Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations herein the Division of Real Estate was the state agency responsible for the licensing of real estate sales persons and brokers and the regulation of the real estate profession in Florida. Respondent, Diana C. Verdi, was licensed as a real estate salesperson under license number 0545114, and Respondent, Realtec Group, Inc., was licensed as a real estate broker under license number 0273784. Respondent, Verdi, was employed by Respondent, Realtec, at its office at 3474 Tampa Road, Palm Harbor, Florida. On October 23, 1993, Respondent Verdi, while working for Respondent, Realtec, solicited and obtained an offer from James and Maureen Herhold, to purchase residential property owned by J. and K. Griffin. The contract called for the placement of a $50,000 non-refundable deposit with Realtec, and allowed the Herholds to move in on October 30, 1993, with closing to be held on November 30, 1993. The contract also provided that once the Herholds moved into the house, the Griffins would no longer be responsible for any repairs or maintenance needed by the property. Prior to moving in, the Herholds requested that Respondent, Verdi, obtain for them a seller's disclosure statement which would list any material defects in the property known to the sellers. In that regard, the Griffins' listing agent, Marta Shank, had previously requested they prepare such a statement. The statement was prepared on August 20, 1993, and reflected that the only known defect was a shower leak which had purportedly been fixed and a shower wall which had purportedly been replaced. Notwithstanding the Herholds repeatedly requested the disclosure statement from Respondent, Verdi, and notwithstanding such a statement had been prepared by the Griffins, the statement was not furnished to Respondent, Verdi, by Ms. Shank and, thereafter, to the Herholds until after they moved into the property. Consistent with the terms of the contract, the Herholds were required to pay for the repairs to the shower and shower wall which, it appears, were not properly repaired prior to their move into the property. At closing the Herholds requested the Griffins reimburse them for the cost of the repairs, which was not done. In the interim, however, and before the Herholds moved into the property, Respondent, Verdi, as was her custom in all residential sales, insisted that the Herholds obtain an independent inspection of the home. Mr. Herhold admits she did this. She claims she would not sell a home without this being done. This inspection, conducted by an inspector of the Herholds' choosing, failed to disclose any defect in the shower or shower wall. Respondent, Verdi, also suggested that since her repeated efforts to obtain the disclosure statement were unsuccessful, Mr. Herhold contact the Griffins or their agent directly. She also suggested to him that if he were not satisfied with the condition of the house, or if he had any qualms about moving in without the disclosure statement, he should not move in until he received it. This was verified by Ms. Kissner. Herhold elected not to do this, however, because he feared he might lose his deposit. Respondent, Verdi, represents herself as being an experienced and successful real estate salesperson, and there appears little reason to doubt that representation. She contends that though she never went to Shank's office to pick one up, she repeatedly asked Ms. Shank, the selling agent, for a disclosure statement as she always does, and her testimony in this regard is supported by that of both Ms. Kissner and Mr. Scarati. Both repeatedly tried to contact the selling office to obtain a disclosure statement but their calls were either nonproductive or not returned. There is some indication that when Ms. Verdi asked Ms. Shank for a disclosure statement, she was told that none existed. After the closing, when Mr. Herhold was unable to obtain a reimbursement from the Griffins for the cost of repairs, he filed suit against Realtec, Verdi, Shank and her agency, Coldwell Banker and his own inspection service. He admits that, at court, when he was asked by the judge who he believed was responsible, he did not know. He sued Verdi because he had asked her for a disclosure statement which she did not give him. He claims the sale was not an "as is" sale. At hearing, he was awarded $835.20 plus costs against Verdi and Realtec. She did not pay right away and sought the advice of counsel. When Herhold found she was listing her own home for sale, he filed a lien against it. As a result of that action, because she determined that fighting the lien would cost more than the amount involved, she paid the judgement even though she believed the judgement to be in error. Realtec paid nothing. No evidence was presented as to exactly when the judgement was satisfied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed in this matter against Respondents Diana C. Verdi and Realtec Group, Inc., t/a Re/Max Realtec Group, be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of September, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Villazon, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, N-308 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Diana C. Verdi 2474 Tampa Road Palm Harbor, Florida 34684 Realtec Group, Inc. percentRe/Max Realtec Group 3474 Tampa Road Palm Harbor, Florida 34684 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900
The Issue Whether Respondent should take final action to deny Petitioner's application for a real estate sales associate license on the ground that Petitioner was found guilty, in the State of Georgia, of the crime of theft by taking.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: On June 12, 2006, Petitioner was working as a clerk at a UPS store in Cherokee County, Georgia, when he "gave in to temptation" (as he described it at hearing) and stole $500.00 in cash from an envelope given to him by a customer for shipment to the customer's former wife in Kansas. When the customer's former wife received an empty envelope, she notified the customer, who, in turn, called the police. On June 16, 2006, the police went to the UPS store to investigate the matter. When questioned by the police during their visit to the store, Respondent admitted to stealing the $500.00. He was thereupon placed under arrest and, thereafter, criminally charged. On October 16, 2007, in Cherokee County, Georgia, State Court, Petitioner was found guilty of the misdemeanor crime of theft by taking and sentenced to 12 months' probation. Among the conditions of his probation was that he provide "proof of repay[ment]" of the $500.00 he had stolen. Petitioner has not been arrested again, and he has returned to its rightful owner the $500.00 he had stolen and has otherwise completed his probation. The record evidence, however, does not reveal how long ago Petitioner's probation was completed; nor, more importantly, does it shed any light on what Respondent has done with his life (other than completing his probation and not getting arrested) since the theft which led to his being placed on probation, or what his present reputation is for honesty, trustworthiness, and fair dealing. The record evidence, therefore, is insufficient to establish that there is reason to believe that, notwithstanding his commission of the aforementioned theft, it is not likely he would act dishonestly or in any other manner endangering the public were he to be granted the real estate sales associate license he seeks.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission issue a Final Order denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate sales associate. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Kevin Vaughn, Jr. 931 Village Boulevard, Apartment 905-203 West Palm Beach, Florida 33409 Tom Barnhart, Esquire Special Counsel Office of the Attorney General Plaza Level 01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Roger P. Enzor, Chair, Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street, N801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Layne Smith, General Counsel, Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Is the practice of the Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency), to decline Medicaid-funded compensation for emergency medical services provided to undocumented aliens once the patients have reached a point of stabilization an unpromulgated rule? The Petitioners' Proposed Final Order identifies the Agency's use of limited InterQual criteria to determine medical necessity as an issue in this proceeding. But the Petition for Determination of Invalidity of Non-Rule Policy does not raise this issue. Neither party's pre-hearing statement identifies it as an issue. Consequently, this Order does not consider or determine whether the Agency's limitation on the use of InterQual criteria is an "unpromulgated rule."
Findings Of Fact Proceedings Before the Division of Administrative Hearings and the First District Court of Appeal In the beginning this was an action by the Hospitals aimed at stopping Agency efforts to recoup reimbursement of Medicaid payments to the Hospitals for emergency services provided to undocumented aliens once the patients have reached a point of “stabilization.” The issue of whether the Agency could apply the “stabilization” standard to the Hospital claims for Medicaid payment for services provided indigent aliens recurred in Agency claims against hospitals throughout the state to recoup Medicaid payments. Hospitals challenged Agency claims in individual proceedings under section 120.569, which the Agency referred to the Division for disputed fact hearings. Duane Morris, LLP (Duane Morris), led by Joanne Erde, represented the hospitals in the individual proceedings. The Hospitals collectively engaged Duane Morris to represent them in this proceeding challenging the Agency’s stabilization standard as an unpromulgated rule. Joanne B. Erde, Donna Stinson, and Harry Silver were the Hospital’s lawyers in this proceeding. Ms. Erde is an experienced lawyer who has focused her practice in health care. Ms. Stinson is an experienced lawyer who concentrated her practice in health care and administrative law litigation before the Division. The Agency does not question their expertise. Mr. Silver is an experienced lawyer with no Florida administrative law experience. His role in the case was minimal. Depositions taken in one of the individual reimbursement cases were significant evidence in this proceeding. Those depositions make it clear that the Hospitals’ counsel was tuned into the unpromulgated rule issue and using discovery in that case to gather and identify the evidence that they would need in this case. Representation of the Hospitals in individual reimbursement actions provided Hospitals’ counsel the advantage of preparing with level of detail before filing the petition. The engagement letters recognize this stating: “We have an understanding of the facts underlying this matter and have substantial knowledge concerning the law governing the issues in this case.” This well-developed understanding of the facts should have minimized the need for discovery and preparation in this proceeding. Counsel were well positioned to prosecute this matter efficiently. Likewise, counsel’s “substantial knowledge concerning the law governing the issues in this case” should have minimized the need for time spent in research. This is not what happened. The pre-existing representation in the reimbursement cases provided another obvious and significant benefit to the Hospitals and their counsel. Since counsel represented the individual hospital in the separate reimbursement matters, the Hospitals could band together to jointly finance one case that would resolve the troublesome point of “stabilization” issue more consistently and more cheaply than if they litigated it in each and every case. As the basically identical engagement agreements between each hospital and counsel state: “Because many hospitals’ interests in [sic] are similar or identical as it relates to the Alien Issue and in order to keep legal costs to a minimum, each of the participants in the [hospital] Group will [sic] have agreed that it wishes this firm to represent them in a Group.” Because of counsel’s pre-existing relationships with the Hospitals, litigating this matter should have continued or enhanced the client relationships. The time required for this matter could not result in lost business opportunities. In fact, by consolidating the issues common to all the clients and their cases, counsel freed up time to work on other matters. Presentation of the issue for resolution in a single case also saved the Hospitals the greater cost of disputing the issue in each case where the Agency sought reimbursement. The Hospitals and counsel dealt with the only possible downside of the representation by including disclosures about joint representation and a waiver of conflict claims in the engagement letters. This was not a contingent fee case. The agreement provided for monthly billing and payment from counsel’s trust account. Each group member made an initial payment of $10,000 to the trust account. Any time the trust account balance dipped below $15,000, each group member agreed to contribute another $10,000 to the trust account. For counsel, this representation was about as risk free as a legal engagement can be. The Hospitals and their counsel knew from the outset that they would have to prove their reasonableness of their fees and costs if they prevailed and wanted to recover fees. The Petition for Determination of Invalidity of Non-Rule Policy seeks an award of fees and costs. They could have adjusted their billing practices to provide more detail in preparation for a fees dispute. An "unpromulgated rule challenge" presents a narrow and limited issue. That issue is whether an agency has by declaration or action established a statement of general applicability that is a "rule," as defined in section 120.52(16), without going through the required public rulemaking process required by section 120.54. The validity of the agency's statement is not an issue decided in an "unpromulgated rule challenge." Courts have articulated the legal standards for unpromulgated rule challenges frequently. See, e.g., Coventry First, LLC v. Off. of Ins. Reg., 38 So. 3d 200, 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Dep’t of Rev. v. Vanjaria Enters., 675 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); and the cases those opinions cite. The facts proving the “stabilization” standard were easy to establish. Many Agency documents stated the shift to the “stabilization” standard. Documents of Agency contractors did also. Two examples of how clear it was that the Agency was applying a new standard were the Agency’s statements in its 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 reports to the Governor on efforts to control Medicaid fraud and abuse. The reports describe the “stabilization” standard as “more stringent” and certain to recover millions of dollars for the Agency. As the Agency’s reports to the Governor indicate, the stakes were high in this matter. For the Hospitals and other hospitals collectively affected by the Agency’s effort to recoup past payments by applying the “stabilization” standard, $400,000,000 was at stake. This matter did not present complex or difficult issues, legally or factually. The Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions requiring parties to disclose documents and witnesses and update the disclosures alleviated the discovery demands present in other litigation. The Agency’s failure to fully comply with the pre- hearing instructions and unfounded Motion in Limine added some additional time demands for the Hospital’s counsel. Nonetheless the issues were narrow, and the facts were essentially undisputed, if not undisputable. This matter did not require extraordinary amounts of time for discovery or preparation. Ordinarily challenges to rules or unpromulgated rules impose time pressures on the attorneys because of the requirement in section 120.56 that the hearing commence within 30 days of assignment to the Administrative Law Judge. The time constraint was not a factor in this case. The Hospitals requested waiver of the time requirement to permit more time for discovery. The Agency agreed, and the undersigned granted the request. Thus the Hospitals had the time their counsel said they needed to prepare for the hearing. The appeal imposed no time constraints. Both parties received extensions of time for their filings. Seventeen months passed between filing the notice of appeal and oral argument. Time for the Administrative Proceeding The total number of hours claimed for the services of the three lawyers, their claimed hourly rate, and the total fees claimed appear below. Joanne B. Erde 458.20 hours $550.00 rate $252,010.00 Donna Stinson 136.20 hours $455.00 rate $61,971.00 Harry Silver 93.40 hours $550.00 rate $51,370.00 Total 687.80 hours $365,351.00 The Hospitals’ counsel’s billing records are voluminous. For the proceeding before the Division, the Hospitals’ counsel’s invoices list 180 billing entries for the work of three lawyers. A substantial number of the entries are block billing. In block billing, all of a lawyer’s activities for a period of time, usually a day, are clumped together with one time total for the entire day’s service. It is an acceptable form of billing. But block billing presents difficulties determining the reasonableness of fees because a single block of time accounts for several different activities and the invoice does not establish which activity took how much time. Here are representative examples of the block billing entries from the Division level invoices: August 20, 2012 (Erde) – Conference call with ALJ; telephone conference with AHCA attorney; telephone conference with newspaper reporters – 2.0 hours September 16, 2012 (Erde) – Review depositions; prepare opening remarks; develop impeachment testimony – 5.50 September 27, 2012 (Erde) – Intra-office conference; finalize interrogatories; work on direct – 8.50 October 2, 2012 (Stinson) – Review and revise Motion in Limine; Telephone conferences with Joanne Erde and Harry Silver; review emails regarding discovery issues - `2.60 October 19, 2012 (Erde) – Intra-office conference to discuss proposed order; Research Re: other OIG audits; research on validity of agency rules – 2.10 hours November 9, 2012 (Erde) – Conference with ALJ; Intra-Office conference to discuss status; further drafting of proposed order – 7.70 hours. November 19, 2012 (Stinson) – Final Review and Revisions to Proposed Final order; Telephone conferences with Joanne Erde to Review final Changes and comments; Review AHCA’s proposed order and revised proposed order – 3.20 hours. Many of the entries, block or individual, do not provide sufficient detail to judge the reasonableness of the time reported. “Prepare for deposition and hearing,” “review depositions,” “review new documents,” “review draft documents,” “intra-office conference” and “attention to discovery” are recurrent examples. Senior lawyers with more expertise and higher billing rates are expected to be more efficient. This, the fact that the matter was not complicated, the relative simplicity of the issue, and the fact that the Hospitals’ counsel already had a great deal of familiarity with the facts and law involved, all require reducing the number of hours compensated in order for them to be reasonable. For this matter, in these circumstances, the claimed number of hours is quite high. The claimed 687.80 hours amounts to working eight hours a day for 86 days, two of which were the hearing. This is not reasonable. A reasonable number of hours for the proceedings before the Division is 180. That is the equivalent of 22.5 eight-hour days. That is sufficient to handle the matter before the Division from start to finish. The number includes consideration of the worked caused by the needless difficulties presented by the Agency in discovery and with its Motion in Limine. Time for the Appellate Proceeding The fees that the Hospitals seek for the appeal are broken down by hours and rates as follows: Joanne B. Erde 255.10 hours $560.00 $142,856.00 Joanne B. Erde 202.80 hours $580.00 $117,624.00 Donna Stinson 88.50 hours $460.00 $40,710.00 Donna Stinson 67.10 hours $500.00 $33,550.00 W.D. Zaffuto 48.30 hours $435.00 $21,010.50 Rob Peccola 10.90 hours $275.00 $2,997.50 Rob Peccola 17.50 hours $300.00 $5,250.00 L. Rodriguez- Taseff 6.20 hours $520.00 $3,224.00 L. Rodriguez- Taseff 19.50 hours $545.00 $10,627.50 Rachel Pontikes 38.20 hours $515.00 $19,673.00 Total 754.10 hours $397,522.50 For the appellate proceeding, the invoices present 341 entries, a substantial number of which are block billing for work by six lawyers. Here are representative examples from the appellate level invoices: May 16, 2013 (Erde) – Reviewed AHCA’s initial brief; intra- office conference to discuss; preliminary review of record – 2.90 May 24, 2013 (Erde) – Intra-office conference to discuss response to brief; preparation to respond to brief – 2.50 May 30, 2013 (Erde) – Attention to Appeal issues; finalize request for extension; brief research re jurisdictional issues – 1.60 June 18, 2013 (Peccola) – Strategy with J. Erde regarding research needs; review/analyze case law cited in answer brief; conduct legal research regarding documentary evidence and exhibits on appellate review; write email memo to J. Erde regarding same – 2.00 July 19, 2013 (Zaffuto) – Revise/draft Answer Brief; discuss extension of time with H. Gurland; research appellate rules regarding extension of time and staying proceedings pending ruling on motion; review appendix to answer brief; instructions to assistant regarding edits and filing of answer brief and appendix prepare answer brief for filing; call to clerk regarding extension of time review initial brief by AHCA and final order by ALJ – 5.50 August 14, 2013 (Erde) – Intra-office conference to discuss brief; further revised brief – 5.80 August 15, 2013 (Stinson) Reviewed appellees' answer brief; discussed language in answer brief with Joanne Erde – 2.50 October 9, 2013 (Stinson) – Review draft motion to relinquish regarding admission of exhibit; exchange e-mails with Joanne Erde; telephone conference with Joanne Erde – 1.60 October 10, 2013 (Erde) – Attention to new motion re relinquishing jurisdiction; review of revisions; further revisions – 6.00 October 30, 2013 (Erde) – Research re: AHCA’s current behavior; intra-office conference to discuss status of action at DOAH - .70 November 7, 2013 (Peccola) – Strategy with J. Erde regarding Appellees’ response in opposition to Appellant’s motion for supplemental briefing; conduct research regarding same; draft same; look up 1st DCA local rule on appellate motions and email same to J. Erde – 3.60 December 5, 2013 (Erde) – Research Re: supplemental briefing issues; research to find old emails from AHCA re: inability to produce witnesses -.90 January 21, 2014 (Rodriguez-Taseff) – Working on Supplemental Answer Brief – legal argument re authentication and cases distinguishing marchines [sic]; editing facts – 6.70 February 3, 2014 (Erde) – Review and revise response to motion for further briefing; intra-office conference to discuss same – 2.20 May 2, 2014 (Pontikes) – Continue to review relevant case law regarding the definition of an unpromulgated rule; continue to analyze the briefs and the arguments; continue to draft an outline of the argument discussed – 5.00 June 5, 2014 (Erde) – draft email to group regarding AHCA’s settlement offer; reviewed supplemental settlement offer from AHCA; draft email to group re same – 1.70 June 11, 2014 (Erde) – Attention to finalizing response to AHCA’s notice of dismissal and filing of fee petition; memo to members of group – 8.00 July 21, 2014 (Erde) – completed motion for rehearing re: fees as sanctions; drafted status report for DOAH regarding status of DCA opinion; drafted status report in companion case; emails with AHCA re: withdrawing pending audits – 6.90 July 21, 2014 (Peccola) – Strategy with D. Stinson and J. Erde regarding motion for rehearing; revise/edit same; review/revise edit notices in trial court 1.20. The descriptive entries in the invoices for the appellate representation also lack sufficient detail. Examples are: “begin preparation to respond to AHCA”s brief,” “attention to appeal issues,” “preparation to draft answer brief,” and “research and draft answer brief.” For the appellate proceedings, Duane Morris added four lawyers, none with experience in Florida administrative or appellate matters. W.D. Zaffuto, L. Rodriguez-Taseff, and Rachel Pontikes are senior level lawyers in Duane Morris offices outside of Florida. Rob Peccola is a junior level lawyer from a Duane Morris office outside of Florida. The apparent result is those lawyers spending more time on issues than the more experienced Ms. Erde and Ms. Stinson would. One example of this is a July 19, 2013, billing entry where a lawyer spent time researching “appellate rules regarding extension of time and staying proceedings pending ruling on motion.” The two lawyers primarily responsible for this matter, both laying claim to Florida appellate expertise, would only need to quickly check the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure to confirm their recollection of the rules, something that would probably take less time than it took to make the time entry and review the draft bill. Hospitals’ also filed a puzzling motion that presents a discreet example of needless attorney time billed in this matter. The Hospitals expended 21.8 hours on a Motion for Rehearing of the court’s order awarding them fees and costs. The court’s opinion and the Final Order stated that fees and costs were awarded under section 120.595(4)(a), Florida Statutes. Yet the Hospitals’ motion fretted that fees might be assessed under section 120.595(4)(b), which caps fees at $50,000. The court denied the motion. Two things stand out when reviewing the invoices for the appellate proceeding. The first is that the appeal took more hours than the trial proceeding. A trial proceeding is generally more time-consuming because of discovery, a hearing much longer than an oral argument, witness preparation, document review, and preparing a proposed order. The second is the sheer number of hours. Hospitals’ counsel seeks payment for 754.10 hours in the appellate proceeding. This is 66.3 more than for the Division proceeding. It included a two day hearing, trial preparation, research, and preparing a 37 page proposed final order. In eight-hour days the claimed hours amount to a staggering 94.26 days. That amounts to one lawyer working on the appeal for eight hours a day for three months. Of this time, 613.5 hours were spent by Ms. Erde and Ms. Stinson, lawyers with expertise in the subject area, who had prepared the case for hearing, who participated in the hearing, who closely reviewed the entire record for preparation of their proposed final order, who researched the issues before the hearing and for the proposed final order, and who wrote the proposed final order. With all this knowledge and experience with the record and the law, handling the appeal should have taken less time than the proceeding before the Division.2/ One factor supports the appellate proceeding taking as many hours, or a few more hours, than the administrative proceeding. It is the Agency’s disputatious conduct over a scrivener’s error in the Final Order which erroneously stated that the Agency’s Exhibit 1 had been admitted. The Agency’s conduct increased the time needed to represent the Hospitals in the appeal. The Agency relied upon the exhibit in its initial brief, although it twice cited page 359 of the transcript where the objection to the exhibit was sustained. Also the Agency’s and the Hospitals’ proposed final orders correctly stated that Agency Exhibit 1 had not been admitted. The Hospitals’ Answer Brief noted that Agency Exhibit 1 had not been admitted. The transcript of the final hearing and both parties’ proposed final orders were clear that the exhibit had not been admitted. Yet the Agency argued in its Reply Brief that it had been. This required the Hospitals to move to remand the case for correction of the error. The Agency opposed the motion. The court granted the motion. The Final Order was corrected and jurisdiction relinquished back to the court. The Agency used this as an opportunity to trigger a new round of briefing about whether Exhibit 1 should have been admitted. This has been considered in determining the reasonable number of hours for handling the appeal. A reasonable number of hours for handling the appeal is 225. Converted to eight-hour days, this would be 28.13 days. For the appeal, Duane Morris attributes 28.4 hours of the work to a junior lawyer. This is 3.8 percent of the total time claimed. Applying that percentage to 225 hours, results in 8.6 hours attributed to the junior lawyer with the remaining 216.45 hours attributed to senior lawyers. Attorneys and Fees Each party presented expert testimony on the issues of reasonable hours and reasonable fees. The Agency presented the testimony of M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire. The Hospitals presented the testimony of David Ashburn, Esquire. As is so often the case with warring experts, the testimony of the witnesses conflicts dramatically. Mr. Bryant opined that a reasonable rate for senior lawyers, such as Ms. Erde and Ms. Stinson, ranged between $350 and $450 per hour. The reasonable rate for junior lawyers was $200 per hour. Mr. Ashburn opined that the reasonable hourly rate for senior lawyers ranged between $595 and $700 and the reasonable rate for junior lawyers was between $275 and $300. The contrast was the same for the opinions on the reasonable number of hours needed to handle the two stages of this litigation. Mr. Bryant testified that the administrative proceeding should have taken 150 to 170 hours and that the appeal should have taken 175 to 195 hours. Mr. Ashburn testified that the Hospitals’ claimed 687 hours for the proceeding before the Division and 754.10 hour for the appellate proceeding were reasonable. The Hospitals argue that somehow practicing in a large national law firm, like Duane Morris justifies a higher rate. The theory is unpersuasive. A national law firm is nothing special. There is no convincing, credible evidence to support a conclusion that lawyers from a national firm in comparison to smaller state or local firms provide better representation or more skilled and efficient lawyering that justifies a higher rate. Based upon the evidence presented in this record, a reasonable rate for the senior lawyers participating in this matter is $425 per hour. A reasonable rate for the junior lawyer participating in this matter is $200.00. Fee Amounts A reasonable fee amount for representation in the proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings is $76,500. A reasonable fee amount for the proceeding before the First District Court of Appeal is $93,701.25. Costs Hospitals seek $6,333.63 in costs. The evidence proves these costs are reasonable. The Agency does not dispute them.
The Issue An administrative complaint dated June 22, 1989, alleges that Respondents violated Sections 475.25(1)(e), 475.25(1)(o), 475.42(1)(a) and 475.42(1)(e), F.S., by failing to pay an administrative fine and by operating as a broker without a valid current license. The issue in this proceeding is whether those violations occurred, and, if so, what discipline is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Jeffrey Robert Horne, is currently licensed as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0433763 in accordance with Chapter 475, F.S. Respondent, the People's Realty, Inc., is now and was at all times material hereto, a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0253302 in accordance with Chapter 475, F.S. Jeffrey Robert Horne is licensed and operating as the qualifying broker for The People's Realty, Inc., at 1125 U.S. Highway One, Sebastian, Florida 32958. On December 6, 1988, the Florida Real Estate Commission issued its Final Order in Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate v. Jeffrey Robert Horne, Case #0156666, DOAH #88-2547, finding Respondent Horne guilty of violations of Section 475.25(1)(a), (b) and (k), F.S., reprimanding him, and assessing a fine of $500.00 for each of the three violations, for a total of $1,500.00. The order was filed, and was sent to counsel for Respondent, on December 13, 1988. The order does not, on its face, designate a deadline for payment of the fine. Jeffrey Horne sent a check dated 1/26/88 to the Department of Professional Regulation, (DPR) in the amount of $500.00, for one-third of his fine. The check was dishonored for insufficient funds and was returned to DPR. A form letter was sent to Jeffrey Horne notifying him of the nonpayment and assessing a $25.00 service charge. On or about April 7, 1989, Jeffrey Horne submitted a cashier's check to DPR in the amount of $525.00. Jeffrey Horne's April 7, 1989, submittal immediately followed his receipt of this form letter: (Note: some portions of letter are handwritten) Records Section 4-5-89 Jeffrey R. Horne 414 Quarry Lane Sebastian FL 32958 Dear I refer you to D. KELLER'S letter dated 2-24-89 , a copy of which is enclosed for your convenience, regarding your check(s) in the amount(s) of $500_ being dishonored by your bank, said check(s) being applicable to your request(s) for fine by Real Estate Commission. Since you have not complied with the above, this is to advise that I have cancelled your ( )salesman, (X)broker, (X)corporate license(s) No.(s) 0433763 & 0253302 effective 1-26-89 , and request the immediate return of said license(s) to this office. Accordingly, if you are operating as a ( )salesman, (X)broker, and/or (X)corporation, you are doing so without being the holder of valid license(s) and in violation of Chapter 475, of the Florida Statutes. For your information, the above license(s) cannot be reacti- vated unless the required amounts of $500 and $25 service charge are submitted by certified check or money order and license applied for on proper form to the undersigned. If within 10 days from the date of this letter, you still have not complied, this matter will be turned over to our Investigation Section. Sincerely, P.S. Both licenses also expired 3-31-89. No renewal shows as processed DJP: Enclosure D. Janet Puckey, Records Administrative Assistant II cc: DPR-Tallahassee - Finance & Accounting People's Realty Inc., 9516 Fellsmere Hwy, Sebastian 329 (Petitioner's exhibit #10) Nothing in the record of this proceeding explains how an effective date of 1/26/89 was established, or by what authority an Administrative Assistant II could cancel a license. In anticipation of license expiration, Jeffrey Horne had sent two renewal fee checks, dated March 27, 1989 and March 28, 1989, in the amount of $57.00 each, to DPR. These checks were dishonored for insufficient funds. Form letters dated April 26, 1989, were sent to Jeffrey Horne and to People's Realty, Inc., informing them that the checks were dishonored and requesting payment of the full amount, plus $10.00 service charge for each check. The letters also included this warning: * * * If you do not comply with the above, your license will be cancelled fifteen days from the receipt of this notice and immediate return of your license will be requested. Accordingly, any real estate business conducted subsequent to the expiration of your old license will be in violation of Chapter 475, Florida Statute. Your license cannot be reactivated unless the dishonored check is paid in full and a $10.00 service charge is paid. * * * (Petitioner's Exhibit #5) Jeffrey Horne received the notices approximately April 28, 1989, and on May 22, 1989, he sent a money order to DPR for $132.00, intending to cover the two $57.00 renewals and $10.00 service charges. He was later informed that he was $2.00 short, and he eventually sent that amount. Larry Whitten was an Investigative Specialist II, assigned to the Division of Real Estate Palm Beach office, between January 1988 and September 1989. In response to a memo from Attorney Steven Johnson, Investigator Whitten contacted Jeffrey Horne to determine whether he was currently operating. Investigator Whitten cannot recall the exact dates of his one office and two telephone contacts, but they were sometime between May 24, 1989 (the date of the memo), and June 16, 1989. The telephone was answered, "People's Realty", and the office was open and staffed by Jeffrey Horne and another person. On June 12, 1990, Darlene F. Keller, Director of the DPR Division of Real Estate, executed a "Certification of Absence of Public Record", stating: I HEREBY CERTIFY that a search of the records of the Florida Real Estate Commission has revealed that as of June 19, 1989, $1,000.00 of the fine owed by Jeffrey Robert Horne had not been received, nor had the renewal fee of $67.00 been paid. The licenses of both Respondents were invalid from April 1, 1989 to June 14, 1989. WITNESS my hand and seal this 12th day of June, 1990. (Petitioner's Exhibit #6) Paragraph 10 of the Administrative Complaint which initiated this proceeding states: "On or before June 14, 1989, Respondent made good the renewal fee checks previously returned NSF." This statement is consistent with Respondents' exhibit #1, which includes the DPR letters acknowledging payments. However, this conflicts with the statement in paragraph 10, above, that as of June 19, 1989, the renewal fee of $67.00 had not been paid. The same claim is also repeated in paragraph 11 of the Administrative Complaint. The complaint alleges that both Respondents are licensed, and that from January 13, 1989 to March 31, 1989, Respondent Horne was licensed and operating as the qualifying broker for the People's Realty, Inc., but that from April 1, 1989 to June 14, 1989, they were operating without valid and current licenses. (Paragraphs #1-4, Administrative Complaint dated June 22, 1989.) It is apparent from the above that it is Petitioner's position that Respondents' licenses expired on March 31, 1989, for nonpayment of a renewal fee, and were reinstated on June 14, 1989, when (according to one version of DPR's account) the renewal fees were properly paid. The retroactive "cancellation" of Jeffrey Horne's license by D. Janet Puckey is either given no effect, or his license was retroactively reinstated when he sent the $525.00. Jeffrey Horne has been licensed as a real estate broker since 1987. Prior to that he was licensed in Florida as a real estate salesman. The incident which led to his discipline in 1988 occurred when he was a salesman and is his only infraction of record. At the time that his checks were dishonored in 1989, he was in financial straits, having incurred legal expenses due to the disciplinary proceedings, and having recently started over with his own business. He does not consider his financial situation a threat to his clients as he refuses to accept or hold funds in escrow. Rather, he has an arrangement with a title company to maintain the escrow account. When the DPR checks were written, he thought that they would be covered by commission checks he had deposited. When he was notified that the checks were bad, he provided restitution as soon as he could. The payment of $132.00 rather than $134.00, to cover the two $57.00 renewal fees and $20.00 in service charges was a mathematical error. Jeffrey Horne concedes that he continued to operate as a broker and to operate the People's Realty, without pause, during the relevant period. He denies that he was given a deadline for payment of his fine, and he was attempting to pay it in installments. Until he was contacted by the investigator, he did not believe that his license had been revoked and would have stopped operating if he had been clearly instructed. He also attempted to pay his renewal fees and, until he was informed otherwise by DPR, he believed the fees were paid. The notice, described in paragraph 7, above, is ambiguous, but appears to provide a 15-day grace period when a check has been dishonored. Horne received the notices on April 28, 1989, but did not send the money order until May 22, 1989. He is guilty, at most, of knowingly practicing with an expired license for nine days (May 13th until May 22nd). At the time of hearing, the entire $1,500.00 administrative fine had been paid, as had the renewal fees.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, recommended that a Final Order be entered finding that Respondents violated Section 475.42(1)(a), F.S., reprimanding them, and assessing a fine of $100.00, to be paid in full 30 days from the date of the Final Order. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire DPR-Division of Real Estate P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Gregory J. Gore, P.A. P.O. Box 780384 Sebastian, FL 32978-0384 Kenneth E. Easley, General Counsel Dept. of Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe St., Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director DPR-Division of Real Estate P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32801
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a small business party within the meaning of Subsection 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes (1987). Petitioner was required to relocate its business in 1986 as the result of a public taking of the property where the business was situated. Petitioner sought relocation benefits from Respondent's relocation assistance program. The program is operated by Respondent in accordance with authority contained in Sections 339.09(4) and 421.55(3), Florida Statutes. Various requests by Petitioner for payment of relocation benefits in accordance with the Uniform Relocation Act were denied by Respondent. In DOAH Case No. 88-0778T, Petitioner sought a formal administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes concerning Respondent's denial of the requested reimbursements. At the final hearing in DOAH Case No. 88-0778T, evidence was presented regarding Respondent's denial of benefit payments of $1,324 for advertisement expense in a telephone directory; $1,370 for installation of an exhaust fan at the new facility; $2,405 for fees for consultative services from an attorney; $1,200 for the alleged loss of employee time spent in conferences with Respondent personnel regarding relocation; $1,500 for expense of a second search for a suitable relocation site; and $1,035 for consultation fees associated with design of a product display area in the new facility. With the exception of Respondent's denial of the claim for $1,035 for consultant fees, Respondent's denials were found to be appropriate in DOAH Case No. 88-0778T. Such a finding of appropriateness also equates to a finding of substantial justification for denial for purposes of this proceeding. A recommended order was issued in DOAH Case No. 88-0778T, finding denials of all requested reimbursements to be appropriate with the exception of Respondent's denial of the request for $1,035 for consultation fees associated with design of a product display area. Payment of this latter amount was recommended as constituting an authorized reimbursement under legal provisions governing the relocation program. On December 26, 1988, Respondent entered a final order awarding Petitioner $1,035 for this consultation fee expense. Other claims for reimbursement by Petitioner in the amount of $10,414.17 were paid by Respondent, prior to the final hearing in DOAH Case No. 88-0778T, in the course of proceedings in the Circuit Court for Broward County, Florida. That court adopted a settlement stipulation of the parties regarding those claims which expressly reserved attorney fees in regard to those issues for later determination by that court. Petitioner presented no evidence with regard to those claims at the final hearing in DOAH Case No. 88-0778T. At the final hearing in the present proceeding, Respondent offered testimony that confusion concerning payment of those claims resulted from the death of the attorney handling the case for Respondent. Respondent initially denied the claims in the absence of the deceased attorney's records in the mistaken belief that the matter had been resolved earlier in the circuit court condemnation proceeding. Upon learning such was not the case, payment of the claim and effectuation of settlement of the issue was made in the circuit court case and occurred shortly after Petitioner's request for hearing in DOAH Case No. 88- 0778T. The circumstances surrounding the initial denial of payment of this benefit by Respondent substantially justify Respondent's denial and constitute a sufficient basis to deny Petitioner's recovery of fees or costs related to this payment recovery in this administrative proceeding. The proof submitted at the final hearing in this cause establishes that Petitioner's counsel expended between 55 and 70 hours of time in his representation of Petitioner's attempts to recover all denied benefits in DOAH Case No. 88-0778T. Counsel's average hourly rate was $125. However, the fee arrangement between client and counsel was a "modified or combined contingency fee" permitting any recoverable attorney fees to serve as the primary source of payment of counsel's fees. Petitioner was not bound by the agreement to pay counsel's fees beyond amounts determined to be appropriate by the hearing officer in the administrative case or the judge in the circuit court matter. To that extent, attorney fees in this cause that have been incurred by Petitioner may be considered "contingent." Documentation submitted by Petitioner includes an affidavit from its president which simply recites the status of Petitioner as a small business party, but sets forth no specifics of a fee arrangement with counsel. The affidavit of Petitioner's counsel establishes a minimum number of hours (55) and dates of work performed by counsel, and states that his hourly rate is $125. Calculating the number of hours by the hourly rate, one reaches a total fee amount of $6,875. Counsel's affidavit does not address which of the various benefits sought to be recovered was the subject of any particular expenditure of time. Although the relocation benefits sought to be recovered were separable subjects, allocation of time expended with regard to a particular benefit recovery effort is not established by the evidence. Testimony of William Robert Leonard was also offered by Petitioner to support the reasonableness of a legal fee amount of $10,000 for Petitioner's counsel. While Mr. Leonard opined that he normally would not support a $10,000 attorney fee as reasonable for a $1,000 recovery, the circumstances of this case were different because "[y]ou are arguing with the state." Petitioner attempted to establish through further testimony of Leonard that the enormity of the resources of the government of the State of Florida justify such a fee because cost considerations prevent private litigants from engaging in costly and protracted proceedings in matters of limited recovery. Leonard did not address allocation of the requested attorney fee among the various benefits for which recovery was sought, choosing instead to premise his opinion regarding reasonableness of a $10,000 attorney fee upon "the amount of time counsel was required to respond to a state agency." Leonard's testimony is not credited with regard to reasonableness of a $10,000 fee for recovery of the $1,035 relocation benefit due to his professed lack of knowledge of certain administrative law procedures; the failure of his testimony to address the nature or difficulty of tasks performed by counsel for Petitioner; and his concurrence with the assertion that his opinion of such a fee was based in part upon a "gut reaction." No evidence was submitted to support the reasonableness of the cost amount of $250 requested as a witness fee for Mr. Leonard's participation in the proceeding. Petitioner seeks recovery of $448.50 in costs associated with the transcript of final hearing had in DOAH Case No. 88-0778T and a $480 expert witness fee in conjunction with testimony of E. Scott Golden, an attorney, at that final hearing. The testimony of Mr. Golden in that proceeding related to his provision of relocation site advice to Petitioner and drafting of legal documents for Petitioner. Petitioner did not prevail with regard to recovery of relocation benefits related to the expense of Mr. Golden's services.
The Issue The issue is the amount of attorney's fees and costs to which Petitioner is entitled as the prevailing party in the underlying matter, DOAH Case No. 19-4155.
Findings Of Fact Through its submission of evidence and presentation of witnesses, Petitioner has demonstrated that the attorney's fees sought are reasonable based upon the reasonable rate charged and the reasonable hours expended in this matter. During the December 19, 2019, hearing, Respondent offered little evidence and no witnesses to adequately dispute Petitioner's position. The hours expended in this matter are reasonable given the time and labor required, the novelty, complexity, and difficulty of the questions involved, the skills required to perform the legal service properly, the fact that working on this matter precluded other employment, and the accelerated time limitations imposed by section 1002.33(8)(c). For example, although the documents reviewed and relied upon by Petitioner were voluminous, and the motion practice was unrelenting throughout the abbreviated discovery period, the allotted time to conduct discovery, prepare for, and litigate this matter was minimal. The governing statute itself, section 1002.33(8)(c), requires that a final order be issued within 60 days of the request for hearing. In order to adequately litigate this matter, Petitioner's legal team had to dedicate almost entirely all of their time to this matter for several weeks at the cost of time that would otherwise have been dedicated to other cases and/or employment opportunities. The impact of this preclusion is especially significant given the fact that Johnson Jackson PLLC Attorney Erin G. Jackson's hourly rate for Petitioner ($165.00) is significantly lower than the hourly rate charged to the firm's private sector clients. This preclusion additionally resulted in Ms. Jackson relying upon the assistance of multiple Johnson Jackson PLLC attorneys, clerks, and paralegals, in addition to Attorney Terry J. Harmon of Sniffen & Spellman, P.A. Like Ms. Jackson, Mr. Harmon charged Petitioner a rate that is significantly lower than the rate he generally charges for private sector clients. The unique circumstances of this case rendered this assistance both reasonable and necessary to Petitioner's success in this matter. Further complicating matters, the question at issue, i.e., whether Petitioner proved violations of law and other good cause to immediately terminate a charter school agreement pursuant to section 1002.33(8)(c), is a novel one. In fact, section 1002.33(8)(c) was recently revised in 2018 in two notable and impactful ways: (1) section 1002.33(8)(d) became 1002.33(8)(c); and (2) the Florida legislature removed the option for the sponsor to hear an appeal of immediate termination, instead now requiring that all such appeals be held before an ALJ. Compare § 1002.33(8)(d), Fla. Stat. (2017), with § 1002.33(8)(c), Fla. Stat. (2018). Consequently, precedent with similar factual circumstances raising related issues pursuant to this statute is nearly nonexistent. The lack of precedent on this issue is further heightened by the fact that the conditions necessary to warrant immediate termination, i.e., an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of charter school students, are more severe and, therefore, much less common than terminations pursuant to other portions of section 1002.33. The novelty, complexity, and difficulty of this issue necessarily required Ms. Jackson to expend significant time and resources on researching and strategizing in preparation for the hearing. Respondent's evasive and dismissive behavior further contributed to the foregoing challenges and required Petitioner's legal team to dedicate additional hours and attorneys to this matter that would not have otherwise been necessary if Respondent simply complied with the rules of discovery and the undersigned's orders regarding the same. Consequently, Petitioner's legal team spent more than 73 hours drafting motions and performing related duties addressing Respondent's persistent refusal to respond to discovery. As a result of Respondent's failure to comply with discovery requirements and direct orders from the undersigned, Petitioner had no choice but to expend this additional time. The legitimacy and necessity of these efforts is further evidenced by the fact that the undersigned granted each of Petitioner's motions to compel. Further, Johnson Jackson PLLC maintained detailed records of all services rendered as evidence of the extensive time and effort dedicated to this matter. These records demonstrate that Johnson Jackson PLLC attorneys and staff dedicated approximately 1,178.8 hours between July 30, 2019 (when Ms. Jackson began drafting written discovery to be issued to Respondent), and January 15, 2020, to this matter. Sniffen & Spellman, P.A., also maintained detailed records of all services rendered. These records show that the attorneys and staff of Sniffen & Spellman, P.A., dedicated approximately 71.9 hours to this matter between August 2019 and January 15, 2020. During the December 19, 2019, hearing, Petitioner's expert, Attorney Robert W. Boos of Adams and Reese, testified to the reasonableness of the hours expended by Johnson Jackson PLLC in this matter. Mr. Boos has been practicing law for approximately 40 years and has served as counsel for the Hillsborough County School Board. Based on Mr. Boos' years of experience as an attorney, in addition to a review of the hours expended by the attorneys and staff of Johnson Jackson PLLC and Sniffen & Spellman, P.A., Mr. Boos testified that the total amount of hours expended was reasonable given the underlying circumstances of this matter. He also found the discounted hourly rate to be "eminently reasonable." In an effort to rebut the reasonableness of the hours expended by Petitioner's legal team, Respondent attempted to dispute the nature of its behavior in the underlying proceedings during the December 19, 2019, hearing. Specifically, although Respondent contended that it was not there "to relitigate what already happened at the previous hearing," Respondent then went on to assert that, "LMA's entire inventory, every single piece of paper, every single record was seized by Manatee County School Board. They had access to everything." However, as already thoroughly addressed by the undersigned in his 95-page Final Order, Petitioner, in fact, did not have access to everything. In fact, Petitioner still does not have access to "everything." As previously explained by the undersigned: Another factor that has not gone unnoticed by the undersigned in the course of these expedited proceedings is that LMA's pattern of refusing to respond to requests for information made by the School District during discovery has continued into these proceedings. The undersigned can only imagine Petitioner's frustration with the constant refusal of LMA to provide the documents requested during discovery, with the common refrain of "you already have the documents, because you (the School District) seized all of LMA's records … leaving us (the former staff) with nothing to provide you." However, this cry by LMA fails to ring true … . No evidence was presented through testimony, and certainly not through documentation, that LMA provided the complete records of their activities in this first year of the charter's school operations. As acknowledged by Respondent, the parties have already litigated this issue. The undersigned previously issued his Final Order as to the issue of these documents. The undersigned also stated his intent to avoid relitigating the issue during the December 19, 2019, hearing. Respondent's argument is without merit, blatantly disregards previous rulings in the underlying case, and, therefore, should have no bearing on the present issues. Notably, Respondent did not dispute the novelty and complexity of the issues involved or expedited nature of this matter. To the contrary, Respondent's qualified representative, Mr. Norwood, described this matter as "very quick, very expedited," explaining further that, "[t]here was a lot of things that happened not, you know, typical of any case … . This is a fairly new area of law, period." Such factors are relevant to determining whether the number of hours expended were reasonable. Although Respondent did not dispute the expedited nature of this matter, it nonetheless attempted to argue that the School Board had a "choice," with respect to terminating LMA's charter immediately pursuant to section 1002.33(8)(c), which requires expedited proceedings, versus section 1002.33(8)(b), which allows for a 90-day timeline. Based on this contention, Respondent suggested that it was Petitioner's own fault that these proceedings were expedited, and, therefore, Petitioner should pay for it. But this argument fails to account for the fact that the undersigned has already determined that the rationale underlying Petitioner's decision to terminate Respondent's charter was warranted due to the dangers that Respondent posed to its students' health, safety, and welfare. With student health, safety, and welfare at risk, Petitioner did not have a "choice." Rather, the act of immediately terminating LMA's charter was "the only remaining" measure available to Petitioner at that point in time: The testimony presented by both parties to this proceeding leads the undersigned to the conclusion that no tools were left for the School District in dealing with a charter school that failed to address their repeated efforts at gathering information. As evidenced by the foregoing, Petitioner has already litigated and provided sufficient evidence of the numerous notices and warnings Petitioner issued to Respondent and Respondent's lack of cooperation preceding the termination of its charter. Contrary to Respondent's allegations, Respondent's own choices caused this expediency. Accordingly, Respondent should bear the cost, not Petitioner. Given the novelty, complexity, and difficulty of resolving this issue coupled with the extraordinary circumstances of this matter, including but not limited to, the time spent by Petitioner's legal team attempting to overcome Respondent's prejudicial hurdles, the hours expended were clearly reasonable. The rates charged by Petitioner were equally reasonable. In consideration of the market value and the factors set forth in Rule Regulating Florida Bar 4-1.5, Johnson Jackson PLLC charged Petitioner $165.00 per hour for attorneys; $100.00 per hour for first-year attorneys; and $90.00 per hour for paralegals and law clerks. Johnson Jackson PLLC's hourly rate is extremely reasonable given the experience and expertise of its attorneys and staff, as evidenced by their CVs and affidavits. Sniffen & Spellman, P.A., similarly charged Petitioner $165.00 per hour for attorneys; $75.00 per hour for paralegals; and $50.00 per hour for law clerks. As evidenced by the fact that both Johnson Jackson PPLC attorneys and Sniffen & Spellman, P.A., attorneys billed the same rate, Sniffen & Spellman, P.A.'s, hourly rate is consistent with the market rate and reasonable given the experience and expertise of its attorneys and staff, once again as evidenced by Mr. Harmon's CV and affidavits. The foregoing rates are also consistent with, if not noticeably lower than, the rates charged by other attorneys, paralegals, and/or law clerks, to school boards in other nearby counties in Florida. For example, attorneys for Indian River County charge $250.00 to $180.00 per hour and attorneys for Hernando County charge $285.00 to $215.00 per hour. Importantly, despite the expedited nature of this matter, these rates do not exceed the fee agreements between Petitioner's legal team and Petitioner, which both preceded the circumstances that gave rise to this matter. Both Johnson Jackson PLLC and Sniffen & Spellman, P.A., remained committed to the hourly rates agreed-to pursuant to these agreements regardless of the complexity, novelty, and difficulty of the issues. The reasonableness of these rates is further evidenced by the nature and length of Johnson Jackson PLLC and Sniffen & Spellman, P.A.'s, professional relationship with Petitioner. For example, Ms. Jackson has had a professional relationship with Petitioner since 2009. The length of Ms. Jackson and Mr. Harmon's relationship with Petitioner also serves as evidence of Ms. Jackson and Mr. Harmon's extensive experience, skills, expertise, and abilities in this area of law. Ms. Jackson has been admitted to The Florida Bar since 2000, and Mr. Harmon has been admitted to The Florida Bar since 2006. Ms. Jackson is board certified by The Florida Bar in labor and employment law, and Mr. Harmon is board certified by The Florida Bar in education law. During the December 19, 2019, hearing, Petitioner's expert, Mr. Boos, testified to the reasonableness of the fees charged by Ms. Jackson in this matter. As mentioned previously, Mr. Boos has been practicing law for approximately 40 years and has served as counsel for the Hillsborough County School Board. Mr. Boos testified that he generally charges the School Board of Hillsborough County $310.00 per hour. By comparison, Petitioner's legal team charged Petitioner no more than $165.00 per hour. Based on Mr. Boos' years of experience as an attorney, in addition to his review of the lawyer invoices, Mr. Boos testified that Petitioner's legal team's hourly rate was "eminently reasonable." Respondent did not dispute or otherwise offer any evidence disputing the reasonableness of the hourly rates charged during the December 19, 2019, hearing. Based upon the foregoing findings, Petitioner's legal team's hourly rates are clearly reasonable in light of the market value, the agreements between the parties, and the experience and skill offered by the attorneys and staff at Johnson Jackson PLLC and Sniffen & Spellman, P.A. Accordingly, the undersigned accepts these rates in calculating the total amount of attorney's fees owed by Respondent in this matter. Based upon the reasonableness of the fees charged and hours expended, the Lodestar figure (i.e., the fees charged multiplied by the hours expended) is $175,658.00 for work performed prior to November 30, 2019, and is $17,992.50 for work performed through January 15, 2020; together, totaling $193,650.50. These totals are broken down in detail below: For work performed prior to November 30, 2019: Erin Jackson (Shareholder) - $165.00 x 346.5 hours = $57,172.50 Kevin Johnson (Shareholder) - $165.00 x 9.1 hours = $1,501.50 Christopher Bentley (Partner) - $165.00 x 4.9 hours = $808.50 Ashley Gallagher (n/k/a Tinsley) (Associate Attorney) - $165.00 x 434.1 hours = $71,626.50 Beatriz Miranda (Associate Attorney) - $165.00 x 118.2 hours = $19,503.00 Colby Ellis (Associate Attorney) - $100.00 x 2.5 hours = $250.00 Colby Ellis (Law Clerk) - $90.00 x 8.3 hours = $747.00 Julia Shinn (Paralegal) - $90.00 x 109.6 hours = $9,864.00 Tiffany Albertson (Paralegal) - $90.00 x 35.5 hours = $3,195.00 Terry J. Harmon (Shareholder)- $165.00 x 66 hours = $10,890.00 Sara Finnegan (Law Clerk) - $50.00 x 2 hours = $100.00 TOTAL PRE-NOVEMBER 30, 2019: $175,658.00 For work performed since the November 30, 2019, invoice: Erin Jackson (Shareholder) - $165.00 x 31.8 hours = $5,247.00 Ashley Gallagher (Associate Attorney) - $165.00 x 61.6 hours = $10,164.00 Bridget McNamee (Of Counsel) - $165.00 x 2.8 hours = $462.00 Julia Shinn (Paralegal) - $90.00 x 15.8 hours = $1,422.00 Tiffany Albertson (Paralegal) - $90.00 x 0.6 hours = $54.00 Terry J. Harmon (Shareholder) - $165.00 x 3.9 hours = $643.50 TOTAL POST-NOVEMBER 30, 2019: $17,992.50 TOTAL FOR PRE- AND POST-NOVEMBER 30, 2019: $193,650.50 Because the total fee amount of $193,650.50 is based upon reasonable hours expended and a reasonable hourly rate, this amount, at a minimum, should be awarded. The costs sought by Petitioner in this matter are also reasonable. As previously mentioned, Ms. Jackson and Petitioner have a professional relationship that began approximately ten years ago. This relationship is governed by a fee agreement. Petitioner's fee agreement with Johnson Jackson PLLC provides that its invoices itemize all costs, and such costs may include travel expenses, courier services, service of process fees, photocopy charges by third parties, filing fees, recording fees, lien and judgment searches, expert witnesses, court reporter services, corporate record books, registration fees charged by governmental authorities, and any other costs incurred in the course of representation. In accordance with this agreement, Johnson Jackson PLLC maintains documents itemizing all costs incurred. Accordingly, Petitioner has proper notice of the costs that may be included in any invoices issued, and each cost can be identified and allocated for purposes of demonstrating the reasonable need for these expenses. During the December 19, 2019, hearing, Mr. Boos testified that he reviewed the expenses and costs charged and found those expenses to be reasonable and customary for this type of matter. For purposes of the December 19, 2019, hearing, Petitioner paid Mr. Boos $7,500.00 for his services and $598.45 for court reporter services, totaling $8,098.45 in additional taxable costs accrued since the December 19, 2019, hearing. These costs were necessary expenditures for purposes of pursuing attorney's fees and costs in this matter. In consideration of Mr. Boos' testimony in addition to the applicable factors and guidelines, the following expenditures by Johnson Jackson PLLC should be taxed: Court Reporters/Transcripts: $25,607.9017 Service of Subpoenas & related services: $4,141.74 Cost of expert testimony by Bob Boos, Esq.: $7,500 The foregoing expenditures total $37,249.64 in taxable costs. Given the reasonableness and necessity of these expenditures, Petitioner should be awarded these costs in full. In addition to the costs outlined above, Respondent must also pay for the services rendered by CRI and Sylint. Petitioner hired CRI to conduct a forensic investigation of LMA, which included, but was not limited to, conducting an analysis of the funding received by LMA and the categorical use of those funds by LMA; confirming LMA's payroll process and determining the status of employee payroll to determine employee payroll liabilities; determining LMA employee withholdings for payroll taxes meant to be paid to the Internal Revenue Service, and LMA employee withholdings for the pension meant to be paid to the Florida Retirement System; and determine LMA's liabilities based upon the unpaid invoices and breakdown of all liabilities between the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 school year. Based on a thorough analysis of this data, CRI prepared a report, accompanied by hundreds of pages of exhibits, upon which Petitioner's legal team heavily relied on during the formal hearing. Among other things, this report identified the voluminous debts accrued by Respondent; the source of some of those debts; and the funds that still remained unaccounted for. Pursuant to this investigation, CRI was able to confirm Respondent's debt totaled more than one million dollars. CRI Manager Mark S. Smith, Jr., drafted the report and testified about his findings and the basis for his conclusions during the hearing. During the December 19, 2019, hearing, Mr. Smith confirmed that he testified during the August 2019 hearing and verified the authenticity of his CV, CRI's invoices, and the scope of CRI's services pursuant to CRI's engagement letter with Petitioner. CRI's forensic investigation and report served as undisputable evidence of Respondent's egregious financial mismanagement and how this financial mismanagement posed an immediate danger to student health, safety, and welfare of LMA's students. The pivotal role that CRI's services played in the underlying case is undisputed. Services rendered by CRI total $42,091.00 and are broken down as follows: August 15, 2019 Invoice: $18,258.00 August 27, 2019 Invoice: $18,871.00 September 10, 2019 Invoice: $4,962.00 For similar reasons, Respondent should also pay for Sylint's services. Petitioner hired Sylint to conduct a forensic audit and investigation of Respondent's laptops, cloud accounts (including but not limited to LMA's "G-suite"), emails, and other electronic software and devices, and provide forensic and evidentiary guidance relative to this litigation. In the performance of these services, Sylint analyzed and authenticated evidence demonstrating the danger that Respondent's ongoing operations posed to student health, safety, and welfare, including but not limited to, surveillance videos showing CEO Eddie Hundley having direct contact with students while on campus, even though this conduct expressly violated statutory law and directives from the Commissioner of Education. The CEO and President of Sylint, John E. Jorgensen, testified and authenticated the date and time of these surveillance videos during the formal hearing on August 27, 2019. Sylint also discovered that agents of Respondent, including, but not limited to, Chief Financial Officer Cornelle Maxfield, deleted hundreds of files during the pendency of this action after Petitioner had served Respondent with written discovery requests. Sylint's employee, Weston Watson, testified regarding the deletion of these files during the formal hearing on August 26, 2019. To demonstrate the prejudicial effect of Respondent's conduct, Sylint also created several demonstratives presented at the hearing, including, but not limited to, a timeline showing when agents of LMA deleted documentation seemingly responsive to Petitioner's discovery requests. In addition to deleting files that should have been preserved, Respondent failed to comply with numerous requests by Sylint, Petitioner, and the undersigned to hand over tablets, phones, and/or emails in a timely fashion. For example, Mr. Hundley never gave Petitioner or Sylint his phone despite numerous requests that he do so and did not provide a USB containing his emails until approximately 3:00 p.m. on the second day of the four-day hearing. Services rendered by Sylint from August 2, 2019, to August 30, 2019, which included, but were not limited to: evidence collection and intake; data analysis; device imaging; hearing preparation; and testimony at hearing, cost approximately $24,996.68. During the December 19, 2019, hearing, and pursuant to a Motion in Limine, Respondent objected to the introduction of evidence regarding CRI and Sylint's services because the respective investigations "would have happened regardless of whether or not LMA had appealed the decision to terminate the school." In support of this contention, Respondent cited the July 23, 2019, School Board meeting minutes. However, contrary to Respondent's contentions, the July 23 School Board meeting minutes demonstrate exactly why CRI and Sylint's invoices are relevant and should be reimbursed—because the services performed by CRI and Sylint would not have been necessary but for LMA's mismanagement and poor decision- making—not any action taken by the School Board. As pointedly explained by the undersigned: I don't think they bring in a firm to perform an audit between school years … if they didn't think there was a problem going on … But this was in no way, shape, or form a routine audit being performed by CRI. It was a forensic audit looking for money that was believed to have gone missing, and ultimately based on my findings proven to have gone missing. The undersigned has already determined that the conditions resulting in the termination of LMA's charter posed an immediate danger to student health, safety, and welfare; and Respondent's conduct caused such conditions to arise. The evidence discovered and/or analyzed by Sylint and CRI was vital to Petitioner's case. In fact, the undersigned expressly relied on evidence discovered and/or analyzed by CRI and Sylint in finding that both Respondent's financial mismanagement and Mr. Hundley's conduct posed an immediate danger to the health, safety, and welfare of students. As explained by the undersigned in his Final Order: When forensic accountants and long-time public officials cannot find all of the necessary records to continue the operation of the school, just two days after being taken over by the School District, to answer the questions about payroll taxes, FRS contributions, Best and Brightest awards, food service menus and purchases, and utility payments, someone is hiding the ball. … Even with limited records available, however, the School District has made a strong case for immediately terminating the charter. Although Respondent disputes whether Petitioner would have employed CRI and Sylint's services regardless of Respondent's appeal, Respondent does not dispute the vital role that CRI and Sylint's services played in this matter. Respondent failed to produce documentation requested during discovery despite assurances that it would do so and, months later, still has not produced requested documentation. Respondent has never, during the pendency of these proceedings, in good faith responded to reasonable discovery requests. CRI and Sylint, to the extent possible, were able to at least partially to fill this gap of missing information and even demonstrate how Respondent was actively engaging in conduct to ensure Petitioner did not have access to this information. In light of Respondent's complete failure to cooperate with Petitioner, Petitioner had no choice but to rely upon CRI and Sylint's assistance. Absent this assistance, Respondent's prejudicial conduct would have significantly, if not completely, debilitated Petitioner's ability to demonstrate the true extent of the immediate dangers that Respondent posed to student health, safety, and welfare. It is also important to note that Petitioner has already reduced the requested costs for CRI and Sylint's services in an effort to be reasonable. As noted by the undersigned, Petitioner reduced the CRI invoices from $54,000.00 to $42,091.00, only submitting invoices beginning in August 2019. Sylint's invoices also begin in August 2019. Thus, prior to submission of Respondent's Motion in Limine, Petitioner already excluded, although it did not have to, any costs pertaining to services that could have arguably been perceived as "outside the scope of the Order on Termination." In consideration of the foregoing, Respondent should pay for CRI and Sylint's services as taxable costs and/or as sanctions for Respondent's willful lack of cooperation throughout these proceedings. Respondent's conduct remains undisputed. The prejudicial effect of Respondent's conduct remains undisputed. Accordingly, Respondent should be liable for these costs, totaling $67,087.68.
The Issue The issue is the amount of attorney's fees and costs to which Petitioner is entitled by Order of the appellate court pursuant to Subsection 120.595(5), Florida Statutes (2007).1
Findings Of Fact On February 9, 2005, the Commissioner of Education (the Commissioner) filed an Administrative Complaint against Ms. Stacy Stinson, now Ms. Stacy Lewis. Ms. Stinson requested an administrative hearing pursuant to Subsection 120.57(1) (a 120.57 proceeding). The Commissioner referred the matter to DOAH to conduct the 120.57 proceeding. DOAH opened the 120.57 proceeding as Jim Horne, as Commissioner of Education v. Stacy Stinson, Case No. 05-0504PL (DOAH August 11, 2005) (the underlying proceeding). The Recommended Order in the underlying proceeding recommended the entry of a final order finding the respondent in the underlying proceeding not guilty of the charges against her and imposing no penalty against her teaching certificate. On January 5, 2006, the Educational Practices Commission (EPC) entered a Final Order rejecting or modifying some findings of fact in the Recommended Order, reprimanding the respondent, imposing a two-week suspension of her teaching certificate, and placing her on probation for three years. On January 5, 2006, the respondent in the underlying proceeding filed a notice of administrative appeal to the First District Court of Appeal. The initial brief was filed on March 16, 2006. The answer was filed on May 1, 2006. On May 15, 2006, the respondent filed a reply brief, motion for attorney's fees, and request for oral argument. On August 22, 2006, the appellate court issued its order in Stinson v. Winn, 938 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). The appellate court concluded that the EPC improperly rejected or modified factual findings and legal conclusions of the ALJ and remanded the matter for entry of a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint and finding the respondent in the underlying proceeding not guilty of the allegations, consistent with the Recommended Order. The appellate court also granted the motion for attorney's fees, pursuant to Subsection 120.595(5), and remanded the case to DOAH to determine the amount of fees. The instant proceeding ensued. Respondent does not contest the reasonableness of costs in the amount of $3,484.95. Petitioner seeks an award of costs in the amount of $3,954.95. Petitioner is entitled to costs in the amount of $3,484.95. Petitioner seeks attorney's fees for the underlying proceeding and the appellate proceeding in the amount of $94,104.45, plus interest. The amount of fees is based on 360.6 hours at an hourly rate of $250.00. Respondent claims the correct amount of attorney's fees is $22,680.00. The amount of fees is based on 252 hours at an hourly rate of $90.00. An hourly rate of $90.00 is reasonable. The $90.00- rate is the rate established in the fee agreement reached between Petitioner and her attorney. Judicial decisions discussed in the Conclusions of Law hold that in no case should the court-awarded fee exceed the fee agreement reached by the attorney and her client. The number of hours reasonably expended is 283.15 hours. The hours claimed by Petitioner in the amount of 360.6 should be reduced by 62.8 hours based on credible and persuasive testimony of Respondent's expert. The subtotal of 297.8 hours includes 34.9 hours billed, from June 6 through July 5, 2005, to prepare the PRO in the underlying proceeding. The total time billed for preparing the PRO includes 19.2 hours for what is labeled, in part, as research undertaken to prepare the PRO. The 2.7 hours for research pertaining to penalties, bearing an entry date of June 27, 2005, is reasonable because the research is reflected in the PRO. The remaining legal research undertaken to prepare the PRO is not reflected in the PRO. The amount billed for preparation of the PRO is reduced from 34.9 hours to 20.25 hours, a reduction of 14.65 hours. The Conclusions of Law in the PRO consist of 33 paragraphs numbered 17 through 49. Apart from administrative proceedings pertaining to penalties, the 33 paragraphs cite three appellate decisions, one of which may be fairly characterized as a "boiler-plate" citation for the burden of proof. The remainder of the 33 paragraphs consists of naked argument. A principal purpose of a PRO is to inform the ALJ of relevant judicial decisions, to distinguish between supporting and contradicting decisions, and to explain why, in the context of the facts at issue, the supporting decisions seize the day for the client. That is the proper role of an attorney in the adversarial process at the trial level. The PRO does not reflect that effort.3 Economic reality is not lost on the fact-finder. It may be that the fee-sensitivity of a client in a particular case precludes an attorney from fully researching and discussing a relevant legal issue. In the instant case, however, the attorney billed 34.9 hours for a PRO with two citations to appellate decisions beyond the burden of proof. Novel and difficult questions of fact and law were present in the underlying proceeding. The factual issues involved a so-called trial by deposition in a penal proceeding. The legal issues involved a literal conflict between a so-called adopted rule and a statute in a 120.57 proceeding. However, the PRO filed in the underlying proceeding provided no legal research concerning either novel question. Judicial decisions discussed in the Conclusions of Law hold that reasonable attorney's fees are determined by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. The mathematical product is the lodestar. The lodestar in this proceeding is $25,483.50, determined by multiplying 283.15 hours by an hourly rate of $90.00. The lodestar is not increased or decreased by the results obtained or risk factor. There is no evidence of a "risk factor" attributable to contingency or other factors. There is no increase for the results obtained. Although the results were favorable, the favorable results turned principally on issues of fact and law for which relevant judicial decisions exist and were found through independent research by the ALJ without any assistance from legal research evidenced in the PRO.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Anthony D. Demma, Esquire Meyer and Brooks, P.A. Post Office Box 1547 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 For Respondent: Todd Resavage, Esquire Brooks, LeBoef, Bennett, Foster & Gwartney, P.A. 909 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing the original Notice of Appeal with the agency clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the Appellate District where the party resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to an award for attorney's fees for litigating the attorney's fees issue where the appellate court has determined the Petitioner is entitled to attorney's fees and costs under the provisions of Section 120.57(1)(b)10., Florida Statutes. Whether the Petitioner is entitled to a multiplier enhancement to the lodestar in an award of attorney's fees and costs under Section 120.57(1)(b)10., Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact In March, 1989, the Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services sought bids for 17,500 square feet of office space in central Orlando, for a period of seven years beginning in December, 1989, with two three-year option extensions. Petitioner and two others submitted bids. After committee review, the bid was awarded to another bidder on or about June 26, 1989. Petitioner timely filed his informal and formal bid protests, and the matter was heard at length before the Division of Administrative Hearings in August, 1989. The Hearing Officer found that Petitioner had sustained the burden of proof and demonstrated that the Department had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in the bid process, and recommended that the lease be re-bid. The Secretary for the Department adopted the Recommended Order but also added an additional condition that the lease be re-bid only if necessary. Petitioner appealed to the Fifth District Court of Appeal which sustained the position of the Petitioner and, although disputed by the Department, granted attorney's fees and costs for all stages of the proceedings. This matter was remanded to the Department for re-bidding and to the Division for the determination of the amount of fees and costs to be awarded. Courtenay v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 581 So.2d 621 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). The Law Office of Terrence William Ackert represented Petitioner through all stages of the administrative bid protest and appeal pertaining to the Invitation to Bid for 17,500 square feet of professional office space in the central Orlando, Florida area. Petitioner, a long time client of counsel of record, agreed to pay counsel at the rate of one hundred twenty-five Dollars, and later at one hundred thirty-five Dollars, per hour and for legal assistant charges ranging from twenty-five Dollars an hour to sixty Dollars an hour, and for costs. The Petition for Costs and Attorneys' Fees was timely filed on July 19, 1991. The parties were unable to reach a stipulation regarding the amount of reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded. A fair and reasonable fee for attorney and legal assistant time is as follows: For the period: 6/27/89-2/27/90 Trial attorney time...141.9hrs at $125.00hr =$17,737.50 Legal assistant time...66.0hrs at $45/50hr = $2,990.00 Total. $20,736.50 For the period: 2/27/90-6/30/91 Post-hearing appellate attorney time...92.4hrs at $125.00 =$11,550.00 Post-hearing appellate attorney time...50.6hrs at $135.00 = $6,871.50 Total. $18,421.50 Post-hearing appellate time for various legal assistants at $25/35/50/60hr. =$4,980 Total. $23,401.50 For the period: 7/1/91-to present Post-remand attorney time...48.2hrs at $135.00 = $6,489 Post-remand legal assistant time...50.1hrs at $25/35/60hr =$2,013.00 Total. $8,502 Costs expended for hearing, appeal and remand hearing Total. $8,548.10 Total due for reasonable attorneys' fee and costs. $61,188.10 During the administrative appeal, the Respondent vacated space previously leased from Petitioner and the consequent loss of income rendered Petitioner unable to make payments to counsel. Total payments to counsel of record have been limited to $5,785. Petitioner remains liable for all fees and costs, and has been billed regularly for the total due and owing. Challenge of a proposed award of bid by an agency is complicated, difficult and time consuming process because the litigation is focused primarily in the administrative arena, where few attorneys are willing to accept cases of this type. In order to attain a successful result, it required considerable skill by counsel to properly perform the service. Acceptance by counsel of this matter precluded the acceptance of other litigation because of the three stage administrative process in order to secure relief for his client.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Intervenors are entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2003).1
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an insurer and carrier within the meaning of Subsections 440.02(4) and 440.02(38), Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602(1)(w).2 Petitioner is licensed in the state as a workers' compensation insurance carrier (carrier).3 Respondent is a state agency within the meaning of Subsection 440.02(3), Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602(1)(b). In relevant part, Respondent is responsible for resolving reimbursement disputes between a carrier and a health care provider. Intervenors are health care providers within the meaning of Subsection 440.13(1)(h), Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602(1)(u). Each Intervenor is a health care facility within the meaning of Subsection 440.13(1)(g), Florida Statutes (2005). Intervenors seek an award of attorney fees and costs against Petitioner pursuant to Sections 57.105 and 120.595, Florida Statutes (2003). The proceeding involving Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2003), is the subject of a separate Final Order entered on the same date as this Recommended Order. The scope of this Recommended Order is limited to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2003). Intervenors allege that Petitioner is the "non- prevailing adverse party" in an underlying proceeding and participated in the underlying proceeding for an "improper purpose" as the quoted terms are defined, respectively, in Subsections 120.595(1)(e)3. and 120.595(1)(e)1., Florida Statutes (2003). The underlying proceeding involves eight consolidated Petitions for Administrative Hearing. Petitioner filed each Petition for Administrative Hearing after Respondent determined Petitioner had improperly discounted the amount of reimbursement Petitioner paid for hospital services that Intervenors provided to eight patients from March 13, 2004, through February 11, 2005. From April 13 through May 23, 2005, Respondent issued separate orders directing Petitioner to pay the disputed amounts pursuant to Subsection 440.13(7), Florida Statutes (2005). From June 1 through June 21, 2005, Petitioner filed eight separate Petitions for Administrative Hearing. The eight petitions were subsequently consolidated into one underlying proceeding. Petitioner is the non-prevailing adverse party in the underlying proceeding. On December 8, 2005, Petitioner filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal in the underlying proceeding. On December 9, 2005, Intervenors filed their motion for attorney fees based on Section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2003). The formal hearing in the underlying proceeding was set for January 18, 2006. The ALJ amended the issue for the formal hearing to exclude the original reimbursement dispute and to limit the scope of the formal hearing to the fee dispute. The ALJ did so to avoid delay in the resolution of the proceeding. The fee dispute at issue in this proceeding includes only six of the original eight reimbursement disputes because Intervenors were not the medical providers in two of the original eight disputes.4 In the six reimbursement disputes involving Intervenors, Respondent ordered Petitioner to pay additional reimbursements in the aggregate amount of $54,178.52. Approximately $51,489.27 of the $54,178.52 in additional reimbursement involved inpatient hospital services provided to one patient.5 The remaining $2,689.25 in additional reimbursement involved outpatient hospital services in the emergency room.6 Subsection 440.13(12), Florida Statutes (2005), mandates that a three-member panel must determine statewide schedules for reimbursement allowances for inpatient hospital care. The statute requires hospital outpatient care to be reimbursed at 75 percent of "usual and customary" charges with certain exceptions not relevant to this proceeding. Notwithstanding the statutory mandate to schedule reimbursement rates for hospital inpatient services, the inpatient services at issue in the underlying proceeding were apparently unscheduled inpatient services. By letter dated April 13, 2005, Respondent ordered Petitioner to pay Intervenor, Holmes Regional Medical Center, Inc. (Holmes), an additional reimbursement in the amount of $51,489.27. The total reimbursement to Holmes was 75 percent of the charges that Holmes submitted to Petitioner for reimbursement.7 Respondent interprets Subsection 440.13(12), Florida Statutes (2005), to authorize reimbursement of both unscheduled inpatient hospital services and outpatient hospital services at the same rate. There is no dispute that Respondent reimburses unscheduled inpatient hospital services and outpatient hospital services at 75 percent of the "usual and customary" charges. The dispute in the underlying proceeding was over the meaning of the phrase "usual and customary" charges. Petitioner challenged the interpretation asserted by Respondent and Intervenors. Respondent and Intervenors contended that the quoted statutory phrase means Intervenors' usual and customary charges evidenced in a proprietary document identified in the record as the "charge master." Each Intervenor maintains its own charge master, and the information in each charge master is proprietary and confidential to each Intervenor. Petitioner asserted that the statutory phrase "usual and customary" charges means the usual and customary charges imposed by other hospitals in the community in which Intervenors are located. Petitioner maintains a data base that contains information sufficient to determine the usual and customary charges in each community. Petitioner did not participate in the underlying proceeding for an improper purpose within the meaning of Subsection 120.595(1)(e)1., Florida Statutes (2003). Rather, Petitioner presented a good faith claim or defense to modify or reverse the then-existing interpretation of Subsection 440.13(12), Florida Statutes (2005). Petitioner had a reasonable expectation of success. The statutory phrase "usual and customary" charges is not defined by statute. Nor has the phrase been judicially defined. Respondent bases its interpretation of the disputed phrase on two agency final orders and relevant language in the Florida Workers' Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals (2004 Second Edition) (the Manual). The Manual is developed by the Florida Department of Financial Services (DFS).8 The Manual interprets the quoted statutory phrase to mean the "hospital's charges." However, after the effective date of the Manual in 2004, DFS developed a proposed change to the Manual that, in relevant part, interprets "usual and customary" charges to mean the lesser of the charges billed by the hospital or the median charge of hospitals located within the same Medicare geographic locality.9 The trier of fact does not consider the new interpretation of the disputed statutory phrase as evidence relevant to a disputed issue of fact. As Respondent determined in an Order to Show Cause issued on February 16, 2006, and attached to Intervenors' PRO, "what constitutes 'usual and customary' charges is a question of law, not fact." The ALJ considers the new interpretation proposed by DFS for the purpose of determining the reasonableness of the interpretation asserted by Petitioner in the underlying proceeding. The ALJ also considers the new DFS interpretation to determine whether the interpretation asserted by Petitioner presented a justiciable issue of law. Intervenors assert that Petitioner's improper purpose in the underlying proceeding is evidenced, in relevant part, by Petitioner's failure to initially explain its reduced reimbursement to Intervenors with one of the codes authorized in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602(5)(n) as an explanation of bill review (EOBR). None of the EOBR codes, however, contemplates a new interpretation of the statutory phrase "usual and customary" charges. Intervenors further assert that Petitioner's improper purpose in the underlying proceeding is evidenced, in relevant part, by Petitioner's failure to respond to discovery. However, responses to discovery would not have further elucidated Petitioner's rule-challenge. Petitioner stated eight times in each Petition for Administrative Hearing that Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.501, the DFS rule incorporating the Manual by reference: [S]hould be read to allow recovery of 75% of the usual and customary fee prevailing in the community, and not 75% of whatever fee an individual provider elects to charge. Respondent and Intervenors were fully aware of the absence of statutory and judicial authority to resolve the issue. Petitioner did raise at least one factual issue in each Petition for Administrative Hearing. Petitioner alleged that Respondent's decision letters ordering Petitioner to pay additional reimbursement amounts had no legal effect because Respondent acted before each provider requested and received the carrier's reconsidered reimbursement decision. The absence of a formal hearing in the underlying proceeding foreclosed an evidential basis for a determination of whether each provider in fact requested and received a reconsidered reimbursement decision before the date Respondent ordered Petitioner to pay additional reimbursements. In this fee dispute, Petitioner presented some evidence to support the factual allegation and thereby established the presence of a justiciable issue of fact. It is not necessary for Petitioner to present enough evidence to show that Petitioner would have prevailed on that factual issue in the underlying proceeding. If the letters of determination issued by Respondent were without legal effect, Petitioner would not have waived its objections to further reimbursement within the meaning of Subsection 440.13(7)(b), Florida Statutes (2005). A determination that Petitioner did, or did not, submit the required information is unnecessary in this proceeding. During the formal hearing in this proceeding, Petitioner called an expert employed by a company identified in the record as Qmedtrix. The testimony showed a factual basis for the initial reimbursement paid by Petitioner. It is not necessary for Petitioner to show that this evidence was sufficient to prevail on the merits in the underlying case. The evidence is sufficient to establish justiciable issues of fact in the underlying case. In this proceeding, Petitioner submitted some evidence of justiciable issues of fact in the underlying proceeding. Petitioner need not submit enough evidence in this fee dispute to show Petitioner would have prevailed on these factual issues in the underlying proceeding. Intervenors are not entitled to a presumption that Petitioner participated in this proceeding for an improper purpose in accordance with Subsection 120.595(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2003). Although Petitioner was the non-prevailing party in two previous administrative hearings involving the same legal issue, the two proceedings were not against the same prevailing hospital provider and did not involve the same "project" as required in the relevant statute. Intervenors seek attorney fees in the amount of $36,960 and costs in the amount of $2,335.37 through the date that Petitioner voluntarily dismissed the underlying proceeding. Absent a finding that Petitioner participated in the underlying proceeding for an improper purpose, it is unnecessary to address the amount and reasonableness of the attorney fees and costs sought by Intervenors. If it were determined that Petitioner participated in the underlying proceeding for an improper purpose, the trier of fact cannot make a finding that the proposed attorney fees and costs are reasonable. Such a finding is not supported by competent and substantial evidence. The total attorney fees and costs billed in the underlying proceeding were charged by six or seven attorneys or paralegals employed by the billing law firm. However, the fees and costs at issue in this proceeding exclude any time and costs charged by paralegals and include only a portion of the total fees and costs charged by the attorneys. The total amount of time billed and costs incurred in the underlying proceeding is evidenced in business records identified in the record as Intervenors' Exhibits 20-23. However, those exhibits do not evidence the reasonableness of the fees and costs billed by the attorneys.10 Either the testimony of the billing attorneys or the actual time slips may have been sufficient to support a finding that the attorney fees and costs are reasonable. However, Intervenors pretermitted both means of proof. Intervenors asserted that the time slips contain information protected by the attorney-client privilege. However, Intervenors neither submitted redacted time slips nor offered the actual time slips for in-camera review. Nor did Intervenors allow the attorneys to testify concerning unprivileged matters. The absence of both the testimony of the attorneys and the time slips is fatal. The fact-finder has insufficient evidence to assess the reasonableness of the fees and costs, based on the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved. Intervenors' expert opined that the attorney fees and costs are reasonable. The expert based her opinion, in relevant part, on her review of the actual time slips maintained by each attorney. However, Petitioner was unable to review the time slips before cross-examining the expert. In lieu of the actual time slips, Intervenors submitted a summary of the nature of the time spent by each attorney. The summary is identified in the record as Intervenors' Exhibit 2. Petitioner objected to Intervenors' Exhibit 2, in relevant part, on the ground that it is hearsay. The ALJ reserved ruling on the objection and invited each side to brief the issue in its respective PRO. The paucity of relevant citations in the PROs demonstrates that neither side vigorously embraced the ALJ's invitation. Intervenors' Exhibit 2 is hearsay within the meaning of Subsection 90.801(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2005).11 The author of Intervenors' Exhibit 2 summarized the unsworn statements of attorneys from their time slips and submitted those statements to prove the truth of the assertion that the time billed was reasonable. Intervenors made neither the attorneys nor their time slips available for cross examination.12 Even if the summary were admissible, the summary and the testimony of its author are insufficient to show the attorney fees and costs were reasonable. The insufficiency of the summary emerged during cross-examination of its author. The author is the lone attorney from the billing law firm who testified at the hearing. Q. What other information did you look at to decide what time to actually bill . . .? A. The information I used was the information from the actual bill. Q. If we look at the first entry . . . were you the person that conducted that telephone conference? A. No, I wasn't. Transcript (TR) at 510-511. Q. In other words, [the entries] go with the date as opposed to the event [such as a motion to relinquish]? A. That's correct. Q. So if I wanted to know how much time it took you to actually work on the motion to relinquish, I would have to look at each entry and add up all the hours to find out how long it took you to do one motion. Is that how I would do that? A. It would be difficult to isolate that information from this record, we bill and explain in the narrative what work is performed each day, and unless that was the single thing worked on for several days, there would be no way to isolate the time, because we don't bill sort of by motion or topic. . . . Q. Well, if I'm trying to decide whether the time billed is reasonable, wouldn't I need to know how much time was spent on each task? A. I'm not sure how you would want to approach that. . . . Looking at this document, it does not give you that detail. It doesn't provide that breakout of information. Q. Is there a way for us to know who you spoke with on those entries? A. The entry . . . doesn't specify who participated in the conference. I don't recall what the conference entailed . . . . And many of these entries are from months ago, and I can't specifically recall on that date if I was involved in a conference and who else might have been there. . . . And so my guess is where the conference is listed on a day when lots of activity was performed on behalf of the client, most of it in this case was research. TR at 516-521.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying the motion for attorney fees and costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2006.
The Issue Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction to hear this cause, alleging that Respondent Employer has committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Following a July 28, 2003, "Notice of Determination: No Jurisdiction," by the Florida Commission on Human Relations, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief as more fully described below. On or about September 3, 2003, the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings. It appearing on the face of the referral package that Respondent did not regularly employ 15 persons and that therefore Respondent did not qualify as an "employer" under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, a September 12, 2003, Order was entered scheduling a telephonic hearing for October 1, 2003, and permitting the filing of any documents in support of the parties' respective positions. Respondent's "Submission of Materials in Support of Dismissal of Petition and Supporting Memorandum of Law" was served by United States Mail on September 25, 2003. It contained a prayer for dismissal. Pursuant to Rule 28-106.204, Florida Administrative Code, Petitioner was entitled to respond in writing by October 6, 2003. Petitioner did not respond. Respondent's "Supplemental Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction" was served upon Petitioner by hand-delivery, by United States Mail, and by "e-mail" on September 26, 2003. Per Rule, Petitioner was entitled to file a written response by October 8, 2003. Petitioner did not respond. A Corrected Order entered September 26, 2003, permitted the parties until October 7, 2003, to submit any documents tending to support or refute jurisdiction by the Division of Administrative Hearings over this cause. This Order also rescheduled the telephonic hearing for October 9, 2003. Petitioner filed nothing in response to either the September 12, 2003, Order or the September 26, 2003, Corrected Order. At the October 9, 2003, telephonic conference call, Respondent appeared through counsel. The opening of hearing was delayed five minutes, but Petitioner did not appear. Thereafter, oral argument upon all Motions proceeded without Petitioner. Petitioner still had not called in to the meet-me telephone number after 15 minutes, and the telephonic hearing was concluded. In an abundance of caution, an Order to Show Cause was entered on October 10, 2003, giving Petitioner 10 days in which to show cause, in writing, filed with the Division, why this cause should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner has filed nothing. Therefore, Respondent's documentation, including but not limited to: Respondent's accountants’ affidavits and its payroll journals, unemployment tax returns, and a payroll schedule, may be presumed true and accurate. All the documentation supports a finding that Respondent never employed more than 14 people for any one week in the year 2001 and employed 15 or more employees for only one week (December 21-28, 2002) in the year 2002.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing this cause for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Truman Jeffery Mayfield 902 Phillips Street Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Robert G. Riegel, Jr., Esquire Ryan R. Fuller, Esquire Coffman, Coleman, Andrews & Grogan, P.A. Post Office Box 40089 Jacksonville, Florida 32203
