Findings Of Fact On April 24, 1992, the Respondent issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) pertaining to the provision of housekeeping services at South Florida State Hospital. Petitioner and Intervenor submitted responses to the RFP. After all responses were received, Respondent convened an evaluation committee to evaluate the responses. The evaluation committee recommended that Intervenor be awarded the contract. Petitioner's response was ranked by the evaluation committee as the second best response. Following the publication of the results of the evaluation committee, Petitioner filed a bid protest and asserted several grounds in support of its protest. At the formal hearing, the Petitioner abandoned all grounds except for the assertion that Intervenor had failed to disclose as a part of its financial information the existence of a tax lien. Petitioner asserted that the failure to disclose the tax lien should result in either the contract being awarded to it or the return of the matter to the evaluation committee for reevaluation. A Notice of Tax Lien was filed by the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security for unpaid unemployment compensation taxes and was in the amount of $1,900.00. Intervenor paid the amounts secured by the said lien on May 12, 1992, which was before the responses were due to the RFP on June 5, 1992. The RFP requires certain financial information of the bidders, but it does not require bidders to list tax liens that may have been filed against it. There is no evidence that Intervenor failed to provide the financial information required by the RFP or that the information was inaccurate or incomplete. Petitioner failed to establish that the existence of this tax lien would have had any bearing on the evaluation of the responses. There was no evidence that Intervenor gained an unfair advantage over Petitioner or any other bidder by failing to disclose this tax lien in its response to the RFP. There was no evidence that Intervenor acted in bad faith or that it tried to misrepresent its financial condition.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which dismisses Petitioner's bid protest. DONE AND ORDERED this 8th day of October, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 1992. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-4310BID The Petitioner did not file a post-hearing submittal. The proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Respondent are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Intervenor. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 30 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 31 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 13 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The testimony of Ms. Diaz as to whether the amount of the tax lien was included in this figure was equivocal. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 18 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. When the Department of Labor and Employment Security satisfied the lien of record is not relevant to the issues presented by this matter. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 24 are rejected as being unnecessary to the findings made. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerry Gordon, Esquire 1413 South Howard Avenue Suite 202 Tampa, Florida 33606 Colleen A. Donahue, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services District 10 Legal Office Room 513 201 West Broward Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301-1885 Stephen G. Murty, Esquire Jay R. Tome, Esquire Murty and Tome, P.A. 777 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 R. S. Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Recommendation It is recommended the stipulated settlement as described above be accepted. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of July, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. K.N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 1991.
Findings Of Fact On and after May 29, 1978, respondent Patricia Bose Haischer has been licensed by petitioner as a licensed practical nurse. She holds license No. 0482051. On May 1, 1981, an information was filed in the Circuit Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Case No. CRC 8103052 CFANO (Pinellas County) charging respondent with "knowingly. . .commit[ting] a lewd and lascivious act in the presence of Yvonne Moir, a child under the age of fourteen years, by willfully and knowingly engaging in sexual activity in the presence of. . .Yvonne Moir. . .but without intent to commit sexual battery upon. . .Yvonne Moir." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. On her plea of guilty, respondent was adjudicated guilty of violating Section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1981), on August 19, 1981; and, on the same date, respondent was sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. At the time of the hearing, respondent was confined at the Florida State Prison for Women. According to respondent's uncontroverted testimony, elicited in petitioner's case, she never fondled Yvonne Moir but was present and undressed while her husband had sexual intercourse with the child; she acted under the domination of her husband (who is now himself incarcerated for sex offenses) and was not altogether well emotionally at the time. Yvonne Moir was not in respondent's care as a nurse when these events transpired. Respondent's misbehavior evinced a disregard for Yvonne Moir's emotional health and reflects adversely on respondent's ability to practice nursing, for that reason. This opinion was expressed by a nurse with eighteen years' experience who testified for petitioner without objection from respondent. As a nurse, respondent has never harmed a patient or put a patient in jeopardy. She has had good recommendations from anybody who has ever supervised her, and one supervisor called her "trustworthy and dependable." During her imprisonment, respondent has visited a psychologist on a regular basis. She feels better and more confident about herself than she did at the time of the offense.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent suspend petitioner's license for two (2) years. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Patricia B. Haischer Box 202 F.C.I. Lowell, Florida 32663 William R. Furlow, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Helen P. Keefe, Executive Director Board of Nursing 111 East Coastline Drive, Room 504 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION BOARD OF NURSING IN RE: PATRICIA MARIE B. HAISCHER, L.P.N. CASE NO. 0017303 License No. 0482051 DOAH NO. 81-3149 /
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Latrice J. Walker’s application for certification as a certified nursing assistant should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 31-year old woman. She is currently employed as a key-holder at Church’s Chicken, where she is a de facto assistant manager. Her duties include handling customers’ credit cards and cash, as well as making drop deposits at a local bank. On or about March 4, 2013, Petitioner completed and submitted a Florida Certified Nursing Assistant Application. The application was received by the Board on March 12, 2013. On page 4 of the application, there is a section entitled “Criminal History.” That section asks of the applicant: “Have you ever been convicted of, or entered a plea of guilty, nolo contender, or no contest to, a crime in any jurisdiction other than a minor traffic offense? You must include all misdemeanors and felonies, even if adjudication was withheld. Driving under the influence (DUI), driving while impaired (DWI) and driving while license suspended (DWLS) are not minor traffic offenses for the purposes of this question.” Petitioner answered, “No”, to the criminal history question. In fact, she had three relevant arrests on her record, to wit: 1) In January 2003, Petitioner was arrested and charged with a violation of section 832.05(2), Florida Statutes (2002), relating to the issuance of a bad check; 2) in April of the same year, Petitioner was arrested and charged with violation of section 812.014(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2002), relating to petit larceny, and section 831.09, Florida Statutes (2002), relating to passing a forged instrument; and 3) on August 8, 2004, Petitioner was arrested and charged with leaving the scene of an accident in violation of section 316.061(1), Florida Statutes (2004), and possession of less than 20 grams of marijuana, a violation of section 893.13(6) (2004). Petitioner entered a plea on the 2002 charges and adjudication was withheld. She was found guilty of the 2004 charges. Petitioner provided two reasons for answering, “No”, to the criminal history question: First, she believed that because adjudication had been withheld she did not need to disclose the arrests. Second, she was holding her six month-old child while preparing the application and may have hit the wrong box on the application form. The testimony concerning her child affecting her typing of the application was not persuasive. Whatever the reason for her response on the application, it is clear Petitioner did not try to hide her criminal past. As early as October 2013, she had requested from the Levy County Clerk of Court information about her convictions so that she could provide that information to the Board. On February 24, 2014, almost one year after submitting her application, the Board sent Petitioner a letter indicating her application was not complete. The letter advised Petitioner that incomplete applications would expire after one year from the “received date.” The letter then identified information that was missing from Petitioner’s application, including the following items: Proof of completion of probation or parole; Proof of completion of fines, restitution, or court-ordered sanctions for each offense; Certificates, counselor letters, and proof of treatment or rehabilitation; Proof of completion of community service; and Proof of completion of pre-trial intervention. It is clear from the Board’s letter to Petitioner that the Board was aware of her criminal convictions as the omissions letter had asked for explanations as to completion of sanctions for each offense. Petitioner went to the Levy County Courthouse and obtained the requested information. She provided the information to the Board as requested. On March 4, 2014, the Board notified Petitioner that additional explanations about each of the offenses were required. Again, Petitioner provided the requested information. On or about June 30, 2015, the Board notified Petitioner that her application for certification was being denied. No one from the Board testified concerning the basis for the denial, but the Notice of Intent to Deny set out the following bases for the denial: That Petitioner was convicted of or entered pleas to a charge of no driver’s license in 2000, worthless checks, petit theft and uttering a forged instrument in 2003, and leaving the scene, resisting arrest, possession of marijuana and petit theft in 2004. The application includes the following question: Have you ever been convicted of, or entered a plea of guilty, nolo contender, or no contest to, a crime in any jurisdiction other than a minor traffic offense? You must include all misdemeanors and felonies, even if adjudication was withheld. Driving under the influence (DUI, driving while impaired (DWI) and driving while license suspended (DWLS) are not minor traffic offenses for the purposes of this question. The applicant answered the question, “NO”. The applicant is in violation of Sections 464.204(1)(a), 464.018(1)(a)(c) and (o), and 456.072(1)(c) and (h), Florida Statutes, by being convicted or found guilty of, or entering a plea of nolo contendere to, regardless of adjudication, a crime in any jurisdiction which directly relates to the practice of nursing assistance or to the ability to practice nursing, and by attempting to obtain a nursing license by bribery, misrepresentation or deceit. No further explanation for denial of Petitioner’s application for certification was stated in the Notice of Intent to Deny or by way of testimony or other evidence at final hearing in this matter. However, one may surmise that the basis for the Board’s denial of the application was: 1) that Petitioner had been found guilty or pled nolo contendere to the enumerated crimes, and 2) that Petitioner attempted to mislead the Board in her application for certification. Petitioner provided evidence as to each of the issues raised in the Board’s Notice of Intent to Deny. Although her memory was clouded as to specifics about each of the incidents due to the passage of time, she admitted each offense and tried to explain the circumstances surrounding them. As to the charges of leaving the scene of the accident, resisting arrest without violence and possession of marijuana, Petitioner explained as follows: She was helping her sister move to a new home. Petitioner was driving the rental vehicle and hit a car in the parking lot of a business. She drove away from the scene. When the police came to her home, Petitioner went into her house. At some point marijuana was found, but Petitioner-–who says she has never done drugs–- claimed it to be her sister’s drugs. Petitioner was arrested. However, she satisfied all of the conditions of probation and made all payments for costs. As to the insufficient funds charge, Petitioner stated that at the time she wrote the check to pay rent for the mobile home she was living in, she had funds in the bank. However, by the time the check was submitted for payment, she had used the existing funds. She admitted the violation and made all payments of restitution and costs. The uttering offense came when she agreed to sign a money order that did not belong to her. She yielded to the influence of nefarious friends with whom she no longer associates. Again, she admitted her culpability and made all necessary restitution to the victim. Petitioner filed her application for certification as a nursing assistant to fulfill a long-time dream of working in health care. She has “changed her ways” and is very desirous of doing positive things in her life. Petitioner’s demeanor and candor at final hearing gave credence to her promise to do better in the future, if given the opportunity. Her testimony was persuasive. However, it is troublesome that Petitioner chose to blame her application errors on the fact that she was holding her child while typing the application. That “excuse” does not ring true and seems an unnecessary reason for not disclosing the crimes. Nonetheless, absent further elucidation by the Board as to exactly why Petitioner’s application was denied, there is no way for Petitioner to further support her challenge to the denial other than as she did at final hearing. The Board did not challenge her reasons; it merely stood by its denial letter without further support or justification.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Respondent, Department of Health, Board of Nursing, granting Petitioner, Latrice J. Walker’s, application for certification as a certified nursing assistant, with appropriate sanctions. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of March, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Latrice J. Walker 454 Southwest 10th Circle Chiefland, Florida 32626 Deborah B. Loucks, Esquire Lynette Norr, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (eServed) Joe Baker, Jr., Executive Director Board of Nursing Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3252 (eServed) Ann-Lynn Denker, PhD, ARNP Chair Board of Nursing Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3252 Nichole C. Geary, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 (eServed)
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of special trust should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: This case involves a request by Petitioner, Bobby Jones, for an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of special trust. If the request is approved, Petitioner would be allowed to return to work as a unit treatment rehabilitation specialist in a unit for developmentally disabled adults at Florida State Hospital (FSH). Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), is the state agency charged with the responsibility of approving or denying such requests. In a preliminary decision entered on an unknown date, a DCFS committee denied the request. Petitioner is now barred from doing such work because of a disqualifying offense which occurred on June 4, 1989. On that date, Petitioner was arrested for the offense of "battery- domestic," a misdemeanor under Section 784.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1987). According to Petitioner, the victim in the incident was his former wife. Thus, the offense constituted domestic violence as it subsequently became defined in 1994 by Section 741.28, Florida Statutes. Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the charge of "battery" on August 10, 1989. He was fined $75.00, and he was placed on probation for a period of "up to 9 months." In addition, the court retained jurisdiction "to [o]rder rest[itution]," and Petitioner was required to complete a mental health counseling program. Petitioner successfully completed all terms of his probation, including the counseling course which lasted around "six to nine months." In October 1989, Petitioner began working at FSH as a human services worker in a unit for developmentally disabled adults. Eventually, he attained the position of unit treatment rehabilitation specialist, a position involving supervision of developmentally disabled adults. Due to a change in the law, in 1996, he was required to undergo a background screening. That screening uncovered his 1989 offense, and on July 14, 1997, he was disqualified from working in a position of special trust with developmentally disabled adults. Petitioner was then offered a temporary assignment effective July 24, 1997, without any "direct care duties." Most recently, however, he has been employed at a Wal-Mart store in Tallahassee, Florida. Because of his desire to return to his former position, he has applied for an exemption from disqualification. Since the disqualifying incident in 1989, Petitioner worked continuously at FSH for almost eight years. Since leaving FSH, he has been steadily employed by Wal-Mart. Petitioner was described by a former supervisor at FSH as being "dependable," "very good" with residents, and someone who got along well with other staff. Three former co-workers echoed these comments. A present co-worker at Wal-Mart also described Petitioner as friendly, helpful, and courteous with customers. Except for the fact that a former wife was the victim, the circumstances surrounding the incident for which the exemption is sought are not of record, and the "harm [if any] caused to the victim" is unknown. Despite the glowing comments of other workers, the adverse testimony of a former supervisor at FSH must be taken into account. In December 1995, she found Petitioner engaged in a verbal confrontation with another worker. She then directed that Petitioner report to her office. On the way to the office, he told her that the other employee was "going to make [Petitioner] put a board on his ass." At the ensuing meeting, Petitioner became extremely upset and told the supervisor that he wished she were dead, that she would get killed in a traffic accident on the way home, and that he would "spit on her grave." Petitioner subsequently received a written reprimand for using "Threatening and/or Abusive Language" towards his supervisor. In another incident that occurred on May 22, 1997, Petitioner was observed by the supervisor "horseplaying with another employee" in the dining room. When told by the supervisor that such conduct was inappropriate for the workplace, Petitioner stated in a loud, hostile manner, in the presence of both co-workers and clients, that he "would choke the motherfucker out." For this conduct, he received another written reprimand for "Threatening and/or Abusive Language," and he was suspended from work for three days. According to the same supervisor, Petitioner has an "explosive" temper, and she would not want him returning to her unit. Given this testimony, it is found that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he will not present a danger if continued employment is allowed. Besides the disqualifying offense, Petitioner has a long string of misdemeanor convictions beginning in 1979 and continuing through 1992. The specific crimes are described in Respondent's Exhibits 1-7 and 9-31 received in evidence. Petitioner himself acknowledged that he has been convicted of passing worthless bank checks approximately thirty times. Most recently, he was convicted for the offense of disorderly conduct in November 1992. In addition, he was convicted for the offense of simple battery on a former wife in October 1990. These convictions, by themselves, are not disqualifying offenses, and many are so old as to be arguably remote and irrelevant. They do, however, establish a continuing pattern of misconduct, especially since Petitioner has at least eight convictions for various misdemeanors since the disqualifying offense in 1989. Given these circumstances, it is found that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence of rehabilitation since the disqualifying event. This being so, his request for an exemption should be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification for employment in a position of special trust. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Pete Peterson, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Ben R. Patterson, Esquire Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-4289 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite 252A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949
The Issue Whether the Petition for Relief from an unlawful employment practice was timely filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction to conduct a formal hearing under the provisions of Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if the Petition was not timely filed.
Findings Of Fact On December 15, 1994, the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) transmitted to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) a Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice, together with all other "pleadings and jurisdictional papers heretofore filed in this proceeding." The pleadings and papers transmitted by FCHR show that Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination with FCHR on November 2, 1993, charging an unlawful employment practice by Respondent in connection with her lay off on October 29, 1992. On October 21, 1994, the FCHR concluded its investigation into the matter and issued its determination of No Cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred. Notice of that determination was mailed to Petitioner and Respondent on October 21, 1994 by regular mail. The Notice of Determination of No Cause served on Petitioner included the following statement: Complainant may request an administrative hearing by filing a PETITION FOR RELIEF within 35 days of the date of this NOTICE OF DETERMINATION: NO CAUSE. A Petition for Relief form is enclosed with Complainant's notice. It may be beneficial to seek legal counsel prior to filing the petition. If the Complainant fails to request an admini- strative hearing within 35 days of the date of this notice, the administrative claim under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Chapter 760, will be dismissed pursuant to Section 760.11, Florida Statutes (1992). Counsel for Petitioner, George T. Paulk II, received the Notice of Determination on behalf of Petitioner and prepared the petition to be "filed" with the FCHR. On November 25, 1994, 35 days after the Notice was mailed, Counsel for Petitioner transmitted to the FCHR her Petition for Relief, requesting an administrative hearing. The petition was submitted on the form provided by the FCHR. The petition was sent by regular U.S. Mail. The Petition for Relief was filed with the FCHR on November 29, 1994, 39 days after the Notice of Determination was issued. The FCHR transmitted the pleadings to the Division of Administrative Hearings for further proceedings. At the same time of the transmittal to Division of Administrative Hearings, FCHR issued a notice of the petition to Respondent advising it of the requirement to file an answer to the Petition for Relief. Respondent timely filed its answer with affirmative defenses, including the first affirmative defense that "Petitioner failed to file her petition within the time allowed by law." Respondent also filed a separate Notice to Dismiss raising the same issue. The Petition for Relief was deposited in the mail on Friday, November 25, 1994, the day after Thanksgiving which is an official state holiday. The next business day was Monday, November 28, 1994.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing with prejudice the Petition for Relief in Division of Administrative Hearings' Case No. 94-6976 and FCHR Case No. 94-7490, for failure to timely file the Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 1995.
The Issue Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction to conduct a formal hearing, under the provisions of Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if the Petition for Relief was not timely filed pursuant to Sections 760.11(8) and 760.11(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 57-year-old male and a former employee of the Respondent. Respondent is an executive agency of the State of Florida with more than 15 full-time employees and is, therefore, an employer under Sections 760.02(6) and (7), Florida Statutes. On May 19, 1995, Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. He charged his former employer, Respondent, with gender and age discrimination for failure to promote him. The Florida Commission on Human Relations conducted an investigation of the charges. It did not issue a Notice of Determination. The staff of the Commission misled or lulled Respondent into inaction, for a period of time, as follows: Day 0000 - 19 May 1995: Charge of Discrimination submitted to Commission. Day 0061 - 19 July 1995: FCHR Notice of Receipt, Docketing and Dual Filing with EEOC. Day 0110 - 6 September 1995: Respondent submitted response to Commission request for information. Day 0255 - 29 January 1996: Petitioner drove from Orlando to FCHR in Tallahassee and met with Iliana Haddock, who advised him that she had just been assigned to investigate the Discrimination Complaint. Haddock took the opportunity to interview the Respondent relative to the complaint. Day 0312 - 26 March 1996: Telephone conversation between Haddock and Petitioner. Haddock stated that she had reviewed all the applications submitted for the Environmental Manager position and had found evidence of age discrimination. Day 0340 - 23 April 1996: Telephone conversation between Haddock and Petitioner. Haddock stated the investigation was almost complete, but they were waiting for Respondent to submit criteria used for determining who would be interviewed for the Environmental Manager position. Day 0431 - 23 July 1996: Petitioner drove from Orlando to FCHR headquarters in Tallahassee and met with Haddock and her supervisor, Harry Lamb. They told Petitioner that Haddock's investigation was completed and that her report would be submitted to Lamb in 30 to 45 days and from there Lamb would submit it to the FCHR legal staff and then it would go to the Executive Director for his approval and determination. Day 0494 - 24 September 1996: Assistant Enforcement Director Singleton sent Petitioner a letter stating that the Commission had not been able to complete the investigation in this case and stated four options of proceeding, (1) file a civil action in civil court; (2) file petition to have case heard by ALJ in DOAH; (3) request a right to sue so I could bring an action in Federal Court; or (4) allow the commission to continue with the processing, investigation and final action in this matter. Day 0509 - 9 October 1996: Petitioner responded to Singleton's letter by pointing out the contradictions between her letter and what Petitioner had been told at the meeting with Haddock and Lamb on 7/23/96. Petitioner requested more information in order to make a decision concerning the future course of this case. Petitioner submitted 11 questions to Singleton. Day 0521 - 21 October 1996: Commission Investigator Iliana Haddock submitted her report to the FCHR Office of General Counsel. Day 0573 - 12 December 1996: Petitioner sent follow-up letter to FCHR Executive Director advising him that he had not received a reply to the 10/9/96 letter to Singleton. Day 0644 - 21 February 1997: Mathis sent Petitioner a letter about the status of the original complaint of discrimination. Mathis stated that Haddock had submitted her report of investigation, with a recommendation for a cause finding to Harry Lamb; that Haddock was no longer with the Commission; that Lamb was no longer with the Commission but had not forwarded the investigation report before he left; and that the report was now in the hands of Otis Mallory. Day 0795 - 22 July 1997: Mathis sent Petitioner a letter advising that the "initial charge is still located in Mr. Mallory's office and will be reviewed." Day 0805 - 1 August 1997: Assistant Director Snell sent Petitioner a letter stating: "The investigation of your first case has been completed and is in the Employment Enforcement Manger's office for review". Day 0809 - 5 August 1997: The EEOC State and Local Coordinator advised Petitioner by letter that the cases were still being processed by the FCHR. Day 0852 - 27 September 1997: Petitioner sent letter to FCHR Executive Director advising him that Otis Mallory had Discrimination Report for almost a year; that Mallory also had received the Retaliation Report in August 1997; and since Mallory now had both reports, he ought to be able to complete his review and move this matter forward. Day 0986 - 29 January 1998: Petitioner sent letter to FCHR Executive Director attempting to get Investigators' Reports through the internal FCHR review system. Day 1076 - 29 April 1998: Commission issued Notice of Determination on Retaliation Complaint. No action on original discrimination complaint. Day 1252 - 22 October 1998: Petitioner mailed Petition for Relief and Administrative Hearing concerning Discrimination Complaint to FCHR. After filing the Complaint of Discrimination with the FCHR, Petitioner actively pursued the progress and status of the Discrimination Complaint with the Commission. In response to his pursuit, the staff of the Commission told the Petitioner throughout the above time-line, that his Complaint was being investigated; the investigation was completed; the report would be submitted; the report was submitted; the report was in for review; and the report would be reviewed. Thus, the Petitioner was misled or lulled into believing by the staff of FCHR not only that the Complaint was going to result in a Determination, but also that the Determination was going to be a cause-finding. On September 24, 1996, a year and four months after filing the Complaint, the Commission advised Petitioner that he had four options relating to the charges, including having the Commission continue with the processing, investigation, and final action in this matter. When Petitioner requested further information so he could make an informed choice, the staff of the Commission failed to respond to his letter. In addition, other staff took no further action on his case. However, Petitioner waited more than two years from issuance of the letter of September 24, 1996, to the filing of his Petition for Relief, dated October 22, 1998. Although Petitioner was misled or lulled into inaction for a period of time by the staff of the FCHR, the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate equitable estoppel or excusable neglect in his failure to file the Petition within a reasonable period of time after the statutorily mandated time limit.
Conclusions The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction on the parties and the subject matter pursuant to Sections 120.569, 120.57(1) and 760.11, Florida Statutes. The Florida Commission on Human Relations has the authority to investigate a charge of discrimination with alleges that an employee has committed an unlawful employment practice by its failure to promote Petitioner based on his sex and/or age. Section 760.10(1) and 760.11, Florida Statutes. When a complaint has been filed with the Commission, it has the duty to investigate the allegations in the complaint and make a determination within 180 days of the filing of the Complaint, if there is reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory practice has occurred in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. After a determination is made, the Commission is charged with the duty to notify the aggrieved person and the Respondent of the determination, the date of such determination, and the options available under the law. Section 760.11(3), Florida Statutes. In this case, the Commission failed to make a reasonable cause determination; and three and one-half years after first filing his Complaint, Petitioner requested a formal administrative hearing under Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Therefore, Sections 760.11(8), (4) and (6), Florida Statutes, applied to this case. These sections read, in pertinent part: In the event that the commission determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory practice has occurred in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, the aggrieved person may either: Bring a civil action against the person named in the complaint in any court of competent jurisdiction; or Request an administrative hearing under ss 120.569 and 120.57. The election by the aggrieved person of filing a civil action or requesting an administrative hearing under this subsection is the exclusive procedure available to the aggrieved person pursuant to this act. * * * (6) Any administrative hearing brought pursuant to paragraph (4)(b) shall be conducted under ss. 120.569 and 120.57. . . . An administrative hearing pursuant to paragraph (4)(b) must be requested no later than 35 days after the date of determination of reasonable cause by the commission. . . . * * * (8) In the event that the commission fails to conciliate or determine whether there is reasonable cause on any complaint under this section within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, an aggrieved person may proceed under subsection (4), as if the commission determined that there was reasonable cause. Although it appears unjust that Petitioner's case should be dismissed because of the failure of a state agency to complete its statutory duty to make a reasonable cause determination, nevertheless, the court in Milano v. Moldmaster, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1093 at 1094 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) held that the 35-day limitation on requesting an administrative hearing begins to run at the expiration of the 180-day period in which the Commission was to make a reasonable cause determination. Therefore, the Petition for Relief is untimely because it was filed nearly three years after the presumed date of determination of cause by the Commission. See Section 760.11(6), Florida Statutes (1997); Wright v. HCA Central Florida Regional Hospital, Inc., 18 FALR 1160 (1995); Pusey v. George Knupp, Lake County Sheriff's Office, 20 FALR 791 (1997); cf. St. Petersburg Motor Club v. Cook, 567 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) and Milano v. Moldmaster, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). This procedure has been determined to be constitutional, under Florida law. McElhath v. Burley, 707 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). The record does establish some evidence of excusable neglect, which might, under certain circumstances, excuse delinquent filing. See, for example, Machules v. Department of Administration 523 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1988). In Machules, the Florida Supreme Court described the parameters of the "equitable tolling" doctrine as follows: Generally, the tolling doctrine has been applied when the plaintiff has been misled or lulled into inaction, has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his rights, or has timely asserted his rights mistakenly in the wrong forum. 523 So. 2d at 1134. Petitioner asserts that the staff of the Commission lulled him into inaction. That assertion is accepted as true for purposes of ruling on the Motion for Summary Recommended Order. However, Petitioner is claiming he was lulled into inaction for two additional years after he was advised of his options under the statute. The District Court of Appeal has held that Petitioner may not enjoy a manipulable open-ended time extension which could render the statutory limitation meaningless. It held that a Petitioner should be required to assume some minimum responsibility himself for an orderly and expeditious resolution of his dispute. Milano v. Moldmaster, Inc., supra, at 1095. Although this result is harsh, two other district courts have followed this precedent and it is, therefore, binding on this tribunal. Joshua v. City of Gainesville, So. 2d , 1999 WL 71523 (Fla. 1st DCA, February 17, 1999) and Adams v. Wellington Regional Medical Center, Inc., So. 2d , (Fla. 4th DCA, March 17, 1999).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing facts and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing with prejudice the petition of Donald A. Garrepy in DOAH Case No. 98-5090; FCHR Case No. 95-5752. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary C. Smallridge, Senior Attorney Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 600 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Donald A. Garrepy Post Office Box 276 Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03802 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
