Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, and at the subsequent deposition, the following facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was a producer of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes (1983). At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Sales was a licensed dealer in agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes (1983), issued license No. 4103 by the Department, and bonded by Hartford Insurance Company of the Southeast (Hartford) in the sum of $20,000 Bond No. RN 4429948. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Hartford was authorized to do business in the State of Florida. The complaint filed by Petitioner was timely filed in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes (1983). On June 12, 1985, Respondent Sales, acting through its agent William C. Summers (Summers), contracted with Petitioner to purchase several loads of watermelons which were to be loaded by Petitioner on trucks furnished by Respondent Sales at Petitioner's watermelon field. Summers acting as Respondent Sales' agent had the authority to purchase, inspect, accept and pay for the watermelons. Petitioner agreed with Summers to load "field run" watermelons that were not "too big" or not "too small". Respondent did not request that the load be small, medium or large. Small being watermelons ranging in size from 11 to 17 pounds medium being watermelons ranging in size from 17 to 24 pounds and large being watermelons ranging in size from 24 to 40 pounds. Although Petitioner did not agree to furnish any specific grade of watermelon, the evidence shows that it was understood by Petitioner that Summers was contracting for "good quality" watermelons. On the second load Summers instructed the Petitioner to eliminate the large watermelons and this was done while harvesting and packing. The agreed upon price per pound of watermelons was $0.03 and the total price of each load of watermelons was to be determined by multiplying the price per pound by the net weight of each load of watermelons. The net weight of the load of watermelons in dispute was 46,260 pounds which when multiplied by $0.03 per pound equals a total price of $1,386.90 which Respondent Sales has refused to pay. Under the agreement it was Petitioner's responsibility to harvest and pack the watermelons on the trailer in accordance with Summers instructions but at Petitioner's expense, and it was Summers' responsibility to inspect the watermelons as to size and quality during the harvesting and packing and to reject any watermelons not conforming as to size and quality under the agreement. Upon the watermelons being loaded, inspected, accepted and weighed, the sale was to be final and Petitioner was to receive payment with title and risk of loss passing to Respondent Sales at point of shipment. Although Petitioner loaded approximately 2 1/2 loads of watermelons for Respondent Sales, only the last load or the second full load, which Petitioner started loading on June 12, 1985 and finished loading on June 13, 1985, is in dispute. On June 13, 1985, Summers issued a check on the account of Respondent Sales for payment of the 2 full loads of watermelons, which included payment for the load in dispute, but later that same day demanded that Petitioner return the check or Summers would stop payment on the check. Petitioner returned the check and was later paid for the first load but Respondent Sales has refused to pay for second load alleging that the quality of the watermelons did not conform to the agreement. There was no problem as to the size of the watermelons. Respondent Sales, after Summers accepted and issued the check for the watermelons in dispute, decided to make payment of the watermelons contingent on acceptance at destination rather than acceptance by Summers at the point of shipment as agreed earlier and refused to pay Petitioner for the watermelons in dispute because allegedly they had not been accepted at their destination. When advised of this change, Petitioner refused to sell any more watermelons to Respondent Sales. Although Respondent's exhibit 1 and 2 show that a load of watermelons loaded by Petitioner was federally inspected on June 17, 1985 at its destination, the evidence is insufficient to prove that the load of watermelons in dispute was inspected on June 17, 1985. In any event, only the condition of the watermelons was reported on the inspection report and no determination made by the inspector as to size, quality or grade, and there was no evidence to show that the condition of the watermelons at their destination would result in the watermelons failing to conform to the agreement; i.e., good quality. The watermelons were culled in the field during harvesting, at the trailer during packing and were additionally culled by Summers during the packing while he was present. Summers was not present full time while the watermelons were being harvested and loaded but was present on several occasions for periods up to 20 or 30 minutes for a total time of approximately 1 1/2 hours. Summers was allowed to inspect the watermelons in the field before harvesting and during harvesting and, in addition to the culling of the watermelon during harvesting and loading by Petitioner, Summers was allowed to cull, while he was present during loading. The evidence is sufficient to show that Summers had ample opportunity to inspect the watermelons and that he did inspect and accept the load of watermelons in dispute at point of shipment. The testimony of Petitioner and Bill Lamb that the watermelons in dispute were of the size and quality to conform to the agreement when loaded on the trailer on June 12 and 13, 1985 was credible.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent Sales be ordered to pay to the Petitioners the sum of $1,386.90. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent Sales fails to timely pay the Petitioner as ordered, then Respondent Hartford be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983) and that the Department reimburse the Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983). Respectfully submitted and entered this 14th day of March, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Doyle Conner, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert Chastain, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 513 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ron Weaver, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joe W. Kight, Chief License and Bond Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Terry McDavid, Esquire 200 North Marion Street. Lake City, Florida 32055 Robin C. Shiver Route 3, Box 248 Mayo, Florida 32066 Carl Boyles A. J. Sales Company P. O. Box 7798 Orlando, Florida 32854 Hartford Insurance Company of the Southeast 200 East Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue Has Respondent VBJ Packing, Inc. (Respondent) paid Petitioner, Chastain- Bishop Farms (Petitioner) in full for watermelons represented by Respondent's load numbers 3002 and 3004 purchased from Petitioner during the 1995 watermelon season?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was a "producer" of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes. Watermelons come within the definition of "agricultural products" as defined in Section 604.15(3), Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed as a "dealer in agricultural products" as defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent was issued license number 8887 by the Department which is supported by Bond Number 137743741 in the amount of $75,000 written by Respondent Continental Casualty Company (Continental), as surety, with an inception date of January 1, 1995, and an expiration date of December 31, 1995. The Complaint was timely filed by Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes. Sometime during the week prior to Monday, May 8, 1995, Petitioner and Respondent entered into a verbal agreement which contained the following terms: (a) Petitioner would sell Respondent a semi-trailer load of medium size melons of good quality to be harvested and loaded by Petitioner onto a semi-trailer furnished by Respondent; (b) Respondent would have the right and opportunity to inspect the melons before or during loading; (c) Respondent would pay Petitioner fifteen cents ($0.15) per pound for the melons loaded onto the trailer; (d) upon delivery at Petitioner's farm, the melons became Respondent's property and Petitioner had no further obligation to Respondent concerning the melons; and (e) settlement was to be made by Respondent within a reasonable time. Subsequent to the above agreement, Petitioner sold and Respondent bought, a second semi-trailer load of melons to be delivered under the same terms and conditions as agreed in the above verbal agreement. On Friday, May 5, 1995, Respondent's agent, Robert Allen and T. J. Chastain, a partner in Chastain-Bishop Farms, had a disagreement concerning Eddie Idlette, Respondent's inspector, being on the Petitioner's farm. Because of an incident in the past involving Idlette and Petitioner, Chastain did not want Idlette on Petitioner's farm and made this known to Allen. As result of this disagreement, Idlette left the Petitioner's farm and was not present on Monday or Tuesday, May 8 & 9, 1995, to inspect the two loads of melons. Allen testified that Chastain also excluded him from Petitioner's farm at this time, and that Chastain told him that neither he nor Idlette needed to be present during the loading of the melons because Chastain "would stand behind the loads". However, the more credible evidence shows that Chastain did not prevent Allen from inspecting the melons on Monday or Tuesday, May 8 & 9, 1995, or tell Allen that he "would stand behind the loads". Furthermore, there is credible evidence to show that Allen was present at Petitioner's farm on Monday and Tuesday, May 8 & 9, 1995, and he either inspected, or had the opportunity to inspect, the two loads of melons, notwithstanding Allen's testimony or Respondent's exhibit 6 to the contrary. Petitioner did not advise Respondent, at any time pertinent to the sale of the melons, that Petitioner would give Respondent "full market protection" on the melons. Furthermore, Petitioner did not agree, at any time pertinent to the sale of the melons, for Respondent to handle the melons "on account" for Petitioner. The more credible evidence supports Petitioner's contention that the melons were purchased by Respondent with title to the melons passing to Respondent upon delivery at Petitioner's farm, subject to inspection or the opportunity to inspect before loading and delivery. On Monday, May 8, 1995, Petitioner loaded Respondent's first semi- trailer with a State of Georgia tag number CX9379, with 2,280 medium size Sangria melons of good quality weighing 46,800 pounds and identified as Respondent's load number 3002. Respondent accepted load 3002 for shipment to its customer. Using the agreed upon price of fifteen cents ($0.15) per pound times 46,800 pounds, the Respondent owed Petitioner $7,020.00 for load number 3002. On Tuesday, May 9, 1995, Petitioner loaded Respondent's second semi- trailer with a State of New Jersey tag number TAB4020, with 2,331 medium size Sangria melons of good quality weighing 46,620 pounds and identified as Respondent's load number 3004. Respondent accepted load 3004 for shipment to its customer. Using the agreed upon price of fifteen cents ($0.15) per pound times 46,620 pounds, the Respondent owed Petitioner $6,9993.00 for load number 3004. The combined total amount owed to Petitioner by Respondent for load numbers 3002 and 3004 was $14,013.00. Respondent shipped load 3002 to E. W. Kean Co, Inc. (Kean). Upon receiving load 3002, Kean allegedly found problems with the melons. Respondent allowed Kean to handled the melons on account for Respondent. Kean sold the melons for $6,804.05 or 14.5 cents per pound. After Kean's deduction for handling, Kean paid Respondent $6,112.05 or 13.02 cents per pound. In accounting to Petitioner, Respondent made further deductions for handling and freight, and offered Petitioner $3,641.24 or 7.8 cents per pound for the melons on load 3002. Respondent shipped load 3004 to Mada Fruit Sales (Mada). Upon receiving load 3004, Mada allegedly found problems with the melons. By letter dated June 8, 1995 (Respondent's exhibit 4), Mada grudgingly agreed to pay the freight plus 10 cents per pound for the melons. Mada paid Respondent $4,662.00 for load 3004, and after Respondent deducted its commission of $466.20, offered Petitioner $4,195.80 or nine cents per pound for the melons on load 3004. By check number 18922 dated May 28, 1995, Respondent paid Petitioner $7,760.08. Respondent contends that this amount was offered to Kye Bishop in full settlement for loads 3002 and 3004, and that after Bishop consulted with Chastain, Bishop on behalf of Petitioner, accepted this amount in full settlement for loads 3002 and 3004. Bishop contends that he turned down the $7,760.08 as settlement in full but took the $7,760.08 as partial payment and proceeded to file a complaint with the Department against Respondent's bond for the difference. There is nothing written on the check to indicate that by accepting and cashing the check Petitioner acknowledged that it was payment in full for load numbers 3002 and 3004. The more credible evidence shows that Bishop did not accept the check in the amount of $7,760.08 as payment in full for loads 3002 and 3004 but only as partial payment, notwithstanding the testimony of Allen to the contrary. There was an assessment charge of $62.72 which Petitioner agrees that it owes and should be deducted from any monies owed to Petitioner by Respondent. Initially, Respondent owed Petitioner $14,013.00. However, substracting the partial payment of $7,760.08 and the assessment of $62.72 from the $14,013.00 leaves a balance owed Petitioner by Respondent of $6,190.20
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order granting the Petitioner relief by ordering Respondent VBJ Packing, Inc. to pay Petitioner the sum of $6,190.20. RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of May, 1996, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-4226A The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Proposed findings of fact 1(a) through 1(i) are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 16. Respondent VBJ Packing, Inc's Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed finding of fact 1 is covered in the Conclusion of Law. Proposed finding of fact 2 is adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 16. Proposed finding of fact 3, 6, 7 and 8 10, are not supported by evidence in the record. As to proposed finding of fact 4, Petitioner and Respondent VBJ Packing, Inc. agreed that Petitioner would sell and Respondent would pay $0.15 per pound for medium size melons. Otherwise proposed finding of fact is not supported by evidence in the record. See Findings of Fact 4, 7 and 8. As to proposed finding of fact 5, Respondent sold the loads. Otherwise proposed finding of fact 5 is not supported by evidence in the record. Respondent Continental elected not to file any proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo Building Lakeland, Florida 32399-0800 David K. Oaks, Esquire David Oaks, P.A. 252 W. Marion Avenue Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Mark A. Sessums, Esquire Frost, O'Toole & Saunders, P.A. Post Office Box 2188 Bartow, Florida 33831-2188
The Issue Whether A. J. Sales Company owes petitioner $1,712.80 for watermelons loaded on June 18, 1986.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Michael C. Jones, is a watermelon grower who resides in Summerfield, Florida. In June of 1986, petitioner arranged to sell his watermelons through Larry Dimaria for four cents a pound. Mr. Dimaria advised petitioner that he would get four cents a pound at the weighing. In his complaint, the petitioner described Mr. Dimaria as his "salesman." At the hearing he stated that Mr. Dimaria was his broker working on commission. Regardless of the characterization, it is clear that Mr. Dimaria was acting as petitioner's agent for the sale of the watermelons in question. Acting on behalf of petitioner, Mr. Dimaria called Carl Boyles, an employee of A. J. Sales Company, to advise that petitioner had watermelons for sale. Mr. Boyles was able to locate a buyer for the watermelons, the Auster Company in Chicago, Illinois. Mr. Boyles then called Mr. Dimaria to inform him of the sale. Mr. Dimaria was specifically advised by Mr. Boyles that the melons would have to be in good condition, meaning that they would pass a USDA inspection, and that petitioner would have to "ride the watermelons in," meaning that petitioner would have to guarantee arrival of the watermelons in good condition in Chicago. In other words, if the melons failed a USDA inspection in Chicago, the Auster Company had the right to reject the watermelons and the risk of the loss would be on petitioner. Petitioner was guaranteed four cents a pound for the watermelons only upon successful delivery. The terms and conditions of the sale were made clear to Mr. Dimaria. Indeed, because A. J. Sales Company had experienced problems with Mr. Dimaria in 1985, which included Mr. Dimaria's misrepresenting the quality of the watermelons he was selling, A. J. Sales Company had determined that the only terms on which it would do business with Mr. Dimaria were that the farmers Mr. Dimaria represented would have to guarantee arrival of the watermelons in good condition and that the farmers would bear the risk of loss if the melons were not in good condition when delivered. Since A. J. Sales Company's representatives do not see the watermelons themselves and could not rely on Mr. DiMaria's representations, A. J. Sales Company felt these terms were necessary to protect its interests. The subject watermelons were shipped to Chicago on June 18, 1986. They were inspected in Chicago on June 20, 1986, by a United States Department of Agriculture inspector. The watermelons failed to grade U.S. No. 1 on account of their condition, which was that the samples averaged 66 percent overmature. Mr. Boyles was advised of the problem with the watermelons on Friday, June 20, the day they were inspected. He attempted to telephone Mr. Dimaria but was unable to reach him. He therefore called the petitioner to advise of the condition of the melons and find out what petitioner wanted done. Petitioner told Mr. Boyles that he knew of no buyer in the area and told Mr. Boyles to do what he could. Mr. Boyles called several people in the Chicago area but could not find anyone who was willing to buy the watermelons. The only possibility was to take the watermelons to a flea market being held on Sunday and sell as many melons as possible directly from the truck. Mr. Boyles was advised that the melons might get $400 or $500 at the flea market, but he knew it would cost $300 to keep the driver in Chicago through Sunday. Therefore, the best return possible from selling the watermelons at the flea market would be $100 or $200. Further, the truck driver advised Mr. Boyles that the melons were popping open and juice was running out the bottom of the truck. Based on all the information that he had, Mr. Boyles determined that the best option was not to add an additional $300 to the freight bill, but simply to tell the truck driver to dump the watermelons. Respondent received a receipt indicating that one load of watermelons, constituting 46 x 2.05 cubic yards, had been dumped at the Inox County, Illinois, landfill and that the charge for dumping had been $94.30. A. J. Sales Company never received any payment for the watermelons in question. A. J. Sales Company invoiced petitioner for the freight charges on the watermelons, but petitioner never paid the invoice. Petitioner never invoiced A. J. Sales Company for the watermelons. What apparently happened in this case is that the petitioner was not fully advised by his agent, Mr. Dimaria, of the terms and conditions of the sale. All negotiations concerning the watermelons were conducted between Mr. Dimaria and Carl Boyles. The petitioner did not talk to any representative of A. J. Sales Company concerning the terms and conditions of the sale. Petitioner's only knowledge of the terms and conditions of the sale came from Mr. Dimaria, and petitioner admitted that he had experienced problems with representations made by Mr. Dimaria on other loads of watermelons he handled for petitioner. On other loads, petitioner was advised by Mr. Dimaria that he would receive a half cent more per pound for the watermelons than he actually got. After the instant dispute, Mr. Dimaria ceased being a broker representing the petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing petitioner's complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Respondent's proposed findings of fact: 1-2. Accepted in paragraphs 1 and 2. Accepted in paragraph 9. Accepted in paragraphs 3 and 9. Rejected, not a finding of fact. 6-8. Accepted generally in paragraph 4. Accepted generally in paragraph 3. Accepted generally in paragraph 5. 11-12. Accepted generally in paragraphs 6 and 7. 13-15. Accepted in paragraph 8. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Accepted in paragraph 5. Accepted in paragraphs 3 and 9. Accepted in paragraph 9. Rejected in that the watermelons failed to grade USDA 1 due to their condition. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Michael C. Jones Route 2, Box 26-E Summerfield, Florida 32691 Thomas B. Smith, Esquire McGUIRE, VOORHIS & WELLS, P.A. Two South Orange Plaza Post Office Box 633 Orlando, Florida 32802 Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Ben Pridgeon, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture Lab Complex Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1650 Robert Chastain, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture 513 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral testimony and the documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner, Carl Hiers and Rachel Hiers were "producers" of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent, Jay Nichols, Inc., (Nichols was a licensed "dealer in agricultural products" as defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes, issued license number 1547 by the Department, and bonded by the U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (Fidelity for the sum of $50,000.00, bond number 790103-10-115-88-1, with an effective date of March 22, 1988 and a termination date of March 22, 1989. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Nichols was authorized to do business in the State of Florida. The Complaint filed by Petitioners was timely in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes. Prior to Petitioners selling or delivering any watermelons (melons) to Nichols, Petitioners and Nichols agreed verbally that: (a) Petitioners would sell Nichols melons on a per pound basis at a price to be quoted by Nichols on the day of shipment; (b) Petitioners would harvest and load the melons on trucks furnished by Nichols; (c) a weight ticket with the weight of the truck before and after loading would be furnished to Petitioners; (d) Nichols or its agent in the field would have the authority to reject melons at the place of shipment (loading) which did not neet the guality or grade contracted for by Nichols; (e) the melons were to be of U.S. No. 1 grade; and, (f) settlement was to be made within a reasonable time after shipment. Although Nichols assisted Petitioners in obtaining the crew to harvest and load the melons, Petitioners had authority over the crew and was responsible for paying the crew. On a daily basis, L. L. Hiers, would contact Nichols and obtain the price being paid for melons that day. The price was marked in a field book with the net weight of each load. Nichols contends that the price quoted each day was the general price melons were bringing on the market that day. The price to be paid Petitioners was the price Nichols received for the melons at their destination minus 1 cent per pound commission for Nichols, taking into consideration freight, if any. Nichols was not acting as Petitioners' agent in the sale of the melons for the account of the Petitioners on a net return basis nor was Nichols acting as a negotiating broker between the Petitioners and the buyer. Nichols did not make the type of accountiig to Petitioners as required by section 604.22, Florida Statutes, had Nichols been Petitioners' agent. The prices quoted by Nichols to L. L. Hiers each day was the agreed upon price to be paid for melons shipped that day subject to any adjustment for failure of the melons to meet the quality or grade contracted for by Nichols. On June 11, 1988, L. L. Hiers contacted Nichols and was informed that the price to be paid for melons shipped that day was 6 cents per pound. This price was recorded in the field book with the net weight of the load of melons shipped on June 11, 1988. Only a partial load, no. 10896 weighing 11,420 pounds for which Nichols paid 5 cents per pound, is in dispute. The amount in dispute is $114.70. On June 13, 1988, L. L. Hiers contacted Nichols and was informed that the price to be paid for melons shipped that day was 5 cents per pound. This price was recorded in the field book with the net weight of 3 loads of melons shipped that day that are in dispute. The 3 loads in dispute are as follows: (a) Load No. 10906, weighing 48,620 pounds for which Nichols paid 4 cents per pound; (b) Load No. 10904, weighing 50,660 pounds for which Nichols paid 4 cents per pound, and; (c) Load No. 10902, weighing 45,030 pounds for which Nichols paid 4 cents per pound. The amount in dispute is as follows: (a) Load No. 10906, $486.20; (b) Load No. 10904, $253.30; and (c) Load No. 10902, $450.30. On June 20, 1988, L. L. Hiers contacted Nichols and was informed that the price to be paid for melons shipped that day was 5 cents per pound. This price was recorded in the field book with the weight of 52,250 for which Nichols paid 2 cents per pound. The amount in dispute is $1,567.50. On June 23, 1988, L. L. Hiers contacted Nichols and was informed that the price to be paid for melons shipped that day was 5.25 cents per pound. This price is 0.25 cent per pound less than that quoted on the same day in Case No. 88-5632A which is apparently due to the variety, Crimson Sweet, as opposed to Charmston Grey, since the average size of the melons shipped that day was within 4 ounces. This price was recorded in the field book with the load of melons shipped that day weighing 44,140 pounds for which Nichols paid 5 cents per pound. The load in dispute is load no. 11251, and the amount in dispute is $110.35. The total amount in dispute is $2,982.35. Load no. 11090 was federally inspected and failed to meet U.S. No. 1 grade on account of condition, not quality requirements. Therefore, the price of 2 cents per pound is a reasonable price and within the terms of the verbal contract. On all other loads, Nichols contends that the quality was low resulting in a lesser price than that agreed upon. However, Nichols failed to present sufficient evidence to support this contention. Nichols has refused to pay Petitioners the difference between the agreed upon price for load nos. 10896, 10902, 10904, 10906, 11090, and 11251, and the price paid by Nichols as indicated in the settlement sheet. The total difference is $2,982.35. However, subtracting $1,567.50, the difference in load no. 11090 that was rejected, from the total differnce results in a net difference of $1,414,85 and the amount owed to Petitioners.
Recommendation Upon cnsideration of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Jay Nichols, Inc., be ordered to pay the Petitioners, Carl Hiers and Rachel Hiers, the sum of $1,414.85. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent, Jay Nichols, Inc., fails to timely pay Petitioners, Carl Hiers and Rachel Hiers, as ordered, then Respondent, U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes, and that the Department reimburse the Petitioners in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED AND ENTERED this 20th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Doyle Conner, Commissioner Mr. Carl Heirs Depaftment of Agriculture and Mrs. Rachel Hiers Consumer Service Route 5, Box 339 The Capitol Dunnellon, Florida 32630 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mallory Horne, Esquire Jay Nichols, Inc. Department of Agriculture and Post Office Box 1705 Consumer Services Lakeland, Florida 33802 513 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company Ben H. Pridgeon, Chief Post Office Box 1138 Bureau of License and Bond Baltimore, Maryland Mayo Building 21203 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800
The Issue The issue is whether respondent is indebted to petitioner in the amount $5,838.59 as alleged in the complaint filed on September 19, 1996.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Bo Bass, is a watermelon farmer in Alachua County, Florida. Respondent, Hapco Farms, Inc., is licensed as a dealer in agricultural products having been issued License No. 8456 by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. As required by state law, respondent has posted a $75,000 bond written by Insurance Company of North America, as surety, to assure proper accounting and payment to producers. Freddie Bell is also a watermelon farmer who operates under the name of B & G Produce. That firm is located in Williston, Florida. According to petitioner, whenever Bell has extra trucks during watermelon season, he will load petitioner’s watermelons on those trucks, deliver them to B & G Produce’s shed for packing, and then sell them to various dealers. Upon collection of the moneys for the sale of such produce, Bell would then pay petitioner. On June 17, 18 and 19, 1996, petitioner verbally agreed to entrust four loads of watermelons to B & G Produce for resale to third parties. Petitioner expected to be paid six cents per pound for his produce. On the same dates, respondent, through its field buyer, entered into an agreement with B & G Produce, but not petitioner, for the purchase of four loads of watermelons. The weight bills for those shipments reflect that, while Bo Bass was the grower on two of those shipments, B & G Produce was the seller of all four loads. After the watermelons were sold to respondent and transported to its customers, a federal inspection determined that a number of watermelons were overripe and rotten. Because of this, a portion of the loads was “dumped.” This in turn reduced the amount of money due the seller. However, respondent made a proper accounting and payment to B & G Produce, and no claim has been filed by the seller against respondent. When petitioner ultimately received only $4,691.30 from B & G Produce, he filed a complaint against respondent seeking an additional $5,838.59. There is no competent evidence that petitioner ever entered into an agreement to sell his watermelons to respondent. Therefore, if petitioner has a dispute over any moneys allegedly due, it lies with Bell, and not respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order denying petitioner’s claim against the bond of respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Bo Bass 2829 Southwest State Road 45 Newberry, Florida 32669 Andrew B. Hellinger, Esquire First Union Financial Center, Suite 2350 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131-2328 Insurance Company of North America 1601 Chestnut Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19192 Brenda D. Hyatt, Chief Bureau of License and Bond Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Rushton is a grower of watermelons and qualifies as a "producer" under Section 604.15(5) F.S. Respondents Smith are broker-shippers of watermelons and qualify as dealers" under Section 604.15(1) F.S. Respondent South Carolina Insurance Company is surety for Respondents Smith. The amount and period of the bond have not been established. Petitioner's complaint sets out the amounts owed as follows: DATE OF SALE QUANTITY, AND PRICE PRODUCTS PER UNIT GRADE 6/7/92 Inv.#2051 43,200 lbs. AMOUNT Crimson Sweet Melons @.04 lb. $1,728.00 NWPB - 8.64 Adv. - 700.00 $1,019.36 6/10/92 Inv.#2053 43,900 lbs. Crimson Sweet Melons @3.5 lb. $1,536.50 NWPB - 8.78 Adv. - 700.00 $ 827.72 6/10/92 Inv.#2056 46,180 lbs. Crimson Sweet Melons @3.5 lb. $1,616.30 NWPB - 9.24 Adv. - 700.00 Less Payment of - 933.18 $ 907.06 $2,754.14 TOTAL $1,820.96 Regardless of the form of the complaint, Petitioner acknowledged at formal hearing that his claim relates only to Load 2051, that he did not dispute the deductions made by Respondents for NwPB or the advances paid him by the Dealer. Petitioner's complaint lumped the three loads together only because Respondent chose to cut a single check for all three loads and pay his accounts that way nearly three months after Load 2051 was shipped. With regard to Load 2051, it is not disputed that 43,200 pounds of watermelons were loaded by Dealers in Petitioner's field on June 7, 1992. The 1992 season was Petitioner's initial endeavor at growing watermelons. He was "in a bind" from the beginning of the growing season. Petitioner had originally intended to sell his watermelons to another buyer- dealer, but that person failed to send trucks to Petitioner's field. Petitioner was approached by Bobby Patton who put him in contact with Respondent Jim Smith on Saturday, June 6, 1992. Petitioner testified that Bobby Patton cut into and inspected sample melons and accepted most of his field of melons on Friday, June 5, 1992. After speaking with Petitioner by telephone on Saturday, June 6, 1992, Jim Smith went to Petitioner's field on Sunday, June 7, 1992. Petitioner and Respondents had no prior business dealings before their June 6 phone call. Jim Smith did not arrive at Petitioner's field on June 7, 1992 until the open-topped truck he had sent was half-loaded with Petitioner's melons. At that time, Smith and his employee, Dale Hires, inspected the melons on the truck and found some hollow hearts. At that time, Mr. Smith thought that the melons on the truck had been picked since Friday, but the undersigned accepts Petitioner's testimony and finds as fact that all the melons loaded into Load 2051 had been picked only since Saturday. Petitioner admitted that the melons were, "a little overripe and should have been loaded on Thursday or Friday and moved." Petitioner admitted that he and Smith then discussed that the melons were a little overripe and that they were "close" and had to be moved. Respondent Jim Smith told Petitioner there was a "potential problem," and he would let him know if a problem actually developed. Smith also said that they would try to work together and move the melons and try not to get Respondents "hurt." However, Petitioner did not specifically agree to "help" Respondent on melon loss. Petitioner later thought he was "helping" by putting a trucker up overnight in a motel at Petitioner's own expense. Smith used the phrases, "help each other" "help us" and "not hurt" to mean, "help Respondents so that Respondents would not show a loss." Petitioner testified that he had understood on June 7 that he was "not going to ride no freight" on the load. Smith concurred that this phrase he had used was mutually understood to mean that Respondents agreed to pick up the cost of freight. Respondent Smith considered the arrangement reached on June 7 to be a brokeraged deal wherein Respondent Dealers would "ride the freight" and Petitioner would "ride the melons," that is, Respondents expected Petitioner to absorb any loss occasioned by bad melons. Petitioner, on the other hand, considered all the watermelons accepted without reservation by Hires and Smith when they stepped off the half-loaded truck on June 7, 1992 and continued to load the truck with melons of questionable ripeness. Despite Petitioner's first assertion that he considered Bobby Patton's acceptance of the melons on Friday, June 5 to have been made on behalf of Respondents, that testimony is found to be contrary to his subsequent and more credible testimony that he considered Dale Hires to be acting for Respondents on June 7 and that he personally negotiated with Jim Smith on June 6 and June 7, after Bobby Patton was out of the picture. Respondents did nothing to cloak Bobby Patton, an independent contractor who "finds" melon fields, with apparent agency to negotiate the final "deal" for them with Petitioner. The "deal" between Petitioner and Respondents, such as it was, was finally and fully negotiated on June 7 between Petitioner and Respondent Jim Smith. The "deal" applied only to a certain specified segment of Petitioner's watermelon crop. Respondent Dealers thereafter handled a total of ten loads of watermelons. Respondent Dealers paid Petitioner satisfactorily on nine of the ten loads Only Load 2051, the first load, presented any problems. No agreement as to Respondents accepting all of Petitioner's field of watermelons was ever reached between the parties. Petitioner lost money with regard to the rest of his field, but that loss is in no way attributable to Respondents, despite Petitioner's expressed frustration in that regard. Petitioner heard nothing from Respondents until he requested payment and to "settle up" concerning all ten loads, approximately June 17, 1992. At that time, Jim Smith gave Petitioner settlement documents, including weight tickets and invoices for all ten loads at one time in a large envelope. Petitioner termed these documents "confirmations." At the time Smith handed Petitioner the envelope, Smith mentioned to Petitioner that one load had a problem with it. He did not give Petitioner any further information about which load had the problem. Before putting the confirmations in the envelope, Jim Smith had written across them, " * protect shipper on quality (ripe)." Petitioner testified that if this phrase had been on the documents, he did not see it, and if he had seen the phrase, he would not have understood it. Jim Smith had originally been promised $3,564.00 on Load 2051 in a telephone conversation with the ultimate recipient/receiver. He had based his June 6 offer and "deal" on June 7 with Petitioner for an expected gross to Petitioner of $1,734.04 in anticipation of the Respondents realizing the full amount of $3,564.00 from the receiver. Smith testified that when Load 2051 reached the receiver, it was rejected by the receiver due to the melons being overripe and hollow-hearted and that a federal inspection paid for by the receiver showed 15 percent to 40 percent of the samples were hollow hearted and the overall samples in the load was 25 percent, with bruising throughout but with the highest percentage in the lower layer of the piled watermelons, and some sunburn. He produced a federal inspection sheet dated June 10, 1992 (three days after the melons left Petitioner's field), covering an estimated sixteen hundred melons to the same effect. Respondent Smith had mailed this inspection sheet to Petitioner only in August 1992, with the final settlement documents and Respondents' check covering three loads, including Load 2051. The inspection sheet indicates "Midwest Marketing 2051" and "North Coast Brokerage, Cleveland, Ohio and carrier 39TR337-AL." The settlement sheets show the same trailer license number for Load 2051. (P-2) Smith also produced a bill of lading showing that North Coast Produce received carrier 39TR337 and rejected 15 melons cut for inspection, 238 melons bruised and racked, and seven decayed melons on June 10, 1992. The bill of lading shows 260 out of 1568 melons or roughly 17 percent of the load were rejected by the receiver. (R-5) Smith also produced a Norman's Brokerage invoice for shipping that trailer, for which shipping he says he paid $1,676.16, (R-4) and an invoice showing he was paid only $1,700.00 by the receiver for this load (R-2). Neither the receiver, the federal inspector, nor any trucker testified. Smith testified that after the receiver rejected some or all of Load 2051, he thought he would get at least $1,743.04 from the receiver but the receiver's check to him was rounded to only $1,700.00. The foregoing shows that Respondent Smith ultimately accepted, without dispute, the $1,700.00 paid him by the receiver which amount was less than 50 percent of the originally promised amount and which amount did not comport with a load that was at the worst only 15 percent to 40 percent bad as per the inspection report and which the bill of lading shows contained only 260 or 17 percent rejected melons. When Jim Smith totalled out the final settlement sheets for Petitioner in August 1992, Smith intended to deduct $1,676.16 for shipping and $108.00 as a "finder's fee" he had paid to independent contractor Bobby Patton from the $1,700.00 that he had actually been paid by the receiver, thus showing a net loss to Respondents on Load 2051 of $84.16. Instead, he explained Respondents' loss to Petitioner in the final August 1992 settlement documents as "original invoice $3,564.00, (meaning the originally anticipated revenues to Respondents) less actual receipts $1,743.04, (meaning the amount Smith had expected to receive after federal inspection and rejection of part of Load 2051 by the receiver, and not what Smith actually received from the receiver) for a balance of $1,820.96." Smith labelled that figure of $1,743.04 as "customer deducts" meaning it was Respondents' net loss due to actions of the receiver. He then deducted the $1,820.96 figure from the total amount owed by Respondents to Petitioner for three loads. Mr. Smith admitted he had no authority or justification per his agreement with Petitioner for deducting the finder's fee of $108.00 he paid to Bobby Patton or his additional loss of $43.04, which occurred when the recipient promised $1743.04 and paid $1700.00. He also admitted he had no authority per Respondents' agreement with Petitioner to deduct anything attributable to freight charges.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture enter a Final Order awarding Petitioner $1,820.96 on Load 2051 only and binding Respondents to pay the full amount, but which in South Carolina Insurance Company's case shall be only to the extent of its bond. RECOMMENDED this 5th day of August, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The De Soto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of August, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Greg Rushton 10940 N. Circle M Avenue Dunnellon, Florida 32630 James R. Smith Randall Smith Midwest Marketing Company Post Office Box 193 Vincennes, IN 47591 South Carolina Insurance Company 1501 Lady Street Columbia, SC 29201
Findings Of Fact Petitioners are growers of watermelons and qualify as "producers" under Section 604.15(5) F.S. Respondents Smith are broker-shippers of watermelons and qualify as "dealers" under Section 604.15(1) F.S. Respondent South Carolina Insurance Company is surety for Respondents Smith. Petitioners Brewton and Respondents Smith have had a good business relationship overall, including the 1992 growing season during which several loads of high quality watermelons were sold by the Brewtons through the Smiths. Of the several loads of melons sold, only one load, the one invoiced on June 18, 1992, is at issue. Regardless of oral agreements with varying conditions for other loads, the parties agreed as of June 18, 1992 that the load of June 18, 1992, invoice 2088, (R-5), would be paid for by Respondents Smith advancing harvest costs and agreeing to pay Petitioners for the load, minus the costs of harvesting, after Respondents had received payment from the recipient. At the time of loading, everyone concerned felt the June 18, 1992 load might have some problems with it, but every attempt was made to load only quality product. Petitioners and Respondents each had input on which specific melons were loaded. At that time, Mr. Rick Smith o/b/o Respondents Smith advised Mr. Dewey Brewton, III that because the quality of the load was borderline and as a result of its borderline condition the whole load could be rejected at its ultimate destination, Respondents Smith wanted Petitioners Brewton to protect the Respondents Smith on the quality of the melons. He also specifically advised Dewey Brewton, III that the whole load could be rejected. The parties then entered into an agreement, partly oral and partly written. Rick Smith and Dewey Brewton, III understood their agreement to mean that Petitioners would absorb any loss as a result of the quality of the watermelons from that point forward, but that Respondents would not come back against Petitioners for the costs Respondents had advanced on Petitioners' behalf or for the cost of the freight. To signify this, the words "grower protects shipper on quality" was written on the invoice. On or about June 22, 1992, Rick Smith informed Dewey Brewton, III that the entire June 18, 1992 load had been rejected by the first receiver. At that time, Dewey Brewton, III accepted Rick Smith's representation and did not require further proof of rejection at the first point of delivery or request an independent inspection at the first point of delivery. He also acquiesced in Respondents shopping around for a second buyer who might take all or some of the load originally sent out on June 18, 1992, and did not request the return of Petitioners' watermelons. At that time, Rick Smith also told Dewey Brewton, III that the load might have to be held on the truck a day or two to ripen some of the watermelons for a second point of delivery. He again indicated that the whole load could be rejected again when the load was sent on to a second receiver. Dewey Brewton, III specifically agreed to let the melons ripen "a day or so," and did not request any change in the grower protection plan initially agreed to between the parties. Respondents Smith were eventually able to market the melons to a second delivery point (consignee) in Michigan. That receiver complained that the melons started breaking down and he had to dump 735 melons. Pursuant to standard custom of the trade, Respondents accepted payment of $1,944.00 for the melons, subtracted $1,831.98 they had laid out in freight costs and also subtracted the $675.18 they had advanced on behalf of Petitioners to the harvester. Thus, Respondents sustained a net loss of $563.16. Respondents absorbed the $563.16 loss and did not require any repayment of harvesting costs advanced or any freight charges from Petitioners. Dewey Brewton, III testified that he originally understood that "grower protection" meant that Petitioners "would stand behind their quality product until the ultimate point," but that he had interpreted a comment by Mr. Rick Smith on June 22, 1992 to the effect that "the grower (Petitioners) agreed to 'ride' the watermelons and the shipper (Respondent) agreed to 'ride' the freight" to mean that the growers (Petitioners) no longer had any duty to cover their own losses on the June 18, 1992 load of watermelons after the first rejection and up to final sale to the second buyer. In light of Mr. Brewton's failure to change the written language concerning protection on the invoice, his knowledge from the day of initial shipment that the June 18, 1992 load was of dubious quality, his acceptance that the first recipient had rejected the load, and his agreement that Respondents could have a further waiting/ripening/shopping around period before ultimate sale, coupled with his knowledge from the very beginning that the June 18, 1992 load could be utterly rejected at any point so as to render the endeavor a complete loss to the Petitioners, Mr. Brewton's assumption that on June 22, 1992, Respondents Smith were voluntarily waiving their written agreement that "grower protects shipper on quality" was not reasonable. On June 22, 1992, the load had already been rejected once. At that stage, the outcome of the proposed sale was considerably more precarious than when the crop was loaded on June 18, 1992. It is also found Mr. Brewton's assumption that the agreement had been modified was not knowingly or intentionally induced by the Respondents and that the assumption was not contemporaneously conveyed to Respondents Smith so that they could disabuse Mr. Brewton of his error. Upon the foregoing, it is further found that the written initial agreement that "grower protects shipper on quality" was not altered on June 22, 1992 but continued in force.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED That the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's complaint. RECOMMENDED this 26th day of March, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Brenda D. Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Jacquelyn J. Brewton 8876 NW 115th Avenue Ocala, FL 34482 Dewey Brewton III 8876 NW 115th Avenue Ocala, FL 34482 Richard L. Smith Midwest Marketing Company P. O. Box 193 Vincennes, IN 47591 South Carolina Insurance Company Legal Department 1501 Lade Street Columbia, SC 29201-0000
The Issue Whether the Respondent, Ronald Justice, is indebted to the complainants, James M. O'Dell, Jr., and Ronald Lewis, d/b/a O'Dell & Lewis Farms.
Findings Of Fact This cause is being considered pursuant to Chapter 604, Florida Statutes, which establishes procedure for settlement of controversies between Florida produce farmers and dealers involved with farmers' products. James M. O'Dell, Jr. and Ronald Lewis filed a complaint against Ronald Justice contending that the Respondent had not paid for two loads of watermelons as follows: May 27, 1977, invoice number 387664, 46,640 lbs Grey Watermelons at 4 cents per lb. totaling $1,865.60 May 29, 1977, invoice number 387670, 43,910 lbs Grey Watermelons at 4 cents per lb. totaling $1,756.40 The Petitioners contend, "Mr. Justice placed this order over the telephone, at which time the price had been agreed upon. He sent his own truck and his own driver to pick up these watermelons. The trucks were loaded according to his instructions while his own drivers were present and observed the loading. We had sold watermelons from this same field prior to these and the same day as well as after these dates and there had been no problem with quality. These watermelons were produced here by us at Oxford, Florida. We had expected payment within a few days after arrival, when he was expected to wire money to our bank. Thus far he has not sent this money which is for the above load while previous loads have been paid for." Respondent contends "As the Respondent in this case I wish to state again that I cannot ignore the first load of melons involved, (which I readily paid for sight unseen) as settled even though O'Dell and Lewis wish to ignore it as they had no grievance in the first load transaction. As my own personal affidavit states and as the affidavit of the driver John Braziel, supports; the first load was the greenest of the three loads which it naturally would be as it was clipped from the vine before the next two loads, also it was the inspection of the first load and the second load that made me feel justified that I had paid O'Dell and Lewis an appropriate sum of money until I was more certain how I could come out financially in the freight, sorting and handling of their melons, also please bear in mind that I suffered a business reputation damage that I am now willing to forego in an effort to settle this matter." The Petitioners sold the Respondent three loads of watermelons. Respondent's drivers loaded the watermelons on or near the farm of Petitioners. The first load was paid for and is not a part of the complaint of the Petitioners. The second and third loads ordered by the Respondent and filled by the Petitioners are the points of controversy. The watermelons were delivered to the Respondent in Mississippi where he had sold them to various stores. He stated that of the first load which he bought from the Petitioners that he could use but 50 percent inasmuch as the watermelons were unripe. He states that of the second load 30 percent of the watermelons were unripe and could not be used and that of the third load 25 percent of the watermelons were unripe and could not be used. He states that he was compelled to dump the part of the watermelons that could not be used and so dumped them. He contends that his loss on the first load was $1,640.34; that his loss on the second load was $356.80; and that his loss on the third load was $298.58 for a total loss on the three loads from the Petitioners of $2,295.72 actual money out of pocket. Mr. Justice states that he intended to cancel the third load inasmuch as a large percentage of the first two loads were unripe, but that it was his understanding by a telephone call to the Petitioner Ronald Lewis that Lewis had the intention of standing behind his loss and that therefore he did not cancel the order for the third load. The Petitioners claim that the watermelons were loaded into trucks sent there by the Respondent with his drivers, each of whom inspected the watermelons at the time of loading. They contend that no more than 1 percent of the watermelons loaded were unripe. They also contend that had the Respondent employed a certified inspector to inspect the watermelons at the point of delivery and the inspector had stated that the watermelons were unripe that they would have accepted the inspector's report, but that no inspection was made. Affidavits from the truck drivers who were not growers or inspectors were submitted. Each stated that a large percentage of the watermelons were not ripe.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent be required to pay the Petitioners $3,622.00 for the watermelons purchased from the Petitioners. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Ronald Justice 500 South Main Street Dermott, Arkansas 71638 James A. O'Dell, Jr., and Ronald Lewis d/b/a O'Dell & Lewis Farms Post Office Box 268 Oxford, Florida
The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to $7,433.00, or any part thereof, from Respondent on the basis of a brokered sale of watermelons?
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner Terry McCully was a first-year independent grower of Sangria watermelons in Jasper, Florida. Respondent is a professional broker of produce. On June 13, 1999, Petitioner and Nolan Mancil, known to Petitioner as a watermelon buyer from Georgia representing Respondent, "walked" Petitioner's sole field. On June 13, 1999, Petitioner and Mr. Mancil agreed that Respondent would pay 10¢ per pound for watermelons from Petitioner's sole field of watermelons. However, Petitioner also understood that ultimately, his payment would be based on whatever the "market price" was, per load. Petitioner had no prior experience with how "market price" is defined or determined. At all times material, Nolan Mancil was acting as an agent of Respondent, and regardless of the extent of the authority actually authorized by Respondent, Mr. Mancil had, with Respondent's concurrence, apparent authority for all agreements reached with Petitioner. According to Respondent's President, Mr. Ward, the standard in the industry is that no value is placed on an agricultural commodity until a final price is determined with the ultimate consumer/retailer. Respondent produced business records tracking each of the six loads harvested from Petitioner's field (including the four loads in dispute) and showing the accepted weights for each load. According to Mr. Mancil, "market price" is "zero," unless some amount is paid by the retailer to the broker on delivery and the amount paid on delivery constitutes "the market price." He denied ever telling Petitioner that their oral contract would use the United States Department of Agriculture National Watermelon Report (USDA Report) to specifically set a daily market price, although he admitted that at a later point in time, under changed conditions (see Finding of Fact No. 19) he had told Petitioner that the USDA Daily Report could be the maximum price. Petitioner conceded that he received the USDA Report from the Department of Agriculture Extension Agent only after a dispute arose and Petitioner had begun to prepare his claim. The undersigned infers therefrom that Petitioner was only aware of this methodology of setting a market price "after the fact." On Monday, June 14, 1999, Nolan Mancil's harvesters and graders entered Petitioner's field. Petitioner agreed to pay for the harvesting by Respondent's deduction of harvesting costs from each load after sale to the ultimate buyer, but at this point Petitioner also expected Respondent to pay him by the load, each load, immediately after sale at the ultimate point of sale (FOB). On Tuesday, June 15, 1999, trucks hired by Mr. Mancil and/or Respondent began removing watermelons from Petitioner's field. On that day, Mr. Mancil indicated that the watermelons being loaded were worth only 8-1/2¢ per pound. Petitioner agreed to the change in the amount to be paid. At some point, Petitioner accommodated Mr. Mancil by getting a truck, driver, and loaders, and by feeding Mr. Mancil's crew members. Petitioner seeks no reimbursement for these accommodations. Respondent took two truckloads away on June 15, 1999. Load #3664 of 46,340 pounds "shipped weight" and 45,830 pounds "accepted weight" were brokered by Respondent to a retailer at 8¢ per pound. Load #3692 of 48,060 shipped weight and 43,392 pounds accepted weight were brokered to a retailer at 9¢ per pound. Respondent's business records show that on the first (undisputed) load, the sale to a retailer was contracted by Respondent at 8¢ per pound, but when the time came to settle- up, the payment was made by Respondent's retail customer at the small melon size (13-plus pounds), not at the medium or large melon size. Respondent's business records further show that the second (undisputed) load was contracted at 9¢ per pound but was ultimately paid-out at the average weight per melon of 15.4 pounds instead of at 19.2 pounds per melon, after an initial rejection by the first buyer. No brokerage fee was imposed by Respondent on either of these undisputed loads, and on each of these loads, Respondent suffered a substantial loss. These losses were not passed on to Petitioner due to their "immediate cash payment" arrangement. Respondent immediately paid Petitioner for both loads at the agreed rate of 8-1/2¢ per pound, less harvesting costs and mandatory government fee. Petitioner does not dispute deduction of the government fee from the first two loads. Indeed, Petitioner's claim does not address the amount, method, or appropriateness of Respondent's payment to Petitioner for these first two loads. Petitioner's claim only addresses the last four loads harvested after June 15, 1999. After the first two loads, Mr. Mancil informed Petitioner that Respondent could no longer pay Petitioner in cash immediately after each load, but would henceforth pay Petitioner within 30 days. There is no dispute that Petitioner reluctantly agreed to this change in the timing of payment. Mr. Mancil claimed that he told Petitioner, either beginning with the third load or sometime between the third and fourth loads, that the USDA Report's daily price would be the highest price Petitioner could be paid by Respondent. According to Mr. Ward, over the four loads in dispute, the price received by Respondent from retailers was 7¢ per pound adjusted downward due to market conditions such as watermelon size being less than expected, smaller watermelons being in less demand, and the watermelons being in poor condition when accepted by the retailer(s). According to Mr. Ward, the net weight of a load is determined by deducting the truck's empty weight from the loaded weight of the truck; then the melons in the truck are counted, and that count is divided into the net weight, to get the average weight per melon. Petitioner maintained that he was never advised by Mr. Ward or Mr. Mancil that the watermelons in the last four loads were the wrong size or that many melons were not good. Mr. Mancil stated that he believed he had indicated to Petitioner that the watermelons in the last four truckloads were actually smaller than the size anticipated when the deal was struck on June 13, 1999, and that the watermelons were of poorer quality. He conceded that he was not sure Petitioner had understood him. There is no dispute that Petitioner's field was rather overgrown or that watermelons could be harvested despite this overgrowth. The overgrowth could have obscured the size and condition of the watermelons until after harvest. After the sixth load, neither Respondent nor Mr. Mancil sent any more trucks. There was never an agreement that Respondent would buy all the watermelons in Petitioner's field. Petitioner found it necessary to obtain trucks himself to haul away and dump the remaining watermelons which were rotting in his field. He seeks no reimbursement for this expense. Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, I also find that the watermelons in the last four loads were smaller and inferior in quality to what had been expected. On June 16, 1999, 42,140 pounds shipped weight of watermelons were loaded by Respondent from Petitioner's field in Load #3691. Petitioner is claiming 7¢ per pound on the basis of a USDA Report on every pound for $2,879.00, less harvesting costs of $781.00 for $2,098.00. On June 17, 1999, 43,500 shipped weight of watermelons were loaded by Respondent from Petitioner's field in Load #3685. Petitioner is claiming 6¢ per pound on the basis of a USDA Report for every pound for $2,610.00, less harvesting costs of $826.00 for $1,784.00. The same day, 43,620 shipped weight of watermelons were loaded by Respondent from Petitioner's field in Load #3694. Petitioner is claiming 6¢ per pound on the basis of a USDA Report for every pound for $2,617.20, less harvesting costs of $830.00 for $1,787.20. Either on June 20, 21, or 22, 1999 (the dates on exhibits conflict), 43,000 shipped weight of watermelons were loaded by Respondent from Petitioner's field in Load #3702. Petitioner is claiming 6¢ per pound on the basis of a USDA Report for every pound less harvesting costs of $817.00 for $1,763.00. Petitioner bases the price per pound that he is claiming on his Exhibit P-6, the USDA Reports for June 17-18, and 21, 1999. He did not select from those reports the price per largest average weight of Sangria watermelon, but selected the middle or lowest average weight of "other red meat varieties." Except for June 21, 1999, this calculation gives Respondent the benefit of the doubt as to cents per pound for average market price on the respective USDA Reports, but in light of all the other evidence it is not an accurate method of calculating the true market price for the four disputed loads. Although Petitioner considers payment on the first two (undisputed) loads based on accepted weight to be within the parties' agreement and correct, he has not made his calculations of claim on the accepted weight of any of the last four (disputed) loads. Petitioner's calculations of claim also have not addressed the mandatory government fee for any of the last four (disputed) loads, although he considers payment on the first two, (undisputed) loads, for which Respondent deducted the mandatory fee, to be within the parties' agreement and correct. According to Respondent's business records for the four loads shipped after the Mancil-Petitioner re-negotiations of price per pound and discussion on maximum market pricing, these disputed loads were sold to retailers as follows: On June 16, 1999, Load #3691 had a shipped weight of 41,140 pounds and accepted weight of 39,940 pounds. The sale price was $0.055 per pound. The sale amount was $2,196.70. The government fee was $7.99. The harvesting cost was $781.00. A brokerage fee of $399.40 was subtracted, and Respondent's debt to Petitioner was calculated as $1,008.31. On June 17, 1999, Load #3685 had a shipped weight of 43,500 pounds and an accepted weight of 43,280 pounds. The watermelons were originally contracted for retail sale at $.0635 per pound but were refused by the first retailer as undersized. The second, alternative retailer bought these watermelons at a smaller-size market price for melons averaging 18 pounds, instead of 19.5- pound melons, and also made some returns of bad watermelons, so that the sale amount ended-up as $973.80, less a $8.66 government fee, less $826.00 for harvesting, less $216.40 brokerage fee, so that even Petitioner lost $77.26 on the deal. Also on June 17, 1999, Load #3694 had a shipped weight of 43,620 pounds and an accepted weight of 42,848 pounds. The contract sale had been for watermelons averaging 19.3 pounds, and the average size turned to out to be 16.7 pounds, and some of these melons were returned. The ultimate sale amount was $1,692.50, less a government fee of $8.72, less harvesting costs of $830.00, less brokerage fee of $321.36, with Respondent owing Petitioner $532.42. Finally, on or about June 22, 1999, the final load, #3702, had a shipped weight of 43,000 pounds, and accepted weight of 41,157 pounds, for a sale amount of $832.00; a government fee of $8.60; harvesting costs of $817.00; brokerage fee of $200.00; and amount due to Petitioner of $193.60. Again, the contract price of 6¢ from the retailer had been negotiated on melons in good condition of an average weight of 19.6 pounds, and the watermelons actually delivered by Respondent from Petitioner's field averaged 16.8 pounds, and many melons were returned to Respondent based on lack of quality. On the foregoing calculations, Respondent admits to owing Petitioner $1,269.87, rather than the $7,433.00 claimed by Petitioner's calculations. Neither party presented any evidence of an agreement to deduct a brokerage fee or how a brokerage fee was to be calculated. No brokerage fee was deducted by Respondent for the first two loads which are not in dispute, but Respondent actually suffered a loss on those loads which was not passed on to Petitioner (See Finding of Fact No. 14). For the last four loads, the only loads in dispute and the only loads for which a brokerage fee was deducted, the brokerage fee constitutes the only profit made by Respondent on the entire six-load transaction.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture enter a final order requiring Respondent Growers Marketing Service, Inc. to pay Petitioner $1,269.87, plus interest, if any, to be calculated by the Department, and requiring that if Growers Marketing Service, Inc., does not pay the amount specified within 30 days of the final order that its surety, Preferred National Insurance Company, shall be liable to Petitioner for the full amount. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Terry McCully 3245 Northwest 30th Lane Jennings, Florida 33806 William R. Ward, Jr., President Growers Marketing Service, Inc. Post Office Box 2595 Lakeland, Florida 33806 Preferred National Insurance Company Post Office Box 407003 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of License and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents owe Petitioner $13,512.09 for watermelons, as alleged in the Amended Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made. Cook Brown Farms is a melon farm in Punta Gorda, Florida. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Cook Brown Farms was a "producer" as defined in Subsection 604.15(5), Florida Statutes, of agricultural products in the State of Florida. Melons come within the definition of "agricultural products" as defined in Subsection 604.15(3), Florida Statutes. J.G.L. Produce is a Florida Corporation, owned by John W. Johnson, Jr., and located in Pompano Beach, Florida. At times pertinent to this proceeding, J.G.L. Produce was licensed as a "dealer in agricultural products" as defined in Subsection 604.15(1), Florida Statutes. Andrew J. Cook, a principal owner of Cook Brown Farms, and Mr. Johnson of J.G.L. Produce entered into an oral agreement regarding the sale of watermelons grown at Cook Brown Farms. The core of this case is a dispute concerning the nature of this agreement. Mr. Cook testified that, under the agreement, J.G.L. Produce would purchase the melons at the farm at their daily market price, plus 1/2 cent to cover Cook Brown Farms' cost of picking, sorting, and placing the melons in special bins and in special pallets required by the ultimate purchaser, Kroger Supermarkets. J.G.L. Produce would provide the bins and pallets and would provide the trucks to ship the melons. Mr. Johnson testified that the agreement was not for purchase but for brokerage of the melons. J.G.L. Produce would act as broker of Cook Brown Farms' watermelons, use its best efforts to sell the melons at the highest price available, and pay Cook Brown Farms the proceeds of the sale, minus expenses and a brokerage fee of one cent per pound. Mr. Johnson testified that J.G.L. Produce never took title to or purchased the melons, and that the risk of loss always remained on Cook Brown Farms. Mr. Johnson testified that he approached Mr. Cook about the melons because he had a ready buyer in another local dealer, Delk Produce, which had a longstanding arrangement to provide melons to Kroger. Mr. Johnson agreed with Mr. Cook that the arrangement included the provision of bins and pallets by J.G.L. Produce, though Mr. Johnson stated that the arrangement also called for J.G.L. Produce to retain $0.015 per pound from the amount paid to Cook Brown Farms to cover the cost of the bins and pallets. J.G.L. Produce took approximately 24 truck loads of watermelons from Cook Brown Farms. J.G.L. Produce deducted a one cent per pound brokerage fee from each load of melons it took, except for certain loads noted below, without contemporaneous objection from Cook Brown Farms. The Amended Complaint claims that J.G.L. Produce owes money to Cook Brown Farms for five of the loads taken by J.G.L. Produce. In sum, the Amended Complaint states that J.G.L. Produce owes Cook Brown Farms $19,991.74 for the five loads, less $6,479.65 already paid, for a total owing of $13,512.09. Item One of the Amended Complaint alleges that J.G.L. Produce owes $4,438.54 for a load of 38,596 pounds at a price of $0.115 per pound, sold on April 20, 2000. Item Two of the Amended Complaint alleges that J.G.L. Produce owes $4,625.30 for a load of 40,220 pounds at a price of $0.115 per pound, sold on April 21, 2000. The Amended Complaint alleges that the melons on these two loads were inspected and approved for shipment during loading by Delk Produce employee Freddie Ellis. The Amended Complaint states that Cook Brown Farms was paid in full for the loads on May 3, 2000, but that the contested amounts were deducted from subsequent settlements by J.G.L. Produce. The evidence established that the melons claimed under Item One were initially sold to Delk Produce for delivery to Kroger. On May 3, 2000, J.G.L. Produce paid Cook Brown Farms the amount of $4,438.54, which constituted the price for 38,596 pounds of melons at $0.125 per pound, less $385.96 for the one cent per pound brokerage fee. Jay Delk, the principal of Delk Produce, testified that this load was rejected by Kroger's buyer in Virginia due to "freshness," meaning that the melons were unsuitably green. Mr. Delk stated that the melons were taken to North Carolina to ripen and eventually sold at $0.06 per pound. The final return on this load, less the brokerage fee, was $1,543.84. In its final settlement with Cook Brown Farms on May 26, 2000, J.G.L. Produce deducted the difference between the original payment of $4,438.54 and the final payment of $1,543.84. The evidence established that the melons claimed under Item Two were initially sold to Delk Produce. On May 3, 2000, J.G.L. Produce paid Cook Brown Farms the amount of $5,809.80, which constituted the price for 50,520 pounds of watermelons at $0.125 per pound, less $505.20 for the one cent per pound brokerage fee. Seminole Produce purchased 10,300 pounds of this load at $0.145 per pound, or $1,493.50. The remainder of the load was rejected by Kroger due to freshness and had to be resold at a lesser price of $0.0346 per pound, or $1,391.00. In its final settlement with Cook Brown Farms on May 26, 2000, J.G.L. Produce deducted the difference between the original payment of $5,809.80 and the final payment (after deduction of the brokerage fee) of $2,576.11. The evidence established that the melons claimed under Item Three were sold to Delk Produce. On May 9, 2000, J.G.L. Produce paid Cook Brown Farms the amount of $2,731.30, which constituted the price for 42,020 pounds of watermelons at $0.0675 per pound, less $105.05 for the brokerage fee, reduced to $0.0025 per pound. Mr. Johnson testified that he decided to forego the full brokerage fee to save money for Mr. Cook and his farm, because it was "hurting" due to the rapidly plummeting price for watermelons. Mr. Johnson discovered at this time that Delk Produce had not been retaining the agreed- upon $0.015 per pound to cover the cost of bins and pallets and decided not to lose any more money on that item. In its final settlement with Cook Brown Farms on May 26, 2000, J.G.L. Produce deducted the difference between the original payment of $2,731.30 and $2,206.05, deducting $525.25 from the original payment to cover the cost of the bins and pallets. The evidence established that the melons claimed under Items Four and Five were originally shipped to Wal-Mart in Kentucky on April 29, 2000, and were rejected on the ground that the melons were not packed to specifications. The melons were trucked back to Florida at J.G.L. Produce's expense. The melons claimed under Item Four totaled 41,100 pounds. J.G.L. Produce divided the melons into four loads and sold them to four local dealers at an average price of $0.775 per pound, totaling $3,185.41. J.G.L. Produce deducted its $0.015 charge for bins and pallets, reducing the total to $2,671.51. J.G.L. Produce then deducted $1,750.00 from the total as reimbursement for the freight charge it paid to bring the melons back to Florida after their rejection by Wal-Mart. J.G.L. Produce did not include a brokerage fee. On May 26, 2000, J.G.L. Produce paid the remaining $921.51 to Cook Brown Farms as part of the final settlement. The melons claimed under Item Five totaled 45,600 pounds. J.G.L. Produce sold 2,426 pounds to Seminole Produce at $0.10 per pound, or $242.60. J.G.L. Produce sold the remaining 43,174 pounds to Belle Glade Produce at $0.065 per pound, or $2,800. From the total for Item Five, J.G.L. Produce deducted its $0.015 charge for bins and pallets and $1,950.00 for the freight charge it paid to bring the melons back to Florida after their rejection by Wal-Mart. J.G.L. Produce did not include a brokerage fee on this load of melons. On May 26, 2000, J.G.L. Produce paid the remaining $416.64 to Cook Brown Farms as part of the final settlement. The weight of the credible evidence, excluding the hearsay that was not supported by the direct testimony of Mr. Johnson, leads to the finding that there was a brokerage arrangement between the parties. J.G.L. Produce routinely deducted brokerage fees from its payments, without objection by Cook Brown Farms. This course of dealing strongly indicates a brokerage arrangement. Mr. Cook testified as to prior dealings with J.G.L. Produce, which also involved a brokerage arrangement. The evidence indicated that J.G.L. Produce fully accounted for the five loads of melons at issue, and paid Cook Brown Farms the full amounts due and owing for those loads.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order dismissing the Amended Complaint filed by Gin Brown Matthews, d/b/a Cook Brown Farms. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Redland Insurance Company 222 South 15th Street, Suite 600, North Omaha, Nebraska 65102 Brenda D. Hyatt, Bureau Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 508 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 John W. Johnson, President Post Office Box 1123 Pompano Beach, Florida 33061 Harold M. Stevens, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1440 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Edward L. Myrick, Jr., Esquire Beighley & Myrick, P.A. 1255 West Atlantic Boulevard Suite F-2 Pompano Beach, Florida 33069 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Honorable Terry L. Rhodes Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
