The Issue The issue in these consolidated cases is whether the Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA") properly disallowed Petitioners' expense for liability insurance and accrued contingent liability costs contained in AHCA's audit of Petitioners' Medicaid cost reports.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioners operate licensed nursing homes that participate in the Florida Medicaid program as institutional providers. The 14 Palm Gardens facilities are limited liability companies operating as subsidiaries of New Rochelle Administrators, LLC, which also provides the facilities with management services under a management contract. AHCA is the single state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid program. One of AHCA's duties is to audit Medicaid cost reports submitted by providers participating in the Medicaid program. During the audit period, Petitioners provided services to Medicaid beneficiaries pursuant to Institutional Medicaid Provider Agreements that they entered into with AHCA. The Provider Agreements contained the following relevant provision: (3) Compliance. The provider agrees to comply with local, state, and federal laws, as well as rules, regulations, and statements of policy applicable to the Medicaid program, including Medicaid Provider Handbooks issued by AHCA. Section 409.908, Florida Statutes (2002)1, provided in relevant part: Reimbursement of Medicaid providers.-- Subject to specific appropriations, the agency shall reimburse Medicaid providers, in accordance with state and federal law, according to methodologies set forth in the rules of the agency and in policy manuals and handbooks incorporated by reference therein. These methodologies may include fee schedules, reimbursement methods based on cost reporting, negotiated fees, competitive bidding pursuant to s. 287.057, and other mechanisms the agency considers efficient and effective for purchasing services or goods on behalf of recipients. . . . * * * (2)(a)1. Reimbursement to nursing homes licensed under part II of chapter 400 . . . must be made prospectively. . . . * * * (b) Subject to any limitations or directions provided for in the General Appropriations Act, the agency shall establish and implement a Florida Title XIX Long-Term Care Reimbursement Plan (Medicaid) for nursing home care in order to provide care and services in conformance with the applicable state and federal laws, rules, regulations, and quality and safety standards and to ensure that individuals eligible for medical assistance have reasonable geographic access to such care. . . . AHCA has adopted the Title XIX Long-Term Care Reimbursement Plan (the "Plan") by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-6.010. The Plan incorporates the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") Publication 15-1, also called the Provider Reimbursement Manual (the "Manual" or "PRM"), which provides "guidelines and policies to implement Medicare regulations which set forth principles for determining the reasonable cost of provider services furnished under the Health Insurance for the Aged Act of l965, as amended." CMS Pub. 15-1, Foreword, p. I. The audit period in these cases spans two versions of the Plan: version XXIII, effective July 1, 2002, and version XXIV, effective January 1, 2003. It is unnecessary to distinguish between the two versions of the Plan because their language is identical as to the provisions relevant to these cases. Section I of the Plan, "Cost Finding and Cost Reporting," provides as follows, in relevant part: The cost report shall be prepared by a Certified Public Accountant in accordance with chapter 409.908, Florida Statutes, on the form prescribed in section I.A. [AHCA form 5100-000, Rev. 7-1-90], and on the accrual basis of accounting in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles as established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) as incorporated by reference in Rule 61H1-20.007, F.A.C., the methods of reimbursement in accordance with Medicare (Title XVIII) Principles of Reimbursement, the Provider Reimbursement Manual (CMS-PUB. 15-1)(1993) incorporated herein by reference except as modified by the Florida Title XIX Long Term Care Reimbursement Plan and State of Florida Administrative Rules. . . . Section III of the Plan, "Allowable Costs," provides as follows, in relevant part: Implicit in any definition of allowable costs is that those costs shall not exceed what a prudent and cost-conscious buyer pays for a given service or item. If costs are determined by AHCA, utilizing the Title XVIII Principles of Reimbursement, CMS-PUB. 15-1 (1993) and this plan, to exceed the level that a prudent buyer would incur, then the excess costs shall not be reimbursable under the plan. The Plan is a cost based prospective reimbursement plan. The Plan uses historical data from cost reports to establish provider reimbursement rates. The "prospective" feature is an upward adjustment to historical costs to establish reimbursement rates for subsequent rate semesters.2 The Plan establishes limits on reimbursement of costs, including reimbursement ceilings and targets. AHCA establishes reimbursement ceilings for nursing homes based on the size and location of the facilities. The ceilings are determined prospectively, on a semiannual basis. "Targets" limit the inflationary increase in reimbursement rates from one semester to the next and limit a provider's allowable costs for reimbursement purposes. If a provider's costs exceed the target, then those costs are not factored into the reimbursement rate and must be absorbed by the provider. A nursing home is required to file cost reports. The costs identified in the cost reports are converted into per diem rates in four components: the operating component; the direct care component; the indirect care component; and the property component. GL/PL insurance costs fall under the operating component. Once the per diem rate is established for each component, the nursing home's reimbursement rate is set at the lowest of four limitations: the facility's costs; the facility's target; the statewide cost ceiling based on the size of the facility and its region; or the statewide target, also based on the size and location of the facility. The facility's target is based on the initial cost report submitted by that facility. The initial per diem established pursuant to the initial cost report becomes the "base rate." Once the base rate is established, AHCA sets the target by inflating the base rate forward to subsequent six- month rate semesters according to a pre-established inflation factor. Reimbursement for cost increases experienced in subsequent rate semesters is limited by the target drawn from the base rate. Thus, the facility's reimbursement for costs in future rate semesters is affected by the target limits established in the initial period cost report. Expenses that are disallowed during the establishment of the base rate cannot be reclaimed in later reimbursement periods. Petitioners entered the Medicaid program on June 29, 2002. They filed cost reports for the nine- month period from their entry into the program through February 28, 2003. These reports included all costs claimed by Petitioners under the accrual basis of accounting in rendering services to eligible Medicaid beneficiaries. In preparing their cost reports, Petitioners used the standard Medicaid Cost Report "Chart of Accounts and Description," which contains the account numbers to be used for each ledger entry, and explains the meaning of each account number. Under the general category of "Administration" are set forth several subcategories of account numbers, including "Insurance Expense." Insurance Expense is broken into five account numbers, including number 730810, "General and Professional Liability -- Third Party," which is described as "[c]osts of insurance purchased from a commercial carrier or a non-profit service corporation."3 Petitioners' cost report stated the following expenses under account number 730810: Facility Amount Palm Garden of Clearwater $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Gainesville $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Jacksonville $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Largo $171,188.00 Palm Garden of North Miami $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Ocala $217,712.00 Palm Garden of Orlando $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Pinellas $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Port St. Lucie $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Sun City $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Tampa $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Vero Beach $217,712.00 Palm Garden of West Palm Beach $231,151.00 Palm Garden of Winter Haven $145,042.00 AHCA requires that the cost reports of first-year providers undergo an audit. AHCA's contract auditing firm, Smiley & Smiley, conducted an examination4 of the cost reports of the 14 Palm Gardens nursing homes to determine whether the included costs were allowable. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") has promulgated a series of "attestation standards" to provide guidance and establish a framework for the attestation services provided by the accounting profession in various contexts. Attestation Standards 101 and 601 set out the standard an accountant relies upon in examining for governmental compliance. Smiley & Smiley examined the Palm Gardens cost reports pursuant to these standards. During the course of the audit, Smiley & Smiley made numerous requests for documentation and other information pursuant to the Medicaid provider agreement and the Plan. Petitioners provided the auditors with their general ledger, invoices, audited financial statements, bank statements, and other documentation in support of their cost reports. The examinations were finalized during the period between September 28, 2006, and October 4, 2006. The audit report issued by AHCA contained more than 2,000 individual adjustments to Petitioners' costs, which the parties to these consolidated proceedings have negotiated and narrowed to two adjustments per Palm Gardens facility.5 As noted in the Preliminary Statement above, the first adjustment at issue is AHCA's disallowance of Palm Gardens' accrual of expenses for contingent liability under the category of GL/PL insurance, where Palm Gardens could not document that it had purchased GL/PL insurance. The second adjustment at issue is ACHA's disallowance of a portion of the premium paid by Palm Gardens for the Mature Care Policies. The total amount of the adjustment at issue for each facility is set forth in the Preliminary Statement above. Of that total for each facility, $18,849.00 constituted the disallowance for the Mature Care Policies. The remainder constituted the disallowance for the accrual of GL/PL related contingent liabilities. Janette Smiley, senior partner at Smiley & Smiley and expert in Medicaid auditing, testified that Petitioners provided no documentation other than the Mature Care Policies to support the GL/PL entry in the cost reports. Ms. Smiley testified that, during much of the examination process, she understood Petitioners to be self-insured. Ms. Smiley's understanding was based in part on statements contained in Petitioners' audited financial statements. In the audited financial statement covering the period from June 28, 2002, through December 31, 2002, Note six explains Petitioners' operating leases and states as follows, in relevant part: The lease agreement requires that the Company maintain general and professional liability in specified minimum amounts. As an alternative to maintaining these levels of insurance, the lease agreement allows the Company to fund a self-insurance reserve at a per bed minimum amount. The Company chose to self-insure, and has recorded litigation reserves of approximately $1,735,000 that are included in other accrued expenses (see Note 9). As of December 31, 2002, these reserves have not been funded by the Company. . . . The referenced Note nine, titled "Commitments and Contingencies," provides as follows in relevant part: Due to the current legal environment, providers of long-term care services are experiencing significant increases in liability insurance premiums or cancellations of liability insurance coverage. Most, if not all, insurance carriers in Florida have ceased offering liability coverage altogether. The Company's Florida facilities have minimal levels of insurance coverage and are essentially self-insured. The Company has established reserves (see Note 6) that estimate its exposure to uninsured claims. Management is not currently aware of any claims that could exceed these reserves. However, the ultimate outcome of these uninsured claims cannot be determined with certainty, and could therefore have a material adverse impact on the financial position of the Company. The relevant notes in Petitioner's audited financial statement for the year ending December 31, 2003, are identical to those quoted above, except that the recorded litigation reserves were increased to $4 million. The notes provide that, as of December 31, 2003, these reserves had not been funded by Petitioners. Ms. Smiley observed that the quoted notes, while referencing "self-insurance" and the recording of litigation reserves, stated that the litigation reserves had not been funded. By e-mail dated April 21, 2005, Ms. Smiley corresponded with Stanley Swindling, the shareholder in the accounting firm Moore Stephens Lovelace, P.A., who had primary responsibility for preparing Petitioners' cost reports. Ms. Smiley noted that Petitioners' audited financial statements stated that the company "chose to self-insure" and "recorded litigation reserves," then wrote (verbatim): By definition from PRM CMS Pub 15-1 Sections 2162.5 and 2162.7 the Company does in fact have self-insurance as there is no shifting of risk. You will have to support your positioning a letter addressing the regs for self-insurance. As clearly the financial statement auditors believe this is self- insurance and have disclosed such to the financial statement users. If you cannot support the funding as required by the regs, the provider will have to support expense as "pay as you go" in accordance with [2162.6] for PL/GL. * * * Please review 2161 and 2162 and provide support based on the required compliance. If support is not complete within the regulations, amounts for IBNR [incurred but not reported] will be disallowed and we will need to have the claims paid reports from the TPA [third party administrator] (assuming there is a TPA handling the claims processing), in order to allow any expense. Section 2160 of the Manual establishes the basic insurance requirement: A. General.-- A provider participating in the Medicare program is expected to follow sound and prudent management practices, including the maintenance of an adequate insurance program to protect itself against likely losses, particularly losses so great that the provider's financial stability would be threatened. Where a provider chooses not to maintain adequate insurance protection against such losses, through the purchase of insurance, the maintenance of a self-insurance program described in §2161B, or other alternative programs described in §2162, it cannot expect the Medicare program to indemnify it for its failure to do so. . . . . . . If a provider is unable to obtain malpractice coverage, it must select one of the self-insurance alternatives in §2162 to protect itself against such risks. If one of these alternatives is not selected and the provider incurs losses, the cost of such losses and related expenses are not allowable. Section 2161.A of the Manual sets forth the general rule as to the reimbursement of insurance costs. It provides that the reasonable costs of insurance purchased from a commercial carrier or nonprofit service corporation are allowable to the extent they are "consistent with sound management practice." Reimbursement for insurance premiums is limited to the "amount of aggregate coverage offered in the insurance policy." Section 2162 of the Manual provides as follows, in relevant part: PROVIDER COSTS FOR MALPRACTICE AND COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY PROTECTION, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, WORKERS' COMPENSATION, AND EMPLOYEE HEALTH CARE INSURANCE General.-- Where provider costs incurred for protection against malpractice and comprehensive general liability . . . do not meet the requirements of §2161.A, costs incurred for that protection under other arrangements will be allowable under the conditions stated below. . . . * * * The following illustrates alternatives to full insurance coverage from commercial sources which providers, acting individually or as part of a group or a pool, can adopt to obtain malpractice, and comprehensive general liability, unemployment compensation, workers' compensation, and employee health care insurance protection: Insurance purchased from a commercial insurance company which provides coverage after a deductible or coinsurance provision has been met; Insurance purchased from a limited purpose insurance company (captive); Total self-insurance; or A combination of purchased insurance and self-insurance. . . . part: Section 2162.3 of the Manual provides: Self-Insurance.-- You may believe that it is more prudent to maintain a total self- insurance program (i.e., the assumption by you of the risk of loss) independently or as part of a group or pool rather than to obtain protection through purchased insurance coverage. If such a program meets the conditions specified in §2162.7, payments into such funds are allowable costs. Section 2162.7 of the Manual provides, in relevant Conditions Applicable to Self-Insurance.-- Definition of Self-Insurance.-- Self- insurance is a means whereby a provider(s), whether proprietary or nonproprietary, undertakes the risk to protect itself against anticipated liabilities by providing funds in an amount equivalent to liquidate those liabilities. . . . * * * Self-Insurance Fund.-- The provider or pool establishes a fund with a recognized independent fiduciary such as a bank, a trust company, or a private benefit administrator. In the case of a State or local governmental provider or pool, the State in which the provider or pool is located may act as a fiduciary. The provider or pool and fiduciary must enter into a written agreement which includes all of the following elements: General Legal Responsibility.-- The fiduciary agreement must include the appropriate legal responsibilities and obligations required by State laws. Control of Fund.-- The fiduciary must have legal title to the fund and be responsible for proper administration and control. The fiduciary cannot be related to the provider either through ownership or control as defined in Chapter 10, except where a State acts as a fiduciary for a State or local governmental provider or pool. Thus, the home office of a chain organization or a religious order of which the provider is an affiliate cannot be the fiduciary. In addition, investments which may be made by the fiduciary from the fund are limited to those approved under State law governing the use of such fund; notwithstanding this, loans by the fiduciary from the fund to the provider or persons related to the provider are not permitted. Where the State acts as fiduciary for itself or local governments, the fund cannot make loans to the State or local governments. . . . The quoted Manual provisions clarify that Ms. Smiley's message to Mr. Swindling was that Petitioners had yet to submit documentation to bring their "self-insurance" expenses within the reimbursable ambit of Sections 2161 and 2162 of the Manual. There was no indication that Petitioners had established a fund in an amount sufficient to liquidate its anticipated liabilities, or that any such funds had been placed under the control of a fiduciary. Petitioners had simply booked the reserved expenses without setting aside any cash to cover the expenses. AHCA provided extensive testimony regarding the correspondence that continued among Ms. Smiley, Mr. Swindling, and AHCA employees regarding this "self-insurance" issue. It is not necessary to set forth detailed findings as to these matters, because Petitioners ultimately conceded to Ms. Smiley that, aside from the Mutual Care policies, they did not purchase commercial insurance as described in Section 2161.A, nor did they avail themselves of the alternatives to commercial insurance described in Section 2162.A. Petitioners did not purchase commercial insurance with a deductible, did not self- insure, did not purchase insurance from a limited purpose or "captive" insurance company, or employ a combination of purchased insurance and self-insurance. Ms. Smiley eventually concluded that Petitioners had no coverage for general and professional liability losses in excess of the $25,000 value of the Mutual Care Policies. Under the cited provisions of the Manual, Petitioners' unfunded self- insurance expense was not considered allowable under the principles of reimbursement. Petitioners were uninsured, which led Ms. Smiley to further conclude that Section 2162.13 of the Manual would apply: Absence of Coverage.-- Where a provider, other than a governmental (Federal, State, or local) provider, has no insurance protection against malpractice or comprehensive general liability in conjunction with malpractice, either in the form of a limited purpose or commercial insurance policy or a self-insurance fund as described in §2162.7, any losses and related expenses incurred are not allowable. In response to this disallowance pursuant to the strict terms of the Manual, Petitioners contend that AHCA should not have limited its examination of the claimed costs to the availability of documentation that would support those costs as allowable under the Manual. Under the unique circumstances presented by their situation, Petitioners assert that AHCA should have examined the state of the nursing home industry in Florida, particularly the market for GL/PL liability insurance during the audit period, and further examined whether Petitioners had the ability to meet the insurance requirements set forth in the Manual. Petitioners assert that, in light of such an examination, AHCA should have concluded that generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") may properly be invoked to render the accrued contingent liabilities an allowable expense. Keith Parnell is an expert in insurance for the long- term care industry. He is a licensed insurance broker working for Hamilton Insurance Agency, which provides insurance and risk management services to about 40 percent of the Florida nursing home market. Mr. Parnell testified that during the audit period, it was impossible for nursing homes to obtain insurance in Florida. In his opinion, Petitioners could not have purchased commercial insurance during the audit period. To support this testimony, Petitioners offered a study conducted by the Florida Department of Insurance ("DOI") in 2000 that attempted to determine the status of the Florida long-term care liability insurance market for nursing homes, assisted living facilities, and continuing care retirement communities. Of the 79 companies that responded to DOI's data call, 23 reported that they had provided GL/PL coverage during the previous three years but were no longer writing policies, and only 17 reported that they were currently writing GL/PL policies. Six of the 17 reported writing no policies in 2000, and five of the 17 reported writing only one policy. The responding insurers reported writing a total of 43 policies for the year 2000, though there were approximately 677 skilled nursing facilities in Florida. On March 1, 2004, the Florida Legislature's Joint Select Committee on Nursing Homes issued a report on its study of "issues regarding the continuing liability insurance and lawsuit crisis facing Florida's long-term care facilities and to assess the impact of the reforms contained in CS/CS/CS/SB 1202 (2001)."6 The study employed data compiled from 1999 through 2003. Among the Joint Select Committee's findings was the following: In order to find out about current availability of long-term care liability insurance in Florida, the Committee solicited information from [the Office of Insurance Regulation, or] OIR within the Department of Financial Services, which is responsible for regulating insurance in Florida. At the Committee's request, OIR re-evaluated the liability insurance market and reported that there has been no appreciable change in the availability of private liability insurance over the past year. Twenty-one admitted insurance entities that once offered, or now offer, professional liability coverage for nursing homes were surveyed by OIR. Six of those entities currently offer coverage. Nine surplus lines carriers have provided 54 professional liability policies in the past year. Representatives of insurance carriers that stopped providing coverage in Florida told OIR that they are waiting until there are more reliable indicators of risk nationwide to re-enter the market. Among the Joint Select Committee's conclusions was the following: In the testimony the Committee received, there was general agreement that the quality of care in Florida nursing homes is improving, in large part due to the minimum staffing standards the Legislature adopted in SB 1202 during the 2001 Session. There was not, however, general agreement about whether or not lawsuits are abating due to the tort system changes contained in SB 1202. There was general agreement that the long-term care liability insurance market has not yet improved. After hearing the testimony, there is general agreement among the members of the Joint Select Committee that: * * * General and professional liability insurance, with actual transfer-of-risk, is virtually unavailable in Florida. "Bare- bones" policies designed to provide minimal compliance with the statutory insurance requirement are available; however, the cost often exceeds the face value of the coverage offered in the policy. This situation is a crisis which threatens the continued existence of long-term care facilities in Florida. To further support Mr. Parnell's testimony, Petitioners offered actuarial analyses of general and professional liability in long-term care performed by AON Risk Consultants, Inc. (AON) on behalf of the American Health Care Association. The AON studies analyzed nationwide trends in GL/PL for long-term care, and also examined state-specific issues for eight states identified as leading the trends in claim activity, including Florida. They provided an historical perspective of GL/PL claims in Florida during the audit period. The 2002 AON study for Florida was based on participation by entities representing 52 percent of all Florida nursing home beds. The study provided a "Loss Cost per Occupied Bed" showing GL/PL liability claims losses on a per bed basis. The 2002 study placed the loss cost for nursing homes in Florida at $10,800 per bed for the year 2001. The 2003 AON study, based on participation by entities representing 54 percent of Florida nursing home beds, placed the loss cost for nursing homes in Florida at $11,810 per bed for the year 2002. The studies showed that the cost per bed of GL/PL losses is materially higher in Florida than the rest of the United States. The nationwide loss per bed was $2,360 for the year 2001 and $2,880 for the year 2002. The GL/PL loss costs for Texas were the second-highest in the country, yet were far lower than the per bed loss for Florida ($5,460 for the year 2001 and $6,310 for the year 2002). Finally, Petitioners point to the Mature Care Policies as evidence of the crisis in GL/PL insurance availability. The aforementioned SB 1202 instituted a requirement that nursing homes maintain liability insurance coverage as a condition of licensure. See Section 22, Chapter 2001-45, Laws of Florida, codified at Subsection 400.141(20), Florida Statutes. To satisfy this requirement, Petitioners entered the commercial insurance market and purchased insurance policies for each of the 14 Palm Gardens facilities from a carrier named Mature Care Insurance Company. The policies carried a $25,000 policy limit, with a policy premium of $34,000. These were the kind of "bare bones" policies referenced by the Joint Select Committee's 2004 report. The fact that the policies cost more than they could ever pay out led Mr. Swindling, Petitioners' health care accounting and Medicaid reimbursement expert, to opine that a prudent nursing home operator in Florida at that time would not have purchased insurance, but for the statutory requirement.7 The Mature Care Policies were "bare bones" policies designed to provide minimal compliance with the statutory liability insurance coverage requirement. The policies cost Petitioners more than $37,000 in premium payments, taxes, and fees, in exchange for policy limits of $25,000. In its examination, AHCA disallowed the difference between the cost of the policy and the policy limits, then prorated the allowable costs because the audit period was nine months long and the premium paid for the Mature Care Policies was for 12 months. AHCA based its disallowance on Section 2161.A of the Manual, particularly the language which states: "Insurance premiums reimbursement is limited to the amount of aggregate coverage offered in the insurance policy." Petitioners responded that they did not enter the market and voluntarily pay a premium in excess of the policy limits. They were statutorily required to purchase this minimal amount of insurance; they were required to purchase a 12-month policy; they paid the market price8; and they should not be penalized for complying with the statute. Petitioners contend they should be reimbursed the full amount of the premiums for the Mature Care Policies, as their cost of statutory compliance. Returning to the issue of the contingent liabilities, Petitioners contend that, in light of the state of the market for GL/PL liability insurance during the audit period, AHCA should have gone beyond the strictures of the Manual to conclude that GAAP principles render the accrued contingent liabilities an allowable expense. Under GAAP, a contingent loss is a loss that is probable and can be reasonably estimated. An estimated loss from a loss contingency may be accrued by a charge to income. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5 ("FAS No. 5"), Accounting for Contingencies, provides several examples of loss contingencies, including "pending or threatened litigation" and "actual or possible claims and assessments." Petitioners assert that the contingent losses reported in their cost reports were actual costs incurred by Petitioners. The AICPA Audit and Accounting Guide for Health Care Organizations, Section 8.05, provides: The ultimate costs of malpractice claims, which include costs associated with litigating or settling claims, are accrued when the incidents that give rise to the claims occur. Estimated losses from asserted and unasserted claims are accrued either individually or on a group basis, based on the best estimates of the ultimate costs of the claims and the relationship of past reported incidents to eventual claims payments. All relevant information, including industry experience, the entity's own historical experience, the entity's existing asserted claims, and reported incidents, is used in estimating the expected amount of claims. The accrual includes an estimate of the losses that will result from unreported incidents, which are probable of having occurred before the end of the reporting period. Section 8.10 of AICPA Guide provides: Accrued unpaid claims and expenses that are expected to be paid during the normal operating cycle (generally within one year of the date of the financial statements) are classified as current liabilities. All other accrued unpaid claims and expenses are classified as non-current liabilities. As noted above, Petitioners' audited financial statements for the fiscal years ending December 31, 2002, and December 31, 2003, showed that the accrual was incurred and recorded by Petitioners during the audit period. Mr. Swindling prepared Petitioners' cost reports, based on information provided by Petitioners, including trial balances reflecting their costs, statistics on patient days, cost data related to square footage, and revenue information. Mr. Swindling advised Petitioners to include the accrued losses. He believed that the loss contingency was probable and could be reasonably estimated. The losses were probable because it was "a given in the state of Florida at that time period that nursing homes are going to get sued." Mr. Swindling testified that the accrual reflected a per bed loss amount of $1,750, which he believed to be a reasonable estimate of the contingent liabilities faced by Petitioners during the audit period. This amount was much less than the per bed loss indicated by the AON studies for Florida. Mr. Swindling used the criteria set forth in Section 8.05 of the AICPA Guide to establish the estimate. He determined that the lesser amount was adequate based on his discussions with Petitioners' management, who indicated that they had a substantial risk management program. Management also disclosed to Mr. Swindling that Petitioners' leases required $1,750 per bed in liability coverage. See Finding of Fact 22, supra. Mr. Swindling believed that the estimated loss per bed was reasonable based on the AON studies and his knowledge and experience of the state of the industry in Florida during the audit period, as further reflected in the DOI and Joint Committee on Nursing Homes materials discussed above. Mr. Swindling's opinion was that the provisions of the Manual relating to GL/PL insurance costs do not apply under these circumstances. The costs at issue in this proceeding are not general and professional liability insurance costs subject to CMS Pub. 15-1; rather, they are loss contingencies related to general and professional liability, including defense costs, litigation costs, and settlement costs. Mr. Swindling placed the loss contingency under number 730810, "General and Professional Liability -- Third Party" because, in the finite chart of accounts provided by Medicaid, that was the most appropriate place to record the cost.9 Despite the initial confusion it caused the agency's auditors, the placement of the loss contingency under number 730810 was not intended to deceive the auditors. Mr. Swindling opined that, under these circumstances, Sections 2160 through 2162 are in conflict with other provisions in the Manual relating to the "prudent buyer" concept, and further conflict with the Plan to the extent that the cited regulations "relate to a retrospective system as opposed to prospective target rate-based system." Mr. Swindling agreed that the application of Sections 2160 through 2162 to the situation presented by Petitioners would result in the disallowance of the loss contingencies. Mr. Swindling observed, however, that Sections 2160 through 2162 are Medicare regulations. Mr. Swindling testified that Medicare reimbursements are made on a retrospective basis.10 Were this situation to occur in Medicare -- in which the provider did not obtain commercial insurance, self-insurance, or establish a captive insurer -- the provider would be deemed to be operating on a pay-as-you-go basis. Though its costs might be disallowed in the current period, the provider would receive reimbursements in subsequent periods when it could prove actual payment for its losses. Mr. Swindling found a conflict in attempting to apply these Medicare rules to the prospective payment system employed by Florida Medicaid, at least under the circumstances presented by Petitioners' case. Under the prospective system, once the contingent loss is disallowed for the base period, there is no way for Petitioners ever to recover that loss in a subsequent period, even when the contingency is liquidated. During his cross-examination, Mr. Swindling explained his position as follows: . . . Medicare allows for that payment in a subsequent period. Medicaid rules would not allow that payment in the subsequent period; therefore you have conflict in the rules. When you have conflict in the rules, you revert to generally accepted accounting principles. Generally accepted accounting principles are what we did. Q. Where did you find that if there's a conflict in the rules, which I disagree with, but if there is a conflict in the rules, that you follow GAAP? Where did you get that from? I mean, we've talked about it and it's clear on the record that if there is no provision that GAAP applies, but where did you get that if there's a conflict? Just point it out, that would be the easiest way to do it. A. The hierarchy, if you will, requires providers to file costs on the accrual basis of accounting in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. If there's no rules, in absence of rules -- and I forget what the other terms were, we read it into the record before, against public policy, those kind of things -- or in my professional opinion, if there is a conflict within the rules where the provider can't follow two separate rules at the same time, they're in conflict, then [GAAP] rules what should be recorded and what should be reimbursed. * * * Q. [T]he company accrued a liability of $2 million for the cost reporting period of 2002-2003, is that correct? A. Yes. * * * Q. Do you have any documentation supporting claims paid, actually paid, in 2002-2003 beyond the mature care policy for which that $2 million reserve was set up? A. No. Q. So what did Medicaid pay for? A. Medicaid paid the cost of contingent liabilities that were incurred by the providers and were estimated at $1,750 per bed. Generally accepted accounting principles will adjust that going forward every cost reporting period. If that liability in total goes up or down, the differential under [GAAP] goes through the income statement, and expenses either go up or they go down. It's self-correcting, which is similar to what Medicare is doing, only they're doing it on a cash basis. Mr. Swindling explained the "hierarchy" by which allowable costs are determined. The highest governing law is the Federal statutory law, Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Subsection. 1396-1396v. Below the statute come the federal regulations for implementing Title XIX, 42 C.F.R. parts 400-426. Then follow in order Florida statutory law, the relevant Florida Administrative Code provisions, the Plan, the Manual, and, at the bottom of the hierarchy, GAAP. Mr. Swindling testified that in reality, a cost report is not prepared from the top of the hierarchy down; rather, GAAP is the starting point for the preparation of any cost report. The statutes, rules, the Plan and the Manual are then consulted to exclude specific cost items otherwise allowable under GAAP. In the absence of an applicable rule, or in a situation in which there is a conflict between rules in the hierarchy such that the provider is unable to comply with both rules, the provider should fall back on GAAP principles as to recording of costs and reimbursement. John A. Owens, currently a consultant in health care finance specializing in Medicaid, worked for AHCA for several years up to 2002, in positions including administrator of the audit services section and bureau chief of the Office of Medicaid Program Analysis. Mr. Owens is a CPA and expert in health care accounting and Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement. Mr. Owens agreed with Mr. Swindling that AHCA's disallowance of the accrued costs for GL/PL liability was improper. Mr. Owens noted that Section 2160 of the Manual requires providers to purchase commercial insurance. If commercial insurance is unavailable, then the Manual gives the provider two choices: self-insure, or establish a captive program. Mr. Owens testified that insurers were fleeing the state during the period in question, and providers were operating without insurance coverage. Based on the state of the market, Petitioners' only options would have been to self-insure or establish a captive. As to self-insurance, Petitioners' problem was that they had taken over the leases on their facilities from a bankrupt predecessor, Integrated Health Services ("IHS"). Petitioners were not in privity with their predecessor. Petitioners had no access to the facilities' loss histories, without which they could not perform an actuarial study or engage a fiduciary to set up a self-insurance plan.11 Similarly, setting up a captive would require finding an administrator and understanding the risk exposure. Mr. Owens testified that a provider would not be allowed to set up a captive without determining actuarial soundness, which was not possible at the time Petitioners took over the 14 IHS facilities. Thus, Petitioners were simply unable to meet the standards established by the Manual. The options provided by the Manual did not contemplate the unique market situation existing in Florida during the audit period, and certainly did not contemplate that situation compounded by the problems faced by a new provider taking over 14 nursing homes from a bankrupt predecessor. Mr. Owens agreed with Mr. Swindling that, under these circumstances, where the requirements of the Manual could not be met, Petitioners were entitled to seek relief under GAAP, FAS No. 5 in particular. In situations where a loss is probable and can be measured, then an accounting entry may be performed to accrue and report that cost. Mr. Owens concluded that Petitioners' accrual was an allowable cost for Medicaid purposes, and explained his rationale as follows: My opinion is, in essence, that since they could not meet -- technically, they just could not meet those requirements laid out by [the Manual], they had to look somewhere to determine some rational basis for developing a cost to put into the cost report, because if they had chosen to do nothing and just moved forward, those rates would be set and there would be nothing in their base year which then establishes their target moving forward. So by at least looking at a rational methodology to accrue the cost, they were able to build something into their base year and have it worked into their target system as they move forward. Steve Diaczyk, an audit evaluation and review analyst for AHCA, testified for the agency as an expert in accounting, auditing, and Medicaid policy. Mr. Diaczyk was the AHCA auditor who reviewed the work of Smiley & Smiley for compliance with Medicaid rules and regulations, and to verify the accuracy of the independent CPA's determinations. Mr. Diaczyk agreed with Mr. Swindling's description of the "hierarchy" by which allowable costs are determined. Mr. Diaczyk affirmed that Petitioners employed GAAP rather than Medicaid regulations in preparing their cost reports. Mr. Diaczyk testified regarding the Notes to Petitioners' audited financial statements, set forth at Findings of Fact 22-24, supra, which left AHCA's auditors with the understanding that Petitioners were self-insuring. Mr. Diaczyk pointed out that Section 2162.7 of the Manual requires a self- insurer to contract with an independent fiduciary to maintain a self-insurance fund, and that the fund must contain monies sufficient to cover anticipated losses. The fiduciary takes title to the funds, the amount of which is determined actuarially. Mr. Diaczyk explained that, in reimbursing a provider for self-insurance, Medicaid wants to make sure that the provider has actually put money into the fund, and has not just set up a fund on its books and called it "self-insurance" for reimbursement purposes. AHCA's position is that it would be a windfall for a provider to obtain reimbursement for an accrued liability when it has not actually set the money aside and funded the risk. Medicaid wants the risk transferred off of the provider's books and on to the self-insurance fund. Mr. Diaczyk testified as to the differing objectives of Medicaid and GAAP. Medicaid is concerned with reimbursing costs, and is therefore especially sensitive regarding the overstatement of costs. Medicaid wants to reimburse a provider for only those costs that have actually been paid. GAAP, on the other hand, is about report presentation for a business entity and is concerned chiefly with avoiding the understatement of expenses and overstatement of revenue. Under GAAP, an entity may accrue a cost and not pay it for years. In the case of a contingent liability, the entity may book the cost and never actually pay it. Mr. Diaczyk described the self-insurance and liquidation provisions of 42 C.F.R. Section 413.100, "Special treatment of certain accrued costs." The federal rule essentially allows accrued costs to be claimed for reimbursement, but only if they are "liquidated timely." Subsection (c)(2)(viii) of the rule provides that accrued liability related to contributions to a self-insurance program must be liquidated within 75 days after the close of the cost reporting period. To obtain reimbursement, Petitioners would have had to liquidate their accrued liability for GL/PL insurance within 75 days of the end of the audit period. Mr. Diaczyk also noted that, even if the 75-day requirement were not applicable, the general requirement of Section 2305.2 of the Manual would apply. Section 2305.2 requires that all short-term liabilities must be liquidated within one year after the end of the cost reporting period in which the liability is incurred, with some exceptions not applicable in this case. Petitioners' accrued liability for general and professional liability insurance was not funded or liquidated for more than one year after the cost reporting period. It was a contingent liability that might never be paid. Therefore, Mr. Diaczyk stated, reimbursement was not in keeping with Medicaid's goal to reimburse providers for actual paid costs, not for potential costs that may never be paid. Petitioners responded that their accrued liabilities constituted non-current liabilities, items that under normal circumstances will not be liquidated within one year. Mr. Parnell testified that there is great variation in how long it takes for a general and professional liability claim against a nursing home to mature to the point of payment to the claimant. He testified that a "short" timeline would be from two to four years, and that some claims may take from eight to eleven years to mature. From these facts, Petitioners urge that 42 C.F.R. Section 413.100 and Section 2305.2 of the Manual are inapplicable to their situation. As to Section 2305.2 in particular, Petitioners point to Section 2305.A, the general liquidation of liabilities provision to which Section 2305.2 provides the exceptions discussed above. The last sentence of Section 2305.A provides that, where the liability is not liquidated within one year, or does not qualify under the exceptions set forth in Sections 2305.1 and 2305.2, then "the cost incurred for the related goods and services is not allowable in the cost reporting period when the liability is incurred, but is allowable in the cost reporting period when the liquidation of the liability occurs." (Emphasis added.) Petitioners argue that the underscored language supports the Medicare/Medicaid distinction urged by Mr. Swindling. In its usual Medicare retroactive reimbursement context, Section 2305.2 would operate merely to postpone reimbursement until the cost period in which the liability is liquidated. Applied to this Medicaid prospective reimbursement situation, Section 2305.2 would unfairly deny Petitioners any reimbursement at all by excluding the liability from the base rate. Mr. Diaczyk explained that, where the Medicaid rules address a category of costs, the allowable costs in a provider's cost report are limited to those defined as allowable by the applicable rules. He stated that if there is a policy in the Manual that addresses an item of cost, the provider must use the Manual provision; the provider cannot use GAAP to determine that cost item. In this case, Mr. Diaczyk agreed with Ms. Smiley as to the applicable rules and the disallowance of Petitioners' contingent liability costs. According to Mr. Diaczyk, GAAP may be used only if no provisions farther up the chain of the "hierarchy" are applicable. In this case, the Medicaid rules specifically addressed the categories of cost in question, meaning that GAAP did not apply. Under cross-examination, Mr. Diaczyk testified that the accrual made by Petitioners in their cost reports would be considered actual costs under GAAP, "[a]ssuming that they had an actuarial study done to come up with the $1.7 million that they accrued." Mr. Diaczyk acknowledged that AICPA Audit and Accounting Guide for Health Care Organizations, Section 8.05, does not limit the provider to an actuarial study in estimating losses from asserted and unasserted claims. See Finding of Fact 49, supra, for text of Section 8.05. Mr. Diaczyk pointed out that the problem in this case was that Petitioners gave AHCA no documentation to support their estimate of the accrual, despite the auditor's request that Petitioners provide documentation to support their costs. Mr. Diaczyk's testimony raised a parallel issue to Mr. Swindling's concern that Medicaid's prospective targeting system permanently excludes any item of cost not included in the base rate. Mr. Swindling solved the apparent contradiction in employing Medicare rules in the Medicaid scenario by applying GAAP principles. Responding to the criticism that GAAP could provide a windfall to Petitioners by reimbursing them for accrued costs that might never actually result in payment, Mr. Swindling responded that GAAP principles would adjust the cost for contingent liabilities going forward, "truing up" the financial statements in subsequent reporting periods. This truing up process would have the added advantage of obviating the agency's requirement for firm documentation of the initial accrual. Mr. Swindling's "truing up" scenario under GAAP would undoubtedly correct Petitioners' financial statements. However, Mr. Swindling did not explain how the truing up of the financial statements would translate into a correction of Petitioners' reimbursement rate.12 If costs excluded from the base rate cannot be added to future rate adjustments, then costs incorrectly included in the base rate would also presumably remain in the facility's rate going forward.13 Thus, Mr. Swindling's point regarding the self-correcting nature of the GAAP reporting procedures did not really respond to AHCA's concerns about Petitioners' receiving a windfall in their base rate by including the accrual for contingent liabilities. On April 19, 2005, Petitioners entered into a captive insurance program. Petitioners' captive is a claims-made GL/PL policy with limits of $1 million per occurrence and $3 million in the aggregate. Under the terms of the policy, "claims-made" refers to a claim made by Petitioners to the insurance company, not a claim made by a nursing home resident alleging damages. The effective date of the policy is from April 21, 2005, through April 21, 2006, with a retroactive feature that covers any claims for incidents back to June 29, 2002, a date that corresponds to Petitioners' first day of operation and participation in the Medicaid program. The Petitioners' paid $3,376,906 for this policy on April 22, 2005. Mr. Parnell testified that April 2005 was the earliest time that the 14 Palm Gardens facilities could have established this form of insurance program. In summary, the evidence presented at the hearing regarding the contingent liabilities established that Petitioners took over the 14 Palm Gardens facilities after the bankruptcy of the previous owner. Petitioners were faced with the virtual certainty of substantial GL/PL expenses in operating the facilities, and also faced with a Florida nursing home environment market in which commercial professional liability insurance was virtually unavailable. Lacking loss history information from their bankrupt predecessor, Petitioners were unable to self-insure or establish a captive program until 2005. Petitioners understood that if they did not include their GL/PL expenses in their initial cost report, those expenses would be excluded from the base rate and could never be recovered. Petitioners' leases for the facilities required them to fund a self-insurance reserve at a per bed minimum amount of $1,750. Based on the AON studies and the general state of the industry at the time, Petitioners' accountant concluded that, under GAAP principles, $1,750 per bed was a reasonable, conservative estimate of Petitioners' GL/PL loss contingency exposure for the audit period.14 Based on all the evidence, it is found that Petitioners' cost estimate was reasonable and should be accepted by the agency. Petitioners included their GL/PL loss contingency expenses in their initial Medicaid cost report, placing those expenses under a heading indicating the purchase of insurance from a third party. The notes to Petitioners' audited financial statements stated that the facilities were "essentially self- insured." These factors led AHCA to request documentation of Petitioners' self-insurance. Petitioners conceded that they were not self-insured and carried no liability insurance aside from the Mature Care policies. The parties had little dispute as to the facts summarized above. The parties also agreed as to the applicability of the "hierarchy" by which allowable costs are determined. Their disagreement rests solely on the manner in which the principles of the hierarchy should be applied to the unique situation presented by Petitioners in these cases.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that AHCA enter a final order that allows Petitioners' accrual of expenses for contingent liability under the category of general and professional liability ("GL/PL") insurance, and that disallows the Mature Care policy premium amounts in excess of the policy limits, prorated for a nine- month period. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 2008.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a licensed insurance agent licensed in the State of Florida as a general lines agent. He was the primary agent of Emerald Coast Insurance Agencies, Inc. (Agency) for Pensacola, Florida. The agency at all times pertinent to the events and times treated in the Amended Administrative Complaint was a general lines insurance agency incorporated under the laws of the State of Florida. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with regulating and licensing the entry of insurance agents into the profession of insurance and regulating the practice of agents and other insurance professionals already licensed by the State of Florida, including the imposition of disciplinary measures. The Respondent had been an insurance agent, as of the time of the hearing, for approximately four years. During that time, he has typically written 50-60 applications for automobile insurance and related coverage per week. The owner of the Agency would not allow the Respondent to issue checks from the Respondent's own office. All processing of insurance application files was completed at the Tallahassee, Florida office. The files with client information for insurance applicants, whose business was initiated by the Respondent, was sent by UPS to the Tallahassee, Florida office on the morning following the taking of the applications. The forms, which the Respondent was required to have completed and asked customers to sign, were pre-printed and issued from the Tallahassee, Florida office. The Respondent had no part in the creation of these forms as to content, format, and the disclosures depicted on their face. The Respondent inquired of the Department's local office as to whether the forms comported with pertinent statutes and regulations, and the Department expressed no objection to them. Indeed, the forms in question do make disclosures of the coverage or products which the customer is purchasing and contain an acknowledgment, which the customer is required to sign, indicating that the coverage has been explained to the customer. In particular, the motor club product is depicted on the relevant form as being an optional product and that it has been explained to the customer, with a blank after that pertinent statement for the customer to sign an acknowledgment of that fact. The issue in this case does not involve whether the customer paid for such a product without executing any consent but, rather, whether the customer was misled or whether the products sold were actually, in fact, explained fully to them; whether they were misled in making a decision to buy such coverage in the belief that it was required in order to obtain the insurance they knew they needed. THE TRANSACTIONS AT ISSUE No evidence was submitted as to Count I, concerning Cheryl Ginsterblum nor Count VIII, concerning Joseph Shelton. Therefore, no findings of fact can be made and these counts should be dismissed. Pam Shivers of Gulf Breeze, Florida, required insurance coverage for her 1988 Dodge Caravan. Because the van was still financed with a lender, "full coverage" was required, that is, she needed personal injury protection (PIP), property damage (PD) coverage, comprehensive risk coverage, and collision damage coverage. On March 8, 1993, she went to the Respondent's Agency, and the Respondent handled the requested insurance transaction. She requested "full coverage", and the transaction was handled while she was standing at the counter, in just a few minutes. PIP and PD insurance was placed with Security Insurance Company of Hartford (Security). Comprehensive and collision coverage was placed with Florida International Indemnity Company (FIIC). The premium for Security was $350.00, and the premium for FIIC was $399.00. The purchase of this coverage was financed so that Ms. Shivers would not have to pay the entire $749.00 premium for all of the coverage at one time. In return for the premium financing arrangement, a $187.00 down payment was required for the insurance coverage. During the transaction, Ms. Shivers was quickly presented with approximately six documents to sign. Included in those documents was a document containing a disclosure that the motor club product which she purchased was optional, that is, not required by law; that she had been offered to purchase automobile insurance by the Agency without an optional motor club and chose to purchase that optional coverage of her own free will at an additional cost of $150.00; that she examined the benefits being offered, and that it was her decision to request enrollment as a member of the motor club association. It is true that Ms. Shivers signed these acknowledgments and disclosures, which on their face, would indicate that she had been informed about the nature of the motor club product or coverage and its cost, including the fact that it was not required by law and was optional. In fact, however, her apparent consent was not an actual, knowing and informed consent. She was presented with the six documents to sign hurriedly, with the places to sign simply marked for her to make quick signatures. She did not, in the course of the transaction, have significant time to read the documents or reflect on what she was signing, what her signatures obligated her for, and what specific products she was purchasing. She was not, in actual fact, informed that she was purchasing a motor club membership. She did not request that product, and the Respondent did not give her any actual explanation about it. She was not informed that she had any choice in whether or not to take that product. She later discovered that the product was optional and that it was, therefore, not an integral, unseverable part of the insurance coverage she did want to purchase. Moreover, Ms. Shivers was confused about the $749.00 premium quote and the amount she was actually required to pay. Her confusion involved the $749.00 premium for insurance quoted to her because of the fact that she was actually required to pay an $899.00 purported "premium". The receipt issued at the end of the purchase transaction indicated a total "premium" of $899.00. In fact, however, the actual cost of the insurance was $749.00. The additional $150.00 was for a motor club membership which was hidden in the receipt amount and what was represented on the receipt as a "total premium". The down payment of $337.00 quoted to her was also deceptive because actually, only $187.00 of that was the down payment on the actual insurance coverage premium. This is shown by the premium finance agreement in evidence. The Respondent had concealed the cost of the motor club membership within what was purported to be the total insurance premium amount reflected on the receipt and included the entire $150.00 charge for that membership within the down payment, simply and misleadingly calling the down payment of $337.00 as the down payment on insurance coverage. Thereafter, on March 21, 1993, Ms. Shivers went back to the Agency to cancel her insurance, related to the fact that her vehicle had been involved in an accident. Upon doing that, she left thinking that her insurance had been effectively cancelled. Later, she received notices from the premium finance company but was told by the Respondent to ignore them. On May 7, 1993, however, the Respondent informed her that she had to come back to the Agency and fill out a cancellation request. Thus, 47 days after she had attempted to cancel her coverage, her request was finally processed by the Agency. In the meantime, she was apparently being charged for premiums on the coverage she thought she had cancelled. Thus, from January 21, 1994, the premium finance company turned an amount it claimed was due of $43.26 over to its attorney for collection purposes, which impinged on Ms. Shivers' credit standing. She had already paid the Respondent $190.00 in premiums under the premium financing agreement, with her down payment, but did not receive any returned unearned premium representing the period after she thought she had cancelled her policy but, instead, was billed the additional $43.26 directly due to the Respondent's 47-day delay in processing her cancellation request. Count III In June, 1993, Laura O'Donohue of Pensacola, Florida, purchased her first vehicle, a 1993 Chevrolet Cavalier. The automobile dealership, where she purchased the vehicle, gave her a card for the Respondent's insurance agency. Therefore, never having established a relationship with an insurance agency, she went to that Agency to purchase insurance. Her mother, Lynn O'Donohue, accompanied her to the Agency. Before coming to the Agency while at the automobile dealership, she had received a quote for the insurance she wanted from the Agency. When she arrived at the Agency, she informed Donald Grubb, an employee of the Agency and the Respondent, that she just wanted "basic coverage". This was the first time she had purchased insurance, and she relied entirely for her decisions regarding that upon the representations of the Respondent and his colleague. Therefore, in a transaction, which took approximately 20 minutes, the Respondent and/or Mr. Grubb assisted her in filling out the paperwork required to place the insurance coverage she requested. During the course of the brief insurance purchase transaction, Ms. O'Donohue learned that she would be required to pay a higher premium amount than the quote she had received from the Agency while she was at the automobile dealership earlier that day. This is consistent with the Agency's custom and practice, established by former agent, James Self's, testimony to the effect that motor club coverage was typically added to the normal insurance coverage requested by customers, which resulted in higher purported "premium" quotes and charges than had initially been quoted to the customer, typically by telephone, before a customer came to the Agency office. When Ms. O'Donohue and her mother arrived at the Agency after having received the lower quote earlier, they were thus not prepared to pay the higher amount of the so-called premium. Ms. O'Donohue did not need a motor club because, through her mother, she was covered by AAA Motor Club for towing and other benefits. She had no knowledge that she had purchased a motor club product from the Respondent. All of the documents were presented to her, in response to her request for just basic insurance coverage, in the context that this was what the law required her to have and what she needed. She totally relied, as did her mother, upon the representations of the Respondent and his agent or employee, Mr. Grubb, concerning what the law required and what she needed in the way of insurance coverage. The testimony of Ms. O'Donohue's mother, Lynn O'Donohue, confirms the fact that they had no intent to purchase towing coverage or "auto club" because they already had a membership with AAA and wanted to pay nothing extra other than the basic insurance coverage. The Respondent or his agent or employee, Mr. Grubb, indicated, as shown on page 91 of the transcript, that "towing was all part of it", that is, they meant that the basic insurance package sought by Ms. O'Donohue included towing as part of its coverage. In fact, that was not the case, and the motor club product was clearly optional, at extra cost, and not legally required. Ms. O'Donohue purchased it unknowingly, based upon the representations and business practice used by the Respondent in connection with her transaction, in spite of the presence of her signatures on the disclosure portion of the application documents for the reasons referenced with regard to the Shivers transaction. The insurance requested was placed with two insurance companies. The PIP and PD were issued by Security at a premium of $223.00. The comprehensive and collision coverage was placed with General Insurance Company (General) at a premium of $411.00. Thus, the premiums for actual insurance coverage, which is all Ms. O'Donohue wanted, totaled $634.00. That was financed by the ETI Premium Finance Company (ETI) on periodic installment payments, with a required down payment of $127.00. The Respondent, however, required Ms. O'Donohue to make a down payment of $277.00 on a purported total premium due of $784.00. This amount, unbeknownst to Ms. O'Donohue, happened to include a motor club purchase (Atlantic Travel Association), which cost $150.00, thus, the difference between the $634.00 actual insurance premium and the $784.00 purported premium due. The $150.00 fee for motor club benefits was concealed in the "total premium" amount falsely represented to the customer by the Respondent. The deceptive and misleading nature of this transaction is further pointed out by the form of the receipt issued to Ms. O'Donohue upon consummating the transaction. That receipt indicates that the "total premium" is $784.00. Actually, the cost of the insurance was only $634.00, as referenced above, and the additional $150.00 of that purported total premium amount was the motor club fee. Likewise, the down payment quoted to her of $277.00 was deceptive because only $127.00 of that was applied to the actual insurance coverage. The remaining amount was the motor club fee which the agent collected in its entirety at the beginning of the transaction, as part of the down payment, while the insurance premiums, in excess of the $127.00 actual down payment for insurance, were financed through ETI. The Respondent did this because, by collecting all of the motor club fee in a lump sum at the outset of the transaction, he could get his entire commission immediately. His motor club sales commission was at a considerably higher rate than the commission he earned on the sale of insurance itself. In fact, his commission was 90 percent of the $150.00 motor club fee. Since Ms. O'Donohue did not have the entire $277.00 at the time of the transaction, because she had been relying on the lower quote for the insurance given to her over the telephone, she only paid $200.00 down payment at the time of the transaction, with a balance owed of $79.00, as reflected on her receipt. Her mother had reservations concerning the purchase of this insurance from the Respondent and told her daughter that she thought that because the insurance she purchased involved financing the premium, she could save money by going to GEICO insurance company. Therefore, the following day, she went to GEICO and secured new coverage at a lower premium rate and then called the Respondent's Agency to confirm that she could cancel her policy, with no penalty. They replied that she could cancel her policy just so long as she brought them proof that she had secured new insurance, since the law presently does not allow them to cancel the coverage until they are shown proof that the insured has obtained other coverage. Ms. O'Donohue, therefore, went to GEICO, purchased new insurance for her vehicle, and then brought proof to the Agency and requested that the Respondent cancel her insurance. This request was made on June 19, 1993. At that time, she requested a refund of the $200.00 down payment which she had made two days before and was assured that she would receive it within 60 days. In fact, she never received a refund and continued to receive past-due and delinquency notices from ETI, the premium finance company. She notified the Agency of this problem on numerous occasions to no satisfaction. Due to ETI's belief that her coverage was still in force and that they were still owed the premium payments, her credit was endangered. This was all directly related to the Respondent's failure to properly and timely process her cancellation request. On June 20, 1993, Terre Thompson of Pensacola, Florida, also went to the Respondent's Agency to purchase insurance for her 1993 GEO Metro automobile. The Respondent met her at the automobile dealership, where she purchased the vehicle. He had already prepared documents for the purchase of insurance to be underwritten by Security and General, along with a premium financing agreement and other documents. He had marked X's where Ms. Thompson was supposed to sign all contracts and disclosure forms. The Respondent filled out all of the information on the documents and merely told her, in effect, to "sign here, here and here". The transaction was conducted very quickly and with little or no explanation of coverage or benefits. Although Ms. Thompson needed full coverage for her vehicle, because it was financed, she did not want towing and rental benefits. The Respondent, however, gave her to understand that it was required in the coverage package she purchased. Accordingly, on June 20, 1993, she made a down payment of $100.00, with an additional amount due of $51.00 by June 27, 1993. Although the receipt was dated June 20, 1993, Ms. Thompson did not actually receive it until June 27, 1993, when she returned to the Respondent's Agency to pay the $51.00 owed. The receipt falsely depicts that the "total premium" was $834.00. Actually, the cost of the insurance was only $754.00. The additional $80.00 was for a motor club product, although the $80.00 was buried in and represented to be part of the total insurance premium for the transaction. The down payment of $231.00 quoted, likewise, was deceptive because only $151.00 of that was actually applied to insurance coverage, which was all of the coverage that Ms. Thompson had requested. The Respondent collected the $100.00 on June 20, 1993 and entered into a financing arrangement with the customer, Ms. Thompson, for the $51.00 to be paid on June 27, 1993. In fact, this was only enough to cover the down payment for the actual insurance coverage because the Respondent forgot to include the fee for the motor club coverage on the "front end" or in the down payment, as was his normal practice. This is why Ms. Thompson became upset when she learned she owed an additional $71.00 when she returned on June 27, 1993, when she thought she had only owed approximately $60.00. In any event, the receipt finally received by her reflected payments of $100.00, $60.00, and $71.00, which totals $231.00. This amount includes the $151.00 down payment for actual insurance coverage and the remaining $80.00 for motor club membership, which Ms. Thompson did not know she had purchased at the time and did not desire to purchase. Indeed, Ms. Thompson, and the other customers referenced in the Amended Administrative Complaint, who testified, signed the disclosure in the standard package of documents presented to them by the Respondent. It indicated that they acknowledged that the motor club benefit or the "nations safe driver" medical benefit was an optional coverage, not required by law and that, after explanation of it, they had elected to purchase it. In fact, they signed those documents, albeit imprudently, without actual knowledge that they were obtaining that coverage and without explanation that it was not legally required. No disclosure was made to them that the purported "total premium" amount actually included payment for the motor club benefit, which was not actually part of the insurance premium and which, at least in the case of those customers with AAA memberships, was totally unnecessary. Timothy Malden of Jacksonville, Florida, purchased a vehicle on or about August 31, 1993. He needed full coverage because the vehicle was financed, that is, he needed PIP, PD, comprehensive coverage, and collision coverage. He went to the Respondent's Agency on that date to purchase coverage on his 1986 Pontiac Fiero. During the course of the transaction, handled by the Respondent, Mr. Malden was asked if he had motor club coverage or benefits and he told the Respondent that he had AAA membership and showed the Respondent his AAA card. The Respondent and Mr. Malden entered into a transaction to sell Mr. Malden insurance. The transaction involved approximately seven different documents and took a total of about 15 to 20 minutes. Mr. Malden merely signed the documents. The Respondent told him that he just needed his signature on the documents and the Respondent did not explain the coverage. The procedure seemed rushed or hurried to Mr. Malden. Although Mr. Malden signed the disclosure (inadvertently, because apparently he did not read it) stating, in effect, that the motor club coverage was optional, not required and that after having it explained to him, he had decided to purchase it, he, in fact, did not know at the time that he had purchased the motor club coverage and it had not been explained to him. Moreover, as stated above, he had explained to the Respondent that he did not need it because he already had AAA motor club coverage. Nevertheless, the Respondent, knowing that Mr. Malden had AAA, still sold him the motor club coverage with the Atlantic Travel Association for an additional fee of $150.00. Mr. Malden made no informed consent to purchase that benefit. The PIP and PD coverage was placed with Security at a premium of $395.00. The comprehensive and collision coverage was placed with Continental American Insurance Company (Continental) for a premium of $525.00. The total premium for "insurance" was $920.00, with a $230.00 down payment. The premiums were financed by ETI. Mr. Malden, however, was required to pay a "down payment" of $380.00. The receipt issued to him reveals a "total premium" of $1,070.00. The actual cost of insurance was only $920.00. The additional $150.00 was for motor club coverage, and the charge for that was hidden in what was represented on the receipt as "total premium". Likewise, the down payment of $380.00 was deceptive in nature because only $230.00 of it was actually a down payment for insurance coverage. The remainder of it, as explained above with regard to the other customers, was actually full payment for the unnecessary, unwanted motor club benefit. On March 8, 1994, Karen Sigler of Pensacola, Florida, went to the Agency to purchase automobile insurance for a 1990 Plymough Voyager. She stated to the Respondent that she only wanted the minimum automobile insurance required by Florida law. She told the Respondent that she needed new insurance because her previous insurance company had gone out of business. The Respondent handled the transaction for her and she specified that she wanted only that coverage which the State of Florida required. Ms. Sigler had been originally quoted a $324.00 premium amount. When she actually entered into the insurance transaction, however, an additional $65.00 was added on to that amount because the Respondent sold her an additional "Nations Safe Drivers, Inc." enrollment. This is not an insurance product but, rather, is a form of supplemental medical benefit. Ms. Sigler had not requested this and did not understand the nature of it, believing that it was unnecessary because she was already qualified as a "safe driver" based upon her driver's record. She was given no explanation as to what that enrollment form, and benefit was nor that there was an extra charge for it. Even as reflected on the enrollment form, Ms. Sigler merely thought that the Nations Safe Drivers membership was a part of the required insurance purchase package. This is not true, in fact, since only PIP and PD coverages are required by law. Ms. Sigler was thus sold a product she did not request, which was not required by law and which was not explained to her. The entire transaction took approximately one- half hour. The receipt issued to Ms. Sigler shows that the "total premium" was $324.00. In fact, however, the actual cost of insurance was a $259.00 premium. The additional $65.00 of the $324.00 amount was the fee for the Nations Safe Drivers membership, which was hidden in what was represented as a "total premium". Moreover, the down payment she paid of $98.00 was deceptive because only a part of it was applied to automobile insurance coverage and the remainder was the fee for the Nations Safe Drivers membership. The Respondent's business practice in this regard resultingly misled Ms. Sigler into believing that Nations Safe Drivers, Inc. was required by State law and that it was an insurance product, which it was not. Here, again, in spite of the disclosure she signed and the documents that she was hurriedly urged to execute by the Respondent, the clear and convincing evidence shows that she did not actually, knowingly consent to purchase the extra non-insurance product referenced above. The Respondent's business practice, the way he represented the nature of her insurance coverage and in the manner in which he conducted the transaction did not involve an actual explanation of the non-insurance product he misled her into purchasing. Thus, there was no informed consent to purchase that product. Rosa Johnson went to the Respondent's Agency on March 21, 1994. She wanted to purchase the "minimum" automobile insurance required by State law for her 1971 Plymouth. She dealt with the Respondent and another gentleman who worked under the Respondent's direction and control. She told them she only wanted the basic, legally-required coverage. PIP and PD coverage was issued through Security. Ms. Johnson was also sold the Nations Safe Drivers product. This product was not actually explained to her, in spite of the fact that she may have signed a written disclosure that it had been, including the fact that it was an optional benefit and not part of the legally-required insurance coverage. She did not request this product nor was it explained to her so that its meaning and coverage was understood by her. Upon conclusion of the transaction, Ms. Johnson had purchased PIP and PD coverage from Security for a premium of $248.00, plus an unrequested enrollment in Nations Safe Drivers, Inc. for a fee of $35.00. All of this amount was financed by ETI. Here, again, as with the other customers, the receipt furnished to Ms. Johnson indicates a total "premium" of $283.00. The actual cost of insurance or true premium was $248.00. The additional $35.00 of the $283.00 amount was the cost of the Nations Safe Drivers, Inc. product, which was hidden in what was represented to her on the receipt as the "total premium". Likewise, the purported down payment of $85.00 was deceptive in the manner in which it was presented and required of Ms. Johnson, because only part of it was applied to insurance coverage, the remainder being the $35.00 fee for the added non- insurance product referenced above. The Respondent's authority to bind coverage with Security Insurance Company had been terminated on March 14, 1994 due to excessive late submissions of insurance applications to the carrier. The problem was later alleviated and his authority to bind insurance for Security was restored by that company. However, during the period of time his binding authority had been terminated, the Respondent kept taking applications and binding policies. This caused the insureds to believe that they had coverage when, in fact, they did not, because the carrier, Security, through its managing agent, U.S. Underwriters, did not, for a period of time, allow the Respondent to obligate that company for coverage. Accordingly, in due course, Ms. Johnson was notified by U.S. Underwriters, on behalf of Security, that she had no coverage. She became upset and filed a complaint with the Insurance Commissioner because she had understood that as soon as the transaction with the Respondent was completed, her coverage had been bound and timely filed and processed with the underwriting insurance carrier. Charles Meadows of Gulf Breeze, Florida, required insurance on his 1986 Chrysler LeBaron. He wanted to purchase the minimum amount of legally- required coverage and went to the Respondent's Agency for that purpose on May 17, 1994. He needed the minimum amount of legally-required insurance so that he could obtain a tag for his automobile from the county tag office. He was in a hurry because he had taken leave from work and needed to get his insurance transaction consummated, as well as to obtain his automobile tag before 4:30 p.m. He conferred with a lady who was employed by the Respondent at the Agency who handled his transaction. She completed all of the documents, spread them across the counter, and marked and told him the places to sign to effect the binder of the coverage that day. The transaction occurred quickly, lasting only approximately 15 minutes. He received no effective explanation of any of the coverages. Rather, he relied on her representations that he was getting what he had asked for, that is, the minimum legally-required Florida insurance coverage. The coverage he obtained was placed with Security as to the PIP and PD coverage. The premium for that coverage was $321.00. The total premium quoted to him was $421.00, which included a $100.00 membership in the Gulf Coast Travel Association, a motor or travel club. Mr. Meadows was not aware that he had this extra amount of coverage or membership until he conferred with Mr. Spencer of the Department at a later time, who informed him of such. If he had known that the agreements he was signing during the hurried, unexplained transaction with the Respondent's employee included the motor club coverage, he would have declined it because his wife already had coverage with AAA for towing and related benefits. Mr. Meadows made a down payment of $190.00 on May 17, 1994. The receipt issued to him revealed a "total premium" of $421.00. The actual cost of insurance was $321.00, with the additional $100.00 being for the motor club, although the total amount was represented as "total premium". Additionally, the down payment of $190.00, which he paid, was deceptive in that only $90.00 was actually applied to insurance coverage and the remaining $100.00 was the total up-front fee for the motor club coverage, although it was represented to Mr. Meadows as being the $190.00 down payment on the insurance premium itself. Later, Mr. Meadows learned that he had the motor club benefits which he did not want or need and so he demanded a refund of his money from the Respondent. He spoke to the Respondent personally about this but did not receive immediate satisfaction. There was a substantial delay in receiving his refund after the Respondent told him that he would receive one. The Respondent justified this by stating to him that it had to come from "another office" and that it would not come from his Agency itself. Dorothy Weber of Pensacola, Florida, required automobile insurance for her 1986 Chevrolet Blazer and a 1978 Chevrolet Caprice. She went to the Respondent's Agency on June 15, 1994 and indicated to one of his employees that she was interested in the cheapest coverage available. She wanted nothing extra, except that required by law. She received very little explanation of the coverages and benefits, other than in response to questions she asked. The transaction of insurance was conducted in a similar manner to those referenced earlier in these Findings of Fact. The PIP and PD coverage was placed with the Florida Joint Underwriting Association. It carried a premium of $787.00. Despite Ms. Weber's request for only the minimum, legally-required insurance, she was also sold a motor club (Gulf Coast Travel Association) unbeknownst to her at the time at an additional fee of $150.00. In spite of the fact that Ms. Weber signed the disclosure concerning the optional nature of the motor club and related fee and so forth, as described in further detail in the above Findings of Fact, in actual fact, it was not explained to her. The fact that the fee for it was separate from the insurance premium for the insurance coverage was not explained to her and she effectively was not informed that she was purchasing that product. During the transaction, she was informed that if her vehicle broke down, she could obtain wrecker service. Nothing was mentioned to her, however, about Gulf Coast Travel Association or that the $150.00 was an extra fee. She merely had all of the forms presented to her in rapid fashion and was asked to sign them. The explanation simply was that the "total policy" cost $937.00, and there was a down payment of $318.00 supposedly for premium only. The entire transaction took approximately one-half hour. Later, Ms. Weber discovered that she had been misinformed and complained to the Department and the Respondent's Agency, specifically indicating that she had not been informed that the $150.00 for the motor club was separate nor that she had purchased motor club coverage. The receipt furnished to Ms. Weber concerning the amounts she paid to secure her coverage is misleading. It indicates a total premium of $937.00, when the actual cost of the insurance was $787.00. The additional $150.00 was for the undisclosed motor club coverage hidden in what was represented on the receipt as a "total premium". The down payment of $308.00 was deceptive or misleading in that only $158.00 of it was actually a down payment on insurance coverage. Barry and Deeana Walker of Pensacola, Florida, needed automobile insurance for a 1990 Plymouth Laser. They wanted the cheapest coverage legally required and available to them. The Respondent dealt with the Walkers and was their agent of record. Mr. Walker remembers nothing being mentioned about a motor club, but Mrs. Walker remembers that the agent mentioned "Nations Safe Drivers, Inc."; however, she specifically informed him that she did not want it. In fact, Nations Safe Drivers is a non-insurance membership plan which includes a medical supplement coverage benefit. It is not a motor club. The PIP and PD and bodily injury coverages were placed with Underwriters Guaranty Insurance Company (UGIC) for a premium of $641.00. The premium was originally financed by Underwriters Financial. Also executed on May 4, 1994 was another premium finance agreement with ETI. It provided for an insurance premium of $441.00 for a policy issued by UGIC and the financing of a Nations Safe Drivers enrollment for $100.00. This document was not signed by the Walkers. On May 4, 1994, the Walkers paid $150.00 by check and were required to pay an additional $143.00 by May 20, 1994. The $143.00 was paid; and subsequently, the Walkers received a notice of additional premium of $190.00 due and they paid an additional down payment of $76.00. The Walkers made payments on the ETI premium financing agreement up until October, 1994, even though it had never actually been signed. They made down payments of $369.00 and monthly payments totaling $333.63, for a total of $702.63. Sometime in October of 1994, they received a letter from the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Division of Drivers Licenses in Tallahassee, Florida, stating that Mr. Walker's driver's license was suspended because his insurance had been cancelled, effective July 16, 1994. The Walkers had received a notice from the insurance company of cancellation (because apparently that company would not insure co-owned vehicles) and had gone to the Respondent to see what to do about that problem. The Respondent told them to fill out a form which he gave them and that everything would be taken care of. They filled out the form at his behest so as to indicate that Mr. Walker's father, the co-owner, would not be a driver of the vehicle. Accepting the Respondent's representation, they believed that that would take care of the cancellation of coverage problem, and they continued to make their monthly payments on their premium financing agreement until October of 1994 based upon what the Respondent told them. In fact, the coverage was cancelled effective July 16, 1994; and soon thereafter, Mr. Walker's driver's license was suspended due to failure to carry valid insurance on his automobile. If the Respondent had acted with promptness in correcting the underwriting error, upon being apprised of the situation by the Walkers, the lapse in coverage and suspension of the driver's license need not have occurred and the payments on the original coverage need not have been made until October 11, 1994, when new coverage was finally obtained by the Respondent at the Walkers' behest. Although, on November 11, 1994, ETI credited the Respondent and the Walkers for $169.41 of unearned premium, the damage had already been done by that point in terms of the lapse of coverage and the suspension of Mr. Walker's driver's license, with attendant financial risk and inconvenience to Mr. Walker. Moreover, the receipt issued to the Walkers in the original insurance transaction indicates a total premium of $741.00. As in the other situations, the actual insurance cost was $641.00, and the additional $100.00 was for the Nations Safe Drivers non-insurance medical payment product, wrapped up in what was represented as "total premium". The down payment of $293.00 was similarly misleading because only $193.00 of that applied to actual insurance coverage. The Respondent received his fee of $100.00 for the added-on product mentioned above entirely out of the up-front, down payment amount. Thus, the Respondent received the entire fee for the Nations Safe Drivers product within a purported "premium receipt" amount described to the customer as an insurance down payment. On January 26, 1995, Ms. Betty Cook of Walnut Hill, Florida, needed to purchase insurance for her 1994 Thunderbird and her 1993 Chevrolet C1500 pickup truck. She went to the Respondent's Agency to accomplish her insurance renewal transaction. A lady by the name of Sonya handled the transaction for her that day. The Cooks' insurance was placed with UGIC for a premium of $1,123.00. The premium was financed through Underwriters Financial of Florida, Inc. The transaction was initiated on January 26, 1995 but ultimately concluded on January 28, 1995, after Mrs. Cook had received and signed all of the paperwork. Mrs. Cook made a premium down payment of $339.00 and mailed her first payment when it was due. She thereupon was sent a notice stating that no policy existed. She called the Agency to see what was wrong and someone at the Agency indicated to her that it would taken care of immediately. A lienholder on the pickup truck sent a notice to her that they had not been notified that the insurance had been renewed. Mrs. Cook became very concerned and the Respondent offered to refund her premium; however, three months had evidently elapsed since she first renewed her insurance or thought she had. Thus, Mrs. Cook, without knowing at the time, was driving her automobiles without insurance coverage for approximately a three-month period. Mrs. Cook contacted the Department and got her insurance reinstated and placed with another servicing agent. The policy was issued by UGIC, without requiring the payment of a premium down payment by the Respondent. The Respondent had still not forwarded the $339.00 down payment originally received from Mrs. Cook as of April 19, 1995. This lapse or failure to forward the insurance down payment obviously resulted in the coverage never being bound with the company. Therefore, the company had not issued and had no record of coverage for Mrs. Cook's vehicles. The agent for this company was required to account for and promptly forward insurance premium down payments, such as this, to the insurer he represented and on behalf of the insured he also represented in the transaction. Christopher Camus of Pensacola, Florida, went to the Respondent's Agency to purchase insurance for a 1983 Oldsmobile Cutlass. He went to the agency on August 25, 1993, and the Respondent placed his coverage with Security. The total premium was quoted as $274.00. Mr. Camus signed an application on that date and paid the full amount to the Respondent. The Respondent failed to forward the application and premium to the insurance carrier, and the policy of insurance was not actually issued until November 30, 1993. Mr. Camus was thus left without coverage for approximately two months. He made repeated telephone calls to the Agency to no avail. Agency personnel maintained that the problem was occurring with the insurance company itself and was not the fault of the Respondent's Agency. The Respondent deposited Mr. Camus' check in August of 1993, but the application for his insurance was never received by Security until December 23, 1993. The Respondent thus did not promptly and appropriately handle the insurance premium funds in question and forward the application so as to promptly bind the coverage for the customer. Indeed, it is noteworthy that this company revoked the Respondent's authority to bind coverage for customers on March 14, 1994 due to an excessive amount of such late submissions of insurance applications and premiums. In 1993, of the 1,299 applications taken by the Respondent and his Agency, only 58 percent reached the insurer's office within the required time period. In summary, the evidence presented in this case indicates that the Respondent engaged in the general business practice of selling ancillary products to insureds without truly obtaining "informed consent" of those insureds. The pattern running through the testimony of the above-described witnesses, none of whom were shown to have any motive to falsify their testimony, was that, although they signed the various disclosures on the insurance underwriting or binding documents, indicating that they understood that the ancillary products were optional, were not insurance, and were not required to be purchased. They did not receive any significant explanation of the optional nature of those products concerning the advisability of their purchase (particularly as to those customers who had AAA coverage), nor the extra cost attributable to those products. Each insured witness consistently maintained that he or she had not read the numerous documents presented to them. Certainly, they should have, in an abundance of caution, read the documents and attempted to understand them. Their failure to do so, however, does not absolve the Respondent of his duty to specifically explain to each customer the exact nature of the coverage being offered, whether or not it was legally optional, particularly, as to those customers who stated definitely that they only wanted the bare minimum coverage required by law, and the fact that it was optional at an extra cost, and was not included in the basic insurance coverage being sold. It is clear from these witnesses' testimony that none had requested motor club benefits or any other ancillary product and yet, in effect, these were automatically added to the policies involved in this proceeding in each transaction and were clearly not explained to the customers. The general business practice of the Respondent involved in the sale of the motor club and ancillary products belies the existence of "informed consent" on the part of the customers. Mr. James Self is a former agent for the Respondent, who testified regarding the Respondent's business practices. He was trained by the Respondent and worked for the Agency from August, 1993 to June, 1994. The Agency had a policy of giving telephone quotes for insurance premiums, without including the amount represented by motor club or other add-on optional products. The Agency would then add such products to the insurance package when the customer came in to purchase insurance. According to Mr. Self, any sort of explanation or disclosure of these add-on products to the customer would be merely to the effect that the insurance "quote" included towing or rental. There was little else explained about it. In many of the situations with witnesses in this case, the insureds only requested the minimum coverage and, therefore, no optional or ancillary products were justified without full explanation to the customer. Mr. Self described how the Respondent specifically trained him in "clubbing", which meant adding motor club coverage to the insurance coverage requested by customers. The Respondent's own testimony shows the economic necessity for the pervasive sale of such motor club benefits to as many customers as possible, when he stated: It's really the only way to exist . . . Q: So you're telling me that the only way for you to exist is to sell motor clubs? A: Financially, it's -- really for most businesses in this market it's the only way to be able to survive. Transcript, page 175. The Respondent further acknowledged the pecuniary interest he had in selling travel or motor clubs since he described his average commission as being 90 percent of the fee for writing that coverage, which is higher than the commission on insurance products. Moreover, he recovered all of that money from the down payment the customers were making, supposedly for their insurance coverages. Therefore, his incentive was multiplied because he was getting the high commission percentage rate, plus he was getting all of it in cash on the initial portion of the transaction, the down payment. Mr. Self also explained that salesmen would never tell the insured exactly how much the motor club cost. On occasions, when Mr. Self would try to partially disclose the motor club, the Respondent would tell him to "hurry up", that he was taking too much time in effecting the transaction. It was Mr. Self's experience that approximately 99 percent of the customers coming into the Agency for insurance left having purchased motor club benefits. Eventually, Mr. Self was terminated because he did not sell enough motor club products. The overall gravamen of his testimony shows that he attempted to make some disclosure or explanation of the motor club and other ancillary products but was discouraged from doing so by the Respondent, with the implication being that this ultimately resulted in his termination from employment with the Respondent's Agency. The evidence thus establishes that, for the most part, the insureds in question did not really know what "minimum coverage" or "full coverage" really consisted of when they came in to purchase such insurance. In making this lay description of the coverage they desired, they then relied on the agent, the Respondent or his employees, to sell them coverage which comported with their wishes and needs, since they were not schooled in the insurance business and related laws themselves. Since they were not so schooled, they almost totally relied on any explanation given to them by the Respondent or his agents or employees. In spite of the signing of the disclosure documents referenced in the above Findings of Fact, the reality of the situation, as a continuing, consistent pattern throughout the testimony adduced from these insureds, and from Mr. Self, reveals that no regular business practice of obtaining an informed consent from customers, such as these, was carried out by the Respondent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Daniel Lee Alison, be found guilty of the violations set forth and discussed above, that his license as an insurance agent in the State of Florida be revoked for a period of two years and that he be ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $9,000.00, within a time to be set by the Department. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 95-2690 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-35. Accepted, except to the extent that they do not comport with the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on these subject matters to which they are subordinate. Rejected, as being subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as being subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter and because of the editorial comment. Accepted, in part, but subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter and rejected, as to the editorial comment. 39-40. Rejected, as being subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter. 41-44. Accepted, in part, but rejected, as subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-13. Accepted, but not as materially dispositive of the issues presented for resolution. Accepted, in part, but rejected, as subordinate and somewhat contrary to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted, but not itself materially dispositive to the issues presented for resolution in this case. 16-17. Accepted. 18. Rejected, as subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter. 19-25. Accepted, but not themselves materially dispositive to the resolution of the issues presented to the Administrative Law Judge. 26. Accepted. 27-29. Rejected, as subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter. 30-32. Accepted. 33-36. Accepted, in part, but rejected, as to the overall material import and as subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter. 37-43. Rejected, as subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter and to some extent, as immaterial. 44. Accepted, as technically correct, but witness Self, a former employee and a witness who purchased insurance, did establish in his testimony that purchase of an ancillary product was a pre-condition to premium financing by Agency policy. 45-47. Accepted, in part, but otherwise rejected, as subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter. 48. Accepted. 49-52. Accepted, but not in and of themselves dispositive of the material issues presented concerning this witness' transaction(s). Rejected, as immaterial. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael K. McCormick, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Charles J. Grimsley, Esquire Charles J. Grimsley & Associates, P.A. 1880 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33129 Bill Nelson Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner, Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether the School Board of Broward County's award of a contract for Excess General and Auto Liability insurance coverage to United National Insurance Company is barred because of illegality?
Findings Of Fact The Parties Ranger Insurance Company, Petitioner, is the holder of a Certificate of Authority dated September 9, 1996 and issued by the Department of Insurance and Bill Nelson, Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer. Good through June 1, 1997, the certificate authorizes Ranger to write in a number of lines of insurance business, including, Private Passenger Auto Liability, Commercial Automobile Liability, Private Passenger Automobile Auto Physical Damage, Commercial Auto Physical Damage and Other Liability. As such, Ranger is an "authorized" or "admitted" insurer in the State of Florida. L.B. Bryan & Company, Alexander & Alexander, Inc., and Benefactor Financial Group, Inc., is a joint venture and co- petitioner with Ranger in this proceeding through whom Ranger proposed to procure the Excess General and Auto Liability (“Excess GL/AL”) coverage. A timely proposal under Request for Proposal 97- 072S was submitted to the School Board of Broward County by the petitioners to provide the Excess GL/AL Insurance Coverage sought by the RFP. United National Insurance Company is an "eligible" surplus lines insurer, approved by the Florida Department of Insurance to transact all surplus lines coverages in the State of Florida and licensed as such. The Department has notified insurance agents of United Nation's eligibility as a surplus lines insurer since 1978. It is the insurer of the Excess General and Excess Auto Liability insurance coverage awarded by the School Board under RFP 97-072S. Arthur J. Gallagher & Company ("Gallagher,") is the eighth largest insurance broker in the world. It has four sales offices, nine service offices, and approximately 150 employees in the State of Florida alone. The office from which it conducted business related to this proceeding is in Boca Raton, Florida, an office for which Area President David L. Marcus is responsible. Gallagher submitted a timely proposal (the "Gallagher proposal,") in response to the RFP on behalf of United National. The School Board of Broward County is the authority that operates, controls, and supervises all free public schools in the Broward County School District, "[i]n accordance with the provisions of s. (4)(b) of Article IX of the State Constitution ...". Section 230.03(2), F.S. In accord with its powers, the School Board may contract directly to purchase insurance. It is not required by its purchasing rules to use a competitive bidding or procurement process to purchase insurance. Nonetheless, on Friday, April 26, 1996, it issued a request for proposals, the RFP at issue in this proceeding, for insurance coverages including for Excess GL/AL insurance coverages. Siver Insurance Management Consultants Siver Insurance Management Consultants ("Siver,") are the drafters of RFP 97-072S. The School Board relied on Siver to draft the RFP, particularly its technical sections. Technical review of the proposals made under the RFP was conducted by Siver. And Siver put together for the School Board's use a summary of the policies proposed by both United National and Ranger. The summary was considered by the School Board's Evaluation Committee when it evaluated the competing proposals. The determination of whether the competing proposers were properly licensed was made by Siver. The School Board's Evaluation Committee, indeed the School Board, itself, played no role in determining the licensing credentials of the proposers while the proposals were under consideration. Under the arrangement between Siver and the School Board, however, the School Board retained the primary responsibility for administering the RFP. The RFP Request for Proposal 97-072S was mailed to 324 vendors (prospective proposers) the same day as its issuance, April 26, 1996. None of the vendors knew the contents of the RFP until it was issued. The RFP sought proposals for seven coverages, each of which was severable from the remainder of the coverages and was allowed to be proposed separately. The scope of the request was described in the RFP as follows: The School Board of Broward County, Florida ... is seeking proposals for various insurance coverages and risk management services. To facilitate distribution of the underwriting data and the requirements for each of the coverages, this consolidated Request for Proposals ... has been prepared. However, each of the coverages is severable and may be proposed separately. The following are included: Boiler & Machinery Excess General and Automobile Liability Excess Workers' Compensation School Leaders Errors & Omissions Crime Including Employee Dishonesty - Faithful Performance, Depositor's Forgery Claim and Risk Management Services (Including Managed Care Services) Statutory Death Benefits Petitioner's Ex. 1, pg. I-1. Since the seven coverages are severable and no proposer had to submit a proposal on all seven coverages, one way of looking at RFP 97-072S is as a consolidated RFP composed of seven, separate proposals, each for a different type of insurance coverage. Of the 324 vendors to whom the RFP was sent, only two, Gallagher, on behalf of United National, and Ranger, through the action of the joint venture, submitted proposals with respect to the Excess GL/AL coverages. Reasons for Using an RFP The School Board, under the auspices of Siver, chose to seek insurance coverage through an RFP rather than an Invitation to Bid, or what is colloquially referred to as a "straight bid," for a number of reasons. As one familiar with RFPs and Invitations to Bid might expect, the School Board and Siver were attracted to the RFP by the increased flexibility it offered in the ultimate product procured in comparison to the potentially less flexible product that would be procured through an invitation to bid. More pertinent to this case, however, Siver chose to use an RFP for the School Board in this case because "as explained ... by the Department of Insurance over the ... years, while there may... [be a] prohibition against any surplus lines agents submitting a straight bid, there would not be a prohibition against a ... [surplus lines] agent responding to a request for proposal " (Tr. 149.) The RFP approach was not chosen, however, in order to avoid any legal requirement or to circumvent the Insurance Code. As explained by Mr. Marshall, the approach was born of hard reality: Id. [O]ne of the primary motivations [for using an RFP rather than an Invitation to Bid] was to allow us [The School Board and Siver] to consider surplus lines companies because of the fact that very often they were the only insurers that would respond on the number of coverages and clients that we were working for. The Insurance Code and the Surplus Lines Law The Insurance Code in Section 624.401, Florida Statutes, requires generally that an insurer be authorized by the Department of Insurance (the "Department,") to transact business in the State of Florida before it does so: (1) No person shall act as an insurer, and no insurer or its agents, attorneys, subscribers, or representatives shall directly or indirectly transact insurance, in this state except as authorized by a subsisting certificate of authority issued to the insurer by the department, except as to such transactions as are expressly otherwise provided for in this code. One place in the code where transactions are "expressly otherwise provided for ...," is in the Surplus Lines Law, Section 626.913 et seq., Florida Statues. The purposes of the law are described as follows: It is declared that the purposes of the Surplus Lines Law are to provide for orderly access for the insuring public of this state to insurers not authorized to transact insurance in this state, through only qualified, licensed, and supervised surplus lines agents resident in this state, for insurance coverages and to the extent thereof not procurable from authorized insurers, who under the laws of this state must meet certain standards as to policy forms and rates, from unwarranted competition by unauthorized insurers who, in the absence of this law, would not be subject to similar requirements; and for other purposes as set forth in this Surplus Lines Law. Section 626.913(2), F.S. Surplus lines insurance is authorized in the first instance only if coverages cannot be procured from authorized insurers: If certain insurance coverages of subjects resident, located, or to be performed in this state cannot be procured from authorized insurers, such coverages, hereinafter designated "surplus lines," may be procured from unauthorized insurers, subject to the following conditions: The insurance must be eligible for export under s. 626.916 or s. 626.917; The insurer must be an eligible surplus lines insurer under s. 626.917 or s. 626.918; The insurance must be so placed through a licensed Florida surplus lines agent; and The other applicable provisions of this Surplus Lines Law must be met. Section 626.915, Florida Statutes, and then only subject to certain other conditions: No insurance coverage shall be eligible for export unless it meets all of the following conditions: The full amount of insurance required must not be procurable, after a diligent effort has been made by the producing agent to do so, from among the insurers authorized to transact and actually writing that kind and class of insurance in this state ... . Surplus lines agents must verify that a diligent effort has been made by requiring a properly documented statement of diligent effort from the retail or producing agent. However, to be in compliance with the diligent effort requirement, the surplus lines agent's reliance must be reasonable under the particular circumstances surrounding the risk. Reasonableness shall be assessed by taking into account factors which include, but are not limited to, a regularly conducted program of verification of the information provided by the retail or producing agent. Declinations must be documented on a risk-by-risk basis. It is not possible to obtain the full amount of insurance required by layering the risk, it is permissible to export the full amount. Section 626.916, F.S. Authorized vs. Unauthorized Insurers Unlike authorized insurers, unauthorized insurers do not have their rates and forms approved by the Department of Insurance, (the "Department.") Similarly, unauthorized insurers are not member of the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association, which guarantees payment of claims if an insurer becomes insolvent. Unauthorized insurers may qualify to transact Florida insurance business under the Surplus Lines Law and so, for purposes of the Surplus Lines Law, be considered "eligible" to transact surplus lines business in Florida. When a Surplus Lines insurer is eligible, Department of Insurance employees refer to the insurer in Surplus Lines terms as "authorized," a term in everyday English that is synonymous with "eligible." But an eligible surplus lines insurer remains an "unauthorized" insurer when compared to an "authorized" insurer for purposes of the Insurance Code and that part of the code known as the Surplus Lines Law. Submission and Review of Proposals Both L.B. Bryan & Company, Alexander & Alexander, Inc., and Benefactor Financial Group, Inc., (the "Joint Venture") and Gallagher submitted timely proposals with regard to Excess GL/AL coverage in response to the RFP. The Joint Venture's proposal was submitted, of course, on behalf of Ranger, an authorized insurer, and Gallagher's was submitted on behalf of United National, an insurer eligible to transact insurance in the State of Florida as a surplus lines insurer but otherwise an unauthorized insurer. The School Board's Insurance Evaluation Committee met on May 30, 1996, to evaluate proposals received pursuant to the RFP. Although briefly discussed by the Evaluation Committee, the issue of proper licensing was not determined independently by the committee. Instead of making that determination, the committee turned to its insurance consultant, Siver. Siver had determined that both proposers, Ranger and United National, were properly licensed for purposes of responding to the RFP and being considered by the committee. Siver communicated that determination to the committee. The committee relied on Siver's determination. Aside from receiving Siver's determination of proper licensing when "briefly discussed" (Tr. 108,) the Evaluation Committee did not address whether either Ranger or United National were properly licensed. Certainly, no issue of whether Ranger should take precedence over United National by virtue that it was an authorized insurer when United National was an unauthorized insurer and a mere eligible Surplus Lines insurer was ever discussed by the committee. In evaluating the proposals, the Committee awarded 73 points to the Gallagher proposal and 69 points to the Ranger proposal. Points were awarded on the basis of three criteria or in three categories: Qualifications (20 points maximum); Scope of Coverages/Services Offered (30 points maximum); and, Points for Projected Costs (50 points maximum.) The Ranger proposal outscored the Gallagher proposal in the "projected cost" category, 50 to 23, but it scored lower in the "qualifications" category, 14 versus 20 for Gallagher, and significantly lower in the "scope of coverages" category, five points versus 30 for Gallagher. The United National coverage was more than twice as costly as Ranger's, a $491,000 annual premium as opposed to Ranger's $226,799, which explains the points awarded in the "projected cost" category. The Gallagher proposal received more points than the Ranger proposal in the "qualifications" category because United National has provided the School Board with Excess GL/AL coverage for a number of years and Ranger has never provided the School Board with such coverage. The Ranger proposal fell so drastically short of the Gallagher proposal in the "scope of coverages/services offered" category primarily because of an athletic participation exclusion appearing in a rider to the specimen policy appearing in its proposal. Ranger had intended to cover athletic participation and the rider was included with the Ranger proposal in error. Ranger notified the School Board of its intent immediately after the tabulations were released. Nonetheless, the Evaluation Committee was never informed of the error and no attempt was made by the School Board to negotiate with Ranger to improve the coverages offered, despite authority in the RFP for the School Board to negotiate with any of the proposers. (The language used in the RFP is "with one or more" of the proposers.) The Ranger proposal also fell short of the Gallagher proposal in the "scope of coverages/service offered" category because the Gallagher proposal was made in several ways. One way was as to only Excess GL/AL coverage. Another way included School Leaders' Errors and Omissions ("E & O") coverage. The E & O coverage was offered by United National in the Gallagher proposal together with the Excess GL/AL coverage in a "combined lines" package, similar to United National coverages already existing for the School Board. Furthermore, the Ranger proposal expressly excluded coverage for Abuse and Molestation, a needed coverage due to the School Board's prior claims history. On June 5, 1996, the Evaluation Committee submitted its recommendations to the School Board's Purchasing Department. With regard to GL/AL coverage, the Evaluation Committee recommended the purchase of the GL/AL/E & O "combined lines" coverage offered by Gallagher through United National. The School Board posted its Proposal Recommendation/Tabulations adopting the recommendation, two days later, on June 7, 1996. Ranger Seeks Redress from the Department Following the School Board's award, Ranger, thinking that it should have received the award under the RFP as the only authorized insurer to submit a proposal for Excess GL/AL coverage, sought redress from the Department. On June 14, 1996, Ranger personnel met with the head of the Department's Surplus Lines Section, Carolyn Daniels, alleging a violation of the Insurance Code's Surplus Lines Law. On June 18, 1996, Ranger reiterated its complaint in writing and asked Ms. Daniels to find a violation that day. On June 24, 1996, Ranger, now through its attorneys, met with Ms. Daniels and her supervisor. Again, on July 4, 1996, Ranger's attorneys wrote to Ms. Daniels, further pleading for her to find a violation and asking for an administrative hearing if Ms. Daniels did not find in favor of the Ranger position. On a fifth attempt, Ranger wrote Ms. Daniels on July 11, 1996, requesting that she adopt Ranger's position. Ms. Daniels reviewed Ranger's five complaints with her supervisor, the Chief of the Bureau of Property and Casualty Solvency and Market Conduct. In a letter dated August 14, 1996, to the School Board's Purchasing Agent, Ms. Daniels announced her determination: I did not find any evidence to indicate that Mr. David L. Marcus of Arthur J. Gallagher & Company or United National Insurance Company violated the Surplus Lines Law in providing a quote for the School Board. Intervenor's Ex. No. 2. Ms. Daniel's determination was based on a number of factors, including the School Board's position in the transaction as an "informed consumer," (Tr. 422-423,) and that the School Board had possessed a United National policy for 13 years. But, the determination was primarily based on the fact that Gallagher had received three declinations from authorized insurers to provide Excess GL/AL coverage and so had performed that which was required prior to deciding that the coverage was eligible for export and provision by a surplus lines insurer: due diligence. Due Diligence Section 626.916(1)(a), Florida Statutes, provides, [n]o insurance coverage shall be eligible for export unless it meets ... the following condition[]: ... [t]he full amount of insurance required must not be procurable, after a diligent effort has been made by the producing agent to do so, from among the insurers authorized to transact and actually writing that kind and class of insurance in this state, and the amount of insurance exported shall be only the excess over the amount so procurable from authorized insurers. (e.s.) The statute goes on to require that the diligent effort, "be reasonable under the particular circumstances surrounding the export of that particular risk." Reasonableness is assessed by taking into account factors which include, but are not limited to, a regularly conducted program of verification of the information provided by the retail or producing agent. Declinations must be documented on a risk-by- risk basis. Section 626.916(1)(a), F.S. "'Diligent effort' means seeking coverage from and having been rejected by at least three authorized insurers currently writing this type of coverage and documenting these rejections." Section 626.914(4), F.S. Under this definition, the "producing agent should contact at least three companies that are actually writing the types of clients and the business in the area [that they are] wanting to write." (Tr. 268.) A specific form to help insurance agents document their three rejections is adopted by Department rule. The rule provides: When placing coverage with an eligible surplus lines insurer, the surplus lines agent must verify that a diligent effort has been made by requiring from the retail or producing agent a properly documented statement of diligent effort on form DI4-1153 (7/94), "Statement of Diligent Effort", which is hereby adopted and incorporated by reference. Rule 4J-5.003(1), F.A.C. Fully aware of the requirement for documentation of diligent effort to find authorized insurers, and cognizant that it would be unlikely that an authorized insurer could be found based on experience, Gallagher began soliciting proposals for coverage in the middle of April, 1996, several weeks before the School Board had issued the RFP. In fact, at the time that Gallagher started soliciting bids, the School Board had not yet assembled or distributed the underwriting data needed by bidders. Nonetheless, with good reason based on experience, Gallagher expected that the School Board would seek a "combined lines" package of GL/AL/E & O coverages like the School Board then received through United National, and that it would be unlikely that an authorized insurer would step forward to propose coverage. Gallagher, therefore, used the policy form current in April of 1996, that is the form providing Excess GL/AL/E & O coverage in a "combined lines" package, "as an example of what the School Board had been looking for this type of program and seeking a program similar to that and similar in coverage." (Tr. 242.) But it also sought Excess GL/AL without combination with E & O coverage. As Mr. Marcus testified, when seeking coverage from authorized insurers beginning in April of 1996, Gallagher "would be looking at a variety of different ways, whether they were package or not." (Tr. 243.) One authorized insurer, Zurich-American, declined to quote because it could not offer a combined line SIR program (a package of excess general liability and excess auto liability coverages) as requested by the RFP. Furthermore, the School Board risk was too large for Zurich-American to handle. A second authorized insurer, American International Group, declined to quote due to the School Board's adverse loss experience. A third authorized insurer, APEX/Great American, declined to provide a quote to Gallagher due to the large size of the School Board account. The responses of these three authorized insurers were listed in a Statement of Diligent Effort provided to Ms. Daniels, which she considered in determining that Gallagher and Mr. Marcus had committed no violation of the Surplus Lines Law. Gallagher also provided Ms. Daniels with a second Statement of Diligent Effort. The statement documented the attempt to attract quotes by adding a school leaders errors and omission component to the Excess GL/AL coverage. It, too, was used by Ms. Daniels in making her determination of no violation of the Surplus Lines Law by Gallagher. The same three insurers refused to quote for the "combined lines" program. Attempts by other Authorized Insurers Gallagher requested that any responses to its requests for quotes be submitted by May 10, 1996, so that it could prepare and submit its proposal by the RFP's deadline for submission of original proposals by all vendors, 2:00 p.m. May 16, 1996. One insurer, Discover Re/USF&G attempted to submit a quote on May 15, 1996, one day before the RFP deadline but five days after May 10. By then, Gallagher had already started printing its 625 page proposal. Furthermore, the company failed to provide the required policy forms until the day after the School Board's deadline for filing proposals. Coregis Insurance Company offered coverage of up to $700,000 for each claim and for each occurrence, but like Discover Re/USF&G, failed to provide the required policy forms until after the RFP deadline. Furthermore, definitive coverage under the Coregis policy would only be provided on the condition that the Florida Legislature pass a Legislative Claims bill, a limiting condition not authorized in the RFP or requested by Gallagher. American Home Assurance Company never responded to Gallagher with the School Board's required quote or policy forms. Rather, the company merely provided an "indication" that the company declined to provide a quote. An "indication" consists of an approximate premium rate, without any terms or conditions. A "quote," on the other hand, includes the terms and conditions of a policy. The Department places with the producing agent the responsibility of determining whether an insurer's communication constitutes and "indication" or a "quote." An agent, according to Ms. Daniels, can only violate the Surplus Lines Law if the agent receives a reliable quote. Gallagher even requested a quote from Ranger, despite never having been appointed to transact insurance on its behalf. But Ranger declined. In response to a request by Gallagher's minority business partner, McKinley Financial Services, Ranger, through E. Michael Hoke on American E & S letterhead, wrote in a letter dated May 6, 1996, "[w]e have received a prior submission on this account so we are returning the attached." Intervenor's Ex. No. 7. The Petition Ranger's petition for formal administrative hearing is the letter dated June 19, 1996, to the Director of Purchasing for the School Board under the signature of E. Michael Hoke, CPCU, Assistant Vice President of AES/Ranger Insurance Company. The letter asks its readers to "bear[] in mind we are not attorneys," p. 1 of the letter, before it outlines three protest issues. The third protest issue is the one about which Ms. Daniels made her determination that no violation of the statute had been committed by Gallagher or its employees: "3) Florida Statute 626.901 (Representing or aiding unauthorized insurer prohibited)." The other two issues deal not with the propriety of Gallagher's actions but the legality of the School Board's award to an unauthorized insurer, United National, when coverage was available from an authorized insurer, Ranger: Florida Statute 626.913 (Surplus Lines Law). . . Our Position * * * Ranger Insurance Company is an admitted authorized insurer ... Its proposal for excess general and auto liability is proof that the Board requested coverage was procurable. United National Insurance Company is an unauthorized insurer under the laws of the State of Florida ... . The United National Insurance Company proposal and/or its offer to extend it's current policies appear to us as "unwarranted competition." Ranger Insurance Company is protected from unwarranted competition from United National Insurance Company in accordance with the Florida Statute 626.913. Florida Statute 626.913 (Eligibility for Export) ... Our Position * * * Ranger Insurance Company is an admitted authorized insurer under the laws of the State of Florida. ... It's proposal for excess general and auto liability is proof that the Board requested amounts were available. The proposal and/or contract extensions offered by United National are for the full amount of coverage sought and not excess over the amount procurable from Ranger, an authorized insurer. The petition, therefore, set in issue not just whether Gallagher acted illegally but whether the School Board acted illegally when it made the award to United National, an unauthorized insurer when Ranger, an authorized insurer, had also submitted a proposal. Extension As soon as the School Board was made aware of the Ranger protest, it extended the existing insurance contracts procured under RFP 92-080S, awarded approximately five years earlier. The extension was on a month-to-month basis until resolution of the protest. The extension was necessary to avoid a lapse in the School Board's coverage during this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the award to United National under the Gallagher proposal in response to RFP 97-072S be rescinded. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of January, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul R. Ezatoff, Esquire Christopher B. Lunny, Esquire Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Marks, Bryant & Yon, P.A. Post Office Box 1877 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1877 Edward J. Marko, Esquire Robert Paul Vignola, Esquire Office of the School Board Attorney K.C. Wright Administrative Building 600 Southeast Third Avenue - 11th Floor Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 A. Kenneth Levine, Esquire Blank, Risby and Meenan, P.A. Post Office Box 11068 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3068 Dr. Frank Petruzielo, Superintendent Broward County School Board 600 Southeast Third Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301-3125
