The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Frank W. Fender, should have received a passing grade on the March 1997 Clinical Chemistry Technologist examination.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Frank W. Fender, took the Clinical Chemistry Technologist examination in March 1997 (hereinafter referred to as the "Examination"). The Examination consists of fifty multiple choice questions. The instructions for the Examination specifically informed persons taking the examination that they were to "[a]lways choose the BEST answer." It was determined that Mr. Fender had answered twenty- seven of the Examination questions correctly. Mr. Fender was, therefore, awarded a score of 349. A score of 350 or more was required for a passing score. If Mr. Fender were determined to have answered one more question correctly, he would receive a passing score. Mr. Fender was informed that he had not passed the Examination. By letter dated July 25, 1997, Mr. Fender requested a formal administrative hearing to contest his failing score. In particular, Mr. Fender challenged the determination that he did not answer questions 3, 9, 16, and 21 correctly. Question 3: Question 3 involved obtaining "true serum triglyceride results." Mr. Fender selected answer "D" which was: "measure a blank in which the dye-coupling is omitted." The answer considered correct was "B." The evidence failed to prove that answer "D" was the best answer. While the use of blanks in triglyceride methodologies is correct, "dye-coupling" is not. Therefore, answer "D" is not a correct response. The evidence failed to prove that answer "D" was the best answer for question 3. Question 9: Question 9 asks which enzyme listed in the answers is found to be elevated in the majority of alcoholics. Mr. Fender selected "B," ALT, as the correct response. The evidence failed to prove that answer "B" was the best answer. While ALT may be raised in an alcoholic, it also may not be. GGT is the most sensitive indicator of alcoholism. Even if ALT is normal, GGT will be raised in an alcoholic. The best answer to question 9 was, therefore, "C," GGT. The evidence failed to prove that answer "B" was the best answer to question 9. Question 16: Question 16 asks why one must wait approximately 8 hours to draw a blood sample after administering an oral dose of digoxin. Mr. Fender selected "D" as the correct response. This answer indicates that the reason one must wait is because "all" of the digoxin "will be in the cellular fraction." Mr. Fender's response was not the best response because of the use of the work "all" in the answer he selected. The most digoxin that could be in the cellular fraction is approximately twenty-five percent, because approximately seventy-five percent is excreted through the kidneys. The evidence failed to prove that answer "D" was the best answer to question 16. Question 21: Question 21 asks the best way to test for suspected genetic abnormalities in an unborn fetus. Mr. Fender selected answer "B," "performing L/S ratios" as the best answer. While the evidence proved that L/S ratios will measure immature fetal lungs, this condition results in respiratory distress syndrome. Respiratory distress syndrome is an "acquired" disorder and not a "genetic" abnormality. While an L/S ratio can be used to test for acquired disorders, a "chromosome analysis," answer "C," is used to test for genetic abnormalities. The evidence failed to prove that answer "B" was the best answer to question 21. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Fender should have received a score higher than 349 on the Examination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Health dismissing Frank W. Fender's challenge to the grade awarded to him on the March 1997 Clinical Chemistry Technologist examination. DONE AND ORDERED this 2nd day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Frank W. Fender 7603 North Laura Street Jacksonville, Florida 32208 Anne Marie Williamson, Esquire Department of Health Office of the General Counsel 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 6, Room 106 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Dr. James Howell, Secretary Department of Health 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 6, Room 306 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Pete Peterson Department of Health 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 6, Room 102-E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Respondent failed to maintain the qualification set forth in Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, requiring a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida to have good moral character by unlawfully being in actual or constructive possession of cocaine on or about May 9, 1988, and by introducing cocaine into her body on or about that date.
Findings Of Fact On November 15, 1974, the State of Florida, acting through Petitioner, certified Respondent as a law enforcement officer. Certificate number 02-11734 was duly issued to Respondent by Petitioner. Respondent is a sworn police officer who has been employed as an investigator in the Special Investigations Unit of the Dade County School System for over 14 years. The Special Investigations Unit is a law enforcement agency consisting of approximately 56 sworn officers whose duties include follow-up investigations on internal issues and the investigation of crimes that are committed on School Board property. There is also a uniformed division which patrols certain of the schools in the Dade County system. The sworn officers of the Special Investigation Unit are required to be certified by Petitioner even though they are employed by the Dade County School Board as School Board employees. The sworn officers of the Special Investigation Unit are represented for collective bargaining purposes with the Dade County School Board by the Police Benevolent Association. The labor contract that was negotiated on behalf of Respondent and her fellow sworn officers of the Special Investigative Unit require that each sworn officer take an annual physical to include the giving of a urine sample from the officer to be analyzed for the presence of controlled substances. Respondent was directed by her employer to present herself on May 9, 1988, for an annual physical examination at Mount Sinai Medical Center. Respondent was aware that an annual physical, including a drug test would be required of her. She was given over two weeks advance notice of the exact date the physical examination would occur. On May 9, 1988, Respondent reported to Mount Sinai Medical Center to submit to the annual physical examination required by her employer. She was given a small sterile sample bottle in which she produced a sample of her urine as instructed. Nurse Cheryl Cain, the Mount Sinai employee responsible for the collection of the urine sample from Respondent, received the urine sample from Respondent and promptly divided the urine sample into two smaller sterile bottles and sealed each of the smaller bottles with its cap and with evidence tape. Nurse Cain followed Mount Sinai's procedures in collecting and sealing the urine sample. The sealed bottles containing Respondent's urine sample were labeled so that each bottle was identified as containing Respondent's urine sample. An identifying series of numbers, referred to as that bottle's bar code, was placed on each of the bottles. Bar code number 118856 was placed on one bottle and bar code number 110783 was placed on the other bottle. The two bottles were then placed in a locked box. On May 9, 1988, the sealed bottles containing Respondent's urine sample were picked up by an employee of Toxicology Testing Service and transported to the facilities of Toxicology Testing Service in Dade County, Florida. Mount Sinai used adequate procedures to ensure that Respondent's urine sample was properly labeled, that the chain of custody was properly maintained, and that the two specimen bottles could not be tampered with without detection. On May 19, 1988, sample bottle 118856 was opened by a laboratory analyst employed by Toxicology Testing Service. A small sample of Respondent's urine sample, referred to as an aliquot, was removed from sample bottle 118856 with a sterile disposable plastic pipette and placed in a sterile disposable cup for analysis. The aliquot of Respondent's urine sample was introduced into the analyzer equipment used by Toxicology Testing Service to screen the sample for the possible presence of controlled substances. The sample screened positive for a cocaine metabolite, which is a metabolized derivative of cocaine created by the natural processing of cocaine by the human body. This screening procedure, known as an emit test, produced a result of 71 on the first screening and a 69 when a separate aliquot from sample 118856 was tested. The emit test is conducted using an Hitachi 705 machine, a piece of equipment that is widely used in the industry. As calibrated, a score of 50 is considered a positive score for cocaine. The purpose of the emit test is to screen those samples that will be later analyzed by gas chromatography mass spectrometry method of testing urine samples. A confirmatory analysis of the sample was then conducted utilizing the gas chromatography mass spectrometry method of testing urine samples. This method is over 99.99% accurate and is the accepted method among toxicologists for identifying drugs and their metabolites. The confirmatory analysis confirmed that Respondent's urine sample was positive for the presence of a cocaine metabolite that can only be produced through the ingestion of cocaine. Subsequent testing on June 3, 1988, by Toxicology Testing Services of aliquots from sample bottle 110783, followed the same procedures as those followed for the analysis of aliquots from sample bottle 118856 and produced similar, positive results for the presence of the cocaine metabolite. Toxicology Testing Service used adequate procedures to ensure that Respondent's urine sample was properly identified, that the chain of custody was properly maintained, and that sample bottle 118856 and sample bottle 110783 had not been tampered with. The testing procedures followed by Toxicology Testing Service are widely accepted in the industry. The equipment used by Toxicology Testing Service was in proper working order. The procedures followed in the taking of Respondent's urine sample and in the subsequent analysis of the aliquots from Respondent's urine sample were consistent with the procedures set forth in Rule 11B-27.00225, Florida Administrative Code, which is entitled "Controlled Substance Testing Procedures". Respondent denies that she has ever used or has unlawfully possessed cocaine. Respondent handles cocaine from time to time in the execution of her official responsibilities, but she was unable to point to an incident that may have produced the positive test results through incidental contact with cocaine. Although samples of the currency in use in South Florida have tested positive for the presence of cocaine, Respondent would not have ingested sufficient quantities of cocaine from currency to produce the level of the cocaine metabolite reflected by the testing. On May 23, 1988, Respondent was advised by her supervisor that she had tested positive for cocaine. Respondent immediately gave another urine sample that tested negative for cocaine. Respondent had attended training sessions that taught that cocaine usually cleared the human body after 72 hours. This is a misconception. The speed with which the cocaine metabolite clears the human system depends on many variable factors, including the general physical condition of the person involved, the amounts of liquids consumed by the person, and the amount of exercise by the person. Cocaine metabolite can be detected in the human body more than 72 hours after its ingestion. Respondent failed to offer any plausible explanation for the positive results of cocaine being detected in her system that would permit any conclusion other than the conclusion that she had voluntarily ingested cocaine. Respondent has been an exemplary employee since her initial employment with the Special Investigative Unit. She has never been suspected of drug use by her superiors. None of her fellow officers ever reported that they suspected Respondent of drug use. Respondent has had several commendations during her term of service. Her performance evaluations have always been satisfactory or higher. Based on the charges involved in the pending proceeding, the Dade County School Board suspended Respondent's employment and instituted proceedings to discharge her from its employ. Following an administrative hearing, the hearing officer (who was not employed by or assigned by the Division of Administrative Hearings) found that the drug tests that found the positive results for cocaine were not reliable and recommended that Respondent be reinstated to her employment. The finding by the previous hearing officer that the tests were not reliable is not binding here and is contrary to the greater weight of the evidence in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission, enter a final order which finds that Respondent failed to maintained good moral character and which further revokes the certification of Respondent as a law enforcement officer. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of January, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUD B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 H. T. Smith, Esquire 1017 N.W. 9th Court Miami, Florida 33136 Jeffrey Long, Director Department of Law Enforcement Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rodney Gaddy, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's employment with Petitioner as a school bus driver should be terminated because he violated his rehabilitation contract and Petitioner's drug-free workplace policy and guidelines by testing positive for cocaine.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida public school district. Respondent was employed by Petitioner as a school bus driver for about ten years and three months prior to his suspension without pay in the summer of 1996. The position of school bus driver is a safety-sensitive position. In June of 1989, Petitioner adopted a drug-free workplace policy. Petitioner directed its superintendent to develop guidelines to implement the policy. In December of 1991, Petitioner adopted Drug-Free Workplace Guidelines, GBCBA-G, which state as follows in pertinent part: The purpose of these guidelines is to comply with the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, 34 CFR Part 85, Subpart F, which requires grantees to certify that they will maintain a drug-free workplace. * * * Pre-employment Drug Abuse Screening examinations shall be required to prevent hiring individuals who use drugs or individuals whose use of drugs indicates a potential for impaired or unsafe job performance or for high risk positions such as bus drivers. Employees in job classification which require an annual physical will be required to submit to a drug screening as part of the annual physical. As a condition of continued employment, current employees shall submit to drug screening when reasonable suspicion exists to believe that an employee is using a substance that is impairing the employee and/or his job performance . . . . * * * All testing shall be conducted by a laboratory certified by the State of Florida as a Medical and Urine Drug Testing Forensic Laboratory which complies with the Scientific and Technical Guidelines for Federal Drug Testing Programs and the Standards for Certification of Laboratories engaged in Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration of the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services . . . . The procedures established by the laboratory shall be followed in administering drug tests to employees. * * * Employees who return to work after completion of a rehabilitation program shall be subject to follow-up drug testing with twenty-four hour notification . . . . Random testing of employees shall not be conducted. Respondent signed a notice to all applicants and employees on April 15, 1992, advising him in advance that the drug-free workplace policy would become effective on June 15, 1992. This notice stated as follows: All pre-employment applicants will be drug-tested prior to being hired. All employees who require fitness-of-duty examination will be drug-tested at least once annually. An employee will be drug-tested when reasonable suspicion of substance abuse exists. An employee will be drug-tested following any work-related accident or mishap involving actual or potential injury or property damage. An employee will be drug-tested during any probationary period following a drug- related suspension or approved drug treatment program. Petitioner acknowledged that he received a copy of the drug-free workplace policy and understood the consequences of violating the drug-free workplace guidelines by signing the notice. The notice clearly states that failure to comply with the guidelines could result in termination of employment and forfeiture of eligibility for workers' compensation medical and indemnity benefits. The guidelines for the drug-free workplace policy are a part of Petitioner's Collective Bargaining Agreement with the instructional and non-instructional bargaining units of the Alachua County Education Association (ACEA). The ACEA ratified the policy and guidelines in January of 1993. The Petitioner's drug-free workplace policy and guidelines have been continuously in effect since that time. Article XI, Section 1(B) of the 1995-1996 Collective Bargaining Agreement between Petitioner and the ACEA requires Petitioner to provide school bus drivers with an annual physical as required by the rules of the State Board of Education. Appendix F of the 1995-1996 Collective Bargaining Agreement sets forth the drug-free workplace guidelines. It states as follows in pertinent part: The purpose of these guidelines is to comply with the Drug-free Workplace Act of 1988, 34 CFR Part 85, Subpart F, which requires grantees to certify that they will maintain a drug-free workplace. * * * Pre-employment Drug Abuse Screening examinations shall be required to prevent hiring individuals who use drugs or individuals whose use of drugs indicates a potential for impaired or unsafe job performance or for high risk positions such as bus drivers. * * * Employees in job classifications which require an annual physical will be required to submit to a drug screening as part of the annual physical. * * * As a condition of continued employment, current employees shall submit to drug screening when reasonable suspicion exists to believe that an employee is using a substance that is impairing the employee and/or his job performance . . . . * * * When a reasonable suspicion exists, the Director of Employee Relations shall be contacted. The employee, if a member of a bargaining unit, shall be afforded the opportunity to have ACEA representation. The employee will be provided an opportunity to explain his/her condition. The employee will be provided with information regarding available drug counseling, rehabilitation, assistance programs, and leave options. A rehabilitation contract including drug testing may be agreed upon. Failure to participate in a treatment program following a positive drug screening will result in disciplinary action, up to and including termination. Due process will be followed. All testing shall be conducted by a laboratory certified by the State of Florida as a Medical and Urine Drug Testing Forensic Laboratory which complies with the Scientific and Technical Guidelines for Federal Drug Testing Programs and the Standards for Certification of Laboratories engaged in Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration of the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services. The laboratory shall be chosen jointly by ACEA and SBAC if the employee is a member of the bargaining unit. The procedures established by the laboratory shall be followed in administering drug tests to employees. Employees who seek voluntary assistance for substance abuse may not be disciplined for seeking assistance. Employees shall be subject to all employer rules, regulations, and job performance standards with the understanding that an employee enrolled in a rehabilitation program is receiving treatment for an illness. Employees who return to work after completion of a rehabilitation program shall be subject to follow-up drug testing with twenty-four (24) hour notification. Any employee who refuses the drug test or subsequently tests positive may be disciplined up to and including termination. Random testing of employees shall not be conducted except as required by state or federal law . . . . On December 13, 1994, Respondent signed the following statement: I have received, read, and understand the training materials on drug and alcohol testing under the U. S. Department of Transportation regulations. In January of 1995, Petitioner began complying with an additional drug testing program pursuant to a federal statute entitled Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act (OTETA). Petitioner did not formally adopt a written policy or develop written guidelines to implement the new drug-testing program. Petitioner's Collective Bargaining Agreement with the ACEA does not refer to OTETA or the federal regulations implementing it. Mandatory procedures governing drug testing in transportation workplaces under U. S. Department of Transportation regulations require that drug tests be performed using split samples. A "split specimen collection" consists of one urination followed by the splitting of that specimen into two bottles. If the primary specimen tests positive, the employee may request that the split specimen be sent to a different laboratory for testing. The majority of drug testing performed in this country is single specimen collection. Drug testing pursuant to state law and rules and the regulations of the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services does not require employers to utilize split samples in the collection process. A split specimen generally is used only for purposes of testing pursuant to the regulations of the U. S. Department of Transportation. The U. S. Department of Transportation requires Petitioner to provide the following testing in transportation workplaces: (a) pre-employment testing; (b) post-accident testing; (c) random testing; (d) reasonable suspicion testing; return-to-duty testing; and (f) follow-up testing. OTETA does not require a routine fitness-for-duty drug test as part of an annual medical examination. State law does require such a test. OTETA requires random testing and post-accident testing. State law does not require these tests. Petitioner's guidelines as adopted in 1991 specifically prohibit random drug testing of employees. However, Petitioner's guidelines, as incorporated into the Collective Bargaining Agreement, state that "[r]andom testing of employees shall not be conducted except as required by state or federal law." In June of 1995, Respondent received a routine fitness- for-duty drug test as part of his annual physical examination. The test yielded a positive result for cannabinoids and cocaine metabolites. Respondent did not contest the results of the test. On June 22, 1995, Petitioner's Director of Employee Relations had a conference with Respondent. During the conference, Respondent signed a medical records release and a rehabilitation contract. The rehabilitation contract stated as follows: . . . positive results indicating alcohol and/or illegal mind-altering substances, following the initiation of this contract, is prima facie evidence of violation of this contract. I understand that failure to comply with the terms of this contract may result in termination of my employment with the School Board of Alachua County, Florida. Respondent subsequently took leave to attend to his rehabilitation. By letter dated August 21, 1995, Petitioner's rehabilitation counselor at the Corner Drug Store reported that Respondent's drug tests from July 5th through August 16th were negative for illegal drugs. The counselor also informed Petitioner that Respondent had attended weekly intervention group meetings as required under the rehabilitation contract. The counselor did not recommend further treatment. A substance abuse professional, other than one who provided treatment, had to assess Respondent in order for him to return to work. In August of 1995, a clinical psychologist from The Education Center evaluated Respondent. The psychologist recommended that Respondent return to work subject to five years participation in the "random drug screening program that is in addition to the standard screening program." Respondent returned to his duties on or about August 26, 1995. His follow-up drug tests performed on October 25, 1995, January 17, 1996, and March 4, 1996, were reported as negative. On the morning of June 10, 1996, Petitioner informed Respondent that he was scheduled that day to take his regular annual physical examination, including a drug test. Respondent went to a medical facility in the northwest part of Gainesville for the physical exam during that morning. He went to Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in the southwest part of Gainesville after work for his drug test. The following are routine procedures when a person goes to Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in Gainesville for a urine drug test: The front desk checks the donor's photographic identification, such as a driver's license. The collector takes the photo ID and the donor into a separate room to sign in. The collector asks the donor to remove any hat, if he or she is wearing one, and to empty his or her pockets onto the counter. The collector watches the donor wash and dry his or her hands. The donor selects a testing kit, which is individually packaged in a plastic bag, from a box. The kit contains a urinalysis bottle. The collector opens the bag, breaks the seal on the specimen bottle, and gives it to the donor. The collector shows the donor how much urine is required on the bottle. The collector takes the donor to the bathroom. The donor is informed that the toilet water contains bluing. The donor is instructed not to flush the toilet. After the collector leaves the bathroom, he or she cuts off the water to the sink using a lever outside the door. The donor stays in the restroom no longer than two and a half or three minutes. The donor comes out of the bathroom and hands the specimen bottle to the collector who is waiting outside. The collector checks the amount of urine in the bottle to be sure the quantity is at least 40 ML. The collector measures the temperature by means of a gauge on the outside of the bottle to be sure that the temperature is between 90 and 100 degrees Fahrenheit. The collector notes this information on the chain-of-custody form. The bottle's cap is screwed on tightly. The collector also checks the appearance of the urine for any unusual color. The collector asks the donor to place his or her initials in the following three places: on the bag; on the chain-of-custody form peel-off label; and on the security seal. The security seal is placed over the top of the bottle. The collector dates and also initials the peel-off label. The collector then removes the label from the form and applies it to the bottle. The collector completes and signs part II of the multi-part chain-of-custody form. The collector separates copies one through three from copies four through seven. The collector hands the donor copies four through seven so that he or she can fill out part III with the donor's name, address and two telephone numbers. The donor signs the form certifying that he or she provided the specimen to the collector, that the bottle was sealed with a tamper-proof seal in the donor's presence, and that the information on the form and on the bottle label is correct. The collector completes part IV of the multi- part forms, copies one through three, initiating the chain-of-custody documentation. The specimen bottle is then placed inside the plastic bag, which is sealed. Copies one through three of the multi-part form, which do not contain the name of the donor, are placed in a pouch on the side of the bag. Copies four through seven of the multi-part form are not sent with the specimen. Instead, one copy is retained at the collection site. Another copy is sent to the employer. The third copy is given to the donor. The bagged specimen bottle is kept in a box in a locked refrigerator with other packaged specimens prior to shipment by courier to the testing laboratory. The collector gives the donor a written checklist showing the steps to be taken in the urine collection process. The donor is asked to read the list and check to make sure that the procedures were followed. The donor signs this form indicating that the collector followed all appropriate steps in the collection process. Once a collector begins the collection process, he or she completes the process alone. No other collector at the site may perform any of the required steps or safeguards. In this case, Respondent signed the following statement in part III of the multi-part chain-of-custody form: I certify that I provided my specimen(s) to the collector, that the specimen bottle was sealed with a tamper-proof seal in my presence, and that the information provided on this form and on the label attached to the specimen bottle is correct. The collector gave Respondent a copy of the donor's checklist to read and verify that the collection procedures were followed. Respondent signed the donor's checklist. Elizabeth Verbeke was the person at Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in Gainesville, Florida, who collected Respondent's urine specimen on June 10, 1996. She usually collected 50 to 60 urine specimens per week for drug testing. She has no independent recollection of collecting Respondent's specimen. However, there is no reason to believe that she failed to follow the laboratory's routine procedures in this case. Ms. Verbeke entered the word "none" at question five of part II on the chain-of-custody form, indicating the collection of Respondent's specimen was entirely routine. She noted no irregularities of any kind. The chain-of-custody identification number for Respondent's urine specimen was 026A13381. In part II of the chain-of-custody form, Ms. Verbeke indicated that she checked Respondent's picture identification, collected the urine specimen, and read the specimen's temperature within four minutes of collection. The specimen's temperature of 94 degrees Fahrenheit was within the proper range. The volume of the specimen was at least 40 milliliters. Later in the day on June 10, 1996, a courier picked up Respondent's urine specimen and transported it to Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in Valdosta, Georgia. The laboratory performs forensic drug testing, as well as other kinds of tests. It processes about 8,000 specimens a month. The accessioner at the laboratory receives the specimens from the courier. Next, the accessioner examines the packaging and the sample bottles for any possible compromise of the security seals. Then, the accessioner compares each specimen bottle with the custody documents to ensure that they are accompanied by the correct paperwork. The accessioner places the urine specimens in batches with approximately 40 in each group. The accessioner pours a small portion of each specimen (an "aliquot"), one at a time, into a collection cup for analysis. The original specimen bottle with the remaining portion of the specimen is placed into temporary refrigerated storage until the initial test is deemed negative or positive. If the test is positive, the accessioner retrieves the original specimen bottle from temporary storage and pours a second aliquot for confirmation testing. The original specimen bottle, with the remaining portion of the specimen, is then placed in long-term frozen storage. Once testing is completed, the aliquots are discarded. Urine drug testing consists first of a rapid and relatively inexpensive procedure which is known as an immunoassay test. A positive result is confirmed by a more sophisticated and expensive technique called gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS). The second test, if properly performed, is one hundred percent accurate. The function of the initial test (immunoassay), is strictly to weed out the negatives. Perhaps 90 percent of all the samples that the laboratory processes are negatives. The initial test also identifies which drug group or groups should be the focus of the extraction procedure because there is no universal extraction procedure for all drugs. The second test (GC/MS), makes an unequivocal identification of a molecule based on its molecular structure. If the confirmation test is positive, the laboratory reports the results to the medical review officer (MRO) as positive for the particular drug group. On June 10, 1996, the laboratory's accessioner received Respondent's specimen from a courier. The specimen's chain-of- custody identification number was 026A13381. The accessioner assigned the specimen a unique lab accession number, number 01298048. Subsequently, Respondent's specimen was tested in the laboratory in the usual manner. The initial test on Respondent's specimen used the total cocaine metabolite screening method. When this method is used, any compound similar to cocaine in the specimen will give a positive result. The initial test on Respondent's specimen was reported as "8H," which means that it was a presumptive positive. For the immunoassay test, any compound similar to cocaine in an amount equal to or in excess of 300 nanograms per milliliter (ng/ml) is positive. In the confirmation test, Respondent's specimen tested positive for benzoylecgonine, a cocaine metabolite. After a person consumes cocaine, benzoylecgonine is present in that person's urine specimen. Respondent's specimen contained 303 ng/ml of benzoylecgonine. For the GC/MS test, any amount of benzoylecgonine equal to or in excess of 150 ng/ml is positive. Respondent's urine sample had an abnormally low level of creatinine. Creatinine is a waste product produced by every human being. Respondent's sample had a creatinine level of 17 milligrams per deciliter (mg/dl). Any creatinine level below 20 mg/dl may indicate dilution. When the creatinine level is low, it is possible that the donor consumed a large amount of fluid at least two to three hours before donating the sample in an attempt to dilute the specimen. It is also possible that water was added to the sample. The laboratory checked the specific gravity of Respondent's sample to determine whether the sample was adulterated. Respondent's specimen passed the specific gravity test. It had a specific gravity of 1.004. Anything over 1.003 is within normal range for specific gravity. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Respondent's sample was not diluted outside of his body because the specific gravity of the specimen was normal and because the specimen's temperature was 94 degrees within four minutes of collection. Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., inserted blind quality controls in the initial testing runs to determine whether the test analysis was valid. Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., receives proficiency test inspections by the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services and the State of Florida. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in Valdosta, Georgia, was certified by the National Institute of Drug Abuse, the State of Florida, and the College of American Pathologists to perform the kind of test at issue here. A scientist employed at Doctor's Laboratory, Inc., certified that the final result of the testing performed on Respondent's specimen was accurate. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that the tests of Respondent's urine specimen were performed in conformity with all applicable testing guidelines. On June 11, 1996, Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in Valdosta, Georgia, reported Respondent's test results to the MRO in Brunswick, Georgia, as being positive for benzoylecgonine. Dr. Robert H. Miller was the MRO who received the Respondent's drug test report. Dr. Miller is certified as an MRO through the American Association of Medical Review Officers. He works for MRO Services, Inc. The function of the MRO is to ascertain whether there is any medical reason for a given test result. If the individual has a legitimate prescription for a medication that showed up on a drug screen and there is no safety concern over the individual having a significant blood level of that particular substance at work, then the report to the employer is negative. In this case, the MRO reviewed the chain-of-custody form. He did not find any irregularity in the chain-of-custody for the Respondent's specimen. The MRO's office telephoned Petitioner on June 12, 1996, and requested that Petitioner have Respondent contact the MRO. Respondent returned the MRO's call that same day. During their conversation, the MRO informed Respondent about his drug test report. The MRO asked Respondent whether there might be any medical reason for the positive test result. Respondent informed the MRO that he had taken a prescription for a toothache. Respondent did not furnish the MRO with the name of a specific drug to account for the positive test result. Benzoylecgonine is the metabolite measured to identify cocaine. Cocaine is rarely used in ear, nose, and throat medical procedures, such as bronchoscopy. It is not available by prescription. The MRO properly determined that there was no medical reason for Respondent's positive drug test result. The MRO explained to Respondent that a re-test of his specimen was available. The MRO gave Respondent a toll-free telephone number to call if he wanted a re-test performed. By letter dated June 12, 1996, the MRO informed Petitioner that Respondent's drug test was positive for cocaine. By correspondence dated June 13, 1996, the MRO provided Respondent with directions for obtaining a re-test of his specimen. Respondent did not request a re-test. MRO Services, Inc. receives about 1000 reports of drug tests from Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., each month. In the past three years, MRO Services, Inc., has not documented any cases where a re-test of a specimen created a discrepancy with initial test results produced by Doctors' Laboratory, Inc. Petitioner's Director of Employee Relations conducted a pre-termination conference with Respondent on June 18, 1996. The purpose of this meeting was to give Respondent an opportunity to present mitigating circumstances. In the conference, Respondent indicated his belief that a co-worker, Debra Martin, put cocaine in his drinking water without his knowledge. The Director of Employee Relations talked to individuals that Respondent thought might have witnessed his activities and the activities of Debra Martin on June 10, 1996. During the time in question, Respondent and Ms. Martin were washing and waxing buses. Respondent and Ms. Martin often would get drinking water for each other. Ice was available in coolers located in a building near the gas pumps and washrack. Water was available from a spigot next to the place where Respondent and Ms. Martin were washing the buses. Ms. Martin specifically denied that she ever put cocaine or any other illegal drug in Respondent's drinking water. Ms. Martin also tested positive for a controlled substance on June 10, 1996. She subsequently signed a rehabilitation contract with Petitioner. After completing her rehabilitation treatment, Ms. Martin returned to work as a school bus driver for Petitioner. Persuasive evidence indicates that Ms. Martin did not put cocaine in Respondent's drinking water without his knowledge at any time prior to his June 10, 1996, drug test. By letter dated June 19, 1996, Respondent was informed that the Superintendent intended to recommend that Petitioner terminate Respondent's employment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order, terminating the employment of Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas L. Wittmer, Esquire Alachua County School Board 620 East University Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601 Francisco M. Negron, Jr., Esquire Florida Education Association/United 118 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1700 Robert W. Hughes, Superintendent Alachua County School Board 620 East University Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601-5498 Michael H. Olenick, Esquire Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Frank T. Brogan, Commissioner Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether, during the course of the random drug testing program, it was appropriately determined that Petitioner Jeffrey Jones reported for work while under the influence of cocaine on or about September 27, 1995. If so, whether Petitioner Jones should be terminated as an employee of the Seminole County School Board. Whether, during the course of the random drug testing program, it was appropriately determined that Petitioner Sylvia Foster reported for work while under the influence of cocaine on or about January 8, 1996. If so, whether Petitioner Foster should be terminated as an employee of the Seminole County School Board.
Findings Of Fact Facts Common to Both Respondents Petitioner, Seminole County School Board, is a political subdivision and an administrative agency of the State of Florida charged with the duty to operate control and supervise all public schools and personnel in the Seminole County School District. Paul J. Hagerty is the Superintendent of Public Schools for Seminole County, Florida. Respondent, Jeffrey Jones, at all relevant times, was an employee in the Transportation Department of the Seminole County School District, including September 27, 1995. His position is bus driver/courier. Respondent, Sylvia Foster, at all relevant times, was an employee in the Transportation Department of the Seminole County School Board, including January 8, 1996. Her position is bus driver. Respondents, Jeffrey Jones and Sylvia Foster, are members of the bargaining unit, the Bus Driver Association, who entered into a collective bargaining agreement with their employer, the Seminole County School Board. Article XXXIII of the collective bargaining agreement provides that Seminole County School Board will implement and abide by all aspects of the Federal Omnibus Transportation and Employee Testing Act. The Federal Omnibus Transportation and Employee Testing Act was applicable to bargaining unit members who hold a Commercial Driver's License (hereinafter CDL). Corning MetPath has a contract with Seminole County School Board to conduct urine sampling. In addition to taking urine samples from school bus drivers, Corning MetPath collects hundreds of other types of sampling at its facility in Longwood, Florida, for other clients. Prior and following entering into a contract with Corning MetPath, the Seminole County School Board did not provide blind test samples for quality control before contracting with Corning MetPath to perform federally required drug testing. John Richert, the director of Petitioner's "Anti-Drug and Alcohol Program", initiated the sampling designated by receipt of a list of persons who were to take the sample for the quarter. Once every three months, John Richert sent a packet of materials containing names of individuals who were to submit to urine testing by the week to Jean Crampton, Director of Transportation. Upon receipt of that list, Jean Crampton, who supervised the bus drivers, selected each person to be tested that week and provided them with a time and date to report for testing. That information was not provided by John Richert, but was left up to Mrs. Crampton. The Director of Transportation was responsible for passing on the list of sample providers, and ultimately for recommending termination of an employee whose test result was verified as positive. Anita Callahan operates the Corning MetPath facility in Longwood, Florida, and is an employee of Corning Clinical Laboratories. During most times of operation, Anita Callahan operates the collection facility by herself, without assistance. Each month, this facility conducts or takes between 500 and 760 samples. Prior to the relevant time, Anita Callahan received training in urine collection from her employer, and she relied on two Corning MetPath office manuals provided for use by personnel for reference. Neither manual contained copies of the Federal Regulations that apply to the specific procedures required under the federal testing act. The regulations call for the collection of urine samples, as follows: An employee is to report to the testing facility with a notice for testing and a collection form (Federal Drug Testing Custody and Control Form). The employee must be identified to the technician by photo identification. The employee selects a sealed box containing a urine sample collection cup and two sample bottles from a large box. The employee is directed to wash his/her hands. The employee is directed to a bathroom to give a urine sample. The collection room is to have no other water source operating and the toilet is to contain a bluing agent. The sample is brought to the technician and the temperature is checked. To initiate the chain of custody, a portion of the urine sample is then poured into each of the collection bottles. The employee then dates and initials the seals and places them on each sample bottle. The technician then places the specimen bottles in a separate plastic bags and places them into the box from which they were originally packed, along with the original and three copies of the completed and signed Federal Drug Testing and Control Form. The box, which becomes the shipping box to transmit specimens to the laboratory in New Jersey, is sealed. The specimens are sent by courier to the Corning Clinical Laboratory in Teterboro, New Jersey for analysis. Anita Callahan did not always strictly follow this procedure because she did not want to be touching the hands, paper or pen of people who had not washed their hands after obtaining the sample. Anita Callahan did not wear gloves when collecting and handling samples. In other respects the practices and procedures used at the Corning MetPath facility varied from the procedures its personnel were to follow: At times, there was other water sources in the collection area and collection closet, including running water in the bathroom sink and a water fountain in the hall. The sample containers that were used were sometimes unsealed and opened before the sample providers arrived. At times, the toilet in the collection closet did not contain a bluing agent. The sample containers were, at times, themselves visibly contaminated. Some drivers were not given a choice as to the sample container that was to be used. At times, if she was busy, Anita Callahan directed drivers to leave samples on the counter to be split and sealed outside the presence of the driver, at a later time. More than one person providing a sample was allowed in the sampling area during collection. Unless sample containers are clean and then sealed, all hands are washed and surfaces are kept clean, contamination is possible. Unless the sample containers are split in front of the sample provider, signed by both the technician and the provider, and sealed in front of the provider, a proper chain of custody has not been initiated and the possibility of mislabeling exists. If a collection site does not strictly follow those procedures set out in the Federal Regulations as to collection, chain of custody and testing, the test result is not scientifically reliable. Facts Relating to Case No. 95-5532 Respondent, Jeffrey Jones, was directed to report to the Corning Clinical Laboratory/MetPath facility in Longwood, Florida on September 27, 1995, prior to beginning work, for the purpose of providing a urine sample for analysis for the presence of drugs/controlled substances. The process followed by Anita Callahan, in the collection of the urine sample of Jeffrey Jones was as follows: The Respondent came to the facility with a notice for testing and a collection form (Federal Drug Testing Custody and Control Form.) The Respondent was identified. The Respondent selected a box containing the urine sample collection cup and the two samples bottles from a box. The Respondent washed his hands. The Respondent went to the bathroom as directed and returned with a urine sample. The temperature of the samples was checked. A portion of the urine sample was poured into each of the collection bottles. The Respondent then dated and initialed the seals which were to be placed on the specimen bottles, referred to as split samples. The specimen bottles were then placed in separate plastic bags and placed into the box from which they were originally packed along with the original and three copies of the Federal Drug Testing and Control Form. The box, which becomes the shipping box in which the specimens are shipped to the laboratory in New Jersey, was sealed. The Respondent then signed the copy of the Federal Drug Testing and Control Form which acknowledges that the urine sample is his urine sample. j. The specimens were then sent by courier to the Corning Clinical Laboratory in Teterboro, New Jersey for analysis. At the time Jeffrey Jones was obtaining his urine sample he dropped his key chain in the toilet and then retrieved it. He did not inform the technician of this event. The first sample bottle remained sealed until it was opened for the purpose of testing at Corning Clinical Laboratories in Teterboro, New Jersey by Shilpa Joshi. The urine sample of Jeffrey Jones (second bottle) was sealed upon collection at the Corning Clinical facility at Longwood, Florida and remained sealed until it was opened for confirmation testing at LabOne in Overland Park, Kansas. Laboratory analysis of urine for the presence of drugs/controlled substance, as prescribed by 49 C.F.R. Subsection 40.29 is to be done in two phases. The initial test (screening) shall employ immunoassay and the second phase (confirmation testing) shall employ gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS). The analysis, by Corning Clinical Laboratories, of the urine sample submitted by Jeffrey Jones was conducted in two phases. The first phase was screening employing an enzyme multiplied immunoassay test (EMIT) followed by confirmatory testing employing analysis by gas chromatograph/mass spectrometry (GC/MS). The GC/MS process for analysis of urine for the presence of controlled substances is generally accepted in the scientific community. Laboratory analysis of the urine sample submitted by Jeffrey Jones, by Corning Clinical Laboratories, determined that the urine sample tested positive for the presence of a cocaine metabolite, benzoylecgonine. The second sample was then sent to LabOne for confirmation testing. Laboratory analysis of the urine sample submitted by Jeffrey Jones to LabOne of Overland Park, Kansas, determined that the urine sample tested positive for the presence of a cocaine metabolite, benzoylecgonine. There is no substance that will cause a person's urine to test positive for benzoylecgonine, a metabolite of cocaine, other than cocaine. Both Corning Clinical Laboratories and LabOne were properly certified as required by 49 C.F.R. Subsection 40.39. Murray Lappe, M. D., was the designated medical review officer (MRO) for the drug testing of Jeffrey Jones. The MRO did not contact Jeffrey Jones or otherwise communicate with Mr. Jones after the putative positive test result. Jean Crampton, Director of Transportation was informed by telephone from Corning Labs that Jeffrey Jones had tested positive for cocaine in his urine. Neither Jean Crampton, nor anyone else in the School Board, contacted Respondent Jones about his result to inquire into possible alternative medical explanations for the result. Jean Crampton believed that alternate medical explanations was the province of the MRO and should have already happened. False positive test results can occur for cocaine either in certain prescription medications, creams, and certain consumer goods, such as teas and drinks, although such teas and drinks have been banned for sale in the U. S. Respondent Jones, prior to and at the time of taking the urine screening, was a care-giver for his two elderly parents, both of whom lived with him, were bedridden, and required extensive medications. There were times that Respondent Jones' father provided headache and toothache medicine to him. The supervisors of Jeffrey Jones were trained to recognize signs of drug or alcohol abuse. The supervisors of Jones, who saw him daily, saw no evidence of drug or substance abuse in his work performance. Facts Relating to Case No. 96-0506 Respondent Sylvia Foster was directed to report to the Corning Clinical Laboratory/MetPath facility in Longwood, Florida, after her first run, on January 8, 1996, for the purpose of providing a urine sample for analysis for the presence of drugs/controlled substances. The process followed by Anita Callahan, in the collection of the urine sample of Sylvia Foster was as follows: The Respondent came to the facility with a notice for testing and a collection form (Federal Drug Testing Custody and Control Form). The Respondent was identified by her School Board Badge. The technician selected a box containing the urine sample collection cup and the two sample bottles from a box and gave it to the Respondent. The Respondent washed her hands. The Respondent went to the bathroom, as directed, and returned with an empty urine sample. She was not able to urinate. The Respondent drank some water and returned to the bathroom. She returned with a urine sample. The technician was across the hall with another person on whom she was conducting a diabetic time test. Respondent was directed to leave her urine sample on the counter and leave; Respondent had previously signed and initialed the documents and labels. Respondent left the sample and departed. The technician later split the sample, sealed them and placed them into the box with the documentation for shipping to the laboratory in New Jersey. The specimens were then sent by courier to the Corning lab in Teterboro, New Jersey for analysis. The urine sample shipped under the name of Sylvia Foster from the Corning Clinical facility at Longwood, Florida, remained sealed until the first sample bottle was opened for the purpose of testing at Corning Clinical Laboratories in Teterboro, New Jersey by Isidoro Lomotan. The analysis, by Corning Clinical Laboratories, of the urine sample submitted by Sylvia Foster was conducted in two phases. The first phase was screening employing an enzyme multiplied immunoassay test (EMIT) followed by confirmatory testing employing analysis by gas chromatograph/mass spectrometry (GC/MS). The laboratory analysis of the urine sample submitted under the name of Sylvia Foster, by Corning MetPath, determined that the urine sample tested positive for the presence of a cocaine metabolite, benzoylecgonine. Sylvia Foster, on January 9, 1996, the day after submitting her urine sample at the Corning MetPath facility, complained to her supervisors that she was taking a lot of different prescription medications and was worried about the result. Murray Lappe, M. D. was the designated MRO for the drug testing of Sylvia Foster. Someone who identified himself as working with the MRO contacted Sylvia Foster, by telephone, after the putative positive test result. The person on the telephone informed Sylvia Foster that she had a drug problem and needed help. The person on the telephone did not make any inquiry into Respondent Foster's medical condition or history, nor that she would be able to produce information and medical records to substantiate an alternate medical explanation. Jean Crampton, Director of Transportation, was informed by telephone from Corning MetPath that Sylvia Foster had tested positive for cocaine in her urine. Neither Mrs. Crampton, nor anyone else in the School Board, contacted Respondent Foster about possible alternative medical explanations for the result. The supervisors of Sylvia Foster, who saw her daily, did not see any evidence of drug or substance abuse in her work performance. Respondent Foster's testimony as to sequence of events is credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED tht the School Board dismiss the Superintendent's request to terminate the employment of Jeffrey Jones and Sylvia Foster, and the Respondents should be reinstated to their former positions. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of July, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 95-5532 and 96-0506 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 (except as to the year), 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22 (as to Jeffrey Jones only), 24, 25, and 27. Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence: paragraphs 23 and 26. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 (except as to the year), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17 (except for the year), 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 (in part), 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54 (in part), 55 (in part), 56, 53 [No. 3], 54 [No. 2], 55 [No. 2], 56 [No. 2]. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial: paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 45. Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence: paragraphs 29 (in part), 54 (in part), 55 (in part). COPIES FURNISHED: Ned N. Julian, Jr., Esquire Seminole County School Board 400 East Lake Mary Boulevard Lake Mary, Florida 32773 Thomas F. Egan, Esquire 56 East Pine Street, Suite 300 Orlando, Florida 32801 Dr. Paul Hagerty, Superintendent 1211 South Mellonville Sanford, Florida 32771 Frank T. Brogan Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Sapa Precision Tubing Rockledge, LLC (Respondent), discriminated against Christopher Brian Edwards (Petitioner) on the basis of age.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is over 40 years of age, and was employed by Respondent from 2009 until May 21, 2013. Prior to his termination, Petitioner received favorable work evaluations and demonstrated good work attendance. Respondent is a manufacturing company that makes aluminum tubing for commercial purposes. Safety in the work environment is critical to Respondent’s success. Part of Respondent’s safety regimen includes maintaining a drug-free workplace. To that end, Respondent retains an outside company, Edge Information Management, Inc. (Edge), to conduct random drug tests of Respondent’s employees. Respondent’s drug-free policy is set forth in its employee handbook that is provided to all employees. Petitioner received a copy of the handbook and knew or should have known of the company’s drug-free policy upon his employment. In order to screen Respondent’s employees, Edge creates a random matrix that assigns all employees a number. The computer program used by Edge then generates a random sampling of employees for the given test date. In this case, approximately one month before the test date, Edge randomly selected employees who were to be tested on May 14, 2013. Petitioner was named among the randomly selected employees. Edge is accredited by the Drug and Alcohol Testing Industry Association and is fully authorized to conduct drug screenings. Edge employee, Leonard Clarke, was fully trained in the process of collecting samples to assure conformance with all applicable testing standards. Prior to the test date, Petitioner attended a meeting with other employees and voiced concerns to Respondent regarding working conditions by “bringing up stuff that they were not comfortable with.” Although not part of his original claim of discrimination, Petitioner now maintains that his termination was also in retaliation for his comments during that meeting. On May 14, 2013, based upon the employees randomly selected by Edge, Respondent notified supervisors to send the employees to a conference room for drug testing. Clarke prepared the paperwork and waited for the 27 employees to report for the screening. No one at Respondent selected the employees to be screened, conducted the collection of samples, or tested the samples taken. Clarke was solely responsible for the drug testing. All of the employees were required to review the testing form, sign, and date it before returning it to Clarke. Each was given a lollypop stick with a sponge attached to one end. By placing the sponge in the mouth and collecting saliva, the sample can then be tested to issue a preliminary result for drugs. Clarke had a difficult time collecting a saliva sample from Petitioner. Eventually, on the second or third attempt Petitioner produced enough saliva to place the sponge in the vial to allow the test strip to render a result. The test strips are designed to react to substances such as marijuana, cocaine, or amphetamines. In Petitioner’s case, the test strip showed positive for drug metabolites and/or alcohol. After testing positive on the saliva test (the only employee who did), Clarke asked Petitioner to give a urine sample so that a complete drug analysis could be performed by the Edge lab. Petitioner consented to all testing procedures and the collection of samples on May 14, 2013. For the purpose of the urine sample, Petitioner was given a cup and asked to go into the adjacent bathroom to produce the sample. When Petitioner returned the cup to Clarke it was noted that the cold, clear liquid did not register a temperature. Based upon his training, Clarke suspected that Petitioner had not urinated into the cup and discarded the sample. Next, Clarke accompanied Petitioner while a second sample was collected for urinalysis. Clarke marked the sample, packaged it in accordance with all applicable standards, and sent it by FedEx to Edge’s lab. Petitioner’s testing went from “random” to “reasonable suspicion/cause” based upon his saliva test and behavior with Clarke. It appeared to Clarke that Petitioner attempted to evade the drug testing process. Based upon the preliminary test results, Petitioner was suspended from work. Petitioner knew he had tested positive for drugs and that his urine sample would be further evaluated. It is undisputed that Petitioner’s urine tested positive for cocaine. Prior to notifying Respondent of the test results, Edge notified Petitioner that the sample tested positive for cocaine and gave Petitioner an opportunity to contest or explain how the result might be erroneous. Petitioner did not contest the result and has not disputed the presence of drugs in his saliva and urine on May 14, 2013. On May 21, 2013, Edge sent Petitioner’s drug results to Respondent. At that time, Respondent decided to terminate Petitioner’s employment with the company, and Chapman notified Petitioner by telephone that he was terminated because he tested positive for cocaine. Respondent gave Petitioner an opportunity to contest the drug results, but he did not. At hearing, Petitioner did not contest the drug results. Of the persons tested with Petitioner, twenty were younger than he and six were older. Only Petitioner tested positive for drugs. In the last ten years, all employees at Respondent who have tested positive for drugs have been terminated. No one younger or older than Petitioner has been retained if they tested positive for drugs. Petitioner’s age did not impact Respondent’s decision to terminate his employment. None of Petitioner’s comments were considered in the termination of his employment. Petitioner did not raise retaliation with FCHR and has not established that Respondent retaliated against him because of comments he made during a company meeting. In short, Petitioner was terminated because he tested positive for cocaine. There was no competent, substantial evidence that persons younger than Petitioner were treated differently from Petitioner or were subject to dissimilar policies or practices. All of Respondent’s employees who tested positive for drugs have been terminated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of July, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of July, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Christopher Brian Edwards 4605 Ocean Beach Boulevard Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931 Mary Susan Sacco, Esquire Ford and Harrison, LLP Suite 1300 300 South Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 (eServed) Tammy Scott Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Shelly Gans, graduated from high school in June, 1973. She attended Broward Community College during terms 1 and 3 of the 1973-74 academic year, where she earned fifteen (15) credits. She does not have two years of academic study as required by Rule 10D-41.069(5). She then attended Sheridan Vocational Technical Center from February, 1974 to February, 1975. She was thereafter employed by Dr. Stephen Katzman from March, 1975 through August, 1979 as a technologist doing laboratory testing including phlebotomy. She was thereafter employed at Florida Medical Center as a technologist doing blood banking, hematology, chemistry and part time phlebotomy. Ms. Gans passed the October, 1983 proficiency examination for clinical laboratory technologists given by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control. After passing the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services examination, Ms. Gans was licensed as a clinical laboratory technician by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Office of Licensure and Certification, Laboratory Personnel Licensure, through June 30, 1986. In October, 1984, Ms. Gans was examined by HRS for licensure as a clinical laboratory technologist in the specialties of clinical chemistry, hematology and immuno- hematology. She passed the immunohematology examination but failed the hematology and clinical chemistry examinations. She re-applied and took those examinations in April, 1985 when she passed the hematology examination but failed the chemistry examination a second time. Under Rule 10D- 41.071(9), Florida Administrative Code, Ms. Gans was required to take continuing education before she could re-apply to sit for the chemical chemistry examination a third time. Ms. Gans enrolled in Broward Community College in the second term of the 1985-1986 school year and took three hours in general chemistry. That course ended after January 1, 1986. She re-applied for examination as a technologist in the specialty of clinical chemistry on July 14, 1986. Her application for that examination was denied on August 14, 1986 because she did not have sixty (60) semesters of college credits which the Department believed was required under Section 10D-41.C69(5), Florida Administrative Code.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Shelly Gans be permitted to sit for the technologist examination in clinical chemistry when it is next given because she meets the requirements of Rule 10D- 41.069(6), as currently written and has taken retraining in clinical chemistry after she twice failed the examination, as is required by Rule 10D-41.071(9), Florid Administrative Code. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3670 The following constitute my rulings on proposed findings of fact pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, (1985). Rulings on Proposed Findings by Petitioner The proposals by the Petitioner are generally in the form of argument rather than proposed findings of fact. Relevant proposed factual findings have been made in the Recommended Order. Rulings on Proposed Findings by Respondent Covered in Finding of Fact 4. Covered in Finding of Fact 4. Covered in Finding of Fact 1. Rejected as an improper reading of Rule 10D-41.069(6). Rejected because the issue is not when notice of the rule was given, but what the rule says. Rejected as based on hearsay. Moreover, even if it was the intention of Centers of Disease Control that the Department of Health and Human Services examination not be a permanent means of credentialing in lieu of education and experience requirements, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has not implemented that intent in the rule which it enacted. Rejected as unnecessary. That Ms. Gans' application was received after January 1, 1986 is covered in Finding of Fact 4. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael O. Mathis Staff Attorney HRS Office of Licensure & Certification 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Shelly Gans 4163 Southwest 67th Avenue Apartment 104C Davie, Florida 33314 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue is whether, pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, Petitioner (all references to "Petitioner" are to Dr. Reich, even though in the preceding case he was the respondent) is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs in defending a case against him in which Respondent alleged that he was guilty of deviating from the applicable standard of care and failing to keep appropriate medical records.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Petitioner has been a licensed physician in Florida, holding license number ME 0051631. He is Board-certified in ophthalmology. At all material times, Petitioner has been a "small business party," within the meaning of Section 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes. From 1996-98, Petitioner worked part-time at The Metabolic Treatment Center in Ft. Myers. Twice weekly, Petitioner visited the center and saw patients, who generally complained of symptoms consistent with metabolic conditions. Toward the end of Petitioner's term of employment at The Metabolic Treatment Center, its owners, one or more natural persons, sold the facility to a publicly traded corporation. Petitioner's relationship with the new chief operating officer was poor. One day, Petitioner reported to work and found the facility had been closed, leaving Petitioner without access to the records kept by the center. Petitioner commenced litigation with the corporate owner of The Metabolic Center to obtain copies of medical records. Petitioner obtained a court order compelling the corporation to turn over medical records, but the corporation did not do so, and the case was closed in February 1999 without Petitioner's ever obtaining the records that he had sought. The corporate owner was administratively dissolved by the Department of State in September 1999. On November 21, 2000, Respondent filed an Administrative Complaint against Petitioner concerning one patient whom he treated in 1997 at The Metabolic Treatment Center. In 2001, Respondent prepared a 50-count Administrative Complaint against Petitioner concerning 10 patients whom he had treated at The Metabolic Treatment Center. In 2001, Petitioner was represented by attorney William Furlow. Mr. Furlow and a representative of Respondent negotiated a settlement, but Petitioner claimed that he had lacked the authority to enter into the settlement. The Board of Medicine declined to reopen the settlement and issued a Final Order to this effect. Petitioner appealed to the First District Court of Appeal, which issued an opinion on March 26, 2004, requiring the Board of Medicine to give Petitioner an evidentiary hearing on the factual issue of whether he had authorized Mr. Furlow to settle the case on the conditions set forth in the settlement agreement. Rather than litigate the authorization question, the Board of Medicine filed an amended Administrative Complaint on August 20, 2004, concerning the lone patient who had been the subject of the earlier-filed Administrative Complaint, and filed a second Administrative Complaint on October 27, 2004, concerning the 10 patients who had been the subject of the never-filed, 50-count Administrative Complaint. After transmittal to the Division of Administrative Hearings, these cases, which were consolidated, became DOAH Case Nos. 04-3222PL and 04-4111PL, respectively. By the time of the filing of the 2004 Administrative Complaints, Petitioner was represented by his present counsel. However, this representation has not been continuous. Shortly before the final hearing in the consolidated cases, Petitioner's counsel moved for leave to withdraw because Petitioner had fired them. The motion was granted, an accompanying request for continuance was denied, and Petitioner represented himself at the hearing, which took place on December 6 and 7, 2005. The undersigned Administrative Law Judge issued a Recommended Order on May 5, 2006. The Recommended Order excluded all of Respondent's evidence consisting of purported medical records, except for the records that Petitioner had identified in a prehearing deposition. These evidentiary rulings left evidence concerning only four patients. The recommendation was for the Board of Medicine to enter a Final Order dismissing all charges against Petitioner concerning all but the four patients mentioned above. For these patients, the recommendation was for the Board to enter a Final Order finding Petitioner guilty of the financial exploitation of four patients, failure to perform a statutory obligation as to three patients, failure to maintain adequate medical records on three patients, preparation of inappropriate prescriptions for two patients, and violation of the applicable standard of care as to one patient. The Recommended Order recommended an administrative fine of $29,000 and five years' probation. In Final Orders issued September 7 and October 9, 2006, the Board of Medicine substantially adopted the Recommended Order with revisions to the penalty. Petitioner appealed the Final Orders and, on January 23, 2008, the Fourth District Court of Appeal vacated the Final Orders. The reasoning of the court was that Petitioner had been denied access to medical records at The Metabolic Treatment Center, and, thus, there was no competent substantial evidence, given the clear and convincing standard, to support the findings of violations. On March 17 and 21, 2008, pursuant to the mandate, the Board of Medicine entered Final Orders dismissing all charges against Petitioner and taxing appellate costs of $610. On March 21, 2008, Petitioner filed his Petition Pursuant to the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act. The attorneys whom Petitioner had discharged immediately prior to the final hearing were re-engaged immediately after the issuance of the Recommended Order. These attorneys, who are presently representing Petitioner, prepared the briefs and argued the appeal. Petitioner seeks attorneys' fees for three phases of this litigation: 1) litigation over the purported consent agreement, concluding with the filing of the two Administrative Complaints that were transmitted to the Division of Administrative Hearings; 2) litigation in the two Division of Administrative Hearings cases through the appellate court's mandate; and 3) litigation with the Board of Medicine in obtaining the Final Order vacating the earlier Final Orders. To the extent that the first claim concerns the consent agreement, it is untimely for the reasons discussed in the Conclusions of Law. To the extent that the first claim concerns the same allegations covered in the second claim, it is part of the second claim. The second claim is really two claims: one concerns the proceeding at the Division of Administrative Hearings and culminating with the Final Orders issued by the Board of Medicine, and the second is for the appellate proceeding. The third claim really is part of the second claim, as the Board of Medicine never filed anything to initiate this phase of the overall proceeding. The question underlying the claim for attorneys' fees for the second phase of litigation is whether the Board of Medicine was substantially justified in filing the two Administrative Complaints in August and October 2004. Respondent has submitted as Respondent Exhibit A a voluminous stack of investigative reports prepared by the Agency for Heath Care Administration (AHCA) in connection with the disciplinary cases prosecuted against Petitioner. The periods of investigation run from July 9, 1998, through August 28, 2001, although the whole period is not covered and the periods covered by some reports overlap the periods covered by other reports. The investigative reports contain opinion letters from five physicians. The investigative report for the period of July 9, 1998, through September 9, 1998, contains an undated letter from Kevin M. Holthaus, M.D. Dr. Holthaus's letter addresses three patients, including one for whom AHCA had obtained medical records. Dr. Holthaus opined that Petitioner fell below the standard of care in the diagnosis and management of endocrine disorders like hypothyroidism and diabetes. Dr. Holthaus added that Petitioner failed to perform an appropriate history and physical examination prior to ordering extensive diagnostic studies. Dr. Holthaus noted that Petitioner's prescription of thyroid hormone, despite laboratory studies obviating the need for this treatment, posed a threat to the wellbeing of the patient. Dr. Holthaus's letter also states that Petitioner stood to gain from his actions, which included inadequate assessments of patient complaints and symptoms and inappropriate or inadequate diagnoses. The investigative report for October 14, 1998, through February 4, 1999, contains the notes of a telephone interview with Craig R. Sweet, M.D., who said that he had contacted The Metabolic Treatment Center about Petitioner's treatment of one patient. An unidentified person said that Petitioner no longer worked at the center, but had treated patients for nonexistent thyroid problems. Dr. Sweet stated that he had seen nothing justifying Petitioner's administration of thyroid medication or human growth hormone to the patient. This investigative report also contained a letter dated April 18, 1999, from E. Timothy Shapiro, M.D., who treats patients for a wide variety of endocrine problems. Dr. Shapiro, who was also an assistant clinical professor at the University of Miami, addressed one patient and found excessive and unjustified lab work, inappropriate treatment with thyroid hormone despite normal thyroid functions, inappropriate treatment with testosterone despite normal testosterone levels, and inappropriate treatment with growth hormone despite inadequate growth hormone testing and no clinical features of growth hormone deficiency. Dr. Shapiro concluded that the evidence "points to a scheme to extract money." The investigative report for May 2, 2000, to July 19, 2000, includes an undated letter from H. Curtis Benson, M.D. Dr. Benson found that Petitioner ordered unnecessary lab tests, treated a patient for hypothyroidism despite normal thyroid function studies, and kept "cursory" medical records containing no mention of a complete physical examination. The investigative report for September 21, 2000, through November 8, 2000, notes that one patient reported that Petitioner had told her that she had a fatal blood disease, but, when she was seen by her regular physician, he found no problems with her blood. Interestingly, this complainant was the insurance investigator who had submitted the other complaints, which were the bases of the insurance company's concern of excessive and unnecessary testing. A principal of The Metabolic Treatment Center had invited the insurance investigator to visit The Metabolic Treatment Center as a patient and see the operation for herself. Also in this report is a letter from Mr. Furlow, dated November 20, 2000, stating that many of Petitioner's records were out of his possession when he was forced out by the center. The investigative report for March 22, 2001, through June 8, 2001, contains a letter dated January 2, 2001, from Dr. Shapiro. Stating that he had reviewed four more cases, Dr. Shapiro stated that Petitioner was performing excessive lab testing, usually of tests that carry high reimbursement levels. Dr. Shapiro questioned the accuracy of the numerous diagnoses of peripheral neuropathy, noting that Petitioner routinely ordered nerve conduction tests, which were performed by a radiologist, rather than, as was common in Dr. Shapiro's experience, a neurologist. Dr. Shapiro also stated that Petitioner treated patients with thyroid hormone despite their normal thyroid function. He concluded that this pattern of medical practice was fraudulent and below the applicable standard of care. This investigative report also contains a letter dated January 18, 2001, from Hamilton R. Fish, M.D., who had examined the records of three patients. Dr. Fish summarized his concerns as: 1) many unnecessary lab tests, including reported abnormalities in the nerve conduction studies with no follow-up or referral; 2) no follow-up or referral on a patient diagnosed with hyerinsulinemia and insulin resistance; 3) lab tests and an EKG done on one patient prior to an evaluation by a physician; and 4) inaccurate medical advice contained in The Metabolic Treatment Center handbook given to patients, such as a warning that exercise makes insulin levels rise. The investigative reports for January 12, 2001, through February 7, 2001, and March 22, 2001, through June 8, 2001, contain letters from Dr. Shapiro dated December 27, 2000, and March 19, 2001. In each of these letters, Dr. Shapiro analyzes another patient and finds excessive and inappropriate lab testing, inappropriate diagnoses and treatment, a failure to refer a patient with neuropathy to a neurologist, and a failure to meet the applicable standard of care. The transcript of the probable cause meeting held on October 22, 2004, reveals that the probable cause panel had all of the above-described investigative materials, which included extensive medical records. Counsel summarized to the panel the important portions of the Administrative Complaint concerning the 10 patients who were the subject thereof. In authorizing the filing of the Administrative Complaint, the chair noted that he had never seen such unanimity of opinion among the consultants and suggested an emergency suspension. Although the transcript of the probable cause meeting on the Administrative Complaint involving only one patient has been lost, it must be inferred, based on the memorandum of action, that a probable cause panel similarly considered the file materials and similarly authorized the filing of that Administrative Complaint a couple of months earlier. Respondent contends that Petitioner never claimed the existence of additional medical records until the final hearing. This is not exactly true, as the records contain representations that Petitioner was unable to obtain all of the records from The Metabolic Treatment Center. On the other hand, Petitioner did not provide the probable cause panels with any expert opinion in his favor, except for Petitioner's medical claims for his treatment methods, which are detailed in the Recommended Order. The first Administrative Complaint filed in this case was on November 21, 2000; it was the complaint concerning one patient, so it was the precursor to the Administrative Complaint filed on August 20, 2004, in DOAH Case No. 04-3222PL. The next Administrative Complaint was filed in 2001, and it was the precursor to the Administrative Complaint filed on October 27, 2004, in DOAH Case No. 04-4111PL. From the earliest of these dates to the latest, Respondent had a reasonable basis in fact to proceed. Viewing the investigative materials in the manner most favorable to Petitioner, they presented a conflict between mainstream medical opinions concerning the proper diagnosis and treatment of endocrinal disorders and Petitioner's opinion, unsupported by other authorities (at least, in the investigative file), that conventional, acceptable ranges for various items, such as T-3 or TSH, are wrong or that holistic approaches are medically necessary to treat certain metabolic syndromes. At best, from Petitioner's point of view, this was a conflict in opinions between five practitioners, on the one hand, and Petitioner, on the other, and the informed, well-reasoned opinions of the five experts with whom Respondent consulted provided a reasonable basis in fact for the filing of all the Administrative Complaints and all of the charges contained within them.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Health dismissing Frank W. Fender's challenge to the grade awarded to him on the March 1997 Clinical Chemistry Technologist examination. DONE AND ORDERED this * day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this * day of March, 1998. * Mailed 3/2/98 undated. -ac COPIES FURNISHED: Frank W. Fender 7603 North Laura Street Jacksonville, Florida 32208 Anne Marie Williamson, Esquire Department of Health Office of the General Counsel 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 6, Room 106 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Dr. James Howell, Secretary Department of Health 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 6, Room 306 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Pete Peterson Department of Health 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 6, Room 102-E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue for determination at the formal hearing was whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character by unlawfully and knowingly possessing cocaine and introducing cocaine into his body in violation of Subsections 943.13(7) and 943.1395(5), (6), Florida Statutes. 1/
Findings Of Fact Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (the "Commission") on April 4, 1982. Respondent was employed as a police officer by the Metro- Dade Police Department for approximately seven and a half years as of September 15, 1988. 2/ During 1988, Respondent was assigned to the Miami International Airport. Metro-Dade police officers were subject to annual physical examinations as part of the terms of their employment. The examinations were routinely scheduled on an alphabetical rotation system. Respondent was notified by his employer approximately three weeks prior to the date of his annual physical for 1988. Respondent reported to Mount Sinai Medical Center, Industrial Medicine, for his annual physical on March 2, 1988. In the course of his physical, Respondent was given a sterile specimen cup by Nurse Linda Arama for collection of a urine sample. Respondent provided the urine sample as directed. Respondent's urine sample was processed in a routine manner and tested at about 10 p.m. on March 2, 1988. At the time it was given, Respondent's urine sample was poured into two smaller cups and capped (the "two smaller sample cups"). Each cap was sealed with special security evidence tape designed to disclose any evidence of tampering. Respondent's urine sample was assigned a unique identification number (116958). Respondent's name, date of birth, social security number and identification number were placed on each of the two smaller sample cups and entered on a chain of custody transmittal form. The two smaller sample cups were then stored in a locked metal specimen box. The specimen box was picked up by courier and transferred to Toxicology Testing Service on the afternoon of March 2, 1988. Israel Sanchez, a forensic toxicologist technician employed at Toxicology Testing Service, inspected the two smaller sample cups at about 10 p.m. on March 2, 1988. Mr. Sanchez assigned an additional number (30658) to the two smaller sample cups and noted that the sealed special security evidence tape was in tact. Mr. Sanchez opened one of the two smaller sample cups and dispensed a small portion of Respondent's urine for drug testing. Mr. Sanchez used a Hitashi 705 screening instrument to conduct the drug test. Respondent's urine tested positive for cocaine in two separate tests conducted by Mr. Sanchez. Urine samples that screen positive using the Hitashi 705 screening instrument are also tested by the gas chromatography mass spectrometry method (the "chromatorgraphy test") as a routine procedure at Toxicology Testing Service. John de Kanel, an expert in forensic toxicology, performed the analysis of Respondent's urine sample using the chromatography test. The chromatography test revealed that Respondent's urine sample contained cocaine metabolite ecgonine methyl ester, which is also known as methyl ecgonine. This metabolite is a unique by-product of the processing of cocaine by the human body. Respondent's urine sample contained approximately 225 nanograms per milliliter of cocaine and its metabolites. The results of the chromatography test were consistent with cocaine use. Respondent was notified on March 11, 1988, that he had tested positive for cocaine during his annual physical. The same day, Respondent submitted two urine samples for drug testing on his own initiative. One sample was given to Toxicology Testing Service. The other sample was given to North Shore Hospital where Respondent was referred by Dr. Benton Perry, Respondent's personal physician. Respondent tested negative for both urine samples given on March 11, 1988. It is not likely that an habitual user would have no positive nanogram readings nine days after the habitual use had stopped. Nanogram readings of a sustained user would be approximately 80,000 to 100,000 if use was continued up to the time of testing. Patients undergoing drug rehabilitation typically have positive test results in the low 1000 ng/ml. The quantity of a substance found in a urine sample is estimated by comparing the numerical value found in the sample with the numerical value of a drug screening from a control sample. Control samples are run at 100 nanograms per milliliter (ng/ml). A numerical value of 225 ng/ml indicates cocaine was ingested in some way but neither indicates the method of ingestion nor whether cocaine was knowingly ingested. The ingestion of milligram quantities of cocaine approximately 14 hours before a urine sample was given could produce a numerical value of 225 ng/ml. The Commission requires the employing agency to use an immunoassay screen that is capable of a minimum of 300 ng/ml of cocaine or cocaine metabolites. Screening tests are sold commercially with a minimum screening level of 300 ng/ml. The Metro Dade County maximum acceptable level for cocaine or cocaine metabolites is 50 ng/ml. Respondent has never knowingly used drugs or alcohol, and does not smoke cigarettes. Respondent never tested positive for drug use in any of his previous physical examinations during his seven and a half years as a police officer for the Miami Dade Police Department. Respondent never tested positive for drug use as a result of eight random drug tests administered to him after testing positive on March 2, 1988. 3/ Respondent did not drink excessive amounts of water or indulge in excessive exercise either before or after his test on March 2, 1988. The totality of the evidence refuted any inference that Respondent knowingly or unlawfully ingested cocaine prior to his annual physical on March 2, 1988. Respondent's testimony was credible and persuasive. Respondent's actions and conduct before and after his test on March 2, 1988, were not consistent with the actions and conduct of one who knowingly and unlawfully used cocaine.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a Final Order finding the Respondent not guilty of the charges in the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 7th day of September, 1990. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division Of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of September, 1990.
