Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto Respondent was a licensed dentist in Florida holding license number DN 0001025. Respondent graduated from Emory University Dental School in 1945, thereafter served two years apprenticeship with a practicing orthodontist before opening his own office in Coral Gables, Florida, where he practiced orthodontics for some 25 years before selling his practice and moving to the Tampa Bay area. Respondent is eligible for board certification. In November 1981 Respondent was working as an orthodontist at the Sheppard Dental Clinic in Seminole, Florida. On November 23, 1981, Valarie Rosenfeld went to Respondent to discuss orthodontic treatment to correct a deep overbite and severe overjet. At the time of this visit Miss Rosenfeld was 17 years old and had a severe Class II skeletal discrepancy with a 9.5 degree discrepancy between upper and lower jaws and an overjet of 12 mm. Respondent took some seven photographs of Miss Rosenfeld (Exhibit 2) showing generally the condition of her teeth and her facial profile. Be also took a cephalometric x-ray (Exhibit 3) and a panoramic x-ray (Exhibit 4) of Miss Rosenfeld. Respondent advised Miss Rosenfeld that it would be necessary to extract one tooth in her upper jaw and maybe a second tooth in order to improve her appearance. The purpose of this extraction was to make room in which to move the upper teeth to reduce the overjet. Respondent did not discuss surgery with Rosenfeld or fully explain to her the options available and the probable consequences of each of the options she may elect. Miss Rosenfeld has a thin maxillary bone which does not show up very well on the cephalometric x-ray taken due to a burnout in this x-ray at the location this fact could be determined. Absent adequate bone in which to move teeth it becomes very difficult to obtain much movement. In accordance with orders issued by Respondent Miss Rosenfeld's tooth number 12 was extracted by another dentist at a subsequent visit to the clinic. Respondent next saw Rosenfeld on December 16, 1981, when he put separators between her teeth to make room for bonds. Respondent intended first to install light wire braces to better level the teeth before this was replaced by heavier wire which would be tightened from time to time to move the upper teeth back and the lower teeth forward. Although he testified he planned to reduce the malocclusion using intrusion mechanics Respondent did not discuss with Miss Rosenfeld the headgear which she would have to wear at night during this process or fully explain the procedure to her. Following her December 16 visit, Rosenfeld was seen by a Dr. Bryant, an orthodontist who was replacing Respondent at the Sheppard Dental Clinic. Bryant saw Rosenfeld on December 22, 1981, when he fitted and cemented bonds on the teeth and put in the flexwire to level the teeth. She was next seen at the clinic on January 23 when Bryant religated the flexwire. The next visit on February 15, 1981, Bryant again religated the braces. Rosenfeld was last seen by Respondent on March 20, 1982, when he religated upper arch and observed lower arch. Rosenfeld was seen on April 24, 1982, by Bryant who advised her that three additional extractions would be required to correct the malocclusion. Rosenfeld then decided to obtain a second opinion before losing anymore teeth and went to see another orthodontist, John Harrison. When Dr. Harrison examined Rosenfeld he explained the three options available to her to wit: (1) do nothing, (2) attempt some movement of the teeth to reduce the overjet and overbite and (3) surgery. Dr. Harrison took additional x-rays and attempted to obtain the dental records from Sheppard's Dental Clinic but without much success. By this time Respondent no longer worked at Sheppard's and Harrison became quite frustrated by the lack of cooperation he got in attempting to obtain Rosenfeld's records. He received only the panoramic x-ray. Harrison made models of Rosenfeld's mouth, took cephalometric x-rays, made intra and extra-oral photographs and did quite a number of tracings from the cephalometric x-rays to better ascertain the misalignment of the upper and lower jaws. He discussed the various options with Rosenfeld and, at her request, commenced the mechanical intrusion needed to move the upper teeth back and the lower teeth forward. Harrison would not have extracted tooth number 12 because there is insufficient maxillary bone to allow much movement of the upper teeth or to fill the void created by the extraction. Harrison further opined that the orthodontic problem faced by Rosenfeld is wholly in the lower jaw and this can be fully corrected only by risky and expensive surgery. Attempting to correct the problem by retracting the upper teeth is, in his opinion, the wrong approach. He considers the entire problem is in the lower arch and retracting the upper teeth, which are satisfactory, to obtain a better alignment between the upper and lower teeth, simply creates another problem, viz. changing the existing good profile of the upper lip. Furthermore the thin maxillary bone in which the upper teeth are being moved is not adequate to accomplish much movement of the teeth and when the bonds are removed the upper teeth will likely return to their original position or close thereto. The cephalometric x-ray taken by Respondent on November 23, 1981, was overexposed in the part of the x-ray which would best show Rosenfeld's maxillary bone and thereby alert Respondent to the problem of moving the upper teeth. Dr. Harrison formed his opinion that Respondent's diagnosis and treatment of Rosenfeld was below minimum acceptable standards on his initial assumption (from the records he obtained from Sheppard's Dental Clinic) that the diagnosis and course of treatment were made with panoramic x-rays only. When he learned the day before the hearing that Respondent also had the benefit of the cephalometric x-ray, Harrison hedged his opinion and ultimately concluded that Respondent's diagnosis and course of treatment did reach minimal acceptable standards. Petitioner also called Dr. DeDominico, an orthodontist, who, at the request of Petitioner, examined Rosenfeld and her dental records. DeDominico concurred with Harrison that extraction of tooth number 12 was not indicated and it is unlikely the space vacated by the removal of that tooth can be closed by the movement of the other teeth on the upper jaw. DeDominico further opined that and adequate diagnosis could not be made from the x-rays taken by Respondent due to the "burnout" in this critical area of the cephalometric x-ray which concealed the thinness of Rosenfeld's maxillary bone. Failure to retake this x-ray before embarking on a plan of treatment that required an adequate maxillary bone for success, and that included an unnecessary extraction was, in his opinion, below the minimal acceptable standards for the dental profession. Respondent testified that his more than 20 years experience in orthodontics qualified him to properly diagnose Rosenfeld's problem without doing tracings from the cephalometric x-ray, and that he considered the cephalometric x-ray adequate for the diagnosis that was made. Further, extraction of tooth number 12 was necessary to provide space into which the upper could be moved to accomplish the retraction of the upper teeth desired. He did not explain the available options to Rosenfeld and never considered surgery as a viable option for the orthodontic problem presented by Rosenfeld. He also failed to apprise her of the full implications of the treatment he planned, such as headgear, for the mechanical intrusion or of the limited success to be expected from this procedure. Respondent's expert witnesses, whose depositions were received into evidence as Exhibits 9 and 10, both opined that the diagnosis and treatment of Rosenfeld by Respondent met minimum acceptable standards of the dental profession. One of these witness' credibility is somewhat tarnished by his testimony that the mandible can be induced to grow in an adult. Not only was this testimony deemed incredible by other expert witnesses but also even a layman generally understands that the skeletal structure does not continue to grow after maturity.
Findings Of Fact Mitchell is a highway construction contractor with its principal place of business located in Tallahassee, Florida. FDOT is the agency of the state of Florida which is responsible for the construction and maintenance of the roads designated as part of the State Highway System. On July 15, 1994, the parties entered into Contract No. 18,784 (contract) which required Mitchell to resurface the existing roadway, construct four (4) foot wide paved shoulders and perform other related work for $626,347.44 in State Project No. 59100-3512 (project) in Wakulla County, Florida. The contract incorporated by reference special provisions attached thereto and FDOT's Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction (1991) (Standard Specifications). The contract required Mitchell to complete the project within 84 calendar days. Construction began on August 31, 1994, which was contract day one (1). In order to construct and pave the shoulders, Mitchell had to remove the top soil and stabilize the subgrade. After removing the top soil, Mitchell hauled borrow material to the project site. Mitchell spread the borrow along the roadside and mixed it with the existing sub-soil. Mitchell then attempted to attain a certain required density by compacting the shoulders. Mitchell hauled borrow to the project site from October 5, 1994, through October 8, 1994, and on October 13, 1994. Mitchell rolled the surface of the shoulders on October 18, and 20-22, 1994. The contractor was unable compact the subgrade to the required density. On or about October 22, 1994, FDOT refused to pay Mitchell for additional material to reestablish grade on the shoulders. From approximately October 24, 1994, through November 11, 1994, Mitchell remixed and compressed the subgrade soil in an unsuccessful attempt to stabilize the shoulders. From October 25, 1994, through November 7, 1994, Mitchell wrote at least four (4) letters to FDOT discussing the problems at the project site in achieving required density and stabilization of the subgrade on the shoulders. These letters are not a part of the record in this case. However, the hearing transcript from February 15, 1995, clearly shows Mitchell's position: (1) Plastic materials beneath the subgrade (unexpected conditions not contemplated under the contract) were causing a delay on the project and preventing Mitchell from achieving the required density and stabilization of the subgrade; (2) Mitchell would have to excavate the plastic material and haul in additional borrow to reestablish the grade of the shoulders before stabilization could be obtained; (3) Mitchell needed an extension of time in which to complete the project; and (4) Mitchell wanted FDOT to pay for the expenses (not covered under the contract) that Mitchell would incur in curing the problem. On or about November 11, 1994, Mitchell informed FDOT in writing that Mitchell was suspending work on the project. Mitchell suspended work without obtaining FDOT's approval as required by the contract. By letter dated November 14, 1994, FDOT responded to Mitchell's four (4) letters. FDOT's letter did not specifically deny each of Mitchell's requests but made it clear that Mitchell's claims were unsubstantiated. FDOT took the position that Mitchell created the problems with compaction by failing to follow FDOT procedures: (1) Prior to hauling in stabilizing material, Mitchell did not submit a sample of the existing on-site material so that a lime rock bearing ratio (LBR) could be established to determine how much, if any, stabilizing material would be needed to obtain the required LBR; (2) Mitchell did not submit samples or get FDOT's approval of the material used for stabilization before spreading and mixing it on the project site; (3) Mitchell did not sufficiently mix the material used for stabilization so that density could be obtained; (4) Soil samples of the material beneath the area being stabilized, to a depth of approximately three and one half feet, indicated that it was suitable for compaction; (5) The sources of borrow material used in attempting to stabilize the subgrade were not approved as required by the contract; (6) Mitchell added unapproved material, in excess of what was required, to the borrow material hauled to the project site. FDOT wrote this November 14, 1994, letter after investigating the problem and performing certain field and laboratory soil tests. On December 12, 1994, Stephen Benak, District Construction Engineer for FDOT, made a visit to the project site to conduct further investigation. Later that day the parties had a meeting. Mitchell again explained to FDOT that unexpected conditions at the job site were causing problems and preventing the contractor from obtaining density requirements on the subgrade. FDOT again informed Mitchell: (1) The unapproved borrow material that Mitchell previously hauled to the project site was unsuitable and causing the problem; and (2) Mitchell's proposal to under-cut (excavate and haul more borrow material) was a drastic cure and not compensable under the contract. Mitchell did not immediately return to work on the project. With credit for twenty-four (24) rain days, the contract performance time increased to 108 calendar days. Taking the rain days and intervening holidays into consideration, FDOT determined that the contract term expired on December 20, 1994. Mitchell did not return to work at the project site until December 23, 1994. By letter dated December 29, 1994, FDOT gave Mitchell notice of the agency's intent to declare Mitchell delinquent on the project and to suspend its Certificate of Qualification and that of all its subsidiaries. This letter states that Mitchell was making unsatisfactory progress on the contract because the contract time had expired and the work was not complete. The letter refers to section 8-8.2 of FDOT's Standard Specifications and Rule 14- 23, Florida Administrative Code. On January 12, 1995, Mitchell filed a Request for Formal Hearing without making an additional request for extension of contract time. This petition states: Mitchell Brothers has filed timely requests for extension of contract time due to the delays resulting from the lack of constructability and differing site conditions of the project. Therefore, the Department's issuance of the notice of delinquency is invalid. After receiving Mitchell's request for hearing, FDOT designated Tom Kinsella, Esquire, as counsel for the agency. By letter dated January 23, 1995, Mr. Kinsella referred Mitchell's request for a hearing to DOAH. The Hearing Officer issued a Notice of Hearing on January 27, 1995, setting this matter for hearing in DOAH Case No. 95-289 on February 8, 1995. In order to allow the parties sufficient time for discovery, the Hearing Officer subsequently rescheduled the case for hearing on February 15 and 16, 1995. The parties took depositions every day from February 2, 1995, to February 13, 1995. Bill Carpenter, FDOT's Project Engineer on the project at issue here, was the first deponent. Prior to Mr. Carpenter's deposition, Mr. Kinsella inquired as to whether there were any outstanding time requests. Mr. Carpenter assured Mr. Kinsella that FDOT had addressed and denied all outstanding time requests in FDOT's letter dated November 14, 1995. At the formal hearing in DOAH Case No. 95-289 on February 15, 1995, Mr. Benak testified on FDOT's behalf. On direct examination, Mr. Benak testified that Mitchell made no "proper" requests for contract time extensions. During cross-examination, Mitchell questioned Mr. Benak concerning Mitchell's letters written between October 25, 1994, and November 7, 1994. Initially, Mr. Benak testified that Mitchell's letters were not "formal" requests for extension of contract time. The Hearing Officer ruled that two of these letters contained preliminary requests for extension of contract time. Mr. Benak subsequently questioned whether Mitchell's letters were timely pursuant to section 8-7.3.2, Standard Specifications. Without resolving the issue of timeliness, Mr. Benak conceded that the delay was on-going and that the agency had never written to Mitchell requesting more specific information about the delay, i.e. all documentation of the delay and a request for the exact number of days justified to be added to the contract time. Therefore Mitchell was never required to submit a more formal request for contract time extensions. However, Mr. Benak never conceded that Mitchell's preliminary requests were pending at the time the agency issued its notice of intent to declare Mitchell delinquent or that the agency failed to follow its own procedures before issuing that notice. Mr. Benak maintained that the contract did not provide for extensions of contract time for delays due to the fault or negligence of the contractor. He testified that FDOT's letter dated November 14, 1994, effectively denied Mitchell's pending preliminary requests for time extensions and informed Mitchell that the delay was due to the contractor's fault or negligence. Accordingly, FDOT was not required to solicit further information from Mitchell before issuing the December 29, 1994, delinquency letter. As the hearing on February 15, 1995, progressed, it became apparent that the parties disputed a variety issues involving mixed question of fact and law. In ruling on an objection which is not at issue here, the Hearing Officer stated: * * It seems to me the more pertinent, you know, a much more pertinent area -- and we haven't addressed this in terms of the Department's procedures, that would start a request for extension of time, and it appears that the Department has never acted on that. And you've raised a very interesting matter, and that is under the rules, apparently if that process has been initiated, you can't go to delinquency, which means that this activity, this that they've tried to initiate, lacks the appropriate legal predicate. That's a good point. After the hearing in DOAH Case No. 95-289 recessed on February 15, 1995, Mr. Kinsella advised Mitchell's counsel that FDOT would withdraw the delinquency. Mr. Kinsella wanted to alert Mitchell that it was unnecessary for witnesses to attend the hearing the next day. When the hearing resumed on February 16, 1995, FDOT filed its Notice of Withdrawal of Notice of Delinquency and Motion for Relinquishment and Remand of Jurisdiction. The motion states, "The Department is now withdrawing it (sic) notice of intent to declare delinquincy without prejudice, it appearing that all of Mitchell Brothers, Inc., requests for additional time may not have been addressed by the Department." However, competent persuasive record evidence indicates that FDOT made this determination based on the Hearing Officer's prior rulings and statements during the hearing on February 15, 1995. Mr. Kinsella stated on the record: * * After the conclusion of the hearing yesterday on the basis of the matters that came up in terms of whether the preliminary requests for time extensions have been properly met by the Department and evaluated and addressed in the correspondence as pointed out by the Court, we went back and evaluated, and determined that we don't believe those have been fairly met and addressed by the Department, and that this delinquency was premature for that reason. Counsel for Mitchell did not object to the motion to relinquish jurisdiction but requested an opportunity to submit a proposed order. The Hearing Officer stated that Mitchell could file a motion to submit a proposed order and that FDOT would have an opportunity to respond to that motion. The Hearing Officer did not set a date certain for the filing of the posthearing motion but Mitchell's counsel stated that the motion would be filed in a very brief time, within a day or two. February 16, 1995, was a Thursday. The following Monday, February 20, 1995, Mitchell filed a Motion to Permit Submittal of Proposed Findings and for Entry of a Recommended Order, a proposed recommended order for the Hearing Officer's signature, and a Motion for Attorney's Fees. DOAH's Clerk docketed Mitchell's motion to submit proposed findings and the proposed recommended order in DOAH Case No. 95-289. The Clerk docketed Mitchell's motion for attorney's fees under DOAH Case No. 95-1096F. That same day, the Hearing Officer entered an Order Closing File which did not retain jurisdiction over any issue in DOAH Case No. 95-289. Subsequent relevant pleadings and procedures arising in the instant case between February 20, 1995, and June 14, 1995, are set forth above in the Preliminary Statement and incorporated herein. The record indicates that the parties were at an impasse when Mitchell suspended work on the project on or about November 11, 1994. After FDOT's November 14, 1994, letter and the meeting on December 12, 1994, the parties certainly were aware of each other's positions, and were deadlocked as to the reason for the delay in stabilizing the subgrade. The dispute between them involved multiple questions of fact and law which are not at issue here. FDOT's December 29, 1994, delinquency letter gave Mitchell what it was entitled to, i.e., a point-of-entry to challenge, in an administrative proceeding, FDOT's position that Mitchell created the conditions causing the delay in stabilizing the subgrade. FDOT had a reasonably clear legal justification for issuing that letter based on sections 8-7.3.2 and 8-8.2 of FDOT's Standard Specifications and Rule 14-23, Florida Administrative Code. The delinquency letter was not issued and subsequently filed with DOAH for an improper or frivolous purpose. As of February 15, 1995, the 165th calendar day of the project, Mitchell continued to work on the project which was only 36 percent complete and which FDOT had not conditionally accepted. Mitchell has incurred $44,408.50 in attorney's fees and $18,071.13 in cost in litigating DOAH Case No. 95-289 and DOAH Case No. 95-1096F. Mitchell is also obligated to pay $1,045.00 to Carolyn Raepple, Esquire, who testified concerning the reasonableness of the fees and costs that Mitchell incurred in DOAH Case Nos. 95-289 and 95-1096F. FDOT has presented no evidence to rebut the reasonableness of these fees and costs.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a Class "D" Security Officer should be denied on the grounds set forth in the Department of State, Division of Licensing's (Department's) March 26, 1992, letter to Petitioner?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is 56 years of age. He has had numerous brushes with the law, many of them alcohol-related, dating back to 1956, but he has never been convicted of a felony. In June of 1956, Petitioner attempted to purchase a beer in Sacramento, California. He was 19 years old at the time and, although in the military, under the legal drinking age. Petitioner was arrested and charged with a misdemeanor violation of California's alcoholic beverage control law. He received a ten-day suspended sentence. In November of 1956, when Petitioner was stationed on a military base in Amarillo, Texas, he and friend, without authorization, went into a room on the base where weapons were stored. They took possession of a .38 calibre firearm and started "playing with it." Petitioner was arrested and charged with the misdemeanor offenses of unlawful entry and wrongful appropriation. He received a bad conduct discharge, which was suspended. After attending a rehabilitation training program, he returned to active military service. In May of 1962, Petitioner was arrested for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, a misdemeanor. He was subsequently convicted of the offense. His license was suspended for ten days and he was ordered to pay $25 in court costs. In the early part of 1964, Petitioner, along with several others, charged $700 worth of merchandise in a department store in Indianapolis, Indiana using credit card slips they had forged. Petitioner was arrested and charged with the felony offense of uttering a forged instrument. Adjudication of guilt on this charge was withheld and Petitioner was placed on three years probation. In October of 1968, while in Anderson Indiana, Petitioner was arrested and charged with theft by deception for having written checks in amounts that exceeded the balance of his checking account. The checks were actually written by Petitioner's estranged wife without his knowledge. The charge against Petitioner was dropped after restitution was made. In January of 1969, Petitioner was again arrested in Anderson, Indiana and charged with theft by deception for having written bad checks. These checks were written by Petitioner, but he did not realize at the time he wrote them that, because of his wife's check writing, he had insufficient funds in his account. Adjudication of guilt on this charge was withheld and Petitioner was placed on probation for a year. In February of 1970, Petitioner stayed in a Naples, Florida hotel for approximately three or four days. When he checked out, he did not have enough money to pay his bill. Petitioner was arrested and charged with the misdemeanor offense of defrauding an innkeeper. Less than a week later, Petitioner made restitution and the charge against him was dropped. The following month, while in Miami Beach, Florida, Petitioner was again unable to pay a hotel bill and, as a result, arrested and charged with defrauding an innkeeper. This charge was also dropped after Petitioner made restitution. In May of 1970, Petitioner was arrested and charged with breaking and entering a Naples, Florida restaurant with intent to commit grand larceny. The charge was unfounded and it was subsequently dropped. In January of 1971, Petitioner was driving a motor vehicle in Fort Myers, Florida that had an expired inspection sticker affixed to it. He was stopped by the police and a firearm belonging to a passenger was discovered in the vehicle. Petitioner was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a firearm and driving a vehicle with an expired inspection sticker. The former charge was dropped. With respect to the latter charge, Petitioner was fined $30 or $35. In October of 1971, Petitioner was arrested in Naples, Florida and charged with writing a worthless check. The check was in the amount of $20 or $25. At the time he wrote the check, Petitioner was unaware that he did not have enough money in his account to cover the check. Petitioner subsequently made restitution and the charge was dropped. In February of 1976, in Lauderhill, Florida, Petitioner was arrested and again charged with writing a worthless check. The amount of this check was less than $50. Petitioner pled guilty to this misdemeanor offense and was fined $10. In addition to paying the fine, Petitioner made restitution. That same month, Petitioner was arrested in Sunrise, Florida and charged with battery on his wife. The charge was unfounded and it was subsequently dropped. In July of 1976, in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Petitioner was arrested and charged with aggravated assault, assault and battery and petty larceny. All of these charges were unfounded; however, as a matter of convenience and pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner pled no contest to the assault and battery charge. Adjudication of guilt on this charge was withheld. Petitioner received a 90-day suspended sentence and a $352 fine, which was also suspended. The remaining charges against Petitioner were dropped. In December of 1977, Petitioner was again arrested in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. On this occasion, he was charged with two counts of writing worthless checks under $50. Petitioner subsequently made restitution and the charges were dropped. In February of 1980, in Jasper, Florida, Petitioner was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated, speeding, driving without a valid drivers license and refusing to sign a summons. The latter charge was dropped. Petitioner pled guilty to the remaining charges and was adjudicated guilty on these charges by the trial court. For speeding and driving without a valid drivers license, he was fined. For driving while intoxicated, he was also fined and, in addition, his drivers license was suspended and he was ordered to attend DWI school. In May of 1985, in West Palm Beach, Florida, Petitioner was arrested on a Dade County, Florida warrant that had been issued in 1980, when he had been charged with two felony counts of writing worthless checks. The checks had actually been written by Petitioner's daughter. After his arrest, Petitioner made restitution and the charges against him were dropped. In November of 1985, Petitioner was arrested in West Palm Beach, Florida and charged with driving while intoxicated. He pled guilty to this misdemeanor charge. The trial court adjudicated Petitioner guilty and suspended his license for six months and ordered him to attend DWI school. Petitioner has not been in trouble with the law since. He is now a law-abiding citizen, who is better able to control is intake of alcohol. In filling out Section 5 of his application for licensure, which addressed the subject of criminal history, Petitioner did not intentionally make any misrepresentations or omit any required information. It was his understanding that he was required to disclose information relating only to felony convictions in this section of the application.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding that Petitioner should not be denied licensure as a Class "D" Security Officer on the grounds cited in the Department's March 26, 1992, denial letter. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 18th day of August, 1992. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1992.
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued August 25, 2000, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating insurance licenses and appointments pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the allegations in this case, the Respondent has been licensed as a Life Health and Annuity Agent, Life Health and Variable Annuity Agent, and a Health Insurance Agent in this state. On March 7, 1982, the Respondent was celebrating her birthday, she turned 22 that day, and was returning home with her husband when the vehicle they were in was stopped for a minor traffic infraction (expired tag). Believing he had to perform a "pat down" for his safety, the officer felt the Respondent's purse and noticed a bulge in the shape of a small weapon. The small hand gun had been a birthday present to the Respondent. Upon discovering the weapon, the officer charged the Respondent with carrying a concealed firearm. Initially the Respondent entered a written plea of not guilty but subsequently changed the plea in open court to one of nolo contendere. In connection with the plea change, the court entered an Order Granting Probation and Fixing Terms Thereof. The fact that the Respondent was placed on probation is not disputed. Further, as the Court determined the Respondent was not likely to again engage in a criminal course of conduct, adjudication was withheld and probation set for a period of one year. The Respondent successfully completed that year of probation and has had no further incidents of criminal misconduct. The Respondent erroneously believed that the successful completion of the probationary period, and the fact that adjudication had been withheld, resulted in the expungement of the criminal record. As the Respondent later found out, criminal records are not automatically sealed or expunged. On November 2, 1999, the Respondent filed an application for licensure as a life health and variable annuity agent with the Petitioner. That application contained two questions dealing with the applicant's past criminal history. As to both questions, the Respondent erroneously entered "no" responses. Had the Respondent entered accurate answers, both responses would have been "yes" based upon the status of the Respondent's criminal record at the time the application was submitted to the Petitioner. The Respondent has a medical condition that she claims has damaged her long term-memory. According to the Respondent, she answered the questions as she did because she did not remember all the facts surrounding the criminal history at the time the application was completed but that, even if she had, she would have assumed the matter was sealed and fully resolved since adjudication was withheld. The Respondent's account in this regard has been deemed credible. The Respondent did not intend to mislead the Petitioner and acted more in ignorance of the law as to the prior arrest and probation than in willful disregard of her responsibility to disclose it. At the time Respondent completed her application for licensure she read the paragraph that appears at the bottom of the third page of said application in bold typeface that states: IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU HAVE READ ALL OF THE FOREGOING QUESTIONS CAREFULLY AND HAVE ANSWERED THEM FULLY. THIS IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT AS IT RELATES TO AN APPLICANT'S LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORDS. THE DEPARTMENT DEEMS ALL MATTERS THAT ARE PART OF AN APPLICANT'S LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORDS TO BE A SIGNIFICANT AND MATERIAL ELEMENT OF THE APPLICATION, THE OMISSION OF ANY PART OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORD IS A MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION OR MATERIAL MISSTATEMENT IN AND OF ITSELF. YOUR FAILURE TO DIVULGE YOUR COMPLETE LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORD ON THIS APPLICATION CAN RESULT IN YOUR APPLICATION BEING DENIED. In addition to the foregoing, the application submitted by the Respondent provided the following statement: Under penalty of perjury, I declare that I have read the foregoing application for license and the facts stated in it are true. I understand that misrepresentation of any fact required to be disclosed through this application is a violation of The Florida Insurance and Administrative Codes and may result in the denial of my application and/or the revocation of my insurance license(s). The answers provided by the Respondent to the two questions (application questions numbered 18 and 19) were incorrect, misleading, and were presumably used to support the issuance of the Respondent's licenses. Although the Respondent is eligible to have her criminal record sealed or expunged, as of the date of the hearing she had not completed that process. During the investigation of this matter, the Respondent fully cooperated with the Petitioner and obtained copies of documents as requested.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance impose an administrative fine against the Respondent in an amount sufficient to cover the costs of prosecuting this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ________________________________ J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. Santurri, Esquire Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Joseph H. Fernandez, Esquire The Law Offices of Brand & Fernandez, P.A. 2 Northeast 40th Street Suite 403 Miami, Florida 33137 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer/Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
The Issue At issue is whether Respondent's Florida real estate license should be disciplined upon charges that: (1) Respondent is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, as set forth in Count I of the Administrative Complaint; and (2) Respondent is guilty of having had a registration suspended, revoked, or otherwise acted against in any jurisdiction in violation of Section 475.225(1)(s), Florida Statutes, as set forth in Count II of the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Chapters 455, and 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Washington Moises Quinones, is and was at all times material to the Administrative Complaint a licensed Florida real estate salesperson, issued license number 0650737 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Washington Moises Quinones, was also a member of the Florida Bar. On or about August 29, 1997, the Florida Bar petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for an emergency suspension of Respondent's bar license. The petition filed with the Florida Supreme Court reflects that Respondent's "trust records reveal losses which approximate $350,000.00." On or about September 11, 1997, the Florida Supreme Court granted the petition for emergency suspension of Respondent's bar license, and suspended Respondent from the practice of law for the reasons set forth in the Petition.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent be found guilty of violation Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and 475.25(1)(s), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint, and that Respondent's real estate license be revoked in accordance with Section 475.25(1), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. RICHARD A. HIXSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Ghunise Coaxum, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32801 Washington Moises Quinones 5119 Agora Street Sebring, Florida 33872 James Kimbler, Acting Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Paul M. Leyden was licensed as a dentist in Florida in 1945 and was so licensed at all times here relevant. Helen Hampton went to Sheppard Dental Center on September 21, 1981, to have crowns on her lower teeth replaced and was referred to Respondent for consultation and treatment. At this initial appointment Respondent examined the crowns Ms. Hampton wanted replaced, viewed X-rays that Ms. Hampton had brought with her of these teeth, and advised Ms. Hampton that the existing crowns appeared to be alright. Ms. Hampton did not like the appearance of these crowns and wanted them replaced. An appointment to do this work was made. On October 1, 1981, Respondent removed the existing crowns on teeth Nos. 20 through 28 of Ms. Hampton and took impressions for replacement crowns. Decay was noted on teeth Nos. 21 and 22, the decay was removed, and the space left thereby cemented. The teeth were prepared and temporary crowns put on pending the construction of the permanent crowns by the laboratory. Ms. Hampton was given an appointment for October 12, 1981, to have the permanent crowns seated. The laboratory was two days late and on October 15, 1981, the permanent crowns were seated by Respondent. Ms. Hampton was pleased by the appearance of these crowns. On October 19, 1981, Ms. Hampton returned to Respondent for replacement of crowns on teeth Nos. 2, 3, 4, 9, and 14. At this time she complained of pain in the lower jaw where crowns had recently been put. At this time Ms. Hampton wanted tooth No. 24 redone but this was postponed until the crowns were replaced on the upper jaw on November 5, 1981. When Ms. Hampton first visited Respondent, he observed some irritation in her gums and prescribed a penicillin mouthwash. Subsequently, when Ms. Hampton complained about soreness in the lower jaw where crowns had been placed on teeth Nos. 20 through 28, Respondent again prescribed penicillin mouthwash. Before the crowns were replaced, he relied upon the X-rays Ms. Hampton provided. After the crowns had been replaced and Ms. Hampton complained of pain and soreness, no additional X-rays were taken. Respondent told Ms. Hampton that she could expect soreness for sometime after new crowns were installed Ms. Hampton's testimony that Respondent told her she could experience pain for two years after crowns were installed was denied by Respondent, who testified that he advises all his patients that crowns can be sensitive for three to six months. On November 23, 1981, when the redone crown was replaced on tooth No. 24, Ms. Hampton again complained of pain in the lower jaw and Respondent suggested she use a water pic. Ms. Hampton called the Sheppard Dental Center several times to talk to Respondent about the pain in her lower jaw, but was unable to make contact with him. When Respondent tried to return her calls, she was out. On December 14, 1981, Ms. Hampton did speak with Respondent on the telephone and complained about the pain. Respondent prescribed penicillin mouthwash with Phenaphen and suggested Ms. Hampton make an appointment for him to check her teeth. By this time Ms. Hampton had been in Respondent's office three times since he had placed the crowns on teeth Nos. 20 through 28, each time she complained of pain in those teeth, and each time Respondent had done other work in her mouth, paid scant attention to her complaints, and left Ms. Hampton quite dissatisfied with the treatment she received. Accordingly, when Respondent, on December 14, 1981, suggested Ms. Hampton come back for him to check her teeth, she did not do so. On December 15, 1981, Ms. Hampton went to John T. Flanigan, D.D.S., complaining of pain in her lower jaw and told him she had those crowns replaced some two months ago. Dr. Flanigan took Panorex X-rays, conducted a visual examination of Ms. Hampton's mouth, found the margins on some of the crowns short, which could cause sensitivity, and suggested she go back to the dentist who had installed the crowns. He did not treat Ms. Hampton. In his deposition (Exhibit 2) taken February 1, 1983, Dr. Flanigan reviewed the X-rays of Ms. Hampton's crowns and testified that tooth No. 20 had an open and short margin on the distal side; tooth No. 21 had an open margin on the mesial side; tooth No. 28 had an open margin on the mesial side; tooth No. 29 had an open margin on the mesial side; and several teeth had short margins on the lingual side. Dr. Flanigan concluded that the crowns on teeth Nos. 20 and 21 were below minimal acceptable standards for the community. In March, 1982, Ms. Hampton went to Woodrow W. Garcia, D.D.S., complaining of pain in the lower jaw. Dr. Garcia briefly examined her, took full mouth X-rays, and told her to go back to the clinic where she had the work done. His examination revealed, inter alia, a fracture of the root of one of the capped teeth. She told Dr. Garcia it hurt so bad "and so I advised her to have it extracted but to go back to the Sheppard Dental Clinic and let them do what they had to do over there because I did not want to take that case on" (Exhibit 1 p. 8). Ms. Hampton returned to Dr. Garcia on May 3, 1982, again complaining of pain. In his deposition (Exhibit 1) Dr. Garcia appears to confuse the March and May visits, as Exhibit 1 leaves some doubt as to whether X-rays were taken on the March or May visit, or both. Regardless of when the X- rays were taken, Dr. Garcia observed some decay on the capped teeth but performed no work on Ms. Hampton. Subsequent to her last visit to Respondent, Ms. Hampton complained to Petitioner and, on March 22, 1982, she was examined by Daniel R. Manrique, Jr., D.D.S. Dr. Manrique heard the patient's complaints, took X-rays of teeth Nos. 20 through 28, and conducted a clinical examination on Ms. Hampton. The radiological examination revealed (Exhibit 5): Tooth No. 20 - distal margin open and short Tooth No. 21 - mesial margin open and short Tooth No. 22 - mesial margin open and short Tooth No. 26 - mesial and distal margins open and short. The clinical examination revealed open margins on teeth Nos. 20 and 21 and margins short on all other teeth. On teeth Nos. 23 and 26 the margins were short as much as 2 mm. Dr. Manrique concluded that the work done on Ms. Hampton by Respondent failed to meet the minimum standards of the community. Following the examination of Dr. Manrique, Ms. Hampton went to a Dr. Collins and he replaced the crowns on the teeth that were bothering her. When open margins exist they can lead to decay of the tooth under the crown, as there is a space between the crown and the tooth that is not protected by enamel and can be attacked by bacteria. If the tooth is vital such decay will cause pain. A root canal had previously been done on Ms. Hampton's tooth No. 20, so this tooth was no longer vital. She would not experience pain if decay started in that tooth as she would in a vital tooth. Where short margins exist the crown does not cover the prepared surface where the enamel has been disturbed or removed by the dentist in preparing the tooth to receive the crown. Short margins can also lead to decay even if below the gingiva, as the exposed dentine is more susceptible to caries than is the tooth covered by enamel. Some tolerance in the fit of the crown over the tooth is inevitable; however, the amount of prepared tooth surface the short crown fails to cover should average about 50 microns, or .050 millimeters. Accordingly, a crown that is two millimeters short far exceeds the allowable tolerance. Since the enamel has been removed to prepare the tooth for the crown, failure of the crown to cover the prepared surface subjects the tooth to attack by bacteria where there is no enamel to provide protection. All witnesses, including Respondent, testified that the crown on tooth No. 20 should have been redone because of the open margin. The open margins on teeth Nos. 21 and 22 were also recognizable from the X-rays, as were the short margins on most of these teeth. Since the X-rays cannot penetrate the metal in the crown, all sides of the tooth cannot be observed on the X-rays that were taken. The only witness who acknowledged performing a clinical examination of Ms. Hampton while the crowns installed by Respondent were in place is Dr. Manrique. No evidence to rebut his clinical findings was submitted. Before crowns are permanently seated, it is routine dental practice to place these crowns on the teeth for which they are made to see if they fit. When doing this the dentist can observe if the crown covers the prepared surface and fits snugly to the teeth so no open margins will remain when the crown is cemented on. The crowns on teeth Nos. 20 and 21 should have been observed by Respondent to fit so poorly that open margins would exist when the crowns were permanently attached. Likewise, the crowns for teeth Nos. 23 and 26, which were short by two centimeters when examined by Dr. Manrique, certainly should have been found unacceptably short when first put on these teeth by Respondent. Leaving open margins on crowns sufficiently large that an explorer can be inserted between the crown and the tooth constitutes dental practice which fails to meet the minimum standards of performance generally prevailing in the community. Leaving margins on crowns that fail to cover as much as 1.5 to 2 millimeters of prepared tooth surface likewise fails to meet the minimum standards of performance in the community.
The Issue This is a license discipline case in which the Petitioner, by means of a three count Administrative Complaint, seeks to take disciplinary action against the Respondent on the basis of alleged violations of subsections (2), (14), and of Section 475.624, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.165, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent Beverly J. Merchant is currently a Florida state certified general appraiser, having been issued license number 000141 in accordance with Chapter 475, Part II, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to Respondent was as a state certified general appraiser with a home address of 548 San Esteban Avenue, Coral Gables, Florida 33146. On January 14, 1994, Graimark/MIG Joint Venture and/or Crown Revenue, Inc., ordered Respondent to perform an appraisal of Sunrise Gardens, an adult congregate living facility (ACLF), in Miami, Florida. On March 31, 1994, the Respondent completed the appraisal of the property. The Respondent's appraisal report made several references to zoning "variances." The use of the term "variances" was reasonable under the circumstances of the subject appraisal. The Respondent's appraisal report stated that the highest and best use of the property was not as an adult congregate living facility (ACLF), but as some other institutional use. Under the circumstances of the subject appraisal, the Respondent provided adequate support to indicate that under the applicable zoning provisions "another institutional use" was probably permissible by variance. The Respondent's appraisal report included a cost approach that utilized a cost factor for "convalescent hospital space," even though the highest and best use was a use other than an ACLF. The use of that cost factor was reasonable under the circumstances of the subject appraisal.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered in this case dismissing all charges against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of September, 1996, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 1996.
The Issue The issue is whether Mr. Pontigo should be awarded $7,150 in attorneys' fees and $300 in costs under Section 57.111(4)(a), Florida Statutes, because the Department brought a proceeding against him which terminated in Mr. Pontigo's favor, the proceeding was not substantially justified when initiated and no special circumstances make an award of fees unjust.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulated facts and the chronology of events filed by the Department on October 31, 1990, the following are found: On December 21, 1982, George S. Pontigo was convicted of three felony offenses (a tax violation, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and using a telephone to distribute cocaine). These convictions constituted violations of Section 493.319(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1982), for at the time of his convictions, Mr. Pontigo held Class "P" license #P00-00679 (detection of deception examiner license). On September 1, 1983, the Department of State, Division of Licensing filed an Administrative Complaint (Case No. C 83-24) to revoke that license. An informal hearing was held on October 25, 1983, during which several character witnesses attested to the unique circumstances of Mr. Pontigo's arrest and conviction, his good moral character, his competence as a polygraph examiner, his honesty and his suitability for licensure. The Department of State entered a Final Order on November 15, 1983, which specifically found that a denial of licensure based solely on Section 493.319(1)(c), Florida Statutes, was unwarranted as too severe. A period of probation for one (1) year was imposed. The probationary period ended on November 30, 1984. No conduct during the probationary period provided a basis for non-renewal of the license. Mr. Pontigo's license was renewed and has been continuously renewed since that date. On June 7, 1988, the Department again filed an Administrative Complaint to revoke Mr. Pontigo's Detection of Deception Examiner License, this time based upon Section 493.319(3), Florida Statutes, and the same criminal conviction of December 21, 1982, which had been the basis for the imposition of probation in the Department's Final Order of November 15, 1983. On June 28, 1989, the Department amended its Administrative Complaint. On August 18, 1989, Pontigo filed an answer and defenses, which argued that further disciplinary action was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and that the statute could not be applied retroactively to Mr. Pontigo. An informal hearing was held on this second effort to revoke Mr. Pontigo's license on October 3, 1989. An Order entered that same day by Fred Speaker, the internal departmental hearing officer, recommended that "in the interest of fairness, I would recommend the Division [of Licensing] honor the decision reached as a result of the hearing of October 25, 1983." The internal departmental hearing officer felt compelled, however, to revoke Mr. Pontigo's license. On November 7, 1989, the Department of State, Division of Licensing entered its second Final Order based upon the 1982 criminal conviction, this time revoking Mr. Pontigo's license. By letter dated November 21, 1989, the Department confirmed that the Final Order was issued after considering Mr. Pontigo's October 19, 1989 Memorandum of Law and the Affidavit of Representative Alberto Gutman of the Florida House of Representatives dated January 5, 1989. The Department stated in the Final Order that it revoked Mr. Pontigo's license based upon Section 493.319(3), Florida Statutes. That statute mandates the revocation of a license or denial of an application "... when the person or licensee has been convicted of a felony, regardless of whether adjudication was withheld or whether imposition of sentence was suspended, unless and until civil rights have been restored and a period of ten years has expired." This disciplinary provision was first enacted in 1986 as part of Chapter 86-193, sec. 17 Laws of Florida, and codified as Section 493.319(1)(p), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.). Before that time, a licensee could be disciplined if found guilty of a crime directly related to the business for which the license had been issued. Section 493.319(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1985). Amendatory language was added regarding convictions based upon a plea of nolo contendere in 1987 and the provision was renumbered. Chapters 87-135, sec. 3 and 87-274, sec. 10, Laws of Florida. By letter of May 9, 1988, the Secretary of State informed the Governor, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House, that the Department would be required to review all licensing files for possible revocation action based on the 1987 amendment. The 1988 Legislature authorized a transfer of funds within the Department for the purpose of reviewing existing Chapter 493, gun permits and Chapter 790, concealed weapons licenses for appropriate action. Chapter 88-557, sec. 30, Laws of Florida; Chapter 87-247, sec. 58, Laws of Florida. The permit at issue here was neither a gun permit nor a concealed weapons permit, so the authorization for a fund transfer is irrelevant. George Pontigo appealed the Final Order of the Department revoking his Detection of Deception License to the District Court of Appeal, Third District, by Notice of Appeal dated December 1, 1989. The Department did not oppose a motion filed in the appellate court to stay the effect of the revocation order, and a judicial stay of the revocation was granted on January 9, 1990. Mr. Pontigo filed his brief on March 19, 1990. On April 13, 1990, the Department entered an Amended Final Order dismissing with prejudice its Administrative Complaint. While the second round of administrative litigation with Mr. Pontigo had been pending, Congressional action placed the continued licensure of polygraph examiners in doubt, because the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, Public Law 100-347, effective December 27, 1988 would reduce the number of examiners throughout the country because the uses of polygraphy were restricted. Chapter 493 went through Sunset Review during the 1990 session of the Florida Legislature. By March 1990, the Department believed that the state licensure program for polygraph examiners would cease. Chapter 493 was revised by Chapter 90-364, Laws of Florida, so that as of October 1, 1990, Part II of Chapter 493, which had regulated polygraphers was repealed. Id., Sec. 10. After the Department determined that the polygraph licensure program would be phased out, it dismissed the Pontigo revocation action then pending in the Court of Appeal. The attorneys for George Pontigo filed a Petition for attorneys fees and costs pursuant to Florida Statute 57.111. For services rendered through November 8, 1990, the attorneys for Petitioner request $7,150.00 in legal fees and $300.00 in costs for a total of $7,450.00 The Department does not dispute the reasonableness of the amount claimed. The sole issue in this proceeding is whether attorneys fees and costs should be awarded to Mr. Pontigo under Section 571.111(4)(a), Florida Statutes, as a prevailing small business party because the actions of the agency were not substantially justified and no special circumstances exist which would make the award unjust.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of obtaining his real estate license by means of misrepresentation or concealment in violation of Section 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent is now, and at all times material to this proceeding, was licensed as a Florida real estate broker. He holds real estate broker's license number 3004152. Respondent passed the real estate broker's examination on April 22, 1996. From May 10, 1996, through September 8, 1996, Respondent was an inactive broker. Since September 9, 1996, Respondent has been a land developer and a real estate broker/officer of a real estate brokerage corporation in DeLand, Florida. There have been no prior complaints or disciplinary action against Respondent's Florida license. Respondent is also a licensed real estate broker in Massachusetts since 1966 and in Colorado since 1994. There have been no complaints or disciplinary actions against Respondent's license in those states. In 1981, Respondent sold a boat for $10,000 to a person who failed to make a full payment. About a year later, Respondent made a demand for payment from the buyer. An argument between Respondent and the buyer resulted in a pushing contest. About one month later, Respondent ran a traffic light in Laconia, New Hampshire. The law enforcement officer who stopped Respondent informed him that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Respondent was arrested and released on the same day. Until that time, Respondent was not aware that he had been charged with any offense. Respondent appeared in court with his attorney on October 15, 1982. After pleading guilty to the charge of simple assault, he paid a fine in the amount of $50. Respondent received a sentence of 10 days of jail time, suspended on good behavior, and given a conditional discharge. Respondent filed a application for a Florida real estate broker's license on August 17, 1995. He signed a notarized affidavit on the application form, swearing that his answers and statements were true and correct. The application form contained a question seeking the following information in pertinent part: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? This question applies to any violation of the laws of any municipality, county, state or nation, including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection, or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, paroled, or pardoned. . . . * * * Your answer to this question will be checked against local, state and federal records. Failure to answer this question accurately could cause denial of licensure. If you do not fully understand this question, consult with an attorney or the Division of Real Estate. From the record, it is found that Respondent clearly understood question nine. In response to this question, Respondent answered in the negative by marking the "no" box. Respondent asserts that his response was truthful at the time he signed the application because he had no independent recollections of the 1982 simple assault charge. He claims that he did not knowingly and intentionally give a false or incomplete response. Respondent testified that he would have disclosed his guilty plea if he had remembered it. Taking into account all evidence, Respondent's testimony is not persuasive. Petitioner's investigator subsequently questioned Respondent about the 1982 offense. Respondent then contacted his attorney in New Hampshire. The attorney obtained a copy of the court docket which was subsequently furnished to Petitioner. During the hearing, Respondent testified that he still cannot remember whether the police fingerprinted him after his arrest. Respondent claims that he cannot remember the judge pronouncing a sentence or his attorney explaining anything about the proceeding to him. Likewise, this testimony is not credited.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order revoking Respondent's real estate broker's license and fining him $1000. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Ghunise Coaxum, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N308 Orlando, Florida 32801 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire 1999 West Colonial Drive, Suite 211 Orlando, Florida 32804 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
