The Issue Whether the Petitioner is eligible for services offered by Respondent to the developmentally disabled under Chapter 393, Florida Statutes (1995).
Findings Of Fact James Champion is a nineteen year old male, born January 22, 1978, who is a permanent resident of the State of Florida. Petitioner currently lives with his natural mother, Susan Champion, who provides him food, shelter and assistance. Petitioner had a normal developmental history until the onset of seizures at the age of four, coinciding with a DPT inoculation. Since then he has had several types of seizures, and has been treated with multiple anti-epileptic medications without success. Currently, Petitioner experiences seizures on an almost daily basis. Petitioner has been oppositional, defiant, and at times volatile in his moods, and can be verbally aggressive. Due to his epilepsy and behavioral difficulties, while in school, Petitioner was placed in a special needs program with small class size and a one-on-one aide. Petitioner graduated from MacArthur North High School in Hollywood, Florida in 1996, with a special diploma. As a child, Petitioner had been given IQ tests. When he was twelve years old, a psychological assessment was performed, yielding a verbal IQ of 100, performance IQ of 88, and full scale IQ of 93. At the age of fourteen, he was tested again, using the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Third Edition (WISC- III). Intelligence testing yielded a verbal IQ of 71, performance IQ of 74, and a full scale IQ of 70. This testing revealed functioning in the Borderline range (second percentile rank) with a six point margin of error. This level of intellectual functioning reflected a 23 IQ point loss from previous testing. A few months past his eighteenth birthday, Petitioner was tested using the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Revised (WAIS-R) and other tests. On the WAIS-R, Petitioner yielded a Verbal IQ of 74, performance IQ of 70, and a full scale IQ of 71. Petitioner was diagnosed as having [Axis I] Dysthymic Disorder (300.4); [Axis II] Borderline Intellectual Functioning (V62.89) and Personality Disorder Due to Medical Condition (310.1); and [Axis III] Epilepsy. This test confirmed that Petitioner was functioning in the Borderline range of intellectual functioning. This drop in test results is accounted for as a result of brain damage caused by Petitioner’s continuing episodes of epilepsy. Applying the margin of error to the lower spectrum, the 70 and 71 test results become 67 and 68, respectively. Taking the totality of the circumstances, it is persuasive that Petitioner has shown that he has tested at an IQ level of approximately 70 or below The accepted criteria used for determining mental retardation and used by Respondent to determine eligibility for its Developmental Services Program is significantly subaverage intellectual functioning (an IQ approximately 70 or below on an individually administered IQ test); concurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive functioning in at least two of the following areas: communication, self- care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self- direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety; and the onset is before 18 years. 12 In determining an individual’s eligibility for its Developmental Services Program, Respondent has a two-step process. First, it determines whether the individual meets the IQ requirement for mental retardation. If, and only if, the individual satisfies this first step, does Respondent proceed to the second step which is determining whether the individual meets the adaptive functioning requirements. Respondent’s evaluator determined that Petitioner failed to satisfy the IQ requirements and, therefore, it was not necessary to examine Petitioner’s adaptive functioning. Petitioner’s IQ results in his teens should be evaluated from the lower tested result, i.e., at 70, and the margin of error should be placed at the lower, not the higher, spectrum (-3). The lower tested result becomes 67, placing Petitioner in the mild mental retardation category. There was some evidence that Petitioner has deficits in adaptive functioning in communication, home living, social/interpersonal skills, self-direction, work, and safety. However, Respondent’s evaluator did not evaluate Petitioner in this area and the testimony of Petitioner’s mother is insufficient to meet the burden of proof necessary in this forum. The onset of Petitioner’s condition occurred prior to his eighteen birthday.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent issue an order determining that prior to his eighteenth birthday, Petitioner has suffered from “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning.” However, the evidence is insufficient to presently establish if it exists concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior. It is further RECOMMENDED that this matter be remanded to Petitioner’s evaluator to determine if Petitioner has deficits in adaptive behavior in two or more areas and would therefore, be eligible for developmental services offered by Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan C. Champion, Parent 104 Lake Gem Drive Longwood, Florida 32750 Eric Dunlap, Esquire District 7 Legal Office Department of Children and Families 400 West Robinson Street, Suite S-1106 Orlando, Florida 32801 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Families 1317 Winewood Boulevard, Room 204-X Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard Doran, General Counsel Department of Children and Families 1317 Winewood Boulevard, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner, Robin Carter Millan, is eligible for the Developmental Services Program of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Robin Carter Millan, requested developmental services from the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in September 1997, when she was 26 years old. The Petitioner's mother, Ann Millan, met with an intake counselor and completed a Referral/Intake Information Questionnaire. Consistent with a long-standing preference not to label her child as autistic, Mrs. Millan listed her daughter's primary disability as mental retardation. After the Petitioner submitted additional information, DCFS psychologist specialist-coordinator Jane Schiereck sent the Petitioner a letter dated March 6, 1998, notifying the Petitioner that DCFS had determined her ineligible for developmental services because the information submitted included IQ test scores exceeding the maximum for mental retardation. At the hearing, the Petitioner's mother presented evidence that the Petitioner actually has autism--a pervasive, neurologically-based developmental disability which causes severe learning, communication, and behavior disorders with age of onset during childhood. Schiereck testified that the evidence proved the Petitioner is eligible for developmental services under the category of autism. According to Schiereck, the Petitioner did not apply for services under the category of autism and that the Petitioner had to reapply under autism. The Petitioner agreed to do so. However, Schiereck also testified that the intake procedures and eligibility determination preceded the filing of an application.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DCFS enter a final order determining the Petitioner eligible for developmental services. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Amy V. Archibald, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 11351 Ulmerton Road, Suite 100 Largo, Florida 33778-1630 Robin Carter Millan c/o Robert and Ann Millan 3963 Eagle Cove West Drive Palm Harbor, Florida 34685 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following findings of fact are made: Charles is Petitioner's natural son. He was born on November 12, 1972. Both Charles and his mother are permanent residents of the State of Florida. Throughout his childhood, Charles experienced severe emotional and behavioral problems that hampered his development. He is still plagued by many of these same problems. Charles has substantial functional limitations in the areas of self- care, receptive and expressive language, learning, 2/ mobility, self-direction, capacity for independent living and economic self-sufficiency. Charles is now, and has been since March 17, 1988, enrolled in a residential program for S.E.D. (Severely Emotionally Disturbed) students at the Devereux Hospital and Children's Center of Florida (Devereux) in Melbourne, Florida. Prior to his admission to Devereux, Charles was a student in the Dade County school system (County). While a County student, Charles participated in a Variety of the County's exceptional student education programs, including those for the learning disabled, emotionally handicapped and educable mentally retarded. None of these programs were deemed suitable to meet Charles' special educational needs. Accordingly, the County contracted with Devereux to provide Charles with the educational services he is now receiving. The scores Charles has received on the most recent standardized intelligence (IQ) tests he has taken accurately reflect that his intellectual functioning is significantly below average. In March 1990, Charles took a Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale- Revised (WAIS-R) IQ test administered by Dr. Ivan Danger. Charles appeared to be nervous and anxious during the testing. The results of the test were as follows: verbal IQ- 66; performance IQ- 71; and full scale (overall) IQ- 67. 3/ A full scale IQ of 67 is more than two standard deviations from the mean score on the test. 4/ In addition to administering this IQ test in March 1990, Dr. Danger also assessed Charles' adaptive behavior by using the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale (Vineland), a tool commonly utilized by clinical psychologists for this purpose. Petitioner provided the survey information upon which Dr. Danger based his assessment. On the basis of the composite score Charles received (44), Dr. Danger concluded that Charles was "within the moderate mentally retarded range of adaptive functioning. Approximately, seven months later, in October 1990, Charles took a WAIS-R IQ test administered by Dr. Kathleen I. van Hover. This time Charles sat quietly and was cooperative during the test. Nonetheless, the results of this test ware almost identical to the results of the test he had taken seven months before. The results of the October 1990 test were as follows: verbal IQ- 66; performance IQ- 70; and full scale (overall) IQ- 67. Like Dr. Danger, Dr. van Hover, in conjunction with the IQ test she administered, also conducted an assessment of Charles' adaptive behavior. She too used the Vineland. Charles' teacher at Devereux, as well as a direct care staff person on Charles' unit, furnished the survey information upon which Dr. van Hover based her assessment. On the basis of the composite score Charles received (47), Dr. van Hover concluded that Charles' behavior was "moderately impaired" and "well below his intellectual level." The IQ tests administered by Drs. Danger and van Hover, although the most recent, are not the only IQ tests that Charles has taken over the years. In September 1977 and again in May 1978 Charles was administered Stanford-Binet IQ tests. He attained a full scale or overall score of 65 on the 1977 test and a full scale or overall score of 94 on the 1978 test. 5/ In September 1979, January 1982, June 1984, October 1986 and February 1988, Charles took Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children- Revised (WISC-R) IQ tests. The results of these tests were as follows: YEAR VERBAL IQ PERFORMANCE IQ OVERALL IQ 1979 46 71 55 1982 66 87 74 1984 64 92 76 1986 50 87 68 1988 57 71 61 Given Charles' age and the lack of any material improvement made in these areas in the past, it is likely that, for the indefinite future, his general intellectual functioning will remain significantly subaverage and that his adaptive behavior will continue to be impaired. 6/
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services issue a final order finding that Charles is eligible for developmental services pursuant to Chapter 393, Florida Statues, and granting the application for such services submitted by Petitioner on Charles' behalf. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 11th day of February, 1991. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of February, 1991.
The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to receive developmental services from the Department of Children and Family Services (the Department), due to his developmental disability based on retardation, pursuant to Chapter 393, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was born on June 21, 1979, and at the time of the hearing was 21 years of age. Petitioner was evaluated at the University Hospital of Jacksonville in Jacksonville, Florida, in 1982, at two and one- half years of age. A report from that evaluation indicated that Petitioner was afflicted with a seizure disorder, speech delay, and right-sided dysfunction. During September, 1985, at age six years, three months, he was evaluated at the Hope Haven Children's Clinic, in Jacksonville, Florida. His hearing was tested and determined to be normal. A psychological evaluation noted that his communication skills were below his age level. A report of this evaluation indicates he was a slow learner with weaknesses in processing, retaining, and retrieving information, particularly in the area of speech and language development. On January 21, 1986, Petitioner was again evaluated at the Hope Haven Children's Clinic in Jacksonville, Florida. It was noted at that time he had difficulty in following directions and performing in a regular school environment. He was far behind his classmates academically. During this evaluation he was administered a Peabody Individual Achievement Test and received a standard score of 75 on both mathematics and reading recognition. These scores are above the range of retardation. Petitioner was examined by the School Psychology Services Unit, Student Services, of the Duval County School Board, on February, 17, 1987, when he was seven years and seven months of age. At the time he was receiving "specific learning disabilities full time services" while at Englewood Elementary School in Jacksonville, Florida. It was noted that he was difficult to evaluate because he was easily distracted. During the evaluation, on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised, Petitioner received a full-scale intelligence quotient (IQ) of 74. This score indicated that he was below average within his verbal abstract reasoning, verbal expression and practical knowledge, visual attentiveness, visual analysis and visual synthesis. He was determined to be within the "slow learner's" range of development. Petitioner was referred to School Social Work Services, Duval County School Board in Jacksonville, Florida, on January 9, 1990. He was referred to the School Psychology Services Unit, where a Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised was administered on June 11, 1990. His full-scale IQ was determined to be 74. He was also administered a Vineland assessment, which measures adaptive behavior rather than intelligence. In this case, Petitioner's mother provided answers regarding Petitioner's behavior and adaptability. At the time of this assessment, he was almost 11 years of age. On December 18, 1996, Petitioner was evaluated by the Sand Hills Psychoeducational Program in Augusta, Georgia, when he was 17 years of age. He was administered a battery of tests. The WAIS-R indicated borderline intellectual ability, but not retardation. The Stanford-Binet was 56. This score included a verbal reasoning score of 58 and an abstract visual reasoning score of 72. The split in the scores generates doubt as to the validity of the test. Psychologist Cydney Yerushalmi, Ph.D., an expert witness for the Department, and psychologist Barbara Karylowski, Ph.D., an expert witness for the Petitioner, opined that the Stanford Binet was inappropriate for a person who had attained the age of 17 because it would tend to produce lower scores. Dr. Karylowski tested Petitioner's IQ in February and March 2000. She concluded that Petitioner had a full-scale IQ of 68, which is mild retardation. At the time of that test Petitioner was 20 years of age. Dr. Karylowski opined that the scores she obtained were consistent with all of the scores she had obtained in prior testing because the confidence interval for his IQ was 68 to 77. This would place Petitioner within the range of retardation. Two standard deviations from the mean IQ is 70. It is Dr. Karylowski's opinion that Petitioner is mildly retarded. Her opinion is based on criteria set forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV), published by the American Psychiatric Association. The DSM-IV definition of retardation requires significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive behavior. The onset must occur before the age of 18 years. Accordingly, she believes that Petitioner was retarded before attaining the age of 18. Luis Quinones, M.D., was accepted as an expert witness in the field of psychiatry. Dr. Quinones opined that Petitioner meets the definition of mental retardation under DSM-IV. This means that he believes Petitioner was retarded before attaining the age of 18. He gave great weight to the Petitioner's lack of adaptive functioning in forming this opinion. Dr. Quinones opined that the definition of retardation in the DSM-IV is essentially the same as that found in Section 393.063(44), Florida Statutes. Dr. Yerushalmi evaluated Petitioner and reviewed his medical records. She administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Third Edition, to Petitioner, on August 11, 1999. Petitioner had a verbal score of 74, a performance score of 75, and a full-scale score of 72. She opined that Petitioner was not retarded under the definition set forth in Section 393.063(44), Florida Statutes. The aforementioned statute requires that one must meet a threshold of two or more standard deviations from the mean IQ, in order to be classified as retarded. All measures of IQ have a statistical confidence interval or margin of error of approximately five points, according to the DSM-IV. If one accepts the lower range of the confidence interval of the scores Petitioner has attained over the years, then he meets the two or more standard deviation threshold. Acceptance of the upper limits of the confidence interval would indicate that Petitioner clearly does not fall within the range of retardation. The significance of the confidence interval is reduced substantially when test results produced over a long period of time, by different test administrators, all indicate that Petitioner's IQ is not two or more standard deviations from the mean. Petitioner was diagnosed with many disorders by a variety of practitioners prior to the age of 18. No diagnosis of mental retardation was ever made. At age 21, Petitioner often behaves as if he were much younger, has focused on an 11-year-old as a girlfriend, and may become violent when not properly medicated. He likes to play pretend games of the sort that one would think would entertain a child. For instance, he likes to pretend that he is a law enforcement officer when he rides in a car. He prefers interacting with children who are five or six years younger. He is deficient in the area of personal hygiene. He likes to act silly. He is incapable of holding a driver's license. At the time of the hearing, Petitioner lived with his aunt, Ms. Mary Margaret Haeberle, who is a special education school teacher. She has provided a nurturing environment for Petitioner. Although Petitioner's parents divorced when he was a child, they have worked to address his needs. His younger sister understood Petitioner's problems and attempted to ameliorate them. Upon consideration all of the evidence, it is found that Petitioner was not possessed of an IQ which was two or more standard deviations from the mean. Therefore, there is no need to consider his adaptive function in concluding that he is not retarded.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a final order finding that Petitioner is not entitled to receive developmental services due to a developmental disability based on retardation. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of January, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael R. Yokan, Esquire 1301 Riverplace Boulevard, Suite 2600 Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Robin Whipple-Hunter, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 5920 Arlington Expressway Jacksonville, Florida 32231-0083 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Case Number 95-l967: Whether the Respondent should be dismissed from his employment with the Duval County School Board [School Board] for the violations alleged in the Superintendent's Notice of Dismissal dated April 7, 1995. Case Number 95-l987: Whether the Education Practices Commission [EPC] should revoke or suspend the Respondent's Florida teaching certificate, or impose any other penalty provided by law, for the violations alleged in the Commissioner's Administrative Complaint dated February 23, 1995.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner takes exception to the findings of fact contained in the Recommended Order at paragraphs 12, 19, and 27, wherein the Hearing Officer found that the evidence did not prove that the Respondent had committed the violations charged as referenced in each finding. This conclusion is not supported by competent and substantial evidence as required by section 120.57(1)(a)10., Florida Statutes. The Hearing Officer was convinced that the altitude of forms utilized by the Respondent in selling the non-insurance products (motor clubs) to Hulan Mitchell, Jenna Chester and Michele Humose demonstrated that they had given their informed consent. However, the Hearing Officer overlooked the blatant misrepresentation and false statement contained in the "premium" receipts issued to each of the insured. Although the Hearing Officer is free to determine the credibility of the witness' testimony, the Hearing Officer cannot ignore or reject unrefuted competent and substantial evidence in the record that clearly and convincingly demonstrates that the premium receipts are a misrepresentation of fact or false statement. No witness testimony is necessary to make this finding. The documents speak for themselves and were not otherwise questioned or refuted. The record unequivocally established the following: Hulan Mitchell - The "premium" receipt (Pet. Ex. "1") issued to Mr. Mitchell indicates a total premium of $378. The actual cost of the "insurance" was $328 with a downpayment of $98 required. See Premium Finance Agreement (Pet. Ex. "1") This is absolutely unrefuted on the record. The premium receipt includes $50 for the cost of the motor club, which is not a policy of insurance and accordingly is not "premium". Also the downpayment required, purportedly for insurance, included $50 for the motor club ($98 + $50 = $148). Furthermore, based on clear documentary evidence in the record, Mr. Mitchell was again subject to a misrepresentation of fact (undisputed) wherein on July 9, 1993 he received a letter (Pet. Ex. "1") threatening to cancel his "insurance" policy because he did not pay a $48 balance due on the motor club. Accordingly the record clearly indicates that the Respondent has made a false or misleading statement with reference to the insurance transaction for Mr. Mitchell. The fact that the Hearing Officer held that Mr. Mitchell knew (despite his testimony otherwise) that he had purchased a motor club, does not negate the fact that the Respondent made a false or misleading statement. JENNA CHESTER - The deceptive premium receipt practice was visited upon Ms. Chester on two occasions. First on February 1, 1994 a "premium" receipt (Pet. Ex. "2") was issued in an amount of $670 for "total premium" due and a required downpayment of $261. The actual cost of the "insurance" was $585 with a required downpayment of $176. See Premium Finance Agreement (Pet. Ex. "2") The "premium" receipt and downpayment included a non-insurance fee for a motor club in the amount of $85. On May 23, 1994 Ms. Chester went to the Respondent to repurchase coverage which had been cancelled. At that time, another "premium" receipt was issued to her in the amount of a "total premium" of $719 and a required downpayment of $286 (Pet. Ex. "2") The actual cost of the insurance was $619 and a required downpayment of $186. See Premium Finance Agreement (Pet. Ex. "2") The additional $100 was for the non-insurance motor club which was sold to Ms. Chester. Although the Hearing Officer held that Ms. Chester knew she was purchasing this motor club (despite Ms. Chester's testimony otherwise) this does not negate the fact that the Respondent has made false or misleading statement in this insurance transaction with Ms. Chester. Michelle Humose - The unrefuted documentary evidence indicates that on May 5, 1994, Ms. Humose was issued a "premium" receipt (Pet. Ex. "3") indicating a "total premium" in the amount of $92 and a required downpayment of $348. The actual cost of the "insurance" was $826 with a required downpayment of $248 See Premium Finance Agreement (Pet. Ex. "3") The additional $100 included in the "premium" receipt was for the non-insurance motor club sold to Ms. Humose. Again despite the Hearing Officer's finding contrary to Ms. Humose's direct testimony that she did not know she was purchasing a motor club, the Respondent has clearly and convincingly made a false or misleading statement with respect to this insurance transaction with Ms. Humose. It is implicit in the Findings of Fact by the Hearing Officer that each referenced transaction took place as described herein. The Hearing Officer merely failed to explicitly state in the Recommended Order that the unrefuted documentary evidence establishes a prima facie misrepresentation of fact. Indeed, the exact factual scenario established herein was determined to constitute a misrepresentation in In the Matter of: Kenneth Michael Whitaker, Case Number 93-L-432DDH (Final Order dated July 3, 1995). It was specifically determined "that the Respondent's standard business practice of combining the costs of insurance overages with the costs of the auto club memberships and then calling such costs "total premium" on receipts issued to customers constituted a misrepresentation and was deceptive." Also, it was further determined "that the Respondent's standard business practice of deducting all or part of the ancillary product fee up front resulted in false statements on other documents that the full downpayment for premium or financing of premium had been made, when in actuality it had not." Whitaker Final Order at pp's 9-10. The Department determined that this activity was a violation of section 626.611(9), Florida Statutes. This finding was also affirmed on appeal in Whitaker v. Department of Insurance and Treasurer, Case No. 95-2702, (21 FLW 1353, Slip Opinion dated June 13, 1996). The court upheld this violation when it summarized the practice in the opinion as follows: Appellant took all or part of the ancillary product from the required premium downpayment and gave the consumer a receipt which listed the full downpayment as "Total Premium". The receipt did not reveal that part of the "premium" went to purchase an ancillary product. Whitaker Slip Opinion at pp's 3-4. This type of fraudulent and deceptive practice also constitutes a violation of section 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by placing before the public a representation or statement which is untrue, deceptive or misleading. The Hearing Officer has already considered the unrefuted facts on the record and was clearly in error to make a finding otherwise. Accordingly, pursuant to section 120.57(a)(a) 10., Florida Statutes, which reads in part: 5 The agency may not reject or modify the findings of fact, including findings of fact that form the basis for an agency statement, unless the agency first determines from a review of the complete record, and states with particularity in the order, that findings of fact were not based upon competent substantial evidence or that the proceedings on which the findings were based did not comply with essential requirements of law. the Department may modify the findings of fact. In this case there was no competent and substantial evidence to make a finding that the Respondent did not make a false or misleading statement with the premium receipts issued in this cause. A review of the entire record demonstrates unrefuted documentary evidence which supports the modified findings of fact contained herein. Therefore, Petitioner's exceptions to findings of fact 12, 19 and 27 are hereby GRANTED. RULINGS ON EXCEPTIONS TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Petitioner takes exception to conclusions of law at paragraphs 30 and 31, based on the Hearing Officer's rejection of unrefuted facts established on the record, i.e., deceptive and misleading premium receipts. Conclusions of Law 30 and 31 are revised to reflect that the premium receipts issued to insureds constitute fraudulent and deceptive practices as well as placing before the public a representation or statement which is untrue, deceptive, or misleading. Conclusion of Law 30 is modified as follows: In this case, the Respondent was charged with violating sections 2.11 (4), 626.611(5), 626.611(7), 626.611(9), 626.611(13), 626.621(2), 626.621(6), 626.9541(1)(b), 626.9541(1)(e), 626.9541(1)(k)1., and 626.9541(1)(z), Florida Statutes. Boiled down to the essentials the Department alleged that Respondent violated the provisions listed above by unlawfully selling insured motor club memberships without their informed consent, made false and misleading statements regarding the coverage provided and falsely represented and illegally required insured to purchase motor club membership as part of their purchase of automobile insurance and that Respondent engaged in the prohibited practice of "sliding" additional coverages or products into the purchase of the insured without the informed consent of the insured. This revision is necessary because the Hearing Officer failed to include sections 626.9541(1)(b) and 62.9541(1)(e), Florida Statutes, as alleged violations. Conclusion of Law 31 is likewise revised as follows: The Department failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent attempted to "slide" coverage or ancillary products involved in this case. Likewise, the evidence did not clearly or convincingly demonstrate that Respondent did not obtain the informed consent of her customers prior to selling them the auto club memberships involved here. However, based on the unrefuted evidence in the record, the Respondent has violated sections 626.611(9) and 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by issuing "premium receipts" which falsely and deceptively represented "total premium" which included a fee for a non-insurance product, ie. motor club membership. Accordingly, the Respondent is guilty of three counts of violating sections 626.611(9) and 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes. The Petitioner's exceptions to conclusions of law 30 and 31 are-hereby GRANTED. RULING ON EXCEPTIONS TO RECOMMENDATION The Petitioner takes exception to the recommendation that the Administrative Complaint be dismissed. The Penalty Guidelines contained in Chapter 4-231, Florida Administrative Code, should be applied in this case. There are three documented violations (one for each count) of engaging in fraudulent and dishonest practices as prohibited in section 626.611 (9), Florida Statutes, and placing before the public a representation 6r statement which is untrue, deceptive or misleading in violation of section 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Under the penalty guidelines, a violation of section 626.611(9), Florida Statutes, requires a suspension of 9 months per count. Under the penalty guidelines, a violation of section 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes, requires a suspension of 6 months per count. Based on Rule 4-231.040, Florida Administrative Code, the highest penalty per count should be assessed, therefore the appropriate penalty is three counts at 9 months for a total suspension period of 27 months. Since the total required suspension exceeds 2 years, the appropriate sanction is the revocation of the Respondent's licenses in accordance with section 626.641(1), Florida Statutes. The violation of section 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes, permits the assessment of an additional fine on top of any other administrative sanction, pursuant to section 626.9521, Florida Statutes. This section permits fines for wilful violations of up to $10,000 per violation not to exceed $100,000. The Petitioner recommends that a fine of $3,000 be assessed against the Respondent. However, insufficient grounds have been demonstrated to justify the assessment of a $3,000 administrative fine. Therefore, Petitioner's exceptions to the recommendation are hereby GRANTED, except for the Petitioner's argument for an additional sanction in the form of a $3,000 administrative fine which is hereby DENIED. PENALTY Rule 4-231.160, Florida Administrative Code, prescribes the aggravating and mitigating factors which the Department shall consider and, if warranted, apply to the total penalty in reaching the final penalty. Aggravating factors in this matter, as delineated in Rule 4-231.160, Florida Administrative Code, are the willfulness of the Respondent's conduct and the existence of secondary violations established in Counts I-III of the Administrative Complaint. Only minimal mitigating factors exist which are outweighed by the aggravating factors. The existence of these aggravating factors would increase the Respondent ` s total penalty, thereby resulting in a higher final penalty. Increasing the Respondent's total penalty would be pointless, however, for section 626.641(1), Florida Statutes, limits a licensee's period of suspension to a maximum of 2 years. The Respondent's 27-month total penalty already exceeds the two-year statutory limit. Consequently, the Department has determined that a revocation of the Respondent's insurance agent license is warranted and appropriate in this matter, and is necessary to adequately protect the insurance-buying pubic. IT IS THEREBY ORDERED: All licenses and eligibility for licensure held by TARA JEANNE SMITH, are hereby REVOKED, pursuant to the provisions of sections 626.611, 626.621, 626.641(2) and 626.651(1), Florida Statutes, effective the date of this Final Order. As of the date of this Final Order, the Respondent shall not engage in or attempt or profess to engage in any transaction or business for which a license or permit is required under the Florida Insurance Code, or directly or indirectly own, control or be employed in any manner by an insurance agent or agency. Any party to these proceedings adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to seek review of this Final Order pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Review proceedings must be instituted by filing a Notice of Appeal with the General Counsel, acting as the agency clerk, at 612 Larson Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333, and a copy of the same and the filing fee with the appropriate District Court of Appeal within thirty (30) days of rendition of this Order. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of September, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. BILL NELSON Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner COPIES FURNISHED: Tara Jeanne Smith 2588 Panther Creek Road, Apt. A Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5628 Charles J. Grimsley, Esquire Charles J. Grimsley and Associates, P.A. 1880 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33129 Diane Cleavinger, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Stephen C. Fredrickson, Esquire Division of Legal Services 200 E. Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that, as to DOAH Case Number 95-1987, the Respondent be found guilty of violating Sections 231.28(1)(i), Florida Statutes, by violating Rules 6B-1.006(4)(b) and (5)(a), (g), (h), and (i), Florida Administrative Code. It is further recommended that: Respondent's teaching certificate be revoked for a period of one year. Respondent shall pay the EPC a fine in the amount of $2,000.00. Prior to being recertified in the State as an educator, Respondent shall successfully complete one three-hour college level course in the area of ethics. Should the Respondent be recertified as an educator in the State of Florida after his period of revocation, Respondent shall be placed on probation for a period of three years, under such terms and conditions as the EPC may prescribe. During the period of probation, Respondent's scope of practice shall be restricted so that he shall have no administrative authority over any employee. Respondent receive a letter of reprimand. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, as to DOAH Case Number 95-1967, the Respondent be found guilty of violating Sections 231.28(1)(i), Florida Statutes, by violating Rules 6B-1.006(4)(b) and (5)(a), (g), (h), and (i), Florida Administrative Code. It is further recommended that: 1. The School Board of Duval County take such actions as it deems appropriate to include suspension and discharge, however, because of the lack of general public knowledge, that the Respondent be considered for reinstatement after having completed any penalties imposed by the Department, and being recertified. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of May, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NOS. 95-1967 and 95-1987 The parties submitted proposed findings of fact which were read and considered. The following sates where the findings were adopted or where they were rejected: DOE'S FINDINGS RECOMMENDED ORDER Paragraphs 1-18 Adopted as 1-18 Paragraph 19 Conclusion of law Paragraphs 20-46 Adopted, although renumbered in some instances. DUVAL COUNTY'S FINDINGS Duval County's findings were a verbatim repetition of the DOE's findings. TASKETT'S FINDINGS RECOMMENDED ORDER Paragraphs 1-22 Adopted or subsumed in the findings. Paragraphs 23 and 24 Are not necessary to the factual conclusion reached. Paragraph 25 Adopted or subsumed in the findings. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald G. Stowers, Esquire Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0400 Thomas E. Crowder, Esquire 600 City Hall 220 East Bay Street Jacksonville, FL 32207 John M. Merrett, Esquire 220 East Forsyth Street Jacksonville, FL 32202 Karen Wilde, Executive Director Education Practices Commission 301 Florida Education Center 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0400 Kathleen M. Richards, Administrator Professional Practices Services 325 Florida Education Center 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0400 Frank T. Brogan, Commissioner Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0400 Larry Zenke, Superintendent Duval County School Board 1701 Prudential Drive Jacksonville, FL 32207-8154
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is 26 years old. She lives by herself. Her residence is 280 John Knox Road, Tallahassee, Florida. She has maintained that residence since September of 1993. Petitioner works at Pyramid Industries, a structured workshop. She is receiving training as a receptionist. In addition, she packages headrests and does other duties which are assigned to her at the workshop. Petitioner's employment with Pyramid Industries is for four days a week, 9:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., on each day. That employment began on January 8, 1994. Petitioner was referred to Pyramid Industries by officials of Vocational Rehabilitation. Petitioner has difficulty in controlling a tendency to use inappropriate language, which she described as "swearing". Petitioner's parents take her shopping, to include trips to the grocery store, assist the Petitioner in maintaining her checkbook, visit with Petitioner on a daily basis, and give her support and try to assist her in controlling her "swearing". When Petitioner's mother was pregnant with Petitioner, the mother contracted rubella. Subsequently, Petitioner was taken to a pediatrician at age one and one-half because Petitioner was not speaking. Petitioner was then taken to Yale Child Study in an effort to analyze her condition. No competent evidence was presented concerning the findings made by that organization. Petitioner participated in a program administered by Yale Child Study, which, from a layperson's perspective, was designed to address Petitioner's behavior. When attending schools in Connecticut, Petitioner rode a special school bus with other students. There is no competent proof in the record concerning the nature of the problem which Petitioner and the other students experienced which required them to have special transportation to school. When Petitioner was a child, her mother attempted to address Petitioner's problems of verbal skills by using vocabulary flash cards and engaging in conversations with Petitioner. As a child, Petitioner was removed from kindergarten and reading readiness class to a private school in which an Individual Education Plan (IEP) was prepared to address her problems. No competent evidence was presented concerning the nature of the problem experienced by Petitioner at that time. Under funding provided by the Guilford, Connecticut, public school system, Petitioner was provided a residential placement at Devereux Foundation for education in middle school in accordance with an IEP. Petitioner attended Guilford High School in Guilford, Connecticut and received a certificate pursuant to a special education program in lieu of a diploma. No evidence was presented concerning the nature of this special education program. Petitioner has sought developmental services from Respondent so that she might be provided transportation to certain outings, such as bowling, and would be allowed to participate in the outings with persons who receive developmental services. The basis for the claim for developmental services is the allegation that Petitioner suffers from retardation, as defined in Section 393.063(41), Florida Statutes. No competent evidence was presented to prove that Petitioner suffers from retardation, as defined in Section 393.063(41), Florida Statutes. When Petitioner initially made application for developmental services from Respondent, she provided supporting information, to include a document which was entitled "Report of Psychological Assessment-Intellectual Functioning", performed by the Devereux Foundation, Devon, Pennsylvania. Consistent with its policy, Petitioner considered information in that document, which was dated March 10, 1992. In particular, Respondent took cognizance of a Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, a test administered to Petitioner.1 Respondent considered this test and its results to be collateral source information. Respondent relied upon the test results in making a preliminary decision about Petitioner's entitlement to receive developmental services. At hearing, Respondent, in the person of its employee and policy spokesperson, continued to defer to the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children scores in the Devereux Foundation testing as a means of determining Petitioner's eligibility for developmental services. Preliminarily and at hearing, Respondent held to the opinion that the full-scale score of 72 obtained by Petitioner disqualified Petitioner from receiving developmental services. Respondent's preliminary decision and position at hearing, was to the effect, that the full-scale score of 72 in the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children obtained by Petitioner placed Petitioner above the range of persons who have significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning. When Respondent saw the full-scale score on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children that had been administered by the Devereux Foundation to Petitioner, and having been persuaded by that information that Petitioner was not entitled to developmental services, it took no further action to review the material submitted by Petitioner or to seek additional material from Petitioner. Additional information which Petitioner provided to Respondent prior to hearing, on a form from the Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, which contained information purportedly related to a WAIS76-69-72 assessment of Petitioner's intellectual functioning, was not considered in determining the question of eligibility because Respondent was persuaded that this testing was done too late in Petitioner's life to be of value. The Social Security Administration form entitled "Disability Determination and Transmittal" makes reference to a report prepared on March 31, 1986 concerning Petitioner's intellectual functioning as purportedly prepared by Kenneth Gilstein, Ph.D. C/E. The Disability Determination and Transmittal form paraphrases that report. The actual report is not part of the Disability Determination and Transmittal form.2 Other than the reference to the full-scale score of 72 obtained by Petitioner in the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, administered by the Devereux Foundation, Petitioner presented no other competent evidence in support of her application for developmental services, as such information would address Petitioner's general intellectual functioning, manifested during the period from conception to age 18. Petitioner presented no competent evidence concerning deficits in her adaptive behavior that existed concurrently with the measurement of her general intellectual functioning, as manifested during the period from conception to age 18. Neither party presented competent evidence concerning Petitioner's intellectual function to establish that Petitioner's performance was two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test specified in the rules of the Respondent, as this proof might describe significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's eligibility for developmental services. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 1994.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of personal conduct that seriously reduces her effectiveness as an employee of the school board, in violation of section 1012.795(1)(j), Florida Statutes, or a violation of the Principles of Professional Conduct, as prohibited by section 1012.795(1)(j), by using institutional privileges for private gain and by failing to maintain honesty in all professional dealings, in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-10.081(4)(c) and (5)(a); and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds educator certificate 1012045, which is valid through June 30, 2019. The certificate covers English and Reading. In March 2015, Respondent was employed by Miami-Dade County Public Schools as a language arts teacher at Brownsville Middle School, where she had taught since 2006. On March 2, 2015, outside the presence of other proctors, Respondent administered the 2015 Florida Standards Assessment in English Language Arts (Test), which is taken in a paper-based format. In the course of administering the Test, Respondent noticed that the subject of the writing prompt was William Shakespeare. Respondent did not read any passages set forth in the Test, but, that evening, Respondent advised her son that, when he took the same Test in Broward County the next day, he would be prompted to write about William Shakespeare, and he should do his best to finish the Test. Objectively, knowledge of the subject of the prompt would not confer upon Respondent's son an advantage over his peers. As the word, "prompt" implies, the citation to William Shakespeare was merely to induce the students to write something, not to display their knowledge of Shakespeare or his plays and poetry. On the other hand, Respondent's motive in disclosing the subject of the prompt to her son was to put him a little more at ease when he took the Test; from this perspective, Respondent's motive was to confer upon her son an advantage that would not be enjoyed by the other students who took the Test. Most parents, like Respondent, could encourage their children to do their best and finish the Test, but none could give them the small measure of assurance that comes with knowing the subject of the prompt ahead of taking the Test. Emboldened by his special knowledge, Respondent's son told his teacher, loudly enough that some of his classmates could hear, that the Test was easy and that it was about a poet named Shakespeare. The teacher ordered Respondent to be quiet and, secure in the knowledge that the students did not know who Shakespeare was, justifiably determined that this disclosure a few moments before starting the Test would not affect the validity of the results. The teacher reported the matter to her principal, and eventually the matter was referred to the Miami- Dade County School District. When asked, Respondent admitted to telling her son about the prompt. Eventually, Respondent agreed to a five- workday suspension, without a right to a hearing, as opposed to a proposed termination, subject to a right to a hearing. She has served her suspension and remains employed by the Miami-Dade County School District. Respondent is an experienced teacher, whose career has taken place within the era of high-stakes testing. This simple case pivots on an act that, in effect, verged on the inconsequential, but, in genesis, revealed a worrisome inattentiveness to the demands of one's profession in maintaining an unassailable boundary between public duty and private interest. The proper penalty must recognize the mereness of the act, but inculcate in Respondent an aversion to self-dealing.
Recommendation RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of a violation of section 1012.795(1)(g) and imposing a reprimand and a requirement that Respondent complete successfully 15 hours of teacher ethics or professionalism coursework, online or in person, by August 1, 2019, on her own time or using her personal leave. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of March, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 2018. COPIES FURNISHED: Gretchen Kelley Brantley, Executive Director Education Practices Commission Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 316 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed) Mark Herdman, Esquire Herdman & Sakellarides, P.A. 29605 U.S. Highway 19 North, Suite 110 Clearwater, Florida 33761 (eServed) Charles T. Whitelock, Esquire Charles T. Whitelock, P.A. 300 Southeast 13th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 (eServed) Matthew Mears, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed) Marian Lambeth, Bureau Chief Bureau of Professional Practices Services Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 224-E 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed)
The Issue The issues in the case are whether the allegations set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner against Respondent are correct, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a Florida teacher, holding Florida Educator's Certificate 780153 (covering the area of Emotionally Handicapped education) valid through June 30, 2007. At all times material to this case, Respondent was employed as a teacher of emotionally handicapped third-grade students at Skycrest Elementary School in the Pinellas County School District. Respondent was employed by the Pinellas County School Board as a teacher of emotionally handicapped students for more than six years. The Pinellas County School District assessed student and instructional performance through the use of the "Pinellas Instructional Assessment Portfolio." The portfolio consisted of two tests administered three times each school year. The tests were known as the "Parallel Reading-Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test" and the "Parallel Math-Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test." The portfolio tests were used by the school district to gauge progress towards meeting the Sunshine State Standards established by the Florida Department of Education (DOE) to determine the academic achievement of Florida students. The portfolio tests, administered over a two-day period, also served to prepare students to take the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT). The FCAT was administered according to requirements established though the DOE and was designed to measure progress towards meeting Sunshine State Standards. Third-grade students were required to achieve a passing score on the FCAT in order to move into the fourth grade. One of the purposes of the portfolio tests was to measure student progress and provide information relative to each student's abilities. Based on test results, additional instruction was provided to remedy academic deficiencies and further prepare students to pass the FCAT. Emotionally handicapped students were required to take the reading and the math portfolio tests. The school district had specific procedures in place related to administration of the tests. Teachers responsible for administration of the tests received instruction on appropriate test practices. Respondent was aware of the rules governing administration of the tests. The procedures permitted teachers to offer general encouragement to students, but teachers were prohibited from offering assistance. Teachers were not allowed to read questions to students. Teachers were not permitted to provide any information to students related to the content of test responses. During the December 2002 testing period, Respondent provided improper assistance to the nine emotionally handicapped students he taught. During the test, Respondent reviewed student answers to multiple-choice questions and advised students to work harder on the answers, indicating that the answers were incorrect. Respondent assisted students by reading questions, helping students to pronounce words and phrases, and advising students as to the location in the test materials where answers could be found. Some of Respondent's students were apparently overwhelmed by the test process and ceased working on the tests. Respondent reviewed their progress and advised the students to continue answering questions. There is no evidence that Respondent directly provided answers to students, but Respondent clearly assisted students to determine which responses were correct. The assistance provided by Respondent to his students exceeded that which was allowed under test rules. Respondent acknowledged that the assistance was inappropriate, but asserted that he did so to provide confidence to the students that they could take and pass the FCAT, and advance to the fourth grade. Respondent's improper assistance to his students prevented school officials from obtaining an accurate measurement of the academic abilities of his students. The test results were invalidated and the students were retested. According to the parties, a newspaper article related to the matter was published in a local newspaper.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order reprimanding Respondent for violating Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.006(3)(a), and placing him on probation for a period of one year. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathleen M. Richards, Executive Director Education Practices Commission Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Room 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Mark Herdman, Esquire Herdman & Sakellarides, P.A. 2595 Tampa Road, Suite J Palm Harbor, Florida 34684 Ron Weaver, Esquire Post Office Box 5675 Douglasville, Georgia 30154-0012 Marian Lambeth, Program Specialist Bureau of Educator Standards Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Suite 224-E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Daniel J. Woodring, Esquire Department of Education 1244 Turlington Building 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Respondent’s employment as a school psychologist should be terminated on the grounds set forth in the Notice of Specific Charges.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was a school psychologist employed by Petitioner pursuant to a continuing contract. Respondent was first employed by Petitioner in 1968 as a guidance counselor. In 1974 she began her employment as a school psychologist. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was a member of the United Teachers of Dade (UTD) and subject to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between Petitioner and UTD. At all times material hereto, Petitioner was a duly- constituted school board charged with the duty to operate, control and supervise all free public schools within the school district of Miami-Dade County, Florida, pursuant to Article IX, Constitution of the State of Florida, and Section 1001.32, Florida Statutes (2005).2 For administrative purposes, Petitioner’s school district is divided into regions. R3 is the region to which Respondent has been assigned at the times relevant to this proceeding. In R3, each school, whether an elementary, middle, or high school, has a CST. Each such team includes an administrator, a school counselor, one or more special education teachers, a school psychologist, and other specialists as appropriate. Typically, a child is referred to the CST because he or she is experiencing difficulties, such as academic or behavioral problems. The child’s case is discussed at a CST meeting and the CST decides whether to refer the child to a school psychologist for a psychoeducational evaluation. If that decision is in the affirmative, certain background information is put together and that information is sent to the R3 office to be opened as a case file. The assigned school psychologist receives the case file, performs a psychological evaluation on the child, writes a report detailing his or her findings, and returns the case file to a staffing specialist. The staffing specialist schedules another CST meeting to determine the next appropriate step in the process, which may result in the preparation of an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) for the student. Petitioner has adopted a manual titled “Psychological Services Procedures Manual” (the Manual) that defines the psychological services provided by Petitioner and delineates the procedures school psychologists are to follow in testing, evaluating, referring and placing students who qualify for the ESE program. The Manual also provides an evaluation report format that school psychologists are to follow. School psychologists are required to keep certain records and file certain monthly reports. They are required to report the number of evaluations and other services performed during the month on a form titled “Psychological Services Monthly Report.” They are also required to keep a case log by school for each student with an open case file at that school. The case log contains the names of children whose cases are opened at each school and the status of the case. The case log is updated monthly to reflect the status of each case. A school psychologist is an essential member of the CST and is a critical player in the development of IEPs for students who qualify for ESE. Time constraints are placed on the CST and on each school psychologist. Petitioner’s policy is that the period from the initial referral of a child to a CST to the development of the child’s IEP (for those children who qualify for ESE services) should not exceed 90 days. Since September 2004, Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-6.0331 has required that students who are suspected of having a disability must be evaluated within a period of time, not to exceed 60 school days in which the student is in attendance. School psychologists are instructed to make every effort to complete the psychological evaluation report and to submit the report for typing within five days after the evaluation is completed. Typically, each school psychologist in R3 is responsible for two or three assigned schools. In an average week, school psychologists spend most of their time at their assigned schools, where they are required to keep the same work hours as the instructional personnel assigned to that school. At the school, the school psychologist meets with other school personnel (whether informally or as part of a CST) and evaluates students. Each school psychologist has at least one day a week at the R3 office, where he or she writes reports and consults with other R3 personnel as needed. During the R3 office day, new cases are assigned and special assignments are made. EVALUATIONS THROUGH SCHOOL YEAR 2001-02 From the school year 1990-91 through the school year 2000-01, Martha Boden was Respondent’s supervisor. For each of those school years, Ms. Boden evaluated Respondent’s performance. During those years, Ms. Boden received a myriad of complaints about Respondent’s job performance. Several school principals testified that they would not want Respondent to serve as their school psychologist based on unfavorable experiences with Respondent during the school years Ms. Boden served as her supervisor. Despite the complaints she received about Respondent, Ms. Boden evaluated Respondent’s performance as being acceptable for each year Ms. Boden supervised Respondent. Each annual evaluation of Respondent by Ms. Boden was a summative evaluation in the sense that Ms. Boden considered all information, both good and bad, that she had about Respondent’s job performance. Ms. Boden’s conclusion that Respondent was an acceptable employee for each of the years that she supervised Respondent is persuasive. The evidence presented by Petitioner as to Respondent’s job performance during the school years 1990-91 through 2000-01 does not establish the allegations set forth in the Notice of Specific Charges. That evidence does, however, establish that Respondent’s job performance was problematic and provides a context for subsequent evaluations. Ms. Boden exerted considerable effort in attempts to help Respondent improve her job performance. Respondent did not take advantage of the help Ms. Boden offered. Respondent knew from Ms. Boden that she was required to produce timely, accurate psychological evaluations and monthly reports. Myra Silverstein supervised and evaluated Respondent for the 2001-02 school year. That evaluation was also a summative evaluation and also concluded that Respondent was an acceptable employee. Ms. Silverstein’s conclusion that Respondent was an acceptable employee for the year she supervised Respondent is persuasive. The evidence presented by Petitioner as to Respondent’s job performance during the 2001-02 school year does not establish the allegations set forth in the Notice of Specific Charges. That evidence does, however, establish that Respondent’s job performance continued to be problematic and provides additional context for subsequent evaluations. DELAYED EVALUATIONS AND REPORTS During the school years subsequent to the 2001-02 school year Respondent failed, on multiple occasions, to timely evaluate and complete reports for children who were being evaluated for ESE services. At Olinda Elementary School, a student was tested by Respondent on February 23, 2004 and Respondent did not close the case until January 12, 2005. Partly because of that delay, the principal of Olinda Elementary School requested that a school psychologist other than Respondent be assigned to her school. During the 2004-05 school year, Respondent was assigned to evaluate two students at Miami Springs Elementary School. More than a year passed between the time Respondent received her assignment and the time she did the testing. During the 2003-04 school year, Respondent was assigned a case in January 2004. Respondent did not do the testing on this student until July 2004 and she did not complete her report until January 2005. At Orchard Villa Elementary, Respondent was assigned a case during the summer of 2004. As of June 2005, the case had not been closed. There was no justification for the lapses in time between the dates of assignment and the dates of completion of Respondent’s reports.3 The CSTs could not determine appropriate strategies for the students Respondent was assigned to evaluate without a psychological report. Respondent’s lapses between her assignments and the completion of her reports delayed the staffing of those students and delayed the development of and the provision of appropriate services for those students. Mary Paz, the Instructional Supervisor at the R3 office became Respondent’s supervisor in March 2004. After she assumed that responsibility, Ms. Paz received multiple complaints from principals and parents as to Respondent’s repeated failures to timely complete evaluations and/or reports. In May 2004, Ms. Paz received a memorandum from an assistant principal at Banyan Elementary School regarding an incomplete evaluation report done by Respondent. Material in the case file established that the Bender Gestalt evaluation was administered, but the Respondent’s report made no mention of that diagnostic tool. Another school psychologist was called in to complete Respondent’s report. Pamela Sanders-White was the principal of Orchard Villa Elementary School during the 2004-05 school year. Respondent was the school psychologist for that school during that school year. Ms. Sanders-White received complaints from teachers, parents, and students pertaining to Respondent’s failure to timely complete her work. Ms. Sanders-White requested that a school psychologist other than Respondent be assigned to her school for the school year 2005-06. CONFRONTATIONS AT IEP MEETINGS Petitioner presented evidence that Respondent argued with other professionals during several CST meetings and that she walked out of one such meeting. Petitioner also presented evidence that a few of Respondent's professional opinions were rejected by other professionals. That evidence, while accepted as credible, did not prove or tend to prove that Respondent was incompetent or that she was insubordinate, which are the charges alleged in the Notice of Specific Charges. Consequently, the proposed findings in paragraphs 22, 23, 25, and 26 of Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order have not been considered by the undersigned in reaching the ultimate findings of this Recommended Order. INACCURATE REPORTS Gail Pacheco has been the Chairperson for Psychological Services in R3 since the 1989-90 school year. She is not a supervisor of the R3 school psychologists, but she works with their supervisors as the supervisor’s designee in resolving problems. At Joseph Jackson’s request after he became Respondent’s supervisor in 2003, Ms. Pacheco reviewed 30 reports prepared by Respondent and monitored all 28 school psychologists in R3 for compliance with time frames for testing, preparation of psychological reports, and case closure. Each of the 30 reports prepared by Respondent and reviewed by Ms. Pacheco had at least one error.4 On May 28, 2003, Mr. Jackson requested all school psychologists, including Respondent, to select a sample evaluation report for review by the respective region chairperson. Respondent did not timely comply with Mr. Jackson’s request. When she did comply, the evaluation report she submitted contained numerous errors, including Respondent’s erroneous conclusion as to the student’s qualification for services.5 In December 2003 Dr. Sue Lee Buslinger-Clifford became the Instructional Supervisor of Psychological Services at the District office. Her job duties included the supervision of all school psychologists, which included the authority to give directives to all school psychologists, including Respondent. Dr. Buslinger-Clifford’s testimony, considered with the other evidence presented by the parties, established that Respondent failed to follow District procedures in the use of two personality or emotional assessments instruments in evaluating students. Respondent’s reports were not individualized for each student, with most of her reports using similar, standardized language. In the academic assessment of students, the reports should identify the needs of the child, the skill level of the child, and specific recommendations. Respondent’s reports often contained the same recommendations written in general, non- specific language that did not recommend the implementation of specific services for the student. Some reports were missing information and others contained limited information that was not helpful for the teacher and the members of CSTs. In addition to typographical and grammatical errors, Respondent’s reports contained test use and procedural errors. On one evaluation report Respondent misinterpreted evaluation data, which caused her to reach an erroneous conclusion as to a student’s eligibility for services.6 On some occasions, Respondent’s narrative report was inconsistent with the report of the evaluation data. Respondent had difficulty managing her time. Her student evaluations generally took longer than they should have. Dr. Buslinger-Clifford reviewed certain reports submitted by Respondent and advised Respondent as to corrections that needed to be made. Respondent did not comply with that advice. Mr. Jackson, as Respondent’s supervisor, reviewed her monthly reports for August through October, 2003, and determined that Respondent’s productivity was greatly below that of the average school psychologist, despite having a similar caseload. Mr. Jackson further determined that Respondent had a backlog that was growing each month; that some of the reports were incomplete; and that some of the reports were inconsistent or misleading. On October 31, 2003, Mr. Jackson notified Respondent in a memorandum of serious concerns that he had related to her poor job performance, and he directed Respondent to provide him with answers to certain questions pertaining to her performance7 no later than November 10, 2003, at 9:00 a.m. Mr. Jackson requested information as to six specific issues. First, he wanted a written response as to an alleged incident at Westview Middle School during which Respondent got into an argument with a staffing specialist in front of a student’s parents during a CST meeting. Second, he wanted to know why three identified cases had not been completed in a timely manner and ordered her to attach the psychological reports for those students with her response. Third, he wanted her to explain her lack of productivity and provide Medicaid forms for nine students who she had evaluated. Fourth, he wanted Respondent to provide Ms. Pacheco with a copy of a recent psychological report so Ms. Pacheco could review it. Fifth, he wanted an explanation as to why she had not provided a psychological report for review when such a report had been requested of her on three occasions. Sixth, he wanted Respondent to explain why she continued to use an instrument (WIAT) that she allegedly could not score. On November 7, 2003, Respondent responded to Mr. Jackson’s memorandum and requested a 60-day extension of the deadline for her response to his questions. Respondent’s response included the following: You have demanded a written response in five (5) days to a long list of you [sic] allegations, to which you offered not [sic] proof, only conjecture, opinions, and a partially extracted table; that was delivered by registered mail on Saturday afternoon at my residence. I feel sure that this memorandum was written and typed on the MDCPS [Miami-Dade County Public School] time clock. No consideration was given for my time clock, or the release of my daily time schedule to complete such a task. The sixty-day extension period is therefore needed to consult my archives in order to give you a detailed and accurate response. I need ample time to secure financial expense; legal advisement and representation; and a typist (all of which I will be seeking reimbursement), before undertaking such a task. Mr. Jackson gave Respondent until November 14, 2003, to respond to his memorandum. That was a reasonable deadline. Respondent did not meet the deadline established by Mr. Jackson. On December 17, 2003, Respondent responded in writing to the questions Mr. Jackson had asked in his memorandum.8 Mr. Jackson was not satisfied with Respondent’s response and continued to have concerns about her job performance. Mr. Jackson’s dissatisfaction with Respondent’s response was reasonable. His continued concerns about her job performance were also reasonable. JANUARY 2004 CONFERENCE FOR THE RECORD On January 15, 2004, Mr. Jackson had a Conference for the Record (CFR) with Respondent. A CFR is a meeting of record, held by a supervisor with an employee who is or may be under investigation for possible disciplinary action, to apprise the employee of the review of the record and the possible disciplinary action, and to give the employee an opportunity to respond or append the record. At the CFR conducted January 15, 2004, Mr. Jackson discussed his continued concerns with Respondent and considered her responses (both written and verbal). Mr. Jackson prepared a memorandum dated January 22, 2004, which summarized the events that transpired at the CFR held January 15, 2004. In the memorandum, Mr. Jackson gave Respondent the following directives: Your are to be professional and courteous to all staff at all times. You are also to represent the school system in a positive light at all times. This directive begins immediately and continues indefinitely. You are to complete evaluations of each child within a week of the beginning of testing, unless approved by the Executive Director or the Instructional Supervisor of the Division of Psychological Services or the ACCESS Center 3 Chairperson. Additional testing must be approved by the Chairperson which may be suggested by you and/or the Chairperson. The additional testing is to be completed within one week of notification of the determination for more testing. A completed report of each evaluation must be submitted for typing to the ACCESS Center within two weeks after the evaluation is completed. (Day that the last assessment instrument has been administered.) All evaluations are to be correctly reflected on your monthly report (log). This directive is ongoing and will be reviewed by the 10th of each month, for the next three months. Your monthly reports/logs are to reflect increased productivity beginning with the February report, averaging a minimum of 10 psychoeducational evaluations per month, unless approved by the Executive Director. Your productivity will be reviewed monthly. If you do not have the assigned cases, you are to request cases from your ACCESS Center chairperson. You are to complete a minimum of 10 psychological evaluations during the next four weeks. The Psychological Services Monthly Report, with a copy of the completed typed report for each of the 10 evaluations attached, is to be submitted to the office of the Executive Director of the Division of Psychological Services on February 27, 2004. All psychological evaluation reports are to be completed and delivered to Ms. Gail Pacheco for review within two weeks after the day the last assessment instrument has been administered. All corrections are to be completed within two school days after they have been received from Ms. Pacheco. No case should be given to the staffing specialist for staffing until the case has been approved by Ms. Pacheco. This directive is to be implemented immediately and will be reviewed randomly by the Executive Director of the Division of Psychological Services during the next six weeks. Reviewing of all reports by the ACCESS Center Chairperson and timelines for completion will be adjusted as needed. You were referred to the Employee Assistance Program through a Supervisory Referral for performance of professional duties related to assignment failures. These directives are in effect as of the date of the conference and will be implemented to prevent adverse impact to your professional status with Miami-Dade Public Schools. In the memorandum dated January 22, 2004, Mr. Jackson advised Respondent that he would review the information in the CFR with appropriate school officials and that he would take the following additional action: All directives will be monitored as stated in the conference and in this memorandum. If you successfully complete the directives, the requirements of the directives will be adjusted to reflect the requirements of all ACCESS Center based school psychologists. If you do not successfully complete the directives, additional directives will be added to assist you in becoming the desired professional you are capable of being. MARCH 2004 CFR Mr. Jackson conducted a second CFR with Respondent on March 19, 2004. Petitioner established that there continued to be concerns with all six of the directives given to Respondent following the January 2004 CFR. As to directive 1, Mr. Jackson continued to receive complaints as to Respondent’s interaction with school-based staff. Petitioner established that Respondent failed to comply with directives 2, 3, 4, and 5. Respondent did not timely complete the evaluation of each child to whom she was assigned nor did she seek or obtain approval from the R3 chairperson for additional testing. Respondent did not submit completed psychological evaluation reports to the R3 office within two weeks of completing all of the evaluations. Respondent’s case log report reflects that 10 cases were completed but only eight evaluation reports were submitted. None of the evaluation reports on Respondent’s monthly case log report were submitted for review as required. Psychoeducational evaluation reports were not timely submitted to Ms. Pacheco for review. Numerous errors were reflected on the psychoeducational evaluation reports that were submitted. Ms. Pacheco returned the reports to Respondent with instructions to correct the reports. Respondent did not return corrected reports to Ms. Pacheco. Respondent declined to participate in the Employee Assistance Program, which was offered in Directive 6.9 In addition to re-issuing the directives that had been given at the January CFR, Mr. Jackson issued directives requiring Respondent to report to work on time, to report her presence at the school site to a designated contact person, and to complete a Professional Improvement Plan (PIP) that was based on specified indicators pursuant to Petitioner’s Professional Assessment and Comprehensive Evaluation System (PACES).1 In addition, Mr. Jackson changed Respondent’s schedule to reduce the number of schools she would have to travel to in order to conduct the number of evaluations Mr. Jackson had directed her to evaluate each month. This change was made in an effort to assist Respondent meet her productivity directives. MAY 2004 CFR Mr. Jackson conducted a CFR with Respondent on May 7, 2004. Petitioner established that Respondent continued to fail to meet the directives that Mr. Jackson had imposed as to productivity. Respondent’s evaluation reports and monthly case reports continued to contain procedural and substantive errors. Respondent failed to submit copies of her evaluation reports to Mr. Jackson’s office as directed. Mr. Jackson issued revised directives to Respondent. Those revised directives, which were similar to the previously issued directives, are set forth in Petitioner’s Exhibit 143 and are incorporated herein by reference. Again, Respondent was directed to complete a PIP on specified indicators on the PACES evaluation system. The PIP Respondent was required to complete was admitted into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 144. ANNUAL EVALUATION FOR 2003-04 SCHOOL YEAR On May 7, 2004, Mr. Jackson completed his annual evaluation of Respondent’s job performance for the 2003-04 school year.11 Part A of the evaluation form contains six domains. Mr. Jackson rated Respondent as meeting standards for each of the six domains in Part A. Those domains are “Preparation and Planning”, “Management”, “Human Relationship”, “Professional Practice”, and “Contribution to School Improvement”. Part B contains the seventh domain of “Professional Responsibilities”. For that seventh domain, Mr. Jackson rated Respondent as not meeting standards. Mr. Jackson’s overall rating of Respondent was that she did not meet standards. On the PACES evaluation form, the evaluator can make one of the following three recommendations: “Recommended for Employment”, “Not Recommended for Employment”, or “Performance Probation Carry-over.” Mr. Jackson recommended the third option, which meant that Respondent’s performance probation was to be carried over to the next school year. Respondent’s May, June, July, and August, 2004, case reports established that she continued to fail to meet productivity directives. She typically did not timely submit reports for typing and she did not complete the assigned number of evaluations. She developed a backlog for her assigned cases. SEPTEMBER 2004 CFR On September 16, 2004, Mr. Jackson had a CFR with Respondent because she had not complied with the directives that had been given to her. Dr. Buslinger-Clifford attended that meeting. Eleven revised directives, similar to the previously- issued directives, were given to her. Those revised directives are set forth in Petitioner’s Exhibit 165 and are incorporated by reference. Included in the directives was another PIP (Petitioner’s Exhibit 167). Mr. Jackson ordered Respondent to return 17 cases that had been assigned to her to Dr. Buslinger-Clifford for reassignment. On September 24, 2004, Respondent complied with that order and those cases were reassigned. Also as directed, Respondent reviewed with Dr. Buslinger-Clifford Respondent’s backlog of 26 other cases. Dr. Buslinger-Clifford observed that Respondent’s case files were disorganized, some contained mold, and some contained pieces of dead roaches. Respondent submitted 26 reports for typing in mid October 2004. Her October 2004 case report fails to reflect that those cases were submitted for typing. NOVEMBER 2004 CFR On November 16, 2004, Mr. Jackson had a CFR with Respondent because she had not complied with the directives that had been given to her. She had not completed her PIP; the psychological evaluation reports she submitted contained typographical, grammatical, and procedural errors; and she did not submit contact information she had been instructed to submit. Eleven revised directives, similar to the previously- issued directives, were given to her. Those revised directives are set forth in Petitioner’s Exhibit 188 and are incorporated by reference. On November 16, 2004, Mr. Jackson reprimanded Respondent in writing. That reprimand is set forth in Petitioner’s Exhibit 189, which is incorporated herein by reference. On November 17, 2004, Respondent provided Mr. Jackson with a report listing the cases that had been assigned to her. That list was not accurate because Respondent failed to list five cases that had been assigned to her. Respondent continued to fail to evaluate cases that had been assigned to her on a timely basis. Respondent’s case status reports for January and February 2005, did not follow district polices. From those reports, Mr. Jackson could not determine the status of cases that had been assigned to Respondent. FEBRUARY 2005 CFR For the school year 2004-05, Robert Kalinsky was the personnel director for R3 and DanySu Pritchett was the Administrative Director of Petitioner’s Office of Professional Standards (OPS). On February 15, 2005, Ms. Pritchett conducted a CFR with Respondent at the OPS offices. Respondent, Mr. Kalinsky, Mr. Jackson, Dr. Bulsinger-Clifford, and two union representatives also attended the CFR. Petitioner’s Exhibit 206, a summary of that CFR, is hereby incorporated by reference. The summary of that CFR reflects the following statement by Ms. Pritchett: The record reflects that you have been repeatedly insubordinate and grossly insubordinate to directives issued to you by Mr. Jackson. Additionally, the record reflects your failure to complete and submit psychological evaluation reports [for] review by the required timelines and your failure to submit monthly reports/logs. . . . Mr. Kalinsy received numerous complaints from school- based personnel about Respondent’s performance. Mr. Kalinsky had difficulty locating Respondent on one occasion because Respondent was not at her scheduled location and had not informed her contact person at the school where she was going. He had difficulty locating her on another occasion because she did not timely report to work at the school site she was scheduled to serve. On March 2, 2005, Mr. Kalinsky wrote Respondent a memorandum advising her that she was in violation of directives that had been issued to her at prior CFRs. That memorandum, Petitioner’s Exhibit 214, is hereby incorporated by reference. On March 5, 2005, Mr. Kalinsky revised Respondent’s schedule so that Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays of each week were reserved for completion of prior assignments. Mr. Kalinsky directed Respondent to submit five completed cases to R3 each Friday. Mr. Kalinsky had the authority to issue that directive to Respondent. The directive was reasonable. On Friday, March 18, 2005, Respondent failed to comply with that directive. Respondent also failed to comply with Mr. Kalinsky’s directive on Friday, March 25, 2005. Mr. Kalinsky issued another memorandum to Respondent on March 31, 2005, for failing to comply with his directive. That memorandum, Petitioner’s Exhibit 222, is incorporated by reference. On May 27, 2005, in the PACES annual evaluation for the School Year 2004-05, Mr. Kalinsky rated Respondent as not meeting standards. Respondent had consistently failed to follow directives that had been issued to her as to timelines and productivity, had failed to adhere to Petitioner’s policies and procedures, and had turned in reports that contained inaccuracies, errors, and misleading information. Mr. Kalinsky did not recommend Respondent for further employment because he reasonably concluded that Respondent had not been fulfilling her professional responsibilities. Respondent’s supervisors recommended the termination of her employment as a school psychologist. Petitioner followed all applicable procedures in processing that recommendation, which resulted in the School Board action at its regular meeting on May 18, 2005, that underpins this proceeding. Dating from Ms. Boden tenure as Respondent’s supervisor in the 1990s, Petitioner made reasonable efforts to try to help Respondent improve her performance. Respondent consistently rejected those efforts.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth herein. It is also RECOMMENDED that the Final Order terminate Respondent’s employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of April, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 2006.
