Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioners were inmates incarcerated at Union Correctional Institution in Raiford, Florida. As of the date of final hearing in this cause, Petitioner Durham was classified as "close" custody pursuant to Rule 33-6.09, Florida Administrative Code. Although Petitioner Durham's reclassification questionnaire score was initially five points, which would have qualified him for classification as "medium" custody, Respondent used the override provision contained in Rule 33-6.09 to classify Petitioner Durham as "close" custody by virtue of his poor institutional adjustment. Petitioner Adams was likewise classified as "close" custody at the time of final hearing. Petitioner Adams' numerical score on the inmate reclassification questionnaire would have classified him as "medium" custody, but the override provisions of Rule 33-6.09 were utilized in Mr. Adams' case to reclassify him as "close" custody by virtue of the fact that his sentence expiration date is 1990, and at the time of his reclassification he had not served 20 percent of his sentence. Petitioner Piccirillo was classified as "medium" custody at the time of final hearing. His numerical score on his inmate reclassification questionnaire was three points, which would have qualified him for "minimum" custody had this score not been overridden by virtue of the fact that Petitioner Piccirillo escaped from Department of Corrections custody on November 17, 1979, while in a minimum custody setting. Petitioner Farrell was classified as "minimum" custody at the time of final hearing in this cause, and his presumptive parole release date is set for July 24, 1984. It was stipulated at final hearing in this cause that none of the policy and procedure directives challenged in this cause had been promulgated by Respondent as rules, pursuant to the requirements of Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. It is also apparent from the face of the various challenged policy and procedure directives that they have statewide applicability at all institutions administered by the Department of Corrections. On or about May 6, 1977, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.22, which was subsequently revised on November 30, 1979. This directive is entitled "Reclassification and Progress Reports," and purports to be issued pursuant to the authority contained in various sections of Chapters 921, 944, 945, and 947, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 33-6, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners in this cause challenge two sections of this directive as unpromulgated rules. The first of these is contained in Section X, entitled "Sources of Information," which provides as follows: It is essential that Progress Reviews Reports be accurate, concise and usable. Compiling up-to-date information to go into the report is as important as writ- ing the report. The following source of information should be utilized by the Classification Team in compiling information for the report. Various evaluation Reports (verbal or written) to include work super- visors, medical, dental, education, recreation, quarters, religious, per- sonal observations, etc Nowhere in either the cited chapters of the Florida Statutes or Chapter 33-6, Florida Administrative Code, are there any specific requirements for information to be considered by the Classification Team in compiling an inmate progress report. Department personnel utilized the above quoted section of the challenged directive in preparing reports on inmate progress. The second section of Policy and Procedure Directive 4.07.22 challenged in this proceeding is XVI, entitled "Recommendations for Parole or Pre-Parole Work Release," which provides as follows: The Department may in selected cases recom- mend to the Florida Parole and Probation Commission that an inmate be placed on parole or pre-parole work release. How ever, note should be made of an inmate's Presumptive Parole Release Date(PPRD) when considering such possibilities. If it is felt that such significant progress has taken place since the setting of the PPRD that it should be moved forward to an earlier date, then such recommendations should be made to the Parole Commission in a full Progress Report setting forth the basis for recommending a change in the PPRD. If at the time of the Progress Review/Report the team does not see the justification in recommending the PPRD be changed then no comment will be required. All reports contaning [sic] parole or pre-parole work release recommendations will be reviewed and signed by the Classification Supervisor and forwarded to the Superintendent for his concurrence or disapproval. The Superintendent will indicate his decision by placing his signature on the appropriate line of the block to be added at the close of the Progress Report format. Upon approving a parole or pre-parole work release recommendation, the Superintendent will prepare a cover letter of endorsement which will be attached to the normal distribution of the Progress Report and for warded directly to the Parole Commission. The above-quoted language from Section XVI of Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.22 is virtually identical to the language contained in Rule 33-6.09(7)(m) , Florida Administrative Code. On or about September 30, 1977, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive 4.07.31, entitled "Community Study and Volunteer Service." This directive purports to be issued pursuant to the authority contained in Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 33-9, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners in this cause challenge as rules the following provisions contained in Section III, entitled "Selection": C. The Classification Team should determine if the inmate meets criteria for eligi- bility described in the Program Directive Community Services Programs. When com- parable study programs are available at the institution, community study should not be considered. On-the-job training programs which are limited in scope are not considered comparable. The educational personnel of the Depart- ment should be Particularly involved in referring inmates for community study since they are in a position to evaluate the inmate's desire, ability, and past performance in the education program. The educational personnel will ensure the availability of the requested course of study or training prior to Classification Team action. Inmates considered for community study must have financial assistance from one or more of the following sources for tuition, books and clothing: Vocational Rehabilitation Veterans benefits Personal finances Committed support by the inmate's family Approval for a government grant Proof of financial support must accompany each application. Inmates are not to borrow money from any university, college or private organiza- tion for the purpose of financing their education. Nowhere in either Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, or Chapter 33-9, Florida Administrative Code, are the above-cited requirements of Policy and Procedure Directive 4.07.31 contained. On or about April 27, 1977, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.40, which was subsequently revised on March 10, 1982. This directive, entitled "Community Work Release general Policies and Procedures" purports to be issued pursuant to the authority contained in Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 33-9, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners in this cause challenge as an umpromulgated rule Section IXB of the directive which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: The Department will permit consideration for work release 18 months prior to release. However, normally such consideration will be given within the last nine months prior to the presumptive parole release date or expiration or[sic] sentence. Should special cases arise which warrant attention prior to the nine months remaining, consideration will be given on an individual basis when there appears[sic] to be appropriate reasons for such. Special cases must be recommended by the Classification Team, approved by the Superintendent and Regional Director, and then forwarded to the Central Office where a Special Review Committee will make the final decision. . . . (Emphasis added) The underlined portion of Section IXB quoted above appears nowhere in either Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, or in Chapter 33-9, Florida Administrative Code. On or about November 30, 1979, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07-90, entitled "Inmate Participation in Outside Activities." This directive purports to be issued pursuant to authority contained in Section 945.21, Florida Statutes. Petitioners in this cause challenge as an umpromulgated rule Section IV of the directive, entitled "Distance Limitations," which provides as follows: The following distance limitations are established as maximums but may be reduced by the Superintendent: Travel to attend civic or religious meeting except the annual statewide meetings will be limited to 100 miles one way. Travel for fund raising projects will be limited to 35 miles one way. Travel to all statewide meetings will be approved by the Regional Director with concurrence of Assistant Secretary of Operations. Nowhere in Section 945.21, Florida Statutes, nor in validly adopted rules of Respondent do the specific requirements contained in Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.90 appear. On or about January 25, 1980, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.42, which was subsequently revised on February 26, 1982. This directive, entitled "Furlough Procedures," purports to be issued pursuant to authority contained in Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 33.9, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners in this cause challenge the entirety of this directive as an unpromulgated rule. The directive establishes a special review team to review furlough applications; makes Florida furlough procedures applicable to federal inmates in interstate compact cases placed with the department; establishes types of furloughs which may be granted; establishes eligibility criteria for selecting inmates for furloughs; sets time and distance limitations for furloughs; establishes the maximum number of furloughs for which inmates may be eligible; establishes verification requirements; establishes clothing requirements while inmates are on furlough; establishes types of transportation available for inmates on furlough; establishes release and check-in procedures; and, finally, establishes a procedure for termination of furloughs in the event of a violation of a furlough agreement. None of the specific requirements contained in Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.42 are contained in either Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, Chapter 33-9, Florida Administrative Code, or any other properly promulgated rule of the Department of Corrections.
The Issue Whether Respondent, a corrections officer, has failed to maintain the qualification to have good moral character, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on February 19, 1993, as a Corrections Officer, Certification Number 136191. Respondent’s certification is active. At all times relevant, the Respondent was employed as a corrections officer with the Central Florida Reception Center. On November 5, 1994, Karen Mills was employed as a law enforcement officer with the Seminole County Sheriff’s office. At the time of the event, Officer Mills had been working under cover for five years with the City/County Investigative Bureau. Officer Mills was working undercover at one o’clock on a Saturday morning posing as a prostitute on the sidewalk and parking lot located at State Road 427 and Pomosa in Sanford, Florida. On November 5, 1994, Mills approached a black male driving a Toyota car, later identified as the Respondent, Travis Long, when he stopped for a traffic light at the corner of State Road 427 and Pomosa. After idle conversation, the Respondent asked what she was doing. She advised that she was trying to make some money. He asked her if she would “take it up the ass?” She took that to mean that he wanted anal intercourse. Mills said yes and asked him how much money he was willing to pay. Respondent said $25.00. Mills said she wanted $40.00. Respondent agreed but stated that he would have to go get the money from an ATM and also that he wanted to get something to eat. He asked Mills if she wanted to go with him to get something to eat. Mills declined. Mills did not immediately arrest Respondent because she wanted to see the money to confirm that he was there to buy sex. Respondent left the area and returned 20 minutes later. Upon his return, Respondent asked Mills if she was a cop and asked her to pull up her shirt to prove that she was not carrying a recording device (a wire). Mills asked Respondent if he was a cop. He said no, and ultimately exposed his penis as a way to prove it to her. Mills asked Respondent to show her the money and kept encouraging him to do so, by saying, “You ain’t gonna pay me . . . You ain’t got no money. I just want to be sure I’m gonna get paid.” Respondent finally showed Mills the money and mouthed, without speaking, “I will pay you.” As soon as she saw the money, Mills, who was wearing a wire, gave the predetermined code. Respondent began to pull away in his vehicle but other officers pulled him over and arrested him. Respondent plead Nolo Contendere to the charge of Lewd and Lascivious Behavior, a second degree misdemeanor, in the County Court for Seminole County, Florida, on January 5, 1995. Respondent was adjudicated guilty, and a $100 fine was imposed. Respondent’s testimony that, although he conducted himself as above stated, he did not have the intent to solicit for prostitution on the night of November 5, 1994, is not credible. Respondent was an energetic, hard-working individual. Respondent had no prior criminal or employment discipline problems prior to this incident. Respondent has continued in his current position as a corrections officer in the three years since the incident and has received above-average ratings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED as follows: Respondent be found guilty of failure to maintain good moral character, as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (1993). Respondent's certification be SUSPENDED for a period of six months and that the Commission impose such conditions on his reinstatement as it deems reasonable and necessary. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Amy Bardill, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 H. R. Bishop, Jr., Esquire 300 East Brevard Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Department of Law Enforcement Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether Petitioner should be granted an exemption from disqualification from certain employment.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services, was the state agency responsible for screening the employment of individuals employed in certain occupations within this state. Petitioner, Jose Ramon Arazo, is married to Stephanie Arazo, who at the time and for a number of years prior to the marriage, operated a child day care center in Largo, Florida. Under the provisions of Chapter 435, Florida Statutes, various positions of trust require screening of federal and state law enforcement records to see if the applicants for such positions have a record of charge or disposition. Various positions have differing requirements for screening. Those positions classified as Level II require a finger print and agency check with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Those positions classified as Level I do not. If the agency check discloses the applicant has been charged with a criminal offense, the Department then determines the disposition of the allegation and obtains court records regarding the court action and verifying any probation imposed. The Department's District V Director has promulgated a policy to be followed in that District that stipulates that an exemption from disqualification will not be granted to any individual who is on probation after conviction of a felony and for three years after release from probation. If probation is not imposed by the court, the same policy provides that an exemption will not be granted within three years of a felony conviction, as is provided for in the statute governing exemptions. Petitioner has been charged with several felonies in the past. On July 18, 1983, he was arraigned on a charge of grand theft, to which he pleaded not guilty. However, on August 29, 1983, he changed his plea to guilty and was placed on probation for three years. Thereafter, in December 1985, a warrant was issued for his arrest alleging various violations of the conditions of his probation, including such offenses as being delinquent in the payment of the cost of his supervision; moving from his residence without the prior consent of his probation supervisor; failing to work diligently at a lawful occupation; and failing to make required restitution. In July 1986, he was again the subject of an arrest warrant for ten further probation violations of a similar nature. No evidence was presented as to what action was taken for those violations, but on April 4, 1986, he pleaded guilty in Circuit Court in Pinellas County to grand theft and was again placed in a community control program for two years. There is also evidence in the record to indicate that in September 1986, he was sentenced to confinement for 18 months as a result of the grand theft in Pinellas County. In May 1989, Petitioner was arrested in Hillsborough County and charged with possession of cocaine, a second degree felony, and with obstructing an officer without violence, a first degree misdemeanor. He entered a plea of guilty to the offenses and on May 2, 1989, was sentenced to three-and-a-half years in Florida State Prison. In an indictment dated December 3, 1991, Petitioner was charged with one count of grand theft in Hillsborough County. He entered a plea of nolo contendere and on October 14, 1994, was sentenced to five years imprisonment. When Petitioner was released from prison in 1998, he was placed on probation for a period of two years and is currently on probation status. He indicates he has successfully participated in this period of probation and was told the probation authorities plan to recommend his release from probation in the near future. No independent evidence to support this contention was offered, though Petitioner presented a statement from correctional officials who supervised him while he was incarcerated at the Tampa Community Correction Center and at the institutional level, that he has shown a significant reformation of character and a good ability to deal with everyday problems in a professional manner. From their joint unsworn statement, it would appear these individuals consider Petitioner a likely candidate to be a productive member of society in the future. Petitioner's wife has been put out of business because Petitioner lives with her in their home which was her place of business. Because of his presence, even though he works outside the home most of the time the children are there, she cannot care for children in the home because of regulations prohibiting it. She has been in business for a number of years and apparently her center has a good reputation in the community. One client, Mrs. Perry, by unsworn written statement commends Mrs. Arazo's performance and indicates that even though she saw Petitioner only a few times, he was one of her daughter's favorite people. He also had a positive influence on her son, preaching the virtue of hard work. Mrs. Perry does not consider Petitioner a threat, and she has no fear of his being near her children. In fact, she is of the opinion it a good thing for the children to see the loving and supportive interplay between Petitioner and his wife. Another client, Mrs. Mineo, has been a foster parent to a number of children over the years, many of whom she has placed in Mrs. Arazo's care, agrees. During the time she has known Petitioner, she has never seen him to be other than very professional. She describes him as a hard worker, well-mannered, and deserving of a chance. She believes him to be trying hard. Mrs. Arazo asserts that Petitioner is no threat to the well-being of any of the children who attend her center. He has, to her knowledge, never hurt a child, and she would have nothing to do with anyone who would. His relationship with the children in her care is very positive, and the children love him when he is there, which is not often. He is not an employee of the center and, in fact, has nothing to do with it. He has made mistakes in the past, has paid for them, and has worked hard to overcome them. In her opinion, he deserves a chance. Petitioner admits he has done wrong in the past on multiple occasions, and he is not proud of the things he has done wrong. He does not believe in rehabilitation except in the physical sense, but he believes in the power of an individual to recognize his wrong ways and reform himself. He believes he has done this. He took the opportunity to learn better life-skills while he was in jail and has reformed his way of thinking and his attitudes. During the total six years he spent in prison, he was given only one disciplinary referral. He learned a trade and has a full-time job. He is doing the best he can and wants a chance to prove himself, so as not to hurt his wife's business.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations concerned herein, Respondent, William M. Floyd has been certified as a corrections officer in Florida under certificate number C- 7585, dated May 23, 1980. He had been certified prior to that time under another Commission procedure. The Commission is the state agency responsible for certifying law enforcement and corrections officers in Florida. Throughout the majority of the year 1986, Respondent was employed as a corrections officer at the Department of Corrections' Tampa Corrections Work Release Center. When he was arrested for grand theft during 1986, he advised his boss that he intended to plead not guilty. Because of his prior eight years of good work and based on his representations, he was not discharged and was allowed to keep his employment. Approximately six months later, Respondent was hospitalized for what his doctors thought was cancer of the spine. While he was in the hospital, his attorneys convinced him that due to his poor health, it would be to his advantage to plead nolo contendere and avoid the stress of a trial and thereafter negotiated an arrangement with the state attorney that in exchange for the plea of nolo contendere, adjudication of guilt would be withheld and Respondent would be placed on two years probation. Respondent entered that plea in open court on November 10, 1986 in the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County and was placed on two years probation. He was promised that at the successful completion of his term of probation, his record would be sealed from the public but not from law enforcement officials. Respondent is looking forward to that happening. After his court appearance, Respondent resigned from his position as a corrections officer with the Department of Corrections, he claims, due to his poor health. On December 4, 1986, the Department of Corrections advised the Petitioner, Commission, however, that Respondent had resigned his position due to the fact that he was placed on two years probation for grand theft. The documentation in question was not presented at the hearing, however, but the basis for Respondent's resignation is irrelevant. The seminal issue here is Respondent's plea of nolo contendere to a felony and of that there is no question. Respondent is not now employed as a corrections officer or in any law enforcement capacity. As a result, he does not need his certification. However, because of the nature of the charges against him, and what he believes is a lack of culpability on his part, (not further explained); and because he may some day again want to work as a corrections officer, he wants to keep his certification.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the certification of Respondent, WILLIAM M. FLOYD, as a corrections officer be revoked. RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of January, 1989 at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 William M. Floyd Post Office Box 1084 Gibsonton, Florida 33534 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Daryl McLaughlin, Executive Director Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Respondent, a certified correctional and probation officer, was guilty of driving under the influence (DUI) on a date certain, as Petitioner alleges; and, if so, whether (and what) discipline should be imposed against Respondent’s certificate.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of certifying law enforcement officers and taking disciplinary action against them. At all times material to this case, Mr. Best was certified by Petitioner as a correctional officer (certificate number 191403) and correctional probation officer (certificate number 233946). In 2009, Mr. Best was disciplined by Petitioner for DUI. On January 11, 2012, Mr. Best arrived at a friend’s home around 10:00 p.m. and drank three beers while chatting about football. He left a little after midnight to return home. That same evening, Deputy James Ooley and Deputy John Carter, two deputies with the Indian River County Sheriff’s Office, were on road patrol. A few minutes after midnight, they observed Mr. Best’s car. The deputies noticed that Mr. Best’s vehicle registration decal had expired, that Mr. Best’s car was swerving within its lane and almost hit a curb, and that Mr. Best stopped beyond where he should have stopped at a stop bar. At 12:07 a.m., they stopped Mr. Best because of the expired decal and possible impairment. Deputy Carter stayed in the patrol car while Deputy Ooley approached the car. Deputy Ooley noticed that Mr. Best’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy, his speech was slurred and mumbled, and he had trouble finding his driver’s license, despite the fact that it was in his wallet. Deputy Ooley also smelled alcohol on Mr. Best’s body and breath. Deputy Ooley asked Mr. Best to perform field sobriety exercises. These tests are designed to be divided attention exercises, to see if the person’s normal faculties (such as walking and talking) are impaired. During the field sobriety tests, Deputy Ooley verbally gave Mr. Best instructions and demonstrated each exercise for him. Directed to walk heel-to-toe on a straight line, Mr. Best stepped off the line a few times, and he turned incorrectly. While trying to stand on one leg, Mr. Best swayed, because he had trouble balancing, and put his foot down before being told to do so. Deputy Ooley arrested Mr. Best for driving under the influence of alcohol, a violation of section 316.193, Florida Statutes. He based his decision on his observations of Mr. Best’s driving before he stopped him, his physical appearance, and the difficulties he had in performing the field sobriety exercises. Mr. Best was handcuffed and placed in the patrol car, where he did not have any access to alcohol. He was brought to the local jail. Video footage of the intake room shows that, at approximately 12:54 a.m., Deputies Ooley and Carter entered the intake room of the jail with Mr. Best. Deputy Carter entered an officer room which was about ten feet away from the seat in which Mr. Best was placed and had a clear view of Mr. Best. Deputy Ooley left Mr. Best’s presence at approximately 12:56 a.m. to gather paperwork and a blank DVD for the DUI breath test. Prior to leaving, he asked Deputy Carter to keep an eye on Mr. Best. Deputy Ooley returned at 12:59 a.m. and started to fill out the DUI paperwork. He asked Mr. Best questions while he completed the paperwork. Mr. Best consented to a breath test and was escorted to the intoxylizer room by Deputy Ooley. Deputy Ooley had to start the intoxylizer and input Mr. Best’s personal information before samples could be given. The intoxylizer data began recording at 1:13 a.m. Deputy Ooley is seen on the video footage giving verbal instructions on how to blow into the machine and giving a demonstration. Mr. Best had difficulty providing a sample; repeatedly, he was unable to blow air for the required amount of time. His first valid sample was recorded at 1:20 a.m. and indicated a reading of .162 blood alcohol level, and the second required sample was recorded at 1:24 a.m. and gave a reading of .157 blood alcohol level. The legal limit is .08 of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. Deputies Ooley and Carter were with Mr. Best from 12:18 a.m., when he was arrested. As of 12:54 a.m., when video footage shows them entering the intake room, Mr. Best was never alone. The Deputies collectively observed Mr. Best continuously for approximately an hour. They never observed Mr. Best ingest anything, or regurgitate during the entire process. Deputy Ooley observed Mr. Best continually from 12:59 a.m. through 1:20 a.m., when the first valid sample was provided. He never saw Mr. Best ingest anything or regurgitate. The intoxylizer was working properly and had been inspected by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. The deputies substantially complied with the requirements for breath tests set forth in Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8, which requires a 20-minute observation period before breath samples are taken. The totality of the evidence, which includes Mr. Best’s driving pattern that evening, his appearance and speech, and the difficulty he had in performing the field sobriety tests, establishes that Mr. Best was driving while under the influence of alcohol. The intoxylizer results provide additional evidence that Mr. Best was guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order permanently revoking Mr. Best’s certifications. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JESSICA E. VARN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Elissa R. Saavedra, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Adrienne D. Soule, Esquire Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc. 300 East Brevard Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jennifer Cook Pritt, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489
The Issue Whether Petitioner may be granted an exemption to work in a position of special trust, pursuant to Section 435.07, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Since July 1997, Petitioner has been employed continuously as a driver for Big Bend Transit, Inc., an organization that provides transportation services to disadvantaged persons. In this capacity, Petitioner provided direct hands-on care to children and disabled adults by driving them from place to place in the course of her job. When Petitioner was hired by Big Bend Transit, Inc., she was screened, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 435, Florida Statutes. It was determined during this screening that Petitioner had been convicted of a felony for possession of cocaine in 1987 and convicted of the misdemeanor of petit theft in 1994. Both of these offenses occurred in Florida. By operation of law, Petitioner is disqualified from working in a position of special trust on the basis of her 1987 conviction for possession of cocaine. It was stipulated by the parties that the petit theft conviction is non-disqualifying. Petitioner also has had a lengthy involvement with, and dependence on, alcohol and cocaine. From before her 1987 conviction for possession of cocaine until at least August 1994, Petitioner regularly used these drugs to excess. Petitioner and her immediate supervisor, Ms. Eddie B. Smith (no relation), were both apparently under the erroneous impression that it was acceptable for Petitioner to continue her employment in a position of special trust, despite the disqualification letter sent them by certified mail on January 26, 1998. There was nothing unclear about the Agency's notification letter. Petitioner has had an incident-free driving record with Big Bend Transit since her employment. Eddie B. Smith, is the Big Bend Transit supervisor for Petitioner. Ms. Smith has never ridden with Petitioner in the Big Bend van nor has she ever observed Petitioner driving the van. However, she considers Petitioner to be a safe, dependable, responsible driver and employee. She testified that among other Big Bend employees and their disadvantaged clientele, Petitioner's reputation is that "all speak highly of her." Although Eddie B. Smith did not know Petitioner prior to her drug rehabilitation, she is aware of Petitioner's past record and experiences, and still wishes to employ her. From 1987 to 1994, Petitioner repeatedly attended and participated in several substance abuse programs, none of which were successful for her. Notwithstanding her substance abuse during the foregoing period, Petitioner managed to maintain regular employment. Petitioner admitted that the shoplifting incident in September 1994 was inspired by her need to get money to buy cocaine and/or alcohol. However, in August 1994, Petitioner had voluntarily entered detox at Apalachee Center for Human Services, in Tallahassee, and voluntarily proceeded immediately afterward to the residential drug rehabilitation program run by Promise Land Ministries in Crawfordville, Florida. Petitioner admitted to one relapse using alcohol in early 1995, but forthrightly asserted that she knows now that she cannot even take one drink of alcohol, let alone use it socially. Petitioner also used drugs on her one night of relapse. She testified that she has not used either alcohol or drugs since that date in 1995. Petitioner quit smoking cigarettes approximately one year before formal hearing. Primary to Petitioner's successful rehabilitation has been her love for, and taking responsibility for the care of, her son, who is now seven years old. On November 14, 1995, Petitioner tested negative for the use of drugs as part of her employment with Cabot Lodge Motel in Tallahassee, Florida. Petitioner also took a mandatory drug screening test ordered by Big Bend Transit when she went to work for that corporation in July 1997. She also tested drug-free on that occasion. The foregoing two successful drug tests are only accurate to show that Petitioner had not used cocaine or other illegal drugs for a period of two to three days prior to the administration of each test. Petitioner is buying her own home at Lake Talquin Resort. She is a community leader and holds the position of a Director on the Board of the Home Owners' Association at Lake Talquin Resort. As a Director, Petitioner oversees the maintenance and quality of her trailer park neighborhood. Petitioner runs her own yard and cleanup service to supplement her regular employment with Big Bend Transit and also baby-sits for her friends and neighbors. Petitioner's immediate neighbors, who know her both professionally and intimately as a friend and baby-sitter for their nine-year-old son, are Sergeant Shelton Turner of the Gadsden County Sheriff's Office and his wife, Annetheria. According to Mr. and Mrs. Turner, Petitioner is a model neighbor and friend. Both expressed the sentiment that "my house is her house." Mr. Turner serves on the Home Owners' Association Board with Petitioner. He has known Petitioner for ten years and testified that since her rehabilitation, Petitioner has made a 360-degree change in her life. He considers her totally rehabilitated and has seen her "transformation." Sergeant Turner has had an opportunity to observe Petitioner in her home at all hours of the day and night and testified that, "[She's] not in that old white station wagon at the drug hole [anymore]... no one with drugs is ever hanging on [at her house]." Sergeant Turner further testified that two signs of drug abuse can never be observed in Petitioner's home, e.g., the lights are never cut off for failure to pay, and there is always food in the house. Antheria Turner is a Program Director at a group home for the elderly, where she has observed Petitioner with disadvantaged clients. She testified that, "If there were a position in one of my homes, I would have no problem hiring her." Mrs. Turner has only known Petitioner for the last three years during which time Petitioner has been drug-free, but she is well aware of Petitioner's past criminal record and drug/alcohol dependency. Petitioner is an active church-goer and credits her religious faith as another reason for her continued rehabilitation. She is characterized by Ms. Turner as a "good Christian." Edith Smith is the former owner of Precious Angels Family Home Daycare. Ms. Smith is employed elsewhere at the present time, but has known Petitioner for six to seven years. She also has had an opportunity to observe Petitioner's transition, subsequent to her final successful drug rehabilitation. Before rehabilitation, she would distance herself from Petitioner but now Petitioner often babysits for Ms. Smith's four year old daughter, and Ms. Smith considers Petitioner to be "very loving and caring around children," and trustworthy. At formal hearing, the Department presented one witness, a district screening coordinator who did not recommend that Petitioner be granted an exemption from disqualification. She speculated that the Petitioner might be somehow "covering up" possible continued weekend drug abuse. Her testimony is to the effect that if Petitioner could remain fully employed while "using," the fact that Petitioner has remained fully employed since she quit "using" in 1995 should not be considered as part of the evidence of good moral character. Ms. LeClair's testimony does not amount to either a policy statement by the agency or an expert opinion that Petitioner's current full time employment should be held against her. The Department seemed to merely assert a "legal position" that a longer period of rehabilitation should be necessary to clearly and convincingly establish Petitioner's good moral character, under the circumstances of this case.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order granting Petitioner Jacqueline Smith's request for exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Albert Thornburn, Esquire Grant Dearborn, Esquire Legal Services of North Florida, Inc. Suite 200 8 West Jefferson Street Quincy, Florida 32351 John Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 100A Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Service Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard A. Doran, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, James Lee Church, is a white male who has been an employee of the Respondent, Department of Corrections since May of 1990. The Petitioner was originally employed as a Correctional Probation Officer, but in June of 1991 accepted a voluntary demotion to Human Services Counselor and relocation to Lake Correctional Institution, LCI, in order to attend graduate school in Orlando, Florida. In early 1993, the Petitioner applied for promotion to a position of Correctional Probation Officer I, also referred to as a classification officer, at LCI. Although this would have been a promotion from the position which he held, this is the same entry level position from which he had earlier taken a voluntary demotion in order to relocate. It can be inferred that the Petitioner was familiar with the job duties of the position which he had earlier held at another institution which included counseling inmates, computing gain time, setting up inmate work assignments, educational goals and social/religious programs. In March, 1993, Paula Hoisington, a black female, was Classification Supervisor at LCI, and reviewed all thirty applications for the Classification Probation Officer I position for which the Petitioner had applied. The Petitioner's qualifications exceeded the required educational and practical experience, and he had been previously employed by the Respondent in a similar position prior to relocating to LCI. Ms. Hoisington and the Petitioner discussed his application before the selection was made, and Ms. Hoisington advised the Petitioner that she was not putting his name forward for the promotional opportunity because she was aware he had applied for another position. The Petitioner queried Ms. Hoisington regarding whether that meant he would get the other position, and she advised him that it did not. The Petitioner advised her that he really was serious about putting his name forward for the instant promotion and desired to be interviewed. Ms. Hoisington excluded the Petitioner for the interview process which is required for recommendation for the promotion, and selected eight applicants (four white males, two black males, one white female, and black female) to be interviewed by the panel making promotional recommendations to the Superintendent of LCI. The panel recommended three candidates, two black males and one white male, and the Superintendent selected Willie McKinnon, a black male to fill the position. Mr. McKinnon had been employed as a correctional officer for eight years and a classroom teacher for three years prior to that, and possessed a degree in sociology and had worked as a social worker. In March 1993, the Petitioner applied for the promotional position of Human Services Supervisor at LCI, the position which had been discussed with Ms. Hoisington. This position required oversight of Tier II substance abuse program at LCI and supervising LCI personnel and staff provided by an outside vendor. Ms. Hoisington again selected the applicants to the interviewed, and this time included the Petitioner in the list. She also prepared the synopsis of each applicant's background and experience which was provided to each member of the panel. The panel consisted of a white female, two white males, and Ms. Hoisington. It recommended three applicants, two black females and one white male to the Superintendent, who selected the black female. The person selected had worked as a Human Services Counselor for three and one half years, and been employed previously by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and had a degree in criminology. Ms. Hoisington and another member of the panel gave the Petitioner a bad score on the interview because he was perceived as arrogant and pompous because he acted as though he was the best candidate for the position. In October 1993, the Petitioner received a promotion to Correctional Probation Officer I. In March 1994, the Petitioner applied for promotion to Correctional Probation Officer II. The Petitioner was interviewed for this promotional opportunity, but was not selected by the panel who recommended a white female, a black female, and a white male to the Regional Administrator, who was the appointing authority. A white female was selected from the individuals recommended. In December 1993, the Petitioner applied for the promotional position of Correctional Probation Specialist, a new position overseeing various substance abuse programs throughout Region III (Central Florida) of Respondent. The application was made before the Petitioner's charge of discrimination by Ms. Hoisington was made to the Commission in January 1994. In the interim, Ms. Hoisington had been promoted to the Regional staff, and in her new position selected the persons to be interviewed for the position of Correction Probation Specialist for which the Petitioner had applied. Again, Ms. Hoisington put together the resumes for the panels consideration and served on the panel. The Petitioner protested Ms. Hoisington's participation in this process to the Respondent through its counsel, and suggested to Respondent's counsel that it was a conflict of interest for Ms. Hoisington to serve on the panel, which included of two white females and Ms. Hoisington. The Respondent refused to take Ms. Hoisington off the panel which recommended one black male and one white female for the position. The hiring authority, a white male, selected a white female who had worked for the Department nine years to fill the position. The Petitioner had a degree in biology, had teaching experience, was a certified correction probation officer, had work experience in West Virginia as a classification supervisor, and had work experience in North Carolina administering and monitoring grants and grant moneys to daycare providers. He had worked in the Tier II drug program during his employment by the Department, and would have been qualified by education and experience for a supervisor's position in this area. The Petitioner was promoted to Correctional Probation Officer II in September 1994. Classification of jobs and validation of requirements for positions in career service was performed by the Department of Administration during the initial period of Petitioner's employment by Respondent, and by the Department of Management Services later in his employment pursuant to statute. The questions used by interview panels for positions within the Department are part of a qualification examination. These examination questions have not been validated relative to the various jobs within the Department of Corrections, and validated to determine their ability to accurately predict job performance by applicants. They are used by panels to assess the applicants and are scored; however, there is a subjective component to the assessment of applicants as revealed by the low grades received by the Petitioner for "arrogance" by panel members in his interview for the Human Services Counselor Supervisor position. Attitude was not a "scorable" component of the test, yet it was determinative in the minds of two of the evaluators. There is no evidence that the questions were racially biased, or that they were the basis of racial discrimination against the Petitioner. The Petitioner's supervisor, Ms. Ramirez, did make statements to Ms. Hoisington which indicated that he was not a team player; however, she also advised Ms. Hoisington that Petitioner did his job as she instructed him to do it. Ms. Hoisington testified regarding this, and Ms. Ramirez' affidavit is not inconsistent with Ms. Hoisington's testimony. The Department is an employer. The Department has been determined to have discriminated against Hispanic and black females in hiring for certain positions which are not at issue in this case. There is no evidence that the Department has discriminated generally in the past against white males in its hiring practices. The only evidence presented on racial discrimination is that outlined above.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner's complaint be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 1995. APPENDIX CASE NO. 94-4480 The parties filed proposed findings which were read and considered. The following states which of those findings were adopted, and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Findings Proposed Order Paragraph 1-3 Subsumed in specific findings. Paragraph 4 No evidence was received that Ms. Hoisington's refusal to place Petitioner's name on the interview list was a violation of Departmental rules. Paragraph 5 Subsumed in Paragraph 4. Paragraph 6-8 Subsumed in Paragraph 19. Paragraph 9 Irrelevant. Paragraph 10 Subsumed in Paragraph 18. Paragraph 11 Cannot be determined from the information provided and is irrelevant. Paragraph 12-20 All of these findings relate to the fourth promotional opportunity, in which a white female was recommended by the panel and hired. The Petitioner failed to make a showing of racial prejudice in this instances, about which evidence was received because it supported the previous allegations; however, the Petitioner did not plead retaliation in his complaint and no findings will be made on allegations about retaliation. Paragraph 21,26-28,30 Subsumed in Paragraph 18. Paragraph 22 Subsumed in Paragraph 17. Paragraph 23-25,29 Legal arguments. Respondent's Findings Proposed Order Paragraph 1-4 Paragraph 1-4. Paragraph 5 Rejected as contrary to more credible evidence. Paragraph 6,7 Paragraph 5. Paragraph 8a,8b,9 Paragraph 6,7,8,9. Paragraph 10,11,12 Paragraph 10,11. Paragraph 13 Paragraph 12,13. Paragraph 14 Subsumed in Paragraph 18. Paragraph 15 Subsumed in Paragraph 15. COPIES FURNISHED: James Lee Church 907 Foresthill Drive Clermont, FL 34711 Susan Schwartz, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4113 Louis A. Vargas, General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioner, Roger Smith, is an inmate in the custody of the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is subject to the rules of the Respondent, the Florida Parole Commission, including the Challenged Rule. The Petitioner is serving a "parole eligible sentence." The Petitioner's eligibility for parole has been determined by the Respondent. The Petitioner was convicted of the offense of escape and, therefore, the Respondent applied the Challenged Rule to the Petitioner. The Respondent. Sections 947.07 and 947.13, Florida Statutes, authorize the Respondent to adopt rules governing the parole of inmates in the State of Florida. Among other things, Section 947.13, Florida Statutes, authorizes the Respondent to determine who is placed on parole and to fix the time and conditions of parole. Pursuant to Sections 947.07 and 947.13, Florida Statutes, the Respondent promulgated the Challenged Rules. Rule 23-21.018(1) and (7), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 23-21.018(1) and (7), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following: Vacation of presumptive or effective parole release date: The exiting of an inmate from the incarceration portion of his sentence, which shall include but not be limited to bond, escape, parole or MCR release, expiration of sentence, or transfer to a mental health facility, shall vacate any established presumptive parole release date. Any subsequent return to incarcerations will require an initial interview to establish a presumptive parole release date. Provided, however, inmates returning to court for modification of a previously imposed sentence or as witnesses shall not have their presumptive parole release dates vacated. Inmates returning to courts outside of Florida's jurisdiction, i.e, Federal or other state, shall not have their presumptive parole release dates vacated. However, information resulting from disposition of cases in court may be used as new information in accordance with applicable law and these rules. Inmates transferred to a Mentally Disordered Sexual Offender Program shall not have their presumptive parole release dates vacated. . . . . Conviction for crimes committed while incarcerated: Escape or any other crime committed during incarceration with an ensuing conviction and sentence vacates any previously established presumptive parole release date and shall cause the inmate to be considered a new admission. If the inmate is found to be eligible for consideration for parole, the Commission shall aggregate.
