonstrate that the standards established by Section 45.24 Land Development Code were met. In these proceedings Appellant presented no additional evidence to support the variances requested than was submitted to the Board.

Florida Laws (2) 114.05120.68
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FLORIDA WILDLIFE FEDERATION AND PROPERTY OWNERS vs. CASETTA, LTD., AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 82-001602 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-001602 Latest Update: Feb. 16, 1983

The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether the Department should issue a permit to Casetta, and whether the Department should issue a permit to Harbor Point. The two application proceedings were consolidated for hearing purposes. In many respects, common factual and legal issues relate to the two proceedings. For that reason, in the interest of economy of time and space, a single recommended order is being issued with respect to the two proceedings.

Findings Of Fact History of Proceedings In 1974, a prior owner of the property now owned by Casetta filed an application with the Department to entirely fill the pond which is the subject of this proceeding. A final order denying the application was entered by the Department on August 31, 1977. A second application to fill the entire pond was filed with the Department by Casetta's predecessor in 1979. During the pendency of that proceeding, Casetta purchased the property and by stipulation was permitted to be substituted as the Petitioner. The Department gave notice of its intent to deny the second application in February, 1981. Casetta challenged the Department's assertion that it had jurisdiction under the provisions of Chapter 253, Florida Statutes. The matter was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings and given Case No. 81-1082. The matter before the Division has been closed, but it remains as a pending proceeding before the Department. It is being held in abeyance pending the resolution of Casetta's present application. The application involved in this proceeding was submitted to the Department during December, 1981. The City of Riviera Beach, Florida, granted local approval for this application; and on May 18, 1982, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to issue the permit. The Department published a notice of its proposed action in the Commercial Record, a Palm Beach County newspaper. The Florida Wildlife Federation and the Property Owners' Association of Singer Island together filed a request for formal hearing with the Department. The Singer Island Civic Association filed a separate request. Counsel for the Wildlife Federation and the Property Owners' Association withdrew during the course of the proceeding. It was indicated that these parties would voluntarily dismiss the requests for hearing, but no such papers were filed. No one appeared on behalf of the Florida Wildlife Federation or the Property Owners' Association of Singer Island during prehearing conferences that were conducted in this matter or at the final hearing. The Executive Director of the Florida Wildlife Federation testified as a public witness at the hearing and indicated that they were not participating in the proceeding as a party. During the pendency of proceedings respecting the Casetta application before the Division of Administrative Hearings, Harbor Point filed an application with the Department to install a culvert which would connect the pond that is the subject of the Casetta application with a pond located on property owned by Harbor Point through a culvert system. Harbor Point sought to have its application considered by the Department as an alternative to the Casetta application. On or about August 2, 1982, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to deny the Harbor Point application Harbor Point thereafter petitioned for a formal hearing. On or about June 4, 1982, the United States Corps of Engineers issued a permit to Harbor Point to construct its proposed culvert system. Description of Property in the Area of Proposed Projects. Casetta is the owner of approximately five acres of land that lie between the Atlantic Ocean and Lake Worth on Singer Island in Palm Beach County, Florida. The property includes a rectangular pond that is approximately three acres in area. This pond will hereafter be referred to as the "Casetta pond." Submerged lands in the Casetta pond were conveyed into private ownership by the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, State of Florida, in 1924. Harbor Point owns land adjacent to Casetta's property to the north. Harbor Point's property includes a pond which is configured in the approximate shape of an hourglass and is approximately one acre in area. A condominium apartment building has been constructed on Harbor Point's property. Harbor Point members own residential units in this facility. The area presently owned by Casetta and Harbor Point was, in its natural condition, a part of the littoral zone, a shallow, submerged area, on the eastern edge of the lake. Lake Worth is an estuarine water body located between the mainland and Singer Island. The littoral zone of such a lake is of fundamental ecological importance. It serves as a habitat for a wide variety of wildlife and serves to maintain water quality in the lake through uptake of nutrients by vegetation that thrives in the area. The natural condition of the area was markedly changed by the construction of State Road A-1-A. The highway separated the area, including what is now the Casetta and Harbor Point properties, to a large extent from the waters of Lake Worth. A culvert was constructed under the highway in the area of what is now the Harbor Point property. This culvert allowed tidal waters from Lake Worth to enter the area, and the area thus remained in a diminished fashion as a littoral zone of Lake Worth. Sometime between 1953 and 1964, landowners in the area constructed dikes which appear to have served as driveways along their northern and southern boundaries. Fill was placed on the Harbor Point property so that a pond was created in its present approximate configuration. The Harbor Point condominium facilities are presently in part set on the filled land. The Harbor Point pond remained connected with the waters of Lake Worth through the culvert system. The Harbor Point pond thus remains subject to tidal influences from Lake Worth. It is an estuarine system which serves as a part of the littoral zone of Lake Worth. The driveway to the condominium, however, completely Separated the Casetta pond from direct interaction with the waters of Lake Worthy. The Casetta pond is presently in an approximately rectangular configuration. Probably as a result of groundwater interaction, it is affected in a minimal manner by tidal influences in Lake Worth. The Casetta pond receives water from runoff and from groundwater interaction. It has become a freshwater body. While the Casetta pond is no longer a direct part of the Lake Worth estuarine system, and while it is by no means in its natural condition, it remains a wetland ecosystem. The pond is surrounded by mangrove communities. There is considerable biologic activity. Many bird species roost in the mangroves and feed in the pond. The mangroves provide shelter for aquatic organisms which are a food source for the birds. The pond does not support a wide diversity of marine plants or animals. A single species of minnow, mosquito fish, exists in substantial quantities These serve as a food source for birds including ducks, herons, egrets, and kingfishers It appears that the Casetta pond has been used in the past as a borrow pit to obtain fill for adjoining properties trenches, which are as much as six feet in depth, have been dug along the northern, southern, and eastern perimeters and across the pond. Because it is cut off from Lake Worth, and because of the ditches that have been cut through it, the Casetta pond is in a very deteriorated condition. While healthy mangroves surround the pond, they are, except to the west, extremely narrow populations due to the sharp banks that have been caused by dredging activity. The mangroves have no room to expand their population and are stressed due to invasion of upland vegetation such as Brazilian pepper. Widgeon grass exists in the lake bottom. Algae, however, has become the dominant vegetation in the pond. From 80 to 90 percent of the pond's bottom is covered by a mat of algae that ranges up to five and one-half inches in thickness. The algae population is increasing rapidly. Widgeon grass populations are being choked off by the algae. Dissolved oxygen levels in the Casetta pond are consistently low, below standards set in the rules of the Department. The oxygen demand of the algae community has depleted dissolved oxygen levels. While the Casetta pond functions as a wetland community, its values are severely reduced, and it appears that water quality in the pond is likely to continue to deteriorate. While by no means in a natural condition, the Harbor Point pond continues to function as a viable part of Lake Worth. This is a result of the pond being connected to the lake through the culvert system. The edges of the pond are populated by mangrove and cord grass communities. Marine species such as mullet are easily observable. Wading birds roost in surrounding vegetation and feed in the pond. The Harbor Point pond is basically a shallow, tidal water body. Water quality in the Harbor Point pond basically mirrors water quality in areas of Lake Worth to the west of Highway A-1-A. The Harbor Point pond has an eastern and western lobe connected by a narrower area, forming an approximate hourglass configuration. The eastern lobe is farthest from the connection to Lake Worth. Water quality in the eastern lobe is generally poorer than water quality in the western lobe and in Lake Worth. The deepest portion of the Harbor Point pond is in the eastern lobe. Wind action cannot serve to fully flush the waters of this area because of its relative isolation from the western lobe. Runoff from the Harbor Point condominium to the east of the pond and from a fire station parking lot to the west enters directly into the Harbor Point pond. It is filtered only by the action of grasses over which it flows. There is no ex-filtration drainage system. The culvert which connects the Harbor Point pond with Lake Worth runs from the western lobe of the pond under Highway A-1-A into Lake Worth. Lake Worth is a Class III water body under the Department's rules. The Parties' Proposals 1. The Casetta Application Casetta is proposing to construct a high-rise condominium on the eastern portion of its property. There is insufficient land on the property as it is presently configured to accommodate needed parking spaces. Casetta proposes to fill in 1.8 acres, or approximately 60 percent of the Casetta pond in order to construct parking facilities. Casetta has proposed to construct a culvert system that would connect the remaining portion of the pond with Lake Worth. The remaining portion of the pond would be regraded and configured. The northern and western boundaries would remain basically in their present configuration The remainder of the pond would be completely modified. A meandering shoreline would be created for an "L"- shaped pond. The bottom would be recontoured so that broader, shallow areas along the shoreline would be created. With the culvert system installed, the reconfigured pond would receive tidal waters from Lake Worth. The pond would effectively become, as the entire area once was, a portion of the littoral zone of Lake Worth. With the meandering shoreline and a gradually sloping bottom, the reconfigured pond would have as much area for littoral zone vegetation to establish itself as the present pond. Casetta proposes to commence construction activities by filling in a portion of the pond and regrading the remainder. The pond would be drained so that the algae that presently exists in large quantities would die and be removed. Clear fill material would be used to grade the pond. An exfiltration system would be created so that runoff that would reach the pond from upland areas would be filtered before it could enter the pond, thus reducing the impact of pollutants from upland runoff. The proposed culvert system would be in three sections. There would be a 35-foot section leading from the pond and slanting gradually downward to a point approximately eight to nine feet under Highway A- 1-A. The second section would be 110 feet long, lying vertically under Highway A-1-A. The third section would be 95 feet long, gradually rising from the second section to the bottom of Lake Worth. The bottoms of the open ends of the culvert in the Casetta pond and in Lake Worth would be at the ordinary low-tide marks. The top would be below the ordinary high-tide marks. Thus, the culvert openings would be exposed at low tide and submerged at high tide. The portion of the culvert under A-1-A would be filled with water at all times. It is necessary to place the culvert at least eight feet under Highway A-1-A in order to avoid utility pipes and cables that lie under the highway. The portion of the pipe under A-1-A would be installed through a boring technique known as "jack and bore." This technique would obviate any need for the closing of traffic on Highway A-1-A. The portion of the culvert in the Casetta pond and in Lake Worth would be installed by digging trenches, laying the pipe, then filling the trenches. Two openings would be made in the pipe at either end of the deep sections. These would be "manhole-type openings that would allow for periodic maintenance. Installation of the portion of the pipe in Lake Worth would be accomplished by building a work platform into the lake from material that is dredged from the trench. Once the pipe is laid, the material from the work platform would be placed back on top of the culvert, and any extra material would be removed from the site. Turbidity screens would be used to surround the project to reduce the short-term impacts of turbidity caused by construction. Once the pond is reconfigured and the culvert is installed, tidal flows would be introduced to the reconfigured pond on a gradual basis in order to observe any problems that might result. Shoreline grasses such as cord grass would be introduced in the shallow areas, and mangroves removed during filling operations would be replanted along the shoreline. This would serve to stabilize the shoreline and to provide the beneficial effects of littoral zone vegetation, including wildlife habitat and water quality benefits. The reconfigured Casetta pond would be approximately 33,000 square feet in area. If the culvert system functions as proposed, the reconfigured pond would become a part of Lake Worth. There are environmental and ecological advantages and disadvantages to the proposal. The disadvantages are rather obvious. One and eight-tenths acres of wetland habitat would be eliminated. While the present Casetta pond is only a marginally valuable wetland, it is not without its beneficent effects as have been described above. Furthermore, during construction, the habitat values of the Casetta pond would be lost, and short-term deleterious water quality impacts would occur in Lake Worth. There are trade-offs. The proposed filling, regrading, and connecting of the ponds to Lake Worth could have substantial positive impacts. The most apparent of these is that Lake Worth would regain 33,000 square feet of littoral zone. Construction activities have removed as much as 75 percent of the Shoreline vegetation that once Surrounded Lake Worth. The littoral zone has been replaced with developments that in ecological terms have negative impacts. Reconnecting the ponds to Lake Worth would be a slight reversal of that trend. Habitat for marine species would be increased, and the "kidney effect" that shoreline vegetation provides would be reestablished. Except during construction, Casetta's proposal would have no adverse water quality impacts upon surrounding waters. Adverse impacts during construction would be minimized by protective techniques that Casetta has proposed, including the use of turbidity screens. Long-term water quality impacts of the proposed project would be positive. Water in the present Casetta pond is of poor quality. The pond does not presently serve any water quality function for Lake Worth, since it is not connected to Lake Worth. Connecting the reconfigured pond to Lake Worth would allow waters from the lake to be purified through nutrient uptake by littoral zone vegetation. In habitat terms, the filling would reduce the total area of wetland habitat. The quality of the habitat would, however, be vastly improved. Rather than an unnatural, stagnant pond which provides habitat for only a few varieties of very common freshwater minnows, a marine habitat would be provided for all manner of creatures that survive in the littoral zone of estuarine water bodies. Bird habitats would not be reduced, since the shoreline of the lake would not be lessened. Thus, while the Casetta proposal would reduce the total size of wetland habitat, it would vastly improve it and would not have a detrimental effect that would be contrary to the public interest. In order for the reconfigured Casetta pond to offer an improved wetland habitat and a positive water quality impact for Lake Worth, it is essential that the proposed culvert system functions so as to allow an unimpeded interchange of water between the reconfigured pond and Lake Worth. If the culvert system does not operate, the result of the proposed project would be merely to lessen wetland habitat. Rather than a three-acre unnatural wetland habitat, there would be a 1.2-acre unnatural wetland habitat. Such an adverse impact upon wildlife habitat would be clearly contrary to the public interest. Furthermore, limited exchange of water between a eutrophic pond and Lake Worth could have an adverse impact upon water quality in Lake Worth so as to result in violations of the Department's water quality standards along the border of Lake Worth. The evidence does not establish that the proposed culvert system will properly function. Casetta had proposed a 36-inch culvert. Robert Snyder, a consulting engineer, was retained to determine the flushing characteristics of the culvert. Snyder calculated that maximum velocities associated with mean or average tides through the culvert system would be 1.89 cubic feet per second. Snyder calculated that this exchange rate would be sufficient to flush sediment and debris that would collect in the culvert. Thus, the culvert would be self- cleaning with only limited maintenance required to keep it open. In calculating the exchange rate, Snyder utilized the wrong formula. He overestimated the exchange rate by a factor of two. If the rate estimated by Snyder is reduced by a factor of two, it is apparent, that the exchange rate would not be sufficient to flush the culvert. Sediment and debris would collect in the pond, and rather regular maintenance would be required. Mechanical means can be utilized to clean a clogged culvert. A culvert of the length and configuration proposed by Casetta is difficult to clean through mechanical processes, however, and the processes themselves increase turbidity in the area. The evidence does not establish that regular maintenance would be sufficient to keep the culvert free of sediment and debris so that there would be a free exchange of water between Lake Worth and the reconfigured pond. When engineer Snyder was made aware of his miscalculations, he proposed reducing the size of the culvert to 24 inches. He testified that this would adequately increase the exchange rate so that the culvert would be selfmaintaining. Snyder's testimony in this regard has not been deemed credible. Given the witness's use of an erroneous formula in calculating exchange rates and another error that he admitted making in calculating scour potential, the witness cannot be considered competent to give expert testimony in these areas. If the culvert system proposed by Casetta allowed for the free exchange of waters between Lake Worth and the reconfigured Casetta pond, the water quality and habitat impacts of the proposed Casetta project would be, on balance, positive. The evidence does not, however, establish that the culvert system would function. It appears likely that the culvert system as proposed would be frequently clogged with sediment and debris, thus preventing the exchange of waters between the reconfigured pond and Lake Worth. The result of the proposed project would therefore be a reduction of wildlife habitat with potentially adverse water quality impacts upon the waters of Lake Worth. 2. The Harbor Point Proposal Harbor Point has proposed to install a culvert system that would connect the Casetta pond in its present configuration with the Harbor Point pond. Since the Harbor Point pond is connected through a culvert system with Lake Worth, the Harbor Point proposal would result in opening the Casetta pond to tidal influences from Lake Worth. Harbor Point has presented no evidence as to construction techniques that would be utilized and has provided no assurance that the construction itself would not result in water quality violations in the Harbor Point pond and in Lake Worth. Opening the Casetta pond in its present configuration to tidal influences would have the positive impact of allowing an exchange of water from the Casetta pond. Water quality in the Casetta pond would inevitably be improved. Given the configuration of the bottom of the Casetta pond, with its deep troughs, a complete exchange of waters would not occur, and water quality in the Casetta pond would be likely to remain poor, albeit improved. The Harbor Point proposal would have short-term and long-term negative impacts upon water quality in the Harbor Point pond and in Lake Worth. Simply opening the Harbor Point pond and Lake Worth to exchange of poor-quality water with the Casetta pond would have a negative impact. As water quality in the Casetta pond improves, this impact will be lessened, but will remain. Furthermore, the proposed culvert would result in poorer flushing of the waters from the eastern extremity of the Harbor Point pond. This would occur as a result of increased water velocities in the western extremity. Water quality in the eastern extremity of the Harbor Point pond is already stressed, and reducing the flushing characteristics of the pond would be likely to result in violations of the Department's water quality standards in the eastern portion of the Harbor Point pond. While the Harbor Point proposal would have the ecologically positive impact of opening the Casetta pond to tidal flows, it would have the negative impacts of reducing water quality in the Harbor Point pond and potentially along the shoreline of Lake Worth. Water quality in the Casetta pond would thus be improved at the expense of water quality in the Harbor Point pond and in Lake Worth. Riparian Rights Harbor Point owns a narrow fringe of the northern border of the Casetta pond. The precise amount of the Casetta pond that is owned by Harbor Point cannot be determined from the evidence, but it is clear that Harbor Point owns some portion of the Casetta pond which may be at one point as much as six feet of the northern portion of the pond. The Casetta pond offers minimal amenity to Harbor Point. The pond is unsuitable for boating, bathing, swimming, or any commercial enterprise. The pond is largely blocked from view by Harbor Point residents by abundant mangrove and upland vegetation. Reconfiguration of the pond as proposed by Casetta would not change the northern boundary of the pond, and it would remain largely blocked from view by Harbor Point residents. To the extent that the Casetta pond provides a view for Harbor Point residents, it is only minimally attractive given the configuration of the pond and given the fact that a high-rise condominium has been constructed on property to the south of the pond. There is no evidence in the record from which it could be concluded that the value of Harbor Point property would be in any way reduced as a result of the projects proposed by Casetta.

Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.60253.77403.087403.088
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CHARLES W. AND BRENDA N. WALTER vs CITY OF CLEARWATER AND ANTONIOS MARKOPOULOS, 93-007068 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida Dec. 13, 1993 Number: 93-007068 Latest Update: Apr. 06, 1994

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the evidence sustains the decision of the City of Clearwater Development Code Adjustment Board (the Board) to grant the application of the Appellant, the City of Clearwater for dock length, width and setback variances to allow the reconstruction of the public pier facility located at the west end of Magnolia Drive in Clearwater, Florida. (The pier was destroyed by the "No Name Storm of the Century" on March 12-13, 1993.)

Findings Of Fact On or about September 1, 1993, the City of Clearwater applied to the City of Clearwater Development Code Adjustment Board (the Board) for dock length, width and setback variances to reconstruct the public pier facility located at the west end of Magnolia Drive in Clearwater, Florida, where it terminates at the waterfront in an "aquatic lands/coastal zoning district." The pier was 91.5 feet in length and 40 feet in width; it was set back 12.5 feet from the extension of the adjacent property lines. It was destroyed by the "No Name Storm of the Century" on March 12-13, 1993. Since the site has 65 feet of waterfront, reconstructing it to its previous dimensions requires variances of: (1) 59 feet in dock length (over the 32.5 feet allowed by the City of Clearwater Development Code); (2) 17.25 feet in dock width (over the 22.75 feet allowed by the Code); and (3) 7.5 feet reduction in setback from the extended adjacent property lines (below the 20 feet required by the Code.) Before its destruction, the public pier at the west end of Magnolia Drive in Clearwater had been in existence for many years. (The original version was built in approximately 1915.) The evidence is that the community at large desires to reconstruct the pier to its former dimensions. The old pier has historic and sentimental significance. It also serves as a recreational facility for residents without private access to a dock on the waterfront. Especially in the last several years before its destruction, public use of the old pier brought with it problems of misuse, loitering, litter, noise, trespassing, and crime. The police did not have the resources to prevent these problems. Criminal activity in the area seems to have decreased since the destruction of the old pier. As a result, the property owners closest to the pier do not want the public pier reconstructed at all, and certainly do not want it reconstructed to its former dimensions. They oppose the variance application. The conditions imposed by the Board (no deviation from the proposed materials and building plan, the erection of signs as to closing times to be enforced by the police, proper lighting, and the installation of an electronic safety system, including a gate, to be monitored by the police) will help alleviate many of the concerns of the neighboring property owners but are not guaranteed to eliminate them in their entirety. The water is shallow in the vicinity of the site, and a dock of a certain length is necessary for the dock to be used for boats of any appreciable size and draft. However, this condition is not unique to the particular site in question, but is uniformly applicable all along the City waterfront, and there was no evidence as to the length of dock required for adequate water depth for use by boats. There is no competent, substantial evidence in the record from which it could be found that the granting of the variances will not be materially detrimental or injurious to other property or improvements in the neighborhood in which the property is located. There is no competent, substantial evidence in the record from which it could be found that the granting of the variance will not impair the value of surrounding property.

Florida Laws (1) 17.25
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JOHN PAUL GALLANT vs. CITY OF CLEARWATER AND ANTONIOS MARKOPOULOS, 88-004968 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-004968 Latest Update: Jan. 05, 1989

Findings Of Fact On or about April 5, 1988, Petitioner filed an application for a variance to replace an existing four foot fence extending to the seawall on his property at 643 Harbor Island, Lot 12 Island Estates, Clearwater, Florida. The subject property is zoned RS-6. Petitioner had already replaced his previous fencing prior to the filing of this application with wooden fencing which extends on the north and south side of his property through the setback to the seawall. The Development Code Adjustment Board considered Petitioner's application at its meeting on May 12, 1988, and based upon the Petitioner's explanation that the variance was sought simply to replace an existing fence that had termite damage, the Board approved his application on a 3 to 2 vote. The variance approval was conditioned upon the Petitioner obtaining a building permit within one month of the approval. Petitioner failed to obtain the required building permit, and no excuse was offered for this failure. Therefore, he had to reapply for the variance. On or about July 21, 1988, Petitioner filed his variance reapplication. The Development Code Adjustment Board considered this reapplication on August 25, 1988, at which time Petitioner again stated that he was simply replacing an existing fence. Due to a tie vote, consideration of the reapplication was continued to the Board's meeting of September 8, 1988. At the meeting on September 8, he explained for the first time that while the fencing on the south side of his property was simply the replacement of a previous fence which had extended to the seawall, the fencing on the north side was not. The previous fence on the north side of his property had stopped prior to the fifteen foot setback. With this clarification, the Board approved his variance reapplication for the south side of his property, but denied the variance for the north side. Petitioner has timely appealed the denial of his variance reapplication as it relates to the north side of his property. Petitioner testified at hearing that prior to the construction of his current wooden fence, he had a wood fence all the way to the seawall on the south side of his property. Since he had to replace that fencing due to termite damage, he took the opportunity to also replace and extend the wooden fencing on the northern side of his property through the setback. This action was not based on any hardship, but simply because he and his family felt it would look better if he had the same fencing on both sides of his property. It is clear and undisputed that Petitioner constructed a new fence on the north side of his property through the setback without obtaining a variance or permit. He did this simply for aesthetic reasons, and not due to any hardship. He failed to disclose this in his applications, or when the Board met on May 12 and August 25, 1988 to consider this matter.

Florida Laws (1) 120.65
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SARASOTA COUNTY vs DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 90-003533 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Jun. 06, 1990 Number: 90-003533 Latest Update: Feb. 19, 1991

Findings Of Fact Sarasota County and MPS both filed extensive exceptions to the Recommended Order. I have grouped these exceptions according to the following issues: Manatee Protection, Turtle Nesting impacts, Fisheries impacts, Seagrass impacts, Wetlands Impacted, Water Quality Improvement, Public interest Balancing Test, Miscellaneous Exceptions, Requests For Additional Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law. I shall discuss and rule on each exception by the above groupings. 1. Manatee Protection Sarasota County Exception Number 1 and MPS Exception Numbers 6 and 8 are directed to the issue of adverse affects on the West Indian Manatee. Sarasota County and MPS take exception to Finding of Fact ("FOF") No. 24, claiming that there is no competent substantial evidence in the record to support the finding that it is anticipated that increased motorboat traffic in the pass vicinity would be an increased potential danger to manatees. MPS additionally takes exception to the finding in FOF No. 29 that maintenance dredging will entail a danger to manatees similar to that during the construction phase. At the outset, I note that where a Hearing Officer's finding of fact is supported in the record by any competent, substantial evidence I am not permitted to reweigh the evidence and reject the finding of fact. See, e.g., Florida Debt. of Corrections v. Bradley, 510 So.2d 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Section 120.57(1)(b)1O., Florida Statutes. In this case the record does contain competent substantial evidence supporting FOF Nos. 24 and 29. The Hearing Officer's finding that increased motorboat traffic is an expected result of opening of the pass is not disputed. FOF No. 34. The area is designated as a critical habitat for the West Indian Manatee. FOF No. 22. The prefiled testimony of Ms. Kimberly A. Dryden states that "[a]n increase in boat/manate collisions associated with increased boat presence in the pass may occur." Dryden, PF-11. Ms. Dryden was admitted as an expert in wildlife biology including expertise in manatees, and her prefiled testimony was accepted into evidence. TR-756-760. Finally, the fact that Sarasota County itself proposed a manatee protection plan involving, among other things, that all project vessels operate at "no wake" speeds, supports the finding that increased motorboat traffic in the pass vicinity would be an increased potential danger to manatees. Sarasota County and MPS point to the public notice of the U.S Army Corps of Engineers (Hearing Exhibit 26) and a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service letter (Hearing Exhibit 27) as overwhelming evidence that no adverse effect on the manatee is expected. In essence, Sarasota County and MPS are asking me to reweigh the competent, substantial evidence. As noted above, I may not lawfully do that. The parties do not dispute the Hearing Officer's finding that maintenance dredging is expected to be needed as long as the inlet remains open. FOF No. 21. For the reasons set forth above, the Hearing Officer's finding that maintenance dredging will present a danger to manatees similar to the construction is supported in the record by competent substantial evidence. Sarasota County and MPS also assert that FOF No. 24 must be rejected because it is contrary to a stipulation of fact by the parties. Indeed, the record shows that a prehearing stipulation was filed and accepted into the record without objection at the hearing. TR-8. Stipulation of Fact No. 24 states: With the implementation of recommendations of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, it is not expected that the project will have a significant adverse impact on the manatee or its habitat. Steven Sauers, Director of the Coastal Zone Division for Sarasota County, testified that he believed the County "could adhere to these [U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service] recommendations under a condition of authorization." TR-94-98. I note that when the prefiled testimony of Ms. Dryden was accepted into evidence at the hearing, neither Sarasota County nor MPS objected to those portions dealing with manatee impacts as being contrary to Stipulation of Fact No. 24. I must therefore consider whether the failure to object constitutes a waiver of the stipulation, and whether the Hearing Officer, as the ultimate finder of the facts, is bound by a stipulation of fact when the record contains competent, substantial evidence which conflicts with the stipulation. It has long been the eablished rule of law that stipulations of fact properly entered into are binding on both the parties and the court. See, e.g., Troup v. Bird, 53 So.2d 717, 721 (Fla. 1951) (where case is tried on stipulation, no further or different facts will be presumed to exist). Where a party seeks to be relieved from a stipulation, he or she generally must file a timely motion, with notice to opposing parties, showing good cause and no prejudice to opposing parties. U.S. Fire insurance Co. v. Roberts, 541 So.2d 1297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Lopez v. Dublin Co., 489 So.2d 805, 807 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Munilla v. Perez-Cobo, 335 So.2d 584 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. den., 344 So.2d 325 (Fla. 1977); Villa v. Mumac Construction Corp., 334 So.2d 274 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Curr v. Helene TransportatIon, 287 So.2d 695 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). Good cause requires showing of fraud, overreaching, misrepresentation, withholding of facts by the adversary party, or such other element as would render the agreement void. Spitzer v. Bartlett Brothers Roof in, 437 So.2d 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Citv of Vero Beach v. Thomas, 388 So.2d 1374 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). In this case, neither the Department nor the Respondent Intervenors sought to be relieved from the stipulation, and there is no contention that any basis for good cause exits to be relieved from the stipulation. However, it is also a long established rule of law that failure to contemporaneously object to the admission of contested evidence is a waiver of the right to object. See, e.g., Swan v. Florida Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 404 So.2d 802 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); DeLuca v. State, 384 So.2d 212 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), rev. den., 389 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 1980); Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, Section 104.1 (2d Ed 1984); Section 90.104, Florida Statutes. in this case the testimony which conflicts with the stipulation was pre-filed before the hearing and the opposing parties had ample opportunity to review it before the hearing. Yet, although Sarasota County did raise objections to certain portions of Ms. Dryden's pre- filed testimony, no objection was raised to the portion relevant to impacts on manatees. TR-754-760. There is also authority for the proposition that when evidence contrary to a stipulation is introduced at trial without objection, the finder of fact is not bound by the stipulation. Special Disability Trust Fund v. Myers, 492 So.2d 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), cause dism'd, 491 So.2d 280 (Fla. 1986); Espada Enterprises Inc. v. Spiro, 481 So.2d 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Woods v. Greater Naples Care Center, 406 So.2d 1172, 1173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), rev. den., 413 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1982). In consideration of the above authorities and circumstances, I conclude that the Hearing Officer was not bound by the stipulation and could properly consider the relevant portion of Ms. Dryden's pre-filed testimony. Therefore the record contains competent, substantial evidence in support of the above findings of fact. Accordingly, the above noted exceptions of Sarasota County and MPS are denied. Turtle Nesting Impacts Sarasota County Exception No. 2 and MPS Exception No. 7 dispute FOF No. 26, which states that: "Once dredged, the beach area in the pass vicinity would be permanently lost for the purpose of turtle nesting." Sarasota County and MPS argue that although a portion of the beach will be removed to create the inlet, the loss of beach will not significantly impact on turtle nesting. Sarasota County and MPS contend that the "overwhelming weight" of the evidence is contrary to FOF No. 26. They are in essence asking me to reweigh the evidence. For the reasons stated above, I cannot do so. If the finding of fact is supported in the record by any competent, substantial evidence, then I am not at liberty to reject it. Florida Department of Corrections, supra; Section 120.57(1) (b)10., Florida Statutes. Ms. Belinda Perry, Projects Coordinator in the Coastal Zone Division of Natural Resources of the Sarasota County Natural Resources Department, testified that she had maintained records of sea turtle nests in the vicinity of Midnight Pass. She testified that on the average over the last eight years there have been four nests per year in the area that the new inlet at Midnight Pass will be located. Perry, TR-537-538; Perry PF-2, 5, 8. This is competent, substantial evidence of an adverse impact on the nesting habitat of sea turtles. Sarasota County and MPS argue that this impact is not "Significant." If I were to consider the "significance" of the loss of 4 nests per year for the purpose of accepting or rejecting FOF No. - 26, I would in effect be weighing that evidence. This I may not do. If the finding of fact is supported in the record by any competent, substantial evidence I may not reject it. Although not articulated, Sarasota County and MPS may be arguing that when evidence which supports a finding of an adverse impact on an endangered or threatened species is "not significant," then such evidence or finding of fact cannot be considered when weighing the seven factors set forth in the public interest balancing test of Section 403.918(2) (a), Florida Statutes. I reject any such argument as contrary to the law. Neither the statute nor any authority requires a minimum threshold weight for any of the factors. The statute merely requires the Department to "consider and balance" the seven criteria. For the foregoing reasons, Sarasota County's Exception No. 2 and MPS's Exception No. 7 are rejected. Fisheries Impacts Sarasota County Exception No. 4 and MPS Exception No. 10 challenge that part of FOF No.-3- that states "the flushing and arrival of predator fishes will adversely affect the nursery habitat now enjoyed by the fish community currently within the LSB." (emphasis added) Sarasota County and MPS contend that this finding is unsupported by any competent substantial evidence in the record. I disagree. Robert L. Stetler, Environmental Administrator, Wetlands Resource Management for the Department's Southwest District testified as follows: Q. What impact on fisheries does the present, i.e., closed condition of the Midnight Pass area have? A. Current conditions in the backwater area of Midnicht Pass as mentioned Before, as quiescent in nature. This influences the fisheries utilization to the competitive advantage of the smaller species and of the early life stages of many of the larger pelagic fish species. The additional cover afforded by seagrass communities and the very shallow water nature of large portions of the site tend to limit successful predation on the smaller specimens. The periphyton communities associated with shallow water areas and seagrass beds also provide large quantities of food to the smaller or younger fish. The conditions now found at Midnight Pass enable it to be classified as a nursery area because they perform the functions of feeding and protecting the early life stages of numerous fish species. Nursery areas like the pass region have been identified as essential to the maintenance of healthy, well balanced fish populations. Q. Does a quiescent estuarine zone provide any particilar benefit to commercially important fish species? A. Under the estuarine conditions, water quality also contributes to the success and/or failure of certain fish species. Many of the estuarine dependent fish species have life histories that include spawning in or near the marine environment and the mitigation [sic] of the larval forms into areas of lower salinity, sometimes lower dissolved oxygen and, in the summer months, often very high water temperatures. These harsh conditions are tolerable to a early life stages of several commercially important fish species and further protects them from predation by adult piscivorous (fish eating) fish that cannot tolerate these conditions. Some of the important commercial species exhibiting this life cycle are the Tarpon, Spotted Seatrout, Redfish, Mangrove snapper, Sheepshead and Mullet. Q. What, in your opinion, would be the overall impact to fisheries resources from the opening of Midnight Pass? A. The overall impact of the project to fisheries would be significant. Reactivating an inlet would produce conditions conducive and reintroducing larger, motile, pelagic fishes into the area. increased flushing would likely occur resulting in increased salinities, higher energy conditions from waye and tidal action. The recreational fishery would probably produce more larger fish utilizing the pass as a migratory, spawning and feeding site. However, the direct impact of the project would also result in the loss of significant portions of the nursery habitat previously described. Q. in your opinion, would opening Midnight Pass be in the public interest from a fisheries standpoint? A. No. Q. Why not? A. The expected physical damages associated with reopening the pass -- increased water depths, destabilization of the substrate by tide and wave energy and destruction of existing shallow water habitat will eliminate or significantly change the habitat characteristics and water guality conditions essential to the early life stages of many fish species. Loss of nursery habitat has been a long-term trend to Tampa and Sarasota Bay due to past dredge and fill activities and increased development. This long-term loss results in a need to classify remaining nursery areas, like Midnight Pass, as critical habitat warranting special protection. (emphasis added) Stetler PF-11-13. This prefiled testimony was accepted into evidence. TR-836, 839. When read in its entirely it clearly provides competent, substantial evidence to support the above finding of fact. Mr. Stetler testified that the existing nature of LSB provides a nursery for certain fishes that in the early stages of their life take advantage of areas of lower salinity, sometimes lower dissolved oxygen and, in the summer months, often very high water temperatures. Such harsh conditions protect them from predation by adult fish that cannot tolerate such conditions. He further testified that reopening Midnight Pass would result in increased flushing, increased salinity, and the loss of significant portions of the above characteristics with a consequent loss of significant portions of the nursery habitat. This testimony is competent, substantial evidence supporting FOF No. 32. Therefore, i may not disturb this finding of fact. Accordingly, the above noted exceptions are rejected. Seagrass Impacts Loss of Seagrass Sarasota County Exception No. 5 and MPS Exceptions Nos. 10 and 11 take exception to the Hearing Officer's finding that the submerged areas of LSB in the vicinity of the inlet are vegetated with seagrasses (including shoalgrass, turtle grass, manatee grass, and halophila), and that a significant portion of these grasses will be dredged if the proposed project is implemented. FOF No. 33. The Hearing Officer also found that the dredged seagrass areas will no longer serve as a nursery to young fishes. FOF No. 34. Sarasota County and MPS contend that only 10 acres of seagrasses will be dredged, and that the evidence shows that reopening Midnight Pass will cause more dense growth of seagrasses in those areas not dredged. Sarasota County and MPS also contend that the Hearing Officer erred in concluding that all four of the above noted types of seagrasses would be lost. The gist of Sarasota County's and MPS's argument is that the loss of ten acres of seagrss is less than 10% of the total seagrass acreage in the project area, and therefore is not significant. Sarasota County and MPS further argue that even if the loss of 10 acres of seagrass was significant, it would only be a temporary loss because the opening of Midnight Pass would result in greater seagrass growth, density, and diversity in those areas not dredged. Neither Sarasota County nor MPS take exception to the finding that l0 acres of seagrasses will be dredged, and that, due to the depth of the channel to be dredged, seagrasses would not be expected to reseed or colonize in the deep channel cuts. FOF No. 34; Prehearing Stipulation of Fact No. 22. The record contains competent, substantial evidence that in the vicinity of the project there are 108 acres of seagrasses. Lewis, PF-6 (accepted into evidence TR-425-436). A loss of ten acres of seagrasses would be a loss of more than 9% of the total acreage in the vicinity of the project. A loss of seagrass can have an adverse impact on a fish nursery. Leiby TR-507, 509-510. I reject any suggestion that such a loss is not significant. MPS and Sarasota County contend that there will be no net loss of seagrass because the loss of the ten acres will be offset by increased growth, density, and diversity of seagrasses in the areas not dredged. in asking me to reject the above noted findings, Sarata County and MPS are in effect asking me to weigh the evidence of the impact of the loss of ten acres against the evidence that increased growth, density, and diversity of the seagrasses elsewhere will soon offset any reduction in nursery value to young fishes. When I rule on exceptions to findings of fact I cannot reweigh the evidence. If the record contains any competent, substantial evidence to support the finding, I must accept it. Finally, as to issue of the types of seagrasses present, the record contains competent, substantial evidence that all four of the species mentioned in the finding of fact are found in the project area to be dredged. Stetler PF- 6, TR-843-845; Wilber PF-33, TR-908-915; Dryden PF-5-7; Prehearing Stipulation of Fact No. 21. For all of the reasons set forth above, i reject the exceptions of Sarasota County and MPS. Propeller Dredging of Seagrass Sarasota County Exception No. 6 and MPS Exception No. 12 take exception to the Hearing Officer's finding that "increase motorboat traffic which is an expected result of the pass reopening, would also limit grasses from re- establishing in shallower areas due to damage caused by propellers." FOF No. 34. Sarasota County and MPS do not dispute that opening - Midnight Pass will increase motoboat traffic in LSB. Dr. Wilber testified that the "foreseeable increased boat utilization, especially by large boats will increase seagrass bed damage through prop dredging . . . ." Wilber PF-31. There being competent, substantial evidence in the record supporting the above finding, the exceptions of Sarasota County and MPS are denied. Wading Bird Habitat Impacts Sarasota County Exception No. 5 takes exception to the Hearing Officer's finding that "the grassy flats will no longer be available to the numerous species of wading birds which frequent the areas since the closure of the pass." FOF No. 33. Ms. Dryden testified that wading birds now use the shallow tidal flats and mud flats which are proposed to be removed. Dryden PF-4-8, 10-11. Mr. G. Jeffery Churchill testified that, as a result of the project, approximately 9 acres of wading bird feeding habitat would be lost. Churchill PF-16-17, TR- 485-487. The record contains competent, substantial evidence supporting the above finding. Therefore, Sarasota County's exception is denied. Wetlands Impacted Sarasota County Exception No. 6 and MPS Exceptions Nos. 5 and 12 take exception to the finding that the dredging proposed by the County would eliminate at least 50 acres of wetlands. FOF Nos. 17 and 34. Sarasota County and MPS contend that only 1.1 - 1.3 acres of vegetated wetlands will be lost. This contention appears to be based on the assertion that submerged lands are not "wetlands" within the meaning of Sections 403.91 - .929, Florida Statutes. I reject Sarasota County's and MPS's narrow construction of the meaning of jurisdictional wetlands. Section 403.912(1) sets forth the powers and duties of the Department in permitting activities in wetlands, including activities "in waters to their landward extent . . ." (emphasis added). The term "waters" includes "rivers, lakes, streams, springs, impoundments and all other waters or bodies of water, including fresh, brackish, saline, tidal, surface, or underground waters." Section 403.031(12), Florida Statutes. the term "wetlands" therefore is inclusive of surface bodies of waters up to and including the limit of the Department's jurisdiction as established by Section 403.817, Florida Statutes and Rule 17-301, F.A.C. Dr. Wilber testified that the project would dredge 43.8 acres for the two access channels, 3.6 acres for the sediment basin, and 7.5 acres of jurisdictional wetlands for the inlet channel. Wilber PF-5-6. Dr. Wilber further testified that habitat within the proposed channels consisted of valuable biological communities of a natural character that would be severely disrupted or eliminated if the project were permitted. Wilber PF-9. The record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the above finding. The exceptions of Sarasota County and MPS are rejected. Water Quality Improvement Sarasota County Exception No. 7 and MPS Exception No. 14 take exception to the Hearing Officer's finding that "the water quality within LSB will not be significantly improved as a result of the reopening of the inlet. "FOF No. 38. it is contended that this finding is immaterial and irrelevant. These exceptions also challenge as irrelevant the Hearing Officer's finding that "it is impossible to conclude that marine environments serve a more useful purpose than estuarine systems." FOF No. 38. I agree that it is not required that the proposed project improve the water quality in LSB in order to be permittable. Permitting of a dredge and fill project in an Outstanding Florida Water requires that the applicant show that the project is clearly in the public interest, and that reasonable assurance has been provided that the project will not cause or contribute to violations of water quality standards, including a showing that the existing ambient water quality within the OFW will not be lowered as a result of the proposed activity. Section 403.918(1),(2), Florida Statutes; Rules 17-4.242(2) (a), 17-302.300, F.A.C. The applicant must also show that secondary impacts of the project, and cumulative impacts of reasonably foreseeable similar projects in the same geographical location will not result in violations of water quality standards, and will not result in the project being not clearly in the public interest. Conservancy, Inc. v. A. Vernon Allen Builder, Inc., No. 90-520 (Fla. 1st DCA, March 29, 1991); Caloosa Property Owners' Ass'n v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 462 So.2d 523 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Section 403.919, Florida Statutes. The analysis of secondary and cumulative impacts is not a third test; rather, it is a factor to be considered in determining whether reasonable assurance has been provided that the project will not result in violations of water quality standards, and that the project meets the applicable public interest test. Conservancy, Inc., supra; Peebles v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 12 FALR 1961 (DER, April 11, 1990); Concerned Citizens League of America v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 11 FALR 4237, 4246 (DER, March 29, 1989). if the applicant is unable to satisfy the applicable public interest test, the applicant may propose or accept measures to mitigate the adverse effects caused by the project. Section 403.918(2)(b), Florida Statutes. 4/ On the other hand, throughout these proceedings Sarasota County has attemptd to justify the project and show that it is clearly in the public interest by asserting the project will improve water quality in LSB. For example, at page 7 of Sarasota County's Proposed Recommended Order it states: Sarasota County has convincingly demonstrated that it meets the statutory criteria for approval of this project in this Outstanding Florida Water. The project will not degrade ambient water quality, and it will cause an improvement in water guality, not only in the immediate vicinity of the Pass but throughout Little Sarasota Bay. This improved water guality will in turn reap substantial benefits to the degraded marine habitat, the flora and fauna, commercial and recreational fishing and the public's general enjoyment and ability to use Little Sarasota Bay. (emphasis added) Similarly, Sarasota County stated in its opening argument at the hearing that: TR-14. We think that there has been a decline in water quality and it will continue to decline and it will continue to get worse. By reopening the pass, we think we can stop that decline. We think that there will be such considerable improvements to the bay to be clearly in the public interest. The Hearing Officer's finding is clearly relevant to Sarasota County's assertion that the claimed improvement in water quality will make or help make the project to be clearly in the public interest. Similarly, since the reopening of the pass will cause the reversion of LSB from an estuarine to a marine ecosystem, the Hearing Officer's finding on the failure to show that a marine ecosystem has a more useful environmental purpose is also, at least arguably, relevant to the public interest test. 5/ The record contains competent, substantial evidence which supports this finding. Nearhoof PF-8-12, TR-891-895; Wilber PF-17-18, TR-920-921. There being competent, substantial evidence to support the finding, I shall not reject it. The exceptions are there denied. Public Interest Balancing Test Sarasota County Exceptions Nos. 8 and 12, and MPS Exceptions Nos. 15 and 17, take exception to the Hearing Officer's finding that "the beneficial changes expected to result from the reopening of the pass do not offset the adverse affects reasonably expected to be caused by the dredging." FOF No. 39. Exception is also taken to FOF No. 43, which states that it was not established that the project is clearly in the public interest. The gist of these exceptions is that the balancing test is a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact. Even if that were so, the error in mislabeling would be harmless. Even though I agree that the ultimate determination of the public interest balancing test is a conclusion of law, I do not agree that predicate findings of ultimate facts are not appropriate. Florida Audubon Society v. Cullen, ER FALR 91:018 (DER, Sept. 27, 1990). The Hearing Officer's FOF Nos. 34 and 43 are predicate findings of ultimate facts sufficiently supported in other findings of fact for each of the seven criteria in the public interest balancing test of Section 403.918(2)(a), Florida Statutes. See for example: Department's Response To Request For Admission No. 17, and R.O. at 21 and 23, accepting MPS's proposed finding of fact- No. 74, and Sarasota County's proposed finding of fact No. 50 (project will not adversely affect public health, safety or welfare); (b) FOF Nos. 17, 22, 24-26, 29, and 32-35 (regarding conservation of fish and wildlife, etc.); FOF No. 36 and R.O. at 23, accepting MPS's proposed finding of fact Nos. 134 and 135 (regarding navigation, flow of water, erosion or shoaling); FOF Nos. 32 and 33 (regarding fishing recreational values or marine productivity); FOF No. 21, 29 and 37 (regarding temporary or permanent nature of project); FOF No. 28 (regarding historical and archaeological rsources); and FOF Nos. 30 and 38 (regarding current condition and relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by project). The exceptions are therefore rejected. Miscellaneous Exceptions Sarasota County Exception No. 9 Sarasota County Exception No. 9 contends that there is no competent, substantial evidence for the finding that the Department has not permitted the destruction of a habitat of this size without requiring extensive mitigation. FOF No. 40. Mr. Randall L. Armstrong, then Director of the Division of Water Management of the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, testified that he had worked at the Department since 1972, and that "[i]n my experience with the Department in issuing permits under those statutes (Sections 403.918-.919] the Department has never permitted the destruction of such a large area of viable habitat without requiring extensive mitigation." Armstrong PF-9, TR-1017. Sarasota County's reliance on the testimony of Mr. Lewis about lack of mitigation in a Key Biscayne project is misplaced since that project occurred before the enactment of the Henderson Wetlands Act in 1984. Lewis TR at 482. in any event, FOF No. 40 is supported in the record by competent, substantial evidence. The exception is denied. Sarasota County Exception No. 11 and MPS Exception No. 16 Sarasota County Exception No. 11 and MPS Exception No. 16 complain about FOF No. 42, yet do not dispute its correctness. The finding is a irrefutable finding that no mitigation is proposed for 10 acres of seagrasses which will be dredged. The exceptions are merely an assertion that mitigation is not necessary for the loss of seagrasses because additional seagrass will grow elsewhere. This contention was addressed above under the heading of Seagrass impacts. Furthermore, the Department has the ultimate authority to determine whether mitigation is required and, if so, whether the proposed mitigation is adequate. 1800 Atlantic Developers v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 522 So.2d. 946 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). The exceptions are rejected. Sarasota County Exception No. 3 Sarasota County's Exception No. 3 claims to take exception to FOF No. 29 but does not dispute any of the facts stated therein. The exception is rejected. MPS Exception No. 1 This exception quibbles over an immaterial issue of semantics in FOF No. 2, i.e., whether the project is to "dredge an inlet" or to "restore" the past inlet. The exception is rejected. MPS Exception No.2 MPS takes exception to FOF No. 4 which states that LSB was designated an Outstanding Florida Water. The gist of MPS's exception is that the Environmental Regulation Commission excluded Midnight Pass when LSB was designated as an OFW. Since "Midnight Pass" no longer existed as a body of water when LSB was designated an OFW on April 29, 1986, the exception is rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. MPS Exceptions No. 3 and 13 MPS takes exception to the Hearing Officer's finding in FOF No. 7 that prior to the closing of Midnight Pass the "beach along the northern stretch of Casey Key eroded badly." MPS also excepts to the finding that without beach renourishment the restoration will cause "harmful erosion" along Casey Key. FOF No. 37. MPS does not dispute the erosion; rather, MPS complains about the choice of words describing the degree of erosion. The choice of words is not material to the underlying validity of the finding. The exceptions are without merit and are rejected as immaterial. MPS Exception No. 9 MPS takes exception to FOF No. 30, contending that there is no support in the record for a finding that, as a result of the evolution of LSB from a marine to an estuarine system, LSB has a longer freshwater residence time. MPS is misreading FOF No. 30. It is clear that FOF No. 30, when properly read, states that as a result of the closure of the pass LSB has evolved from a marine to an estuarine system, and that this evolution is a consequence of the longer freshwater residence time which was caused by the closing of the inlet. This is supported in the record by competent, substantial evidence. Echernacht TR-707. MPS also takes exception to the finding that levels of dissolved oxygen and salinity within LSB are fairly typical for a healthy estuarine system. FOF No. 30. The record contains competent, substantial evidence to support this finding. Wilber PF-32. The exceptions are rejected. Requests For Additional Findings of Fact Sarasota -County Exceptions Nos. 3, 10, and 13 through 16, and MPS Exceptions Nos. 4 and 18 are in essence asking me to make additional findings of fact, or to accept proposed findings of fact which were rejected by the Hearing Officer. I may not lawfully make an independent determination of a disputed fact. Cohn v. Department of Professional Regulation, 477 So.2d 1039, 1047 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1985). Accord, Miller v. State, Department of Environmental Regulation, 504 So.2d 1325, 1327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). See also Manasota 88, Inc. v. Tremor, 545 So.2d 439 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Inverness Convalescent Center v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 512 So.2d 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Friends of Children v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 504 So.2d 1345 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). As to Sarasota County Exception No. 14, which requests a finding of fact that the project will not adversely affect the pubic health, safety and welfare, I note that the Hearing Officer accepted this finding of fact which was proposed in both paragraph 74 of MPS's proposed recommended order and in paragraph 50 of Sarasota .County's proposed recommended order. See R.O. at 21 and 23. Therefore, I consider the requested finding of fact to have already been made by the Hearing Officer. No additional finding is required of me. Sarasota County Exception No. 15 asks me to make specific additional findings of fact in relation to effects of the project on marine productivity. Sarasota County orrectly points out that a finding regarding whether the project will adversely affect marine productivity is needed to conduct the public interest balancing test of Section 403.918(2), Florida Statutes. However, I note that the Hearing Officer's FOF Nos. 32 and 33 are sufficient predicate findings for her to consider and weigh this criteria in the balancing test. Furthermore, the Hearing Officer has considered and ruled on Sarasota County's proposed findings related to marine productivity as set forth in Sarasota County's proposed recommended order paras. 105-108 and 110 (accepted) and para. 111 (rejected as vague). See R.O. at 22. Sarasota County Exception No. 15 is essentially a reiteration of proposed findings of fact which had been asserted before the Hearing Officer. Where the Hearing Officer clearly and specifically addressed and ruled on the proposed finding in the recommended order, I am not required to provide further reasons for my ruling. Britt v. Dept. of Professional Regulation, 492 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), overruled on other grounds sub nom., Dept. of Professional Regulation v. Bernal, 531 So.2d 967 (Fla. 1988). I concur with and adopt the Hearing Officer's rulings as being based on competent, substantial evidence, and therefore reject the exception. Sarasota County Exception No. 16 asks me to make specific findings with regard to cumulative impacts. The matter ofwhether the proposed project will have any significant adverse secondary or cumulative impacts was a disputed issue at the hearing. See Prehearing Stipulation at 24, Stipulated Disputed issue VI(A)9. Section 403. 919, Florida Statutes, requires consideration of the cumulative impacts of the project in conjunction with other existing or future projects where there is a "reasonable likelihood" of similar project applications in the same geographic location in the future. Caloosa Property Owners Ass'n v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 462 So.2d 523 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Reasonable expectation of future projects is the polestar of cumulative impact analysis. Chipola Basin Protective Group v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 11 F.A.L.R. 467, 477 (D.E.R. December 29, 1988). Testimony at the hearing showed that the Department conducted an evaluation of the project for cumulative impacts and was unable to identify any such impacts. Wilber PF-30, TR-949-950; Armstrong TR-1021-1022. A finding that the Department conducted a cumulative impact analysis and concluded that it was unable to identify any cumulative impact was proposed by Sarasota County in its Proposed Recommended Order, paras. 118 and 119. - These findings were accepted by the Hearing Officer (R.O. at 22). Therefore, the requested findings of fact have already been made by the Hearing Officer, and no additional finding is required of me. The exception is therefore rejected. MPS Exception No. 18 asks me to adopt numerous proposed findings of fact which the Hearing Officer expressly rejected. The Hearing Officer expressly ruled on each of these proposed findings of fact. (Recommended Order at 23-24) Where exceptions merely reiterate proposed findings of fact which had been asserted before the Hearing Officer, and where the Hearing Officer clearly and specifically addressed each in the recommended order, I am not required to provide any further explicit reasons for my ruling. Britt v. Dept. of Professional Regulation, supra. I concur with and adopt the Hearing Officer's rulings on these proposed findings of fact. I therefore reject the above exceptions. RULINGS ON EXCEPTIONS TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Public Interest Test Sarasota County's Exception To Conclusion of Law No. 2, and MPS Exception No. 20 take exception to the Hearing Officer's conclusion of law that "the County has failed to establish that the proposed project is clearly in the public interest." Conclusion of Law No. 6, R.O. at 15-16. As I noted in my earlier discussion on findings of fact, in order to obtain a permit to dredge and fill in an Outstanding Florida Water, the applicant must show, among other things, that the project is clearly in the public interest. Section 403.918(2), Florida Statutes. Failure of the applicant to make that showing makes the project not permittable. In order to determine whether the project is clearly in the public interest, the Department must consider and balance the following seven factors set forth in Section 403.918(2)(a): Whether the project will adversely affect the public health, safety, or welfare or the property of others; Whether the project will adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats; Whether the project will adversely affect navigation or the flow of water or cause harmful erosion or shoaling; Whether the project will adversely affect the fishing or recreational values or marine productivity in the vicinity of the project; Whether the project will be of a temporary or permanent nature; Whether the project will adversely affect or will enhance significant historical and archaeological resources under the provisions of 5.267.061; and The current condition and relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by the proposed activity. In order to consider and balance these factors it is necessary, of course, to make sufficient findings of fact as to each factor. As I discussed above, the Hearing Officer had accepted or expressly made findings of fact relevant to each of the above factors. in Conclusion of Law No. 6, she considered and balanced those factors in reaching her determination that it was not shown that the project is clearly in the public interest. I am, of course, not bound by the Hearing Officer's conclusions of law. I am free to substitute my own legal conclusions for those of the Hearing Officer, so long as competent, substantial evidence supports my legal conclusions. Harloff v. City of Sarasota, 16 FLW D458 (Fla. 2d DCA, Feb. 20, 1991); Hunter v. Dept. of Professional Regulation, 458 So.2d 842 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); MacPherson v. School Board of Monroe County, 505 So.2d 682 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Section 120.57(1) (b)lO., Florida Statutes. I have considered and balanced each of the seven criteria set forth in Section 403.918(2) (a) in the light of the findings of fact discussed above. I concur in the Hearing Officer's conclusion that it has not been demonstrated that the project is clearly in the public interest. In reaching my conclusion I am aware of the holding in 1800 Atlantic Developers v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 552 So.2d 946 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) that no net public benefit need be shown. I conclude that Findings of Fact Nos. 17, 22, 24-26, 29 and 32-35 on balance establish that the project will adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats. Findings of Fact 32 and 33 on balance show that the project will adversely affect the fishing or recreational values or marine productivity in LSB. Findings 30 and 38 on balance sfrthat the current conditiofr of LSB makes it a valuable estuarine ecosystem which will be lost if the project is permitted. Finding of Fact 36 and MPS proposed findings of fact Nos. 134 and 135, which were accepted by the Hearing Officer, on balance show a net benefit to navigation. And, the Hearing Officer's acceptance of Sarasota County's proposed finding of fact No. 50, and MPS's proposed finding of fact No. 74, allow me to conclude that the project will not adversely affect the public health, welfare or safety. I note that there is abundant proof that the project is permanent in nature and that there will be no adverse affect on historical or archaeological resources. When I consider and balance all of these factors and their relevant facts, I conclude that the adverse impacts outweigh any benefits, and therefore donclude that there has been no showing that the project is clearly in the public interest. Since I have determined that it has not been shown that the project is clearly in the public interest, I must also consider any mitigation which Sarasota County has proposed. Sarasota County and MPS contend that no mitigation is needed for the loss of ten acres of seagrasses because reopening the pass will result in recolonization of new areas of seagrass, greater density of growth in existing areas, and greater diversity of seagrass species. Even when I assume that Sarasota County's and MPS cotentions are true, I still conclude that the adverse effects of the loss of ten acres of seagrass will not be mitigated by the proposed project. 6/ Accordingly, I reject the exceptions. Water Quality Improvement Sarasota County Exception To Conclusion of Law No. 1, and MPS Exception No. 19, challenge the Hearing Officer's Conclusion of Law No. 4. Specifically, the exceptions challenge the statement that "[t]he County has not established, however, that the reopening of the inlet will somehow improve water quality and justify the proposed dredging." Conclusion of Law No. 1, R.O. at 14. To the extent that the Hearing Officer may have thought that a showing of improvement in water quality was a requirement for obtaining a permit, she erred. However, for the reasons set forth in my previous discussion of water quality in relation to findings of fact, Sarasota County and MPS had made improvement in water quality an issue in determining whether the project was clearly in the public interest. Rather than erroneously imposing a requirement of improvement of water quality, it appears that the Hearing Officer was merely making a predicite observation prior to conducting the public interest balancing test. Regardless of how one interprets the above matter, it is clear that the issue does not affect the outcome of this case because both the Hearing Officer and I have concluded that there has been no showing that the project is clearly in the public interest. I therefore reject the exception on the basis that the conclusion of law is not erroneous, or if error, then it is harmless error. Having ruled on all of the exceptions it is ORDERED: Except as is otherwise stated in this Final Order, the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order is adopted and incorporated herein by reference. Sarasota County's Permit Application No. 581473069 is DENIED. NOTICE OF RIGHTS Any party to this Final Order has the right to seek judicial review of the Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, by the filing of a Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, with the clerk of the Department in the Office of General Counsel, 2600 Blair Stone Road, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400; and by filing a copy of the Notice of Appeal accompanied by the applicable filing fees with the appropriate District Court of Appeal. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days from the date this Order is filed with the clerk of the Department. DONE AND ORDERED this 4 day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation CAROL BROWNER Secretary Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL. 32399-2400

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a final order denying the permit requested by Sarasota County. DONE and ENTERED this 19 day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Joyous D. Parrish Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19 day of February, 1991. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 90-3533 RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT: Paragraphs 1 through 19 are accepted. Paragraphs 20 through 24 are rejected as irrelevant, speculative or immaterial to the issues of this case. Paragraphs 25 and 26 are accepted. Paragraphs 27 through 29 are rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 30 is accepted. Paragraph 31 is accepted with the deletion of the quotation marks around the word monitor and with the deletion of the last phrase following the words "survival rate" which is rejected as argumentative or irrelevant or not supported by the record. Paragraphs 32 through 36 are accepted. Paragraph 37 is rejected as repetitive. Paragraphs 38 through 40 are accepted. Paragraph 41 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 42 through 44 are accepted. Paragraph 45 is rejected as irrelevant or unnecessary to the resolution of the issues of this case. Paragraphs 46 through 48 are accepted. Paragraphs 49 through 53 are rejected as irrelevant, unnecessary to the resolution of the issues, comment, repetitive, or argumentative. Paragraphs 54 through 62 are accepted. Paragraph 63 is rejected as repetitive. Paragraph 64 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 65 and 66 are accepted. Paragraph 67 is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 68 through 73 are accepted.

Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.68267.061403.03190.104
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RICHARD O'MALLEY vs. MEISTER DEVELOPMENTS AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 86-004747 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-004747 Latest Update: Jun. 11, 1987

Findings Of Fact The site of the revetment that is the subject of this litigation is located near the northerly coast of Pine Island in Charlotte Harbor. The property fronts on Pine Island Sound which is inside the barrier islands westward of Pine Island. Pine Island Sound is as an Outstanding Florida Water and Charlotte Harbor at this location is classified as Class II waters. Petitioner's property abuts the property owned by Meister Development Group. On Petitioner's property is located a two-story residence and two rental units. On Meister's property a four unit residential development has been erected. Sometime around 1970 a vertical seawall was erected to protect both Petitioner's property and Respondent's property. Since that time the beach has accreted to the point that by 1989 the sand beach extended an average of approximately twenty-five feet seaward of the seawall in front of Petitioner's property. However, this seawall ended near the middle of Respondents property and erosion of the beach became serious at the four unit residential development building located thereon in 1984. In 1984 the beach at this location had eroded to the point that the high water mark had passed the northern most portion of the building foundation and was threatening to undermine the structure. At this time this shoreline was devoid of aquatic vegetation. Meister employed an engineering firm to prepare a solution to the erosion problem. That firm concluded a revetment was needed and the application for the dredge and fill permit that is here contested was filed in July 1984. Since the application involved use of land seaward of the mean high water, permission of the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) was required before the application could receive final approval. To obtain the approval of DNR Meister agreed to provide a conservation easement to DNR and a public easement to allow the public access to cross the property seaward of the residential development. Additionally Meister conferred with Outstanding Florida Water Group to obtain their acquiescence to the project and agreed to provide navigational aids to mark the Jug Creek Channel across form the Meister property. Before a dredge and fill permit can be granted involving an Outstanding Florida Water the applicant must show the project to be in the public interest. In consulting with DER the applicant proposed a sloping revetment which is generally considered to better tolerate wave action than does a vertical wall. To enhance the public interest concept the applicant agreed to place toe stones at the foot of the revetment and plant mangroves. The toe stones would serve to hold sand in which the mangroves could grow and serve as a habitat for aquatic organisms. The applicant also agreed to place an artificial reef of rocks on the sand shoal which sits about one half mile north of applicant's and petitioner's property. Although the mangroves planted did not survive due to heavy wave action and the permit did not require survivability of these mangroves, at the hearing Meister agreed to a provision in the permit's next renewal that will include a requirement that a percentage of these mangroves planted in the toe stones survive. Landward of the residential development is a stormwater retention area that serves to keep contaminants out Pine Islands Sound. The erosion of the beach at the Meister property was threatening to extend further inland and allow contaminants to leach from the water retention area into Pine Island Sound and contaminate that body of water. Approval of the project would serve to remove that threat and be in the public interest. Finally consideration was given to the fact that the foundation of the condominium was being threatened which affected the dwelling of the residents. Protecting these residences is also considered to be in the public interest. The project was completed during a two weeks period in August 1986. The revetment generally takes off in the same line as the Vertical seawall on petitioner's property and is basically convex to fit the existing building and meet the zoning setback requirement of twenty-five feet from the building. To construct the revetment the existing vertical seawall on Meister's Property had to be removed. During construction turbidity screens were installed and construction was restricted to periods of low water to reduce turbidity. Any excess turbidity caused by the construction would settle out within twenty-four hours. Dr. O'Malley left Pine Island in March and returned in October 1986. At the time he left the beach in front of his seawall extended an average of twenty-five feet from the seawall. When he returned in October the revetment had been completed and approximately fifty-percent of Petitioner's beach had eroded. In October 1986 the beach on O'Malley's property extended two to twenty feet from the seawall. O'Malley was aware that prior to his departure the Meister property had suffered severe erosion. Believing that the construction of the revetment was the cause of the erosion of his beach Petitioner instituted this action. This was the only issue seriously contested. Petitioner's expert witness opined that the revetment acted like a groin east of Petitioner's property and caused a littoral drift, which is basically from east to west in this area, to take the sand from Petitioner's property. Further this witness opined that the longer fetch (area of open water to the north-east of Meister property) was the primary cause of the erosion of the Meister property. Historically beaches erode and accrete. Gentle waves have the tendency to cause accretion while storm waves result in seaward migration of beach sand. Photographs (exhibit 3) of Petitioner's property show typically storm wave generated erosion. The expert opinion of Respondents' witnesses that the erosion of Petitioner's property was caused by storm driven waves and was not caused by the revetment is deemed the more credible explanation of the erosion of Petitioner's beach.

Florida Laws (1) 267.061
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ROLF ROBERT vs. CITY OF CLEARWATER AND ANTONIOS MARKOPOULOS, 89-002641 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-002641 Latest Update: Oct. 09, 1989

The Issue The issue in this appeal is whether the decision of the City of Clearwater Development Code Adjustment Board denying Petitioner's application for variances for certain signage on his property is supported by the evidence in the record, or whether it departs from the essential requirements of law. See Section 137.014(f)(3), City of Clearwater Land Development Code.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of certain property located at 1923-1943 U.S. Highway 19 North, Clearwater, Florida (Section 05-29-16, M&B 23.05). This property is zoned CC (Commercial Center), and is the site of a strip shopping mall. On or about March 23, 1989, Petitioner applied for three variances for the subject property, as follows: 243 square feet to permit a total of 411 square feet of property identification signage; 13.5 feet in height to permit a 33.5 foot high pole sign; permission for a roof mounted sign. The Development Code Adjustment Board denied Petitioner's application for variances on April 13, 1989, and Petitioner timely filed this appeal of the Board's decision. Under the provisions of the City of Clearwater Land Development Code applicable to the Petitioner's property, only 168 square feet of property identification signage and pole signs not to exceed 20 feet in height would be allowed without a variance, and roof signs of any kind are prohibited unless a variance has been granted. Several months prior to Petitioner's filing for these variances, a roof sign was erected on the building located on the subject property. This roof sign consists of individual letters spelling "Harbor Square", which is the name of this shopping mall. The letters are from 3 feet, to 4 feet 9 inches in height, and span a distance of 34 feet 9 inches in width. The roof sign replaced a property identification sign at the right of way which previously carried the name of the shopping center, but the space on the pole sign previously used to identify the mall was not eliminated. That space is now used to identify a uniform business in the mall. Petitioner is seeking these after the fact variances to authorize the roof sign which has already been erected, and to approve the height of an existing pole sign. An enforcement action initiated by the City is pending this variance determination. Tenants in the Harbor Square mall testified that the change in signage has made the mall more visible and accessible, and several of their customers have commented that their businesses are now easier to find. The tenants feel that this change in signage will benefit their businesses financially. The Development Code Adjustment Board has previously granted variances from the signage limitations imposed by the Code, but the evidence produced at hearing indicates that none of these variances were granted after the fact. The two variances which were approved for roof signs were based upon a finding of conditions unique to the property which created a hardship for the applicant. In both instances, the Board found that the applicant had not created his own hardship, but that it arose from the size or positioning of the property involved in each application. In this case, nothing unique about the property can be found. The applicant has caused his own problems by allowing a sign to be erected without first obtaining a permit or variance. The Petitioner urges that it was the responsibility of his sign contractor to obtain all necessary permits or variances, and that the contractor did not inform him that a variance was necessary before he erected the sign. However, neither the sign contractor nor the Petitioner himself was present to testify, and therefore, there can be no finding with regard to his credibility, or with regard to whatever arrangement he had with the contractor. In any event, as the property owner seeking a variance, Petitioner has failed to establish any basis for a finding of a hardship or circumstance unique to his property, other than the fact that he allowed this sign to be erected without obtaining the necessary approvals from the City.

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MICHAEL G. PRESTON vs GULFVIEW LODGING, LLP; COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BOARD; AND CITY OF CLEARWATER, 17-006226 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida Nov. 09, 2017 Number: 17-006226 Latest Update: Feb. 06, 2018

The Issue The issues to be determined in this appeal are whether the decision of the Community Development Board (Board) to approve Flexible Development Application FLD2017-07012 filed by Gulfview Lodging, LLP (Gulfview), cannot be sustained by substantial competent evidence before the Board, or that the decision of the Board departs from the essential requirements of law.

Findings Of Fact The 0.59-acre project site is located at the northeast corner of South Gulfview Boulevard and Fifth Street and wraps around the McDonald’s parking lot and Frenchy’s Beach Café (Frenchy’s) to the west. The project site includes two parcels owned by Gulfview, and 2,195.09 square feet of the South Gulfview Boulevard right-of-way, which will need to be vacated by the City. Gulfview’s proposal is to demolish all structures currently on the project site and build a seven-floor hotel with 150 units per acre, which would be 88 rooms if the City vacates the 2,195.09 feet of right-of-way. Gulfview’s application for development approval was filed with the City on July 28, 2017, including design plans. The subject property is zoned Tourist (T) District with an underlying Future Land Use Plan (FLUP) category of Resort Facilities High (RFH). The subject site is located in the Beach Walk district of Beach by Design.2/ The maximum permitted density for the site pursuant to Beach by Design is 150 units per acre. The application contemplates a subsequent vacation process for the 2,195.09 square feet of City right-of-way. On July 20, 2017, the City Council approved the allocation of up to 59 units from the Hotel Density Reserve under Beach by Design (Case No. HDA2017-04001) and adopted a resolution to the same effect (Res. No. 17-19). Preston’s attorney admitted that he attended the July 20, 2017, City Council hearing that resulted in the July 28, 2017, Hotel Density Reserve Development Agreement (Development Agreement) between Gulfview and the City. Preston’s attorney attended the July 20 City Council hearing on behalf of Frenchy’s, but conceded to the Board and at oral argument that Frenchy’s is located on the land owned by Preston, as trustee, and Preston is the sole shareholder of Frenchy’s. The Development Agreement was recorded in Book 19727, Page 2465-2503 of the Public Records of Pinellas County, Florida, on August 2, 2017. The Development Agreement includes Exhibit “B”-- the same set of design plans that were filed with Gulfview’s July 28, 2017, application for development approval. Section 6.2.4 of the Development Agreement specifically states: The overall number of proposed units density provided for by this Agreement (88 units) is contingent upon the proposed vacation of the 2,195.09 square feet of South Gulfview Boulevard right-of-way within the Beach Walk district. The City shall process a right-of- way vacation ordinance to vacate the 2,195.09 square feet of South Gulfview Blvd. right of way within the Beach Walk district conditioned upon submission of a complete set of building plans for construction of the improvements shown on Exhibit “B”. Regardless of whether or not the vacation is granted the maximum permitted density of the property may not exceed 150 units per acre. Gulfview’s application requires a Level Two approval. Under Section 4-206 of the Community Development Code, a Level Two approval requires mailing of a notice of application to owners of properties “within a 200-foot radius of the perimeter boundaries of the subject property.” The notice mailed by the City identifies both the north parcel and the south parcel by address and parcel number. The notice also describes the quasi-judicial public hearing process before the Board and ends with an invitation “to discuss any questions or concerns about the project and/or to better understand the proposal and review the site plan” with the assigned planner. The City Clerk mailed notice of Gulfview’s application to owners of parcels located within 200 feet of the two parcels identified in the notice, including Preston. Preston does not dispute receiving the notice. Section 4-206 of the Community Development Code also requires the posting of a sign on the “parcel proposed for development.” Preston does not dispute that the sign was posted. Preston objected that the mailed and posted notices did not reference the proposal to vacate 2,195.09 square feet of right-of-way. He argued that if he had known more than “a few days ago” when he received the Staff Report ahead of the October 17, 2017, Board meeting that the right-of-way was proposed to be vacated, he would have had expert witnesses at the hearing to give “an equal presentation” in response to Gulfview’s presentation. Preston requested a continuance citing lack of proper notice and insufficient time to prepare for the public hearing. Preston did not introduce any testimony or other evidence regarding the application. Preston’s primary objection to the project was vacation of the right-of-way and he wanted the opportunity to present witnesses regarding that issue. Vacating the right-of-way is a separate process and the hearing before the Board is not the proceeding in which the right-of-way vacation is decided. However, the substantial competent record evidence shows that Preston had actual notice as early as July 20, 2017, that the proposed project contemplated vacating 2,195.09 square feet of right-of-way. Preston’s other objection was that Gulfview’s design plans did not meet the requirements of Beach by Design’s Beach Walk District overlay. Preston argued to the Board that the hotel’s proposed design did not meet the redevelopment goals for addition of facilities and amenities generally described as areas for outdoor dining, outside cafes, and other seaside amenities.3/ However, although Preston had actual notice of the hotel design plans as early as July 20, 2017, he did not introduce any expert testimony or other evidence to support those objections. The Staff Report states that Beach by Design proposed to create a great beach front, known as “Beach Walk,” by relocating South Gulfview Boulevard from the existing right of way. Beach by Design recognized that the redevelopment and revitalization of the properties that front on South Gulfview were and, to a certain extent, still are generally constrained by several factors including small parcel sizes and the Coastal Construction Control Line. As a result, most of the motels and hotels which existed along the east side of South Gulfview would have limited opportunities for redevelopment even if Clearwater Beach were repositioned in the tourism market place. Beach by Design proposed to relocate South Gulfview to the west of its current alignment in order to achieve multiple purposes. First, it would create a drive with a real view of the Beach and the Gulf of Mexico. Second, it would allow the City to vacate the east 35 feet of the existing right of way in favor of the properties along the eastern frontage of existing South Gulfview as an incentive for appropriate redevelopment. Many of those existing properties would substantially benefit from an additional 35 feet of depth which could be used for the addition of facilities and amenities such as safe and comfortable areas for outdoor dining. The creation of Beach Walk and the realignment of South Gulfview Boulevard have all been realized. Several segments of the South Gulfview Boulevard have already been vacated and many of the properties along South Gulfview Boulevard have, in the years since the initial adoption of Beach by Design, been redeveloped with hotels. As noted, this proposal also includes a vacation of a portion of the South Gulfview Boulevard right-of-way which will facilitate the redevelopment of the subject site with a new hotel playing an important role in the ongoing renewal and revitalization of the Beach. Specifically, the vacation will allow for the location of an outdoor seating area providing a strong link between Beach Walk and the proposed hotel as supported by Beach by Design. Therefore, the proposal is consistent with this provision. (Emphasis added). The Staff Report concluded that the proposed project is consistent with applicable provisions of the Community Development Code, applicable components of the City’s Comprehensive Plan, the Beach Walk District of Beach by Design, and the Design Guidelines of Beach by Design. Mark Parry, Senior Planner with the City, testified that “the proposed number of units, 88, is contingent on vacation of that right-of- way,” and if the right-of-way is not later vacated, it “would knock out about eight units.” Mr. Parry also testified that the proposed project provides amenities and an outdoor seating area as specified by Beach by Design. Preston only conducted a very short cross-examination of Mr. Parry, despite having party status to do so. Sue Ann Murphy, an experienced land use planner, also testified that the proposed development complied with all applicable Community Development Code, Comprehensive Plan and Beach by Design requirements. The project architect, Istvan Peteranecz, AIA, was accepted by the Board as an expert. Mr. Peteranecz answered questions from Board members regarding the design of the proposed hotel’s main entrance, including the porte cochere and public seating area adjacent to the Beach Walk and immediately south of Frenchy’s. Preston did not cross- examine Ms. Murphy or Mr. Peteranecz, despite having party status to do so. Substantial competent evidence in the record supports the conclusion that the proposed project is consistent with applicable provisions of the Community Development Code, applicable components of the City’s Comprehensive Plan, the Beach Walk District of Beach by Design, and the Design Guidelines of Beach by Design. At the conclusion of the public hearing, the Board acknowledged Preston’s pending request for continuance and proceeded with discussion. After extensive discussion among the Board members, a motion was made and seconded for the Board “to approve case number FLD2017-07012 based on the evidence, the testimony presented, and the application, the staff report, and at today’s hearing, and to adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law stated in the staff report with all of the conditions of approval, as listed.” The motion carried. On October 19, 2017, the City entered a Development Order memorializing the Board’s decision. The Development Order includes a Finding of Fact that “[t]he total lot area includes 2,195 square feet of the South Gulfview Boulevard right-of-way which would need to be vacated by the City,” and includes a Condition of Approval that “application for a building permit be submitted no later than October 17, 2019, unless time extensions are granted.” The City represented at oral argument that if the proposed development is not consistent with the Development Order (e.g., if the approximately 2,195 square feet of the South Gulfview Boulevard right-of-way is not vacated), Gulfview will not be able to get a building permit without going through a minor amendment process for a less intense project.

Florida Laws (1) 28.05
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STANISLAW BUDZINSKI AND KAZIMIERA BUDZINSKI vs CITY OF CLEARWATER AND ANTONIOS MARKOPOULOS, 97-001109 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida Mar. 10, 1997 Number: 97-001109 Latest Update: Jun. 09, 1997

Findings Of Fact Lior Hason is the owner of Britt's Cafe, a restaurant which occupies property owned by the Petitioner's Stanislaw and Kasimiera Budzinski. On or about December 19, 1995, Harry S. Cline, an attorney for Mr. Hason and the Budzinskis, filed an application for a variance from the City of Clearwater's Development Code, for the purpose of eliminating three required parking spaces from the front of the subject property for the construction of an outdoor cafe at 201 South Gulfview Boulevard. The Code requires one parking space per 200 square feet of gross floor area, and a variance was required to remove three existing parking spaces from the unit's parking space inventory. The matter was brought before the City's Development Code Adjustment Board at its January 11, 1996 meeting. Mr. Cline appeared at the meeting on behalf of the applicant and presented the project. No one else was present to speak in support of or in opposition to the request. However, four letters in opposition from neighboring business owners were submitted. Notwithstanding these objections, the Board determined that the applicant had substantially met all standards for approval listed in the City's Land Development Code; and upon vote of the Board, the application was approved, subject to certain conditions, by a three to two majority. Mr. Hason entered into discussions with City officials to determine what was necessary. Official City reaction was initially favorable. Mr. Hason was advised of the requirements for the project and had plans drawn which called for a deck with a 35 to 36 inch railing with landscaping around it, and with posts and lights. When the plans were submitted to the City officials, the only change suggested was to raise the railing height to 45 inches, which was done, after which the City approved the plans and the permit was granted. The deck was then constructed exactly according to the approved plans. At some time during 1996, Mr. Hason discussed with some City employees putting an awning over the deck. During these discussions, the City employees sent Mr. Hason a copy of Section 41.221(1)(c), Clearwater City Code, which provides for awnings to be removable. Mr. Hason considered the sending of this Code provision to be tantamount to a favorable reply to his inquiry, and, based on that, he finalized his plans for the installation of a removable awning. The proposed awning is designed in such a fashion as to be extendible and retractable on a frame, capable of easily being pulled up against the front of the building like a drapery. With a minimum of further effort, consisting of the removal a several bolts, the entire awning construction can be removed from the frame. Mr. Hason submitted his application for the variance to install the awning on February 2, 1997. In the interim, the City employees with whom Mr. Hason discussed the project changed their position from favoring the project to opposing it. He was ultimately advised in December 1996 or January 1997 that the awning could not be permitted because an awning could not be approved over a deck for which a permit should not have been issued and for which the issuance was a mistake. Though the Board had not yet voted on the application, no information was given to Mr. Hason as to what he could do to make the project approvable. His application, on February 2, 1997, was submitted because, Hason claims, he had been told, by someone not further identified, that applying for a variance for the awning would make everything right. The Variance Staff Report submitted to the Board by the appropriate City employees acknowledged that the frame over which Mr. Hason proposed to put the awning does not meet code because it was constructed within a required setback area from South Gulfview Boulevard, but since the frame was built pursuant to a City-issued permit, consistent with City policy, the City accepted its existence. In its final recommendation to the Board, the staff concluded that notwithstanding the encroachment into the setback area, the project "appears to comply with all standards for approval, provided attention is given to the external appearance of the cafe:" The staff then went on to recommend approval of the project subject to certain conditions, all of which, Mr. Hason accepts and agrees to. Nonetheless, the Board denied the permit by a vote of four to one. Mr. Hason contends that the Board vote was an attempt by the Board to get back at him because of what it perceived as his failure to comply with the conditions placed upon the issuance of the first permit and his alleged misrepresentation of the scope of his project at the time. Mr. Hason, however, categorically denies he has done anything contrary to the dictates of the City. He went back to City officials many times during the construction of the deck to make sure the project was built as required. The majority of the Board members believe, however, that the deck as constructed, goes far beyond the limited structure approved by the granting of the parking space variance in January 1996. This animosity toward the project can be seen from a review of the audio record of the February 13, 1997, Board meeting where, during a colloquy between a Board member and Mr. Hason, it appeared the member was somewhat put out by the entire situation. His analysis indicates a less than complete recollection of the matter, however. Whereas one of the conditions to the issuance of the initial permit was that the area of the outdoor cafe should not be greater than 25 percent of the indoor area of the restaurant, this member pointed out that the 69 outdoor seats were far in excess of 25 percent of the 115 or so indoor seats. This constituted a confusion of seating as opposed to area. No evidence was presented concerning whether Mr. Hason had violated the area constraint. In the main, however, while it appeared that a majority of the Board members were unhappy about the way the project developed, and expressed the opinion that the project did not conform to what they had intended to approve, there was no indication any member s vote was motivated by anything other than a sincere belief in the correctness of his position. There was no indication of any inappropriate or vindictive action by anyone on the Board or its staff. Stephen Sarnoff, a central permitting specialist with the City reviewed the plans for the initial construction and for the current application. As he recalls, the plans for the initial deck construction did not show any support beams, fans, overhead structure or latticework fencing, and the deck, as built, does not conform to the plans as submitted. City Code requirements call for a railing of from 30 to 42 inches high. The current railing of 45 inches does not conform to that standard, and Mr. Sarnoff is not aware of any request from the City that the railing be raised to that height, as Mr. Hason claims. By the same token, while there is no requirement in the ordinance that a deck be of a certain height, anything higher than 12 inches is considered a structure and a waiver is required. This deck was approved for 12 inches. A certificate of occupancy is usually issued for a deck, but in the instant case, such a certificate has not been issued because the deck, as built, is not in compliance with the 1996 approval. If it is brought into compliance, it will be approved. Sarnoff is aware of and familiar with other outdoor restaurant decks built at various locations in the Clearwater area, as indicated by Mr. Hason. Some are not within the CR-28 zone and do not come under the same standards as are applicable here. Others, which must conform to the instant requirements appear to have movable awnings which are acceptable. Still others are in a different zoning district with different set-back requirements, and some were initially denied, but were subsequently approved when they were brought into compliance with the requirements. John Richter, a senior planner for the City, was the individual who prepared the staff report on the instant project and initially recommended approval, contingent upon changes to the external appearance of the facility. He made suggestions and has discussed the project with Hason on his several visits to the property. He did discuss an awning with Hason at some point, but their discussions did not deal with its mobility. All in all, Mr. Richter concluded that the project appears to meet the standard for approval, provided attention is given to the external appearance of the cafe. David S. Shuford, the City's central permitting director and development code administrator indicated that the variance required for the awning, which was an integral part of the structure already built, was not automatically granted with the granting of the permit for the deck structure. Section 42.221, Clearwater City Code, was adopted to promote a more festival atmosphere in some of the outdoor tourist areas. The intent of subsection (l)(c) of that provision was to require the use of moveable items and to design structures that would meet wind requirements and not interfere with pedestrian traffic. The term "moveable" means what it says, and in Shuford's opinion, from the plans he saw, the proposed awning would not be easily moveable on a daily basis. The Clearwater City Code establishes the area in question as one where, once guidelines are developed, they will be adopted and be complied with. Mr. Shuford opines that the current deck, in the rafter area, goes beyond what was proposed at the time the project was submitted for the parking variance and was approved. This is what appears to be the source of the difficulty the Board members have with it. However, if designed to comply with the guidelines, this awning could be approved. He would agree with the conditions outlined in the staff recommendation so far as they relate to painting and architectural matters.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57120.69
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UNIVERSITY HIGH EQUITY REAL ESTATE FUND II, LTD. vs. CITY OF CLEARWATER AND ANTONIOS MARKOPOULOS, 86-001724 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-001724 Latest Update: Aug. 18, 1986

Findings Of Fact On or about March 7, 1986, Petitioner submitted an application for a variance from the open space and rear set-back line requirements applicable to property located at 2612 U.S. 19 North, Clearwater, Florida. The subject property is zoned CC (commercial center). Petitioner's application requests a variance to provide 12.33% open space instead of 25%, and to construct a building 30 feet from the rear property line rather than 50 feet as required by the Land Development Code for property zoned CC. On or about April 24, 1986, the Development Code Adjustment Board denied Petitioner's application for a variance, and Petitioner timely appealed on May 6, 1986. The only evidence in support of its application offered by Petitioner was the testimony of Robby Tompkins. He testified that Petitioner's application is "unique" because Petitioner was 90% complete with its architectural plans for the renovation and modernization of the subject property when the current ordinance took effect, and Petitioner therefore urges that the current ordinance should not apply. Additionally, Petitioner argues that there will be no injury to the public as a result of the variance, and in fact the project will add 6800 square feet to its shopping center. Tompkins admitted that an increase in financial return was the primary reason Petitioner has sought the variance. Finally, he stated that if Petitioner complies with the 25% open space requirement, there will not be enough parking to meet Code provisions, and if sufficient parking is provided, there will not 25% open space.

Florida Laws (1) 120.65
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