Conclusions THE PARTIES resolved all disputed issues and executed a Settlement Agreement. The parties are directed to comply with the terms of the attached settlement agreement. Based on the foregoing, this file is CLOSED. DONE and ORDERED on this the QIhay of Qucenater > 201\, in Tallahassee, Florida. bd WM fer ELIZABETH DUDEK, SECRETARY Agency for Health Care Administration 1 Filed January 5, 2012 11:44 AM Division of Administrative Hearings A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO A JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: L. William Porter Assistant General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Office of the General Counsel (Interoffice) Carlos Muniz Deputy Attorney General/Chief of Staff Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs (electronic mail) Michael Verbitsky, President 2024 Hollywood Boulevard Hollywood, Florida 33020 (U.S. Mail) Eleanor M. Hunter Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 Mike Blackburn, Bureau Chief, Medicaid Program Integrity Finance and Accounting Health Quality Assurance Department of Health CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to the above named addressees by U.S. Mail, Laserfiche or electronic mail on this the fay of denne 2012. Agency Clerk State of Florida Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 412-3630/FAX (850) 921-0158 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (hereinafter referred to as “ Agreement”) is entered between the STATE OF FLORIDA, acting through its MEDICAID FRAUD CONTROL UNIT (hereinafter referred to as “MFCU”) of the OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (hereinafter referred to as “OAG”) and WELLSCRIPTS, LLC (hereinafter referred to as “WELLSCRIPTS”) and MICHAEL VERBITSKY (bereinafter referred to as “VERBITSKY”), acting through its authorized representative. As a preamble to this Agreement, the MFCU, WELLSCRIPTS, and VERBITSKY agree to the following: A. “WELLSCRIPTS,” “VERBITSKY,” and “Parties” Defined: As used in this Agreement, the term “WELLSCRIPTS” is defined as WELLSCRIPTS, LLC, an inactive Florida for Limited Liability Company, its current and former parent entities, predecessors, successors, and assigns, including the agents, employees, officers, and directors, and independent contractors of WELLSCRIPTS, their successors and assigns, to the extent such agerits and independent contractors were acting for or on behalf of WELLSCRIPTS. WELLSCRIPTS was dissolved on September 26, 2008. VERBITSKY was the president and owner of WELLSCRIPTS during the Covered Conduct. Collectively, WELLSCRIPTS, VERBITSKY, and MFCU are the “Parties,” as used herein. B. “Investigation” of the “Covered Conduct”: The MFCU conducted an investigation of WELLSCRIPTS concerning WELLSCRIPTS’ alleged improper claims for and receipt of Medicaid payments from Florida’s Agency for Health Care Administration (hereinafter Page 1 of 11 referred to as “AHCA”). As used herein, the term “Investigation” shall mean MFCU’s investigation into WELLSCRIPTS. As a result of this investigation, the MFCU alleges that WELLSCRIPTS improperly billed the Florida Medicaid program $346,887.88 for certain drugs. This calculation was based on an audit of the top seven (7) drugs billed by Wellscripts. Also, the MFCU alleges that WELLSCRIPTS was improperly reimbursed for medications billed to two assisted living facilities totaling $17,139.16. WELLSCRIPTS submitted these claims through Medicaid Provider Number 0268208-00. The MFCU alleges that the total amount improperly billed by WELLSCRIPTS to Florida’s Medicaid program is $364,027.04. This MFCU-investigated conduct is the “Covered Conduct,” as used hereafter. The “Covered Conduct” does not include any conduct or potential claims that WELLSCRIPTS may have administratively against AHCA or any other entity for billed services which have not yet been paid that are outside the scope and/or time frame of the conduct detailed above. . MFCU’s Claims: MFCU contends it has certain statutory and common-law civil claims against WELLSCRIPTS as a result of the Covered Conduct. . Motivation to Resolve Claims: The Parties desire to conclude the aforementioned Investigation into the Covered Conduct and to settle and compromise on all claims, including, but not limited to, any claims pursuant to Sections 68.081 through 68.092 Florida Statutes, against WELLSCRIPTS arising out of the Investigation that the MFCU either asserted or maintained against WELLSCRIPTS or could have asserted or maintained against WELLSCRIPTS. The Parties enter into this full and final Agreement Page 2 of 11 to avoid the delay, uncertainty, inconvenience, and expense of protracted litigation of these claims. NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the mutual promises, agreements, obligations, and covenants set forth, and for good and valuable consideration as stated herein, the Parties agree as follows: 1, Settlement Terms: a. Settlement Amount: WELLSCRIPTS’ relinquishment of all rights and interests in the monies previously seized from Bank of America Account Number 003738055311 totaling $219,193.66 plus interest. The monies previously seized are currently being held in the OAG’s Trust Account. b. Return of Funds Seized: The OAG agrees to abandon the claim for forfeiture of the seized currency from Bank of America Account Numbers 003671024535 and 003672757995 in the names of Michael Verbitsky and Ricki R. Kaneti totaling $22,253.27 and will return the funds to Michael Verbitsky and Ricki R. Kaneti. The funds will be returned to Michael Verbitsky and Ricki R. Kaneti’s counsel via check to Nason, Yeager, Gerson, White & Lioce P.A.’s trust account at Sabadell United Bank, Account Number 0215000258. c, Upon the signing of this Agreement by both parties, the MFCU will transfer to AHCA, $219,193.66 plus interest to satisfy the Medicaid program loss. d. Upon the signing of this Agreement by both parties, OAG agrees to voluntarily dismiss the Civil Action case number 2010 CA 015157 (09), which was filed in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit of Broward County, FL on April 6, 2010. OAG also agrees to voluntarily dismiss the Civil Forfeiture Action case number 2007 Page 3 of 11 CA 000765 (14), which was filed in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit of Broward County, FL on January 11, 2007. 2. MFCU’s Release: Subject to the exceptions in Paragraph 3 (“Scope of Release”) and Paragraph 4 (“Bankruptcy Provisions”), upon full execution of this Agreement by all Parties and WELLSCRIPTS’ simultaneous remittance to the MFCU of the settlement amount as provided in Paragraph 1, the MFCU agrees to release WELLSCRIPTS from any and all civil and administrative actions, causes of action, obligations, liabilities, claims, or demands for compensatory, special, punitive, exemplary, or treble damages, or demand whatsoever in law or in equity, which were asserted or maintained or could have been asserted or maintained, against WELLSCRIPTS based upon or arising out of the Investigation of the Covered Conduct specifically as defined in Preamble Paragraph B. However, the Agreement will have no actual or intended effect until executed by MFCU’s authorized representative. In the event WELLSCRIPTS makes payment of the Settlement Amount prior to full execution of this Agreement, MFCU may deposit the Settlement Amount in an escrow account pending execution and such deposit shall not be construed as acceptance of the terms of this Agreement. 3. Scope of Release: Notwithstanding any term of this Agreement, the following are specifically reserved and excluded from the scope and terms of this Agreement as to any entity or person, including WELLSCRIPTS: a. MFCU, AHCA, or other appropriate law enforcement or regulatory agency or private party suit against WELLSCRIPTS or any predecessor, successor, director, officer, employee, assign or agent of WELLSCRIPTS for: Page 4 of 11 i. Any administrative or civil cause of action for any violation of law arising out of the covered conduct and not encompassed within the Investigation as defined in Preamble Paragraph B; or ii. Any criminal liability. Accordingly, WELLSCRIPTS agrees not to assert the defenses of res judicata, collateral estoppel, excessive fines, or double jeopardy as to actions described in subparagraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this Paragraph 3. b. Any actions or matters involving the exclusion of WELLSCRIPTS or other entities or persons from Federal or State, including Florida, health care programs; c. Any administrative action(s) relating to professional licensure or adjudication of claims by persons or entities who are not parties to this Agreement; d. Any claims based upon such obligations as are created by this Agreement, e. Any liability to the State of Florida, including MFCU and OAG, for any conduct other than the Covered Conduct; f. Any express or implied warranty claims or other claims for defective or deficient products or services, including quality of goods and services, provided by WELLSCRIPTS; g. Any claims for personal injury or property damage or for other consequential | damages arising from the Covered Conduct; ! h. Any claims based on a failure to deliver items or services due; and i. Any action against a healthcare professional, including WELLSCRIPTS and any of its employees or agents, for practicing without the necessary license or certification. Page S$ of 11 . Bankruptcy Provisions: The Parties warrant and agree to the following bankruptcy provisions: a. WELLSCRIPTS warran ts that it has reviewed its own financial position and WELLSCRIPTS is solvent within the meaning of Title 11 of the United States Code §§547(b)(3) and 548 (a)(1)(B)Gi)@, and will remain solvent following its payment to the MFCU of the Settlement Amount. _ No Admission of Fault: This Agreement, any exhibit or document referenced herein, any action taken to reach, effectuate, or further this Agreement, and the terms set forth herein, shall not be construed as, or used as, an admission by or against any of the Parties of any fault, wrongdoing, or liability whatsoever. Entering into or carrying out this Agreement, or any negotiations or proceedings related thereto, shall not in any event be construed as, or deemed to be evidence of, an admission or concession by any of the Parties, or to be a waiver of any applicable defense. However, with the exception of certain bankruptcy provisions in Paragraph 4, nothing in this Agreement, including this Paragraph 5, shall be construed to limit or to restrict WELLSCRIPTS’ right to utilize this Agreement, or payments made hereunder, to assert and maintain the defenses of res judicata, collateral estoppel, payment, compromise and settlement, accord and satisfaction, or any legal or equitable defenses in any pending or future legal or administrative action or proceeding arising out of the specific subject matter of the Investigation, as defined in Preamble Paragraph B. WELLSCRIPTS does not admit MFCU’s contentions that arise from its Investigation of the Covered Conduct, set forth in Preamble Paragraph B, and specifically denies WELLSCRIPTS knowingly submitted any claims in Page 6 of 11 violation of state or federal law. This Agreement, and the payment, promises, and release provided hereunder, are not and shall not be construed to be an admission of liability or any acknowledgment of the validity of any of the claims that were or that could have been asserted by the MFCU against WELLSCRIPTS, arising out of the: Investigation, which liability or validity is hereby expressly denied by WELLSCRIPTS. . Denied Medical Claims: The Settlement Amount shall not be decreased as a result of the denial of claims for payment now being withheld from payment by AHCA or its intermediary agents related to the Covered Conduct. WELLSCRIPTS agrees not to resubmit to Medicare, Medicaid, or any State or Federal payer any previously denied claims related to the Covered Conduct and agrees not to appeal any such denials of claims. However, WELLSCRIPTS reserves the right to appeal and/or resubmit previously denied claims or seek administrative remedies with AHCA of those claims which are outside the scope of the Covered Conduct. . Complete Resolution: The Parties have agreed that the terms of this Agreement constitute a complete resolution and settlement of the claims asserted against WELLSCRIPTS by the MFCU, as well as the claims that could have been asserted against WELLSCRIPTS by the MFCU arising out of or as a result of the Investigation described in Preamble Paragraph B. Upon WELLSCRIPTS’ continued fulfillment of its obligations under this Agreement, and relinquishment of all rights and interests in the monies seized provided in Paragraph 1, the Investigation, as defined in Preamble Paragraph B, shall be concluded. Page 7 of 11 10. il. 12. 13, 14, Survival: This Agreement shal! be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the Parties and their successors, transferees, heirs, and assigns. Merger: This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the Parties with regard to the subject matter contained herein and all prior negotiations and understandings between the Parties shall be deemed merged into this Agreement. No External Representations: No representations, warranties, or inducements have been made by the MFCU concerning this Agreement other than those representations, warranties, and covenants contained in this Agreement. No Oral Modifications or Waivers: No waiver, modification, or amendment of the terms of this Agreement shall be valid or binding unless in writing, signed by the Party to be charged, and then only to the extent set forth in such written waiver, modification, or amendment. Failure of Strict Performance: Any failure by any Party to the Agreement to insist upon the strict performance by any other Party of any of the provisions of this Agreement shall not be deemed a waiver of any of the provisions of this Agreement, and such Party, notwithstanding such failure, shall have the right thereafter to insist upon the specific performance of any and all of the provisions of this Agreement. Choice of Law: This Agreement shall be governed by, and construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of Florida, without regard to its conflict of law principles. Release of Florida; WELLSCRIPTS fully and finally releases the MFCU, the OAG, and the State of Florida, its agencies, employees, servants, and agents from any claims (including attorney’s fees and costs of any kind) that WELLSCRIPTS has Page 8 of 11 15. 16. 17. 18. asserted, could have asserted, or may assert in the future against the MEFCU, the OAG, or the State of Florida, its agencies, employees, and agents arising out of or resulting from the Investigation as defined in Preamble Paragraph B. Contract Beneficiaries: This Agreement is intended to be for the benefit of the Parties only and by this instrument the Parties do not release any claims against any other person or entity, except to the extent provided in the immediately preceding Paragraph 14. Contribution from Medical Beneficiaries: WELLSCRIPTS waives and shall not seek payment for any of the health care billings covered by this Agreement from any health care beneficiaries or their parents, sponsors, legally responsible individuals, or third party payers based upon the claims defined as Covered Conduct. Litigation Costs: With exception of investigative costs and litigation costs, which may be specifically provided for in Paragraph 1, each party to this Agreement shall bear its own legal and other costs incurred in connection with this matter, including the preparation and performance of this Agreement. Unenforceable Clause: Neither Party shall challenge the legality or enforceability of this Agreement. If any clause, provision, or section of this Agreement shall, for any reason, be held illegal, invalid, or unenforceable, such illegality, invalidity, or unenforceability shall not affect any other clause, provision, or section of this Agreement, and this Agreement shall be construed and enforced as if such illegal, invalid, or unenforceable clause, section, or other provision had not been contained herein. Page 9 of 11 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. Arm’s Length Negotiations: The Parties executed this Agreement after arm’s length negotiations and it reflects the conclusion of the Parties that this Agreement is in the best interest of all the Parties. Each Party is satisfied with the Agreement’s language and construction, and therefore the interpretation of the terms of this Agreement shall not be construed against any of the Parties. Each Party represents that this Agreement is freely and voluntarily entered into without any degree of duress or compulsion whatsoever. Authority to Execute Agreement: The undersigned individuals signing this Agreement on behalf of WELLSCRIPTS represent and warrant that they are authorized to execute this Agreement. The undersigned MFCU signatories represent that they are signing this Agreement in their official capacities and that they are authorized to execute this Agreement. Effective Date: This Agreement is effective on the date of signature of the last signatory to the Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “Effective Date”). Non-Punitive Effect: The Parties agree that this Settlement is not punitive in purpose or effect. IRS Characterization: Nothing in this Agreement constitutes an agreement or representation characterizing the Settlement Amount for the purposes of the Internal Revenue Code, Title 26 of the United States Code. Public Disclosure: All Parties consent to the MFCU’s disclosure of this Agreement, and information about this Agreement, to the public. Introductory Signals: The introductory paragraph signals are for subject identification only and do not affect the meaning or become part of the Agreement. Page 10 of 11 WELLSCRIPTS, LLC FOR FLORIDA'S OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS PAM BONDI ATTORNEY GENERAL AY C. A oa * 3 ™ Carlos Muniz “ ie . J f- Deputy Attorney General/Chief of Staff Position: f , eal 4h vali Date: Date: Page 1! of Il (Page 1 of 48) POROA AGENCY FOR HESLIA CARE ADMINSTRATION: JEB BUSH, GOVERNOR CHRISTA CALAMAS, SECRETARY CERTIFIED MAIL. — 91 7108 2133 3932 8581 4299 September 7, 2006 Provider No: 026820800 License No: PH20057 Mr. Michael Verbitsky Wellscripts LLC 2024 Hollywood Boulevard Hollywood, Florida 33020 In Reply Refer to FINAL AUDIT REPORT CL No. 06-4308-000/P/AAE Dear Mr. Verbitsky: The Agency for Health Care Administration (the Agency), Bureau of Medicaid Program Integrity, has completed a review of claims for Medicaid reimbursement for dates of service during the period of December 1, 2004 through November 30, 2005. A preliminary audit report dated July 25, 2006 was sent to you indicating that we had determined you were overpaid $347,963.94. Based upon a review of all documentation submitted, we have determined that you were overpaid $347,963.94 for services that in whole or in part are not covered by Medicaid. A fine of $5,000.00 has been applied. The total amount due is $352,963.94. . Be advised of the following: (1) Pursuant to Section 409.913(23)(a), Florida Statutes (F.S.), the Agency is entitled to recover all investigative, legal, and expert witness costs. (2) In accordance with Sections 409.913(15), (16), and (17), F.S., and Rule 59G-9.070, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.), the Agency shall apply sanctions for violations of federal and state laws, including Medicaid policy. This letter shall serve as notice of the following sanction(s): ° A fine of $5,000.00 for violation of Rule Section 59G-9.070(7)(n), F.A.C. 2727 Mahan Drive « Mail Stop #4 Vallahassee, FL 32308 Visit AHCA online at www fdhe. state flus APPENDIX A (Page 2 of 48) Wellseripts LLC Page 2 of 4 This review and the determination of Overpayment were made in accordance with the provisions of Section 409.913, F.S. In determining the appropriateness of Medicaid payment pursuant to Medicaid policy, the Medicaid program utilizes procedure codes, descriptions, policies, limitations and requirements found in the Medicaid provider handbooks and Section 409.913, F.S, In applying for Medicaid reimbursement, providers are required to follow the guidelines set forth in the applicable tules and Medicaid fee schedules, as promulgated in the Medicaid policy handbooks, billing bulletins, and the Medicaid provider agreement. Medicaid cannot pay for services that do not meet these guidelines. Below is a discussion of the particular guidelines related to the review of your claims, and an explanation of why these claims do not meet Medicaid requirements. The audit work Papers are attached, listing the claims that are affected by this determination. REVIEW DETERMINATION(S) The audit included a comparison of your lawful documented product acquisitions with your paid Medicaid claims. Only product acquisitions from Florida licensed wholesalers were included in the review. The audit period for this review was from December 1, 2004 through November 30, 2005. The drug quantity paid for by Medicaid, in some instances, exceeded the quantity available to dispense to Medicaid recipients. This review identified an overpayment of $347,963.94. Enclosed for this revicw are the overpayment calculations which include the summary sheet(s), the paid claims data, and acquisition data. If you are currently involved in a bankruptcy, you should notify your attorney immediately and provide a copy of this letter for them. Please advise your attorney that we nced the following information immediately: (1) the date of filing of the bankruptcy petition; (2) the case number; (3) the court name and the division in which the petition was filed (e.g., Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee Division). If you are not in bankruptcy and you concur with our findings, remit by certified check in the amount of $352,963.94, which includes the Overpayment amount as well as any fines imposed. The check must be payable to the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration. Questions regarding procedures for submitting payment should be directed to Medicaid Accounts Receivable, (850) 488- 5869. ‘To ensure proper credit, be certain you legibly record on your check your Medicaid provider number and the C.I. number listed on the first page of this audit report. Please mail payment to: Agency for Health Care Administration Medicaid Accounts Receivable P.O. Box 13749 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-3749 If payment is not received, or arranged for, within 30 days of receipt of this letter, the Agency may withhold Medicaid payments in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 409.913(27), F.S. Furthermore, pursuant to Sections 409.913(25) and 409.913(15), F.S., failure to pay in full, or enter into and abide by the terms of any repayment schedule set forth by the Agency may result in termination from the Medicaid Program. Likewise, failure to comply with all sanctions applied or due dates may result in additional sanctions being imposed. (Page 3 of 48) Wellscripts LLC Page 3 of 4 You have the right to request a formal or informal hearing pursuant to Section 120.569, F.S. Ifa request for a formal hearing is made, the petition must be made in compliance with Section 28- 106.201, F.A.C. and mediation may be available. Ifa request for an informal hearing is made, the petition must be made in compliance with rule Section 28-106.301, F.A.C. Additionally, you are hereby informed that if'a request for a hearing is made, the petition must be received by the Agency within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of this letter. For more information regarding your hearing and mediation rights, please see the attached Notice of Administrative Hearing and Mediation Rights. Any questions you may have about this matter should be directed to: Arlenc Elliott, Senior Pharmacist, Agency for Health Care Administration, Medicaid Program Integrity, 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #6, Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403, telephone (850) 921-1802, facsimile (850) 410-1972, Sincerely, @. katy D. Kenneth Yon AHCA Administrator aae Enclosure(s) cc: Christopher Parrella, J.D., CHC Health Law Offices of Anthony C. Vitale, P.A. 799 Brickell Plaza Suite 700 Miami, Florida 33131 Medicaid Accounts Receivable Arlene Elliott (Page 4 of 48) Wellsenpts 110 Page suf NOTICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING AND MEDIATION RIGHTS You have the tight to request an administrative hearing pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes. If you disagree with the facts stated in the foregoing Final Audit Report (hereinafter FAR), you may request a formal administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57{L), Florida Statutes. If you do not dispute the facts stated in the FAR, but believe there are additional .feasons to grant the relief you seek, you may request an informal administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes. Additionally, pursuant to Section 120.573, Florida Statutes, mediation may be available if you have chosen a formal administrative hearing, as discussed more fully below. The wnitten request for an administrative hearing must conform to the requirements of either Rule 28-106.201(2) or Rule 28-106.301(2), Florida Administrative Code, and must be received by the Assistant Bureau Chief by 5:00 P.M. no later than 21 days after you received the FAR. The address for filing the written request for an administrative hearing is: Assistant Bureau Chief Medicaid Program Integrity Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #6 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 The request must be legible, on 8 % by 11-inch white paper, and contain: 1. Your name, address, telephone number, any Agency identifying number on the FAR, if known, and name, address, and telephone number of your representative, if any; 2. An explanation of how your substantial intcrests will be affected by the action described in the FAR; 3. A statement of when and how you received the F. AR; 4. Fora request for formal hearing, a statement of all disputed issues of material fact; 5. Fora request for formal hearing, a concise statement of the ultimate facts alleged, as well as the rules and statutes which entitle you to Telief; : 6. Fora request for formal hearing, whether you request mediation, if it is available; 7. For a request for informal hearing, what bases support an adjustment to the amount owed to the Agency; and 8. A demand for relief. A formal hearing will be held if there are disputed issues of material fact. Additionally, mediation may be available in conjunction with a formal hearing. Mediation is a way to use a neutral third party to assist the parties in a legal or administrative proceeding to reach a settlement of their case. If you and the Agency agree to mediation, it does not mean that you give up the right to a hearing. Rather, you and the Agency will try to settle your case first with mediation. Tf you request mediation, and the Agency agrees to it, you will be contacted by the Agency to set up a time for the mediation and to enter into a mediation agreement. If a mediation agreement is not reached within 10 days following the request for mediation, the matter -will proceed without mediation. The mediation must be concluded within 60 days of having entered into the agreement, unless you and the Agency agree to a different time period. The mediation agreement between you and the Agency will include provisions for sclecting the mediator, the allocation of costs and fees associated with the mediation, and the confidentiality of discussions and documents involved in the mediation. Mediators charge hourly fees that must be shared equally by you and the Agency. 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026820800 ‘ oem nae
The Issue The issue in this case is the amount of the Petitioners' personal injury settlement required to be paid to the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) to satisfy its Medicaid lien under section 409.910, Florida Statutes (2013).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners are the grandparents and legal guardians of Taya Rose Savasuk-Maldonado, who is 11 years old. On October 2, 2010, Taya and six family members were involved in a horrific car crash. The driver of another car (the tortfeasor) failed to stop at an intersection and slammed into the family van, which rolled over, ejecting three passengers, including Taya and her great-grandparents. The great- grandparents died on the pavement next to Taya, and Taya suffered severe injuries, including a skull fracture, pancreatitis, bleeding in her abdomen, and severe road rash that required multiple skin graft surgeries and dressing changes so painful that anesthesia was required. Taya has significant, permanent scarring, which has left her self-conscious and unwilling to wear any clothing that exposes her scars, including bathing suits and some shorts. Taya's emotional injuries include nightmares and grief over the loss of both great-grandparents. Other family members also suffered injuries. Taya required emergency and subsequent medical care that has totaled $257,567 to date. It is not clear from the evidence how much, if any, of that total was reduced when providers accepted Medicaid. Future medical expenses are anticipated, but there was no evidence as to the amount of future medical expenses. The tortfeasor had a $100,000/$300,000 Hartford insurance liability policy on the car he was driving at the time of the accident. Hartford agreed to pay the policy limits. The injured family members agreed that $200,000 of the policy limits should be paid to Taya. On October 14, 2013, Hartford and the Petitioners agreed that the Petitioners would release Hartford, the tortfeasor and his wife (the other owner of the car) in return for payment of $200,000 to be held in trust by the Petitioners' attorneys for distribution as follows: $60,000 to be paid to the Prudential Assigned Settlement Services Corporation to fund future payments to Taya beginning in year 2020; up to $84,095 to lienholders in amounts to be determined; and the balance to the Petitioners' attorneys. The parties to that agreement, which did not include AHCA, agreed that $51,513 of the $200,000 should be allocated to payment of Taya's medical bills, with the rest allocated to claims other than medical expenses. There was no evidence that anything has been paid to AHCA towards its Medicaid lien, or that anything has been paid into an interest-bearing trust account for the benefit of AHCA pending the determination of the amount of its Medicaid lien, which at the time was claimed to be $55,944. The owner of the family van involved in the accident had a $10,000/$20,000 GEICO underinsured motorist policy, which also paid the policy limits. Although the evidence was not clear, the Petitioners appear to concede that all $20,000 was recovered by them for Taya's benefit. There was no evidence as to when the family's claim against the GEICO policy settled, or as to any agreement how the $20,000 should be allocated between medical expenses and other kinds of damages. There was no evidence that any of the $20,000 was paid to AHCA towards its Medicaid lien, or into an interest-bearing trust account for the benefit of AHCA pending the determination of the amount of its Medicaid lien. In addition to the insurance policy settlements, the owners of the other car paid the family approximately $250,000 from their own assets, which the family members agreed to apportion among themselves in a manner that was not disclosed by the evidence. There was no evidence as to when those funds were paid to the family, or when any of those funds was paid to Taya's benefit, if any. The evidence was not clear whether any of those funds was paid towards Taya's medical expenses that were not paid by Medicaid. The evidence suggested that some of the $250,000 was paid towards Taya's medical expenses to date, but it is possible that some of those expenses were reduced when providers accepted Medicaid. There was no evidence that any of those funds was paid to AHCA towards its Medicaid lien claim, or into an interest-bearing trust account for the benefit of AHCA, pending a determination of the amount of its Medicaid lien. A personal injury lawyer, who also was Taya's guardian ad litem, testified that the value Taya's claims against the owners of the other car was approximately $1.4 to $1.8 million. He did not testify as to the amount future medical expenses would contribute to the total value he estimated. AHCA has paid $55,710.98 in Medicaid benefits to treat Taya for her accident injuries. (The Petitioners stipulated to this amount.) Lee Memorial Hospital provided medical services for Taya and claims that it is owed $38,317.05, for which it appears to claim a statutory lien. The evidence was that Lee Memorial refused to accept Medicaid in payment for those services. If Medicaid were accepted, the amount of AHCA's lien would be more than $55,710.98, but probably not $38,317.05 more.
The Issue Is proposed rule 59G-3.010(4)(b)2.c. an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, for reasons described in the respective petitions that formed the basis of this dispute? See Section 120.56(2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The party Florida Medical Association, Inc., a not for profit corporation is organized and maintained for the benefit of approximately 17,000 licensed physicians who are its members. It represents the common interests of those members. Some of its members provide services under the terms contemplated by proposed rule 59G-3.010(4)(b)2.c. Likewise, Robert Anthony Savona, D.O.; John F. Hull, D.O.; and Robert Kagan, M.D., as licensed physicians, provide services contemplated by a proposed rule 59G- 3.010(4)(b)2.c. Respondent is the agency responsible for administering the state Medicaid Program under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 1396 et seq. and Section 409.901, et seq. Florida Statutes. This responsibility includes reimbursement of Medicaid providers. Respondent offered the proposed rule for adoption. The services contemplated by proposed rule 59G- 3.010(4)(b)2.c., in which the rule describes a payment mechanism, are in association with patients who are Medicare and Medicaid eligible. The arrangement contemplated by the proposed rule is in relation to Medicaid reimbursable services which complement Medicare. Under the proposed rule, Medicare Supplemental Insurance (Part B) is paid for the deductible and coinsurance for the Medicare and Medicaid eligible recipients by the Medicaid fiscal agent, in accordance with a rate identified in the proposed rule. The recipients of the services from physicians under the proposed rule, eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid benefits, are also referred to as Qualified Medicare Beneficiaries (QMBs). QMBs are described as poor, elderly and disabled persons. In pertinent part the proposed rule states: 59G-3.010 Medicaid Services Complementing Medicare. * * * (4) Medicaid Reimbursable Services which Complement Medicare. * * * (b) Medicare Supplemental Insurance (Part B). * * * 2. The Medicare Part B deductible and coinsurance is paid for the Medicare and Medicaid eligible recipient by the Medicaid fiscal agent at the following rates: * * * c. Physician services, including doctors of medicine, doctors of osteopathy, and providers of chiropractic and podiatric services are reimbursed 100 percent of the deductible and 100 percent of the coinsurance only to the extent that the total payment received does not exceed the Medicaid fee for the service provided. If there is no comparable Medicaid fee for the service, the Medicaid fee is calculated to be 50 percent of the Medicare approved charge for the service provided. In these situations, whether the physician did or did not receive a payment from Medicaid, by billing Medicaid he is bound to the Medicaid payment schedule as payment in full. Other parts of proposed rule 59G-3.010(4)(b)2. at a., b., d., and e. address Medicare Part B deductibles and coinsurance for other providers as follows: Part B patient hospital services are reimbursed 100 percent of the deductible and coinsurance. Rural health centers, federally qualified health centers and county health departments are reimbursed their encounter rate minus the amount of Medicare's payment. * * * Pharmacy providers are reimbursed 100 percent of the deductible and 100 percent of the coinsurance only to the extent that the total payment does not exceed the Medicaid fee for the service provided. Other Part B suppliers are reimbursed 100 percent of the coinsurance and 100 percent of deductible. Under Medicare Part B, 80 percent of reasonable costs or charges for the delivery of health care to Medicare eligible patient is paid through the Medicare program as a premium. That program is administered by the federal government under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C., Section 1395 et seq. That payment is a form of insurance. The remaining 20 percent is anticipated to be paid by the patient as copayments or coinsurance, in addition to an annual deductible. The proposed rule in relation to physician services addresses the manner in which some portion of the 20 percent is "crossed-over" to be paid for potential payment through the Medicaid program administered by Respondent using federal and state funding, pursuant to Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C., Section 1396 et seq. and Section 409.901 et seq., Florida Statutes. Payment to the physicians for their services in relation to the deductible and coinsurance depends upon the application of the formula in the proposed rule. The formula contemplates reimbursement to the physicians at less than 100 percent of the deductible and 100 percent of the coinsurance because the Medicaid fee schedule is generally lower than the federal Medicare fee schedule for the same services. In fact, in most cases the physicians will receive no payment for the deductible or coinsurance above the 80 percent payment under the Medicare fee structure in relation to the basic Medicare premium. By comparison to other health care and service providers discussed in the proposed rule, some other individuals and entities are reimbursed at 100 percent of the deductible and coinsurance and others are not guaranteed reimbursement at 100 percent. The formulas for reimbursement for services provided under the proposed rule related to Medicare Part B deductible and coinsurance are influenced by the results of quarterly estimating conferences held between legislative and executive branch staff. Those estimators, within respective categories of services, examine the performance of the various categories of services concerning fiscal impact through a comparison of available revenues against expenditures. This assists in the preparation of future budgets upon the recommendation of the governor to be passed by the legislature. Respondent assists in preparation of budget requests, to include recommendation for policy changes related to the amount of expenditures for the various services performed for the benefit of Medicare and Medicaid eligible recipients, QMBs, who are entitled to the payment of their deductible and coinsurance under Medicare Part B. However, the impetus for the reimbursement formula for physician services described in the proposed rule has a more precise origin, for reasons now explained. A prior version of Rule 59G-3.010(4), Florida Administrative Code in effect on April 8, 1996, was challenged in an administrative proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings. That version limited the amount of reimbursement for physician services associated with Medicare Part B deductible and coinsurance in a different manner than the proposed rule. In the decision of Reynolds v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 18 F.A.L.R. 3474 (Fla. DOAH 1996) the rule was held invalid. Among the cases cited for this decision was Pennsylvania Medical Society v. Snider, 29 F.3d 886 (3d Cir. 1994) and Haynes Ambulance Service, Inc. v. State of Alabama, 36 F.3d 1974 (11th Cir. 1994). The federal court cases refer to the recipients of cost reimbursement for deductibles and coinsurance as QMBs. Essentially, they are the same persons who are described in the proposed rule as Medicare and Medicaid eligible. Although the rule had been declared invalid, Respondent continued to exercise the policy of denying payment of Medicare deductibles and coinsurance on physician crossover claims at 100 percent of the deductible and 100 percent of the coinsurance as contemplated by the federal court cases. Following Respondent's return to the policy of not paying the deductible and coinsurance at 100 percent for physician services, Petitioner's Savona, Hull, and Kagan brought a lawsuit in federal count to compel payment for physician services to QMBs at the Medicare rate. On March 3, 1997, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida granted a final injunction that required Respondents to pay the physician class in the lawsuit at the Medicare rate for services provided to QMBs. See Savona v. Cook, Case No. 4:96CV14-WS (N.D. Fla. 1997). After the decision in Savona, Respondent pursued a policy of paying the deductible and coinsurance at 100 percent of the Medicare rate. This policy lasted from March 3, 1997 until October 1, 1997. To facilitate the payment for physician services at 100 percent of the Medicare rate for the crossover claims related to the deductible and coinsurance, Respondent amended its state Medicaid plan, with the federal Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). In addition, Respondent sought an appropriation through the legislature to fund the increase in copayments to assure that physician services were reimbursed at 100 percent of the Medicare rate for the deductible and coinsurance. This led to the passage of Chapter 97-152, Laws of Florida, Item 248, the 1997-98 General Appropriations Act, which set aside monies from the General Revenue Fund and from the Medical Care Trust Fund, totaling $87 million for Medicare Part B copayment for reimbursement of physician services for the dually eligible recipients. This refers to recipients eligible for services under Medicare and Medicaid. The 1997-98 fiscal year for that appropriation began July 1, 1997, and continues until June 30, 1998. The amount appropriated has proven more than adequate to meet the copayment for physician services at the 100 percent Medicare rate. Another document, prepared by persons unknown, was associated with the appropriations process for 1997-98. That document is referred to as Respondent's Ex No. 1 and is entitled 1997-98 General Appropriations and Summary Statement of Intent. It sets out the exact language in Chapter 97-152, Laws of Florida, Item 248, related to the $87 million for full Medicare Part B copayment for physician services. It also sets out a summary statement of intent that is not found within the General Appropriations Act. The language in that summary statement of intent is as follows: It is the intent of the Legislature that the funds in Specific Appropriation 248 which are provided to pay the full Medicare part B co- payment for physician services to clients who are dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid, be expended only to the extent currently required by federal law. In the event that changes in federal law relating to reimbursement for these services occurs, the Agency for Health Care Administration shall directly submit to the federal Health Care Financing Administration any amendments to the state Medicaid Plan which are necessary to realize cost savings options permitted by and in compliance with federal law. As anticipated by the summary statement of intent, federal law relating to reimbursement for physician services did change in August of 1997 when Congress enacted the Congressional Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Section 4714. In pertinent part it stated: * * * (2) In carrying out paragraph (1), a State is not required to provide any payment for any expenses incurred relating to payment for deductibles, coinsurance or copayments for medicare cost-sharing to extent that payment under title XVIII for the service would exceed the payment amount that otherwise would be made under the State plan under this title for such service if provided to an eligible recipient other than a medicare beneficiary. That law became effective October 1, 1997. By its terms it created the option for states to reduce payments on crossover claims to the state Medicaid rate, although it did not mandate that outcome. The payment option created by the congressional enactment had application to all categories of providers. In view of the Congressional Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Respondent decided to change its payment policy to disallow payment for physician services at the 100 percent Medicare rate in all instances for physician services related to the deductible and coinsurance for dually eligible recipients. The effective date of the change in policy was October 1, 1997, coinciding with the effective date of the Congressional Budget Act. Respondent implemented its policy change without the benefit of rule adoption. The failure to implement the payment policy by rule adoption was challenged in the case of Savona v. Agency for Health Care Administration, DOAH Case No. 97-5909RU (Fla. DOAH 1998). On January 16, 1998, Respondent gave notice of rule development, to include the preliminary text of the rule. For this reason, the February 12, 1998, order entered in DOAH Case No. 97-5909RU denied the petition for determination of invalidity of the non-rule policy brought in accordance with Section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes. Consistent with its notice of rule development, Respondent published notice of proposed rulemaking pertaining to the rule under challenge here. That publication was made on February 13, 1998, through the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 24, No. 7. The specific authority for rule promulgation was Section 409.919, Florida Statutes, and the law to be implemented was Section 409.908, Florida Statutes. No mention was made of the summary statement of intent associated with the 1997-98 General Appropriations Act in Florida and the Congressional Balanced Budget Act of 1997. The testimony of Richard T. Lutz, Director of the Division of State Health Purchasing, Agency for Health Care Administration, at hearing established his reliance upon those latter two items as authority for promulgating the proposed rule in relation to the copayment for physician services under Medicare Part B, for the deductible and coinsurance. Mr. Lutz was principally responsible for the promulgation of the rule as policymaker for the Respondent. In addressing the difference in the reimbursement policies for physician services, contrasted with other services detailed in the proposed rule, Mr. Lutz indicated that changes in relation to reimbursement policies, other than for physicians, would be the product of an estimating conference showing the financial impact of the changes, followed by a budget item to effect the changes. In the absence of that impetus, Mr. Lutz described that he had been instructed that the methodologies that were in place for various services under Medicare Part B utilizing established methodologies for the reimbursement practices would remain in effect. Unlike the circumstances existing in the proposed rule, for classes of providers other than physicians, Mr. Lutz in behalf of Respondent took the initiative in dealing with reimbursement for physicians care under Medicare Part B when promulgating the proposed rule. He concluded that the terms of the federal court order in Savona were subject to the language in the summary statement of intent, and with the advent of the Congressional Balanced Budget Act of 1997 Respondent was at liberty to change its reimbursement scheme for physician services effective October 1, 1997. In making the policy choice to promulgate the proposed rule, Mr. Lutz recognized the option which Florida had to either limit copayments or continue copayments at the Medicare rate for physician services under Medicare Part B. In promulgating the proposed rule Mr. Lutz identified that the Agency did not consider language in Section 409.908(13), Florida Statutes. He did indicate in his testimony the belief that the preamble to Section 409.908, Florida Statutes, creates authority for promulgation of the proposed rule in its comment about the Respondent's ability to make payments in accordance with methodologies that are set forth in its rules, manuals, and handbooks, consistent with limitations placed in the General Appropriations Act and any statement of legislative intent. Mr. Lutz in promulgating the proposed rule recognized that the physician services under Medicare Part B copayment for deductible and coinsurance would eventuate in no payment beyond the 80 percent premium in many instances. Although Mr. Lutz expresses the opinion that the proposed rule for payment of physician services under Medicare Part B has retroactive application to October 1, 1997, he acknowledges that the language in the proposed rule makes no reference to its retroactivity to that date.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent is liable to Petitioner for the principal sum of $94,675.83, which equals the amount that the Florida Medicaid Program paid Respondent for the "professional component" of claims for radiologic services rendered to Respondent's patients between July 1, 2001 and December 31, 2005.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA" or the "Agency") is the state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program ("Medicaid"). Respondent Harold L. Murray, M.D. ("Murray") was, at all relevant times, a Medicaid provider authorized to receive reimbursement for covered services rendered to Medicaid beneficiaries. Exercising its statutory authority to oversee the integrity of Medicaid, the Agency sent investigators to Murray's office on November 22, 2005. The purpose of this visit was to verify that claims paid by Medicaid had not exceeded authorized amounts. To this end, the investigators inspected Murray's facilities and reviewed his medical records. What the investigators saw gave them reasons to believe that Medicaid had been overpaying Murray for radiologic services. They focused on the period from July 1, 2001 to December 31, 2005 (the "Audit Period"). During the Audit Period, Murray had submitted approximately 2,000 claims seeking the "maximum fee" for radiologic services, which Medicaid had paid. The maximum fee includes compensation for "professional component" services. (Medicaid uses the term "professional component" to describe the physician's services of interpreting a radiologic study and reporting his or her findings. These services are distinguished from those comprising the "technical component," which are routinely performed by technicians. These latter services include operating the radiologic equipment (e.g. an X-ray or sonographic machine) and performing the exam.) It appeared to the investigators that Murray had not, in fact, been performing the professional component. Using information in its database, the Agency determined that, during the Audit Period, Murray had received Medicaid payments totaling $94,675.83 for professional component services. The Agency repeatedly requested that Murray supply additional information that might substantiate his prior claims for fees relating to the professional component. Murray failed, refused, or was unable to comply with the Agency's requests. Murray did testify at hearing, however, providing a reasonably clear picture of what had occurred. On direct examination, Murray explained that he had performed the "first preliminary" review of each radiologic examination in question before sending the study to a radiologist, whom he paid "out of [his own] pocket" to interpret the exam and make a report. According to Murray, Medicaid paid only for his (Murray's) professional component services——not the radiologist's. Murray argues that he is entitled to compensation for the professional component services that he personally performed, notwithstanding that another doctor performed the same services. Analysis of the Facts Although Murray's position might have some superficial appeal, it does not withstand scrutiny as a matter of fact, the undersigned has determined. To explain why this is so requires an analysis of Murray's testimony that entails neither legal conclusions nor findings of historical fact. The undersigned's rationale, being essentially fact-based, is explicated here in the interests of organizational coherence and readability. Assume first, for the sake of argument, that Murray's "first preliminary" review constituted an authoritative interpretation of the radiologic study. Because it is reasonable to infer (and the undersigned finds) that the radiologist's subsequent interpretation of the study was authoritative——Murray's routine practice of ordering and personally paying for the "second opinion" would have been inexplicable, and indeed irrational, if the radiologist's interpretation were of dubious value——the inevitable conclusion, assuming Murray's findings were authoritative, is that the "second opinion" was nearly always duplicative, excessive, and unnecessary.i Murray's responses to that conclusion doubtless would be: (1) Medicaid did not pay for the second opinion, so whether it was excessive and unnecessary is irrelevant; and (2) there is no statute, rule, or Medicaid policy that forbids a provider from procuring, at his own expense, a second opinion——even an unnecessary one. It is not accurate to say, however, that Medicaid did not pay for the second opinion; this, ultimately, is the fatal flaw in Murray's reasoning. To the contrary, Murray's testimony shows clearly that Medicaid did pay for some or all of the expense of the second opinion, albeit indirectly, when it paid Murray for the same work. As his own account reveals, Murray was, in effect, merely a conduit for the Medicaid money, which passed through his hands on its way to the radiologist. Murray contends, of course, that the Medicaid payments for the professional component were "his," that he had earned them by performing the "first preliminary" read, and that he was free to spend his income however he chose. If our initial assumption were true, namely that Murray's preliminary interpretation were authoritative, then his claim to the Medicaid payments at issue might have merit. But, on reflection, this assumption is difficult, if not impossible, to square with the fact that Murray found it necessary always to pay another doctor to perform the very same professional component services. Indeed, having a second opinion was so important to Murray that he was willing to perform his purported preliminary read at a substantially discounted rate, at least, if not for free——or even, maybe, at a financial loss: in every instance, one of these was necessarily the net economic result of his actions.ii If, as we have assumed, Murray were performing a valuable professional service each time he interpreted a radiologic exam, then——the question naturally arises——why would he effectively have given away his expert opinions? Murray testified that he did so for "the safety of [his] patient" and because the radiologist is "educated for that." But these "answers," far from being persuasive, actually undermine the assumption that spawns the question of motive. Indeed, Murray's testimony confirms a reasonable inference contrary to our initial assumption, which inference is that Murray lacked sufficient confidence in his so-called "preliminary" interpretations ever to rely on them alone. This inference, which the undersigned accepts as a finding, arises from the basic undisputed fact that Murray routinely sought "second opinions" for every patient. It is ultimately determined, therefore, that whatever Murray's "first preliminary" reviews comprised, they did not constitute authoritative interpretations of the radiologic studies at hand. That being the case, it is determined that Murray's preliminary opinions added little or no actual value to the subject medical transactions. Offering some sort of provisional opinion that holds only until the "real" opinion can be obtained from the radiologist is not tantamount to performing the professional component.iii Based on the evidence presented, it is determined that the radiologist performed the professional component of the radiologic studies at issue, not Murray. As a result of improperly claiming that he had performed professional component services when in fact he had not, Murray received from Medicaid a total of $94,675.83 in payments that were not authorized to be paid. This grand total of $94,675.83 constitutes an overpayment that Murray must return to the Agency.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a final order requiring Murray to repay the Agency the principal amount of $94,675.83, together with an administrative fine of $1,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 2007.
Conclusions THE PARTIES resolved all disputed issues and executed a Settlement Agreement. The parties are directed to comply with the terms of the attached settlement agreement. Based on the foregoing, this file is CLOSED. DONE and ORDERED on this the ,2 day of -;{ Tallahassee, Florida. , 2009, m HOLLY BENSON, SECRETARY Agency for Health Care Administration 1 Filed June 29, 2009 1:44 PM Division of Administrative Hearings. A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO A JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: L. William Porter II, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration (Laserfiche) William M. Furlow, Esquire Metzger, Grossman, Furlow & Bayo, LLC 1408 N. Piedmont Way Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (U.S. Mail) Lawrence P. Stevenson Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 Ken Yon, Bureau Chief, Medicaid Program Integrity Kathy Herold, Medicaid Program Integrity Finance and Accounting CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to the above named addressees by U.S. Mail on this th f L ) ,2009. c§ Richard Shoop, Esquire Agency Clerk State of Florida Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 922-5873
Findings Of Fact The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) received a letter of intent (LOI) dated October 21, 1988 from "Ocala Healthcare Associates Joint Venture." That letter of intent provided that the proposed applicant sought to add twenty-five community nursing home beds to its 35 bed facility then under construction, in HRS District 3 in Marion County, Florida. The letter of intent was a prerequisite to filing an application for a certificate of need (CON) authorizing those beds. The October 21, 1988 LOI was accompanied by a "certificate of resolution" of Ocala Healthcare Associates Joint Venture of even date. That resolution was certified by Winston A. Porter. HRS generally does not recognize a joint venture as a legal person or entity capable of applying for and holding a certificate of need, based upon an opinion of its legal counsel and based upon the fact that Chapter 10-5 Florida Administrative Code, at its definition of "applicant" does not include the entity known as a "joint venture." There is no specific prohibition, by statute or rule, against joint ventures holding certificates of need, however, and the Department's witness, Ms. Gordon-Girven also acknowledged that the Department has no specific policy prohibiting issuance of a CON to a joint venture. In any event, on November 23, 1988, "Ocala Healthcare Associates General Partnership" filed an application for a certificate of need pursuant to the previously filed letter of intent. In its letter of December 2, 1988, HRS rejected that application on the basis that "the applicant submitting the application was not the same as the applicant identified in the letter of intent." Upon learning of this, Mr. Winston A. Porter, the owner of the parent entity and chief operating officer of the applicant entity, or general partner, immediately notified HRS that the joint venture named in the letter of intent and the general partnership named in the application were actually one and the same entity and that the use of the term "joint venture" in the letter of intent and resolution was a mere clerical error. In corroboration of this position, in fact, Ocala Healthcare Associates general Partnership (Ocala) had already altered its form from a joint venture to a general partnership by way of "an amendment and conversion of Ocala Healthcare Associates Joint Venture to General Partnership Agreement" entered into and dated December 10, 1987. That conversion agreement had been done at the behest of HRS, based upon its advice to Mr. Porter and Ocala Healthcare Associates, Inc. that the Department did not recognize joint ventures as capable of holding certificates of need. It was thus done to comply with HRS' own requirements. HRS does not license joint ventures to operate nursing homes but does license general partnerships for that purpose. The minimum requirements for the certificate of need application require that the legal name of the applicant and parent corporation be given. Rule 10-5.008(1)(d), Florida Administrative Code quoted below, contains no specific "minimum requirements" regarding how the name of an applicant should be listed on an application nor that it should agree or be the same in all cases as that depicted on the letter of intent. The Rule merely incorporates the application form as to "minimum requirements" by reference. The form, in turn, requires only that the applicant's name be entered, not that the name be the same as that on the letter of intent. Ocala, on its certificate of need application listed its legal name just as it truly is, that is, Ocala Healthcare Associate General Partnership. It, of course, had listed its name by mistake, on the letter of intent as "Ocala Healthcare Associates, Joint Venture." The CON application, however, also indicated that the current general partnership, Ocala Healthcare Associates General Partnership, was indeed the same entity as the former joint venture. Further, HRS was on constructive and actual notice of the change in business form undergone by Ocala at HRS' behest in December, 1987. Be that as it may, however, no rule or policy of the Department specifically states that an application for a CON and the related letter of intent must be filed by exactly the same entity. In fact, however, here the evidence shows that the letter of intent and the application were actually filed by the same entity. The controlling and owning members or partners of Ocala Healthcare Associates General Partnership were listed in the letter of intent, even though it was mistakenly called a joint venture, and were also listed in the application. They were named as, and are, one and the same entities. Further, the minimum requirements depicted in the application form say nothing about the applicant's name and the name depicted in the letter of intent being identical. HRS' position that the letter of intent and the application be identical or filed by the same entity is designed to put potential competitors on notice of who the new attempted market entrant is. Here that purpose was accomplished anyway. Ocala never attempted to mislead anyone by its filing of the letter of intent under the "joint venture" name. The joint venture is owned and controlled by the same entities as the general partnership and the component parts of the joint venture and general partnership are identical. Further, HRS personnel involved with this matter were on notice, both constructively and actually, that the joint venture had been dispensed with and the general partnership had supplanted it. Finally, the agency was not prohibited from notifying Ocala of the apparent discrepancy in the names depicted on the letter of intent and on the application, but it took no such action, even though its certificate of need review personnel were on actual notice that Ocala had altered its business form from that of joint venture to general partnership.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered accepting Ocala's application for a certificate of need for comparative review with other applicants in the November 1988 batching cycle. DONE AND ORDERED this 2nd day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 1989. APPENDIX Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraphs 2-16: Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Accepted. Paragraph 3: Accepted. Paragraph 4: Accepted. Paragraph 5: Accepted. Paragraph 6: Accepted. Paragraph 7: Rejected as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence and as subordinate to the hearing officers findings of fact on this subject matter. Paragraph 8: Rejected as to its' material import and as contrary to the preponderant evidence and subordinate to the hearing officers findings of fact. Paragraph 9: Rejected as not material to resolution of the narrow range of issues in this proceeding. COPIES FURNISHED: R. Bruce McKibben, Jr., DEMPSEY AND GOLDSMITH Post Office Box 10651 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Richard H. Patterson, Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, FL 32308 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
