The Issue Whether Petitioner willfully violated Section 106.021(3), Florida Statutes, which prohibits a candidate from making an expenditure except through the campaign treasurer on 66 separate occasions, and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony, documentary evidence, entire record of the proceedings, and facts admitted to in the Joint Pre-Hearing Stipulation, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner, Alan Schreiber, was the incumbent candidate for Public Defender, 17th Judicial Circuit, in the 2000 election. Petitioner was unopposed for reelection when qualifying ended on July 21, 2000. Petitioner is an experienced politician serving his seventh term as Public Defender. During the 2000 campaign qualifying period, Petitioner made sixty-six expenditures for which he submitted receipts and received reimbursement from his campaign account. The expenditures for which Petitioner was reimbursed are as follows: Date Merchant Amount 05-01-00 Andrew's Tallahassee $261.00 04-04-00 Andrew's Tallahassee $225.61 12-13-99 Bar Amici/ Cathode Ray $50.40 10-29-99 Bar at Embassy Suite $51.41 06-30-00 Big Louie's $265.01 06-20-00 Big Louie's $145.72 06-27-00 Bimini Boatyard $64.82 05-31-00 Bimini Boatyard $316.49 05-21-00 Bimini Boatyard $70.08 05-18-00 Bimini Boatyard $43.26 12-08-99 Bimini Boatyard $71.66 10-20-99 Bimini Boatyard $47.92 05-04-00 Bravo Italiano $63.86 02-24-00 Bravo Italiano $232.43 02-15-00 Bravo Italiano $52.79 01-31-00 Bravo Italiano $62.86 01-27-00 Bravo Italiano $86.83 06-19-00 Café de Paris $113.34 05-24-00 Café de Paris $70.04 05-16-00 Café de Paris $154.99 05-12-00 Café de Paris $160.94 05-06-00 Café de Paris $136.11 04-13-00 Café de Paris $146.65 03-18-00 Café de Paris $113.09 03-04-00 Café de Paris $144.47 02-23-00 Café de Paris $280.10 02-07-00 Café de Paris $73.27 01-17-00 Café de Paris $193.51 12-27-99 Café de Paris $66.47 11-29-99 Café de Paris $145.60 11-26-99 Café de Paris $230.51 11-24-99 Café de Paris $133.57 11-15-99 Café de Paris $183.97 10-31-99 Café de Paris $105.68 10-22-99 Café de Paris $99.43 10-19-99 Café de Paris $130.76 03-31-00 Café de Paris $182.64 03-15-00 Costco Wholesale $140.96 12-14-99 Costco Wholesale $267.61 10-27-99 Costco Wholesale $231.02 Costco Wholesale $256.87 05-23-00 French Quarter $499.24 11-09-99 French Quarter $81.25 11-09-99 French Quarter $85.02 06-08-00 Georgio's Food and Spirits $193.14 05-11-00 Greek Islands $89.73 06-03-00 Greek Islands $75.25 01-04-00 Greek Islands $70.49 10-29-99 Heavenly Ham $349.66 03-22-00 Houston's $75.54 10-28-99 Mayhue's Liquors $70.02 06-14-00 Mezzanot $102.02 12-01-99 Padrino's Restaurant $61.21 03-17-00 Publix $235.32 12-16-99 Publix $235.32 10-29-99 Publix $212.00 Publix $149.41 05-07-00 Restaurante Botin $146.39 01-04-00 Sage $79.85 12-28-99 Sage $107.89 10-29-99 Salute-Embassy Suites $211.26 03-01-00 TGI Fridays $47.08 05-25-00 Things Remembered $79.49 05-24-00 Things Remembered $296.69 05-21-00 Things Remembered $386.22 01-03-00 Wolfgang Puck Café $138.87 While Petitioner's personal decision to "wine and dine potential donors, supporters and campaign volunteers" at upscale restaurants may have been the genesis of the complaint that caused the Commission's investigation, no evidence was offered that suggested this to be an inappropriate expenditure of campaign funds. Sixteen checks were written by the campaign treasurer from the campaign account to Petitioner to reimburse him for the above expenditures. The campaign treasurer acknowledged that he had misdated one of the sixteen checks. Each check was written on the campaign accounts, was dated, was made payable to Petitioner, and each check listed that the purpose of the expenditure was to reimburse for non- specific campaign expense(s) as follows: Date Check No. Purpose Amount 10-29-99 1003 Reimb.-Campaign party expenses 11-02-99 1004 Reimb.-misc. campaign lunches 11-16-99 1005 Reimb.-misc. campaign lunches $968.38 $536.68 $350.24 11-30-99 1006 Reimb.-misc. campaign dinners 01-06-00 1008 Reimb.-camp. party expenses $509.68 $502.93 01-07-00 1009 Reimb.-misc. camp. dinners $496.50 03-03-00 1015 Reimb.-misc. camp. dinners $566.81 04-04-00 1019 Reimb.-camp. meeting expenses $565.32 04-11-00 1020 Reimb.-camp. party exp. $376.28 04-27-00 1021 Reimb.-misc. camp. dinners $799.23 5-16-00 1023 Reimb.-misc. camp. dinners $679.69 5-18-00 1024 Reimb.- misc. camp. lunches $462.58 5-22-00 1025 Reimb.-novelty items $368.22 5-24-00 1051 Reimb.-misc. camp. lunches $612.58 5-26-16 1054 Reimb.-camp. novelty items $376.16 06-09-00 1055 Reimb.-camp. meals/lunches $386.53 Each of the above-noted reimbursements to Petitioner was listed as an expenditure on Petitioner's campaign treasurer's reports filed with the Division of Elections as follows: Date Name and Address of Purpose Amount Person Receiving Reimbursement 10-29-99 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement for campaign party expenses $968.38 11-02-99 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign lunches $536.68 11-16-99 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign lunches $320.24 11-30-99 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign dinners $509.68 01-06-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement for campaign party expenses $502.93 01-07-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign dinners $496.50 03-03-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign dinners $566.81 04-04-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement campaign meeting expenses $565.32 04-11-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement for campaign party expenses $376.28 04-27-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign dinners $799.23 05-16-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign dinners $697.69 05-18-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign lunches $462.58 05-22-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement campaign novelty items $386.22 05-24-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign lunches $612.58 05-26-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign novelty dinners $376.16 06-09-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign lunches $386.53 While the campaign treasurer's report accurately reports reimbursements to Petitioner, because the reimbursements are non-specific and aggregated, it is impossible to determine the actual expense for which reimbursement is made. Stephen Michaelson served as the campaign treasurer for Petitioner's 2000 reelection campaign and had served as deputy treasurer of Petitioner's 1996 campaign. Mr. Michaelson has served a number of candidates in a similar fashion. Prior to filing papers to open the 2000 reelection campaign account, Mr. Michaelson and Petitioner discussed whether it was permissible under Florida law for a candidate to be reimbursed from his campaign account for legitimate, campaign-related expenditures made by him personally in the course of the campaign. Petitioner had experienced difficulty writing campaign checks at restaurants during the 1996 campaign. After the 1996 campaign, Mr. Michaelson had researched the issue and informed Petitioner that he had discovered a "reimbursement statute." Mr. Michaelson also found a 1994 Division of Elections opinion that he believed "to be right on all fours," i.e., the opinion dealt specifically with the issue. The 1994 Division of Elections opinion [DE 94-07] referred to by Mr. Michaelson provides, in pertinent part, as follows: It is also permissible for a candidate to make a purchase with his own personal check or currency if the candidate intends to seek reimbursement from his campaign. However, the purchase does not become a campaign expenditure until such time as the reimbursement is made by campaign check or petty cash through the candidate's campaign treasurer. In 1999, prior to opening his campaign account, Petitioner and Mr. Michaelson again discussed the "reimbursement issue." Mr. Michaelson checked Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, that had been in effect when the 1994 Division of Elections opinion [DE 94-07] had been issued and noted no changes in the statute. In addition, he did a computer search on Florida Statutes Annotated of District and Supreme Court cases and found nothing dealing with the subject that, in his opinion, would warrant a change in the Division of Elections opinion. He checked the Division of Elections website to see if the 1994 opinion was still there and concluded that it was. He did a computer check to see if there were any subsequent Division of Elections opinions that referred to expenditures; finding none, he concluded that the 1994 opinion was still in effect. Based on his review, he advised Petitioner that Petitioner could seek reimbursement from the campaign account for legitimate campaign expenditures that he paid with personal funds. Mr. Michaelson has been a campaign treasurer or deputy campaign treasurer on seven occasions, has, himself, been a candidate, is a lawyer who has practiced criminal defense law for 23 years, and, during his testimony at this formal hearing, demonstrated competency and understanding of the Florida election law/campaign financing law. He gave Petitioner advice on Florida election law/campaign financing law knowing that Petitioner would rely on his advice. Petitioner's reliance on Mr. Micahelson's advice was warranted. In the same general time period during which he opened his reelection campaign account, Petitioner spoke to David Bogenschutz, an attorney in Fort Lauderdale, and asked whether a candidate could incur campaign expenses and then seek reimbursement from his campaign account. Mr. Bogenschutz is a lawyer who has known Petitioner since 1971, whose practice is devoted largely to criminal defense, who had previously advised and represented candidates and public officials in proceedings related to the Florida's election law/campaign financing law, had himself been a candidate, and was believed by Petitioner to be knowledgeable regarding Florida election law/campaign financing law. While Mr. Bogenschutz was reluctant to acknowledge that he was an "expert" in Florida election law, his testimony at this formal hearing demonstrated a satisfactory working knowledge of Florida election law/campaign financing law; it was appropriate for Petitioner to seek his counsel and to be guided by his advice. Mr. Boganschutz advised Petitioner that he saw nothing wrong with his reimbursing himself from his campaign treasury for authorized campaign expenses. He further advised that he would research the matter and advise if he saw anything wrong. Mr. Boganschutz reviewed Section 106.021(3) and Subsection 106.07(4)(a)7, Florida Statutes, and Florida Statutes Annotated. He concluded that Subsection 106.07(4)(a)7, Florida Statutes, permitted a candidate to be reimbursed for authorized campaign expenditures from the campaign account and so advised Petitioner. In giving his advise, he did not review Division of Elections Opinion DE 94-07 or a later opinion, DE 97-06, because, while other Division of Elections opinions are found in Florida Statutes Annotated, neither of the referenced opinions is listed in Florida Statutes Annotated. In addition, he felt that the statute regarding reimbursement was so clear that there was no need to do further research. In addition to his discussions with Mr. Michaelson and Mr Bogenschutz, Petitioner conducted his own research and concluded that it was appropriate to pay vendors personally for campaign-related expenses and then be reimbursed from his campaign account for those campaign-related expenses. The qualifying period ended on July 21, 2000, with Petitioner having drawn no opposition. At about the same time, a local newspaper article questioned Petitioner's campaign spending habits and quoted a Division of Elections official saying Petitioner should have been using campaign checks. After reading the newspaper article, Mr. Michaelson called the local Supervisor of Elections who advised him that Division of Elections opinion DE 94-07 had been rescinded by Division of Elections opinion DE 97-06. This caused Mr. Michaelson obvious concern; the qualifying period had ended and, for Petitioner, the election was over. It appeared that he had incorrectly advised Petitioner regarding the propriety of paying campaign-related expenses personally and then seeking reimbursement. Mr. Michaelson then checked his research in an effort to understand how he had missed the rescission of Division of Elections opinion DE 94-07 and discovered that the Division of Elections website did not indicate that opinion DE 94-07 had been rescinded. The Division of Elections, Department of State, maintains a website which includes "Formal Opinions of the Division of Elections." This website lists all opinions from 1987-2000. Intermittently throughout the list of opinions is the notation "rescinded" in highlighted type, indicating that the particular opinion has been rescinded. No such notation appeared in reference to opinion DE 94-07. The 1997 Division of Elections opinion DE 97-06 indicates "Rescinding DE 76-16, 78-2, 88-32, 90-16, and 94-7." This is presented in the same type as the rest of the text and is not highlighted. Mr. Michaelson then used his web browser to search the Division of Elections website that lists these advisory opinions for the words "expenditure" or "reimbursement," the website did not direct him to the 1997 opinion DE 97-06. Division of Elections opinion DE 97-06, which, in part, rescinds Division of Elections opinion DE 94-07, provides in pertinent part, as follows: We held that candidates could make unlimited purchases by personal check as long as they intended for such expenditures to be reported as in-kind contributions. The opinion also stated that the "candidate cannot make such purchases as a campaign expenditure except by means of a campaign check . . . made through the candidate's campaign treasurer." This reasoning has resulted in some confusion as to when and under what circumstances a campaign expenditure or in-kind contribution occurs. Therefore, we rescind DE 94-07. Except for petty cash expenditures allowed under section 106.12, Florida statutes (1995), the only way that a candidate may make a campaign expenditure is by means of bank check drawn on the primary campaign depository, pursuant to section 106.11(1), Florida Statutes (1995). Having said this, we recognize the applicability of section 106.07(4)(a)7, Florida Statutes (1995), which requires that candidates report any reimbursements of authorized expenses from the campaign accounts to themselves. We believe that the purpose of this provision is to cover rare occurrences where the campaign must make an expenditure, but the campaign check book is not available. Such a situation could occur when a bill must be paid and the campaign has not received its first order of checks from the bank, or where, during the course of campaign travel, tolls or other miscellaneous expenses must be paid in cash and the candidate has failed to take the money out of his petty cash fund for such purposes. During the 2000 campaign, Mr. Michaelson maintained possession of the campaign checkbook which was usually kept at his home. On occasion, he would have one or two campaign checks on his person. If Petitioner asked for a campaign check, and Mr. Michaelson had one on his person, he would give it to Petitioner. On occasion, Petitioner would return a campaign check to Mr. Michaelson, indicating that the check was not accepted by a particular vendor. Most of the reimbursements at issue are a result of Petitioner's not having a campaign check with him at the time of a transaction or the vendor's unwillingness to accept a check or campaign check. In most instances the transaction involved purchases by Petitioner at restaurants. TGI Friday's located in Plantation, Florida, does not accept checks. Petitioner made one campaign-related purchase at TGI Friday's for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. Bimini Boatyard does not generally permit patrons to pay with checks, although exceptions have been made. Petitioner made six campaign related-purchases at Bimini Boatyard for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. During his 1996 campaign, Petitioner wrote 15 checks directly to Bimini Boatyard for campaign expenditures from the campaign account. Café de Paris and French Quarter have a policy of not accepting checks except when personally approved by the owner or for a special party. The owner indicated he would not accept a campaign check. Petitioner made 20 campaign related-purchases at Café de Paris and three campaign-related purchases at French Quarter for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. The Sage Restaurant accepts only cash, MasterCard and Visa from restaurant patrons; checks are accepted for catering. The owner opined that had Petitioner called ahead and advised that campaign laws required him to pay by campaign check, she would accept that form of payment. Petitioner made two campaign-related purchases at Sage Restaurant for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. Bar Amici and Cathode Ray do not accept checks; however, if a candidate advised that the law required payment by campaign check, a check would be reluctantly accepted. Petitioner made one campaign-related purchase at Bar Amici and Cathode Ray for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. Greek Island Taverna does not accept checks. Petitioner sought reimbursement for three campaign-related expenditures at Greek Island Taverna for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. Padrino's Restaurant does not accept checks. The owner, who is seldom at the restaurant, indicated that he would accept Petitioner's check. Petitioner made one campaign-related purchase at the Padrino's Restaurant for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. Andrew's, a Tallahassee restaurant, does not accept checks from restaurant patrons. The manager opined that, if prior arrangements were made, a campaign check might possibly be accepted, but an out-of-town campaign check made it more problematic. Petitioner made two campaign-related expenditures at Andrew's for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. Connie Evans, Chief, Bureau of Election Records, Division of Elections, Department of State, who has been employed by Division of Elections for 22 years and a bureau chief for five years, was qualified as an expert witness "in the area of Chapter 106 of Florida Statutes," without objection. She opined that Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, requires full disclosure of all contributions and expenditures for the public benefit. Ms. Evans further opined that Division of Elections advisory opinions are only binding on the candidate or organization who sought the opinion. Ms. Evans further opined that the Division of Elections, in applying Division of Elections opinion DE 97-06, considers that it is appropriate for a candidate to seek reimbursement for personal payment of a campaign-related expense at a restaurant when the restaurant refuses to take a check, but that the candidate should not return to the same restaurant knowing that the restaurant will not accept a campaign check in payment. She acknowledged that there is no statutory authority in Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, for this opinion. Ms. Evans further acknowledged that Division of Elections opinion DE 97-06 refers to Subsection 106.07(4)(a)(7), Florida Statutes (which allows reimbursement for campaign- related expenses), and that both DE 97-06 and DE 94-07 advise that it is permissible for candidate to reimburse himself for campaign-related expenses. Ms. Evans opined that the Division of Elections website should have indicated that Division of Elections opinion DE 94-07 had been rescinded in bold type, as is done with the other rescinded opinions. Ms. Evans further opined that, if a candidate were to reimburse himself or another person for authorized campaign- related expenses, it is the position of the Division of Elections that the reimbursement must be made by a campaign check, must be reported on the campaign treasurer's report as an expenditure, and the amount, date, and the purpose of the expenditure must be reported.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order finding that Petitioner, Alan Schreiber, did not violate the Florida Campaign Financing Law as alleged and dismissing the Order of Probable Cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark Herron, Esquire Mark Herron, P.A. Post Office Box 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1701 Eric M. Lipman, Esquire Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Barbara M. Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Patsy Rushing, Clerk Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs against Respondent and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner, Ron D. Baker (Petitioner), was the personnel director for Indian River County (County or Indian River County). Petitioner was hired to this position by Respondent, James E. Chandler (Respondent), the administrator for Indian River County, on March 18, 1996. As personnel director for Indian River County, Petitioner is a public employee and, thus, subject to the Code of Ethics. Prior to Petitioner's being hired as personnel director for Indian River County, he had served as personnel director for the City of Melbourne from 1989 to 1996. On May 15, 1997, Respondent was contacted by a reporter of the Vero Beach Press Journal and asked to comment on allegations of impropriety that had surfaced with respect to Petitioner. The allegations were that improper procedures had been followed in the County's awarding a contract to Brevard Drug Screening; that Petitioner had requested that the owner of Brevard Drug Screening, Jon Peterson, hire Petitioner's son; and that Petitioner had directed a subordinate to call the City of Melbourne to obtain personal information about the director of aviation of the Melbourne International Airport. With one exception, Respondent was unfamiliar with the allegations. The one allegation raised by the newspaper reporter that had previously been brought to Respondent's attention involved Petitioner's utilizing the services of his subordinate, Colleen Peterson, to make inquiries to the City of Melbourne for personal information about the aviation director for the Melbourne International Airport. The day after the news reporter met with Respondent, in the May 16, 1997, edition of the Press Journal, Indian River County's local newspaper, an article was published that made allegations of impropriety against Petitioner. The allegations included in the newspaper article were the same ones the newspaper reporter discussed with Respondent the preceding day. Because the allegations appeared to relate to Petitioner's employment with Indian River County, after Respondent received information regarding alleged improprieties by Petitioner from the newspaper reporter, he immediately conferred with Assistant County Attorney Terry O'Brien. Later that same day, because of the seriousness of the allegations, O'Brien set up a meeting for Respondent with Indian River County Assistant State Attorney Lynn Park, to review the information that had been provided. Thereafter, Respondent met with both Assistant State Attorney Park and Assistant County Attorney O'Brien concerning the allegations raised by the newspaper reporter. After Respondent conferred with Assistant County Attorney O'Brien and Assistant State Attorney Park, a recommendation was made that the allegations against Petitioner be investigated by the Indian River County Sheriff's Office because of potential criminal violations. On May 22, 1997, Detective Lewis Beckerdite of the Indian River County Sheriff's Office was assigned to investigate the allegations involving Petitioner. Prior to commencing the investigation, Detective Beckerdite requested that Respondent Chandler prepare a memorandum summarizing the information and allegations relative to the matter. In response to Detective Beckerdite's request, Respondent prepared a memorandum detailing the information and allegations that had been presented to him regarding Petitioner and other parties. The memorandum stated that on May 15, 1997, a newspaper reporter raised three issues of alleged impropriety by Petitioner. First, the memorandum noted that the reporter advised Respondent that according to Jon Peterson, Petitioner had requested that Peterson hire Petitioner's son. This was possibly significant because Peterson was owner of Brevard Drug Screening Services, Inc., a firm that had a contract with Indian River County. A second issue raised by the newspaper reporter and addressed in the memorandum was whether proper purchasing procedures were followed in issuance of the Brevard Drug Screening contract. Third, Respondent's memorandum noted that the reporter had made an inquiry concerning Petitioner's directing Colleen Peterson, the County's personnel assistant and his subordinate, to call the City of Melbourne's personnel office to obtain personal information about the director of aviation at the Melbourne International Airport for potential litigation involving Petitioner's wife. With regard to the issuance of the contract to Brevard Drug Screening, Respondent's May 22, 1997, memorandum indicated that he had previously looked into the matter and determined that there was no violation of County policies. Further, the memorandum noted that Respondent had spoken to Petitioner about the call made to the City of Melbourne seeking personal information about the aviation director. According to the memorandum, during that discussion, Petitioner had agreed that it was improper to use County personnel for personal matters and had said it would not happen again. In addition to information described in paragraph 10 above, Respondent's memorandum indicated that on May 16, 1997, he received a call from a County employee who said that he had heard that Jon Peterson had either sold Human Resource Health Care Group or his client list to Mackie Branham of O'Neil, Lee, and Wood, the County's health insurance firm, and that Petitioner was allegedly involved and may have received some monetary gain. The County employee also told Respondent he had heard that Petitioner had made a trip to North Carolina and stayed at a cabin or condominium either paid for or owned by Markie Branham. After receiving Respondent's May 22, 1997, memorandum, Detective Beckerdite commenced an investigation which included his interviewing and taking sworn statements from various persons, including Petitioner, Colleen Peterson, and her husband, Jon Peterson. In addition to giving sworn statements, the Petersons provided Detective Beckerdite with documents to support the allegations that they made against Petitioner. Detective Beckerdite also interviewed James "Jaime" Carraway and County employees, Beth Jordan, Tobi Erts, and Joe Baird. Detective Beckerdite presented his preliminary investigative report, including the documents obtained during the course of the investigation, to the Indian River County State Attorney's Office. The report was reviewed by State Attorney Bruce Colton and Assistant State Attorney Park, who determined that there was insufficient evidence to charge Petitioner with any criminal violation. In light of this determination, Detective Beckerdite concluded his investigation and finalized the investigative report, which included attached documents. The Beckerdite report recommended that Indian River County conduct either an internal investigation of the allegations involving Petitioner or refer the matter to the Ethics Commission. After consulting with legal counsel for the County, Respondent determined that the matter should be referred to the Ethics Commission. The primary reason for this decision was that the Ethics Commission, unlike Indian River County, had the power to subpoena witnesses and documents. Respondent believed that by having subpoena power, the Ethics Commission could address the contradictory and conflicting testimony and statements of individuals by compelling the testimony of witnesses and the production of documents that might support or refute the allegations. Respondent prepared a formal ethics complaint on the form required by and obtained from the Ethics Commission. A narrative was prepared by Respondent and a specification of charges, based upon the Code of Ethics, was prepared by Deputy County Attorney Will Collins. These two parts were combined into one document titled, "Narrative Addendum to Sworn Statement." The narrative portion prepared by Respondent detailed the events that resulted in the decision to file the complaint with the Ethics Commission and expressly stated the basis upon which the allegations against Petitioner were made. In the "Narrative Addendum to Sworn Statement," Respondent stated: On May 15, 1997, I received information regarding allegations concerning Personnel Director Ron D. Baker. The information is reflected in the attached investigative report generated by Indian River County Sheriff's Department. * * * The report summarizes the statements taken by the Sheriff's Department. I believe the report is self-explanatory. In essence there are strong allegations with respect to Mr. Baker and various individuals or firms doing business with Indian River County. As reflected in the report Mr. Baker denies the allegations. The report draws no conclusions other than it is being transmitted to me to determine whether to handle this matter internally or to contact the Florida Commission on Ethics. After a thorough review of the report, it is my opinion and our attorney's office that the allegations are very serious and, if true, would be a violation of [the Code of Ethics]. * * * As a result, as County Administrator, I am requesting an investigation by the State of Florida Commission on Ethics. The Complaint consisted of the complaint form, the "Narrative Addendum to Sworn Statement," a copy of the Beckerdite report and attachments thereto, and a copy of a May 16, 1997, article from the Press Journal. The Complaint form and these attachments were filed with the Ethics Commission on June 30, 1997. Respondent did not publicize the filing of the Ethics Complaint or desseminate it to anyone other than County employees involved in its preparation and to County commissioners. Since no criminal prosecution was to ensue and the Sheriff's Department's investigation was complete, the Beckerdite report became a public record. In light thereof, a copy of the Beckerdite report was provided to Petitioner and to a newspaper reporter. Although the newspaper reporter was provided with a copy of the Beckerdite report, Respondent did not discuss the Beckerdite report with any reporter. After Petitioner received a copy of the Beckerdite report, he requested and was granted an administrative leave of absence with pay. Several weeks after filing the Complaint, Respondent contacted the Ethics Commission Office and asked about the status of resolution of the Complaint. Respondent was advised that it would be a matter of months before a determination would be made as to whether an investigation would proceed. Because Petitioner's administrative leave with pay was scheduled to end in August 1997, Respondent believed immediate action needed to be taken to resolve the issues before that time. To accomplish this, Respondent enlisted the assistance of Robert Von Buelow, a fire investigator employed by the County, to pursue further investigation of the allegations and charges against Petitioner. Investigator Von Buelow immediately commenced his investigation by conferring with Detective Beckerdite and reviewing the Beckerdite report. As a part of his investigation, Investigator Von Buelow took sworn statements and/or interviewed several individuals and reviewed documents. Investigator Von Buelow took sworn statements from both Colleen Peterson and her husband, Jon Peterson. The Petersons also provided Investigator Von Buelow with numerous documents which appeared to substantiate their claims or allegations. However, Von Buelow's investigation was limited because of his inability to compel statements of individuals who did not want to provide statements or produce documents. On or about August 1, 1997, the results of Investigator Von Buelow's investigation were presented to Respondent for review. Based upon the investigations of Investigator Von Buelow and Detective Beckerdite and the evidence collected, Petitioner was notified of Respondent's intent to terminate his employment with the County. Petitioner was also provided with all information collected as of that date. After receiving the notice regarding the County's intent to terminate his employment, Petitioner requested a pre- determination hearing. On August 13, 1997, a nine-hour pre- determination was held during which sworn testimony and documentation pertinent to the allegations were presented. This included the sworn testimony of Petitioner, Investigator Von Buelow, Detective Beckerdite, Jon Peterson, Colleen Peterson, Lea Keller, Zander Carraway, and Ron Baker, Jr. Also, a number of evidentiary documents were received into evidence at the proceeding. On August 15, 1997, Respondent determined to terminate the employment of Petitioner based upon the evidence, the documents and sworn testimony, received and reviewed at the pre- termination hearing. However, in his decision on termination, Respondent found that there was insufficient evidence to sustain several of the charges against Petitioner and thus, those charges were not the basis of Petitioner's being terminated. After the decision to terminate Petitioner was rendered, pursuant to County personnel procedures, Petitioner requested a post-termination hearing. The post-termination hearing was held on October 16, 1997, before an appointed hearing officer. At this hearing, sworn testimony was taken from Petitioner, Mackie Branham, James Carraway, Douglas Wright, Elizabeth Jordan, Deborah Archer, Colleen Peterson, and Jon Peterson. The deposition testimony of Dr. Leo Bradman was submitted and a number of exhibits were introduced and received into evidence, including documentary evidence that had been obtained between the pre-termination hearing and post-termination hearing. On November 17, 1997, the hearing officer who presided at the post-termination hearing issued his opinion in which he found that there was insufficient evidence to terminate Petitioner. The Indian River County Commission appealed this decision to the Circuit Court of Indian River County. In November 1997, after the post-termination hearing, Thomas Reaves, the investigator with the Ethics Commission assigned to investigate the Complaint, requested that Respondent provide him with a list of potential witnesses and any documentation relevant to the Complaint. In response to this request, on December 22, 1997, County representatives delivered to Investigator Reaves all the information generated since the Complaint was filed in June 1997. This information included the Von Buelow investigative report and attached documents, transcripts of the pre-determination and the post-termination hearings, depositions, and documentary evidence presented at those hearings or other legal proceedings. Additionally, copies of the hearing officers' decisions in both the pre-determination hearing and the post-determination hearing were provided to Investigator Reaves. Some of the information provided to Investigator Reaves on December 22, 1997, contained information that had not been developed or known at the time the initial complaint was filed. Accordingly, that information was not included in the initial Complaint. After the records had been delivered to Tallahassee, Florida, Respondent spoke to Investigator Reaves by telephone and was advised that allegations or information not included in the original complaint could not be investigated unless an amended complaint was filed. Respondent informed one of the assistant County attorneys of his conversation with Investigator Reaves and discussed the apparent necessity of filing an amendment to the Complaint. Following his discussion with one of the County's assistant attorneys, Respondent prepared an amendment to the Complaint. The Amended Complaint, filed on January 28, 1998, included additional allegations and information based on Investigator Von Buelow's report, depositions, and transcripts of the pre-termination and post-termination hearings. The Amended Complaint included a completed Ethics Commission complaint form and a letter to Investigator Reaves, both which were prepared and signed by Respondent. The letter listed several additional allegations not included in the Complaint that represented potential violations of the Ethics Code. Each of the allegations was based on the testimony or statements of individuals given during the pre-determination or post-determination hearings, depositions, or Investigator Von Buelow's investigation and on documents received during the aforementioned proceedings or investigation. Prior to listing the allegations and the basis thereof, the letter stated: By letter dated November 7, 1997, you advised that the complaint had been forwarded to the Investigative Section. Additionally, a list of potential witnesses and any relevant documentation was requested. Since the original June 30, 1997, transmittal to the Commission, a substantial amount of information and documentation has been developed. This information was presented to you by County Representatives at the December 22, 1997, meeting at your office in Tallahassee. The entire file was presented including additional investigative reports, transcripts, depositions, etc. The files include information that was not known or confirmed at the time the original complaint was filed. This information and documentation appear to represent potential violation of F.S. 112.313(2), (4), (6), (7), and (8). . . . The Ethics Commission determined that the Complaint and Amended Complaint were legally sufficient. On September 29, 1997, Bonnie Williams, Executive Director of the Ethics Commission, entered a Determination of Investigative Jurisdiction and Order to Investigate which authorized Investigator Reaves to investigate allegations in the Complaint. Thereafter, on February 9, 1998, an Amended Determination of Investigative Jurisdiction and Order to Investigate was entered authorizing Investigator Reaves to investigate the allegations in the Amended Complaint. In conducting the investigation, Investigator Reaves took sworn statements from witnesses who had not been questioned during the pre-determination and post-termination proceedings, including Catherine Wendt and Christopher Matteson. He also reviewed and considered the investigative reports of Detective Beckerdite and Investigator Von Buelow; the pertinent transcribed testimony and evidence presented in the nine-hour pre- determination hearing conducted on August 13, 1997; the testimony presented in the ten-hour post-termination hearing on October 16, 1997; the sworn deposition testimony given by Petitioner in a civil action between Jon Peterson and James Carraway; and a sworn statement that Investigator Reaves obtained from Petitioner. Investigator Reaves' findings were summarized in a single-spaced typed, 60-page Report of Investigation which included numerous attached exhibits. At its June 3, 1999, meeting, the Ethics Commission concluded that there was no probable cause found that Petitioner had violated the Code of Ethics. The Ethics Commission's public report memorializing its decision was rendered on June 8, 1999. In this proceeding, the presentation of Petitioner's case centered mainly on the assertion that the alleged violations of the Ethics Code were not proven. However, the standard for this proceeding is not whether a violation of the Ethics Code has been proven. That issue has already been determined by the Ethics Commission in its dismissal of the Complaint and Amended Complaint. Rather, the issue is whether Respondent filed the Complaint and Amended Complaint with a malicious intent to injure the reputation of Petitioner by filing the Complaint and Amended Complaint with knowledge that they contained one or more false allegations, or with reckless disregard for whether they contained false allegations of fact material to a violation of the Ethics Code. Respondent did not file the Complaint or Amended Complaint to injure the reputation of Petitioner, but to carry out the responsibilities of the job as appointed County administrator. As County administrator, Respondent could not reasonably nor justifiably ignore the serious allegations of impropriety made against Petitioner merely because Petitioner denied or disputed the allegations. As described below, the allegations included in the Complaint and Amended Complaint were based upon sworn testimony, interviews, and documents obtained during investigations by trained investigators and confirmed by documentary evidence and sworn testimony presented at official proceedings. One of the allegations in the Complaint was that James Carraway, who had an ownership interest in a company providing contractual services to the County, provided Petitioner's daughter with an airline ticket to travel from Colorado to Florida. Although Baker initially denied that this occurred, in a sworn statement to Detective Beckerdite, Jon Peterson swore that this occurred. During Investigator Reaves' investigation and in this proceeding, Catherine Wendt, secretary to James Carraway, stated under oath that she arranged such a trip in the spring of 1996 using Carraway's frequent flyer miles. This fact was significant because Petitioner admitted that at or near this time, he had contacted Jon Peterson and requested that he submit a bid for the Indian River County drug screening contract and that Peterson, who was a partner with James Carraway in Brevard Drug Screening, was awarded the contract. Thus, the allegation that Peterson made and included in the Complaint, was not false, but was corroborated by Wendt. A second allegation in the Complaint was that Petitioner used a cabin, chalet, or condominium in North Carolina owned by James Carraway. In a sworn statement to Beckerdite and at the pre-determination hearing, Jon Peterson testified that arrangements had been made for Petitioner to use the Carraway cabin or chalet in North Carolina. Although, Petitioner denied that this occurred, Investigator Reaves determined that Carraway owned a cabin, chalet, or condominium in North Carolina that was available for use by friends and associates and that a request was made for Petitioner to use it. Thus, there was evidence to support this allegation. The Complaint also alleged that Petitioner received stock car race tickets from James Carraway. Jon Peterson gave sworn statements to Detective Beckerdite and testified under oath that he had received stock car race tickets from James Carraway and had given the tickets to Petitioner. James Carraway admitted to Investigator Reaves that he had given stock car race tickets to Peterson and that such tickets may have been given to Petitioner. Thus, there was evidence to support this allegation. The Complaint contained an allegation related to the hiring of Petitioner's son, Ron Baker, Jr., by James and Zander Carraway and Jon Peterson. This allegation was based on sworn statements made by Colleen and Jon Peterson and supporting documentation provided by the Petersons, both of which were included in the Beckerdite report. According to the sworn statements given by the Petersons, Petitioner asked Jon Peterson to hire Baker, Jr. and Peterson had agreed to do so. Furthermore, Jon and Colleen Peterson told Beckerdite that they hired Baker, Jr., to work for Brevard Drug Screening. However, the Petersons admitted that in lieu of paying Baker, Jr., a salary for his services, they paid the rent on his apartment, his utility bills and phone bill, and provided him with spending change. The Petersons provided cancelled checks to substantiate these statements. Petitioner's statement to Detective Beckerdite conflicted with the statements given by the Petersons. Contrary to the Petersons' statements, Petitioner denied that he ever asked Peterson to hire Baker, Jr., but indicated that he had asked James Carraway to "help" his son so he could "get on his feet." Notwithstanding Petitioner's denying that he asked Jon Peterson to hire his son, the statements of the Petersons, and the documents they furnished provided some evidence to support the allegation concerning the hiring of Petitioner's son. Another allegation in the Complaint related to Petitioner's potential involvement in a joint venture with James Carraway, owner of a County vendor, and his son, Zander Carraway, and Dr. Leo Bradman. Based on Jon Petersons's statements to Detective Beckerdite and documents Jon Peterson gave to Investigator Beckerdite, it appeared that the joint venture between the aforementioned parties contemplated and would result in their taking over the County's Employee Assistance Program (EAP) contract. The allegation involving the possible joint venture was based on the Beckerdite report, which included Peterson's sworn statement relative to that matter and the substantiating documentation provided by Peterson. Moreover, as noted in the Amended Complaint, the allegation concerning the possible joint venture appeared to be confirmed by the testimony of Dr. Leo Bradman taken on October 13, 1997, and a letter from Zander Carraway to Dr. Bradman. There was evidence to support this allegation at the time the Complaint was filed, as well as additional evidence that appeared to substantiate the allegation at the time the Amended Complaint was filed. The Amended Complaint alleged that, in a deposition taken in a civil action on September 5, 1997, Petitioner admitted that while serving as Personnel Director for Indian River County, he negotiated for the purchase of the EAP business from James Carraway. At the time of these negotiations, Petitioner knew that James Carraway and Jon Peterson were owners of Human Resource Health Care Group, the County's EAP provider, and Brevard Drug Screening, the County's drug screening contractor. Although Petitioner initially claimed to have been a mediator in the negotiations, Peterson testified that if Carraway agreed to sell his interest in the business to Peterson, Peterson and Petitioner would be partners in the EAP. In light of Petitioner's admission and Peterson's sworn statement that Petitioner was, in fact, negotiating a deal involving the purchase of the vendor providing the EAP to Indian River County, there was evidence to support this allegation. The Amended Complaint also alleged that Petitioner co- signed on a credit card application with Colleen Peterson, Petitioner's subordinate and the County's personnel administrator and wife of Jon Peterson, owner of Brevard Drug Screening, a Indian River County vendor. This allegation was based on sworn statements made by Colleen Peterson as well as documents provided by the Petersons to Investigator Von Buelow reflecting that such an application was completed. One of the documents provided by the Petersons was a copy of the completed credit card application. The application appeared to be signed by Petitioner and listed Petitioner's address as the business address of Florida Occupational Health Group in Melbourne, Florida, the entity owned by the Petersons that was vying for the Indian River County EAP contract. According to sworn statements made by the Petersons to Investigator Von Buelow, the application for the credit card was made to fund a joint venture between Petitioner and the Petersons to obtain employee assistance provider contracts, including the one for Indian River County. Notwithstanding Petitioner's testimony at this proceeding that the credit card was never issued, the statements of the Petersons and the substantiating documents they provided to Investigator Von Buelow provided a reasonable basis for Respondent's including this allegation in the Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint alleged that Petitioner hired Colleen Peterson as personnel assistant and advised her not to disclose that she was married to Jon Peterson, a County vendor. Furthermore, it was alleged that prior to hiring Colleen Peterson to this position, Petitioner directed her to change her resume knowing that she had insufficient experience to meet the advertised job requirements and hired her without interviewing other applicants who had substantial education, qualifications, and experience. These allegations were based on statements made by Colleen Peterson and documents provided to Investigator Von Buelow during his investigation. According to Mrs. Peterson, after Petitioner became personnel director for Indian River County, he invited her to apply for the position of personnel administrator for Indian River County. In her statement, Colleen Peterson indicated that she later met with Petitioner and asked him to review her cover letter and resume; that he reviewed her resume and cover letter; and upon such review, he directed her to change her resume and/or cover letter to be misleading as to her qualifications. Petitioner was aware of Mrs. Peterson's professional experience because she had worked for Petitioner when he was personnel director for the City of Melbourne. In addition to Mrs. Peterson's statements, a review of Mrs. Peterson's resume compared to her actual experience indicated she may not have met the advertised job requirements, education, or experience as a grievance adjudicator. Also, a review of the applications of other applicants for the position of personnel assistant reflected that some of those individuals, none of whom were interviewed, had the required education and experience. Based on the findings in paragraphs 48 and 49, there was evidence to support the allegation relative to Petitioner's hiring of Colleen Peterson. The Amended Complaint further alleged that Petitioner directed an Indian River County employee with a substance abuse problem to Heritage Hospital for an in-patient treatment program at a cost of $12,930.61. This allegation was based on statements Jon Peterson made to Investigator Von Buelow. According to Jon Peterson, when a County employee required an in-patient treatment program for substance abuse, the employee was given three facilities from which to select. However, in this instance, Peterson stated that his job was to convince the employee to go to Heritage Hospital, even though that facility was not pre- certified by Blue Cross/Blue Shield, the County's insurance company; was not on the County's preferred provider list; and was approximately 200 miles from Vero Beach. A facility not on the preferred provider list was allowed to charge 20 percent more than a facility on the list. At the time the County employee was referred to Heritage Hospital, James Carraway was owner of and had a financial interest in Heritage Hospital and Petitioner was aware of Mr. Carraway's ownership interest in that facility. The apparent significance of the referral was that, as noted above, it had been alleged that Petitioner had been negotiating with James Carraway about a possible joint venture involving an EAP and the purchase of an EAP which may have served Indian River County. The allegation in the Amended Complaint relative to Petitioner's referring a County employer to Heritage Hospital was based on statements Jon Peterson made to Investigator Von Buelow and the deposition testimony of Dr. Leo Bradman. Accordingly, there was evidence to support this allegation. Additional allegations in the Amended Complaint concerned Petitioner's requesting that Peterson and the Carraways, both County vendors, make certain payments to Petitioner or Petitioner's relatives. First, it was alleged that Petitioner was paid to perform certain construction work on a bathroom at the Brevard Drug Screening Office. Second, it was alleged that Peterson's company, Brevard Drug Screening, paid medical expenses for Petitioner's wife. These allegations were based on statements Jon Peterson made to Investigator Von Buelow and on substantiating documents that Peterson provided, both of which were included in Investigator Von Buelow's investigative report. Although it was later determined that the alleged payments were not improperly made, at the time the Amended Complaint was prepared and filed, there was evidence to support these allegations. The Amended Complaint alleged that the Carraways, County vendors, had advanced Petitioner's son, Baker, Jr., $2,000 to move from Jacksonville to Melbourne. This allegation was based on statements made by Jon Peterson during the Von Buelow investigation and during the August 1997 pre-determination hearing. Thus, there was evidence to support this allegation. The Amended Complaint alleged that Jon Peterson, a County vendor, paid the cellular telephone bill for Petitioner and expressly noted that this allegation was based on "testimony" of Colleen Peterson. In addition to Mrs. Peterson's statement, this allegation was supported by Jon Peterson's testimony at the August 13, 1997, pre-determination hearing and by a copy of a canceled check given to Detective Beckerdite by the Petersons. At hearing, Petitioner testified that Jon Peterson had, in fact, paid his cellular bill as indicated by the cancelled check provided by the Petersons. However, Petitioner explained that Jon Peterson asked to borrow Petitioner's cellular phone and that he had allowed Peterson to do so on the condition that Peterson pay the bill for the time period that he had the telephone in his possession. Notwithstanding Petitioner's testimony explaining the reason for the payment, at the time Respondent completed the Amended Complaint, there was evidence to support this allegation. Another allegation in the Amended Complaint was that Petitioner directed Colleen Peterson, a County employee, to prepare personal letters for him during business hours using County equipment. This allegation was based on statements Colleen Peterson made to Investigator Von Buelow and on supporting documentation, copies of the letters, that Mrs. Peterson gave to Investigator Von Buelow. In view of Mrs. Peterson's statements and the substantiating documentation, there was evidence to support this allegation at the time the Amended Complaint was filed. Finally, the Amended Complaint alleged that Petitioner utilized the research resources of the Indian River County Attorney's Office to obtain information and materials for his son for a project unrelated to Indian River County business. This allegation was based on statements Jon Peterson gave to Investigator Von Buelow and documents Peterson provided to Investigator Von Buelow. The documents that Petitioner provided were WestLaw documents and research materials which Peterson stated were found in Petitioner's son's office at Brevard Drug Screening after he was no longer employed there. Investigator Von Buelow interviewed a legal assistant in the County Attorney's Office who confirmed that she had conducted the subject research for and at Petitioner's request. The allegations in the Complaint and Amended Complaint could not be substantiated and/or did not constitute violations of the Code of Ethics. Nonetheless, the inclusion of those allegations were reasonably based on information that Respondent obtained from reliable sources, including the Beckerdite and Von Buelow's investigative reports, the records of the pre- determination and the post-termination hearings; and depositions from other legal proceedings. On or about July 9, 1997, Respondent retained Jack B. Nichols, Esquire, to represent him in the defense of the Ethics Complaint and Amended Complaint 97-103. Mr. Nichols' regular hourly rate is $225. However, trial time is billed at $450 an hour and travel time is billed at one-half of the hourly rate or $112.50 an hour. For the period July 9, 1997, through March 23, 2000, Mr. Nichols has expended 233.70 hours on this matter. As a result of Mr. Nichols' representation, Petitioner has incurred total attorney's fees and costs of $55,576.25 and $10,296.83, respectively. These attorney's fees and costs are reasonable. However, based on the foregoing findings, it is clear that Respondent did not file the Complaint and the Amended Complaint against Petitioner with a malicious intent to injure the reputation of Petitioner by filing such complaints with knowledge that the complaints contained one or more false allegation or with reckless disregard for whether the complaints contained false allegations of fact material to a violation of the Ethics Code. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs from Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Respondent, James E. Chandler, is not liable for attorney's fees and costs and dismissing the Petition for Attorney's Fees. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack B. Nichols, Esquire 801 North Magnolia Avenue Suite 414 Orlando, Florida 32803 George P. Roberts, Jr., Esquire Roberts and Reynolds, P.A. 470 Columbia Drive Suite 101C West Palm Beach, Florida 33409 Sheri L. Gerety, Complaint Coordinator and Clerk Florida Commission on Ethics 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Philip C. Claypool, General Counsel Florida Commission on Ethics 2822 Remington Green Circle Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent is guilty of using or attempting to use his position as mayor of the City of South Pasadena for his benefit or the benefit of candidates that he supported in the 2014 city commission election, in violation of section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (2013).
Findings Of Fact In March 2014, the Respondent was the mayor of the City of South Pasadena, having been elected the year before. City commission elections were scheduled for Tuesday, March 11. There were two contested slots. The incumbents were Max Elson and Arthur Penny. The challengers were Harris Blair and Robert Small. The Respondent supported the challengers and donated to their campaigns to unseat the incumbents, who had been voting against the Respondent's positions since his election as mayor. Of the two elections, the Respondent was more interested in unseating Penny, who regularly opposed the mayor. Pasadena Liquors is a retail business operating in the City of South Pasadena. It was operated by Jimmy Valenty, whose family trust owned the business. Although not a resident and not eligible to vote in the city commission elections, Valenty supported Elson, who was a personal friend. A few weeks before the election, Elson mentioned to Valenty that the campaign signs Valenty allowed him to place outside Pasadena Liquors kept disappearing. Elson asked if Valenty would let him use the marquee inside the front window. Valenty agreed. Elson then asked if Valenty also would let Penny use it. Valenty had no personal interest in Penny's campaign but agreed to his friend's request. Valenty arranged the letters on the marquee to read: "VOTE ELSON AND PENNY CITY COMMISSIONER." During the week before the election, the Respondent received telephone calls regarding the marquee from several constituents who were supporting Blair and Small. They did not recall the marquee being used to solicit votes for city commission elections in the past and questioned whether it was legal. The Respondent was not aware of the sign before receiving the telephone calls and told his constituents that he would look into it. On Friday, March 7, the Respondent went to Pasadena Liquors to talk to Valenty and tell him about the telephone calls he had received. Valenty asked if the Respondent was there as mayor, and the Respondent said, no, he was there as a concerned customer or concerned citizen. During the discussion about the propriety and legality of the sign, Valenty asked to see the city's sign ordinance. The Respondent offered to get a copy of it for Valenty. Normally, the mayor would not be involved in enforcement of the city's sign ordinance. The city's government is run by the mayor and five commissioners, all elected positions. The city has five departments. The mayor oversees the administration department. Each commissioner oversees one of the other four departments. Code enforcement, which includes enforcement of the sign ordinance, is part of the community improvement department (CID). Code violations usually would come to the attention of the city through either a code enforcement inspection or a citizen complaint, which would be referred to code enforcement for investigation. It was the CID director's job to interpret, as necessary, the ordinances being enforced. His interpretation would stand unless the city commission overruled him. In March 2014, Commissioner Elson was in charge of and oversaw the CID. The CID's director, Neal Schwartz, reported directly to Commissioner Elson. After talking to Valenty, the Respondent went to Schwartz's office, told him about his conversation with Valenty, and asked for a copy of the sign ordinance pertaining to the Pasadena Liquors marquee. Schwartz copied the sign ordinance, which was long and convoluted, and highlighted the pertinent provisions. It was the CID director's opinion that the sign was legal, in part because the marquee was a "reader board" with changeable letters. The CID director offered to check with the county election supervisor to verify his opinion and was told that the city clerk, who directed the administration department overseen by the Respondent, was in charge of city elections. It was not clear from the evidence whether the Respondent was still present in the office of the CID director when he telephoned the county elections supervisor. It was clear that the Respondent had left the CID director's office before the CID director talked to the city clerk. When the clerk was asked, she was of the opinion that the sign was legal because it was not paid political advertising. She was prepared to tell the Respondent her opinion if he contacted her. The Respondent did not contact the city clerk for her opinion. After meeting with the CID director, the Respondent returned to Pasadena Liquors to show Valenty the sign ordinance. Valenty saw nothing in the highlighted portions of the sign ordinance that made it clear to him that the sign was illegal, but there appeared to him to be a size limitation. Valenty got a tape measure and concluded that the sign exceeded the size requirements. Valenty asked if the Respondent was requiring him to remove the signage from the marquee. The Respondent said no, it was up to Valenty to decide what to do with the sign. Valenty was planning to remove the sign the next day anyway to replace it with advertising for St. Patrick's Day, so he decided to go ahead and switch the signage on the marquee that day. At the election on March 11, the incumbents won. After information was reported to him about the Respondent's actions regarding the Pasadena Liquors marquee, Commissioner Penny swore out an Ethics Commission complaint alleging that the Respondent went to Pasadena Liquors and demanded that the owner remove the "vote-for-the-incumbents" sign by falsely telling him that he was in violation of the political advertisement laws, after insisting that the CID director call the supervisor of elections and not waiting for the opinion of the city clerk as to the sign's legality. After receiving and reading the ethics complaint, the Respondent brought a copy to Valenty because his name was mentioned, and the Respondent thought he should know about it. Valenty read it and said there was nothing negative in it about him, so he was not concerned about it. The Respondent did not try to influence Valenty's reaction to the complaint, and there was no evidence that there was anything else to this encounter. A few months later, the Respondent asked the city clerk to begin the process of recognizing the lounge at Pasadena Liquors for being open for 25 years and to be sure to say that it was at his request. When the city clerk broached the subject with Valenty, he declined the honor because the timing suggested to him that the recognition was to "make up for" any hard feelings that arose from the issue regarding the business's election sign. In fact, the timing was a coincidence. The city had recognized Pasadena Liquors for the 10th anniversary of its lounge being open, and other businesses in the city were recognized similarly when they reached landmark anniversaries. It was not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent's actions with respect to the Pasadena Liquors marquee were taken for the purpose of influencing the election, and it is unlikely that they had any influence on the election. In part for these reasons, it was not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent's actions with respect to the Pasadena Liquors marquee were taken for the purpose of securing a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself or the unsuccessful candidates. It also was not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent's actions with respect to the Pasadena Liquors marquee were taken with corrupt intent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Ethics Commission enter a final order dismissing the charges against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss, Executive Director Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed) C. Christopher Anderson, III, General Counsel Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed) Millie Wells Fulford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed) Melody A. Hadley, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (eServed) Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A. Building B, Suite 431 2454 McMullen Booth Road Clearwater, Florida 33759-1339 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Petitioners violated provisions of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Order of Probable Cause filed August 23, 2002.
Findings Of Fact Chapters 97 through 106, Florida Statutes, comprise the Florida Election Code (Code). Pursuant to the Code, the Commission is empowered specifically to enforce the provisions of Chapters 104 and 106, Florida Statutes. Mary McCarty was elected to the City Commission of Delray Beach, Florida in 1987. She was elected to the Palm Beach County Commission in 1990. She has been returned to that office in each subsequent election and she is currently a member of the Palm Beach County Commission. In November of 2002, she was elected to her fourth term as Chairman of the Palm Beach County Republican Executive Committee. The Committee to Take Back Our Judiciary was an unincorporated entity. It was a de facto committee, which, for reasons addressed herein, did not ever become a "political committee" as defined in Section 106.011(1), Florida Statutes. Ms. McCarty has run for public office six times and was successful on each occasion. Prior to each election she received from the Florida Secretary of State a handbook addressing campaign financing. She is familiar with the statutes and rules with regard to financing an individual campaign. Sometime before the Thanksgiving Holiday in 2000, Ms. McCarty received a telephone call from Roger Stone of Washington, D.C. Ms. McCarty knew Mr. Stone, who at various times had been a campaign operative for Senator Arlen Specter, had been involved in opposing the sugar tax amendment in Florida, and had been a consultant to Donald Trump, during his short-lived presidential campaign. Ms. McCarty was aware that Mr. Stone and Craig Snyder were principals of IKON Public Affairs, a business entity with offices in Washington, D.C., and Miami Beach, Florida. Roger Stone informed Ms. McCarty that he was forming a committee to raise funds for the purpose of taking action against the Florida Supreme Court. Mr. Stone stated that he had formed The Committee and that he wished for her to be the chairperson. She did not initially commit to undertake this responsibility. A few days after the conversation with Mr. Stone, Ms. McCarty received a facsimile draft of a fundraising letter that The Committee proposed to post. The facsimile was sent by Roger Stone from Washington. She made some suggested changes and returned it to the address in Washington from whence it came. Subsequently, she had a telephone conversation with Lora Lynn Jones of Unique Graphics and Design in Alexandria, Virginia. Ms. Jones was in the business of making mass mailings. Ms. McCarty told Ms. Jones that her name could be used on the fundraising letter although Ms. McCarty did not sign the fundraising letter. Nevertheless, the document was mailed to a large number of people and it bore the printed name, "Mary McCarty, Palm Beach County Commissioner." The first time Ms. McCarty saw The Committee's finished product it was in the form of a "Telepost, high priority communication." She first saw the "Telepost" when it arrived in her mailbox in early December 2000. The wording of the letter was different from the draft Ms. McCarty had seen earlier. Unlike the draft, it targeted specific justices on the Florida Supreme Court. It cannot be determined from the evidence the date the December "Telepost" was posted, but it was posted before Ms. McCarty determined that she had become Chairperson of The Committee. The "Telepost," dated December 2000, solicited funds so that The Committee could, ". . . send a clear message to the Florida Supreme Court that we will not tolerate their efforts to highjack the Presidential election for Al Gore." Later in December 2000, Mr. Stone called Ms. McCarthy and told her that she should be the chairman of The Committee. She agreed. Ms. McCarty signed a "Statement of Organization of Political Committee," which was dated December 19, 2000. This is a form provided by the Division of Elections, which, if properly completed and filed, officially establishes a political committee. She also signed a form entitled "Appointment of Campaign Treasurer and Designation of Campaign Depository for Political Committee." Mr. Stone, or his operatives, provided these forms to Ms. McCarty. She signed them and mailed them to Mr. Stone's address in Washington, D.C., which was the headquarters of the IKON Public Affairs Group. The "Statement of Organization of Political Committee," dated December 19, 2000, was received by the Division of Elections on December 26, 2000. It listed Amber McWhorter as Treasurer. Inez Williams, who works in the document section of the Division of Elections, processed the form. When Ms. Williams received it, she recognized that the form was incomplete because on the face of it the reader could not determine if the committee was an "issue" committee, or a "candidate" committee. Ms. Williams noted that the mailing address on the form dated December 19, 2000, was "c/o VisionMedia," 1680 Michigan Avenue, Suite 900, Miami Beach, Florida. Ms. Williams found a telephone number for that business and dialed it, on December 27, 2000. No one answered so she left a message on VisionMedia's answering machine. In addition to the telephone call, Ms. Williams prepared a letter with the address of, "Mary McCarty, Chairperson, The Committee to Take Back Our Judiciary, 1348 Washington Avenue, Suite 177, Miami Beach, Florida." This letter was dated December 27, 2000, and was signed by Connie A. Evans, Chief, Bureau of Election Records. This is the address found on the "Appointment of Campaign Treasurer and Designation of Campaign Depository for Political Committee," which had also been received by the Division of Elections on December 26, 2000. The letter signed by Ms. Evans on December 27, 2001, informed Ms. McCarty that items 3 and 7 needed to be "rephrased." It further informed Ms. McCarty, that upon receipt of the requested information the committee would be included on the "active" list. The message recorded on The Committee answering machine on December 27, 2001, generated a response from a person who identified himself as Mr. Snyder, on January 2, 2002. Mr. Snyder engaged in a telephone conversation with Ms. Williams. Ms. Williams explained to Mr. Snyder that items 3, 5, 7, and 8, would have to be completed properly as a condition of The Committee's being recognized. A letter dated January 4, 2001, bearing the letterhead of "The Committee to Take Back Our Judiciary," and signed by Amber Allman McWhorter, was faxed to the Division of Elections on January 4, 2001, and received that date. This letter referenced the telephone call between Ms. Williams and Craig Snyder, who was further identified as The Committee's attorney. The letter stated that a corrected Statement of Organization of Political Committee, and a designation of treasurer, would be forwarded to the Division of Elections within the next 72 hours. On January 8, 2001, a filing was received by the Division of Elections that was deemed by the Division to be complete. Subsequently, in a letter dated January 10, 2001, and signed by Connie Evans, informed Ms. McCarty and The Committee that the Statement of Organization and the Appointment of Campaign Treasurer and Designation of Campaign Depository for The Committee complied with the Division of Elections' requirements. The Committee was provided with Identification No. 34261. Posted with the letter was a copy of the "2000 Handbook for Committees," which is published by the Division of Elections. The letter and the handbook were sent to The Committee operation in Miami, not Ms. McCarty, and no one in the Miami Beach operation ever forwarded it to her. Connie Evans, Bureau Chief of Election Records, the entity that supervises the filing of the forms mentioned above, believes that due to a court ruling in Florida Right to Life v. Mortham, Case No. 98-770-Civ-Orl-19A, the language in Section 106.011, Florida Statutes, which defines a "political committee," has been found to be unconstitutional. She believes that a political committee is not required to register with the Division of Elections but that if a committee does register, it must abide by the statutes regulating political committees. Ms. Evans has informed numerous entities of this interpretation of the law in letters. The efficacy of that case, and Ms. Evans' interpretation of it, will be discussed further in the Conclusions of Law, below. Ms. McCarty signed a "Campaign Treasurer's Report Summary"(CTR-Q1) which was filed with the Division of Elections on April 10, 2001. This addressed the period January 1, 2001 until March 31, 2001. Under the certification section of the CTR-Q1 are the words, "It is a first degree misdemeanor for any person to falsify a public record (ss. 839.13, F.S.)." Immediately above her signature are the words, "I certify that I have examined this report and it is true, correct, and complete." The box found immediately above and to the right of her signature, was checked to signify that Ms. McCarty was the chairperson of The Committee. According to Ms. Evans, The Division of Elections regulates several kinds of committees. There are "issues" committees, "candidate" committees," "party executive" committees, and "committees of continuing existence." Depending on the nature of the committee, different rules apply. The Committee was a "candidate" committee so the contribution regulations of a political candidate applied to the committee. That meant that the maximum contribution per person was $500. The CTR-Q1 indicated in the "Itemized Contributions Section" that seven people contributed $1,000 and one person contributed $2,000. Walter Hunter, Neda Korich, Arthur Allen, William Shutze, Caroline Ireland, Henry Allen, and Honore Wansler, contributed $1,000, each. Robert Morgan contributed $2,000. The amounts in excess of $500 were eventually returned to the $1,000 contributors, except that in the case of Henry Allen, the refund was made to Allen Investment corporation. The sum of $1,500 was returned to Robert Morgan, the $2,000 contributor, but the CTR-Q1 listed only a $500 repayment. Therefore, the CTR-Q1 in its expenditures section was incorrect with regard to Mr. Morgan. The CTR-Q1 also listed in the "Itemized Contributions Section" the receipt, on January 2, 2001, of $150,000 for "LOA/INK extension of credit for direct mail services." These words may be interpreted to mean that a loan in the form of an "in kind" service had been provided. This was reported under the name of Creative Marketing, 2760 Eisenhower Avenue, Suite 250, Alexandria, Virginia. The Committee had a bank account at CityBank of Miami, Florida. The sole authorized signatory on the account was Diane Thorne. The Account No. was 3200015694. There was no entry in the bank account of the receipt of $150,000. This indicates that the item was not processed through the bank and it would not have been processed through the bank if it were really an "in kind" contribution. Because the beginning balance was zero on February 8, 2001, it is concluded that the inception date of Account No. 3200015694 was February 8, 2001. Lora Lynn Jones, is the principal of Unique Graphics and Design, which is located in Suite 253, at an address in Alexandria, Virginia, which is not further identified in the evidence of record. Ms. Jones prepared and posted the fundraising letter of December 2000, at the direction of Mr. Stone. Ms. Jones talked on the telephone with Ms. McCarty prior to mailing the fundraising letter and determined that the language in the letter was agreeable to Ms. McCarty. At the direction of Mr. Stone, Ms. Jones requested payment and received payment for her work, but from whom she cannot remember, except that she is sure that Creative Marketing did not pay it. The money for this production was paid in advance by wire transfer. There is no evidence in the record that this was paid from the account of The Committee. In fact, because the payment was made sometime in early December 2000, it could not have been paid from the account because it had not been opened. Ms. Jones is aware of an entity by the name of Creative Marketing Company and she believes it may be located in Northern Virginia, but she is not involved with it. It is found by clear and convincing evidence that the fundraising letter was not paid for by Creative Marketing, 2760 Eisenhower Avenue, Suite 250, Alexandria, Virginia. The bank records of The Committee reflect a $50,000 expenditure made to Unique Graphics and Design, paid with a check dated May 9, 2001. This represents a payment for something other than the fundraising letter dated December 2000. The $50,000 item was reported as an expenditure on the CTR-Q1 that was reported to have been made on March 12, 2001. It was reported as having been made to Creative Marketing as payee. The only check in the amount of $50,000, reflected in The Committee checking account for the period February 8, 2001, to June 30, 2001, was payable to Unique Graphics and Design and was dated May 9, 2001. Therefore, it is found that the CTR-Q1 is incorrect when it was reported as having been made on March 12, 2001, to Creative Marketing. Ms. Jones believes there is a company by the name of Creative Marketing Company, which she believes may be located in Northern Virginia, but she is not involved with it. Contributions remitted in response to the fundraising letter were forwarded to one of Mr. Stone's two addresses. Because the address of 1348 Washington Avenue, Suite 177, in Miami Beach, Florida, is the address listed on the fundraising letter, it is likely that contributions in response to the fundraising letter went to Mr. Stone's Miami Beach operation. In any event, it is found as a fact that Ms. McCarty did not personally receive or have any contact with any of the contributions remitted to The Committee. The people handling the receipt of funds and the deposits were Roger Stone and people paid by his organization, including Diane Thorne, the secretary; Amber McWhorter, the treasurer; and Craig Snyder. Just as Ms. McCarty was not involved in the receipt of income to The Committee, she was also not involved in the disbursement of funds. The CTR-Q1 was completed by The Committee's staff in either Miami Beach or Washington, D.C., but Ms. McCarty had no input into its preparation. When Ms. McCarty signed the CTR-Q1 she was without knowledge as to whether the report was truthful, correct, or complete. It is further found that she made no effort to ascertain whether the report was truthful, correct, or complete. She believed it to be true and correct because she trusted Mr. Stone's operatives to accurately prepare the report. Ms. McCarty, excepting the current litigation, has never been the subject of a Commission action. Ms. McCarty has an income of approximately $80,000. She owns a residence jointly with her husband which is valued at approximately $300,000 and which is subject to a mortgage of approximately $200,000. She owns a vacation home in Maine jointly with her husband that is valued at approximately $25,000. She and her husband own three automobiles. She owns stocks, annuities, mutual funds or certificates of deposit of an indeterminate value.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Orders of Probable Cause entered in the case of both Mary McCarty and The Committee to Take Back Our Judiciary. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Kendall Coffey, Esquire Coffey & Wright, LLP 2665 South Bayshore Drive Grand Bay Plaza, Penthouse 2B Miami, Florida 33133 J. Reeve Bright, Esquire Bright & Chimera 135 Southeast 5th Avenue, Suite 2 Delray Beach, Florida 33483-5256 Mark Herron, Esquire Messer, Caparello & Self, P.A. Post Office Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1876 Eric M. Lipman, Esquire Florida Elections Commission 107 West Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Barbara M. Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission 107 West Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Patsy Ruching, Clerk Florida Elections Commission 107 West Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue Whether respondents unlawfully (1) discriminated against petitioner on the basis of her sex, and (2) retaliated against her for opposing sexually discriminatory practices.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner's discrimination claim is two-fold. First, she contends that respondent sexually discriminated against her by paying her less salary and excluding her from participating in the managerial bonus plan and weekly managerial staff meetings when male employees, performing equal or comparable work, were paid more and participated in the bonus plan and staff meetings. Second, she contends that respondent retaliated against her--by firing her-- because she complained of its sexually discriminatory policies. As alleged, both unlawful employment practices occurred between January, 1978, and November, 1979, during which time petitioner was respondent's Personnel Manager, both in title and in fact. Petitioner, now 47, graduated from the University of Michigan in 1958 with a Bachelor of Arts Degree. She majored in journalism, minored in psychology and sociology, attended on scholarship, and maintained a B average. After graduation, she became a policewoman with the Detroit Police Department, where she counseled and referred juvenile offenders. She then retired and raised her children during the next 10 years, after which she obtained a real estate license and sold residential real estate. On March 4, 1974, she was hired by the Detroit Free Press as an "Executive Secretary and Administrative Assistant to the Personnel Director." At that time she had no formal training or prior employment in personnel. The Detroit Free Press and respondent Bradenton Herald, Inc., both newspapers in the Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. group, are separate and distinct entities. There is no evidence of record that employees of Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. directed or participated in any of the alleged unlawful employment practices complained of by petitioner. In September, 1975, after one and one-half years with the Detroit Free Press, petitioner wrote respondent, (Bradenton Herald, Inc.) about possible future openings in its Personnel Department, stating that she would like to move to the Gulf Coast area of Florida within the next year. She stated that she wished to relocate because she had two dependent school age children and wished to live near her parents in Clearwater, Florida rather than contending with the bad weather and drawbacks that she was experiencing in Detroit. (P-33) She also indicated that she did not plan to start "job hunting" until early the next year. She described her current position, stating that she had responsibility for handling the day-to-day personnel operation of the Detroit Free Press, which had 2,000 employees. She listed her duties as testing and supervising employees; maintaining personnel files; handling stock purchase plans, unemployment claims, interviewing; handling correspondence and secretarial work for the personnel section; writing letters to all employees; informing labor and corporate officials on a regular basis of all personnel changes; maintaining accurate address information on all employees; preparing monthly personnel reports, quarterly employee reports, monthly reports to the Knight-Ridder Newspaper headquarters in Miami, Florida, and quarterly reports to the National Alliance of Businessmen regarding the hiring of Vietnam veterans and the disadvantaged; verifying employment, credit and employee references; distributing performance appraisal reports including the compilation of delinquency lists and records; researching personnel files and making appropriate responses; handing out applications to prospective employees and answering employee questions regarding insurance, stock purchase and other employee benefits; answering the telephone and handling all calls; scheduling the conference room; maintaining contact with functional and department heads as well as employees at all levels of the newspaper; and, making extensive contact with the general public, as well as most applicants for positions of employment. (P-33) In August, 1975, petitioner's work at the Detroit Free Press was becoming increasingly clerical and a source of frustration to her. She felt clerical work no longer challenged her. Her supervisor agreed with her assessment, observing that she was "becoming super at the [personnel] testing situation." He discerned no way out of her dilemma but recommended that a raise in her salary be considered "because of her ability and work." (P-33) At the time of her job inquiry, respondent was a small newspaper, acquired in 1973 by Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., and in the process of organizing various departments and functions. It had no openings in Personnel but, in October, 1975, offered her a position as secretary to William LaMee, the Publisher. She rejected the job offer because, as she explained, her training had advanced to the point where she believed she could handle a personnel management position. Subsequently, in March, 1976, respondent offered and petitioner accepted a position as "Personnel Assistant" to Byron Callahan, both Personnel Director and Promotion Manager at the Bradenton newspaper. Petitioner replaced Doris Hiscox, the former Personnel Assistant. At that time, the paper had no Business Manager. II. Petitioner began work at her new job in April, 1976. Respondent paid her travel and moving expenses from Detroit, Michigan to Bradenton, Florida, which indicates that it perceived her as being more than a clerical employee. It was respondent's practice to pay travel and moving expenses of managerial and professional employees. Petitioner performed the functions of the newly created Personnel Section, functions formerly handled by the Accounting Department. Byron Callahan, the new Promotions Personnel Director, was responsible for these functions, in addition to various promotional or public relations activities of the newspaper. These included such things as preparing the newspaper's Manatee County Fair Booth; establishing a safety committee; preparing special section promotions; running newsroom personnel promotions; handling promotions for the DeSoto Celebration; handling a special promotion performance of "Up With People"; preparing a "supervisory manual"; negotiating for the acquisition of equipment and reduction of service costs; becoming involved with minority organizations and community action groups; auditing and reporting hiring and promotion patterns to assure compatibility with the affirmative action program; conducting career counseling for minority employees; implementing training programs; initiating drug awareness programs; handling United Way representation, including "loaned executive" program; initiating special promotion publications; implementing radio advertisements in the newspaper; establishing a speakers' bureau; establishing public tours through the newspaper; reducing building maintenance staff; procuring estimates for demolition of one of respondent's properties; completing the maintenance and restriping of the employee's parking lot; and initiating training of all personnel concerning Occupational Safety and Health Act safety programs. (R-4 through R-7) Within a month after petitioner's arrival at her new job, Mr. Callahan was fired and replaced by Donald Heath, who was hired as the new Business Manager. His responsibilities included the Advertising Department as well as Personnel and Promotions, the two areas for which Mr. Callahan had been responsible. Although petitioner's functions remained relatively unchanged, her responsibilities as the Personnel Assistant increased as Mr. Heath--who had no personnel experience--relied on her to carry out the newspaper's personnel functions. Unlike Mr. Callahan, he did not assist in performing these functions. After three months at her new job, petitioner wrote the Personnel Manager of the Detroit Free Press, asserting that she was fully and completely responsible for personnel functions at the Bradenton newspaper. During her first five months at the newspaper, she was happy with her work and, by all reports, performing her duties well. She had received two pay increases and was then earning $200.00 per week. The quantity and pace of her work, however, began to trouble her. She was almost single-handedly performing, with some part-time clerical assistance, all of the personnel work for the newspaper. Yet she did not hold the title of Personnel Manager. In January, 1977, she wrote the Detroit Free Press asking to be considered for its Personnel Manager position, should it become available. In September, 1977, when the position became available, she applied to he the personnel Manager of the Detroit newspaper, stating that she was ready to move into a personnel management position on a large metro paper. She wrote that she wanted to move back to Detroit, because of, among other things, personal family reasons. After receiving no response, she renewed her request in October, 1977, and enclosed another resume. (P-33) On January 10, 1978, petitioner was promoted, both in title and fact, to the position of Personnel Manager by William Appleby, respondent's then General Manager. (She had, in fact, been performing the duties of a personnel manager for almost two years.) As Personnel Manager, her duties required her to: Interview, test, and recruit prospective job applicants; Pre-screen all applications and resumes received from job applicants; Interpret prospective job applicants' test scores for department heads, General Manager and Publisher. Test management applicants for employment. Test applicants for positions at other Knight- Ridder Newspapers, at the request of those papers; Administer and prepare all unemployment, workers compensation, OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Act) and EEO (Equal Employment Opportunity) reports; Represent the newspaper at unemployment hearings. Supervise the switchboard employees and the operation of the switchboard; Supervise the in-house print shop, including approval of all in-house printing orders. Write, supervise and edit the employee handbook; Maintain the newspaper's personnel records in "KRIS," Knight-Ridder's computerized central data bank; Set up periodic performance evaluation and salary review programs for all employees; Prepare regular quarterly reports to the Publisher regarding activities of the Personnel Department; Write regular memoranda to employees regarding personnel matters of interest; Assist General Manager and Controller in setting up Personnel Department budget; Write, edit and produce the monthly employee newsletter, Headliners; Write, employment ads for the newspaper; Devise a new job application for the newspaper; Represent the newspaper at Knight-Kidder Personnel Directors' meetings in Miami. Attend management training seminars; Become a member of NPRA - Newspaper Personnel Relations Association and SPA - Sarasota Personnel Association. She was also responsible for employee of the month and year programs, employee service awards, press releases on managerial appointments, employee tours and orientation programs, employee bulletin board, employee Christmas luncheon and employee open house. She also supervised the print shop, which was operated by one person. She had no authority to hire or fire him, but--within three months of her employment--had cleared up a workload backlog of several months and had the shop running smoothly. She approved all printing orders. She also supervised the switchboard, which had one full-time and one part-time employee. They sometimes helped her type and score test results. (P-33) The secretary to the Publisher and General Manager also provided petitioner with 15 hours per week of clerical assistance and maintained all personnel records. This secretary also helped petitioner with basic interviewing and correspondence; answering inquiries concerning employment positions; preparing ads for positions of employment; administering of tests; and processing of insurance claims. As in the past, petitioner was expected to, and did, perform many of the clerical duties associated with Personnel. The Publisher and General Manager expected that petitioner would initiate training and employee counseling programs in addition to performing her other duties, although they made no specific request for such programs. Because of the rapid turnover of employees, and her lack of adequate clerical and administrative assistance, she was unable to initiate these programs although she did some informal counseling of employees. As the newspaper's new Personnel Manager, one of her duties was to edit and re-write the Employee Handbook. She organized and substantially revised it, and was praised for her accomplishment by the Vice-President for Personnel at Knight-Ridder: "It is a very vast improvement over what you [respondent Bradenton Herald, Inc.] had in the past and better than most of our other companies." (P-33) She also programmed required personnel statistical information in the newspaper's new computer system. In regard to her other duties, she acknowledges that the training of the switchboard operators was performed by the telephone company and that she handled only three contested unemployment claims and no worker's compensation hearings. During the last three months of her employment at the newspaper, she assumed responsibility for preparing the monthly newsletter, which she admits was a professional, not a managerial, function. She had no dealings with employee unions since there were no unions at the Bradenton newspaper. During the time petitioner was Personnel Manager, respondent published an internal organizational chart indicating that six employees reported to the General Manager: Personnel Manager Promotion Manager Advertising Director Circulation Director Production Manager Controller. Petitioner contends that her functions, duties, and responsibilities were comparable to or equal to those of the Advertising Director, Circulation Director, Production Manager and Classified Manager, who reported to the Advertising Director. These positions were filled by males. Unlike petitioner, these four male employees participated in the managerial compensation bonus plan and weekly managerial staff meetings. They also were paid more than petitioner. Her predecessor, Mr. Callahan, had participated in the managerial bonus plan and weekly managerial staff meetings. Of six positions reporting to the General Manager, two (Personnel Manager and Promotion Manager) were filled by female employees. Neither participated in the bonus plan or weekly managerial staff meetings. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the four employees to which she compares herself had greater responsibilities than she had, and a higher level of skill and effort were required of them. The four positions were not equal, or virtually equal, or even comparable to that of the Personnel Manager, which required less skill and effort, and had less responsibility. The only significant similarity among these positions was that most reported directly to the General Manager. The real and substantial differences between them, however, far outweigh this similarity. The major functions of the newspaper were in the advertising, production, circulation and accounting department. These were the "on-line" departments, in contrast to an administrative support department, such as Personnel. These departments exercised substantially more responsibility for the operation of the newspaper than did the Personnel Department. The most important departmental head (excluding the Publisher/President and General Manager) was the Advertising Director. The functions of the Advertising Director included establishment of revenue goals, budgets and adjustments to budgets; management of personnel and internal organizations; preparation and implementation of sales strategy and marketing practices; establishment of rates for advertising; and coordination of special advertising projects. The Advertising Director accounted for 70-80 percent of the total revenue of the newspaper, which approached twelve million dollars annually. He was directly accountable for a staff of approximately forty persons, whom he had sole authority to hire and fire. He was responsible for his staff's training, coordination, and development, and the expenditure of budgeted funds, including the implementation and constant adjustment of the budget throughout the year. Within the Advertising Department, three lower level management personnel reported to the Advertising Director: the Retail Ad Manager, who was accountable for approximately 80 percent of the revenue generated within that department; the Classified Ad Manager, who was responsible for approximately 20 percent of the revenue, and the National Advertising Manager. These managers were interviewed and hired by the Advertising Director; petitioner did not interview them before they were hired. The Retail Ad Manager was responsible for special sections, real estate ads and television ads. He had a sales staff of eight persons. His duties included preparing training programs, advertising booklets and brochures, and recommending purchases and redesign of equipment. The Classified Ad Manager was responsible for the hiring, firing, training and performance of the ten people on his staff. The Advertising Department trained its staff without assistance from the personnel section. Petitioner's successor, aided by a newly hired second employee in Personnel, took over these functions, including recruitment, interviews, screening, scheduling and training. After the departure of petitioner's immediate successor, these functions continued to be carried out with only one individual in the Personnel Section, Donna Campbell. The next major department of the newspaper was the Circulation Department, which was responsible for 20 percent to 30 percent (approximately $3 million) of the total revenue of the newspaper. This department had the largest departmental staff and distributed papers to almost 20,000 customers. It employed district managers, who were responsible for over 60 newspaper carriers. The Circulation Manager had direct responsibility and authority for the hiring and firing of his employees, the transportation and delivery of the newspapers, and the coordination of all circulation and collection functions, including sales promotions. Budgeting and adjustments to the budget was required throughout the year in coordination with the Advertising Director, and the Controller. The Production Director headed the third major department of the newspaper and was responsible for 50 employees in five operational departments: composing, camera, plate making, press and pressroom. Each department had a supervisor and two had assistant supervisors or foremen. For example, the Supervisor of the Pressroom had responsibility for ordering supplies and supervising the press operators. The Mail Room Foreman supervised 15-20 employees, whose responsibilities included the bundling of newspapers for dissemination through circulation. The Production Director was responsible for the printing of the newspaper, the training of his staff, and the preparation of his department budget. The annual budget for this department was $1.5 million, which included purchasing and maintaining equipment. He was also responsible for ordering and maintaining adequate inventory and supplies, including the purchasing of newsprint. The value of the inventory exceeded $1 million. His operational decisions were not subject to the prior approval of the Publisher or General Manager. The Controller was the fourth major operational department. He was the chief financial officer and responsible for the fiscal operation of the newspaper. He supervised a staff of approximately 15 people, including a Credit Manager, who supervised two employees, and an Accounting Manager, who supervised fifteen employees. The annual accounts receivable for the newspaper approached $8 million. He monitored the other three departments to ensure they remained within their budgets. In contrast, petitioner's duties as Personnel Manager can only be described as administrative or clerical in nature. One expert witness, who testified on her behalf, acknowledged that the personnel department in a newspaper the size of respondent's could be handled by a clerical staff rather than a Personnel Manager. Her supervisory and budgeting responsibilities were limited and circumscribed. She supervised one full time switchboard operator and one print-shop employee, whom she could neither hire nor fire. Her main role was to provide administrative support to the operational "on-line" departments of the newspaper. Her pay was within the range of, or even exceeded, the pay of male employees holding similar mid-management positions, such as Mail Room Supervisor, National Co-op Manager, Home Delivery Manager, Single Copy Manager, Credit Manager and Building Maintenance Supervisor. Petitioner was ineligible to participate in the managerial bonus compensation program, which was limited to department heads who exercised substantially greater responsibilities than she. Many managerial positions, with substantially greater responsibilities than those of the Personnel Manager, were also ineligible. These included the Pressroom Foreman, Composing Room Foreman, District Managers, Sub-editors, Accounting Manager and Credit Manager. In the newspaper industry, executive or management bonus programs are not normally made available to Personnel Managers. Moreover, it is a generally accepted practice in the industry to pay more compensation to the heads of production, editorial, advertising, and circulation than to the head of personnel. This is because the former are generally regarded as exercising greater responsibilities. The basis for establishing the relative importance of the respective managers was neither by their title or position on the newspaper's organizational chart, nor the rank of the position to whom they reported. For example, the Building Superintendent reported to the General Manager, supervised employees and had authority to expend funds without prior approval. But he was not equal to the Advertising Director in responsibility or managerial importance. The organizational chart merely depicted the various sections of the newspaper and to whom these sections were accountable. During the period of petitioner's employment as Personnel Manager, she was excluded from weekly staff meetings and the annual Christmas party, which was primarily for the newspapers' customers. Her exclusion was consistent with the newspaper's policy to exclude mid-management personnel, whether male or female. The weekly staff meetings were intended to include only managers having primary responsibility for "on-line" functions of the newspaper. As Personnel Manager, petitioner had no "on-line" functions. III. In October, 1978, after returning from an equal employment opportunity seminar, petitioner became convinced that she was the victim of sex discrimination. She complained to General Manager Appleby, asserting that her exclusion from the managerial bonus plan and weekly managerial staff meeting was evidence of sex discrimination. In January, 1979, she repeated her complaint to General Manager Appleby, who attributed her exclusion from the bonus plan and staff meetings to the policies of Publisher LaMee and promised to discuss her complaints with him. Her complaint of sex discrimination was, under the circumstances, reasonable, and made in good faith. Although the newspaper had many female employees, none were included in its top-management or the important "on-line" positions. 2/ These were occupied, exclusively, by males. No females participated in the managerial bonus system or attended the weekly managerial staff meetings. Petitioner was excluded from the staff meetings, although her predecessor--who had been responsible for personnel, in addition to his other duties--was a regular participant. Because they occupied lower ranking positions, females, as a group, were paid less than on-line or executive male managers. Finally, Publisher LaMee's style of relating to and supervising female employees was perceived to be overbearing, condescending, and demeaning. In fact, he treated both male and female subordinates, alike, with abruptness and brooked no dissent. He sometimes abused and intimidated employees and was viewed, by some, as a "tyrant." An employee who crossed his policies could expect recrimination or retaliation. Although Publisher LaMee denied any knowledge of petitioner's complaints of sex discrimination, his denial is rejected as unworthy of belief. General Manager Appleby told him of her two complaints after each was made. Soon after petitioner complained to Mr. Appleby, and during the ensuing year, Publisher LaMee wrote notes to himself and left them on his desk. Those noted contained short phrases such as, "Fire Ann," "Fire A.M.," and "Can Ann." His attitude toward her became increasingly critical. On November 30, 1979, Publisher LaMee fired her for writing a personal letter during working hours and leaving the office prior to the close of business hours. He fired her abruptly and summarily, without first talking to the General Manager, her immediate supervisor. On the day in question, petitioner left work 15 minutes before 5:00 P.M., after other managers, including the Publisher and General Manager, had already left for the day. Indeed, the Ad Manager was, at that time, playing golf, though not on leave. Before leaving work, she notified the switchboard operator and left a number where she could be reached. Respondent supplies a third reason why petitioner was fired, though that reason was not expressed to her at the time. She was, according to respondent, lazy and had demonstrated a deteriorating work performance. Respondent asserts that petitioner was fired for these three reasons and denies that her prior complaints of sex discrimination were a factor in her dismissal. This assertion, and denial, are rejected as pretextual and unworthy of belief. The allegation that petitioner was lazy and her work deteriorating is inconsistent with her individual personnel record. Throughout her employment, she consistently, and repeatedly, received merit pay increases and positive comments about her performance. The only negative written comment is contained in a personnel extract compiled in late 1978 and early 1979. The extract, at least in part, is based on Publisher LaMee's derogatory comments about her. His credibility is already suspect so little weight is given the extract. Testimony by two of respondent's witnesses that she was frequently orally reprimanded is rejected as vague and inconsistent with her regular meritorious reviews and salary increases. Moreover, in petitioner's unemployment compensation hearing occurring after her dismissal, respondent did not express the view that she was fired, even in part, because of laziness or deteriorating job performance. Failure to express the view then detracts from its credibility now. As for her writing a personal letter during office hours, this was a practice engaged in by other managerial employees without disciplinary action. Petitioner was not paid an hourly wage and did not "punch a time clock." Because she and other managers worked overtime and on weekends without additional pay, they were given latitude during business hours, so long as they performed their work properly,. As for leaving 15 minutes early, this was also a common practice among managers at or above petitioner's level. Publisher LaMee had never before fired any employee for either of these reasons. The firing of petitioner for either or both of these reasons, is inconsistent with respondent's past treatment of its other employees, both male and female. In summary, the evidence convincingly supports an inference, now drawn, that petitioner was terminated from her employment, at least in part, because she opposed, and twice complained of, sexual discriminatory practices of her employer. There was a causal link between her complaints of sex discrimination and her dismissal. Her complaints were a substantial or motivating factor in respondent's decision to fire her. The three nondiscriminatory reasons given as grounds for her dismissal are unworthy of belief and rejected as pretextual, or a cover-up, for a discriminatory motive. IV. In 1978, respondent paid petitioner an annual salary of $12,140.80. She worked only 11 months in 1979--since she was fired on November 30, 1979--and earned $13,216.00--$1,201.45 per month. If she had not been fired in November, she would have earned $14,417.40 in 1979. In 1980, she worked at two jobs and earned a total of $7,239.87. In 1981, she earned $10,209.68; in 1982, $12,911.11; and in 1983, approximately $12,000.00. Since the hearing in this case occurred in November, 1983, evidence of her subsequent earnings should be supplied the Commission on Human Relations by supplemental evidence. Her salary at respondent's newspaper increased 8.85 percent between 1978 and 1979, from $12,140.80 to $13,216.00. If it is assumed that this rate of increase would have continued through 1984, but for her termination, she would have earned $15,693.34 in 1980; $17,082.20 in 1981; $18,593.97 in 1982; $20,239.53 in 1983; and $22,030.73 in 1984. A comparison of what she earned from other employment, and what is reasonable to expect she would have earned if she had remained in respondent's employ after November 30, Earnings From Other Employment 1979, are depicted below: Expected Earnings If She Had Not Been Fired Difference 1979 (Dec.) -0- 1,201.45 1,201.45 1980 7,239.87 15,693.34 8,453.47 1981 10,209.69 17,082.20 6,872.52 1982 12,911.11 18,593.97 5,682.86 1983 12,000.00 22,239.53 8,239.53 1984 * 22,030.73 * Total 30,449.83 To be calculated based on submittal of supplemental evidence before the Commission on Human Relations. Must be adjusted based on submittal of supplemental evidence. It follows that petitioner's salary loss due to her termination in November 30, 1979, totals $30,449.83, subject to adjustment for earnings during 1984. Petitioner is also obligated to pay her attorney a reasonable attorney's fee for his representation. Both parties agreed that the amount of any attorney's fee to be awarded should be determined by the Commission on Human Relations when it takes final action in this case, so no evidence was presented on this issue.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Commission on Human Relations enter an order finding that: Respondent is not guilty of committing an unlawful employment practice against petitioner in terms of her salary or her exclusion from the managerial bonus plain and weekly staff meeting; Respondent is guilty of engaging in an unlawful employment practice forbidden by Section 760.10(7), since it fired her because of, at least in part, her past complaints of and opposition to respondent's alleged sexually discriminatory practices; and Further, the order should prohibit respondent from engaging in further sexually discriminatory practices; and require that respondent (1) reinstate petitioner, with restoration of all job benefits; (2) pay her $30,449.83 in back pay, subject to adjustment for 1984 earnings; and (3) pay her a reasonable attorney's fee, as determined by the Commission. That Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. be dropped as a party-respondent. DONE and ENTERED this30th day of August, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of August, 1984.
The Issue The issue presented for decision in this case is whether Respondent committed the violations of Sections 106.07(5) and 106.19(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), as set forth in the Order of Probable Cause and accompanying Statement of Findings issued by the Florida Elections Commission on August 13, 1998.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent John Morroni is a member of the Florida House of Representatives, representing District 50. He was first elected in 1992, and has been reelected subsequently. In 1995, Representative Morroni was serving his second term and beginning his reelection campaign for 1996. Representative Morroni appointed Robert P. Symanski, a certified public accountant, as his campaign treasurer. Representative Morroni designated himself as deputy treasurer for the campaign. Prior to the commencement of each campaign, Representative Morroni signed a "Statement of Candidate" form, attesting that "I have received, read, and understand the requirements of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes." Thomas Carey is a trial lawyer from Clearwater. Representative Morroni had known Mr. Carey before 1992. After Representative Morroni was elected, Mr. Carey served as the liaison between the Florida Academy of Trial Lawyers and Representative Morroni. Mr. Carey is nationally known as a leader in efforts to prevent drunk driving, having served as a local and a national officer of Mothers Against Drunk Driving. Mr. Carey had worked with Representative Morroni in connection with drunk-driving issues. Representative Morroni was reelected without opposition in 1994. After that election, Mr. Carey approached Representative Morroni and offered to throw a kick-off party for his next campaign, telling Representative Morroni to let him know when the time was right to plan such a function. At some point in the summer of 1995, Representative Morroni called Mr. Carey and told him the time was right to plan the kick-off party for the 1996 campaign. Mr. Carey told Representative Morroni that his home could not be used for the party, but that his sister’s house would be ideal for the party. Mr. Carey and Representative Morroni decided that the party would be held on the last week of August. Mr. Carey obtained the consent of his sister, Patricia Rowan, and her husband, Dr. Patrick Rowan, to use their home on Clearwater Beach for the party. The Rowans also agreed to contribute $500 each as an in-kind contribution to defray the costs of the party. In July 1995, Mr. Carey was in the midst of a large jury trial, and did not have the time to oversee the details of the party. At this time, Mr. Sandy Golden was working as a volunteer for Mr. Carey on drunk driving issues, and was beginning to take on some paid personal duties for Mr. Carey. Mr. Carey delegated the planning of the party to Mr. Golden and his friend, Marilyn Curtis. Mr. Golden testified that he had nothing to do with the planning of the party, beyond getting his friend Ms. Curtis involved. Mr. Golden testified that he found Ms. Curtis and that Mr. Carey hired her to coordinate the party. Mr. Carey testified that he had no recollection of "hiring" Ms. Curtis. He testified that he believed Ms. Curtis was volunteering her services, and that it was only after the fact that he agreed to pay her, at the urging of Mr. Golden. Ms. Curtis testified that she had no discussions with Mr. Carey concerning payment for her services. She testified that Mr. Golden assured her that she would be paid. Mr. Carey testified that at the outset he established a budget of $1,500 for the party, and that he based this number on the fact that he and each of the Rowans could lawfully provide $500 as in-kind contributions to the Morroni campaign. Neither Mr. Golden nor Ms. Curtis remembered a firm dollar amount being established before the party. Ms. Curtis telephoned Representative Morroni to obtain a list of invitees and other information for the party. Representative Morroni testified that he knew Ms. Curtis had planned major events for corporate clients, including the president of Outback Steakhouse, and he was concerned that his campaign kickoff party not be too ostentatious. Representative Morroni cautioned Ms. Curtis that this was not a fundraiser, but a party for his campaign co-chairs and friends, and that a "fancy" party was not required or wanted. Ms. Curtis designed and mailed the invitations. She was reimbursed for the printing and mailing of the invitations by personal check from Mr. Carey, in the amount of $106.44, dated August 16, 1995. The party was held at the Rowans’ house on August 26, 1995. Mr. Carey testified that he arrived early and was presented with invoices from the various vendors who provided goods and services for the party. It is undisputed that Mr. Carey paid the following amounts by personal checks dated August 26, 1995: $52.50 for valet parking services; $296.80 for bartending services; and $900 for catering services and dinner buffet; $100 for photography services. By check dated September 13, 1995, Mr. Carey paid an invoice of $79.18 for floral arrangements. At Mr. Golden’s urging, Mr. Carey wrote a check for $300 to Ms. Curtis to compensate her for 15 hours' work on the party, at a rate of $20 per hour. This check was written on August 27, 1995, the day after the party. Thus, Mr. Carey wrote checks totaling $1834.92 to cover expenses for the party, including the $300 payment to Ms. Curtis and the late payment of $79.18 to the florist. There was some dispute at the hearing as to how Mr. Carey came to write these checks and whether he was reimbursed for his outlay of all the expenses for the party. Representative Morroni testified that it was obvious the party cost more than the $500 an individual is allowed by law to contribute, and that he remembered a passing conversation in which he complimented Mr. Carey on the party and expressed the hope that someone was sharing the expenses with him. Representative Morroni testified that a more detailed discussion as to the division of expenses would have been improper, given that this was a party and there were 28 other campaign people present. He also considered Mr. Carey to be knowledgeable and experienced in political matters, and thus not in need of a lecture about contribution limits. Mr. Golden testified that he was present during the brief conversation between Mr. Carey and Representative Morroni. Mr. Golden’s recollection was similar to that of Representative Morroni. Mr. Golden recalled Representative Morroni complimenting Mr. Carey on the party, then reminding Mr. Carey of the $500 limitation and telling Mr. Carey to be sure he "split out" the costs of the party. Mr. Carey testified that a more detailed conversation took place. As noted above, Mr. Carey testified that he had established a $1,500 budget for the party, based on $500 contributions from him and from each of the Rowans. As the invoices rolled-in during the party, Mr. Carey became concerned that the $1,500 budget was going to be exceeded, and concerned as to the logistics of paying the invoices. Mr. Carey testified that he discussed these matters with Representative Morroni in the presence of Mr. Golden and Mrs. Rowan. One option discussed was for Mr. Carey and the Rowans to write $500 checks to the Morroni campaign, which would in turn pay the invoices. Another option was to divide each invoice three ways and write three separate checks to cover each one. Mr. Carey testified that Representative Morroni suggested that, because Mr. Carey had already paid some of the invoices, he keep writing his personal checks to cover them, then have the Rowans reimburse him. Mr. Carey thought this the most workable option, and so continued paying the invoices by personal check. Mr. Carey testified that the group still had to deal with the contingency of the expenses exceeding the $1,500 budget. Mr. Carey testified that, at Representative Morroni’s suggestion, Mr. Golden agreed that any amount over $1,500 would be attributed to him, and that Mr. Golden would reimburse Mr. Carey by working for him without pay on drunk-driving issues. Mr. Golden flatly denied ever agreeing to such an arrangement or agreeing to make a contribution of any kind to the Morroni campaign. As noted above, Representative Morroni testified that he had no recollection of this detailed conversation taking place, let alone suggesting the payment/reimbursement plan outlined by Mr. Carey. Representative Morroni’s testimony, as corroborated by Mr. Golden's, is credited on this point. Representative Morroni testified that he had a difficult time getting hold of Mr. Carey to obtain the contribution details for inclusion in his campaign finance report. As the reporting deadline approached, Representative Morroni made several telephone calls to Mr. Carey. At length, he reached Mr. Carey, who gave him the needed information over the telephone. Representative Morroni relayed the information to Mr. Symanski, his campaign treasurer, who in turn included the information in the campaign treasurer’s report for the period July 1, 1995 through September 30, 1995, filed October 10, 1995. Mr. Carey testified that he had no clear recollection of providing the numbers to Representative Morroni, and that he believed Mr. Golden had provided the information to the Morroni campaign. Mr. Carey testified that if he did call Representative Morroni with the information, he simply would have been relaying information provided to him by Mr. Golden. Representative Morroni’s testimony is credited, and it is found that Mr. Carey provided the numbers to Representative Morroni. It was undisputed that the figures included in the referenced treasurer’s report accurately reflected Mr. Carey’s oral report to Representative Morroni. The relevant figures related to the kick-off party were as follows, all listed as "in-kind contributions" and dated August 26, 1995: Name Amount Description Dr. Patrick Rowan $500 Kick-off Party Expenses Mrs. Patrick Rowan $500 Kick-off Party Expenses Mr. Tom Carey $500 Kick-off Party Expenses Ms. Marilyn S. Curtis $79.26 Kick-off Party Expenses Mr. Sandy Golden $300 Kick-off Party Expenses Thus, the total reported expenses for the party were $1,879.26, as compared to $1,834.92 in actual paid invoices. Representative Morroni testified that he took these figures from Mr. Carey at face value, seeing no reason to question their accuracy or completeness. He knew that all the individuals listed as contributors were present at the party and were involved in its organization. Representative Morroni testified that he took down the figures and reported them directly to Mr. Symanski. Mr. Symanski testified that he had no previous experience serving as a campaign treasurer, and felt that it was not his position to "challenge" someone who claimed to have made an in-kind contribution. His practice was to refer any questions regarding in-kind contributions to Representative Morroni. Mr. Symanski testified that $1,800 "seemed like a lot more than what we would have spent, but if that’s what they said they spent, that’s what I recorded." He testified that the $500 allocations for the party did not raise concerns in his mind, because he knew beforehand that the costs of the party would have to be split up in some fashion. Both Representative Morroni and Mr. Symanski testified that, as a general matter, they reported in-kind contributions based upon the word of the contributor. They did not ask for receipts or other verification of the amount claimed by the contributor, provided those amounts seemed reasonable. Neither man was aware of any legal requirement that a candidate or campaign obtain documentation of the value of in-kind contributions. Other factual issues were raised by the parties that are ultimately tangential to the resolution of this case but nonetheless require resolution to complete the record. First, the Commission questions the veracity of Mrs. Rowan’s testimony regarding the $500 contributions made by her and her husband, because Dr. and Mrs. Rowan initially executed affidavits, on forms sent by the Commission’s investigator, attesting that they made no contributions to the Morroni campaign. Mrs. Rowan’s explanation of this seeming contradiction is credited. She testified that her husband has been extremely ill, having been diagnosed with a brain tumor in January 1998. In fact, as of the date of the hearing, Dr. Rowan had already outlived his initial prognosis of one year. The Rowans learned of Dr. Rowan’s condition at roughly the same time they executed the original affidavits. Mrs. Rowan testified that under the circumstances neither she nor Dr. Rowan paid much attention to the affidavits. Mrs. Rowan testified that someone later mentioned to her a newspaper article listing her as a contributor to the Morroni campaign. The article jogged her memory regarding the party and caused her to execute a corrected affidavit reflecting her $500 in-kind contribution. She had no explanation as to why the corrected affidavit was not provided to the Commission until the date of the hearing. On the date of the kick-off party, Mrs. Rowan wrote a check to her brother, Mr. Carey, in the amount of $4,200. She testified that $1,000 of this amount was the contribution of her and her husband to the party expenses, and the remainder was payment for legal services performed by Mr. Carey. Her testimony is credited on this point. Respondent presented testimony regarding a subsequent falling-out between Mr. Carey and Mr. Golden over tactics in the crusade against drunk driving, as well as testimony regarding Mr. Golden’s feeling that Representative Morroni had "sold out" on the drunk-driving issue. Respondent’s purpose was to provide an ulterior motive for Mr. Golden’s filing the confidential complaint in this matter some two years after the events occurred, and to at least imply that Mr. Golden is mentally unstable and unreliable as a witness. It is found that the facts concerning the Carey/Golden feud, all of which occurred after the events here at issue, are irrelevant to this proceeding, except as they provide some indicia that both Mr. Carey and Mr. Golden have reasons, rational or otherwise, to make each other look as bad as possible. Mr. Golden’s motive in filing the confidential complaint is irrelevant. As to Mr. Golden’s reliability as a witness, the only relevant point on which his testimony is contradicted concerns whether he agreed to have the party expenses exceeding the purported $1,500 budget attributed to him, to be "worked off" at a later time. For the reasons set forth in the Conclusions of Law below, it makes no difference to the resolution of this case whether Mr. Golden or Mr. Carey is credited as to whether this arrangement was made. The relevant point is whether Representative Morroni was aware of any such arrangement, such that he could be found to have willfully signed a false or incorrect report. Representative Morroni’s testimony that he was not aware of such an arrangement is credited.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order dismissing the charges against the Respondent, Representative John Morroni. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael T. McGuckin Assistant General Counsel Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Chris Haughee, Esquire Greene, Donnelly & Schermer 102 West Whiting, Suite 201 Tampa, Florida 33602-1480 Barbara Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Steven Christensen, Clerk Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 112.317(7), Florida Statutes (2009), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 34-5.0291.
Findings Of Fact Respondent has been employed as a firefighter with Destin Fire Control District (DFCD) since 2002. Currently, he is a Lieutenant and paramedic with DFCD. In 2005 and early 2006, he was a firefighter in the main fire station where all the DFCD administrative offices are located. Additionally, during the same period he served as the Union President for the local firefighters. As such, he knew that Commission meetings were recorded. Petitioner is licensed as a Certified Public Accountant (CPA). Her primary background is in the area of public finance. From January 2004, until January 2005, Petitioner served as an Administrative Assistant to then Fire Chief, Milner “Tuffy” Dixon (Dixon). She left that position for full-time employment at a CPA firm. While maintaining her employment as a CPA, Petitioner was appointed as a Fire Commissioner for DFCD on March 14, 2005. The principle reason for Ms. Metz’s appointment to DFCD was her extensive background as a certified public accountant and the growing annual budget of DFCD. At DFCD Commission meetings held on June 13, 2005; September 12, 2005; October 11, 2005; and December 12, 2005, Ms. Metz identified portions of the financial reports prepared by then Financial Administrator Wanda Martin (Martin) that did not comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Specifically, the financial statements prepared by Wanda Martin did not properly accrue expenses; did not always correctly reconcile bank accounts; did not properly record fund balances, receivables and liabilities, and misspelled account names. DFCD’s outside auditor Bruce Nunnally, who is also a CPA, agreed with Ms. Metz’s observations. Ms. Metz, along with the Commission, wanted the financial statements corrected and to conform with GAAP. However, because Ms. Martin had no formal accounting education, Mr. Nunnally offered to help Ms. Martin make the corrections noted by Ms. Metz and had at least one meeting with her and Ms. Metz to achieve that purpose. After several months, Ms. Martin did not adopt the changes requested by Ms. Metz and the financial reports remained essentially the same. Since Ms. Martin failed to make these corrections, at the December 2005 DFCD Commission meeting, Ms. Metz initially stated that, due to her CPA training, she could not in good faith approve a financial statement she knew to be incorrect. After further discussion amongst the DFCD Commissioners, Ms. Metz accepted the financial statement prepared by Ms. Martin with the condition that the corrections would be made in the future. As indicated, all of these commission meetings were recorded. Although some of the recordings were of poor quality, the tapes showed that Petitioner was always polite to Ms. Martin. They contained no evidence that Ms. Metz ever bullied or harassed Ms. Martin. Importantly, throughout this time period the gossip in the fire station, which stations tend to be rampant with, was that Ms. Metz was being extremely hard on Ms. Martin and getting on to her. Other gossip was that Ms. Metz was being extremely hard on Ms. Martin because she wanted her job. However, neither during the unfolding of these events nor shortly after, did Respondent feel it was necessary to inquire into the activities of Ms. Metz or Ms. Martin. Similarly, Respondent did not feel it was necessary to file an ethics complaint against Ms. Metz. On January 9, 2006, Wanda Martin resigned from her position of Financial Administrator with DFCD. After learning of Ms. Martin's resignation, Petitioner resigned from the Fire Commission on January 12, 2006, in order to apply for the Financial Administrator position vacated by Ms. Martin. The evidence did not demonstrate when Ms. Metz submitted her application for the Financial Administrator position. Sometime in January, either upon or after her resignation, Ms. Metz spoke with former Chief Dixon regarding turning in her job application. She told him she felt she had a good chance to get the job because she thought she was the best qualified. She did not threaten or pressure former Chief Dixon to hire her for the Financial Administrator position. Former Chief Dixon told her that he had to advertise the job according to the rules and that Ms. Metz could put her application in “like anyone else.” The position was advertised during the month of January and about 30 applications, including Petitioner's application, were received by DFCD. At no time did Petitioner solicit any Commissioner's support. Petitioner was subsequently, hired as Financial Administrator by Chief Dixon on January 30, 2006. Ms. Metz was not a DFCD Commissioner and did not hold any public office at the time she applied for the DFCD Financial Administrator position. In fact, Ms. Metz remained employed full-time as a CPA with the accounting firm she had been working for, receiving a compensation package similar to that offered for the DFCD Administrator position. She left her employment with the CPA firm when she was hired as the DFCD Financial Administrator. Former Chief Dixon denied that he was pressured to hire Ms. Metz for the position. Rather, the ethics investigation revealed that Chief Dixon thought that out of approximately 30 applicants for the Financial Administrator position, Ms. Metz was the best qualified applicant because she was a CPA and had previous employment history with DFCD. The ethics investigation further revealed that Chief Dixon stated he felt "uncomfortable" when Ms. Metz said that she was only resigning from the DFCD Commission because she thought she was the most qualified for the DFCD Financial Administrator position. However, he also did not feel pressured by Ms. Metz because she was tendering her resignation from the Commission at the time that she made the comment and no longer had any influence over his position as the Chief of the Fire District. At hearing, Respondent claimed that Chief Dixon may have been untruthful during the ethics investigation, but offered no credible proof of his assertion. Chief Dixon did not testify at the hearing in this matter and Respondent's assertion about Chief Dixon's untruthfulness is not credible or material since Respondent never inquired whether Chief Dixon was pressured by Ms. Metz. In 2005 and 2006, gossip among the firefighters was rampant about the hiring of Ms. Metz and Respondent was aware of this gossip. However, he again did not feel compelled to inquire into any of these events or file an ethics complaint against Ms. Metz. In March 2009, Chief Dixon retired from DFCD after 19 years of service to DFCD as Fire Chief. Assistant Chief Sasser became the Fire Chief. By 2010, due to a variety of incidents, the atmosphere in the fire district was poisonous because of some actions taken by Ms. Metz and some actions taken against her son, who had been employed by DFCD as a lifeguard. For example, by letter dated March 10, 2010, Ms. Metz provided notice to the DFCD Board of Commissioners that DFCD Chief Sasser had allegedly violated the Sunshine Law and created a hostile work environment. By this same letter, Ms. Metz sought whistleblower protection under chapter 122, Florida Statutes, stating, “I am very concerned about retaliation after you receive this letter.” On the other hand, some of the incidents involved the termination of Ms. Metz's son by Chief Sasser. Rumors and innuendos were flying around the fire station both in conversation and in blogs. Some of the problems were appearing in the local news. Respondent, who described Chief Sasser as a friend, mentor, and superior, was upset that Ms. Metz exposed Chief Sasser’s alleged Sunshine Law violations. Mr. Myers felt that, by calling attention to Chief Sasser’s misconduct, Ms. Metz cast the department and Chief Sasser in a “bad light.” Mr. Myers testified: “I was upset that we were getting drug in the paper every week.” He wanted the coverage to stop. In this atmosphere, many of the old rumors about Ms. Metz were resurfacing. Respondent was told by another firefighter, that in January 2006, Ms. Metz had gone to Chief Dixon with her resignation in one hand and her application in the other and informed Chief Dixon that she was applying for Ms. Martin's old job. Although all of these rumors were around in January 2006, Respondent claims that, over 4 years later, he was now troubled by them and went to Chief Dixon to inquire about what he had been told. Importantly, Respondent had no direct knowledge of any of the alleged events that occurred in 2005 and 2006. Chief Dixon told Respondent that he had met with Ms. Metz, but that he could not remember whether she had her resignation and application with her at the time. Essentially the conversation was as outlined above. In addition, Chief Dixon discussed the alignment of the Commission on the issue of hiring Ms. Metz that he thought was prevalent in January 2006. Importantly, Respondent never asked Chief Dixon whether he was pressured by Ms. Metz to hire her for the position. If he had, Chief Dixon would have denied such pressure as he has consistently done during the investigation of this matter by the Ethics Commission. The omission of this question demonstrates that Respondent's belated interest in Ms. Metz's hiring and Ms. Martin's resignation was motivated not because he was a concerned citizen but more by a desire to strike out at Ms. Metz in order to stop her from disparaging the fire department. The deliberate omission of this question was also in reckless disregard of the truth of his allegation that the Chief was pressured by Ms. Metz. Respondent also spoke with Ms. Martin who was known for being overly dramatic and sensitive and who remains bitter about Ms. Metz. She felt Ms. Metz was overly hard on her. She cited no specifics and the evidence did not show any such specifics, other than the alleged harassment occurred in commission meetings. She, also specifically mentioned the November commission meeting when she felt harassed by Ms. Metz because she did not have the financial reports for the meeting completed due to the time off she had taken to help her mother who was ill. Other than these two individuals, Respondent made no inquiry of anyone with direct knowledge of these events. More importantly, he did not listen to the tapes of the meetings at which such harassment allegedly occurred. If he had he would have learned that Ms. Metz was not rude or hostile to Ms. Martin during these commission meetings. He would have learned that Ms. Metz did not harass Ms. Martin during these commission meetings, but performed her duty to inquire about financial reports that to a CPA were done incorrectly. He would have learned that the District's auditor agreed with Ms. Metz and that Ms. Martin repeatedly failed over several months to incorporate the corrections that Ms. Metz desired and the commission had instructed her to do. In short, Petitioner would have learned that his belief that Ms. Metz harassed Ms. Martin until she resigned was not true. Such a failure to investigate the facts to determine their validity constitutes reckless disregard for the truth especially given Respondent's knowledge that such tapes existed and the length of time that had passed since Ms. Martin's resignation and Ms. Metz's hiring, as well as, the ulterior motive of Respondent to silence Ms. Metz in 2010. Instead of reasonable inquiry regarding his beliefs, on April 7, 2010, Respondent filed an ethics complaint against Petitioner alleging that Petitioner had violated section 112.313(6)(Misuse of Public Office) for actions that had allegedly occurred in 2005 and January 2006 regarding Ms. Martin's resignation and Ms. Metz employment as Financial Administrator by DFCD. The Complaint alleged that Ms. Metz had used her position as a fire commissioner to harass and belittle Ms. Martin at DFCD commission meetings in order to force her to resign and then used that same position to pressure Chief Dixon to hire her for that same position. To support his allegation, the initial complaint, contained factual allegations confined primarily to the following facts that are not in dispute: (i) Ms. Metz was a Fire Commissioner with the DFCD in 2005; (ii) Wanda Martin was the Financial Administrator for DFCD at that time; (iii) Ms. Metz questioned Ms. Martin about the financial statements at four Fire Commission meetings in the fall of 2005; (iv) Ms. Martin resigned in January of 2006; (v) Ms. Metz subsequently resigned as a Fire Commissioner; and (vi) Ms. Metz was hired as the new DFCD Financial Administrator. Based on these bare facts, Respondent concluded that Ms. Metz “used her position to push Ms. Martin out so that she could step into the job.” However, the Commission on Ethics’ investigator determined that these allegations were legally insufficient for investigation and told Respondent that the Complaint would be dismissed unless he provided additional information. Respondent called Chief Dixon again; Chief Dixon gave him the same information he had given him before. Importantly, Respondent, again, failed to inquire about whether Chief Dixon was pressured by Ms. Metz. No other investigation or inquiry was made by Respondent regarding his beliefs. Again, this failure to inquire into essential facts was in reckless disregard of the truth. Instead, Respondent filed an amendment to the complaint on April 30, 2010. Specifically, Respondent again alleged that in 2005 and 2006, some four and a half years prior to his complaint, Petitioner misused her public position as a Fire Commissioner to (a) create a hostile work environment for Ms. Martin thereby forcing Martin to resign as Financial Administrator, and pressured former Chief Dixon to hire Petitioner. Given this timing and his motivation, Respondent's explanation that he did not think it was not his "job" to investigate this matter before he filed his ethics complaint is not credible. After amendment, the Executive Director of the Commission on Ethics found the complaint against Petitioner to be legally sufficient and ordered a preliminary investigation to determine if Petitioner’s actions were violative of section 112.313(6). In order to defend herself, Ms. Metz entered into a retainer agreement with the firm of Greenburg Traurig, P.A. on September 14, 2010. Ms. Metz intends to fully pay the bill. As of April 14, 2011, Ms. Metz incurred fees in the amount of $25,356.76, and costs in the amount of $1,158.22. Additional fees in the amount of $17,277.50, and costs in the amount of $1,418.31 have since been incurred. The parties have stipulated to the reasonableness of the hourly rates, hours expended, and total fees and costs incurred. Given that Respondent's ethics complaint was filed in reckless disregard of whether the complaint contains false allegations, Petitioner is entitled to an award of costs and attorney's fees for her defense against Respondent's complaint and subsequent costs and fees associated therewith in the amounts outlined above.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is Recommended that the Commission enter a Final order granting the Petition for Fees and awarding attorney's fees and costs in the amounts noted above. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of July, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of July, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Glenn T. Burhans, Jr., Esquire Greenberg Traurig 101 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Kaye Starling, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Jennifer H. Copus, Esquire Copus & Copus, P.A. 1817 Lewis Turner Boulevard, Suite E Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32547 Philip C. Claypool, General Counsel Florida Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South Suite 201 Tallahassee, Florida 32312
Findings Of Fact Petitioner and the Florida Elections Commission are responsible for enforcing Chapter 106, Florida Statutes. In 1993, Respondent qualified as a candidate for re- election to Seat Five of the Tallahassee City Commission. She was defeated for this office in the general election on February 22, 1994. On December 27, 1993, Respondent signed a Statement of Candidate indicating that she had received, read and understood the requirements of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, as required by Section 106.023, Florida Statutes. Respondent has run for public office on four different occasions. Respondent's 1994 campaign staff was made up of volunteers. Some of these volunteers were supporters who had worked in her prior campaigns. Others were supporters who were participating in a political campaign for the first time. In the early days of the campaign, Respondent met with her supporters at weekly campaign committee meetings. As time went on, Respondent's employment and campaign schedule prevented her from attending these meetings. She also found it increasingly difficult to spend much time at her campaign headquarters. In 1994, Respondent used the same system she had used in prior campaigns for registering the names, addresses and telephone numbers of supporters for purposes of organizing the campaign. These cards included a check-list of jobs for which a campaign worker could volunteer. The cards also had a signature line for volunteers who were willing to publicly support Respondent. The cards did not contain a place to indicate the date of the signature. Respondent's campaign headquarters was initially staffed entirely by part-time volunteers including, but not limited to, Vivian Pelham. As a result, the card filing system became disorganized. In many instances, there were duplicate cards for campaign supporters. Some of the cards were misplaced or lost as they were in constant use for campaign work in the neighborhood. In mid-January, Chuck Cyrus began working at Respondent's campaign headquarters on a full-time basis. He unsuccessfully attempted to organize the card filing system. At the conclusion of the campaign, all of the cards that could be located were stored along with other campaign records. On or before January 6, 1994, Respondent's staff decided to prepare a flyer for circulation at a Council of Neighborhood Associations (CONA) meeting. Respondent's husband, Jim Crews, instructed Vivian Pelham and other part-time workers to make telephone calls to people to verify approval of the use of their names on the flyer prior to its distribution. Ms. Pelham did not search for signature cards before she called people because she did not think about it. In retrospect, Ms. Pelham knew it was necessary to have signatures of people willing to publicly support Respondent. However, Ms. Pelham did not know that endorsers had to sign cards at any particular time. She was not aware of a difference between "written" and "verbal" approval before a candidate may use a person's name in a campaign advertisement. Rather, Ms. Pelham thought specific "verbal" approval was better than "written" approval as long as an endorser signed a card at some point in time. One of the people Respondent's staff contacted by phone was Dennis Murphy. Mr. Murphy refused to allow the use of his name on the flyer. Consequently, Respondent's staff did not include him as an endorser on the campaign advertisement. The flyer ultimately contained the names of twenty-two "neighborhood leaders" who endorsed Respondent's candidacy. The flyer listed the neighborhood of each person under their name. The following disclaimer was located at the bottom of the flyer: The above individuals are current or past officers in their neighborhood associations. This document does not represent an endorsement by the Council of Neighborhood Associations nor any individual neighborhood group. This is a paid political advertisement paid for by the campaign treasurer. There is no competent persuasive evidence that the flyer, read in its entirety, misrepresented the personal endorsement of the people named therein as an endorsement by a particular neighborhood group. The only names included on the flyer which are at issue here are Sterling and Rosemarie Bryant and Dorothy Rose. Mr. and Mrs. Bryant were long- time supporters of Respondent. They worked in Respondent's 1994 and previous campaigns. Ms. Rose supported Respondent in 1994 but was not actively involved in the campaign. At the time Respondent circulated the subject flyer, neither the Bryants nor Ms. Rose had signed a 1994 campaign card stating that they were willing to publicly endorse Respondent. Mr. Bryant did not remember receiving a call about the flyer prior to January 6, 1995. However, Ms. Rose did receive such a call. On the evening of January 6, 1994, Respondent arrived at the CONA meeting just before it convened where she reviewed the flyer for the first time. Respondent recognized the name of each person listed on the flyer as a past and/or current supporter. She had no reason to doubt whether the people listed had signed a 1994 campaign card prior to her staff's preparation of the flyer. The document was circulated at the meeting to about thirty-five (35) people, many of whom were listed on the campaign advertisement. Dennis Murphy was present at the January 6, 1994, CONA meeting. He did not see the flyer at that time. Days later Mr. Murphy became aware of the flyer. He went to Respondent's campaign headquarters and got a copy of it. On January 14, 1995, Mr. Murphy filed a sworn complaint with Petitioner alleging that Respondent had violated Section 106.143(3), Florida Statutes. He filed the complaint because he thought Respondent failed to get proper authorization to use the names of the people listed on the flyer. Soon thereafter, Respondent's staff learned about the complaint informally. Jim Crews instructed Vivian Pelham and other campaign workers to locate signature cards for each person listed on the flyer. If a card could not be located, the workers were to call the people and get a duplicate. No one on Respondent's staff advised her about the rumored complaint. Several campaign workers began looking for signature cards. Vivian Pelham could not find a card for Sterling Bryant and called him. Because the Bryants were elderly, Ms. Pelham went to their home where Mr. and Mrs. Bryant signed a card. Ms. Pelham's testimony that she specifically requested the Bryants' signature relative to the flyer and not a subsequent newspaper advertisement is more persuasive than Mr. Bryant's testimony to the contrary. The subsequent newspaper advertisement, published on January 27, 1994, included a picture of Respondent with several neighborhood leaders, including the Bryants. Petitioner sent a letter dated January 19, 1994, to Mr. Murphy informing him that it had initiated an investigation of his complaint. Petitioner's letter to Mr. Murphy also requested information concerning the issue of "willfulness." That same day, Petitioner sent Respondent a letter, by regular United States Mail, enclosing a copy of the complaint. This letter gave Respondent the opportunity to submit a response in the form of a sworn statement. Respondent's staff received the letter on her behalf but did not bring it to her attention or respond to it in any way because they thought cards were available for each of the people listed on the flyer. Petitioner sent Respondent a second letter dated February 21, 1994. This letter was sent certified mail, return receipt requested. Respondent was in her headquarters when the letter arrived on February 23, 1994. She learned about the complaint for the first time when she signed for the letter. Respondent immediately located Petitioner's first letter and initiated a search of her records for the cards in question. Respondent was able to locate a card for everyone listed on the flyer except Dorothy Rose. Consequently, Respondent called Ms. Rose and went to her home where she obtained Ms. Rose's signature on a card. Respondent thought she was obtaining a duplicate card for Ms. Rose. During her 1994 campaign, Respondent continued to work as Mayor and City Commissioner of Tallahassee, Florida. She also worked full-time for Florida State University School in various administrative positions. Because of the demands of her schedule, she relied on her family, friends and volunteers to run her campaign. On the day before the primary, Respondent became ill and was hospitalized due to the intense stress of the campaign and pressure associated with her employment. In a letter to Petitioner dated February 24, 1995, Respondent denied the allegations in the complaint and enclosed copies of signature cards for the people listed in the flyer. The cards did not have dates to indicate when Respondent's supporters signed them. By letter dated June 28, 1994, Petitioner requested Respondent to furnish dates for the signatures and the names of the campaign workers who solicited the signatures. Respondent was unable to furnish this information because it was unavailable. With the exception of Ms. Rose's signature card, Respondent did not know when the cards were signed or which of the cards in her possession might have been duplicates of lost or misplaced cards. She was still under the impression that Ms. Rose's card was a duplicate. C. L. Ivey investigated the complaint for Petitioner. He randomly selected approximately twelve (12) people from the list of names on the flyer and contacted as many of them as he could reach. Most of them could not remember when they signed the cards. No one expressed an objection to Respondent's use of their name. Mr. Ivey subsequently deposed several of Respondent's supporters including Sterling Bryant and Dorothy Rose. The only cards they remembered signing in 1994 were executed after January 6, 1994. Mr. Bryant had not seen the subject flyer before Petitioner deposed him. He would have preferred to see a stronger disclaimer than the one at the bottom of the flyer. In 1994, Mr. Bryant was president of his neighborhood association and did not want to give the impression that the association endorsed a particular candidate. However, he did not object to Respondent publicly representing that he personally endorsed her candidacy. Respondent did not willfully violate Section 106.143(3), Florida Statutes. Neither she nor her campaign staff were aware that the Bryants and Ms. Rose had not signed a card prior to distribution of the flyer. To the contrary, Respondent and her staff knew that each of the people listed on the flyer were Respondent's past and/or current supporters. Their failure to ensure that they had a signature card on file for each person was at most simple negligence. The actions of Respondent and her staff after they learned about the complaint were not motivated by a desire to circumvent the election code. At all times, Respondent and her staff attempted to conduct themselves within the letter of the law. After the election, it was not reasonable to expect Respondent to know when the endorsers signed the cards because they were not dated. There is no competent persuasive evidence that Respondent received an unfair advantage by publishing the flyer without the prior written approval of the Bryants and Ms. Rose. Moreover, there is no competent persuasive evidence that distribution of the flyer resulted in harm to any person. The Bryants and Ms. Rose continue to espouse their friendship and support for Respondent. It did not become clear that the Bryants and Ms. Rose had not timely signed a signature card until after Petitioner completed its investigation. By then, Respondent had no effective means to remedy the situation.
Recommendation Based on the above referenced findings of fact and conclusions of law, the undersigned recommends that the Florida Elections Commission enter a Final Order finding that the Respondent did not willfully violate Section 106.143(3), Florida Statutes and dismissing the charges against her. RECOMMENDED this 14th day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD, Hearing Officer Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 1995. APPENDIX The following constitutes the undersigned's specific rulings on the parties' proposed findings of fact pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in Findings of Facts (FOF) number 1. Accepted in FOF number 2. Accepted in FOF number 13. Accepted in FOF numbers 12-13. Accepted in FOF numbers 10 and 14 as modified therein. Accepted in FOF numbers 17-18. Accepted in FOF numbers 5 and 21. Accepted in FOF number 22. Accepted in FOF numbers 23-24. Accepted as modified in FOF 6 & 15. Accepted in FOF numbers 12, 16, and 24-25. Rejected. See FOF numbers 16 and 25. Accepted as modified in FOF numbers 12 and 19. Accepted in FOF 3-4. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Respondent did not number her proposed findings of facts. They are included in her proposed recommended order on page 1 through the first whole paragraph of page 6. The undersigned accepts all of Respondent's proposed findings of facts in substance as modified in FOF numbers 1-29 of this Recommended Order except: Mr. Murphy's political opposition to Respondent is not relevant; (2) Reference to any conversation between Mr. Murphy and a Mr. Fulford is uncorroborated hearsay; (3) Mr. Murphy's reason for not reporting the alleged violation to the Leon County Supervisor of Elections is not relevant; and (4) Reference to any newspaper articles that Petitioner's investigator relied upon is not relevant and uncorroborated hearsay. COPIES FURNISHED: David R. Westcott, Esq. The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Robert Augustus Harper, Esq. P. O. Box 10132 Tallahassee, FL 32302-2132 Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Don Bell, Esq. Dept. of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated various election laws and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a licensed physician. For many years, he practiced as a heart surgeon in Springfield, Illinois. After developing a hand tremor resulting from a medical condition, Respondent relocated to Naples, where he had vacationed for several years. In early 1996, after moving to Naples, Respondent opened a walk-in clinic in Naples. At all material times, Respondent has worked at the clinic about 60 hours weekly. Respondent has never assumed responsibility for financial matters or record-keeping at his home or in his office. At home, these responsibilities are borne by his wife of 28 years. At the office, these responsibilities are assumed by his office manager. Prior to fall 1996, Respondent had never had any significant experience in politics. However, dissatisfied with aspects of the training and qualifications of certain personnel who responded to emergency medical calls, Respondent decided to run in the fall 1996 election for Seat 3 of the North Naples Fire and Rescue Commission. On July 1, 1996, Respondent obtained a "candidate packet" from the Filing Officer of the Office of the Collier County Supervisor of Elections. The packet contained considerable information, including treasurer's report forms; a list of key dates, including filing deadlines; a Division of Elections Candidate Handbook; copies of Chapters 99, 105, and 106, Florida Statutes; itemized contribution forms; and itemized expenditure forms. Without studying any of the information, Respondent signed and filed a Statement of Candidate on the same day that he picked up the candidate packet. The signed Statement of Candidate acknowledges that Respondent received, read, and understood the requirements of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes. On the same day, Respondent signed a form appointing himself as his campaign treasurer and designating The Huntington Bank as his campaign depository. The campaign bank account, which was a checking account, was titled, "Dr. Robert C. McGann Campaign Account for North Naples Fire District" and bore account number 02628208279. The only authorized signatories on the account were Respondent and his wife. The same bank also handled the checking account for Respondent's medical practice. On July 18, 1996, Respondent signed and filed a form titled, "Acknowledgment by Candidate." In this form, Respondent acknowledged that he had reviewed and understood various items, which he initialed. These initialed items included two items concerning the deadlines for filing campaign treasurer reports. On the same day, the Filing Officer provided Respondent with a two-sided document titled, "State of Florida 1996 Calendar and Election Dates." This document summarizes the deadlines for filing election reports and provides report-filing deadlines. For the First Primary, the filing deadlines are: August 2 for the period from July 1 through July 26; August 16 for the period from July 27 through August 9; and August 30 for the period from August 10 through August 29. For the Second Primary, the filing deadlines are: September 13 for the period from August 30 through September 6 and September 27 for the period from September 7 through September 26. The State of Florida 1996 Calendar and Election Dates requires that each candidate whose candidacy terminates as of the Second Primary must file his or her final report by December 30, 1996. Respondent filed six campaign treasurer reports. He signed each of the reports and filed each of the reports on time. The first allegation is that, "on multiple occasions," Respondent failed to timely deposit timely campaign contributions. Petitioner proved that Respondent failed to timely deposit campaign contributions on several occasions. However, Petitioner failed to prove that any of these failures was willful. The modest amounts do not invite a finding of willfulness, nor do the identities of the contributors, none of whom appears to be someone whom Respondent would wish to hide from public scrutiny. The preponderance of the evidence suggests only that Respondent's failures to timely deposit campaign contributions were due to his carelessness, and nothing in the record suggests that this carelessness was studied, purposeful, or otherwise calculated to avoid the requirements of the law. The second allegation is that Respondent failed to include his political party affiliation in a political advertisement. Petitioner proved that Respondent published at least two political advertisements that failed to disclose his political party affiliation. However, Petitioner failed to prove that these nondisclosures were willful. The nondisclosures occurred during the Republican primary elections. Failing to alert potential voters of Respondent's political affiliation could only hurt Respondent, as potential voters who found his campaign literature appealing might not be able to find the particular race in which Respondent was involved. In a larger sense, concealing his Republican affiliation hurt Respondent because he was running in a largely Republican area. The third allegation is that Respondent failed to use, in his political advertisements, the word "for" between his name and the office for which he was running. The stated purpose of this requirement is to alert potential voters that a candidate is not an incumbent. Petitioner proved that Respondent published at least two political advertisements that failed to include the word "for" between his name and the office for which he was running. However, Petitioner failed to prove that the failures were willful. The first advertisement ran during the First Primary, which included Respondent, the incumbent, and another challenger. The advertisement showed the incumbent's name followed by: "Incumbent- committed to the status quo." The advertisement showed the other challenger's name followed by: "Union Candidate." The advertisement showed Respondent's name followed by: "Candidate for Change." The whole thrust of Respondent's campaign in the First Primary was to change the policies of the North Naples Fire and Rescue Commission. Emphasizing his outsider status through the use of "for" would have served this purpose. The omission is thus due to neglect, not willfullness. The second advertisement evidently ran during the Second Primary because it mentions only the challenger, who eventually won this primary. The advertisement again emphasizes the outsider status of Respondent as an agent for change. Given this campaign theme, it is impossible to infer willfulness, rather than carelessness, in the failure of this advertisement to include "for" between Respondent's name and the position that he was seeking. The fourth allegation is that, "on multiple occasions," Respondent made expenditures from campaign funds other than by a check drawn on his campaign depository. Petitioner proved that Respondent made the following expenditures with funds not drawn from his campaign depository: $23 and $110 to Home Depot, $29 to Sam's Club, $6.15 to Mary Morgan, $25 to Office Depot, $30.60 to Office Depot, and $28 to Kinko's. Respondent reported each of these expenditures, but the campaign checking account does not reveal payments of these sums. However, Petitioner failed to prove that these acts were willful. With the exception of $6.15 given to Mary Morgan, the recipients of these sums are commercial establishments that provide goods and services of obvious usefulness to a political campaign. Mary Morgan is the Supervisor of Elections, whose office received $6.15, apparently in payment of some filing fee. Also, these relatively modest sums qualify as petty cash expenditures. The fifth allegation is that, "on multiple occasions," Respondent signed a check drawn on the campaign depository without sufficient funds on deposit in the campaign depository to pay the full amount of the check, to honor all outstanding checks, and to pay all previously authorized but unpaid expenses. Petitioner proved that Respondent's wife, who was an authorized signatory on the campaign checking account, signed a $507.15 check to Sir Speedy. The check is dated August 1, although the evidence does not establish that Sir Speedy received the check on that date. However, the evidence does establish that Sir Speedy presented the check for payment on August 6, at which time the bank honored the check and paid Sir Speedy $507.15. The bank statement for the campaign checking account reveals that the bank credited the account with a $500 deposit on August 2, leaving a balance of $2.30. The next activity was August 6, when the bank debited the account for the Sir Speedy check in the amount of $507.15, leaving a negative balance of $4.85, which increased the next day to a negative balance of $7.35 after the application of monthly checking fees. Although Respondent is responsible for the acts of his wife, as his agent in making this expenditure, Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent or his wife willfully delivered a campaign check without sufficient funds. If this had been their intent, their effort was stymied by the bank's honoring the check. In fact, they had no such intent. Although they probably did not know that this check would cause a negative balance of a few dollars, it is more likely that they delivered the check knowing that the bank would honor the check because the account had sufficient funds or, if it did not, it was short only a few dollars and the bank, consistent with its policy on their accounts, would nonetheless honor the check. Additional evidence that this was bank policy is the absence of any overdraft fee on the August or September bank statement. The sixth allegation is that, "on multiple occasions," Respondent failed to report a contribution required by law to be reported. Petitioner proved that Respondent received numerous contributions that he failed to report, including $500 from himself on August 2, $1000 from himself on August 19, $100 from Barry or Diane Flagg on August 16, $50 from Gordon Radcliff in late September, $50 from Thomas Jewell on September 26, $50 from David Grieder on September 26, and $100 from Peter or Carol Boyd on September 26. The evidence in support of the allegation that Respondent failed to report a contribution consists of seven contributions over a seven-week period. These omissions totaled $1850 out of a total reported contributions of $9414.75 (including $4500 in loans from Respondent); in other words, Respondent failed to report nearly 20 percent of the contributions. Bank records for the campaign checking account record only $6820 in deposits. Reporting contributions is arguably the most basic requirement of the applicable law. Respondent's reports reveal a knowledge of the requirement to report contributions. Respondent even testified that he understood that he was required to report contributions, as well as expenditures. Although he reported numerous contributions, he failed to report a considerable amount of contributions under circumstances that reveal that this failure to report was willful. The seventh and eighth allegations are, respectively, that, "on six occasions" each, Respondent certified to the correctness of a campaign treasurer's report that was incorrect, false, or incomplete and falsely reported or failed to report information required by law. Petitioner has proved numerous inaccuracies and omissions in the campaign reports filed by Respondent. To the extent that the seventh and eighth allegations cover the sixth allegation, Petitioner has proved a willful violation, but the same acts and omissions cannot provide grounds for double discipline under two different statutes. To the extent the seventh and eighth allegations cover other acts and omissions, besides the mere failure to report contributions, Petitioner has failed to prove willfullness. To the contrary, the many inaccuracies and omissions (apart from the violations covered by the sixth allegation) again appear to be the product of Respondent's carelessness, rather than a studied attempt to avoid complying with the reporting requirements imposed by law. Petitioner infers willfullness from Respondent's failure to respond to six certified letters from the County filing officer alerting him to the deficiencies in his previously filed reports. The cited deficiencies consist mostly of 22 contributions or expenditures lacking a date, six contributions or expenditures lacking an address (i.e., one contributor for which Respondent previously supplied an address, Office Depot for which Respondent supplied an address on a later report, the County Supervisor of Elections (twice; this is the employer of the filing officer), Kinko's in Naples, and Desk Top Results in Naples). There are two problems in using the unanswered letters as grounds for inferring willfullness. First, the letters ignore most of the deficiencies on which Petitioner relies. Most of these ignored items are facially evident, and the filing officer's failure to mention them does not assist Petitioner's effort in showing willfullness. Such items include the wrong reporting timeframes; the failure to identify the report as quarterly, first primary, etc.; and the failure to indicate whether the report is an original or amendment. Second, the letters only raise two claimed deficiencies--the failure to disclose dates and addresses for contributions and expenditures. Even as to these matters, the letters provide no basis for an inference of willfullness for several reasons. First, the filing officer sent all of the letters on the same date, December 6. The most recurring failing cited in the letters is the absence of dates for contributions and expenditures. The record suggests that Respondent's carelessness in recordkeeping rendered impossible any accurate amendment of his reports to add the dates. The situation might have been different if the filing officer had sent such a letter after Respondent had filed the first report without the required dates. As to that report, it would have been more likely that Respondent could have reconstructed the dates. As to subsequent reports, it is much more likely that the carelessness defense would have been unavailing, after Respondent would have received a specific demand for this information. Given the outcome of the case, the Administrative Law Judge has examined the sealed exhibit containing copies of Respondent's personal income tax returns for 1996 and 1997. There is no indication in these tax returns that a fine of $1000 would be excessive.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order imposing a $1000 fine against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of July, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Steven Christensen, Clerk Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Michael T. McGuckin Assistant General Counsel Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Robert B. McKay Carney & McKay 1140 Franklin Avenue, Suite 201 Garden City, New York 11530
