The Issue Should Petitioner's request for exemption from disqualification pursuant to Section 435.07, Florida Statutes, be granted?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Prior to August 9, 1996, Petitioner was employed by Avon Park Cluster Home in a position that required background screening. At the request of Petitioner's employer, Avon Park Cluster Home, the Department conducted a background check on Petitioner. As a result of this background check, it was determined that there were potentially disqualifying criminal offenses pending against Petitioner in the State of New York and the State of Florida. Because of the lack of information as to the disposition of these potentially disqualifying offenses the Department was unable to complete the background screening on Petitioner. In accordance with Section 435.05(1)(d), Florida Statutes, the Department, by letter dated August 9, 1996, advised Petitioner that it was his responsibility to provide the Department with the necessary documentation to show the disposition of those offenses so that it could complete its background check of Petitioner. By letter dated September 11, 1996, the Department advised Petitioner that since he had not been able to provide the Department with the necessary information as to the disposition of the potentially disqualifying offenses, the Department could make no screening determination and therefore, Petitioner was not eligible for a position requiring background screening. Subsequent to the Department's letter of September 11, 1996, Petitioner furnished certain information concerning the potentially disqualifying offenses. By letter dated October 9, 1996, the Department again advised Petitioner that it was unable to conduct a proper background screening with the information furnished by Petitioner. Therefore, Petitioner was not eligible for a position that required background screening and further advised Petitioner that he could request a hearing to be exempted from this disqualification. Petitioner timely requested a hearing which was afforded to him by the Department. At this hearing, Petitioner was allowed to present evidence to show that he was entitled to be exempted from this disqualification. After hearing Petitioner's evidence, the Department determined that Petitioner had failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that he was entitled to an exemption from disqualification. Petitioner timely requested a hearing under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Although Petitioner was given ample time and opportunity to present evidence of the disposition of the potentially disqualifying offenses, he failed to present any evidence of the disposition of those offenses. Likewise, Petitioner failed to present any evidence of rehabilitation or circumstances or evidence indicating that Petitioner would not present a danger if continued employment was allowed as required by Section 435.07(3), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard A. Doran General Counsel Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32299-0700 William Brown, pro se 504 West Halmcrae Boulevard Avon Park, Florida 33825 Jack Emory Farley Chief Legal Counsel, District 14 Department of Children and Family Services 4720 Old Highway 37 Lakeland, Florida 33813-2030
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, Michael R. Harrison, committed the violations alleged in an administrative complaint dated June 28, 1996, and if so, what discipline or penalty is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Michael R. Harrison is certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as a law enforcement and correctional officer, having been issued corrections certificate number 26101 on December 18, 1985, and law enforcement certificate number 26100 on July 2, 1987. At the time of the incident at issue, Officer Harrison was employed as a deputy with the Orange County Sheriff’s Office. On February 14, 1995, around 4:25 p.m., Harrison was parked in the woods on Willow Street in Zellwood, Florida, doing some paperwork. He observed two young black males engaged in what he thought was drug dealing. A yellow car pulled up to them, with a white male driving. The tag on the yellow vehicle was in Harrison’s plain view. Familiar with the area, and knowing that the white male did not live there, Harrison decided to run a check on the tag. The tag itself was slightly lopsided and not well-attached, and Harrison’s instincts made him suspicious of the situation. As soon as Harrison gave the tag number to the teletype operator, the yellow car began to pull away from the scene. It was apparent that the driver had noticed Harrison’s vehicle. Harrison began pursuit of the yellow car as he waited for the teletype response on the tag. By the time the tag response came over the radio, Harrison was totally absorbed with his pursuit. There was rush- hour traffic and the yellow car was on U.S. Highway 441, a busy thoroughfare. When Harrison made the stop and the driver produced his license, the computer check revealed that the license was restricted “for business purposes only.” After a brief inquiry that satisfied him that the suspect was not on his way home from work, Harrison arrested the driver on what he considered was a driver’s license violation. As he waited for a back-up deputy and a tow truck for the yellow car, Harrison searched the car and found a small quantity of marijuana. Harrison then charged the driver with the drug offense. In the meantime, and while Harrison was still pursuing the yellow car, the report on the suspected tag came back “negative” (a valid tag). The dispatcher reported that the tag “...should appear on a ’70 Ford, two-door, yellow in color.” This was the vehicle Harrison was pursuing. Moreover, the person to whom the vehicle was registered was the driver arrested by Harrison. Later, the same day as the arrest, Harrison filled out the arrest report, a form titled “Charging Affidavit.” Under the narrative statement of facts to establish probable cause, Harrison included this statement: “I ran the tag and it came back no record found.” (Petitioner’s Exhibit 1) Corporal McCarthy McCullough was reviewing reports at the end of her shift at Orange County Sheriff’s Office around 1 a.m., February 15, 1995. She read Deputy Harrison’s charging affidavit and questioned the sufficiency of his probable cause for the stop. She called him in to discuss the report. He tried to explain to her what “no record found” meant. Harrison admits that when Corporal McCullough talked to him, he was aware he had made an error on the form. He wanted to talk to his supervisor because Corporal McCullough was new on the job, but the sergeant was at school. Harrison felt he needed to amend the charging affidavit, but never did as “things just started happening too fast, and I didn’t have the opportunity.” (transcript, p.31, ll. 5-7) After Harrison left the shift, Corporal McCullough, still suspicious about the probable cause, ran the tag through the teletype herself and got the response described in paragraph 7, above. The next day she talked to her sergeant, and they got a tape of the message to Harrison from the communications center. The tape reflects the exchange between Harrison and the dispatcher when he gave the tag number to the dispatcher and asked for a “28-29,” which is code for a vehicle registration and check to see if the car was stolen or wanted for any reason. The answer, as acknowledged by Harrison at hearing, was the “negative” with information describing the car and driver stopped by Harrison. The statement by Harrison on his charging affidavit is patently false. Although no one formally administered an oath to him before he signed the form, his signature appears under this printed statement: “I swear and affirm the above statements are correct and true.” His signature is next to that of another law enforcement officer or correctional officer with this statement: “Sworn to and subscribed before me, the undersigned authority”. (Petitioner’s Exhibit 1) These statements and the title of the form itself were ample notice to Harrison that he was swearing to the truth of his handwritten report of the arrest and its probable cause.i Aside from his specious argument that he was not really “swearing” to the document, Harrison’s defense is that he never intended to make a false statement. Instead, he never listened to the dispatcher’s response, as he was intent on pursuing his suspect and was concerned for his safety in the pursuit. His instincts were that the driver had intended to deal drugs back on Willow Street, an area where he did not belong, and that because the tag was awry, there was some problem with the vehicle. When he was questioned by Corporal McCullough a simple admission that he had not listened properly to the dispatcher would have credited his excuse of a “mistake.” Instead, he stuck to his story and tried to explain what “no report” meant. His account of the incident is disingenuous and supports a finding that the report was intentionally false, perhaps from an overabundance of zeal to justify a stop that yielded two offenses. After the incident was referred to Internal Affairs, Harrison was dismissed from his position. He had been a deputy for six years without any suspensions or discipline for duty work. He and his partner once shared a commendation of “deputy of the month.”
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order finding that Michael R. Harrison knowingly made a false report, imposing one year’s suspension of his certificate and two years’ probation, with the further requirement that he complete appropriate retraining specified by the Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ Hearings Hearings MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 27th day of June, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Amy J. Bardill, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 H.R. Bishop, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 11239 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1239 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Respondent should be assessed the cost of a clean-up of contaminant which resulted from a motor vehicle accident in which he was involved on June 16, 1997, on State Road 64.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Ray W. Crawley, is a professional truck driver. On June 16, 1997, he owned a 1990 Mack tractor and an open dump trailer. At approximately 12:15 a.m., on June 16, 1997, Respondent was driving his rig east toward Lake Wales on State Road 64. He chose that road because, having driven it frequently, he knew it to experience normally low traffic and to be a high quality highway. On numerous occasions he had seen both cattle and deer on the highway, and it is a generally accepted fact that the wildlife have the right-of-way. Mr. Crawley had just passed through Zolfo Springs when, in his lights, he saw a cow on the roadside off in the distance. Before he could take any action to slow down, another cow ran onto the road from the south and into his truck. Later examination of the vehicle revealed that this caused the axle pin to shear. As a result, Mr. Crawley, who was driving between 55 and 60 miles per hour in a 60 mile per hour speed zone, lost control of his vehicle. It veered off the road to the right, struck a power pole, demolished a mailbox, went through a fence, and ended up on its side on the south side of the highway in a pasture owned by Ms. Carrie Graham. Mr. Crawley was pinned inside the cab of the truck for a while, but suffered only a cut on his head and pulled muscles. He either was able to extricate himself from the wreck or was freed by emergency medical technicians who arrived at the scene shortly after the incident, and who insisted he be taken to the hospital for observation. Mr. Crawley was not cited for speeding or for any other violation as a result of this accident. As a result of the overturning, Respondent’s truck leaked diesel fuel and hydraulic oil from the tractor onto the ground, and this material had to be removed from the site. Approximately 80 gallons of diesel fuel and 40 gallons of hydraulic oil were spilled. The Department contacted Ms. Graham’s brother, Mr. Ken Willis, and Mr. Crawley to inform them that the spill had to be cleaned up. Mr. Willis declined to do so because the cow which caused the accident did not belong to him or Ms. Graham, and he did not think liability for the cleanup was their responsibility. Mr. Crawley also declined responsibility for the cleanup. He claimed the accident was not his fault, and that because of the injuries he sustained, he was incapable of overseeing a contractor hired to effect the cleanup. Mr. Crawley’s tractor and the trailer were both totally destroyed as a result of this accident. His insurance paid him $20,000 for the tractor and $16,000 for the trailer. However, his insurance company declined to cover the cost of the cleanup, asserting a lack of fault on his part. Because Respondent did not agree to clean up the spill, the Department hired a contractor to remove the diesel fuel and hydraulic oil on June 20, 1997. The cost of the cleanup was $3,333.95, which was paid from the Water Quality Assurance Trust Fund. Respondent does not deny that a cleanup was required; that the Department paid to have the cleanup done by a contractor; that the cost of the cleanup was as stated; or that the cost was reasonable and proper. The cow which ran into the side of Mr. Crawley’s truck and prompted the accident was not owned by him. Though it is impossible to tell at this time, it would appear that this cow was with several (approximately 15) cows which were owned by Mr. John Eason, a citrus grower and rancher who runs cattle both on his home property and on pasture which he leases from someone else. The pasture he leases runs along State Road 64, and is totally fenced. There are two gates on the side which abuts the highway, and another gate which permits access to the pasture from the barn. There is also a small gate which permits access from the outside to the yard behind the owner’s property, from which access to the pasture may be gained through the barn. Mr. Eason relates he was called to the accident scene the evening in question and was told his cattle had escaped from the pasture. By the time he arrived, most of the cattle had been rounded up and were being put back into the pasture. He was also advised that it appeared the cattle had escaped through the second gate further down the road from the accident site. Since the cows could not have opened the gate, it is clear that the gate was left open by someone who used it earlier. After helping with the round-up of the remaining escapees, Mr. Eason got them back into the pasture and the gates were all closed. Once that was done, Mr. Eason made an examination of the dead animal and determined that it was a heifer. Mr. Eason claims not to have owned any heifers. If his claim is accepted as true, the dead animal was not his. He did not claim the carcass at the time, and the animal was hauled away by the driver of the wrecker which came to the scene. None of the animals owned by Mr. Eason bear his brand. Most are not branded at all, and those which are branded bear the brand of a prior owner from whom Eason purchased the animal. Taken together, the evidence presented at the hearing fails to show any negligence in this accident on the part of Mr. Crawley. The ownership of the cow in question cannot be determined with any degree of certainty, but it is likely the animal was owned by Mr. Eason. No evidence was presented to indicate who was responsible for leaving open the pasture gate through which the cow was given access to the highway. It does not appear that any identifiable party was negligent in this matter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a Final Order holding Respondent responsible for clean-up costs in the amount of $3,333.95 arising out of the spill in which he was involved on June 16, 1997. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Kisha R. Pruitt, Esquire Thomas M. Beason, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Paul S. Reed, Esquire Leonard A. McCue and Associates, P.A. 524 Ninth Street West Bradenton, Florida 34205-7737 Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 F. Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue Whether two policy statements issued by Respondent, TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18, are unadopted rules, as defined in section 120.52(20), Florida Statutes, that violate section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes.3/
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is a co-trustee of the Sparkhill Trust (the "Trust"), which was created in July 2009. Opinicus Sentinel, LLC ("Opinicus Sentinel") currently is a co-trustee of the Trust, and has been a trustee of the Trust since its creation. Barbara Williams is the manager of Opinicus Sentinel, and has served in that capacity since its creation.8/ Petitioner was appointed as a trustee of the Trust on October 11, 2016.9/ The Trust owns a 2001 Porsche 996/911 Turbo motor vehicle (hereinafter, "Vehicle"). Solely for purposes of this proceeding,10/ the Vehicle Identification Number ("VIN") of the Vehicle is WP0ZZZ99Z1S682830, as alleged in the Amended Petition. As of the final hearing, the Vehicle was located in Germany. During all times relevant to this proceeding, the Vehicle was located in a foreign country. Respondent is the state agency responsible for, among other things, implementing and administering chapter 319, Florida Statutes, governing the issuance of certificates of title for motor vehicles. See § 319.17, Fla. Stat. Background and Events Giving Rise to This Proceeding On or about September 30, 2014, Opinicus Sentinel——at that time, the sole trustee of the Trust——submitted an application consisting of completed Form 8204011/ and supporting documentation to the Lee County Tax Collector ("Tax Collector")12/ on behalf of the Trust, requesting issuance of a certificate of title for the Vehicle in the name of the Trust. The application included a letter from a motor vehicle dealer in London, Ontario, Canada, stating that the dealer had inspected the Vehicle and that the Vehicle's VIN is WP0ZZZ99Z1S682830. On or about October 22, 2014, the Tax Collector sent a letter to Ms. Williams, as manager of Opinicus Sentinel, stating that the application for certificate of title could not be processed "because all used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country must have the Vehicle Identification Number verified by a Division of Motorist Services Compliance Examiner." When asked for further explanation, the Tax Collector responded by electronic mail ("email"): The Lee County Tax Collector is a Constitutional Office that provides the services of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV). As such, we are bound by both statutory and department procedural guidance. Procedures often are entitled Technical Advisories. The technical advisory relied upon by this office indicates that all used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country must have the VIN verified by a Division of Motorist Services Compliance Examiner as referenced in TL-10 in effect on the date the correspondence was drafted. Email from Tax Collector to Barbara Williams, dated October 27, 2014 (emphasis added). This email directed Ms. Williams to contact Respondent if the trustee wished to challenge the denial of the application for certificate of title for the Vehicle. On November 3, 2014, Ms. Williams contacted Respondent, asserting that the Tax Collector's denial of the application for a certificate of title violated section 319.23(3)(a)2, Florida Statutes. Also on that date, Ms. Williams filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing with Respondent on behalf of Opinicus Sentinel, challenging TL-10 as an invalid and unadopted rule pursuant to section 120.56(4).13/ On November 24, 2014, Respondent sent a letter to Ms. Williams, refusing to issue the requested certificate of title. The letter stated: After researching the issue identified in your letter, the Department stands by the decision made by . . . [the Lee County Tax Collector]. Section 319.23(a)(2), Florida Statutes, states that, '[a]n appropriate departmental form evidencing that a physical examination has been made of the motor vehicle by the owner and by a duly constituted law enforcement officer in any state, a licensed motor vehicle dealer, a license inspector as provided by s. 320.58, or a notary public commissioned by this state and that the vehicle identification number shown on such form is identical to the vehicle identification number shown on the motor vehicle. Letter from Respondent to Barbara Williams, dated November 24, 2014 (emphasis added). The letter further stated: However, section 319.23(11), Florida Statutes, states that, '[t]he Department shall use security procedures, processes, and materials in the preparation and issuance of each certificate of title to prohibit to the extent possible a person's ability to alter, counterfeit, duplicate, or modify the certificate of title.' In the case at bar, the Department is choosing to implement the language found in 319.23(11) to ensure that the certificate of title is issued correctly. The Department has the authority to require VIN verifications on vehicles entering the state of Florida from a foreign country before a title can be issued. In subsequent correspondence to Ms. Williams, dated December 18, 2014, Respondent stated: I can only again point you to s. 319.23(11). Since April of 2000 the Department's policy is to require all used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country to have the VIN verified by a Motor Vehicle Field Office Compliance Examiner prior to being titled. * * * I have included a copy of the Department's Technical Advisory, TL 14-18, which explains the Department's policy in depth.[14/] On December 18, 2014, Respondent referred Opinicus Sentinel's Petition for Administrative Hearing to DOAH. The case was assigned DOAH Case No. 14-6005. On March 3, 2015, Opinicus Sentinel withdrew the petition, and the DOAH case file for Case No. 14-6005 was closed. Notwithstanding that Case No. 14-6005 was pending at DOAH, on February 25, 2015, Respondent sent Ms. Williams a letter dismissing the previously-filed petition for administrative hearing with leave to file an amended petition. The letter also asserted an additional basis15/ for Respondent's denial of the certificate of title for the Vehicle, specifically: Because the vehicle to be titled is not currently in Florida, clearly the vehicle will not be operated on the roads of Florida. Accordingly, the vehicle cannot be registered in Florida and the titling provisions of Chapter 319, Fla. Stat., do not apply. Therefore, the application for title you submitted to the Lee County Tax Collector pursuant to section 319.23, Fla. Stat. will not be approved. While DOAH Case No. 14-6005 was pending, Stephen J. Williams, as beneficiary of the Trust, filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing challenging both TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as unadopted and invalid rules pursuant to section 120.56(4). That case was assigned DOAH Case No. 15-0484 and ultimately was dismissed by Final Order dated March 25, 2015.16/ As previously noted, on October 11, 2016, Petitioner was appointed as a co-trustee of the Trust. On October 17, 2016, Petitioner, as a trustee of the Trust, initiated this proceeding by filing a Petition for Administrative Hearing, again challenging both TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as unadopted and invalid rules. As noted above, the scope of this proceeding subsequently was narrowed to eliminate the challenge to the substantive invalidity of TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18, so that the sole issue in this proceeding is whether TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 are unadopted rules that violate section 120.54(1)(a). The Challenged Statements: TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 TL-10, identified by the Tax Collector as the original basis for denial of issuance of the certification of title for the Vehicle, went into effect on April 30, 2014. The portion of TL-10 pertinent to this proceeding states: IV. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION * * * B. Vehicle identification number (VIN) verifications are to be completed by the applicant. * * * 2. VIN verification may be done by one of the following: * * * c. Florida Division of Motorist Services (DMS) Compliance Examiner, DMS or tax collector employees. * * * NOTE: All USED vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country, including dealer transactions, MUST have the VIN verified by a DMS Compliance Examiner. Technical Advisory RS/TL 14-18 is titled "Motor Vehicles Coming Into Florida from a Foreign Country." It states in pertinent part: All used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country (including dealer transactions) must have the vehicle identification number verified by a Motor Vehicle Field Office Compliance Examiner prior to being titled. * * * The Regional Motor Vehicle Field Office staff will perform an inspection of the vehicle that includes verification of the public VIN, confidential VIN or secondary VIN, manufacturer’s label or letterhead letter that states compliance with US vehicle standards, computer checks of NMVTIS/NICB data-bases, and a review of documentation showing vehicle clearance through US Customs (if applicable). Copies of these documents, including a copy of the completed form HSMV 84044, will be maintained in the regional office. The VIN verification will be completed by the compliance examiner on a form HSMV 84044, in lieu of a form HSMV 82040 or HSMV 82042. The compliance examiner will give the customer the original required documentation (including the original complete form HSMV 84044). The customer must submit all documentation to a tax collector’s office or license plate agency in order for him/her to apply for a Florida Certificate of Title. The undisputed evidence establishes that neither TL-10 nor RS/TL 14-18 have been adopted as rules pursuant to the procedures prescribed in section 120.54. Respondent did not present any evidence showing that rulemaking was not practicable or feasible. Respondent's Position Respondent admitted, in its Amended Responses to Requests to Admissions served on Petitioner on November 21, 2016, that TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 are intended to be, and are, of general application; that TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy and/or describe the procedure or practice requirements of Respondent; and that TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 have not been, and are not published in the Florida Administrative Code. Additionally, Respondent acknowledges that neither TL-10 nor RS/TL 14-18 have been adopted as rules. Respondent takes the position that Petitioner lacks standing to challenge TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as unadopted rules. Specifically, Respondent asserts that Petitioner has not suffered a "real or immediate injury in fact" for purposes of having standing because although the Tax Collector and Respondent referred the Trust to TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as grounds for denial of the certificate of title, they were not the "ultimate grounds" on which the Trust was denied a certificate of title. On this basis, Respondent asserts that it did not apply TL-10 or RS/TL 14-18 to Petitioner, so Petitioner did not suffer injury as a result of application of these statements. Respondent further asserts that because Petitioner cannot meet the requirements in section 319.23 to be entitled to issuance of a certificate of title for the Vehicle, Petitioner's claimed injury in this proceeding is speculative and hypothetical. To this point, Respondent argues that Petitioner's alleged injury in this proceeding is speculative because the Trust has not satisfied the requirements of section 319.23 for purposes of being entitled to issuance of a certificate of title. Specifically, Respondent argues that because the Vehicle is not physically present in the state of Florida, it is not being operated on the roads of Florida, and because it is not being operated on the roads of Florida, it is not required to be registered or to obtain a certificate of title——and, indeed, cannot be registered and a certificate of title issued until it is physically present in Florida. Accordingly, Respondent reasons, until the Vehicle is physically present in Florida and thus subject to registration and licensure requirements, TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 were not, and cannot be, applied to determine whether the certificate of title for the Vehicle should be issued. Also on this point, Respondent argues that Petitioner's alleged injury is speculative because Petitioner did not meet the requirement in section 319.23 that a physical examination of the Vehicle be made by the owner and a motor vehicle dealer licensed in the state of Florida. Respondent further asserts that Petitioner's alleged interest does not fall within the zone of interest of this proceeding. Specifically, Respondent argues that because the Vehicle is located in a foreign country, Petitioner is unable to establish that the Vehicle must be registered and a certificate of title issued in Florida. Respondent concludes: Because Petitioner cannot meet the burden of establishing that the motor vehicle in question is required to be licensed and registered in Florida, and because he failed to satisfy the application requirements of section 319.23(3)(a)(2), he cannot meet the burden of establishing that any interest in obtaining a certificate of title for the vehicle in question is within the 'zone of interests' to be protected and regulated.
The Issue Did the Department of Transportation (Department) improperly deny a refund to Petitioner of a penalty assessed pursuant to Chapter 316, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Department is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility of enforcing the provisions of Chapter 316, Florida Statutes. On June 7, 1999, the Department's Inspector Clemente Igracio stopped Petitioner's truck for an inspection. After inspecting Petitioner's truck, Inspector Igracio issued a Safety Report Citation numbered 0862152 wherein Petitioner was cited for the alleged violations of Sections 316.515(1) and (3) and 316.550, Florida Statutes. The total fine imposed was $1,600.00 which included a fine of $1,250.00 for the alleged violation of Section 316.515(3), Florida Statutes. However, since the maximum fine imposed for a Section 316.515(3), Florida Statutes, violation is $1,000.00, the total fine imposed was $1,350.00, which Petitioner paid. Subsequently, due to mitigating circumstances, the Department refunded Petitioner the $100.00 that it had paid for the alleged violation of Section 316.550, Florida Statutes. Petitioner does not protest the Section 316.515(1), Florida Statutes violation nor does it protest the Section 316.550, Florida Statutes violation. Petitioner stipulated that the combined length of the truck and trailer was 65 feet, 9 inches. Petitioner also stipulated that the length of the trailer was 42 feet, 10 inches. Inspector Igracio categorized the truck as a "straight- truck" because it had two axles and load-carrying capacity on the power unit. The vehicle in question is a two-axle vehicle with the cargo unit and motive power unit located on the same frame so as to form a single, rigid unit. The subject vehicle and trailer combination was 65 feet, 9 inches in overall length. The subject trailer was 42 feet, 10 inches in length. Petitioner did not have a permit to be over the legal length.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order denying the refund sought by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter Byra West Coast Towing 124 South Berkley Road Auburndale, Florida 32823 Kelly A. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
