The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of obtaining his license by fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been a licensed real estate broker, holding license number 0500228. Respondent’s licensing cycle ends on March 31 every two years. He duly renewed his broker’s license prior to its expiration on March 31, 1994. During the ensuing two-year licensing term, Respondent executed on January 1, 1996, a Request for License or Change of Status and submitted the form to Petitioner. The purpose of submitting the form was to notify Petitioner that Respondent had adopted a corporate form of doing business as a real estate broker. Section A of the form contains a series of options. Respondent selected “other” and wrote in “change to corp.” Section B contains identifying information, and Respondent completed this section. Section C is irrelevant to the change that Respondent was making, and he did not fill in this section. The instructions for Section A direct the person filing the form as follows: “If this is a renewal of your license, it must be accompanied by the required fee and sign this: I hereby affirm that I have met all statutory and rule requirements regarding education for license renewal.” Respondent signed this statement even though he was not seeking a renewal of his license. The instructions for Section B told the person filing the form how to complete Section B. But these instructions required no representations. The next form generated in this case was another renewal notice, as Respondent’s license neared the end of its term, which expired March 31, 1996. This form states: “By submitting the appropriate renewal fees to the Department . . ., a licensee acknowledges compliance with all requirements for renewal.” By check dated December 30, 1995, Respondent timely submitted his license renewal fee of $95 in response to the renewal notice. He was unaware at the time that he had not met the continuing education requirement for relicensing, which called for 14 hours of education. In reliance on the implied representation that Respondent had completed the required continuing education, Petitioner renewed Respondent’s license. Later, during a random audit, Petitioner discovered that Respondent had not completed the necessary courses and commenced this proceeding. Respondent was cooperative during the audit. Upon discovering that he had not complied with the continuing education requirement, he promptly undertook the necessary coursework, which he completed by August 6, 1996.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the administrative complaint against Respondent. ENTERED in Tallahassee, Florida, on June 4, 1997. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on June 4, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Attorney Andrea D. Perkins Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Legal Section 400 West Robinson Street Suite N-308A Orlando, Florida 32801 Frederick H. Wilsen Frederick H. Wilsen & Associates, P.A. Law Office of Gillis & Wilsen 1415 East Robinson Street Suite B Orlando, Florida 32801 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Henry M. Solares Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds real estate broker license no. 0186475, and was so licensed at all times relevant to this proceeding. However, he did not act in his licensed capacity in any of the transactions discussed herein. Respondent was involved in a corporate business venture with Donald M. and Darlene Pifalo. He believed the Pifalos had improperly diverted funds from the corporation and filed suit accordingly. In December, 1980, while this suit was pending, Respondent filed a notice of lis pendens against various properties owned by the Pifalos. This action encumbered property in which the Pifalos' equity greatly exceeded Respondent's alleged loss in the business venture. There was no evidence that the Pifalos were planning to leave the jurisdiction or would be unable to make any court ordered restitution. Further, the encumbered property was not at issue in this litigation. Finally, Respondent filed the notice of lis pendens on his own volition and not on the advice of counsel. The notice was subsequently dismissed.
Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Subsections 475.25(1)(a) and 475.42(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1979), and fining Respondent $500. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of April, 1982 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April, 1982.
The Issue Whether the Respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed by the Petitioner and, if so, whether Respondent's real estate license should be suspended, revoked, or otherwise disciplined.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.165, Florida Statutes; Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes; and the rules adopted pursuant thereto. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Jared A. White T/A Jerry White Realty was a licensed real estate broker, having been issued license number 0187087 pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to Respondent was as a broker with an address of 231 Skiff Pt. 7, Clearwater, Florida 34630. TITLE TO THE PROPERTY The matters at issue began with Respondent's retention as a real estate broker to bid at a foreclosure auction for a beachfront house and lot at 235 Howard Drive in Belleair Beach, Pinellas County, Florida. Respondent was hired to submit the bid on behalf of Dr. Moshe Kedan and/or his wife, Ella Kedan. Prior to the auction on August 17, 1995, Respondent had no contact with the Kedans. Kathy MacKinnon of Viewpoint International Realty in Clearwater was Respondent’s point of contact with the Kedans. It was Ms. MacKinnon who obtained Respondent's services to bid on behalf of the Kedans, and Ms. MacKinnon who negotiated with Dr. Kedan as to the financial arrangements for both the bid and any ensuing commissions for Respondent. Neither Ms. MacKinnon nor Dr. Kedan was called as a witness in this case. Respondent attended the foreclosure auction and tendered the winning bid on the property. Respondent bid in his own name. Respondent testified that he had bid at several similar sales in the past, and his practice was to bid in the name of the person who would hold title to the property. Respondent did not follow his usual practice here because Ms. MacKinnon failed to instruct him as to whether the property would be titled in the name of Dr. Kedan, Mrs. Kedan, or one of their corporations. Ms. MacKinnon told Respondent she would know on August 18 how the property was to be titled. Respondent's testimony regarding the initial titling of the property is supported by a handwritten note faxed by Ms. MacKinnon to Dr. Kedan on August 17, shortly after the auction. Ms. MacKinnon's note provides instructions regarding payment of the purchase price, indicating that the money must be submitted to the Clerk of the Court no later than 10:30 a.m. on the morning of August 18. The note specifically asks, "Also, whose name do you want the house in?" Respondent testified that on August 18, he went to Atlanta on business, with the understanding that Ms. MacKinnon would handle the payments to the Clerk of the Court and the titling of the property on that date. This testimony is consistent with the handwritten note in which Ms. MacKinnon indicates that she will take the Kedans' checks to the court. The record evidence shows that the payments were made to the Clerk of the Court and that title insurance on the property was timely issued. However, the title and the title insurance policy listed Respondent as owner of the property. Respondent was unaware the property had been titled in his name until he received the certificate of title in the mail, approximately two weeks after the auction. Upon receiving the incorrect certificate of title, he went to the title company and signed a quitclaim deed, effective August 17, 1995, in favor of Ella Kedan. Respondent testified that he had learned from Ms. MacKinnon that the property would be titled in Ella Kedan’s name at sometime during the two-week period after the auction. The quitclaim deed was not notarized until October 9, 1995, and was not recorded until October 10, 1995. However, the face of the deed states that it was made on August 17, 1995. It is plain that the signature line of the notary statement on the quitclaim deed has been altered from August 17, 1995 to October 9, 1995. Respondent had no knowledge of how the quitclaim deed came to be altered. Respondent also had no clear recollection as to why he dated the quitclaim deed August 17, 1995, in light of his testimony that he signed it approximately two weeks after that date. A reasonable inference is that Respondent so dated the quitclaim deed to clarify that Mrs. Kedan's ownership of the property commenced on August 17, the date on which Respondent submitted the winning bid. Respondent also had no knowledge of why the title company failed to record the quitclaim deed at the time he signed it. He testified that on or about October 9, 1995, he checked the Pinellas County computer tax records and discovered that he was still the owner of record. At that time, he returned to the title company to make sure the quitclaim deed was recorded the next day. Petitioner offered no testimonial evidence regarding the events surrounding the titling of the property. Respondent's uncontradicted testimony is credible, consistent with the documentary evidence, and thus credited as an accurate and truthful statement of the events in question. THE CONTRACT FOR REPAIRS Shortly after the auction, Respondent began discussing with Dr. Kedan the possibility of Respondent’s performing repairs on the just-purchased property. Because Dr. Kedan did not testify in this proceeding, findings as to the substance of the negotiations between Respondent and Dr. Kedan must be based on the testimony of Respondent, to the extent that testimony is credible and consistent with the documentary evidence. Respondent testified that Ms. MacKinnon approached him after the auction and asked him if he would be interested in fixing up the house for the Kedans. Respondent testified that he was agreeable to contracting for the work because his carpenter was between jobs and could use the money. Respondent thus met with Dr. Kedan at the doctor’s office to discuss the repairs. Dr. Kedan explained to Respondent that his ultimate plan was to demolish the existing house on the property and to build a more elaborate residence. Dr. Kedan wanted to rent out the house for five years before tearing it down, and wanted Respondent to affect such repairs as would make the house rentable for that five-year period. Respondent testified that Dr. Kedan expressly told him he did not want to spend a lot of money on the repairs. Respondent quoted Dr. Kedan a price of $20,000.00, which was the price it would take to pay for the repairs, with no profit built in for Respondent. Respondent testified that he sought no profit on this job. He had made a substantial commission on the purchase of the property, and anticipated doing business with Dr. Kedan in the future, and thus agreed to perform this particular job more or less as a “favor” to Dr. Kedan. After this meeting with Dr. Kedan, Respondent walked through the house with Irene Eastwood, the Kedans’ property manager. Ms. Eastwood testified that she and Respondent went from room to room, and she made notes on what should be done, with Respondent either concurring or disagreeing. Ms. Eastwood typed the notes into the form of a contract and presented it to Respondent the next day. On September 21, 1995, Respondent signed the contract as drafted by Ms. Eastwood. There was conflicting testimony as to whether Respondent represented himself as a licensed contractor in the negotiations preceding the contract. Respondent testified that he never told Dr. Kedan that he was a contractor, and that he affirmatively told Ms. Eastwood that he was not a contractor. Ms. Eastwood testified that she assumed Respondent was a licensed contractor because Dr. Kedan would not have hired a nonlicensed person to perform the contracted work. She denied that Respondent ever told her that he was not a licensed contractor. The weight of the evidence supports Respondent to the extent it is accepted that Respondent never expressly represented himself as a licensed contractor to either Dr. Kedan or Ms. Eastwood. However, the weight of the evidence does not support Respondent’s claim that he expressly told either Dr. Kedan or Ms. Eastwood that he was not a licensed contractor. Respondent’s subcontractors commenced work immediately upon the signing of the contract. Ms. Eastwood was in charge of working with Respondent to remodel the house, and she visited the site every day, often two or three times. She only saw Respondent on the site once during the last week of September, and not at all during the month of October. She did observe painters and a maintenance man regularly at work on the property during this period. Respondent concurred that he was seldom on the property, but testified that this was pursuant to his agreement with Dr. Kedan that he would generally oversee the work on the property. Respondent testified that he was on the property as often as he felt necessary to perform his oversight duties. Ms. Eastwood testified as to her general dissatisfaction with the quality of the work that was being performed on the property and the qualifications of those performing the work. She conveyed those concerns to the Kedans. Respondent testified that he did not initially obtain any permits to perform the work on the house, believing that permits would not be necessary for the job. On or about October 11, 1995, officials from the City of Belleair Beach shut down Respondent’s job on the Kedans’ property for lack of a construction permit. Respondent made inquiries with the City as to how to obtain the needed permit. City officials told Respondent that a permit could be granted to either a licensed contractor, or to the owner of the property if such property is not for sale or lease. Respondent checked the City’s records and discovered that, despite the fact that he had signed a quitclaim deed on August 17, he was still shown as the owner of the property. Respondent then proceeded to sign a permit application as the homeowner, and obtained a construction permit on October 11, 1995. Respondent testified that because the City’s records showed him as the record owner of the property, he committed no fraud in obtaining a construction permit as the homeowner. This testimony cannot be credited. Whatever the City’s records showed on October 11, 1995, Respondent well knew he was not the true owner of this property. Respondent cannot be credited both with having taken good faith steps to correct the mistaken titling of the property and with later obtaining in good faith a construction permit as the record owner of the property. Respondent testified that in obtaining the construction permit under false pretenses, his main concern was to keep the job going and to finish it in a timely fashion. He testified that there was no financial advantage to him in having the property in his name: he was making no profit on the job, and actually lost money because he had to pay for another title policy in the name of the Kedans. While there may have been no immediate financial advantage to Respondent, he was clearly motivated by the prospect of future profits in projects with Dr. Kedan. The City’s closing down this project jeopardized Respondent’s anticipated continuing relationship with Dr. Kedan, and Respondent took the improper step of obtaining a construction permit as the property owner to maintain that relationship. The Kedans ultimately dismissed Respondent from the job. A claim of lien was filed against the property by the painter hired by Respondent, and the cabinet maker sent the Kedans a lawyer’s letter threatening to file a claim of lien. Mrs. Kedan testified that she paid off both the painter and the cabinetmaker in full. Ms. Eastwood estimated that the Kedans ultimately had to pay an additional $20,000 to $50,000 to complete the repairs to the house, some of which included correctional actions for the improper repairs performed by Respondent’s workers. ALLEGED PRIOR DISCIPLINE Respondent has been the subject of a prior disciplinary proceeding by the Florida Real Estate Commission. In that prior proceeding, the Division of Real Estate's Administrative Complaint alleged that Respondent was guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(b) and (1)(k), Florida Statutes. On September 25, 1995, Respondent and the Division of Real Estate entered into a Stipulation disposing of the Administrative Complaint. Under the terms of the Stipulation, Respondent agreed to pay a fine of $1,000, and be subject to one year of probation, during which he would complete 30 hours of post-license education for brokers. The Stipulation expressly stated that Respondent neither admitted nor denied the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint. The Florida Real Estate Commission entered a Final Order approving the Stipulation on November 14, 1995. Respondent's broker license was suspended by the Florida Real Estate Commission on January 24, 1996. The cause for this suspension was Respondent's failure timely to pay the $1,000 fine imposed by the Stipulation. Respondent paid the fine on February 19, 1996, and late renewed his license on April 24, 1997. In the instant proceeding, Respondent testified that by entering into the Stipulation, he had no intention of pleading guilty to any of the allegations, and that he would never have entered into the Stipulation had he known it would be construed in any way as a guilty plea.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing Counts One and Three of the administrative complaint, and finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count Two of the administrative complaint, and suspending Respondent’s real estate license for a period of three years and fining Respondent a sum of $1,000. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Geoffrey T. Kirk, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, N-308 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 John Bozmoski, Jr., Esquire 600 Bypass Drive, Suite 215 Clearwater, Florida 34624-5075 Jared White White Realty 231 Skiff Point, Suite Seven Clearwater, Florida 34630 Henry M. Solares Division Director 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent, Gloria Corsoro, has been a licensed real estate broker. She is the qualifying broker for the company known as Orange Management Corp. The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating real estate licensees in the State of Florida. On or about July 20, 1994, the Respondent, Gloria Corsoro, entered a plea of nolo contendere to the crime of unlawful use of a notary. As a result, the Respondent was adjudicated guilty, placed on probation for a period of six months, and required to make payments and serve community service as directed by the court order. The plea and conviction stemmed from Respondent's conduct in connection with a warranty deed (the deed) which was recorded in the public record for Indian River County, Florida, on October 12, 1993. The deed conveyed a condominium unit from Leon R. Leavitt to the G. Corsoro Family Trust. The deed, notarized on October 1, 1989, purportedly bore the signatures of Leon R. Leavitt, the grantor; Mamie Cellura, a witness; Marie Copley, a witness; and Joseph Cellura, the notary before whom the document was executed. In fact, the document was not signed by Marie Copley or Leon R. Leavitt. At the time of the hearing, Mamie Cellura and Joseph Cellura were deceased. They were the parents of Marie Copley and her sister, the Respondent. At the time the deed was executed, Respondent signed Mr. Leavitt's name under a power of attorney he had reportedly given to her. Respondent further claims that Mamie Cellura signed for herself as a witness, signed for Marie Copley as a witness, and signed her husband's name with him (he had Parkinson's disease) as the notary. All this was completed, according to Respondent, Marie Copley, and Leon R. Leavitt, with everyone's full consent and knowledge. Marie Copley and Leon R. Leavitt were not present when the document was executed. Since they claim Respondent was authorized to execute the document, they are not concerned as to who signed the document but believe Mamie Cellura and Respondent signed as represented by Respondent. According to Nicholas Burczyk, the Respondent signed the document for all signatories on the instrument. Even by Respondent's account, the named parties did not execute the deed as presented on the face of the document. Respondent was originally charged with uttering a forged instrument and forgery. She chose to enter the plea as to the misdemeanor charge of unlawful use of a notary because she was "financially unable to pay to go to trial."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, through the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order determining the Respondent, Gloria Corsoro violated Section 475.25(f), Florida Statutes, and imposing a reprimand together with an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000.00. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 10th day of July, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-0334 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 are accepted. Paragraph 4 is accepted as stated in findings of fact paragraphs 6 through 14 above; otherwise rejected as incomplete statement of fact. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: 1. None submitted. Respondent's assessment of the charges against Respondent together with the argument has been considered in the preparation of the foregoing. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller Division Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Daniel Villazon Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Michael F. Berry MICHAEL F. BERRY, P.A. 2145-15th Avenue Vero Beach, Florida 32960
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Cluett Realty, Inc., is a licensed corporate real estate broker having been issued license number 0216798 and whose last known address is 4720 Palm Beach Boulevard, Fort Myers, Florida. The Respondent, Ernest H. Cluett II, is a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 0191613 and at all material times was employed as a licensed real estate broker by Cluett Realty, Inc. In November, 1981, Mary Ann Knopic was shown a home in Cape Coral by the Respondents. She offered the owners $92,500 for the home with a $500.00 earnest money deposit. When the home was sold to another buyer, the Respondents and Knopic agreed that the Respondents would retain the $500.00 and attempt to find another home for the complainant. In December, 1981, the Respondents showed Knopic the Soviero home and Knopic made an offer on the home and secured the offer with an additional $1,500 security deposit. In late February, 1982, the complainant informed the Respondents that she would not close on the Soviero home. The complainant decided not to close because the cost of renovating the home exceeded the original estimate. Under these circumstances, the complainant was willing to lose her $2,000 deposit rather than spend $6,000 to renovate the Soviero home. On June 8, 1982, after the complainant agreed to the February disbursement, she sent the Respondents a letter demanding either a copy of the contract which amended the earnest money amount or a refund of her $1,500. Walter V. Horn, a Respondent, was not properly served and at final hearing the petitioner agreed that he was not a proper party to this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondents, Cluett Realty, Inc., Ernest H. Cluett II and Walter V. Born. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of July, 1984, at Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred Langford, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Legal Section Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida Herbert A. Fried, Esquire 1625 Hendry Street, Suite 103 Fort Myers, Florida 33901 Mr. Walter V. Horn 4732 Dee Prado Boulevard Cape Coral, Florida 33904 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact In February of 1988, Petitioner took the real estate broker's examination compiled by Respondent, and otherwise complied with all applicable licensure requirements. The Petitioner received a grade of 74 on the written examination. A grade of 75 or higher is required to pass the test. Had Petitioner answered question number 62 with the answer deemed by Respondent to be correct, Petitioner's score would have been 75 and, as such, would have entitled him to licensure. Question number 62 reads as follows: The Department of Professional Regulation may withhold notification to a licensee that the licensee is being investigated IF: NOTIFICATION COULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE INVESTIGATION. NOTIFICATION COULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE LICENSEE. THE ACT UNDER INVESTIGATION IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE. Possible answers to question number 62 were as follows: I only. II only. I and III only. I, II and III. The answer to question number 62 chosen by Petitioner was D. The Respondent determined the correct answer should have been C. The Respondent's examining board followed a standard procedure for conducting and grading the examination. Statistically, 58 per cent of candidates taking the examination and placing in percentile rankings 50 through 99, answered the question correctly. Of those candidates taking the examination and placing in the lower half (0-50 percentile), 33 per cent answered the question correctly. The results obtained to question number 62 from all applicants taking the examination revealed the question exceeded effective testing standards. Question number 62 and the appropriate answer to that question are taken directly from section 455.225(1), Florida Statutes. The purpose of the question is to determine if an applicant is knowledgeable of the law governing real estate broker licensees. The Respondent adopts the position that section 455.225(1), Florida Statutes, mandates that Respondent shall notify a licensee of any investigation of which the licensee is the subject and authorizes withholding notification to that licensee only where such notification would be detrimental to the investigation, or where the act under investigation is a criminal offense. The Petitioner takes the position that section 455.225(1), Florida Statutes, does not prohibit withholding notification of an investigation from a licensee when such notification would be detrimental to the licensee. The Petitioner bases this contention on the broad power provided the Real Estate Commission by section 475.05, Florida Statutes. The Commission has not, however, adopted any rule, regulation or bylaw supportive of Petitioner's position and the statutory mandate is clear. Further, the statute referenced by Petitioner specifically does not support an exercise of this power of the Commission if the result is a conflict with another law of the State of Florida. Section 455.225(1), Florida Statutes, states Respondent "shall" notify "any person" of an investigation of that person. Under that section, discretionary authority to refrain from such notification is allowed only where there is a potential for harm to the investigation, or the matter under investigation is a criminal act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered confirming the grade of the Petitioner as previously determined. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 20th day of July, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-2442 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings The Petitioner submitted a document entitled summary of hearing and consisting of seven numbered paragraphs. They are treated as follows: Rejected as unnecessary. Included in findings 5, and 7. Rejected, contrary to the weight of the evidence. 4.- 6. Rejected, contrary to evidence adduced. 7. Rejected as argument. Respondent's Proposed Findings The Respondent submitted a three page document entitled "argument" and consisting of eight unnumbered paragraphs. Numbers 1-8 have been applied to those paragraphs. They are treated as follows: 1.-5. Rejected as conclusions of law. 6. Included in findings 8, 9, and 10. COPIES FURNISHED: H. Reynolds Sampson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Darlene F. Keller Acting Director Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Phillip I. Salerno 11812 Timbers Way Boca Raton, Florida 33428 William O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the respondents, Dorothea L. Prisament and Warricks Real Estate , Inc., should be disciplined on charges filed in a six-count Administrative Complaint, three counts for each respondent, and alleging that the respondents: (1) were culpably negligent in allowing their escrow account to have a negative balance, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1989); (2) failed to maintain trust funds in a properly maintained escrow account, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes (1989); and (3) failed to maintain a proper office sign, in violation of F.A.C. Rule 21V-10.024 and Sections 475.25(1)(e) and 475.22, Florida Statutes (1989).
Findings Of Fact Dorothea L. Prisament and Warricks Real Estate, Inc., are now, and were at all times material hereto, licensed as real estate brokers in the State of Florida. Dorothea L. Prisament was the active real estate broker for the corporate broker, Warricks Real Estate. On or about August 16, 1989, investigator Marjorie G. May conducted an office inspection and audit of the escrow accounts of the respondents. Ms. May also reviewed the outer office of the respondents. The entrance sign did not have the name of Dorothea L. Prisament on it; however, the sign did have Warricks Real Estate correctly identified and identified as a licensed real estate broker. Ms. May advised Ms. Prisament of the fact that Ms. Prisament's name needed to be on the sign and identified as a real estate broker. Ms. Prisament had a new sign made which fully complies with the statutes and rules. There was no evidence introduced at hearing to show that the escrow account of the respondents had a shortage in any amount; directly to the contrary, both the Department of Professional Regulation investigator and Ms. Prisament agreed that there was no shortage in the account.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and in light of the fact both that the respondents' violation was a very minor and technical one which was immediately corrected and that the respondents had to undergo the costs of defense of this case and suffer the mental duress of defending this case, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing Counts I through IV of the Administrative Complaint and reprimanding the respondents for a minor and technical violation under Counts V and VI. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Janine A. Bamping, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire One Urban Centre, Suite 750 4830 West Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33609 Darlene F. Keller Director, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729
Findings Of Fact Respondent Sexsmith is a licensed real estate broker, having held License Number 0079448 at all times relevant to these proceedings. Respondent Bellitto is a licensed real estate salesman, having held License No. 0204206 at all times relevant to Case No. 81-2630. Respondent Select Realty, Inc., is a licensed corporate real estate broker, having held License No. 0157174 at all times relevant to these proceedings. Respondent Sexsmith founded Select Realty, Inc., in 1975. He was a full time realtor until his employment by the Hollywood Fire Department in 1976. Select Realty thereafter became inactive. In 1979, Respondent Sexsmith was contacted by a Mr. Jim Holmes, who was seeking to register the corporate name, Select Realty. Sexsmith agreed to permit the name Select Realty to be used by Holmes and his associates to open a real estate office at 3045 North Federal Highway, Fort Lauderdale. Sexsmith also applied to Petitioner for certification as a director and active broker with this company. His application was granted in June, 1979, and he remained affiliated with Respondent Select Realty, Inc., in this capacity until about April, 1980. Respondent Sexsmith did not participate in Select Realty operations and received no compensation for the use of his name and broker's license. He was slated to open and manage a branch office in Hollywood, but this project failed to materialize. Petitioner produced Mr. Tom Ott and Ms. Terri Casson as witnesses. They had utilized the services of Select Realty, Inc., in December, 1979 (Ott) and February, 1980 (Casson). Both had responded to advertisements in which Select Realty offered to provide rental assistance for a $45 refundable fee. These witnesses understood money would be refunded if Select Realty did not succeed in referring them to rental property which met their specifications. Mr. Ott was referred to several properties which did not meet his requirements. He sought to have his fee or a portion thereof returned, but was refused. His demand for such return was made within the 30-day contract period (PX-11). Ms. Casson was similarly dissatisfied with the referrals and sought the return of her fee within the 30-day contract period (PX-7). However, she was unable to contact this company or its agents since the office had closed and no forwarding instructions were posted or otherwise made available to her.
Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent Select Realty, Inc., and Gary Lee Sexsmith be found guilty as charged in Counts Three and Four of the Administrative Complaint filed in DOAH Case No. 81-2630. It is further RECOMMENDED that all other charges against these Respondents and other Respondents named in DOAH Cases 81-2630 and 81-2490 be dismissed. It is further RECOMMENDED that the corporate broker's license of Select Realty, Inc., be revoked. It is further RECOMMENDED that the broker's license of Gary Lee Sexsmith be suspended for a period of one year. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Cohen, Esquire Suite 101, Kristin Building 2715 East Oakland Park Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 William Grossbard, Esquire Suite 6175M 6191 Southwest 45 Street 6177 North Davie, Florida 33314 Anthony S. Paetro, Esquire Bedzow and Korn, P.A. Suite C 1125 Northeast 125 Street North Miami, Florida 33161 Lawrence J. Spiegel, Esquire Spiegel and Abramowitz Suite 380 First National Bank Building 900 West 49th Street Hialeah, Florida 33012 Mr. Gary Lee Sexsmith 321 Southwest 70t Avenue Pembroke Pines, Florida 33023 Mr. Guiseppe D. Bellitto 2635 McKinley Street Hollywood, Florida 33020 Select Realty, Inc. c/o Mr. Gary Lee Sexsmith last acting Director and Trustee of Select Realty, Inc. 321 Southwest 70th Avenue Pembroke Pines, Florida 33023 Mr. Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Board of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Petitioner was licensed as a real estate broker by the Florida Real Estate Commission. In May 1988, he was working as a broker-salesman with G.V. Stewart, Inc., a corporate real estate broker whose active broker is G.V. Stewart. On April 20, 1989, Respondent submitted a Contract for Sale and Purchase to the University of South Florida Credit Union who was attempting to sell a house at 2412 Elm Street in Tampa, Florida, which the seller had acquired in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding. This offer reflected a purchase price of $25,000 with a deposit of $100 (Exhibit 2). The president of the seller rejected the offer by striking out the $25,000 and $100 figures and made a counter offer to sell the property for $29,000 with a $2000 deposit (Exhibit 2). On May 9, 1989, Respondent submitted a new contract for sale and purchase for this same property which offer reflected an offering price of $27,000 with a deposit of $2000 held in escrow by G.V. Stewart (Exhibit 3). This offer, as did Exhibit 2, bore what purported to be the signature of William P. Murphy as buyer and G. Stewart as escrow agent. In fact, neither Murphy nor Stewart signed either Exhibit 2 or Exhibit 3, and neither was aware the offers had been made at the time they were submitted to the seller. This offer was accepted by the seller. This property was an open listing with no brokerage firm having an exclusive agreement with the owner to sell the property. Stewart's firm had been notified by the seller that the property was for sale. Respondent had worked with Stewart for upwards of ten years and had frequently signed Stewart's name on contracts, which practice was condoned by Stewart. Respondent had sold several parcels of property to Murphy, an attorney in Tampa, on contracts signed by him in the name of Murphy, which signatures were subsequently ratified by Murphy. Respondent considers Murphy to be a Class A customer for whom he obtained a deposit only after the offer was accepted by the seller and Murphy confirmed a desire to purchase. Respondent has followed this procedure in selling property to Murphy for a considerable period of time and saw nothing wrong with this practice. At present, Respondent is the active broker at his own real estate firm.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that William H. McCoy's license as a real estate broker be suspended for one year. However, if before the expiration of the year's suspension Respondent can prove, to the satisfaction of the Real Estate Commission, that he fully understands the duty owed by a broker to the seller and the elements of a valid contract, the remaining portion of the suspension be set aside. ENTERED this 29th day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: John Alexander, Esquire Kenneth E. Easley 400 West Robinson Street General Counsel Orlando, Florida 32802 Department of Professional Regulation William H. McCoy 1940 North Monroe Street 4002 South Pocahontas Avenue Suite 60 Suite 106 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Tampa Florida 33610 Darlene F. Keller Division Director 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 =================================================================
The Issue The issue to be resolved herein concerns whether the Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney's fees in this proceeding. Embodied in that general issue are questions concerning whether the Petitioners are the prevailing parties; whether they meet the definition of "small business" parties, including the net worth amounts, enumerated in Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, as well as whether the disciplinary proceeding against both Petitioners was "substantially justified". See Section 57.111(3)(e) , Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with licensing and regulating the practices of real estate salesmen and brokers by the various provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Included within those duties is the duty to investigate conduct by realtors allegedly in violation of Chapter 475 and related rules and to prosecute administrative penal proceedings for which probable cause is found as a result of such investigations. At times pertinent hereto, both Ms. Maxwell and Ms. Cosyns, (then Pauline Sealey) were licensed realtors working as independent contractors for Mariner Properties, Inc. and V.I.P. Realty Inc. The complete file of the underlying proceeding DOAH Case No. 86-0140, was stipulated into evidence. That file included the Administrative Complaint filed against these Respondents and the Recommended and Final Order, which Final Order adopted the Recommended Order. The findings of fact in that Recommended Order are incorporated by reference and adopted herein. During the Petitioner's case, counsel for Petitioner voluntarily reduced the attorney's fees bills for both Petitioners such that Ms. Maxwell's bill is the total amount of $2,695.50 and Ms. Cosyns' bill is $17,200, rather than the original amounts submitted in the affidavit. Respondent acknowledged in its proposed Final Order that the fees and costs submitted by the Respondent were thus reasonable. The testimony the Petitioners presented through depositions, transcripts of which were admitted into evidence into this proceeding, was unrefuted. That testimony demonstrates that both Ms. Cosyns and Ms. Maxwell were prevailing parties in the administrative proceeding referenced herein brought by the Respondent, Department of Professional Regulation. They were individually named as Respondents in the Administrative Complaint whereby their professional licenses were subjected to possible suspension or revocation for alleged wrong doing on their part. There is no dispute that they were exonerated in that proceeding and are thus prevailing parties within the meaning of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. The Petitioners are also "small business parties". In that connection, they both were independently licensed Real Estate professionals during times pertinent to the underlying proceeding and were acting in the capacity of independent contractors for all the activities with which the administrative complaint was concerned. Each established that her net worth is below the limit provided by Section 57.111 as an element of the definition of "small business party". The reasonableness of the fees having been established in the manner found-above and the Petitioners having established that they meet the definitional requirements of prevailing small business parties, there remains to be determined the issue of whether the proceedings against the two Petitioners were "substantially justified", that is, whether the proceeding had a "reasonable basis in law and fact at the time it was initiated by a State agency." See Section 57.111(3)(e), Florida Statutes. The facts concerning each Petitioner's case regarding the three counts of the Administrative Complaint relating to them are as found in the Recommended Order incorporated by reference herein. Respondent Maxwell was charged in the complaint with having worked in conjunction with an office manager, Mr. Hurbanis of V.I.P. Realty, in conspiring with him to submit a fraudulent real estate sales contract to a lending institution for purposes of financing. This allegedly involved submitting a contract to the lending institution with an inflated purchase price in order to secure one hundred percent financing, the scheme being more particularly described in that portion of the findings of fact in the Recommended Order related to Jean Maxwell. In fact, Ms. Maxwell did not work in the realty office as charged in the Administrative Complaint, but rather was employed by Mariner Properties, which may have been a related company. The contract in question, although alleged to be fraudulent was, in fact, a bona fide contract which was a legitimate part of the Real Estate transaction submitted to the bank for financing purposes, about which the bank was kept fully advised. All details of the transaction were disclosed to the lender. Maxwell was specifically charged with concealing the true contract from the lender in order to enhance the percentage of the purchase price that the bank would finance, done by allegedly inflating the purchase price in a second contract submitted to the bank. It was established in the disciplinary proceeding that no such concealment ever took place. In fact, Ms. Maxwell was purchasing a lot from her own employer, Mariner Properties. Two contracts were indeed prepared for the purchase of Lot 69, a single family lot on Sanibel Island. In fact, however, the difference of $42,875 and $49,500 in the stated purchase price, as depicted on the two contracts, was the result of continuing negotiations between Ms. Maxwell and the seller, who was also her employer. The difference in the two prices depicted on the contracts was the result of, in effect, a set-off to the benefit of Ms. Maxwell, representing certain employee discounts and real estate commission due from the employer and seller to Ms. Maxwell, the purchaser. As Petitioners' composite Exhibit 5 reflects, the lender involved, North First Bank of Ft. Myers, Florida, was fully apprised of all the details concerning this transaction at the time it was entered into and the loan commitment extended and closed. Mr. Allan Barnes, the Assistant Vice President of North First Bank revealed, in the letter contained in this exhibit in evidence, that there was no concealment or misrepresentation of the facts to his institution by Ms. Maxwell. This letter is dated April 18, 1984. The other related letter in that exhibit, of May 2, 1984 from attorney Oertel to attorney Frederick H. Wilson of the Respondent agency, thus constitutes notice to the agency well before the complaint was filed, that no concealment or misrepresentation to the lender involved had occurred and the charges were requested to be dismissed. In spite of the fact that the agency was on notice of this turn of events well before the filing of the Administrative Complaint, it proceeded to file the complaint and to prosecute it all the way up to the date of hearing, requiring Ms. Maxwell's attorney to attend the hearing to defend her interests. At the hearing, counsel for the Department acknowledged that there was no basis for prosecuting Ms. Maxwell and voluntarily dismissed the complaint as to her. The Respondent's witness, Investigator Harris, in his deposition taken September 11, 1984, acknowledged that he did not discuss any details concerning the investigation, with attorney Frederick Wilson, who prepared the complaint, nor did he confer with him by telephone or correspondence before the filing of the complaint. Therefore, the complaint was prepared solely on the basis of the investigative report. The investigative report came into evidence as Respondent's Exhibit 1. It reveals that Mr. A. J. Davis the president of Mariner Group and Mariner Properties, who was Jean Maxwell's employer and the owner of the lot in question, signed one contract and his Executive Vice President signed the other. In spite of this, the investigative report does not reveal that the investigator conferred with either Ms. Maxwell, or the sellers concerning this transaction. He conducted a general interview of A.J. Davis concerning the alleged "problem" in his office of "double contracting," but asked him no questions and received no comment about the Jean Maxwell transaction whatever. Nor did the investigator confer with Mr. Allen Barnes or any other representative of North First Bank. If the investigation had been more complete and thorough, he would have learned from Mr. Barnes, if from no one else, that the bank had knowledge of both contracts and all details of the transaction underlying them and there had been no concealment or misrepresentation of the facts regarding the transaction by Ms. Maxwell. This information was learned by attorney Oertel as early as April 18, 1984 by Mr. Barnes' letter, referenced above, and it was communicated to the agency by Mr. Oertel on May 2, 1984. Nevertheless, the complaint was filed and prosecuted through to hearing. Therefore, the prosecution and filing of the Administrative Complaint were clearly not substantially justified. If the Department had properly investigated the matter it would have discovered the true nature of the transaction as being a completely bona fide real estate arrangement. Former Respondent, Pauline Sealy Cosyns was charged with two counts, III and V, in the Administrative Complaint at issue. One count alleged, in essence, that Ms. Sealey had engaged in a similar fraudulent contract situation regarding the sale of her residence to a Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Floyd. The evidence in that proceedings revealed no concealment of any sales contract occurred whatever with regard to the lending institution or anyone else. The facts as revealed at hearing showed Ms. Cosyns and the Floyds, through continuing negotiations after the original sales contract was entered into, amended that contract and executed a second one, in order to allow Ms. Cosyns to take back a second mortgage from the Floyds. This was necessary because Mr. Floyd, an author, was short of the necessary down payment pursuant to the terms of the original contract, because his annual royalty payment from his publishers had not been received as the time approached for closing. The second contract was executed to allow for a second mortgage in favor of the seller, Ms. Cosyns, in order to make up the amount owed by the Floyds on the purchase price agreed upon, above the first mortgage amount. The testimony and evidence in the disciplinary proceeding revealed unequivocally that the lending institution, Amerifirst Mortgage Company, was fully apprised of the situation and of the reason for the two contractual agreements. The $24,000 second mortgage in question is even depicted on the closing statement issued by that bank. There was simply no concealment and no effort to conceal any facts concerning this transaction from the lender or from anyone else. The investigation conducted was deficient because the investigator failed to discuss this transaction with the lender or with the purchasers. He discussed the matter with Ms. Sealy-Cosyns and his own deposition testimony reveals, as does his investigative report, that he did not feel that he got a complete account of the transaction from her. She testified in her deposition, taken prior to the instant proceeding, that she indeed did not disclose all facts of the transaction to him because she was concerned that he was attempting to apprehend her in some "legal impropriety". Therefore, she was reluctant to be entirely candid. The fact remains, however, that had he conducted a complete investigation by conferring with the lender and the purchasers, he would have known immediately, long before the Administrative Complaint was filed and the matter prosecuted, that there was absolutely no basis for any probable cause finding that wrong-doing had occurred in terms of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Thus, the facts concerning the prosecution as to Count III against Pauline Sealy-Cosyns, as more particularly delineated in the findings of fact in the previous Recommended Order, reveal not only that Ms. Cosyns was totally exonerated in the referenced proceeding, but that there was no substantial basis for prosecuting her as to this count at all. Concerning Count V against Ms. Cosyns, it was established through the evidence at the hearing in the disciplinary case that she was merely the listing agent and did not have any part to play in the drafting of the contract nor the presenting of it to the lender. Because there was no evidence adduced to show that she had any complicity or direct involvement in any fraudulent conduct with regard to the transaction involved in Count V of the Administrative Complaint at issue she was exonerated as to that count as well. It is noteworthy here that a statement was made by counsel for the agency, appearing at pages 20 and 21 of the transcript of the proceeding involving the Administrative Complaint, which indicates that the agency, based upon its review of certain documents regarding Counts III and V, before hearing, felt that indeed there might not be a disputed issue of material fact as to Mrs. Cosyns. The agency, although acknowledging that a review of the documents caused it to have reason to believe that it was unnecessary to proceed further against Ms. Cosyns nevertheless did not voluntarily dismiss those counts and proceeded through hearing. Be that as it may, the investigation revealed that Ms. Cosyns acknowledged that she knew that there were two contractual documents involved, but the investigation also revealed that Ms. Cosyns was only the listing agent. The selling agent was Mr. Parks. The investigation revealed through interviews with Ms. Cosyns, Mr. Parks and Mr. Hurbanis, the office Manager of V.I.P. Realty, that Ms. Cosyns, as listing agent, was merely present when the offer from the buyers was communicated to the office manager, Mr. Hurbanis, and ultimately to the sellers, the Cottrells. There was no reason for the investigator to believe that Ms. Cosyns had anything to do with the drafting of the contracts nor with the communication of them to the lending institution involved. That was done by either Mr. Parks or Mr. Hurbanis or by the buyers. The investigation (as revealed in the investigative report) does not show who communicated the contract in question to the lender. The investigation was simply incomplete. If the investigator had conferred with the buyers, the sellers and especially the lender, he could have ascertained-whether the lender was aware of all the facts concerning this transaction and whether there was any reason to believe that Ms. Cosyns had anything to do with the arrangement and the details of the transaction. It was ultimately established, by unrefuted evidence at hearing, that indeed Ms. Cosyns did not have anything to do with the transaction, nor the manner in which it was disclosed to the lender. The fact that she was aware that two contracts had been prepared did not give a reasonable basis for the investigator to conclude that she had engaged in any wrong-doing. The report of his interviews with Ms. Cosyns, Mr. Hurbanis and Mr. Parks, as well as Donna Ross, does not indicate that he had a reasonable basis to conclude that Ms. Cosyns had engaged in any fraudulent conduct with regard to the transaction, including the conveyance of a bogus contract to the lending institution involved, nor for that matter, that Mr. Hurbanis or Mr. Parks engaged in such conduct. In order to ascertain a reasonable basis for concluding whether Ms. Cosyns was involved in any wrongful conduct, he would have had to obtain more information than he did from these people or confer with the lender, the buyer or the seller, or all of these approaches, before he could have a reasonable basis to recommend to the prosecuting agency that an Administrative Complaint be filed against her concerning this transaction. In fact, he did not do so, but the Administrative Complaint was filed and prosecuted through hearing anyway, causing her to incur the above-referenced attorney's fees. It thus has not been demonstrated that there was any substantial basis for the filing and prosecution of Count V of the Administrative Complaint against Ms. Cosyn. Thus she is entitled to the attorneys fees referenced above with regard to the prosecution of the Administrative Complaint in question.
