The Issue Should discipline be imposed by the State of Florida, Education Practices Commission, against the Respondent's Florida Educator's Teaching Certificate No. 770007, for alleged professional misconduct?
Findings Of Fact Respondent was issued Florida Educator's Teaching Certificate No. 77007 on September 4, 1997, and continued to hold that certificate in an active status until June 30, 2001. Respondent's initial certificate was valid beginning July 1, 1997. The certification covered the subject area of biology. VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINE At one time Respondent was a practicing attorney in the state of Virginia. In an action before the Virginia State Bar Tenth District Disciplinary Committee, IN RE: GEOFFREY T. WILLIAMS, SR., RESPONDENT, Docket No. 89-102-0281, dated November 6, 1989, Respondent received a public reprimand. The order setting forth the factual basis and provisions of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Rules violated is found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 8, admitted. Further disciplinary action was taken against Respondent before the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, In the Matter of Geoffrey T. Williams, Sr., VSB Docket Nos. 89-051-0857; 91-05l-0139; 92-051-0185 and 92-051-0558. In these cases orders were entered by the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board Chair on February 26, 1993 and May 10, 1993, revoking Respondent's license to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia. The opinion and order of revocation set forth facts forming the basis for the decision and identified the rules of the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility violated by Respondent leading to the discipline imposed. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7 admitted as evidence is constituted of those orders describing the revocation. The Virginia State Bar found reason to discipline Respondent based upon his treatment of legal clients and business practices with his partners. The grounds for discipline included the recognition that Respondent's conduct involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice law, among other grounds. EXPLOITATION OF AN ELDERLY PERSON/THEFT In State of Florida vs. Geoffrey Thomas Williams, Sr., in the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Volusia County, Florida, Case No. CRC00-34359CFAEF, an information was brought against Respondent. Count 1 charged exploitation of an elderly person, and/or a disabled adult in violation of Section 825.103(1) and (2), Florida Statutes. Count 2 charged grand theft in violation of Section 812.014(1) and (2) (c), Florida Statutes. Both counts pertain to Respondent's association with M.B. and her funds. The period envisioned by the counts to the information was from February 1, 2000 through March 27, 2001. Respondent pled nolo contendere to both counts. Respondent was adjudicated guilty of both counts, felony offences in Florida. Respondent was placed upon probation and made to pay court costs and jurisdiction was reserved to determine restitution upon the motion of the State. The period of probation was for five years under supervision of the Department of Corrections. M.B., Respondent's acquaintance, was at the time in question experiencing erratic thoughts, did not have good insight, and evidenced poor judgement. M.B. was being cared for by a psychiatrist. M.B. was a client of a health care company assigned to attend her interest. M.B. was not able to manage her daily affairs. Respondent had expressed an interest in discussing relieving M.B. of her legal obligations. This expression was made to Kimberly Zbin, a case manager with ACT Corporation, the mental health company assisting M.B. as its client. Respondent acknowledged to Linda Basbagill, an investigator who was at that time an investigator with the Department of Children and Family Services, that Respondent received checks from M.B. or M.B. issued checks on his behalf. Examples of those checks are found in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6 admitted. The dates on those checks correspond to the dates within the criminal information that has been described. EXPERT OPINION Duane Busse is the Director of Professional Standards for the School District of Volusia County, Florida. He holds bachelor's and master's degrees from Florida State University in education. He is an expert in education. He has been a teacher, a principal, has worked at the state level in education, and is a school district level administrator. His present position with Volusia County School District involves the investigation of alleged employee misconduct and the imposition of discipline for that misconduct. Mr. Busse is familiar with the documents that have been described concerning the action taken by the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board and the Circuit Court in Florida, Criminal Division. Mr. Busse expressed the opinion that the outcomes in the bar discipline and the criminal court case reduce Respondent's effectiveness as an educator. Mr. Busse expresses the belief that Respondent would not be eligible for any type of employment with the school system where the witness is employed. Mr. Busse expressed the opinion that the Respondent has precluded himself from any level of a trust from parents and students based upon the circumstances in the bar discipline and criminal court case. He premises his opinion on loss of effectiveness on the fact of having been in Volusia County for about 15 years and his familiarity with people in Volusia County as to their expectations for moral standards of teachers.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding Respondent in violation of Sections 231.2615(1)(c), and 231.2615(1)(e), Florida Statutes, set forth in Counts 1 and 3 respectively and dismissing the allegations of a violation of Section 231.2615(1)(f), Florida Statutes, as set forth in Count 3, and imposing permanent revocation of his teaching certificate pursuant to Section 231.2615(1), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce P. Taylor, Esquire Post Office Box 131 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731-013 Geoffrey T. Williams 8161 West Eastman Place Building 16, Apartment 103 Lakewood, Colorado 80227 Kathleen M. Richards, Executive Director Education Practices Commission Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Room 224E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Jerry W. Whitmore, Chief Bureau of Educator Standards Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Room 224E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been employed with the Florida Department of Transportation since 1971. He is a graduate of the University of West Florida, with a degree in business management. Petitioner is 38 years old, with a physical disability which limits his use of his left hand and arm, and his left leg is shorter than his right. In 1979, Petitioner was employed by Respondent in its right-of-way section, as a Right-of-Way Agent III. In that position, he was responsible for the coordination of the Acquisition, Relocation and Property Management sections of Respondent's District III. One of Petitioner's subordinates was H. E. Walls, who was in charge of the Acquisition section. Petitioner's immediate supervisor was J. F. Culpepper, Assistant Right-of-Way Administrator. In April, 1980, a new Right-of-Way Administrator, J. A. Alfes, was assigned to District III. In 1980, and again in 1981, Petitioner filed charges of discrimination against Respondent with the Florida Commission on Human Relations premised upon Petitioner's aforementioned disability. The 1980 charge was resolved through the entry of a settlement agreement. The charge filed in 1981 was premised upon the same disability, but that charge was ultimately dismissed by the Florida Commission on Human Relations. In January, 1981, a hearing was held in Tallahassee, Florida, on one of the charges of discrimination filed by Petitioner. On the day following that hearing, Petitioner was called into Mr. Alfes' office in Chipley, Florida, and was told that the hearing held in Tallahassee had been several hours of "horse shit." On May 18, 1981, Mr. Alfes advised Petitioner of an impending reorganization of the section in which Petitioner was employed. Subsequently, on June 17, 1981, Mr. Alfes told Petitioner that there would be "consequences" as a result of Petitioner's having filed complaints with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. In 1981 a reorganization of functions occurred in all six districts statewide of DOT. This reorganization eliminated one classification of position, Right-of-Way Agent III, which Petitioner had held in District III, and elevated the positions at the head of Acquisition and Relocation sections to the administrator level. At the time this reorganization occurred, Petitioner, as previously mentioned, was a Right-of-Way Agent III, and Herbert Walls headed the Acquisition section. Mr. Alfes, Petitioner's immediate superior, recommended that Petitioner be placed in charge of Relocation, and that Mr. Walls, who had been working in Acquisition, be placed in charge of the Acquisition section in light of his experience in that area since 1978. J. F. Culpepper, who occupied the position on DOT's organization chart to whom the Acquisition section, Relocation section, and Property Management section would report, recommended that the Petitioner be placed in charge of the Acquisition section, based upon his belief that Petitioner was better qualified by reason of his real estate training and college degree. Mr. Walls had only a high school diploma. During the period of his employment with DOT, Petitioner had not handled any complete right-of-way acquisition matters, and had never negotiated for DOT in the acquisition of any right-of-way parcels. Petitioner had, however, attended two relocation seminars while employed by DOT. Mr. Walls had been continually engaged in acquisition work for DOT since at least 1978. DOT's District Engineer, Alan Potter, was the DOT employee ultimately responsible for selecting the heads of the Acquisition and Relocation sections. Mr. Potter concurred with the recommendation that Petitioner be placed in charge of the Relocation section, based upon his belief that it was the most important job involved in right-of-way acquisition, and that it required a very thorough and cautious person. Based upon Mr. Potter's evaluation of Petitioner as possessed of high ability, and being very mature and compassionate, Petitioner was placed in charge of the Relocation section. At the time Petitioner was named as head of Relocation and Mr. Walls was placed as head of Acquisition, the two positions were both classified as Right-of-Way Specialist II's, pay grade 22. Later both were reclassified as Right-of-Way Administrator I's, at pay grade 23. The record in this cause establishes that neither position was more prestigious" than the other, or that either position placed the individual holding it in a more favorable posture for promotion or advancement. Subsequently, in the summer of 1981, the reorganization of DOT was completed, with Mr. Walls having been appointed head of Acquisition, with approximately six subordinates. Petitioner became responsible for Relocation, and shared the supervision of a clerical employee with the head of Property Management. After reorganization, Mr. Alfes relocated Petitioner's office in another building 100 feet away from the main office. Petitioner's office was initially located in a passageway and, as a result, Petitioner was required several times a day to make trips to the main building to obtain files necessary to complete his work. In August of 1983, prior to final hearing in this cause, Mr. Alfes retired, and Petitioner's office was relocated in a more spacious office close to the Acquisition section.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida, Commission on Human Relations, dismissing the petition for relief, and denying the relief requested therein. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd of May, 1984, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: BEN R. PATTERSON, ESQUIRE POST OFFICE BOX 4289 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32315 VERNON L. WHITTIER, JR., ESQUIRE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION HAYDON BURNS BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301 JEAN OWEN, ESQUIRE ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS WOODCREST OFFICE CENTER 325 JOHN KNOX ROAD SUITE 240, BUILDING F TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32303 DONALD A. GRIFFIN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS 325 JOHN KNOX ROAD BUILDING F, SUITE 240 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32303
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by engaging in unsolicited and unwanted sexually or romantically oriented behavior toward a subordinate female employee, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Gary Latham (Latham), has served as a member of the Florida Parole Commission (Parole Commission) since July 24, 1992. Claretha Billingslea Walker started to work for the Parole Commission on May 1, 1991, as an Administrative Secretary to the General Counsel's Office. At all times pertinent to this Complaint, she was known as Claretha Billingslea and will be so referred to for purposes of this Complaint. Effective May 27, 1994, Ms. Billingslea was promoted to the position of Executive Secretary to Commissioner Judith Wolson. On July 1, 1994, Ms. Wolson became Chairman of the Parole Commission. Ms. Billingslea was promoted to the position of Senior Executive Secretary to the Chairman. When a potential opening arose, Latham and Ms. Billingslea discussed the possibility of Ms. Billingslea accepting a position as the Executive Secretary to Latham. Latham had previously interviewed Ms. Billingslea for an Executive Secretary position in his office approximately two years before. Ms. Billingslea was interested in coming to work for Latham because a number of her duties had been eliminated when Ms. Wolson was made Chairman, but she was concerned about making such a move because she had been with Chairman Wolson's office such a short time. Latham discussed the possibility of transferring Ms. Billingslea to his office with Chairman Wolson and her administrative assistant, Gene Strickland. Both Chairman Wolson and Mr. Strickland agreed that it would be a good opportunity for Ms. Billingslea to learn more about the duties in a Commissioner's office because the work in the Chairman's office was more administrative than that in a Commissioner's office. Neither Mr. Strickland nor Chairman Wolson was dissatisfied with Ms. Billingslea's work. Prior to hiring Ms. Billingslea, Latham also discussed the hiring with his future administrative assistant, Brenda Henry, and with his wife. Effective August 5, 1994, Ms. Billingslea was reassigned to the position of Executive Secretary to Latham. Because there is only one position of Senior Executive Secretary in the Parole Commission (the Chairman's Secretary) this reassignment was nominally a demotion. It did not act as a demotion, however, because Ms. Billingslea's salary and benefits remained unchanged. In her capacity as Executive Secretary to Latham, Ms. Billingslea reported directly to Latham. As a career service employee, Ms. Billingslea could not be unilaterally fired by Latham, but as her direct supervisor Latham could set the wheels in motion for her termination. Ms. Billingslea understood that the Chairman would have to approve her termination. Latham had the authority to assign tasks to Ms. Billingslea and to grant or deny her leave or flex time. From the start of Ms. Billingslea's employment in Latham's office, Latham engaged in comments and behavior of questionable propriety. He told her that he would not be able to get any work done with such a pretty secretary. Ms. Billingslea took this as a joke. On another occasion, one of Ms. Billingslea's male friends complained to her that Latham had been rude to him when he called. She thought Latham might have been upset that she was receiving too many personal calls, but when she asked Latham about it, he told her no, and said, "I guess I'll just have to get used to guys calling all the time with such a pretty secretary." Latham often stared at Ms. Billingslea, looking her up and down. In describing these looks, Ms. Billingslea stated, "The way he looks at me, it is really weird. And it makes me feel uncomfortable, the way he kind of stares and looks me up and down. It will almost be as if he's going to say something, but he never said anything." Once when he was looking at her in this strange way, Ms. Billingslea asked him whether there was something he wanted to say, to which he responded, "No, that was my sexy look." At the time she took it as a joke. One day Latham told Ms. Billingslea that he had been on his way to a friend's house and had gotten lost and ended up on her street. He said that he had gone by her house and that she had a nice place. He asked her why she kept her blinds closed so tightly. Whenever the Florida Parole Commission denies parole, a "947.18" report is completed, justifying the decision not to grant the parole. Procedurally, the Parole Commission will make a decision to grant or deny parole at a meeting. The case is then assigned to a commissioner to prepare a 947.18 report. The report is prepared in the office of the commissioner and two weeks after the initial consideration the case is placed back on the agenda for review and acceptance of the 947.18 report. At its meeting on September 21, 1994, the Parole Commission denied parole for an inmate who had been convicted of sexually abusing his daughters. Latham had been assigned to prepare the 947.18 report. Ms. Henry drafted the report for Ms. Billingslea to type. The report was very sexually explicit. After the report was typed, Ms. Billingslea took it to Latham for his review. Both Latham and Ms. Billingslea commented that it was an interesting case. Latham closed his eyes and in a low voice began to describe the graphic details of the sexual abuse to Ms. Billingslea. Ms. Billingslea later asked Ms. Henry if the file contained any pictures. On September 27, 1994, Latham went into Ms. Billingslea's office and sat down in front of her desk. He informed her that he had "the hots" for her. He told Ms. Billingslea she had done nothing to make him approach her in this way, but that he did not know what had come over him lately, he had been attracted to a lot of young pretty women, and she was just "such a doll." He told her that he had nasty thoughts about her while he taught Sunday School. When she told him that she could not work for him if she were to be with him sexually, he responded that she wouldn't be working for him that he would be working for her. When she told him that she was not interested, he became defensive, stating that he had a lot of political power. His last words to her in that encounter were, "I might not be able to keep my hands to myself." Later the same day, as Ms. Billingslea was preparing to leave work, Latham asked her to stay late. Over and over, he asked her to stay and "be with him," initially standing behind her chair, preventing her from pushing back. Ms. Billingslea took Latham's remarks and actions on September 27 as an invitation to a sexual or romantic relationship, which she had neither solicited or encouraged. Ms. Billingslea did not misunderstand Latham or his intentions. Ms. Billingslea was afraid that her rejection of Latham's advances would cost her her job. She believed that Latham could cause her to be fired. On September 28, 1994, Ms. Billingslea was ill. She called her doctor's office and requested that the doctor call in a prescription for her to a local pharmacy. The doctor's office did call in a prescription. Ms. Billingslea advised Latham that she felt ill to which Latham responded that she had just "better be to work." Ms. Billingslea took this remark as an admonishment not to take sick leave. On October 3, 1994, Ms. Billingslea was late for work. She had tried to call the office to advise that she would be late but no one answered the telephone. On October 3, 1994, Latham expressed concern to Ms. Billingslea that she was abusing or not accurately reporting her leave time. Ms. Billingslea perceived that Latham's attitude toward her became cool after their conversation on September 27. Although Latham had never said anything to Ms. Billingslea about being tardy or being absent from work prior to September 27 because he did not think that it was a big deal, he began to voice his dissatisfaction with her work hours after she had spurned his advances. Ms. Billingslea went to the Parole Commission's personnel officer, Frank Trueblood. She wanted to take time off from work to look for another job and asked Mr. Trueblood if there was any type of leave request that she could take which could not be denied by Latham. Mr. Trueblood questioned Ms. Billingslea about the underlying nature of her problems and she told him about Latham's actions. Ms. Billingslea did not want to create a problem but wanted to find another job. Mr. Trueblood told Ms. Billingslea that she could file an informal complaint against Latham and that it would remain confidential. On October 5, 1994, Ms. Billingslea filed an informal complaint against Latham. About 5:00 p.m. that day she met with Chairman Wolson, Mr. Strickland and Clay Phillips to discuss the situation. Chairman Wolson told Ms. Billingslea that she would be transferred to another section. Ms. Billingslea did not display eagerness to file a formal complaint against Latham. Latham saw Ms. Billingslea in Chairman Wolson's office and after Ms. Billingslea had left, he asked to speak with Chairman Wolson. Latham wanted to know what was going on but Chairman Wolson would only tell him that Ms. Billingslea was being transferred to Clemency and that Murlene Amison would be transferred to his office as his secretary. At first Latham was upset at the news of the transfer and told Chairman Wolson that it would be setting a dangerous precedent to make the transfer. Latham told Chairman Wolson that he would like to "save face" in the matter and be the one who would offer the transfer to Ms. Amison. Latham then became exuberant about the transfer, closing his fist, punching up with it in a victory signal and saying "yes." He left Chairman's Wolson's office. A few minutes later, Latham returned to Chairman Wolson's office and told her that he thought he had figured out what had happened. He said that Ms. Billingslea had been sexually harassing him and that he had talked with her and explained that he did not want to have an affair with her. This was the first time anyone at the Parole Commission had heard Latham's claim of sexual harassment by Ms. Billingslea. On October 6, 1994, Ms. Billingslea filed a formal complaint against Latham. Latham tried to find out from Mr. Trueblood whether Ms. Billingslea had filed a sexual harassment complaint against him but Mr. Trueblood would not tell him. Effective October 7, 1994, Ms. Billingslea was reassigned to the position of Executive Secretary for the Clemency Section. On October 7, 1994, Latham called Mr. Strickland to his office and thanked Mr. Strickland for the personnel move, indicating that it had "sav[ed] his butt." Latham asked Mr. Strickland to close the door and then told him that he had been attracted to Ms. Billingslea but nothing had happened, and now, because of the move, nothing would happen. Latham wanted to know what was on the paperwork regarding the transfer. Mr. Strickland told him that it indicated a lateral transfer. Latham knew that it was wrong for a supervisor to invite a subordinate employee into a sexual or romantic relationship. Since she has been at the Parole Commission, Ms. Billingslea has never received formal discipline relevant to any fact or issue in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Gary Latham violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, and recommending a civil penalty of $4,000 be imposed and public censure and reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-3717E To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Advocate's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1: The first sentence is accepted. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 2: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 3-5: Accepted. Paragraph 6: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is accepted. Paragraphs 7-8: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: Accepted. Paragraph 10: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 11: Accepted. Paragraphs 12-19: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 20: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 21: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 22-25: Accepted. Paragraphs 26-30: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 31: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 32-33: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 34: Accepted. Paragraph 35: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 36: Accepted. Paragraph 37: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 38: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 39-45: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 46-59: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 60: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraphs 61-64: Accepted in substance. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Accepted. Paragraph 3: Accepted. Paragraph 4: The first two sentences are accepted. The last sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 5-6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: Accepted. Paragraph 8: The third and fourth sentences are rejected as subordinate to the facts found. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: The last sentence is accepted. The remainder is accepted in substance. Latham voiced his concerns after the conversation that he had with Ms. Billingslea on September 27. Paragraphs 10-11: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 12-13: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 14: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 15: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 16: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 17: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 18: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 19: The last sentence is accepted in substance except the portion about sexual innuendo. The evidence did establish that he did make sexual innuendos to Ms. Billingslea. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 20: The first sentence is rejected as not supported by the record. The second sentence is accepted to the extent that he never directly asked Ms. Billingslea for sex, but he did imply that he wanted a romantic liaison when he asked her to stay after work and be with him. The third, fourth, and fifth sentences are rejected as subordinate to the facts found. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the record. Latham did tell Ms. Billingslea that he had a lot of political influence. Paragraph 21: The first sentence is rejected as argument. The second sentence is accepted in substance. The third sentence is accepted to the extent that that is what she thought at the time the incident occurred but later she realized that it was not a joke. The third sentence is accepted to the extent that Latham denied the incidents but rejected to the extent that it implies that the incidents did not happen. Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, I find that the incidents did happen. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 22: The first four sentences are accepted in substance. The fifth sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 23: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 24: The first sentence is accepted in substance as that is what Latham testified but rejected to the extent that it implies that the conversation did not take place. Accepted in substance that Latham got lost while going to a fund raiser but rejected that he did not go by her house and that he did not comment that she had a nice house and that her blinds were shut. Paragraph 25: The first two sentences are rejected as not supported by the evidence. The third sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The last two sentences are rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 26: The first four sentences are accepted in substance. The last two sentences are rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 27-28: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 29: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is accepted in substance as that was Latham's testimony but rejected to the extent that it implies that he did not describe the graphic sexual details of the case. The third sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence based on the credibility of the witnesses. The fourth sentence is accepted to the extent that Latham made a comment to Ms. Henry that Ms. Billingslea was interested in the case. The last sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraph 30: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 31: Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, the paragraph is rejected. Paragraph 32: Accepted that Latham disputes Ms. Billingslea's allegations but rejected that Latham's version is credible. Paragraph 33: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 34-37: Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, the paragraphs are rejected. Paragraph 38: The first and second sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is accepted to the extent that Latham did not intentionally restrain Ms. Billingslea but rejected to the extent that it implies that Latham was not asking Ms. Billingslea to stay after work for the purpose of seeking sexual gratification or favors. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 39: The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraphs 40-41: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 42: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 43: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 44: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 45: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 46: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 47: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 48-49: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 50: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 51-53: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 54: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 55: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 56: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 57: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The third sentence is accepted as that is what Latham said but rejected as being true. Given other witnesses accounts of Ms. Billingslea's appearance on that date, it is inconceivable that Latham could not have known that she was not sick. The last two sentences are subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 58: Rejected as constituting argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Carrie Stillman Complaint Coordinator Commission on Ethics Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Mark Herron, Esquire Post Office Box 10555 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2555 Virlindia Doss Advocate For the Florida Commission on Ethics Department of Legal Affairs PL-01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Bonnie Williams Executive Director Florida Commission On Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool General Counsel Ethics Commission 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
The Issue Whether Respondent Employer committed an unlawful employment practice by discrimination on the basis of age and/or retaliation1/ against Petitioner, in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Deanna L. Eftoda, was born on August 26, 1949. Respondent, HealthSouth Rehabilitation Hospital of Tallahassee (HealthSouth), is a healthcare facility providing both in-patient and out-patient rehabilitation services in Tallahassee, Florida. As such, it employs personnel designated as "exempt" and "non-exempt," pursuant to the federal Fair Labor Standards Act. Generally speaking, "exempt" employees are salaried employees, in managerial posts, who do not receive over-time pay by the hour, and "non-exempt" employees are regular, non- managerial employees, who are paid a set amount per hour up to 40 hours per week and time and a-half per hour for every hour above 40 hours that they work in the same 40-hour week. There are some exceptions to this federal compensation scheme which are immaterial to this case. At all times material, a “Nursing House Supervisor” or “RN House Supervisor” were interchangeable job titles. Petitioner was initially hired by Respondent on January 26, 2004, as an "RN-Baylor Nurse." The RN-Baylor position was a non-exempt position, and in that position, Petitioner's hourly pay rate was $28.00. Petitioner's hourly rate of $28.00, was very high for an RN-Baylor Nurse, but Petitioner's credentials are exceptional. Within days of her hire, Petitioner was asked whether she would take an RN House Supervisor position. Petitioner accepted the RN House Supervisor position, and a corrected personnel action form reflecting this change was prepared on January 30, 2004. Petitioner signed an acknowledgement of her acceptance of the House Supervisor position on February 22, 2004. Every House Supervisor employed by Respondent during Petitioner's period of employment was an exempt employee. The RN House Supervisor position that Petitioner accepted was an exempt position. Nursing House Supervisors traditionally worked the evening and night shifts, when there was no member of the hospital administration on duty. Without a member of the hospital administration on duty, the Nursing House Supervisor was the highest ranking management employee at the facility. While Petitioner was employed with Respondent as an RN/Nursing House Supervisor, Respondent simultaneously employed “Charge Nurses.” The duties of a Charge Nurse were similar to the duties of a Nursing House Supervisor. However, unlike Nursing House Supervisors, Charge Nurses traditionally worked the day shift, during which higher-ranking members of the facility’s administration were simultaneously on duty. In 2004, Respondent also employed a Charge Nurse on the weekend day shift(s) when at least one administrator was present for several hours. (This anomaly seems to be at least one element which confused Petitioner and led to this case.) Even so, unlike RN House Supervisors, all Charge Nurses were classified by Respondent Employer as filling non-exempt positions. Every Charge Nurse employed by Respondent during Petitioner's employment was classified as a non-exempt employee, eligible to earn time-and-a-half for overtime. Petitioner’s salary was not increased when she accepted the RN House Supervisor position, because her base salary (calculated at $28.00 per hour) was commensurate with the salary of other RN House Supervisors already being paid as managerial employees at straight salary. On the other hand, because Petitioner worked as an RN/Nursing House Supervisor on a “Baylor,” or weekend, shift, Respondent paid Petitioner a special compensation for being scheduled to work every weekend, with no weekends “off.” This special compensation took the form of Respondent’s paying Petitioner as if she had worked 36 hours per week, even though she was only scheduled for 32 actual hours of work per week. Petitioner believes that she worked a minimum of four additional hours per week, because it was her practice to come on shift an hour early and leave an hour late to set up and wind down the area and staff under her supervision as Nursing House Supervisor. She “guessed” there were some weeks when, between this practice and meetings she was required to attend, she worked 32 hours above the usual 40 hours per week. Her “best guess” was that she was working “two (additional) hours per eight-hour shift,” plus attending meetings which were not held during her shift(s), beyond her scheduled 32 hours, but Petitioner never worked straight eight-hour shifts. (See Findings of Fact 12-15, and 25.) A Nursing House Supervisor working the Baylor shift, or an RN-Baylor Nurse, normally worked two twelve-hour shifts on the weekend and one eight-hour shift during the week. When Petitioner was hired by Respondent in January 2004, she was completing a second doctoral degree. In order to accommodate Petitioner's work on her dissertation, Respondent had offered Petitioner an irregular shift pattern consisting of two sixteen- hour shifts on the weekends. Petitioner had accepted this scheduling accommodation. As RN House Supervisor, Petitioner was required to attend occasional mandatory meetings for Nursing Supervisors and other nursing staff. These meetings were held during the week, and usually, but not always, between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. This meeting time was more convenient for employees regularly working the weekday shift immediately before 5:00 p.m. or coming on shift immediately after 6:00 p.m., than for staff on other shifts, but no age or retaliation component existed with regard to Petitioner or anyone else on other shifts. Petitioner also was required once or twice to attend several hours of computer classes in a single day and other training, but so was everyone else on staff. Because the meetings were not on the weekends during the hours Petitioner would normally work, Petitioner’s attendance at the mandatory weekday meetings upset Petitioner's personal plans for study, research, and writing her doctoral dissertation, but there is no evidence she was singled out for this inconvenience. Petitioner claimed herein that she was entitled to be paid overtime for coming to "work" for meetings and classes. Because her Nursing House Supervisor position was an exempt position, Petitioner was not paid overtime for attending these mandatory meetings and classes, but no other exempt employees were paid overtime for attending these meetings and classes outside of their normal working hours, either. Respondent's policy does provide that if a Nursing House Supervisor works an additional shift as a "floor nurse," separate and apart from his/her regularly scheduled shifts as a House Supervisor, then that Nursing House Supervisor can be granted additional pay for that additional shift during which he/she works as a floor nurse, even though the House Supervisor position is that of an exempt employee. In order to be granted this additional pay, the Nursing House Supervisor must fill out an "Additional Pay for Exempt Employees" request form and submit the form to management for prior approval. The mandatory weekly meetings that Petitioner was required to attend as a part of her Nursing House Supervisor duties did not qualify as a full additional shift, for any employee. Petitioner received a memorandum dated April 12, 2004, explaining this. In fact, When Petitioner filled out the correct form for work as a floor nurse, she was paid at the $27.50 per hour rate for a floor nurse. She was not paid when she filled out such a form for mandatory staff meetings, classes, and training sessions. Petitioner represented that throughout her employment by Respondent, she repetitively and persistently inquired about how her pay was being calculated and why the Employer did not calculate it the way she thought it should. She also claims to have repeatedly requested a different calculation of her pay and leave accruals on the basis of her beliefs and desires, but at the time she made no formal claim or discrimination complaint related to these inquiries and requests. In her testimony, even Petitioner described what she was doing as “negotiating” her salary. Throughout her employment by Respondent, Petitioner was cited by management for performance problems, including but not limited to difficulty in dealing with staff; poor management style; poor judgment in dealing with her supervisors and subordinates; creating confusion and chaos for staff on her scheduled shift by her confrontational manner; failing to properly address performance concerns with staff on her scheduled shift; and failure to take responsibility for her own actions. Giving Petitioner the benefit of the doubt, some of her friction with management and staff may have arisen because of her complaining that evaluators did not observe her for an entire shift; because she mis-read management’s instructions on how to code her timesheets as a requirement to falsify them; because she perceived that Respondent’s staffing levels occasionally fell below matrix, and she then created turmoil by calling in extra staff, whereas her superiors did not share her interpretation of the matrix requirements or the staffing events themselves; because she blamed the preceding shift for cleanliness issues; because she perceived herself undervalued for her extensive nursing experience; because she perceived herself personally opposed and ridiculed by a nurse of lesser or equal rank (Mandar); and because she did not believe that her superiors backed her up sufficiently and/or did not afford her the appropriate discretion in her interactions with subordinates. Petitioner objected to Respondent’s chain of command, which had her reporting to Ms. Roberts, Nurse Manager. Petitioner felt she should report directly to the Director of Nursing, her “two-up” supervisor. However, none of these disputes rose to the level of a protected activity under Chapter 760.10(7), Florida Statutes (see Finding of Fact 35), or related to Petitioner's age in any way. From Respondent's perspective, its administration received a myriad of complaints from Petitioner's supervisors, peers, and subordinates, regarding Petitioner's management style and performance. Some of Respondent's employees threatened to quit if they were forced to continue to work under Petitioner's supervision. Petitioner testified that in July 2004, she had polled her subordinates and asked them to indicate that they had “no problems” with her management style. Then she presented the list of subordinates to her superiors. This could have legitimately been viewed by Respondent’s management as Petitioner’s insubordination to them and/or intimidation of the polled subordinates by Petitioner. Respondent’s Nurse Manager and Petitioner’s direct supervisor, Barbara Roberts, felt that she was being required to spend an inordinate amount of her time dealing with Petitioner's problems. As a result of these problems, Petitioner was placed on probation on September 10, 2004. Petitioner challenged this probation, and a review was conducted by Respondent's management. Despite the fact that the complaints concerning Petitioner's management style and performance came from various sources, Petitioner complained that Ms. Roberts was unfairly disciplining and harassing her. Respondent's management concluded that the attention Petitioner had received from Ms. Roberts was not improperly motivated, but was a result of personality conflicts between Petitioner and other employees. Some of the allegations against Petitioner were substantiated, but investigation into an allegation that Petitioner had coerced or threatened employees into working, only produced limited supporting documentation. In the absence of additional documentation, Lynn Streetman, Hospital Administrator, concluded that probation was not the correct level of discipline for Petitioner. (P-22) Ms. Streetman recommended that Petitioner's supervisor, Ms. Roberts, chalk the problems up to differences in management style and downgrade Petitioner’s probation citation to a "written warning." On September 30, 2004, the probation citation was replaced with a written warning citation. Also on September 30, 2004, six months after Petitioner’s initial hire and approximately five and a-half months after she accepted the exempt Nursing House Supervisor position, Ms. Roberts sent Petitioner a memorandum informing her that it was no longer operationally feasible to continue the irregular pattern of two sixteen-hour shifts on the weekend (R- 3).2/ Respondent's reason for this change was that for four hours of each day that Petitioner was scheduled to work, there was an overlapping period when two supervisors were on duty, and this duplication of supervisory personnel resulted in an unnecessary expense for Respondent. Ms. Roberts' memorandum informed Petitioner that it was operationally necessary for Petitioner to begin working the traditional Baylor-RN's two twelve-hour weekend shifts and one eight-hour shift during the week, beginning with the October 16-17, 2004, weekend. This managerial decision obviously inconvenienced Petitioner for purposes of completing her doctoral dissertation, and she contends the decision was “retaliatory.” However, the change had been in discussion with management before September 30, 2004. Immediately after her probation was down-graded to a written warning, Petitioner asked for a weekend off, which was granted. Because she took a weekend off at that time, Petitioner had one less weekend to use later in December 2004. (See Finding of Fact 36.) Approximately October 17-18, 2004, when her new shift arrangement was beginning, Petitioner's supervisors again sought to put her on probation, due to a series of complaints by staff similar to the previous ones. Ms. Roberts and other superiors believed Petitioner distorted common conversations and created chaos on her shift by misinterpreting in her conversations with her subordinates the instructions her superiors had given her. In accord with its policy, Respondent launched a second investigation into Petitioner's alleged misconduct. On December 11, 2004, prior to conclusion of the second investigation, Petitioner sent an e-mail to Ms. Roberts and to Respondent's Human Resources Director, Jackie Chaires, requesting that her status be changed from full-time Nursing House Supervisor to "PRN," or "as needed," status. Petitioner's e-mail stated, I believe I have 'too many irons in the fire.' With my dissertation and numerous meetings outside my 32 hours, I find myself run down. To remedy this situation I am willing to wait until January 17, 2005 for this transition to begin. Please advise as to the salary changes. Petitioner believed that by giving four weeks’ notice before the date she wanted to “go PRN” she would be entitled to a payout of “personal time off” (PTO). However, due to subsequent events, she was not entitled to an "in cash" payout of PTO. (See Findings of Fact 59-60.) Respondent's policy provided that at any time an employee moved to a new position, he/she was placed on a 90-day mandatory probation to assess his/her performance in that new position. Because Petitioner was to be placed on a mandatory 90-day probation at the time that her status changed to PRN, there was no need to also place Petitioner on probation due to the conclusions of the second investigation into her alleged misconduct. However, Ms. Streetman instructed Ms. Chaires and Ms. Roberts to meet with Petitioner to go over the various performance problems that Petitioner was experiencing, and to inform Petitioner that continued poor performance in these areas during her PRN probationary period could result in disciplinary action up to, and including, termination. This meeting took place on December 15, 2004, and led to a rebuttal by Petitioner on December 29, 2004. (See Finding of Fact 34.) Petitioner previously considered moving to PRN status during February 2004. Petitioner also claimed that in March or April 2004, she had requested to be moved back to an RN-Baylor Nurse position, and that Ann McElreath, Director of Patient Care Services/Director of Nursing, told her that she could not make such a move without suffering a 45-percent decrease in compensation. Ms. McElreath testified that she did not remember any such request from Petitioner, and that she never told Petitioner that Petitioner would suffer a 45 percent decrease in pay if she moved back to a Baylor-RN position. Ms. McElreath further testified that she would have no reason to make such a statement to Petitioner, because she was not involved in any way in setting salaries. In light of the differential between part-time and full-time pay schedules, as discussed hereafter (see Findings of Fact 38 and 58), and the complexity of Respondent Employer’s other pay categories, coupled with the complexity of Baylor status, one can see how Petitioner misunderstood her situation, but her testimony evidences a clear misunderstanding of how Respondent calculated salaries, as well as a misunderstanding of the effect of designating exempt and non-exempt positions. On December 29, 2004, Petitioner sent a memorandum to Ms. Roberts, Ms. Chaires, Ms. Streetman, and Ms. McElreath, requesting to rescind her request to move to PRN status and requesting to finish another six months as House Nursing Supervisor; complaining about “harassment” by Ms. Roberts due to Ms. Roberts’ telephone calls reminding Petitioner to attend meetings and Ms. Roberts’ “insulting” Petitioner’s professional abilities by not seeing/taking Petitioner’s side of many issues with staff. Petitioner requested to begin “dispute resolution.” At no point in this memorandum did Petitioner mention anything about alleged discrimination on the basis of age. At no point during any investigation, nor at any other time, did Petitioner allege that she was being discriminated against based on her age. She did allege harassment by her immediate supervisor, Ms. Roberts, but this was in the nature of challenging Respondent’s basic chain-of-command decisions; Ms. Roberts' not permitting her sufficient discretion; and Petitioner’s belief that only Petitioner could interpret Center for Disease Control (CDC) requirements regarding cleanliness and restrictions on the employment of coughing personnel and Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) staffing requirements with regard to scheduling additional staff and instructing staff concerning these issues. Yet, Petitioner has never posed any complaint directly alleging violations of any federal or state regulation besides her “exempt” versus overtime issues, which she raised for the first time, herein. Petitioner wanted to take off December 31, 2004, and January 1, 2005 (New Year’s Eve and New Year’s Day), and she had been authorized in advance to do so. However, that authorization was rescinded when management discovered that she had already used the three weekend leaves to which she was entitled and that there might be staffing problems for the weekend period requested. (See Findings of Fact 26 and 54-57.) Petitioner had already made arrangements for her personal activities, and badgered management by e-mail to give her one or the other day off. Management ultimately let her have one of the days off, despite its “only three weekends” policy. Due to Petitioner’s on-going performance problems; management’s continuing concerns about her ability to effectively function as Nursing House Supervisor raised in the second misconduct investigation; and the patient safety concerns raised by her admission that she felt she had too many demands on her time, Respondent's management declined to allow Petitioner to rescind her request to move to PRN status. On January 5, 2005, Ms. Chaires told Petitioner, and on January 10, 2005, Ms. Chaires sent Petitioner a formal acknowledgement, of Respondent's acceptance of Petitioner's request to move to PRN status, effective January 17, 2005. On January 12, 2005, Ms. Chaires sent Petitioner an e- mail communication outlining the Respondent Employer’s pay rates for PRN status/service. Because Petitioner would be moving from a full-time House Nursing Supervisor position to a part-time PRN position, Ms. Chaires informed Petitioner that there would be a reduction in her salary from $28.00 per hour to $21.00 per hour. Ms. Chaires testified that it was customary for an employee moving from a full-time House Supervisor position to a PRN position to experience a reduction in pay. Petitioner claimed she was discriminated against because she received no merit increase at the end of 2004. She believes the lack of merit increase constituted retaliation for her obtaining the rescission of probation on September 30, 2004. Actually, Respondent’s employees undergo performance evaluations approximately every October. According to Respondent's policy, if an employee is on probation at any time during the third- quarter (July, August, September) of the calendar year, that employee is not eligible for a merit increase in connection with that year's October performance review. Respondent considered Petitioner ineligible for a merit raise at the end of 2004, because she had been on probation in September 2004; because there was a second investigation into Petitioner's performance and alleged misconduct that continued at least until December 15, 2004; and because Petitioner had requested to change her status to PRN. Because Petitioner’s probation was rescinded on the last day of September 2004, she technically was not barred from a merit increase due to being on probation in the third quarter, but she continued to be in the turmoil of some sort of disciplinary investigation until at least December 15, 2004. Respondent may have not followed the letter of its policy, but it maintained that policy’s spirit and purpose in not rewarding with a merit increase an employee who was subject to discipline at any moment. Petitioner also has not demonstrated that she was eligible for a merit increase based on meeting or exceeding performance standards. There is no credible evidence that the lack of an evaluation, the contents of an evaluation, or the lack of a 2004 merit increase in pay for Petitioner, constituted discrimination against her on the basis of her age or in retaliation for any protected activity. On January 14, 2005, a Friday, Petitioner had a friend phone Ms. Roberts on her behalf. The friend informed Ms. Roberts that Petitioner had undergone surgery that same day and would not be able to work as scheduled on the upcoming weekend. When Ms. Roberts inquired as to what kind of surgery Petitioner had undergone, the speaker would not give that information to Ms. Roberts. Ms. Roberts informed the caller that Petitioner should call Respondent to discuss her expected recovery time and her availability to return to work. Petitioner, who testified that she had listened to the foregoing conversation, described Ms. Roberts as “rude,” and the phone call may, indeed, have been acrimonious, in that the caller insisted on Petitioner’s right to medical privacy and Ms. Roberts wanted some detailed explanation why Petitioner was unable to report for work and why Petitioner was giving such short notice for her weekend shift(s), if she had not been in an accident and if she had elected the surgery in advance. At hearing, Petitioner’s explanation for her inability to work her last House Supervisor shift(s) covering January 14, 15, and 16, 2005, was that she had elected minor surgery with the intent to return to work her regular shift, but the procedure had turned out to be more debilitating than she had expected, so she could not return to work as scheduled. Also by date of January 14, 2005, Petitioner submitted an application for PRN employment with a different health care provider, Interim Healthcare. This date was a little more than a month after Petitioner had requested PRN status with Respondent; a little more than two weeks after Petitioner had sought to rescind that request; and two days after Respondent had declined in writing Petitioner's PRN rescission request. It was three days prior to Petitioner's scheduled move to PRN status with Respondent on January 17, 2005, pursuant to her accepted request. There was nothing to prohibit Petitioner from signing-up for PRN work with multiple health care providers. Because Petitioner did not show up for her last three scheduled shifts (two days) as Nursing House Supervisor, Respondent's policy required Petitioner to provide a doctor's note releasing her to return to work before Respondent would place her on PRN duty. Petitioner never provided Respondent with a doctor's note releasing her to return to work. Petitioner's testimony, that Ms. Chaires had told Petitioner on some previous occasion that as an "exempt" employee Petitioner did not need a doctor’s note for her absences, is not credible upon the record as a whole. It also is immaterial whether Petitioner's absence for her last three shifts/two days equate with "three consecutive days' absence," per Respondent’s policy on doctors’ notes, because more than three days passed without any word from Petitioner in response to Ms. Robert’s January 14, 2005, instructions by telephone. Respondent’s witnesses maintain that after January 14, 2005, Petitioner never initiated contact with Respondent in any way to discuss her availability for work, and that Ms. Streetman first phoned Petitioner in March 2005, to determine whether she was returning to work as a PRN. Petitioner claims that Respondent did not call her for any PRN work until May 2005, and therefore, in effect, Respondent constructively terminated Petitioner’s employment. There also is some divergence in testimony whether or not Respondent mailed Petitioner a package of materials with instructions that she must complete and return those materials before Respondent would call her for PRN duty, in March or at any other time. However, there is no dispute that during May 2005, Ms. Streetman, as acting interim Human Resources Director for Respondent, had telephone contact with Petitioner to coordinate Petitioner’s return to work as a PRN nurse. During this conversation, Petitioner informed Ms. Streetman that she would not return to work for Respondent as a PRN nurse under any circumstances. Petitioner stated that she would only work for Respondent if: Petitioner were returned to the position of full-time House Supervisor; Petitioner would only work a 16-hour shift on the weekends; and Ms. Streetman would set up a meeting with herself, Petitioner, Ms. Roberts, and a corporate representative of Respondent to discuss the resolution of various issues Petitioner wanted addressed. These issues were much as set out previously. (See Findings of Fact 17-19 and 35-39.) Age does not seem to have been one of Petitioner’s issues. Petitioner also indicated that she had not received the PRN packet of information that Respondent maintains it had sent her. Ms. Streetman immediately forwarded a copy of the PRN package to Petitioner. Although Petitioner provided a copy of a current CPR card to Respondent in May of 2005, she did not provide a doctor's note releasing her to return to work, her executed PRN paperwork acknowledging her duties and responsibilities as a PRN nurse, or an executed acknowledgement of Respondent's HIPPA policies and procedures, all of which Respondent required before putting Petitioner on its PRN status/phone list. On or about May 24, 2005, Ms. Streetman once again contacted Petitioner and informed her that she was unable to bring Petitioner back to work under the conditions that Petitioner had previously outlined, but Respondent was willing for Petitioner to work as a PRN nurse. Once again, Petitioner informed Ms. Streetman that she would not return to work as a PRN nurse under any circumstances. Accordingly, at that time, Ms. Streetman terminated Petitioner. During her employment with Respondent as a Nursing House Supervisor, Petitioner accrued PTO, in accordance with her position and length of service. As a Nursing House Supervisor, Petitioner should have accrued PTO at the rate of 7.69 hours of accrued PTO per two week pay period, which corresponds to the PTO accrual schedule for staff employees. However, due to a clerical error by Ms. Chaires, Petitioner actually had been allowed to accrue PTO at a rate of 9.54 hours of accrued PTO per two-week pay period, which corresponds to the PTO accrual schedule for department head employees, even though as Nursing House Supervisor, Petitioner was not a department head. Respondent's policy in 2004, permitted all Baylor, or weekend, employees of Respondent to expend PTO hours on no more than three weekends per year. Because Petitioner worked a Baylor, or weekend, schedule as Nursing House Supervisor, Petitioner was limited to using PTO for three weekends per year. Petitioner signed off on, and acknowledged, this three weekend limitation. Although this policy limited the weekend days on which Petitioner was entitled to use her accrued PTO, Petitioner was entitled to use her accrued PTO for any weekday shifts for which she was scheduled after September 30, 2004, when Ms. Roberts informed her that it was operationally necessary for her to work at least one eight-hour shift during each week. During 2004, Petitioner used 171 hours and 15 minutes of PTO, and all three of her allotted weekends off as a Baylor employee of Respondent. (See Findings of Fact 26 and 36.) Later in 2005, Respondent re-examined its PTO leave policy. In order to compete for staff with other local health care providers, Respondent changed the number of allowed weekend PTO days for its Baylor employees from three to four weekends. However, this increase in the number of weekend leaves permitted for Baylor employees did not affect Petitioner, because her request to move from full-time Nursing House Supervisor to PRN nurse had been granted, effective January 17, 2005, and the new leave policy was not retroactive. A PRN nurse occupies a part-time position. As a PRN nurse, Petitioner was not eligible to accrue or use PTO. On January 22, 2005, Petitioner’s PTO balance was 4.37 hours, meaning Petitioner had 4.37 hours of PTO available for use. The dollar value of Petitioner’s remaining PTO hours amounted to $83.09. According to Respondent's policy, an employee was eligible for a cash payout for his/her unused PTO hours upon voluntary resignation (including a voluntary employment status change) and/or involuntary lay-off if: (1) the employee had successfully completed his/her 90-day probationary period; (2) the employee provided Respondent with proper notice; and (3) the employee worked a minimum of four hours on his or her final scheduled day of work. Whether Petitioner successfully completed her probationary period as a Nursing House Supervisor is not at issue in this case. Sufficient notice of status change is not at issue in this case. (See Findings of Fact 29- 30.) Petitioner did not receive a cash payout for her 4.37 unused PTO hours on January 17, 2005, when she moved from a full-time Nursing House Supervisor position to a PRN nurse position, because she did not work the required four hours on her final scheduled day of work as a Nursing House Supervisor. Petitioner missed her final three scheduled shifts as a Nursing House Supervisor in January of 2004, and she did not work on the day that her employment with Respondent was terminated. whether one counts the status change date of January 17, 2004 or the final termination date in May 2005. (See Findings of Fact 45 and 52.) Therefore, Petitioner was not eligible for a PTO payout under Respondent Employer’s policy at the time her status changed to PRN nurse, January 17, 2005. Between January 14, 2005, and November 2005, Petitioner did not apply for any type of work so as to mitigate potential damages. After January 14, 2005, she had PRN status with Interim Healthcare, but she did not accept work from Interim until November 2005. During that period, she only attended classes and lived on her student loans. Petitioner had previously acquired at least a J.D. (law degree), two nursing degrees, and possibly another doctorate. With these credentials, she was certainly not “unemployable” during the interim of January-November 2005. Petitioner never complained to Ms. Roberts, her direct supervisor, that Petitioner believed that she was being discriminated against on the basis of her age. In 2004, Petitioner would have been 55, and Ms. Roberts would have been 51 years of age. Ms. Roberts never treated Petitioner any differently than any other Nursing House Supervisor. Ms. Roberts was not actively aware of Petitioner's age at any time during her employment. Petitioner never complained to Ms. McElreath, then- Director of Nursing and Petitioner's “two-up” supervisor, that Petitioner believed she was being discriminated against on the basis of her age. Ms. McElreath would have been 50 to Petitioner's 55 years of age at all times material. Petitioner never complained to Ms. Chaires, Director of Human Resources, that Petitioner believed she was being discriminated against on the basis of her age. No decision that Ms. Chaires made concerning Petitioner was motivated by Petitioner's age. Petitioner never complained to Ms. Streetman, Respondent's administrator, that Petitioner believed she was being discriminated against on the basis of her age. Ms. Streetman would have been 49 years of age, at all times material. No decision that Ms. Streetman made concerning Petitioner was motivated by Petitioner's age.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief and Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of September, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 2006.
Findings Of Fact After the motion for continuance was again denied, petitioners declined to offer any evidence and petitioners announced that they would be pursuing certain supposed federal remedies.
The Issue The issue is whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice under section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2011), by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of race or sex, and if so, what remedy should be ordered.
Findings Of Fact Apalachee Center is a not-for-profit health center providing mental health and substance abuse services in the Big Bend region of North Florida, which employs over 15 people. One of its facilities is a 16-bed mental health residential facility in Tallahassee, Florida, primarily housing men who suffer from severe mental illness. Ms. Sandra Johnson, an African–American woman and Petitioner in this case, has been a Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN) since 1984. She began working for Respondent in 2009 as the only LPN on duty on “B Shift Days” from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. at the Forensic Residential Program. Another LPN, Ana Degg, was a white woman who worked on the “A” shift, and was the lead forensic nurse and Petitioner’s acting supervisor, though she was not actually present during the shift Petitioner worked. Most of the residents in the facility in which Petitioner worked have been found incompetent by the criminal justice system and have been sent to the program by court order. Petitioner maintained their medications, monitored their health, and helped to ensure that they did not leave the facility. At the time she was hired, Petitioner was made aware of Apalachee Center’s policies prohibiting discrimination and had been advised to immediately report any suspected discrimination to the Human Resources Department. Ms. Candy Landry, the Human Resources Officer at Apalachee Center, is proud of Apalachee’s diversity record. Apalachee employs more African-Americans than whites. Ms. Degg had some conflicts with Petitioner immediately after they began working together, but later came to the conclusion that it was just a reflection of Petitioner’s personality. Ms. Degg said that she still continued to receive some staff complaints, mostly about Petitioner’s demeanor. She testified that Petitioner “came off as gruff.” Ms. Degg was very credible. Ms. Degg consulted Ms. Jane Magnan, Registered Nurse (RN) who was the Director of Nursing, and Ms. Jeanne Pope, the Director of Residential Services, as to the best way to handle the situation. Ms. Magnan and Ms. Pope each testified that they advised Ms. Degg to start with basic lines of communication and mentoring on a one-to-one level to see if the problem could be handled before anything went to the written stage. Ms. Degg provided some handouts on interpersonal relations and “soft skills” to Petitioner and her unit and tried to coach Petitioner on how to be a bit more professional in her interactions. Ms. Degg told Petitioner that staff was saying that Petitioner was rude and she asked her to talk to people a little differently. She said Petitioner responded by saying that that was “just the way she was.” Petitioner’s conduct did not change and complaints continued. Ms. Magnan, who had hired Petitioner, believed that Ms. Degg found it difficult to discipline Petitioner. Ms. Magnan also believed there was some resistance from Petitioner in acknowledging Ms. Degg, a fellow LPN, as Petitioner’s supervisor. Petitioner had no “write–ups” from the time of her employment at Apalachee in August or September of 2009 until January of 2011. On January 21, 2011, Petitioner was presented a memorandum dated January 7, 2011, to document a Written Supervisory Session on two incidents. First, the memorandum stated that Petitioner had been counseled for failure to give a report to the oncoming nurse who had arrived late for her shift. Second, it stated that Petitioner had been counseled for being rude and unprofessional in a telephone conversation with the Dietary Supervisor. The memorandum was signed by Petitioner and by Ms. Degg. Ms. Degg testified that in response Petitioner had denied that she had failed to give a report to the oncoming nurse, but that the other staff people had corroborated what the oncoming shift nurse had told her, so she believed it had happened. At hearing, Petitioner continued to deny that she had failed to give a report to the oncoming nurse and denied that she had been rude or unprofessional in her conversation with the Dietary Supervisor. In the months following the January “write-up,” Ms. Degg did not notice any change in Petitioner’s demeanor and continued to receive complaints. She noted that she did not personally consider Petitioner’s behavior to be rude, but others did, and she could understand why. On May 18, 2011, Petitioner was presented a memorandum dated May 10, 2011, to document another Written Supervisory Session. The memorandum indicated that Petitioner had been unprofessional in communications to a Mental Health Assistant (MHA) whom Petitioner supervised. It stated that Petitioner had used phrases such as “shut up” and “get out of my face” to the MHA and that Petitioner had previously been counseled regarding this issue. The Memorandum was signed by Petitioner and by Ms. Magnan and Ms. Pope. Ms. Magnan and Ms. Pope offered Petitioner training and assistance. On the memorandum, Petitioner wrote that she did not agree with the statement and that she was willing to learn. On May 27, 2011, Petitioner’s Employee Performance Evaluation for the period April 23, 2010, through May 15, 2011, was presented to Petitioner. It indicated “Below Performance Expectations” or “Needs Improvement” in several areas, including supervision of MHAs, training of staff, unit management, acceptance of responsibility, and attitude. Hand-written notes by Ms. Magnan and Ms. Dianne VanZorge, the RN supervising the forensic unit, commented on difficulties in communicating with staff, compromised staff morale, and lack of leadership. The report noted that various employees had brought Petitioner’s attitude to the attention of the Program Director and Director of Nursing. The evaluation was signed by Petitioner, Ms. Magnan, and Melany Kearley, the Chief Operations Officer. In conjunction with this unfavorable Employee Performance Evaluation, and in accordance with Apalachee policy, Petitioner was placed on a Corrective Action Plan, a 60-day period of Conditional Probationary Status. The memorandum advising Petitioner of this action explained that Petitioner should immediately take action to maintain a friendly and productive work atmosphere, demonstrate respect and courtesy towards clients and co-workers, and demonstrate initiatives to improve Petitioner’s job and the program. The memorandum advised that any further non-compliance could result in disciplinary action or termination of employment. Petitioner’s supervisor was changed to Ms. VanZorge. Petitioner knew Ms. VanZorge because they had worked together many years earlier. Petitioner was advised in the Corrective Action Plan that Ms. VanZorge would meet with her on a weekly basis to provide any needed assistance. At the time Petitioner was placed on probation, Ms. Magnan testified that Petitioner became angry. Petitioner asked if they wanted her to quit. Ms. Magnan encouraged Petitioner not to quit, telling her that that “we are going to work this out.” Ms. Magnan and Ms. VanZorge testified that they made sure that Petitioner acknowledged that resources and coaching were available to help her. Petitioner testified that leadership, nursing management, and supervisory resources were not subsequently provided to her as promised. On June 29, 2011, Mr. Alphonzo Robinson, an African-American MHA who worked under Petitioner’s supervision, submitted complaints about Petitioner to Ms. VanZorge and Ms. Pope. Ms. VanZorge and Ms. Pope then met with Petitioner regarding these complaints. A memorandum documenting the meeting with Petitioner, prepared the same day, states that an MHA reported that Petitioner had eaten a resident’s lunch. The MHA alleged that the resident had gone out on a morning community pass, asking staff to save his lunch for him until he returned. The memorandum states that when the resident returned, the MHA went to get his lunch for him, only to find Petitioner eating the last of the resident’s food in the staff kitchen. The MHA indicated that Petitioner denied eating the resident’s lunch, saying that it had been thrown away, and directed the MHA to give the resident another patient’s meal instead. Only an empty tray without food was found in the garbage. The MHA noted that another patient’s lunch could not be substituted because the first resident was diabetic and had special dietary needs. The memorandum also indicates that several other complaints were made against Petitioner by the MHA and discussed with her at the meeting. It was alleged that the Petitioner was continually rude to staff, asked residents to run errands for her, left the commode dirty with urine and feces, and used her hands to get ice from the ice machine. The memorandum noted that at the meeting, after an initial denial, Petitioner finally had admitted that she had eaten the resident’s lunch. It also noted that Petitioner had admitted that “a while back” she had asked residents to get Cokes for her, but that now she drank water. The memorandum concluded by noting that the expectations on Petitioner’s Corrective Action Plan had been reviewed, and that it was further discussed that Petitioner was not to eat any resident meals or ask them to perform errands. Petitioner had been instructed to buy a meal ticket or bring her own, clean up after herself, and adhere to infection control policy and universal precautions. At hearing, Ms. VanZorge testified that during the meeting Petitioner admitted having eaten the resident’s lunch, but stated she had not done that for a long while prior to that. Ms. VanZorge stated that Petitioner also admitted she had gotten ice with her hands once. Ms. Pope testified that Petitioner had initially denied eating the resident’s food, but then later during the course of the meeting had admitted that she had eaten it, and also admitted that she had sent residents to run errands for her. MHA Kim Jenkins, a white woman and the second MHA under Petitioner’s supervision, testified that she knew nothing about the allegations that Petitioner ate a resident’s lunch. She testified that the bathroom was a unisex bathroom and that Petitioner did leave it in an unsanitary condition almost every time she used it, although she had been too embarrassed for Petitioner to ever discuss that with Petitioner. Ms. Jenkins said she did try to discuss all of the other recurring issues with Petitioner. She testified that Petitioner was rude on a daily basis. She testified that she had seen Petitioner going through other staff members’ mail and opening it. She testified that Petitioner did get ice with her bare hands on several occasions. On cross-examination, Ms. Jenkins stated that she did not document any of these incidents and could not remember dates on which they occurred. Pressed to provide dates, Ms. Jenkins testified that the only approximate date she could remember was the time that Petitioner sent a client with a staff member to get two hot dogs for Petitioner and the client had ended up paying for the hot dogs. Ms. Jenkins said that she knew this occurred in October because Ms. Jenkins had been assigned to the unit for only about two weeks when it happened. Ms. Jenkins testified that she clearly remembered when this occurred because Ms. Jenkins had been “written up” by Petitioner shortly afterwards for stopping at a McDonald’s drive–through on the way back from a client’s doctor’s appointment to allow the client to buy some ice cream. Ms. Jenkins testimony was very credible. Petitioner testified at hearing that the allegations in the June 29, 2011, letter of Alphonzo Robinson were not true. She testified that she did not eat a patient’s food, never asked patients to buy sodas or candy for her, never left urine and feces on the toilet seat, and that he never caught her sleeping on the job. She testified that it was a public bathroom, and noted that anyone could have left it in that condition. She also stated that someone should wonder, “[W]hy was Alphonzo Robinson in ladies’ bathroom watching toilet seats? Apparently he needs to be monitoring the patient and not the lady bathroom.” Petitioner noted that in all of the allegations against her, “[I]t is their word against mine.” In a memo dated July 1, 2011, to Ms. Kearley, Ms. Pope recommended the termination of Petitioner’s employment with Apalachee Center. Ms. Magnan, Ms. VanZorge, and Ms. Pope were unanimous in this recommendation. On or about July 6, 2011, Ms. Pope accompanied Petitioner to the office of Ms. Candy Landry, the Human Resources Officer, where Petitioner was informed that her employment was terminated. Ms. Landry testified that Petitioner had violated policies of Apalachee and that the disciplinary process and termination of employment with respect to Petitioner had followed standard procedures. Ms. Landry testified that Petitioner’s replacement was also African-American. Petitioner filed a complaint with the Florida Human Relations Commission (Commission), alleging that Apalachee Center had discriminated against her based upon her race and sex on August 15, 2011. Her complaint alleged that non-African- American employees had never been disciplined without reason, as she had been. Her complaint stated an employee had made unwelcome comments that she was “fine,” “sexy” and “beautiful.” On December 20, 2011, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief, which was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings. At hearing, Petitioner presented no evidence regarding similarly situated white employees. Petitioner presented no evidence that anyone ever made comments that she was “fine,” “sexy” or “beautiful.” She did testify that she made a note on June 20, 2011, regarding Alphonzo Robinson. Her testimony was as follows: Okay. Ready for Alphonso Robinson. This is what he states, “I’m looking for a wife. Bring your friend down here so I can look at her.” I informed Robinson to sit in day room with client. Let Kim Jenkins come from back there with the men. He states, “I don’t want to deal with the men. When I worked at Florida Hospital, we punish inmate.” I told him we don’t do that here. Social Service case managers do that. Group coordinator recommend –- group coordinators recommend treatment, member, nurse, case manager, and Ms. Pope. Robinson state, “I used to be a man that – that – I used to be a man that a husband was having problem with sex, I took care of his wife.” I stopped talking to him and just restrict everything to work only with Mr. Alphonzo Robinson. I gave this note to Ana Degg. I asked her please to address it with Ms. Pope. I never heard anything else about that. I did my job as I was told. I went by the instructions what the facility asked me to do. Petitioner testified that she prepared the note with this information on June 20, 2011, and gave it to Ms. Degg. This would have been a bit more than one week prior to Mr. Robinson’s complaints about her performance. Under cross-examination, Mr. Robinson denied that he had been sleeping on the job or had made inappropriate sexual remarks. He denied that he made the allegations against Petitioner because he was fearful he would be terminated and was attempting to get Petitioner fired first: Q You said – you made sexual statements, you told me that you had a new lady, that her husband had problems with sex, and you took care of the lady. After that I learned that, to stay out from around you, because I am a married lady. I have been married for 37 years. I don’t endure stuff like that. So after that, then later on you was in the room and you made a sexual comment. You – I said that is inappropriate, that’s not the kind of behavior – we do not come to work for that kind of behavior. * * * Q So Alphonzo – A Yes. Q -- after you made that comment, and then you said those statements, and then after that I approached you and told you that you cannot be sleeping at the desk, and then you decided to make these statements, to go to Dianne, Kim’s friend and all that, so they can get me fired before you get terminated, is that not true? A No, that’s not. Q You had never been sleeping at the desk? A No, I haven’t. There is no evidence that Petitioner mentioned the note or showed it to anyone at the Florida Commission on Human Relations in connection with her complaint of discrimination. She did not provide a copy of the note to the Division of Administrative Hearings or to Respondent prior to hearing. Petitioner testified that she found the note in her papers when she went through them. Ms. Degg was no longer Petitioner’s supervisor on June 20, 2011. Ms. Degg testified that she could not recall Petitioner ever complaining about anyone in the workplace sexually harassing her. Ms. Degg testified that she had received a written complaint about MHA Jenkins, but that she had never received any written complaint about MHA Robinson. Ms. Degg’s testimony that she did not receive the note was credible, and is accepted as true. Ms. VanZorge testified that Petitioner never complained to her about any type of sexual harassment by Mr. Robinson. Ms. Pope testified that Petitioner never complained to her about any sexual harassment. Ms. Candy Landry, the Human Resources Officer, testified that Petitioner never complained to her that she had been subjected to sexual harassment. She further testified that she was never aware of any allegations of sexual harassment of Petitioner from any source. The facts do not support the conclusion that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of race or sex.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of April, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Sandra Johnson 284 Centerline Road Crawfordville, Florida 32327 Thomas A. Groendyke, Esquire Douberley and Cicero 1000 Sawgrass Corporate Parkway, Suite 590 Sunrise, Florida 33323 tgroendyke@dc-atty.com Chris John Rush, Esquire Rush and Associates 1880 North Congress Avenue, Suite 205 Boynton Beach, Florida 33426 cjrushesq@comcast.net Lawrence F. Kranert, Jr., Esquire Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 kranerl@fchr.state.fl.us Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 violet.crawford@fchr.myflorida.com
Findings Of Fact By operation of the Constitution of the State of Florida, Article IX, Section 4(b), the Board is charged with the operation, control and supervision of all schools within Volusia County, Florida. By state law, Section 230.01, Florida Statutes (1991), the State of Florida has delegated to the Board the responsibility for the actual operation and administration of all schools within Volusia County. Section 230.23, Florida Statutes (1991), provides that the Board will exercise, inter alia, the following general powers: (5) PERSONNEL - Designate positions to be filled, prescribe qualifications for those positions, and provide for the appointment, compensation, promotion, suspension, and dismissal of employees as follows, subject to the requirements of Chapter 231: (a) Positions, qualifications and appointments. - Act upon written recommendations submitted by the Superintendent for positions to be filled . . . Section 230.33(7)(a), Florida Statutes, requires the Superintendent of Schools to make written nominations of persons to fill positions established by the School Board. With respect to classroom teachers employed by the Board, such employees may be granted tenure, that is the right to continuing employment subject to removal upon certain conditions. The tenure rights of classroom teachers employed by the Board are provided by the Volusia County Teachers' Tenure Law, Chapter 18964, Laws of Florida (1937), as amended (hereinafter referred to as "the Volusia County Tenure Law" or "the tenure law.") The procedure used by the Board in determining which teachers are to be granted tenure begins with a recommendation made by the principal who is supervising the teacher in question. The recommendation is made to the Board's personnel office which then passes it on to the Superintendent, who either supports the recommendation by making it to the School Board or not. Only the Board may reelect a teacher for employment, and such reelection is an essential precondition to the obtainment of status as a tenured teacher. The Volusia County Tenure Law provides for a probationary period of three years following which, if the teacher is reelected to employment for a fourth consecutive year and fills other requirements set forth in the tenure law, he or she will obtain tenure. In the case of the three individual Petitioners who are parties to this action, each was denied tenure following her third year of employment, but did obtain employment in the status of a fourth year probationary employee. The alternative to this fourth year of probation was described by the Board's representative as a "failure to enter into a contract for an additional year and termination." The Union introduced a list of three teachers besides the individual Petitioners in this action as Petitioners' Exhibit 7. Of the three persons listed in that exhibit, one, Hall, was granted tenure after her fourth year of probation. Another, Maynar, was granted tenure after his fifth year of probation. The third, Powers, was granted tenure after seven years of probationary status. The fact that two of those teachers served probationary periods in excess of four years was described to be as the result of "oversight" on the part of the Board. Petitioners' Exhibit 1 sets forth tenure treatment of classroom teachers employed by the Board from and including the 1988-89 school year to and including the 1991-92 school year. In the 1988-89 school year, 123 teachers received tenure after a third year of probation, 12 teachers were granted tenure after a fourth year of probation, 115 teachers were non-renewed (terminated) after their third year, and 23 accepted a fourth year of probation. In the 1989-90 school year, 110 teachers received tenure after their third year, 22 were granted tenure after a fourth year of probation, 25 were non-renewed, and 25 accepted a fourth year of probation. In the 1990-91 school year, 155 teachers received tenure after their third year, 25 were granted tenure after a fourth year of probation, 28 were not renewed after their third year, and 41 accepted a fourth year of probation. In the 1991-92 school year, the last year for which records were available at the time of the hearing, 198 teachers received tenure following a third year of probation, 46 were granted tenure after a fourth year of probation, 33 were not renewed after their third year of probation, and 9 accepted a fourth year of probation. On March 30, 1993, Dr. Willie D. Brennon, Assistant Superintendent for Personnel for the Board, issued an interoffice memorandum to all principals and department heads which informed those principals and department heads that contract "Status 5," that is the granting of a fifth probationary year, was no longer an option open to principals and department heads dealing with classroom teachers. The Board's Division for Personnel Services has also issued a document entitled "Procedure for Giving Notice of Non forms for the employment and treatment of teachers. The Board has not promulgated any set of standards to be used by a principal in deciding whether he or she will recommend a classroom teacher for tenure. On April 19, 1991, Pearl Coleman was employed by the Board as a classroom teacher. On that same day, Ms. Coleman's principal, Rowena Reddix, completed a form entitled "Instructional Personnel Reappointment 1991 School Year." In that form, Ms. Reddix requested that Ms. Coleman be recommended for reappointment for the 1991 On May 10, 1991, Ms. Reddix recommended that Ms. Coleman be granted tenure by completing a form entitled "Recommendation for Tenure 1991-92 School Year." However, Ms. Reddix later rescinded her recommendation that tenure be granted to Ms. Coleman. After the recision, on June 13, 1991, Ms. Reddix recommended that Ms. Coleman be appointed as a probationary (non employee for the 1991 document, Ms. Coleman accepted employment as a probationary employee by executing a sworn statement that read as follows: This is to inform you that I voluntarily accept classification as a probationary employee for the 1991-92 school year. When Ms. Coleman signed that statement and accepted employment as a probationary employee, she understood that, but for her acceptance of this status, she would not be employed by the Board. Furthermore, although Ms. Coleman believed she would receive tenure after her fourth year of probation, she understood that she did not have tenure in that fourth year. On May 15, 1992, Mr. Gerald L. Gill, who succeeded Ms. Reddix as Ms. Coleman's principal, signed a letter, which informed Ms. Coleman that she would not be recommended for employment for the 1992-93 school year and that the Board would not enter into a contract of employment with her for any period subsequent to the 1991-92 school year. Linda L. Williams was employed by the Board as a classroom teacher for the 1989-90, 1990-91, and 1991-92 school years. In her third year of employment, Ms. Williams was employed as a classroom teacher at Woodward Avenue School and served under principal Jo Anne Rodkey. In the same year, Ms. Rodkey informed Ms. Williams that she would not be recommended for reemployment because the school was losing a unit and therefore there was no position for her at the school. On May 12, 1992, Ms. Rodkey delivered to Ms. Williams a letter informing Ms. Williams that Ms. Rodkey would not be recommending her for tenure. Subsequently, Ms. Williams applied for a position as a sixth grade teacher at Holly Hill Middle School. Ms. Williams previously had been informed by Ms. Rodkey that any further employment by the Board would be as a probationary employee. Ms. Williams specifically understood that the only way she would be hired at Holly Hill was on a probationary basis and further understood that if she had not agreed to probationary status she would not have been employed at Holly Hill Middle School. Ms. Williams accepted employment at Holly Hill under these conditions. On June 12, 1991, Petitioner Lynne Demarest was employed as a classroom teacher at South Daytona Elementary School. On that same date, Ms. Demarest executed a notarized statement which stated: This is to inform you that I voluntarily accept classification as a probationary employee for the 1991 Subsequently, on June 14, 1991, Mr. David C. Butler, who was the principal at South Daytona Elementary School, recommended the reappointment of Ms. Demarest as a probationary employee for the 1991 time that Ms. Demarest accepted employment on probationary status, she understood that this was the only condition upon which she would be employed by the Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is ORDERED that the Petition is DENIED and DISMISSED. DONE and ORDERED this 12th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 1993. APPENDIX TO THE FINAL ORDER IN CASE NO. 93-1862 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Florida Education Association et al. 1. Proposed findings of fact 1-11 are unsupported by the competent and substantial evidence. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, School Board of Volusia County 1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-17(1-17). COPIES FURNISHED: Lorene C. Powell Chief Trial Counsel, FEA/United 118 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1700 Thomas M. Gonzalez Attorney at Law 109 North Brush Street, Suite 200 Post Office Box 639 Tampa, Florida 33601 Carroll Webb Executive Director Administrative Procedures Committee Holland Building, Room 120 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1300
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner's allegation of subjection to an unlawful employment practice is barred by Section 760.11(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was previously employed by Respondent until her termination on November 15, 1996. Petitioner discussed the firing with her attorney in January of 1997. Petitioner was apprised by the attorney that she could file a complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Prior to August of 1997, Petitioner's attorney informed her that he had filed a Charge of Discrimination on behalf of Petitioner with the EEOC. Petitioner was led to understand that an investigator for EEOC would contact her. Petitioner was never contacted by the EEOC. On April 14, 2000, Petitioner received a notice from her attorney that apprised Petitioner that the attorney had been suspended from the practice of law by the Supreme Court for a period of 10 days. Later in either May or June, Petitioner read a newspaper article that recounted the suspension of Petitioner's attorney from the practice of law. Petitioner then determined to consult her present counsel in this matter, David Glasser, Esquire, to handle the charge she believed had been filed with the EEOC. Petitioner learned through Glasser that her previous counsel had not filed a complaint or charge with the EEOC. On July 10, 2000, Petitioner filed her Charge of Discrimination with the FCHR. Petitioner has neither filed a complaint with the Florida Bar Association or filed a legal malpractice suit against her previous counsel.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of September, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Azizi M. Dixon, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 David Glasser, Esquire Glasser and Handel 150 South Palmetto Avenue Suite 100, Box N Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Douglas Kreuzkamp, Esquire American Red Cross Blood Services King & Spalding 191 Peachtree Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1763 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner should be granted an exemption from disqualification to work in a position of trust or responsibility in a direct care position pursuant to Section 435.07(3), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a single mother of five children, including two sets of twins. She is twenty-nine years old and has a tenth-grade high school education. On July 26, 1995, Petitioner drove a car into a Walmart parking lot in Leon County, Florida, and parked illegally directly in front of the store. Petitioner was operating the car while her driving privileges were suspended. After parking the car, Petitioner left her five children unsupervised in the car while she went into Walmart to exchange a shirt. At that time, the older twins were six years old, one child was four years old, and the younger twins were three years old. When Petitioner went into the store, she removed the key from the ignition and left the windows down. The temperature was 93 degrees. Petitioner was in the store for approximately ten minutes. Upon Petitioner's return to the car, a policeman arrested her for the second-degree misdemeanor offense of "negligent treatment of children" under Section 827.05, Florida Statutes (1993). 1/ The children were not harmed as a result of being left unattended in the car. They were never removed from Petitioner's custody. After her arrest, Petitioner and her children were picked up and taken home by a relative. In September 1995, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the charge of "negligent treatment of children." The County Judge of Leon County accepted Petitioner's plea, withheld adjudication of guilt, and ordered that Petitioner be placed on probation for six months. One of the conditions of Petitioner's probation was that she attend parenting class. On February 28, 1996, Petitioner was charged with violating her probation related to the charge of "negligent treatment of children." Specifically, she had not provided proof that she had attended the parenting class. Additionally, she had not paid a $100 probation supervision fee or a $150 court fine. Petitioner violated her probation because she did not have funds to pay for the parenting class or the required fee and fine. At the violation of probation hearing on May 10, 1996, Petitioner presented proof that she had attended the parenting class. The County Judge of Leon County terminated Petitioner's probation in open court. On March 5, 1998, Petitioner was charged in Leon County, Florida, with the traffic offense of driving with suspended driving privileges. The County Judge of Leon County convicted and adjudicated Petitioner guilty of this offense on March 25, 1998. On September 7, 1998, Petitioner was charged in Leon County, Florida, with the traffic offense of driving with suspended driving privileges. The County Judge of Leon County withheld adjudication of guilt for this offense on October 7, 1998. Petitioner has worked as a dietary aide at Tallahassee Convalescent Home (TCH) for four years. In 1998, she applied for a position with TCH as a certified nurse assistant, a direct care position. The application included Petitioner's request for a Florida Abuse Hotline Information System Background Check. A member of Respondent's staff completed the background check on September 23, 1998, finding no confirmed report of abuse or neglect. On April 16, 1999, Petitioner signed a sworn Affidavit of Good Moral Character as part of the application process to secure a direct care position with Tallahassee Developmental Center. By signing the affidavit, Petitioner swore that she had not been found guilty or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, regardless of the adjudication, to a number of offenses, including "negligent treatment of children." This affirmation was false. Petitioner's testimony that she forgot her plea of nolo contendere and subsequent conviction for "negligent treatment of children" or that she never knew the exact nature of her crime is not persuasive. In April 1999, Petitioner was charged with violating her probation related to one of her offenses for "driving while privileges suspended" in Leon County, Florida. Petitioner violated her probation because she did not have funds to pay her traffic fines. Petitioner subsequently entered the Florida Traffic Assistance Program. She completed a corrective driving class on August 14, 1999. The Department of Motor Vehicles issued Petitioner her first driver's license on August 31, 1999. Since October 1999, Petitioner has paid $50 per month on her outstanding traffic fines. She now owes $453 in traffic fines.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
