The Issue In this disciplinary proceeding, the issues are, first, whether Respondent, a certified real estate appraiser, committed various disciplinable offenses in connection with three residential appraisals; and second, if Respondent is guilty of any charges, whether she should be punished therefor.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Real Estate Appraisal Board ("Board") is the state agency charged with regulating real estate appraisers who are, or want to become, licensed to render appraisal services in the State of Florida. The Department of Business and Professional Regulation ("Department") is the state agency responsible for investigating and prosecuting complaints against such appraisers. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Elsa Cartaya ("Cartaya") was a Florida-certified residential real estate appraiser. Her conduct as an appraiser in connection with the matters presently at issue falls squarely within the Board's regulatory jurisdiction. Case No. 04-1680 In the Administrative Complaint that initiated DOAH Case No. 04-1680, the Department charged Cartaya with numerous statutory violations relating to her appraisal of a residence located at 930 East Ninth Place, Hialeah, Florida (the "Hialeah Property"). Specifically, the Department made the following allegations against Cartaya:1 Respondent developed and communicated an appraisal report (Report) for the property commonly known as 930 E. 9 Place, Hialeah, Florida 33010. A copy of the report is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 1. On the Report, Respondent represents that: she signed it on July 27, 2000, the Report is effective as of July 27, 2000. On or about October 26, 2001, Respondent provided a "Report History" to Petitioner's investigator. A copy of the report history is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 2. On the Report History, Respondent admits that she completed the report on August 7, 2000. On Report, Respondent represents that there were no prior sales of subject property within one year of the appraisal. Respondent knew that a purchase and sale transaction on subject property closed on July 28, 2000. Respondent knew that the July 28, 2000, transaction had a contract sales price of $82,000. A copy of the closing statement is attached hereto as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 3. Respondent knowingly refused to disclose the July 28, 2000, sale on Report. On [the] Report, Respondent represented that the current owner of subject property was Hornedo Lopez. Hornedo Lopez did not become the title- owner until on or about July 28, 2000, but before August 7, 2000. On [the] Report, Respondent represents that quality of construction of subject property is "CBS/AVG." The public records reflect that subject property is of mixed construction, CBS and poured concrete. On [the] Report, Respondent represents: "The income approach was not derived due to lack of accurately verifiable data for the mostly owner occupied area." The multiple listing brochures indicate as follows: for comparable one: "Main House 3/2 one apartment 1/1 (Rents $425) and 2 efficiencies each at $325. Live rent free with great income or bring your big family." A copy of the brochure for comparable one is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 4. for comparable three: "Great Rental . . . two 2/1 two 1/1 and one studio. Total rental income is $2,225/month if all rented." A copy of the brochure for comparable three is attached and incorporated as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 5. On or about October 23, 2001, Petitioner's investigator inspected Respondent's work file for Report. The investigation revealed that Respondent failed to maintain a true copy of Report in the work file. On [the] Report, Respondent failed to analyze the difference between comparable one's listing price, $145,000, and the sale price, $180.000. On [the] Report History, Respondent admits to having received a request for appraisal of subject property indicting a contract price of $195,000. On [the] Report History, Respondent admits that the multiple listing brochure for subject property listed the property for $119,900, as a FANNIE MAE foreclosure. On [the] Report History, Respondent also admits that she had a multiple listing brochure in the file, listing subject property for $92,000. On [the] Report History, Respondent admits that she did not report the listings in Report. On [the] Report History, Respondent admits knowledge that comparable three was "rebuilt as a 2/1 with two 1/1 & 1 studio receiving income although zoned residential." On [the] Report, Respondent failed or refused to explain or adjust for comparable three's zoning violations. On the foregoing allegations, the Department charged Cartaya under four counts, as follows: COUNT I Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest conduct, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction in violation of Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes.[2] COUNT II Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of having failed to use reasonable diligence in developing an appraisal report in violation of Section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes. COUNT III Based upon the foregoing, Respondent has violated a standard for the development or communication of a real estate appraisal or other provision of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice in violation of Section 475.624(14), Florida Statutes. COUNT IV Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of having accepted an appraisal assignment if the employment itself is contingent upon the appraiser reporting a predetermined result, analysis, or opinion, or if the fee to be paid for the performance of the appraisal assignment is contingent upon the opinion, conclusion, or valuation reached upon the consequent resulting from the appraisal assignment in violation of Section 475.624(17), Florida Statutes.[3] In her Answer and Affirmative Defenses, Cartaya admitted the allegations set forth in paragraphs 5-9, 11, 13-15, 17-19, and 23-25 of the Amended Complaint. Based on Cartaya's admissions, the undersigned finds these undisputed allegations to be true. Additional findings are necessary, however, to make sense of these particular admissions and to determine whether Cartaya committed the offenses of which she stands accused. In April 2000, Southeast Financial Corporation ("Southeast") asked Cartaya to prepare an appraisal of the Hialeah Property for Southeast's use in underwriting a mortgage loan, the proceeds of which would be applied by the prospective mortgagor(s) towards the $205,000 purchase price that he/she/they had agreed to pay Hornedo Lopez ("Hornedo") for the residence in question.4 In preparing the appraisal, Cartaya discovered that the putative seller, Hornedo, was actually not the record owner of the Hialeah Property. Rather, title was held in the name of the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"). The Hialeah Property was "in foreclosure." Cartaya informed her contact at Southeast, Marianella Lopez ("Marianella"), about this problem. Marianella explained that Hornedo was in the process of closing a sale with Fannie Mae and would resell the Hialeah Property to a new buyer soon after acquiring the deed thereto. Cartaya told Marianella that, to complete the appraisal, she (Cartaya) would need to be provided a copy of the closing statement documenting the transfer of title from Fannie Mae to Hornedo. No further work was done on the appraisal for several months. Then, on July 25, 2000, Marianella ordered another appraisal of the Hialeah Property, this time for Southeast's use in evaluating a mortgage loan to Jose Granados ("Granados"), who was under contract to purchase the subject residence from Hornedo for $195,000. Once again, Cartaya quickly discovered that Fannie Mae, not Hornedo, was the record owner of the Hialeah Property. Once again, Cartaya immediately informed Marianella about the situation. Marianella responded on July 26, 2000, telling Cartaya that the Fannie Mae-Hornedo transaction was scheduled to close on July 28, 2000. On July 27, 2000, Marianella faxed to Cartaya a copy of the Settlement Statement that had been prepared for the Fannie Mae sale to Hornedo. The Settlement Statement, which confirmed that the intended closing date was indeed July 28, 2000, showed that Hornedo was under contract to pay $82,000 for the Hialeah Property——the property which he would then sell to Granados for $195,000, if all the pending transactions closed as planned. Upon receipt of this Settlement Statement, Cartaya proceeded to complete the appraisal. In the resulting Appraisal Report, which was finished on August 7, 2000,5 Cartaya estimated that the market value of the Hialeah Property, as of July 27, 2000, was $195,000. The Department failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the house at the Hialeah Property was, in fact, constructed from CBS and poured concrete, as alleged.6 At the time Cartaya gave the Department a copy of her workfile for this appraisal assignment, the workfile did not contain a copy of the competed Appraisal Report.7 (The workfile did, however, include a working draft of the Appraisal Report.) The allegation, set forth in paragraph 21 of the Administrative Complaint, that Cartaya "failed to analyze the difference between comparable one's listing price, $145,000, and the sale price, $180,000," was not proved by clear and convincing evidence. First, there is no nonhearsay evidence in the record that "comparable one" was, in fact, listed at $145,000 and subsequently sold for $180,000. Instead, the Department offered a printout of data from the Multiple Listing Service ("MLS"), which printout was included in Cartaya's workfile. The MLS document shows a listing price of $145,550 for "comparable one" and a sales price of $180,000 for the property——but it is clearly hearsay as proof of these matters,8 and no predicate was laid for the introduction of such hearsay pursuant to a recognized exception to the hearsay rule (including Section 475.28(2)). Further, the MLS data do not supplement or explain other nonhearsay evidence.9 At best, the MLS document, which is dated July 25, 2000, establishes that Cartaya was on notice that "comparable one" might have sold for more than the asking price, but Cartaya has not been charged with overlooking MLS data. Second, in any event, in her Report History, Cartaya stated that she had analyzed the putative asking price/sales price differential with respect to "comparable one" and concluded that there was no need to make adjustments for this because available data relating to other sales persuaded her that such differentials were typical in the relevant market. Cartaya's declaration in this regard was not persuasively rebutted. Since the evidence fails persuasively to establish that Cartaya's conclusion concerning the immateriality of the putative asking price/sales price differential as a factor bearing on the value of "comparable one" was wrong; and, further, because the record lacks clear and convincing evidence that an appraiser must, in her appraisal report, not only disclose such information, even when deemed irrelevant to the appraisal, but also expound upon the grounds for rejecting the data as irrelevant, Cartaya cannot be faulted for declining to explicate her analysis of the supposed price differential in the Appraisal Report. The evidence is insufficient to prove, clearly and convincingly, that Cartaya "failed or refused to explain or adjust for "comparable three"'s zoning violations." This allegation depends upon the validity of its embedded assumption that there were, in fact, "zoning violations."10 There is, however, no convincing evidence of such violations in the instant record. Specifically, no copy of any zoning code was offered as evidence, nor was any convincing nonhearsay proof regarding the factual condition of "comparable three" offered. Cartaya cannot be found guilty of failing or refusing to explain or adjust for an underlying condition (here, alleged "zoning violations") absent convincing proof of the underlying condition's existence-in-fact. Case No. 04-1148 In the Administrative Complaint that initiated DOAH Case No. 04-1148, the Department charged Cartaya with numerous statutory violations relating to her appraisals of residences located at 1729 Northwest 18th Street, Miami, Florida ("1729 NW 18th St") and 18032 Northwest 48th Place, Miami, Florida ("18032 NW 48th Place"). These appraisals will be examined in turn. With regard to 1729 NW 18th St, the Department alleged as follows: On or about April 29, 1999, Respondent developed and communicated a Uniform Residential Appraisal Report for the property commonly known as 1729 NW 18th Street, Miami, Florida. A copy of the report is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 1. On or about March 18, 2001, David B. C. Yeomans, Jr., A.S.A., and Mark A. Cannon, A.S.A., performed a field review of the report. A copy of the review is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 2. The review revealed that unlike it states in the Report, the subject property’s zoning was not "Legal," but "legal noncomforming (Grandfathered use)." The review further revealed that Respondent failed to report that if the improvements sustain extensive damage or demolishment or require renovation which exceeds 50% of the depreciated value, it is likely that a variance would be necessary to build a new dwelling. The review further revealed that Respondent failed to report that subject property has two underground gas meters. The review further revealed that unlike Respondent states in Report, subject property’s street has gutters and storm sewers along it. The review further revealed that subject property is a part of a "sub-market" within its own neighborhood due to its construction date of 1925. Respondent applied three comparables built in 1951, 1953, and 1948, respectively, all of which reflect a different market, without adjustment. Respondent applied comparables which have much larger lots than the subject, which is of a non-conforming, grandfathered use. Respondent failed to adjust for quality of construction even though subject is frame and all three comparables are of concrete block stucco construction. Respondent failed to note on the Report that comparables 1 and 2 had river frontage. Respondent failed to adjust comparables 1 and 2 for river frontage. The review revealed that at the time of the Report there were at least five sales more closely comparable to Subject than those which Respondent applied. On the foregoing allegations, the Department brought the following three counts against Cartaya: COUNT I Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of having failed to use reasonable diligence in developing an appraisal report in violation of Section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes. COUNT II Based upon the foregoing, Respondent has violated a standard for the development or communication of a real estate appraisal or other provision of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice in violation of Section 475.624(14), Florida Statutes. COUNT III Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of culpable negligence in a business transaction in violation of Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes. Cartaya admitted the allegations set forth in paragraph 4 of the Administrative Complaint. Those undisputed allegations, accordingly, are accepted as true. The rest of the allegations about this property were based upon a Residential Appraisal Field Review Report (the "Yeomans Report") that David B.C. Yeomans, Jr. prepared in March 2001 for his client Fannie Mae. The Yeomans Report is in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 2, and Mr. Yeomans testified at hearing. Mr. Yeomans disagreed with Cartaya's opinion of value regarding 1729 NW 18th St, concluding that the property's market value as of April 29, 1999, had been at the low end of the $95,000-to-$115,000 range, and not $135,000 as Cartaya had opined. The fact-findings that follow are organized according to the numbered paragraphs of the Administrative Complaint. Paragraphs 6 and 7. The form that Cartaya used for her Appraisal Report regarding 1729 NW 18th St contains the following line: Zoning compliance Legal Legal nonconforming (Grandfathered use) Illegal No zoning Cartaya checked the "legal" box. Mr. Yeomans maintains that she should have checked the box for "legal nonconforming" use because, he argues, the property's frontage and lot size are smaller than the minimums for these values as prescribed in the City of Miami's zoning code. The Department failed, however, to prove that Cartaya checked the wrong zoning compliance box. There is no convincing nonhearsay evidence regarding either the frontage or the lot size of 1729 NW 18th St.11 Thus, there are no facts against which to apply the allegedly applicable zoning code provisions. Moreover, and more important, the Department failed to introduce into evidence any provisions of Miami's zoning code. Instead, the Department elicited testimony from Mr. Yeomans regarding his understanding of the contents of the zoning code. While Mr. Yeomans' testimony about the contents of the zoning code is technically not hearsay (because the out-of-court statements, namely the purported code provisions, consisted of non-assertive declarations12 that were not offered for the "truth" of the code's provisions13), such testimony is nevertheless not clear and convincing evidence of the zoning code's terms.14 And finally, in any event, Cartaya's alleged "mistake" (which allegation was not proved) was immaterial because, as Mr. Yeomans conceded at hearing, in testimony the undersigned credits as true, the alleged "fact" (again, not proved) that 1729 NW 18th St constituted a grandfathered use would have no effect on the property's market value. Paragraphs 8 and 9. The Yeomans Report asserts that "[b]ased on a physical inspection as of March 17, 2001[,] it appears that the site has two underground gas meters and there were gutters and storm sewers along the subject's street." It is undisputed that Cartaya's Appraisal Report made no mention of underground gas meters or storm water disposal systems. While the Department alleged that Cartaya's silence regarding these matters constituted disciplinable "failures," it offered no convincing proof that Cartaya defaulted on her obligations in any way respecting these items. There was no convincing evidence that these matters were material, affected the property's value, or should have been noted pursuant to some cognizable standard of care. Paragraphs 10 and 11. The contention here is that Cartaya chose as comparables several homes that, though relatively old (average age: 48 years), were not as old as the residence at 1729 NW 18th St (74 years). Mr. Yeomans asserted that older homes should have been used as comparables, and several such homes are identified in the Yeomans Report. The undersigned is persuaded that Mr. Yeomans' opinion of value with respect to 1729 NW 18th St is probably more accurate than Cartaya's. If this were a case where the value of 1729 NW 18th St were at issue, e.g. a taking under eminent domain, then Mr. Yeomans' opinion might well be credited as against Cartaya's opinion in making the ultimate factual determination. The issue in this case is not the value of 1729 NW 18th St, however, but whether Cartaya committed disciplinable offenses in appraising the property. The fact that two appraisers have different opinions regarding the market value of a property does not mean that one of them engaged in misconduct in forming his or her opinion. Based on the evidence presented, the undersigned is not convinced that Cartaya engaged in wrongdoing in connection with her appraisal of 1729 NW 18th St, even if her analysis appears to be somewhat less sophisticated than Mr. Yeomans'. Paragraphs 12 through 16. The allegations in these paragraphs constitute variations on the theme just addressed, namely that, for one reason or another, Cartaya chose inappropriate comparables. For the same reasons given in the preceding discussion, the undersigned is not convinced, based on the evidence presented, that Cartaya engaged in wrongdoing in connection with her appraisal of 1729 NW 18th St, even if he is inclined to agree that Mr. Yeomans' opinion of value is the better founded of the two. With regard to 18032 NW 48th Place, the Department alleged as follows: On or about August 9, 1999, Respondent prepared and communicated a Uniform Residential Appraisal Report for the Property commonly known as 18032 NW 48th Place, Miami, Florida, 33055. (Report) A copy of the Report is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 3. On the Report, Respondent incorrectly stated that the property is in a FEMA Zone X flood area. In fact, the property is in an AE Zone. In Report, Respondent states: "Above sales were approximately adjusted per market derived value influencing dissimilarities as noted." Respondent failed to state in Report, that comparables 1 and 3 have in-law quarters. In [the] Report, Respondent represented comparable 1 had one bath, where in fact it has at least two. In [the] Report, Respondent failed to state that comparable 1 has two in-law quarters. In [the] Report, Respondent stated that comparable 3 is a two-bath house with an additional bath in the in-law quarters. On the foregoing allegations, the Department brought the following three counts against Cartaya: COUNT IV Based upon the foregoing, Respondent has violated a standard for the development or communication of a real estate appraisal or other provision of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice in violation of Section 475.624(14), Florida Statutes. COUNT V Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of having failed to use reasonable diligence in developing an appraisal report in violation of Section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes. COUNT VI Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of culpable negligence in a business transaction in violation of Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes. Cartaya admitted the allegations set forth in paragraphs 18 and 20 of the Administrative Complaint. Those undisputed allegations, accordingly, are accepted as true. The rest of the allegations about this property were based upon a Residential Appraisal Field Review Report (the "Marmin Report") that Frank L. Marmin prepared in May 2001 for his client Fannie Mae. The Marmin Report is in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 5. Mr. Marmin did not testify at hearing, although his supervisor, Mark A. Cannon, did. Mr. Marmin disagreed with Cartaya's opinion of value regarding 18032 NW 48th Place, concluding that the property's market value as of August 9, 1999, had been $100,000, and not $128,000 as Cartaya had opined. The fact-findings that follow are organized according to the numbered paragraphs of the Administrative Complaint. Paragraph 19. Cartaya admitted that she erred in noting that the property is located in FEMA Flood Zone "X," when in fact (she agrees) the property is in FEMA Flood Zone "AE." She did, however, include a flood zone map with her appraisal that showed the correct flood zone designation. Cartaya's mistake was obviously unintentional——and no more blameworthy than a typographical error. Further, even the Department's expert witness conceded that this minor error had no effect on the appraiser's opinion of value. Paragraphs 20 through 24. The Department asserts that two of Cartaya's comparables were not comparable for one reason or another. The Department failed clearly and convincingly to prove that its allegations of fact concerning the two comparables in question are true. Thus, the Department failed to establish its allegations to the requisite degree of certainty. Ultimate Factual Determinations Having examined the entire record; weighed, interpreted, and judged the credibility of the evidence; drawn (or refused to draw) permissible factual inferences; resolved conflicting accounts of what occurred; and applied the applicable law to the facts, it is determined that: Applying the law governing violations arising under Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes, to the historical facts established in the record by clear and convincing evidence, it is found as a matter of ultimate fact that Cartaya did not commit culpable negligence in connection with the appraisals at issue. Applying the law governing violations arising under Section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes, to the historical facts established in the record by clear and convincing evidence, it is found as a matter of ultimate fact that Cartaya did not fail to exercise reasonable diligence in developing the appraisals at issue. Applying the law governing violations arising under Section 475.624(14), Florida Statutes, to the historical facts established in the record by clear and convincing evidence, it is found as a matter of ultimate fact that, in connection with the Appraisal Report relating to the Hialeah Property, Cartaya did commit one unintentional violation of Standards Rule 2- 2(b)(vi) of Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and two unintentional violations of Standards Rule 2-2(b)(ix).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a final order finding that: As to Case No. 04-1148, Cartaya is not guilty on Counts I through VI, inclusive; As to Case No. 04-1680, Cartaya is not guilty on Counts I, II, and IV; she is, however, guilty, under Count III, of one unintentional violation of Standards Rule 2-2(b)(vi) and two unintentional violations of Standards Rule 2-2(b)(ix). As punishment for the violations established, Cartaya's certificate should be suspended for 30 calendar days, and she should be placed on probation for a period of one year, a condition of such probation being the successful completion of a continuing education course in USPAP. In addition, Cartaya should be ordered to pay an administrative fine of $500. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 2004.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Florida Real Estate Appraisal Board (Department), is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the duty and responsibility to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.165, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent, Iris Adames, is now and was at all times material hereto, a registered real estate appraiser in the State of Florida, having been issued license number RI0003454. On or about March 21, 1996, Respondent filed an application (dated March 8, 1996) with the Department for licensure as a registered real estate appraiser. Pertinent to this case, item 11 on the application required that Respondent answer yes or no to the following question: Have you ever 1) been convicted of a crime, 2) pled nolo contendere to any crime? (This question applies to any violation of any municipality, county, state, or nation, including traffic offenses --but not parking, speeding, inspection, or traffic signal violations-- regardless of whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, were paroled or were pardoned.) Respondent responded to the question by checking the box marked "N[o]." The application concluded with the applicant's signature immediately below the following affirmation: . . . I have read the questions in this application and have answered them completely and truthfully to the best of my knowledge. . . . Contrary to Respondent's response to item 11 on the application, the proof demonstrates that on October 23, 1995, Respondent pled nolo contendere to the crime of uttering a worthless check, a first degree misdemeanor, in the Circuit Court, Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, Brevard County, Florida, Case No. 94-23154-CF-A. The court entered an order withholding adjudication of guilt, placed Respondent on probation for a period of six months, and imposed a fine and costs totaling $105.65. On September 18, 1997, the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Florida Real Estate Commission or FREC) issued an Administrative Complaint against Respondent, as a licensed real estate salesperson. That complaint alleged, in pertinent part, as follows: At the time Respondent made application for a real estate license, Respondent was asked to indicate whether or not [s]he had "ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld. This question applies to any violation of the laws of any municipality, county, state, or nation . . . without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, paroled or pardoned." Respondent checked the "No" box. (Licensure Application, at Question 9). Respondent swore and attested that all answers and information contained in h[er] application were true and correct. Respondent's signature was duly notarized. On or about October 23, 1995, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to one count of writing a worthless check, a first degree misdemeanor (§ 832.05, Fla. Stat.) A true and correct copy of the Order of Judgment is attached hereto, incorporated herein and made a part hereof by reference as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 2. Further, in connection with this investigation, mail addressed from Petitioner to Respondent was returned by the U.S. Postal Service noting that Respondent has moved without any forwarding address. COUNT I Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of obtaining a license by means of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment in violation of § 475.25(1)(m), Fla. Stat. COUNT II Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of failing to timely advise Petitioner of a change of mailing address in violation of Rule 61J2-10.037, Fla. Admin. Code and, therefore, in violation of § 475.25(1)(e), Fla. Stat. WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests the Florida Real Estate Commission to issue a Final Order as final agency action finding the Respondent(s) guilty as charged. The penalty for each count or separate offense may range from a reprimand; an administrative fine not to exceed $5,000.00 per violation; probation; suspension of license, registration or permit for a period not to exceed ten (10) years; revocation of the license, registration or permit; and any of or all of the above penalties as provided by § 455.227 and § 475.25(1), Fla. Stat. and Fla. Admin. Code R. 61J2-24.001. In addition to the foregoing, Petitioner requests an award of costs as provided by § 455.227(3), Fla. Stat. Respondent did not formally respond to the Administrative Complaint and on February 18, 1998, the Florida Real Estate Commission held a hearing on Petitioner's Request for an Informal Hearing and Motion for Final Order. Respondent was served with a copy of the notice of hearing and failed to appear. By final order dated February 18, 1998, and filed March 9, 1998, the Florida Real Estate Commission resolved the case, as follows: Upon a complete review of the evidence presented by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, the Florida Real Estate Commission finds: That the Respondent was properly served with the Administrative Complaint and failed to request a hearing or otherwise respond to the service of Administrative Complaint. See s. 120.60(5), Florida Statutes, and Rules 28- 5.111 and 28-6.009, Florida Administrative Code. That there are no disputed issues of material fact and, therefore, the Petitioner's Motion for an Informal Hearing, pursuant to s. 120.57(2), Florida Statutes, is granted. That the Petitioner has established a prima facie case. That the facts and legal conclusions contained in the Administrative Complaint are adopted as true and that violations of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, have occurred, as stated in the Administrative Complaint, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A and made a part hereof. Therefore, the Commission ORDERS that the license of Iris Amor Adames be revoked. This Order shall be effective on date of filing with the Clerk of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation. However, any party affected by this Order has the right to seek judicial review, pursuant to s. 120.68, Florida Statutes, and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Within 30 days of the filing date of this Order, review proceedings may be instituted by filing a Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, at Suite 309 North Tower, 400 West Robinson Street, Orlando, Florida 32801. At the same time, a copy of the Notice of Appeal, with applicable filing fees, must be filed with the appropriate District Court of Appeal. In her response to Count I of the Administrative Complaint, and again at hearing, Respondent explained she entered the plea of nolo contendere to the worthless check charge based upon advice of her court-appointed counsel even though (in her opinion) she was innocent of the charge. As for her negative response to the question posed on the application, Respondent averred she understood the judge to have directed her attorney to have her records sealed, she assumed he had done as directed, and consequently gave what she understood was an appropriate response to the question on the application. See Section 943.059(4), Florida Statutes. Here, Respondent's explanation for her failure to disclose her plea on her application is credited, and it is resolved that, at the time she submitted her application, Respondent did not intend to mislead or deceive those who would be reviewing the application. In so concluding, it is observed that Respondent's testimony was candid and her understanding of the disposition of the matter (and the propriety of her response to the question on the application) was, given her unfamiliarity with such matters, reasonable. 1/ Count II of the Administrative Complaint sought to take disciplinary action against Respondent based on the Final order of the Florida Real Estate Commission (FREC) which had disciplined (revoked) Respondent's licensure as a real estate sales person. As heretofore noted, that final order was premised on Respondent's failure to respond to a two-count Administrative Complaint. Count I was predicated on the same issue raised by the Department in the instant case, and Count II was premised on Respondent's "fail[ure] to timely advise [FREC] of a change in her mailing address." Here, Respondent explained her failure to respond to the FREC complaint as follows: . . . when I called Tallahassee, they told me that you have 48 hours to respond, or get a lawyer. I say excuse me, I cannot just go and get a lawyer. Because, why? Because, now in 1998, since December 1997, I've been into a domestic violence case, and I almost -- Me and my daughter almost got killed. And, in the meantime, the father of my child took my car, took every means for me to make my living. I was almost fighting all the time. December, January, February, I was fighting eviction. I was fighting the court. And, all the problems. And, I have all the paperwork here. And, I cannot take more stress. Now, you ask me my life -- My life, and the life of my child is priority. I cannot just go, and hire a lawyer. I don't have the money. I don't have the means. You have to give me more time. And to say that I am sorry it's only 48 hours, you should had [sic] been in response to this before, and that's it. When she told me that, what else can I do? So, I said well, fine. One day I will go back, and try to reopen the case. There is nothing that I can do at this moment. (Transcript, pages 28-30.) With regard to her failure to keep FREC informed regarding her current address, Respondent explained: The reason I didn't keep changing my addresses is because my realtor appraiser license, the person who supervised my work, Gary Eilen, he's the father of my child, he's the person who I get the injunction for. That's why sometimes I just tried to disappear from his life. And, when -- That's one of the complaints that I don't keep moving with my addresses, but he [could] get it from the state [if she informed the state of her new address. Therefore, for safety reasons, she chose not to notify FREC of her new address]. (Transcript, page 39.) Respondent's testimony was candid and credible, and her domestic problems (at the time of the FREC proceeding) well- documented. See Respondent's Exhibit 4. Had Respondent the means and opportunity to contest the FREC complaint, the conclusion of that proceeding would, most likely, have mirrored the conclusions reached in this case. In sum, given the conclusion reached here that (by her response to the application at issue in this case) Respondent did not intend to mislead or deceive the Department, a de minimus penalty should be imposed as a consequence of the FREC Final Order, which was essentially entered by default and premised on the same issue (of non- disclosure) raised in this case (and resolved favorably to the Respondent).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered which finds Respondent not guilty of violating of Subsection 475.624(12), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count I of the Administrative Complaint. It is further RECOMMENDED that the final order find the Respondent guilty of violating Subsection 475.624(6), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint, and that for such violation Respondent receive a reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 1999.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Leonard Fernandez, is a licensed real estate salesman, holding license number 0145203. In July and August of 1979, the Respondent was employed as a mortgage solicitor for Southeast Mortgage Company in Broward County, Florida. Alan Edwards was the Respondent's supervisor during this time period. In July, 1979, the Respondent advised Alan Edwards that he was going to purchase property, and requested that Mr. Edwards loan him money for a short period of time. Mr. Edwards loaned the Respondent $4,000 under a verbal agreement that the Respondent would repay the loan within 60 days. When the Respondent failed to repay this loan as agreed, Mr. Edwards had the Respondent sign a promissory note in the amount of $4,000. In an attempt to repay a portion of this note, the Respondent gave Mr. Edwards a check in the amount of $1,800 on or about August 29, 1979. Mr. Edwards presented the check for payment, but it was returned unpaid because the Respondent had stopped payment on it. When Mr. Edwards contacted the Respondent about the check, the Respondent stated that he had expected some funds from a relative, and when he did not receive this money, he stopped payment on the check. The Respondent told Mr. Edwards that he would give him a cashier's check to replace the $1,800 check that had been returned unpaid, but the Respondent never provided the cashier's check. Instead, the Respondent, in September, 1979, gave Mr. Edwards several postdated checks drawn on account number 002312352 at Southeast Bank of Broward County. The purpose of these checks was to repay, the $1,800, after which the Respondent was to pay the remaining debt due under the note. In November, 1979, Mr. Edwards presented the first of the postdated checks, dated November 15, 1979, to Southeast Bank for payment, but was notified that the Respondent's account upon which all the postdated checks had been issued, was closed. When the bank failed to honor this first check, Mr. Edwards sent a notice of dishonored check to the Respondent by certified mail. The return receipt indicates that the Respondent received this notice. In December, 1979, and in January and February of 1980, Mr. Edwards presented to Southeast Bank the postdated checks that Respondent had given him for these months. On each occasion the bank informed Mr. Edwards that the Respondent's account was closed. Mr. Edwards sent the Respondent notices of dishonor of these checks, which the Respondent received. Mr. Edwards never received any payment of the debt owed by the Respondent. On January 7, 1980, in Dade County Circuit Court, the Respondent pled nolo contendere to two counts of conspiracy to sell, deliver or possess with intent to sell or deliver, cocaine, and was found guilty, placed on one year probation, and ordered to pay $2,400 in restitution. On February 29, 1980, the court withheld adjudication on this charge.
Recommendation From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that license number 0145203 held by the Respondent, Leonard Fernandez, be revoked. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 9th day of June, 1983 in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Tina Hipple, Esquire Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Mr. Leonard Fernandez 10024 S.W. 2nd Terrace Miami, Florida 33174 William M. Furlow, Esquire Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Harold Huff, Executive Dir. Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact George A. Heyen is a duly registered real estate salesman with the Florida Real Estate Commission, and was so registered and has been so registered continuously since October 1, 1972, as evidenced by Petitioner's Exhibit number 1. While serving in the capacity as a real estate salesman, the Respondent entered into a listing agreement with one Thomas S. Bowers and Brenda L. Bowers, his wife. This agreement was drawn on December 11, 1973 and is Petitioner's Exhibit number 4. On February 6, 1974, a purchase and sell agreement was drawn up by the Respondent and entered into between Maria A. Hindes and the Bowers. This purchase and sell agreement is Petitioner's Exhibit number 3. This contract of February 6, 1974 was submitted to Molton, Allen and Williams, Mortgage Brokers, 5111 66th Street, St. Petersburg, Florida. The contract, as drawn, was rejected as being unacceptable for mortgage financing, because it failed, to contain the mandatory FHA clause. When the Respondent discovered that the February 6, 1974 contract had been rejected, a second contract of February 8, 1974 was prepared. A copy of this contract is Petitioner's Exhibit number 5. The form of the contract, drawn on February 8, 1974, was one provided by Molton, Allen and Williams. When, the Respondent received that form he prepared it and forged the signature of Mr. and Mrs. Bowers. The explanation for forging the signatures as stated in the course of the hearing, was to the effect that it was a matter of expediency. The expediency referred to the fact that the parties were anxious to have a closing and to have the transaction completed, particularly the sellers, Mr. and Mrs. Bowers. Therefore, in the name of expediency the signatures were forged. Testimony was also given that pointed out the Bowers were very hard to contact in and around the month of February, 1974, and some testimony was given to the effect that the Bowers made frequent trips to Ohio, but it was not clear whether these trips would have been made in the first part of February, 1974. The Bowers discovered that their name had been forged when they went to a closing on April 11, 1974. They refused to close the loan at that time. On April 24, 1974, a new sales contract was followed by a closing which was held on April 26, 1974 and a copy of the closing statement is Petitioner's Exhibit number 6. The Respondent has received no fees or commissions for his services in the transaction and there have been no further complaints about the transaction. Prior to this incident, the Respondent, George A. Heyen, was not shown to have had any disciplinary involvement with the Florida Real Estate Commission and has demonstrated that he has been a trustworthy individual in his business dealings as a real estate salesman.
Recommendation It is recommended that the registration of the registrant, George A. Heyen, be suspended for a period not to exceed 30 days. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of April, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. R. Parkinson, Esquire Associate Counsel Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 George A. Heyen c/o Gregoire-Gibbons, Inc. 6439 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, Florida 33710
Findings Of Fact Mr. Latter is licensed by the Florida Real Estate Commission as a real estate broker under licenses 00500688 and 0224707 and has been so licensed at all times material to this case. In July of 1981 Mr. Michael Kass offered for sale a house located at 4005 Obispo, Tampa, Florida. Mr. Latter was the listing broker on behalf of Mr. Kass. Ms. Evette C. Vining saw the house and made an offer which was for less than Mr. Kass wanted. He counteroffered to sell the house "as is" with no warranties. After numerous subsequent offers and counteroffers which included both typed and handwritten additions on several signed contracts of sale between the parties both Mr. Kass and Ms. Vining believed they arrived at an agreement and the closing was scheduled. The documents on which the parties began their negotiations were printed forms prepared by the Tampa Board of Realtors. Paragraph 2 on the prepared form provides: Seller, at his expense, shall furnish the buyer with a letter from a licensed termite inspector stating there are no visible signs of active termite infestation. In event infestation is indicated, pro perty shall be treated at expense of Seller. The copy of the Contract for Sale of Real Estate which was used by Mr. Kass and Ms. Vining at their closing had paragraph 2 lined out. That copy had been given to Respondent to have the closing documents prepared by the title company. Respondent lined out that paragraph in order to conform the second paragraph to the preceding handwritten provisions on the document providing that the sale of the house was "as is". The only warranties provided by the parties were those relating to appliances, the roof, electrical and plumbing systems which had just been recently repaired or installed by Mr. Kass. The warranties relating to those items were typed in on the back of of the contract. Mr. Latter removed paragraph 2 from the copy of the contract on which the parties closed because he believed that when a house is sold "as is" no termite inspection report is required, and if paragraph 2 had remained in the contract it would confuse and possibly delay the closing process. There is no evidence that his deletion of paragraph 2 was made with the intent of misleading, defrauding, or otherwise harming any person. Mr. Latter did not obtain the approval of either the buyer or the seller to remove paragraph 2 and he informed neither of them about the deletion until after the closing. There is considerable conflicting testimony in the record about whether or not Mr. Latter actually made the deletion of paragraph 2 himself. The finding that he did so is based on the demeanor of the testifying witnesses, their possible motives for bias and prejudice, and on the reliability of their recollection of the incident in question. Mr. Latter has been a real estate broker for almost 20 years. There has never been a grievance filed against him at the local level or a complaint previously filed before the Department of Professional Regulation concerning his conduct as a realtor. His reputation among his fellow realtors in the Tampa area is extremely good. In the Tampa area a contract for sale of real estate such as the house in question here would not normally have an "as is" clause and also provide for the seller to secure a termite inspection report. It is widely understood among realtors that an "as is" clause excludes such reports, particularly here where the "as is" clause was handwritten in the contract while the termite inspection report provision is part of the printed form.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent Alexander M. Latter. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 1st day of February, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL PEARCE DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1984.
Findings Of Fact Louis W. George has been registered as a real estate broker in Florida for seven years; he holds license No. 0030981. At all pertinent times, he has done business as Apollo Realty of Miami, and has been, in addition, co-owner with Allen Scherer of Karma Properties, Inc. In an effort to sell a house he owned at 1105 Sharazad Boulevard in Opa locka, Florida, John F. German placed a classified advertisement in a newspaper. Seeing the ad, respondent George telephoned Mr. German and offered his services as a real estate broker. As a result, Mr. German eventually signed an agreement listing the house with Apollo Realty of Miami for 90 days, which elapsed without a sale, in late 1978 or early 1979. In June of 1979, Mr. German again visited respondent, telling him he would let the property go for $25,000. The following day respondent telephoned Mr. German to say, "I'll take it," to which Mr. German replied, "That was yesterday." Later in the telephone conversation, however, Messrs. George and German agreed on a price of $25,000. On June 29, 1979, respondent presented Mr. German with a form "Deposit Receipt." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. Mr. German lined through $23,500, substituted $25,000, initialled the alteration, and signed the document. Respondent had already signed. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2 recites: Receipt is hereby acknowledged of the sum of . . .$500.00. . .from KARMA PROPERTIES, INC. proceeds to be held in escrow by APOLLO REALTY OF MIAMI subject to the terms hereof. . . This offer is subject to obtaining an FHA commitment of not less than $35,000.00 if commitment is less than-the above $35,000.00 this offer will be null and void . . . [I]n case of default by the purchaser. . .the seller may at his option retain one-half of the deposit herein paid as consideration for the release of the purchaser. . . These written provisions notwithstanding, respondent told Mr. German that he would give the $500 deposit to his attorney, rather than place it in Apollo Realty's escrow account. The deal fell through. On November 19, 1979, Albert I. Caskill, Esquire, wrote Apollo Realty of Miami, on behalf of Mr. German: Demand is herewith made upon you for the $500 deposit being held in your escrow account in relation to the above-referenced transaction. We have been notified by the attorney for the purchasers, Lawrence M. Weiner, that his clients will not be going forward with the purchase, and, accordingly, their failure to complete the transaction pursuant to the contract constitutes a breach of the agreement. Please forward all deposit moneys to this office, same being made payable to the seller, John German. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. The house was off the market from June until the end of November. Mr. German never received any money on account of the transaction. (He did not even get the keys back.) Respondent never deposited any money anywhere on account of this transaction, nor did he pay Mr. German any money directly. He testified that he instructed Allen Scherer, the other principal in Karma Properties, Inc., to deposit $500 with Lawrence Weiner, Esquire; that he read Mr. Caskill's letter of November 19, 1979, and passed it on to Mr. Scherer with instructions to "correct" (T. 36) the situation; but only learned that there was no money in escrow when he received the administrative complaint with which these proceedings began. In these particulars, respondent's testimony has not been credited. The parties stipulated that Mr. Weiner would testify, under oath, that he "never held or received any money in connection with the subject transaction." Petitioner filed a proposed recommended order which has been reviewed and considered. The proposed findings of fact have been adopted in substance for the most part. Proposed findings of fact not adopted have been rejected as immaterial or as inconsistent with the weight of the evidence.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner reprimand respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Joel S. Fass, Esquire 626 Northeast 124 Street North Miami, Florida 33161 Adam Kurlander, Esquire 1820 Northeast 163 Street North Miami Beach, Florida 33162 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Board of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Wallace Adams was a registered real estate salesman with Continental Marketing Services from November, 1975, until May, 1976. The depositions of Robert Cline, Donald Brawdy and Jean Sue Brawdy were received into the record without objection. The depositions of the Brawdys reflect that they received a telephone call from an individual identifying himself as Wallace or Wally Adams. The deposition of Robert Cline reflects that he received a call from an individual whom Cline identified only as Mr. Adams. The deponents indicated that the caller stated he represented Continental Marketing Services, a real estate sales organization. The caller represented that Continental Marketing Services desired to list property which they owned in Florida and Arizona for sale. The caller represented that their property would be advertised nationally and internationally, and that foreign buyers were interested in purchasing such property. Cline indicated that he was called in approximately November of 1975, and the Brawdys indicated that they were first contacted in February of 1976. The caller suggested the potential sales prices of the property to be listed, and the deponents eventually entered into a listing contract with Continental Marketing Services, paying advance listing fees ranging from $350 to $1,125. None of the deponents indicated that they ever met the Respondent, Wallace E. Adams.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission take no action against the registration of Wallace E. Adams as a registered real estate salesman. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mark A. Grimes, Esquire Staff Attorney Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Wallace E. Adams c/o Dory Auerbach 456 NE 29th Street Miami, Florida 33137
Findings Of Fact At the hearing Petitioner presented evidence of service of the complaint and notice of hearing by mailing same, to Respondent's last address reported to the Real Esate Commission, by registered mail as provided by s. 475.26 Florida Statutes. Accordingly I find Respondent was duly subjected to the jurisdiction of the hearing officer and of the Real Estate Commission. Thereafter Petitioner presented as Exhibit 4, the Certification of the Executive Director of the Florida Real Estate Commission that registration certificate number 0119992 was issued to Jesse E. Moore as a real estate salesman on January 30, 1974, that a non-active salesman's registration was issued on June 10, 1974 to expire September 30, 1974, and a copy of his application for registration subscribed and sworn to by Moore on July 9, 1973. Thereon Respondent listed only two offenses under question 9, viz. DWI and a bad check offense. Petitioner submitted Exhibits 5, 6, and 7 which were only admitted into evidence. Exhibit 5 shows that on November 20, 1961 Gene Moore was found guilty in the County Judge's Court of destroying personal property and fined $15.00 to include $12.50 costs. Exhibit 6, a Justice of the Peace Docket Sheet purports to show that on September 11, 1969 Jesse E. Moore was charged with failure to report sales tax, and Exhibit 7, a similar docket sheet purports to show that on October 30, 1969 Jesse E. Moore was again charged with failure to report sales tax. Since both Exhibits 6 and 7 show the same amount of sales tax it may be assumed that they relate to the same offense. However, Exhibit 6 indicates that the bond posted in the amount of $12.50 was forfeited and the final entry on Exhibit 7 is that the charge (if such it be) was dismissed by the judge. Although these docket sheets are subject to some question regarding their relevance in proving that the person named thereon was charged with an offense against the laws of Florida, for the purpose of this Recommended Order it is found that they do prove that Jesse E. Moore was charged with such offenses.
