Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations and admissions of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at hearing, I make the following findings of fact. Facts admitted by all parties The water quality standards contained in Rule 17-3.111, Florida Administrative Code will not be violated by this project. There are no aquatic macrophytes located in the area of the proposed project. The proposed project is located within 500 feet of the incorporated municipality of Horseshoe Beach, Florida. The proposed project is located within Class II waters of the State not approved for shellfish harvesting. The project will not adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats. The proposed project will be of a permanent nature. The project will not adversely affect or will not enhance significant historical or acheological resources under the provisions of Section 267.061, Florida Statutes. The rest of the findings The Applicant, Dixie County, applied for a dredge and fill permit to construct a dock which would expand the existing public dock at Horseshoe Beach. In accordance with the revised plans dated October 23, 1986, the proposed facility would consist of a pier 6 feet wide and 120 feet long designed to accommodate six boat slips, each 30 feet wide and 40 feet long. The boundaries of the boat slips will be demarcated by pilings set 10 feet apart. Four of the boat slips would be primarily for the use of commercial fishing boats and commercial shrimping boats. The other two boat slips (the two slips closest to the land) would be reserved for the exclusive use of recreational and other small vessels. By adding a catwalk 3 or 4 feet wide down the middle of the two slips reserved for recreational vessels, the usefulness of those slips to recreational vessels would be greatly enhanced and the narrowness of the resulting slips would preclude their use by large vessels. Adding the two catwalks would be a minor addition to the proposed project which would greatly enhance the usefulness of the project and at the same time avoid the possibility that large vessels in the two slips closest to the land would impede ingress and egress at the nearby boat lift, boat fueling facility, and boat ramp. Adding a reasonable number of permanent trash or garbage containers would also enhance the usefulness of the proposed project and minimize the possibility of improper disposal of trash and garbage which is generated by the normal use of a dock by fishermen and boaters. The proposed project site is located in the Gulf of Mexico at Horseshoe Beach, Florida, and would extend into the waters of the Gulf, which is a tidally influenced water body adjacent to Dixie County, Florida. The water along the shoreline of the area is shallow for a considerable distance waterward, except where basins and channels have been dredged. The Horseshoe Beach area is relatively unpolluted. The existing public dock at Horseshoe Beach is used primarily by recreational vessels, but there is also extensive commercial fishing and Shrimping boat activity in the area. The project is located at the mouth of a canal with direct access to the Gulf. Several commercial fishhouses operate from the canal bank, which generates extensive commercial boat traffic past the proposed project site. Large numbers of commercial shrimp boats presently dock along the canal that ends near the proposed project site. The proposed project requires no dredging. The only filling required by the proposed project is the placement of pilings into the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico. Even though the plans do not specify whether concrete or wooden pilings will be used, this lack of specificity in the plans is irrelevant. Regardless of what types of pilings are used on this project, the filling activity will not violate the water quality criteria contained in Rule 17- 3.051(1), Florida Administrative Code. The placement of the pilings will not adversely affect the public health, safety, and welfare. Further, the proposed project will not adversely affect any property interests of the Petitioners within the scope of Chapter 403, Florida Statutes. The Gulf bottom in the area of the proposed project has already been disturbed. The presently existing suspension of particulate material in the water column, a natural occurrence in the area of the project, results in low visibility which means that seagrass beds and other marine vegetation, which provide shelter and detrital deposits for fish and other marine resources, will not grow. Coast Guard regulations prohibit commercial fishing vessels from depositing materials into the water within three miles of the coast line. Commercial fishing vessels must prominently display a sticker reciting that regulation and it is the practice of commercial fishing vessels operating in the vicinity of Horseshoe Beach to comply with this Coast Guard no discharge requirement by cleaning nets and scrubbing decks outside the three mile limit. It is not the practice of Commercial fishing vessels to deliberately discharge diesel fuel, fish parts or other material into the water while docked. Further, the limited number of commercial fishing vessels which could dock at the proposed facility at the same time cannot reasonably be expected to create discharges in amounts creating a nuisance, posing any danger to the public health safety or welfare, or violating the water quality criteria contained in Rule 17-3.051(1), Florida Statutes. Although small amounts of diesel fuel can become mixed with bilge water and be discharged by automatic bilge pumps while commercial fishing vessels are docked, there is no evidence that this would be in amounts Sufficient to create a nuisance or violate water quality criteria. To the contrary, notwithstanding a large amount of commercial boat traffic past the proposed site and notwithstanding the fact that large numbers of shrimp boats dock up the canal from the proposed site, the water in the area of the proposed site has remained relatively unpolluted. The proposed project will not affect the normal wind and wave action in the area of the proposed project. Such wind and wave action presently results in free exchange between the waters of the open Gulf and the waters near the shore. This free exchange of waters means that any pollutant discharges in the area of the proposed project will be diluted and rapidly dispersed into the Gulf of Mexico. There will be no measurable difference in the wind and wave action, or in the water exchange, after the proposed project is built. No harmful shoaling or erosion is expected to result from construction of the proposed project. Any docking structure extending out into the Gulf of Mexico will obviously have some effect on navigation in the area of the dock, but there is no evidence that the proposed dock will present a hazard to navigation or any significant interference with customary navigation patterns. The distance between the nearest channel marker and the waterward end of the proposed project is more than 200 feet. The angle of the proposed dock and its Spatial relation to the main Horseshoe Beach turning basin cause no impediment to navigation. The placement of Coast Guard Safety lights on the dock would minimize any potential for impeding navigation or posing a danger to the public health or safety during hours of darkness.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, I recommend that the Department of Environmental Regulation issue a Final Order in this case granting the permit applied for by Dixie County. It is also recommended that the permit be made subject to the following additional conditions: That one or more Coast Guard safety lights be placed on the proposed expansion to the dock; That catwalks be added down the middle of the two most landward of the proposed boat slips; and That a reasonable number of trash or garbage receptacles be permanently located on the proposed expansion to the dock to minimize the possibility of trash and garbage being thrown overboard. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-1448 The following are my specific rulings on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by all of the parties. The paragraph numbers referred to below are references to the paragraph numbers in the parties' respective proposed recommended orders. Ruling on findings proposed by the Petitioners: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Accepted. Paragraph 3: Accepted. Paragraph 4: First sentence is rejected as appearing to be more in the nature of an introduction to a discussion of legal issues than a proposed finding of fact. Second and third sentences are rejected as repetitious Paragraph 5: Entire paragraph rejected as unnecessary speculative generalizations in light of the other evidence in this case. Paragraph 6: Entire paragraph rejected as unnecessary speculative generalizations in light of the other evidence in this case. Paragraph 7: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 8: Entire paragraph is rejected as appearing to be more in the nature of an introduction to a discussion of legal issues than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 9: Entire paragraph rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence; construction of the dock may be expected to bring about some changes in the nature of the boat traffic in the immediate area, but nothing of the nature or magnitude suggested by these proposed findings. Paragraph 10: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 11: First sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Second sentence is accepted in part and rejected in part. Rejected portion is irrelevant. Third sentence is rejected as irrelevant. Fourth Sentence is accepted. Fifth sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and as repetitious Sixth sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 12: Entire paragraph rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rulings on findings Proposed by the Respondent: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 3: First two sentences accepted in substance. Last sentence rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 4: Accepted. Paragraph 5: Accepted. Paragraph 6: Accepted. Paragraph 7: Rejected as unnecessary recitation of opposing party's contentions and not proposed finding of fact. Paragraph 8: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 10: Accepted. Paragraph 11: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 12: Accepted. Paragraph 13: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence accepted in part and rejected in part; rejected portion concerns riparian rights, which are irrelevant to whether this permit should be issued. Paragraph 14: Entire paragraph rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 15: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 16: Accepted. Paragraph 17: Accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick M. Bryant, Esquire Moore, Williams & Bryant, P.A. Post Office Box 1169 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 J. Doyle Thomas, Esquire County Attorney Post Office Box 339 Cross City, Florida 32628 Ann Cowles-Fewox, Legal Intern Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Karen Brodeen, Esquire 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dale Twachtmann, Secretary Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
The Issue The issues to be determined in this proceeding are whether Respondent Prospect Marathon Coquina, LLC (PMC), is entitled to an environmental resource permit for the proposed expansion of a docking facility, and whether PMC is entitled to a modified sovereignty submerged land lease for the proposed project.
Findings Of Fact The Parties With the exception of Elizabeth Schuh, all Petitioners live in the Driftwood neighborhood, which is located across Big Bayou from the proposed project. All Petitioners use Big Bayou for various recreational purposes, including swimming and boating. Several Petitioners also use Big Bayou for nature observation. Petitioner Peter Pav owns waterfront property on Big Bayou. Respondents do not dispute Petitioners’ standing. The Department is charged with the responsibility to regulate construction activities in waters of the state. The Department has also been delegated authority from the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Trustees) to process applications for submerged land leases for structures and activities that will preempt the use of sovereign submerged lands. PMC is a Florida limited liability corporation that owns 2,786 linear feet of upland shoreline contiguous to the state-owned submerged lands of Big Bayou. PMC is the developer of the multi-family residential condominium development on Coquina Key that the proposed project would serve, known as Coquina Key North. The Affected Waterbody Big Bayou is near the southern end of the St. Petersburg peninsula. The mouth of the bayou opens to Tampa Bay. Big Bayou is part of the Pinellas County Aquatic Preserve, which includes most of the coastal waters of Pinellas County. Like all aquatic preserves in Florida, the Pinellas County Aquatic Preserve is also designated as an Outstanding Florida Water.1 Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-20.001 states that the aquatic preserves in Part II of Chapter 258 (which include the Pinellas County Aquatic Preserve) “were established for the purpose of being preserved in an essentially natural or existing condition so that their aesthetic, biological and scientific values may endure for the enjoyment of future generations.” The term “essentially natural condition” is defined as “those functions which support the continued existence or encourage the restoration of the diverse population of indigenous life forms and habitats to the extent they existed prior to the significant development adjacent to and within the preserve.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.003(24). In the 1960s and 1970s, development activities throughout Tampa Bay caused the loss of about 80 percent of its seagrasses and significant degradation of water quality. The seagrasses and water quality in Big Bayou were also adversely affected by filling and other development activities, including the filling and bulkheading of Coquina Key where the proposed project would be located. In more recent years, the water quality in Big Bayou has improved. Although trash sometimes washes up on the shoreline and one can sometimes see a sheen on the water surface caused by gasoline or oil, the water quality in Big Bayou is generally good, with high dissolved oxygen and low nutrient concentrations. The seagrasses have also recovered to a large extent. A variety of seagrasses grow in Big Bayou, including shoal grass, manatee grass, turtle grass, widgeon grass, and a relatively uncommon species, palm grass. Seagrasses are the foundation for the marine food web. They also serve as a nursery for small fish and invertebrates, stabilize sediment, and improve water quality. Manatees regularly enter and use Big Bayou because it provides good habitat. The manatees in this area are part of the Southwest Florida manatee subpopulation. Based on data collected through 2001, that subpopulation is either stable, or possibly declining. Pinellas County is not one of the 13 Florida counties that were required to develop and implement manatee protection plans. There are two areas of Pinellas County that the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWCC) has identified as needing additional manatee protection measures, but Big Bayou is not one of them. The Proposed Project The proposed authorizations would allow PMC to expand an existing multi-family, residential docking facility on the north end of Coquina Key, along an existing seawall and adjacent to the Coquina Key North condominiums that PMC converted from a former apartment complex. The proposed project would add 60 boats slips to the existing 30 boat slips at the project site. The new slips could accommodate boats up to 25 feet in length. PMC would restrict use of the boat slips to Coquina Key North condominium owners. In converting the former apartment complex to condominiums, PMC retained ownership of a strip of land immediately upland of the submerged lands on which the proposed project would be constructed. The ground for Petitioners’ Motion for Summary Order is that the ownership retained by PMS, because it does not include ownership of the upland residences, does not entitle PMS to obtain a submerged land lease for the proposed project. That legal argument is addressed in the Conclusions of Law. Direct Impacts An earlier plan for the proposed project was to place 30 new boat slips on the north side of the existing docks and 30 new slips on the south side. However, to avoid direct impacts to seagrasses, the plan was modified to avoid an area of seagrasses on the south side. The proposed project now would add 38 boat slips on the north side and 22 slips on the south side. The over-water dock structures would be placed waterward of the seagrasses that currently grow along the seawall. The seagrasses adjacent to the proposed project are not likely to be harmed by wave action or turbulence from boating activity around and in the slips because of the distance between the slips and the seagrasses. The proposed authorizations include specific conditions that prohibit numerous activities that could cause adverse water quality impacts at the proposed project site, such as the discharge of trash, human or animal waste, or fuel; fish cleaning stations; boat repair facilities; fueling facilities; hull cleaning, painting or other external boat maintenance; and boat maintenance or repair activities requiring removal of a boat from the water, or removal of major portions of the boat for purposes of routine repair or maintenance on site, except where removal is necessitated by emergency conditions. No liveaboards would be allowed at the proposed project. PMC intends to incorporate these conditions into its agreements with the condominium owners who use the boat slips. Because Big Bayou is an Outstanding Florida Water, PMC is required to provide reasonable assurances that the project will not result in the lowering of existing ambient water quality. Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-4.242(2)(c) defines “existing ambient water quality” as the better water quality of either what existed on the date that the water body was designated an Outstanding Florida Water or what existed in the year prior to the permit application. Because the current water quality is better than it was in 1972 when the Pinellas County Aquatic Preserve was created, the current water quality is the standard to apply in this case. Although some incidental non-compliance with the conditions of the proposed authorizations could occur, such incidental non-compliance would not likely result in significant2 degradation of the existing ambient water quality in Big Bayou. Secondary Impacts – In General Petitioners’ primary concerns with the proposed project are with the secondary impacts that would be caused by increased boating activity in Big Bayou. Petitioners contend that the additional boats using the 60 new boat slips would adversely affect water quality, seagrasses, manatees, and other natural resources. Petitioners also assert that the additional boating activity would cause erosion of the north shoreline of Big Bayou and impair Petitioners’ recreational uses of the bayou. It is reasonable to assume that there would be more boat trips on Big Bayou if the proposed project were built than if it were not built. However, it is impossible to say how many more boat trips would be generated by the proposed project. It cannot be assumed that because there would be 60 more boat slips, there would be 60 more boats on Big Bayou each day, each week, or even each month. Moreover, the number of boats on Big Bayou on any given day fluctuates because it depends not only on the whims of the boat owners who have boat slips in Big Bayou, but also on the whims of the boat owners who anchor their boats in the open waters of Big Bayou, launch their boats from the public boat ramps on Big Bayou, or enter Big Bayou from Tampa Bay or more distant waters. Secondary Impacts - Erosion Petitioners did not present competent evidence to support their claim that the proposed project would cause erosion of the north shoreline of Big Bayou. Secondary Impacts – Water Quality The Department has adopted by reference the Southwest Florida Water Management District’s Basis for Review for Environmental Resource Permits (Basis of Review) to apply to applications for environmental resource permits for projects over which the Department retains permitting authority. For docking facilities, Section 3.2.4.3 of the Basis of Review requires the applicant to provide hydrographic information to demonstrate that the “flushing time” (the time required to reduce the concentration of a pollutant) is sufficiently short to prevent the accumulation of any pollutants to the point of violating water quality standards. PMC’s hydrographic analyses indicate that Big Bayou is well-flushed. The water of the bayou moves a half mile to a mile during a normal tide. The fact that the current water quality in Big Bayou is good indicates that contamination associated with the current level of boating activity in the bayou is not accumulating. Incidental discharges of contaminants from boats using the proposed project would likely be rapidly dispersed and diluted. Petitioners argued that PMC’s hydrographic analyses did not address every part of Big Bayou. The rule requires hydrographic characterization of “the project site and surrounding waters.” As the challengers, Petitioners needed to rebut PMC’s prima facie case regarding the hydrographic characteristics in the bayou with competent evidence showing PMC’s findings were inaccurate, or show that the scope of PMC’s hydrographic analyses did not conform with any reasonable interpretation of the applicable rule. Petitioners presented no such evidence or showing. Some additional, incidental contamination can be expected to occur as a result of the operation of the boats that would use the proposed project. However, PMC provided reasonable assurance that the addition of these contaminants would not significantly degrade the existing ambient water quality of Big Bayou nor cause any other applicable water quality standard to be violated. Secondary Impacts - Seagrasses The maximum water depth at which most seagrasses can grow is between five and six feet because of their need for light. When boaters attempt to cross shallow areas where seagrasses are located, they sometimes damage the grasses with the boat propellers, leaving areas of torn grass and “prop scars,” furrows in the bottom. Even when boat propellers do not touch the bottom, but come close, they can disturb the loose sediments and cause turbidity. It can be especially harmful when boats run aground, because the boater will sometimes grind away at the seagrasses in an attempt to move the boat to deeper water, causing holes 10 or 12 feet in diameter. Different seagrasses recover from such damage at different rates. In some cases, it can take years for a prop scar to become re-vegetated. A 1995 study of prop scars by the Florida Marine Research Institute found that the Tampa Bay area is one of four areas of Florida with the greatest acreage of moderate and severe scarring. There are prop scars visible in the bottom of Big Bayou and Petitioners testified about seeing boats run aground in Big Bayou. The main navigation channel on the north side of Big Bayou ranges in depth from slightly less than 8 feet to over 17 feet. There are channel markers to help boaters find and stay in this channel, but some of the original markers are missing. In addition to the main navigation channel, there is an area along the north side of Coquina Key that is used by the residents living along that shoreline to get to and from Tampa Bay. This second route, which is not marked, is much shallower than the main channel and its use by boaters at low tide is a threat to seagrasses in the area.3 If more boaters in Big Bayou stayed in the main navigational channel, there would be a decreased threat to the seagrasses. However, the evidence shows that boaters often travel out of the main channel, either by inadvertence or to take a shortcut, and cross shallow areas where the seagrasses are located. It was the opinion of David Crewz, a plant ecologist who specializes in seagrasses, that increased boating activity in Big Bayou could decrease the habitat quality of the bayou. He said that one can expect more prop scarring and more turbidity caused by stirring up the bottom sediments. He was most concerned about boats larger than 16 feet in length that do not stay in the marked navigation channel. The 1995 Florida Marine Research Institute study of prop scarring, which Mr. Crewz co-authored, recommended a four- point approach to reduce prop scarring: (1) boater education, (2) channel marking, (3) enforcement, and (4) speed zones. The conditions contained in the proposed authorizations would implement two of the four points recommended by the study. PMC would install informational signs about seagrasses at the proposed project and at Grandview Park so that boaters using the proposed project and boaters using the boat ramp at the park would be less likely to operate their boats in a manner harmful to seagrasses. PMC would replace all missing markers along the main navigation channel. The current distance between some of the channel markers may be causing some boaters to stray from the channel. PMC would mark the location of seagrasses adjacent to the navigation channel. The operation phase of the environmental resource permit would not become effective until the channel markers and seagrass markers have been installed. The proposed educational displays, channel markers, and seagrass markers would probably reduce boat traffic across seagrass areas, but they would not eliminate it. However, because the displays and markers would be viewed by boaters using Big Bayou other than just the 60 boaters who would use the slips at the proposed project, the “net” effect of the proposed project would likely be no significant increase in prop scars or related adverse impacts to seagrasses in Big Bayou due to the proposed project. Therefore, PMC provided reasonable assurance that the proposed project would not result in significant adverse impacts to seagrasses. To go further, however, and contend as PMC does that, even with the addition of 60 boats, the effect of the proposed project would be to significantly reduce the current incidents of prop scarring, boat grounding, and other adverse impacts to seagrasses, is mere speculation without a statistical analysis of boater behavior or other evidence that was not presented in this case. PMC would also limit the use of its boat slips to vessels with a draft that would provide at least a twelve-inch clearance between the vessel’s draft in a motor-down position and the top of submerged resource at mean low tide. This condition appears to been intended to track similar wording used in Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-20.004(5)(b)8., but because the condition leaves unstated the depth of the submerged resources and the water level of Big Bayou at mean low tide, a prospective renter of a boat slip would not know whether his or her boat would comply with the condition. The rule cannot be more specific because it applies to all waterbodies, but the specific condition in the proposed authorizations can and should be more specific to provide for adequate notice and enforcement. PMC provided reasonable assurance that the proposed project would not cause significant adverse impacts to seagrasses. Secondary Impacts – Manatees In Florida, between 25 and 30 percent of the annual manatee deaths are caused by collisions with boats. From 2002 to 2006, in Pinellas County waters, 41 percent of the manatee deaths of a known cause were watercraft-related. That percentage exceeds the state average and corresponds to an average of 3.2 deaths per year caused by boats. However the study area from which these statistics were compiled does not include Big Bayou. Dr. John Reynolds, a marine mammal expert, believes that boat speed is the primary factor in manatee deaths from boat collisions. At higher speeds, boaters and manatees have less time to avoid a collision and the severity of the injury to a manatee is generally greater when the manatee is struck by a boat moving at higher speeds. There are no boat speed zones currently established in Big Bayou. Thirty-three years of data collected by the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWCC) indicate that there are no known boat-related manatee deaths within two and a half miles of the project site. There have been two dead manatees discovered in Big Bayou, but their deaths were not attributed to boat collisions. Increasing the number of boats in an area used by manatees increases the potential for boat/manatee collisions. To minimize the potential for boat/manatee collisions, PMC would implement the standard manatee protection measures that apply during the construction of the proposed docks. PMC would also implement and maintain a manatee education program approved by the FWCC, including informational signs regarding manatees at the proposed project. Although reducing speeds by establishing, posting, and enforcing idle speed or slow speed zones in the bayou would probably be the most effective measure for the protection of manatees, PMC cannot be required by the proposed authorizations to control boat speeds because boat speed zones must be established by Pinellas County and the Florida Marine Patrol. The proposed authorizations incorporate the conditions recommended by the FWCC for the protection of manatees. Tom Logan, the former FWCC endangered species coordinator and now a consultant who focuses on endangered species and their habitat, believes that the special conditions included in the proposed authorizations provide adequate protection for manatees. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service also concluded that the proposed project is not likely to adversely affect manatees. PMC provided reasonable assurance that the proposed project would not cause significant adverse impacts to manatees. Secondary Impacts – Recreation Petitioners claim that their recreational uses of Big Bayou for fishing, swimming, canoeing, kayaking, and windsurfing would be diminished by the proposed project. However, Big Bayou is large enough to accommodate the additional boat trips associated with the proposed project and Petitioners’ recreational uses. A public water body like Big Bayou must be shared by persons living along or near its shores with all other citizens of Florida. Although some Petitioners would prefer that the bayou had the feel of a more remote or wild place, the Pinellas County Aquatic Preserve is recognized to have a “highly developed, urban nature.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.019. It already has the attributes of an urban preserve. PMC provided reasonable assurance that the proposed project would not prevent or significantly impair the existing recreational uses of Big Bayou. Cumulative Impacts Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-20.006 and Section 3.2.8 of the Basis of Review require that cumulative impacts be evaluated in determining whether to issue, respectively, a submerged lands lease or an environmental resource permit. PMC and the Department state in their Proposed Recommended Orders that the consideration of cumulative impacts is limited to projects that are existing or under construction, but Florida Administrative Code Rule 18.006(1) also requires, for a sovereignty submerged lands lease, consideration of “the number and extent of similar human actions within the preserve which have previously affected or are likely to affect the preserve.” Because the principal source of potential adverse impacts associated with the proposed project is boating activity, the existing docking facility at Coquina Key North, the other docks in Big Bayou, and the boat ramp at Grandview Park are existing structures generating boating activity that must be taken into account in the cumulative impacts analysis. Although the proposed project, with the conditions on its construction and operation, would, alone, have no significant adverse impact on water quality, seagrasses, manatees, or recreational uses in Big Bayou, the cumulative impacts to Big Bayou from all similar activities in the preserve have created significant (material) adverse impacts to Big Bayou in the form of trash, water contamination, damage to seagrasses, and prop scars. Public Interest Criteria Section 258.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes, requires that a lease of sovereignty submerged lands within an aquatic preserve by the Trustees must be “in the public interest.” Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.003(46) defines “public interest” in this context as “demonstrable environmental, social, and economic benefits which would accrue to the public at large as a result of a proposed action, and which would clearly exceed all demonstrable environmental, social, and economic costs of the proposed action.” Florida Administrative Code 18-20.004(2) sets forth the public interest criteria to be considered and balanced by the Trustees in determining whether to issue a submerged land lease or other authorization to use sovereignty submerged lands. The Rule identifies public boat ramps and “marking navigation channels to avoid disruption of shallow water habitats” as examples of public benefits. These benefits, however, must “clearly exceed” the “costs,” such as degraded water quality, degraded natural habitat and function, harm to endangered or threatened species and habitat, and adverse cumulative impacts. For issuance of the environmental resource permit, a determination is required that the proposed project is “clearly in the public interest,” because Big Bayou is part of an Outstanding Florida Water. Fla. Admin Code R. 62-4.242(2). This determination requires the consideration and balancing of a number of criteria set forth in Section 3.2.3 of the Basis of Review: Whether the activity will adversely affect the public health, safety, or welfare or the property of others; Whether the activity will adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats; Whether the activity will adversely affect navigation or the flow of water or cause harmful erosion or shoaling; Whether the activity will adversely affect the fishing or recreational values or marine productivity in the vicinity of the activity; Whether the activity will be of a temporary or permanent nature; Whether the activity will adversely affect or will enhance significant historical and archaeological resources under the provisions of s. 267.061; and The current condition and relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by the proposed activity.4 As explained in the Conclusions of Law, the “clearly in the public interest” test does not require the applicant to demonstrate that the intended activity would have a net public benefit. The counter-intuitive result is that, to meet the “in the public interest” test for the sovereignty submerged land lease, PMC must demonstrate a net public benefit, but to meet the “clearly in the public interest test” for the environmental resource permit, PMC does not have to show a net public benefit. The measures that PMC has agreed to undertake to meet the public interest criteria for the proposed authorizations are as follows: Contribute $300,000 to the construction of a second boat ramp at the current Sutherland Bayou Boat Ramp project in Palm Harbor; Install and maintain navigational aides marking the main channel in the bayou; Install markers indicating the location of seagrass beds; Install and maintain an informational display at the public boat ramp in Grandview Park, relating to the protection of seagrasses and natural resources within the bayou; and Install and maintain an aerial map at the Grandview Park boat ramp depicting the location of the navigation channel and the seagrass beds in the bayou. The $300,000 contribution for the boat ramp was based on a similar contribution ($5,000 per slip) that was made previously by the developer of another docking facility in Pinellas County. The Department had originally suggested that PMC contribute to a spoil island restoration project to satisfy the public interest criterion. However, due to the Trustees’ and/or Department’s concern about the reduction in the number of boat slips available to the general public,5 the Department proposed that PMC contribute $300,000 to Pinellas County’s Sutherland Bayou Boat Ramp project in Palm Harbor. The definition of “mitigation” in Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-20.003(35) states that, “Cash payments shall not be considered mitigation unless payments are specified for use in a previously identified, Department endorsed, environmental or restoration project.” No evidence was presented to show that the Sutherland Bayou Boat Ramp project is an “environmental or restoration project,” and it does not appear to qualify as such. Implicit in the boat ramp contribution proposal is the view that the public interest in providing more recreational boaters with access to Pinellas County waters outweighs the negative impacts to marine resources that are associated with increased boating activity. No evidence was presented, however, to explain or support this view. The strange result here is that PMC would be mitigating for the adverse impacts associated with increasing the boating activity in Big Bayou by helping to increased boating activity in other county waters where seagrass losses have been greater, prop scarring is a bigger problem, and more manatees are being killed by boat collisions.6 Dr. Reynolds stated that the Sutherland Bayou Boat Ramp project in Palm Harbor could be a benefit to Big Bayou if the boat ramp project took boat traffic away from the bayou, but he did not know whether it would. A reasonable inference can be made that, being so far away, the Sutherland Bayou Boat Ramp project is unlikely to add to or subtract from boat traffic in Big Bayou. As found above, the adverse environmental impacts of the proposed project, taking into account the proposed conditions, would be insignificant. However, because the record evidence shows that the Sutherland Bayou Boat Ramp project would put boats into county waters (and aquatic preserve waters) where there has been greater seagrass losses, more prop scarring, and more manatees killed by boat collisions than in Big Bayou, PMC’s $300,000 contribution to the boat ramp project actually increases the secondary impacts and cumulative impacts of PMC’s proposed project and causes it to fail to meet the public interest criteria. Without the $300,000 contribution to the Sutherland Boat Ramp project, PMC would meet the “clearly in the public interest” test for the environmental resource permit because the other mitigation offered by PMC would offset the secondary and cumulative impacts of the proposed project. However, a different result would occur in the case of the sovereignty submerged land lease. Eliminating the $300,000 contribution to the Sutherland Boat Ramp project would result in a situation where the public benefits of the proposed project do not “clearly exceed” the costs of the project and, therefore, PMC would not meet the “in the public interest” test. Although the record in this case is insufficient to demonstrate that PMC’s contribution to the boat ramp project would cause the benefits of the project to clearly exceed its costs, the record evidence is sufficient to support issuance of the lease modification if PMC were able to get the appropriate government authorities to establish a boat speed zone in Big Bayou, or if PMC contributed to the enforcement of boat speed zones in the aquatic preserve. As restated in the Conclusions of Law, whether the proposed mitigation is sufficient to offset the adverse impacts of the proposed project is a determination that rests exclusively with the Trustees and the Department, based on the record evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order denying Environmental Resource Permit No. 52-0258984-001 and the modification of Sovereignty Submerged Land Lease No. 520224543. In the event the Trustees determine to issue the submerged land lease, it is recommended that the lease be modified to add a condition that the boat slips shall only be subleased or sold to residents of Coquina Key North condominiums. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 2008.
The Issue This case concerns the issue of whether the Respondents, B. W. and Mildred Peake, should he granted a permit to construct an addition to an existing dock located on the north shore of Old River in Pensacola, Florida. The Petitioner, Mrs. A. K. Doyle, testified on her own behalf and also called as a witness, Mildred N. Peake, one of the applicants. The Petitioner offered no exhibits into evidence. Mr. B. W. Peake testified on behalf of himself and his wife Mildred N. Peake. The Peakes offered and had admitted into evidence Exhibits 1-7. The Department of Environmental Regulation called as witnesses Mark Snowden and Richard Fancher. The Department offered and had admitted Exhibits 1-6. Subsequent to the final hearing, Counsel for the Petitioner and the two Respondents submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for consideration by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that those proposed findings and conclusions are inconsistent with this order, they were rejected as not being supported by the evidence or as unnecessary to the resolution of this cause.
Findings Of Fact The Respondents, B. W. and Mildred N. Peake, have filed an application for a permit to construct an addition to an existing private pier located on the north shore of Old River, adjacent to Innerarity Point. It will be centered on a lot located at 878 Innerarity Road, Pensacola, Florida. B. W. and Mildred N. Peake are the owners of the property where the existing dock is located. On December 23, 1982, the Department of Environmental Regulation by letter notified the applicants that the Department intended to grant the permit application. The Petitioner, Mrs. A. K. Doyle, filed an objection to the issuance of that permit. Mrs. Doyle's property is adjacent to the eastern boundary of the Peake property. The application, as modified, seeks to extend the existing pier by sixteen (16) feet. The existing pier is five feet wide and approximately 185 feet long. The addition is to be constructed of the same materials used in the existing pier and will rest on treated pine pilings. The purpose of the pier is to allow temporary berthing for two additional sailboats. There will be no fuel pumps or toilets on the pier. The pier will be used for private purposes only and will involve no commercial operation. Upon completion of the addition, the Peake's pier would be approximately 110 feet from the Intercoastal Waterway Channel and will not create a hazard to navigation. The Peakes have obtained approval from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to construct the pier extension. They have not obtained consent from the Department of Natural Resources to use the state owned lands beneath the proposed addition. The addition to the pier will total approximately 80 square feet and will require 4 pilings. There is currently an extensive grass bed consisting of Cuban Shoalweed approximately 90 feet from the shoreline. Jetting of pilings for the addition will occur approximately 103 feet from the closest point of this grass bed. The proposed addition will have no significant impact on the existing grass beds. The grassbeds in this area stop growing at the edge of the photic zone or that point at which sunlight can no longer penetrate the water. At this site, this occurs at a depth of 1.5 meters or approximately 4.8 feet. The depth of the water at the site of the proposed addition is from 8 to 10 feet. There are no grasses growing in the immediate area of the project site. The grass beds in the area contain a wide diversity of benthic microinvertebrates. The number of species and density of benthic microinvertebrates were less at the addition site. The proposed addition will not interfere with marine life or destroy marine productivity. The substrate at the immediate project site consists of coarse sand with some fines associated with the sand. During the piling installation, these fines will become suspended in the water, thus creating turbidity. The use of a turbidity screen or control device during construction would limit turbidity to the project site with very temporary, limited violation of water quality. The project will have no deleterious effect on water quality. All boats using the pier will have Coast Guard approved marina heads. These marine heads will not discharge into the waters in the area. Garbage from the boats will be disposed of at the Peake home adjacent to the pier. The pier is presently being used to permanently moor one sailboat.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Environmental Regulation issue a permit for the applicants, B. W. and Mildred N. Peake, to construct an addition to their existing dock in accordance with the application as modified. The permit should contain all the specific conditions included in the Department's letter of intent dated December 23, 1982. In addition, the necessary approval from the Department of Natural Resources should first be obtained. DONE AND ORDERED this day of April 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARVIN E. CHAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Victoria Tschinkel Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 E. Gary Early, Esquire Division of Administrative Hearings Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ralph A. Peterson, Esquire Post Office Box 12950 Pensacola, Florida 32576 James M. Wilson, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1832 Pensacola, Florida 32598
The Issue Whether respondent discriminated against petitioner on account of his race in terminating his employment as a glass bottom boat captain at Silver Springs? Whether Emma Hawkins should be allowed to intervene? If so, whether respondent discriminated against intervenor on account of her race in failing to promote and ultimately in discharging her?
Findings Of Fact On January 1, 1989, FLAC acquired Silver Springs and Wild Waters, an adjacent tourist attraction dating to 1977 or 1978. In or near Ocala, Florida, both properties had belonged to Florida Leisure Acquisitions, Inc., who had acquired them from American Broadcasting Company some five years earlier, in a "leveraged buyout." FLAC also acquired Weeki Wachee in 1989. T.449. Thomas Cavanaugh, who started as a vice-president and general manager in 1973, survived both changes in ownership, and had effective control over a unified personnel system until his departure in 1990. As late as 1973, everybody who worked at Silver Springs as a glass bottom boat captain was black. When FLAC acquired Silver Springs, five of twelve glass bottom boat captains were black. At the time of petitioner's discharge on June 21, 1989, seven of the boat captains were black. The number had fallen to three by November of 1990. Hiring Patterns Most of the jobs at Silver Springs require little or no skill, and this has been true at all pertinent times. Boat captains needed only to be able to deliver a spiel or learn a script and handle a boat. Maintenance and food service positions were predominantly unskilled. In all these areas, there were also some positions for managers or supervisors. Between December 7, 1987, and May 6, 1991, inclusive, respondent or its predecessor hired 104 boat captains or guides, and offered jobs as boat captains or guides to 20 others who did not accept. None of those who refused offers and only one who accepted was black. Nine of 520 persons who applied for these positions during this time period were black. In late 1989 and early 1990, blacks applying for other positions at Silver Springs comprised a significantly higher proportion of the applicants for these other positions. In the early part of 1990, blacks accounted for 6.95 percent of applicants for all jobs at Silver Springs, up from the latter part of the year before. Treating the population between 15 and 64 as a proxy for the civilian labor force, the civilian labor force in the area was, according to 1980 census data, 14.7 percent black, a percentage that had fallen by 1990 to 12.7 percent. Blacks comprised 11.1 percent of the Marion County population 15 and older in 1990, and 16.8 percent of those who found work through the Florida State Employment Service in the period from July of 1990 through June of 1991. A labor economist called by petitioner testified that the discrepancy between the percentage of blacks in the flow of applicants for work as boat captains or guides and the percentage of blacks in the work force in Marion County permitted an inference "that there is . . . probably some barrier to entry for individuals to apply," Fresen Deposition, p. 21, for those positions. The same witness was also willing to speculate, id. at 54, that the discrepancy between the percentage of blacks in the flow of applicants for boat captain or guide positions and the percentage of blacks in the flow of applicants for other positions at Silver Springs "may be . . . [attributable to t]he channelling of applicants for navigational positions into other positions." Id. at 55. Respondent attributed the conceded decline in black applicants for work at Silver Springs to better opportunities increasingly available elsewhere in Marion County, including positions at a Martin-Marietta plant with 1800 employees, at Certified Grocers with 800 employees, at Energy One and at Federal Motors, each with 1100 employees in the community, and at a K-Mart Distribution Center with two or three hundred employees. T.440-1. Glass Bottom Boats For several years, perhaps since 1957, U.S. Coast Guard regulations have required that passengers on glass bottom boats at Silver Springs be told about life jackets on board, and boat captains have been responsible for doing this, before setting out. Otherwise, until a few years ago, each glass bottom boat captain had broad discretion about what he did or did not say to passengers on board. On July 1, 1957, when petitioner David Faison, who is black, began work for one of respondent's predecessors in interest as a glass bottom boat captain (or driver), each captain was required to compose a talk to deliver to glass bottom boat passengers. As a new recruit, Mr. Faison read the book "Eternal Springs" and rode with other captains, before leading his own boat tours, pointing out flora and fauna and sharing information about the springs. An Easter Outing Jim Schorr, then FLAC's new chief executive officer, took his family for their first ride on a glass bottom boat at Silver Springs on Easter Day 1989. They "went down on the glass bottom boat dock, and they took the first boat that was available and that happened to be Riley Williams' boat." T.526. Afterwards Thomas Cavanaugh summoned Riley Williams, a black boat captain with more than 30 years' experience, and Michael Jacobs, respondent's director of operations, to his office. "Riley, what happened? What happened with your trip, Riley?" he asked. "We just talked to Jim Schorr. He said it was a terrible trip." T.526. Surprised and visibly shaken, Mr. Williams reported that "Mr. Schorr even told me my trip was good," (T.527) but allowed that he had been nervous. Mr. Cavanaugh told him to take the afternoon off and said, "Riley, we're going to go ahead - we're going to help all the drivers. We're going to hire a drama coach, and it will help everybody out." Id. Standardization David London, the new drama coach, prepared the first version of a script the boat captains were asked to commit to memory, or at least to follow closely as a guide when giving tours. As requested, petitioner, along with other boat captains, made suggestions for improving the script. T.251, 521. At a meeting on or after May 2, 1989, a revised script was distributed to assembled boat captains, and Mr. Schorr announced "that he wanted them to learn the script, and if they chose not to learn the script, that they could find work elsewhere." T.484. No deadline was given. T.44, 429. Whether petitioner Faison was in attendance is unclear. T.294. Riley Williams now works on the grounds at Silver Springs, landscaping and gardening. His pay is no less than if he had remained a boat captain. He asked for a transfer because he felt he "really wasn't coming up to par of what they wanted . . . [from boat captains] and the time was closing in " T. 581. Dockmaster A black man, Willie Barr began as a glass bottom boat captain at Silver Springs in 1974. Except for a hiatus that began in 1980 and ended in 1981, he continued in respondent's employ (or that of a predecessor in interest) until November 18, 1989, when he retired as dockmaster, a salaried position he first assumed in 1982. As dockmaster, Mr. Barr reported directly to Mike Jacobs, the white man who worked as respondent's director of operations. Mr. Barr had overall responsibility for both jungle cruise and glass bottom boats; and particular responsibility for scheduling glass bottom boat captains' work and for maintenance of the glass bottom boats. A separate maintenance department actually did the work. He also piloted, loaded, unloaded and tied up glass bottom boats. Mr. Barr retired at age 52 at least partly because of high blood pressure, a malady of which both he and Mr. Jacobs had become aware in early 1989. T.299, 481. During the months before he stepped down, Mr. Barr came to Mr. Jacobs on several occasions, and told him "about the stress he was under at the boat dock, the problems he was having with the drivers, a new company taking over and all the changes that were taking place." T.481. In May of 1989, Mr. Jacobs asked Mr. Utz, a decorated Navy veteran who had worked at Silver Springs longer than Mr. Barr, "to give Willie a hand." T.371, 481-2. At the time of this request, Mr. Utz, who is white, was "at the jungle cruise most of the time running the jungle cruise operation," (T.298) as lead or "manager of the jungle cruise." T.368. Mr. Barr viewed Mr. Utz, before May of 1989, as his assistant, as did every glass bottom boat captain who testified on this point. But management witnesses insisted that Mr. Utz's position "at the jungle cruise" was equal in rank to that of glass bottom boat dockmaster, the position Mr. Barr held. T.472. Although Mr. Utz worked for an hourly wage before (and, initially, after) the change in May of 1989, Mr. Utz's remuneration exceeded Mr. Barr's salary significantly. In addition to supervising jungle cruises, Mr. Utz trained boat captain recruits. Respondent gave Mr. Utz no pay raise in May of 1989, when his broader responsibilities seemed to most to entail greater authority. The company's chief executive officer acknowledged that a change in the pecking order occurred. T.455. Mr. Barr began reporting to Mr. Utz in May of 1989. T.275. On May 7, 1989, Mike Sentman took over as lead for jungle cruise operations. Response to Petitioner's First Set of Interrogatories, No. 16. Glass bottom boat drivers considered Mr. Barr their supervisor before, but not after, the time Mr. Utz undertook his new role in glass bottom boat operations. T.42, 53- 4, 57. Ultimately Mr. Utz assumed a new title, supervisor of boat operations (T.295, 372), and filled a newly created position, which respondent never advertised, even to other employees. He continued to train all new boat captains before they took a test the U.S. Coast Guard required, drawing on his long experience with boat handling. Only in January of 1990, after Mr. Barr had retired, however, did Mr. Utz acquire his present title and become a salaried employee. T.372. We Are Not "Edutained" On Tuesday, June 20, 1989, the day David Faison returned from a two- week vacation, David London rode on his boat and listened to what petitioner said to the tourists. Unfavorably impressed, he told Donald Utz afterwards, "Wow, that was terrible. That was the wors[t] yet." T.378. That afternoon Donald Utz and Michael Jacobs sent Robert Sinkler, Jr., at the time employed in respondent's "Edutainment" program, on a boat ride with petitioner, with instructions to videotape petitioner's performance. Virtually without interruption, petitioner (who mistook Mr. Sinkler for a tourist) was videotaped for the duration of the trip. Received in evidence as Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, the videotape records petitioner's remarks, delivered in a sometimes unintelligible singsong. They bear scant resemblance to the prescribed script, and include no reference to life jackets. On other occasions, however, petitioner did advise passengers of the life preservers on board. T. 278. David Faison was asked the next day to join Messrs. Jacobs and Utz, in viewing at least a portion of the videotape. In the discussion that followed, petitioner, who was said to be good-natured ordinarily, expressed resentment at having to use the script, which Mr. Jacobs took as a refusal to do so. Petitioner is "a person that would tell you what he thought." T.451. He terminated petitioner's employment on the spot, although Mr. Faison was generally seen by his superiors in the organization as not the type of person to be insubordinate. T.450-451. The day Mr. Faison was discharged Willie Barr, the dockmaster, asked to see the videotape, after he learned from other boat captains that petitioner had been sent home. Mr. Barr watched part of it in the company of Don Utz, who told Mr. Barr that petitioner had been discharged for failure to use the assigned script. T.295. Mr. Utz "didn't really indicate that" (T.295) respondent had refused to use the script. Before petitioner's discharge, Mr. Utz had told Virginia Phillips that he did not know how the black boat captains were going to do because they were difficult to understand. T.51. He also told her he did not want her going to "that area of the city," (T.47) which she took to mean the black residential area. She had recently travelled there when she drove a black boat captain, Alphonso Sears, home. Insubordination was (and remains) a recognized ground for dismissal. T.293, 303. But a white glass bottom boat captain was not dismissed despite refusing to be "cross-trained" as a boat captain for two of the three other rides offered by FLAC, even though he had originally been told that "cross training" for all three was mandatory. T.108. The white employee did train as a boat captain for one of the three other rides. He was told, three weeks before the hearing, that training for the other two was not required. T.109. Another boat driver, Virginia Ferguson, testified that she "was told recently all boat drivers needed to be cross-trained" (T.175) to act as guides on all four rides. T. 176. A second white boat driver also refused cross- training with impunity. T.420. But nobody else was shown to have insisted on giving the glass bottom boat tour his own way, without using the prescribed script. Respondent's newly installed chief executive officer had personally decided and publicly announced that all glass bottom drivers were to use the script. Recruitment Efforts Four times petitioner tried unsuccessfully to get in to see Mr. Cavanaugh in an effort to regain the job he had held for more than three decades. At hearing, Mr. Cavanaugh characterized his failure to talk to petitioner about his discharge as an "error" (T.452) that he attributed to the emotional drain of having himself to terminate the employment of so many people he had worked with for a long time. David Faison was one of approximately twenty employees FLAC discharged in 1989, most of whom were managers. "The new management was making a sweep." T.449. Like his brother David, Roosevelt Faison has worked as a boat captain at Silver Springs for many years. He began on May 4, 1956, and worked full-time until 1989, when he chose to cut back to two days a week. An average or above average employee (T.276), his evaluations have been consistently "good" or "excellent." In May of 1989, he told Anne Dansby, a white woman who worked for respondent that "the few blacks . . . [still employed] felt like they w[ere] not really wanted in the park." T.125. She apparently relayed the substance of this conversation to Tom Cavanaugh, who later brought up the subject with Mr. Roosevelt Faison, agreeing that the number of black employees had dropped. Mr. Cavanaugh told Mr. Roosevelt Faison that he "was dead on the money, but it wasn't done intentionally." T.126.36. On the third or fourth day after his arrival at Silver Springs, Thomas Cavanaugh ordered an end to racially segregated bathrooms at Silver Springs. He personally included a sledge hammer in an attack on a urinal reserved, until its destruction, for the use of black men. Within months of his arrival, he "retired" the white supervisor of glass bottom boats and replaced him with a long-time black employee. He sought to recruit black employees through the school system and enlisting the assistance of black community leaders. These efforts antedated his discussion of the situation with Roosevelt Faison, and intensified after their discussion. Lay-Off On a Monday in July of 1989, when Mr. Roosevelt Faison reported to work, he found a note with his paycheck, which said, "Roosevelt, you are off until notified to come back to work." T.127. When he spoke to Ms. Dansby about the note, she called Mike Jacobs, but he was reportedly too busy to talk to Mr. Roosevelt. Ms. Dansby then called Mr. Utz, who did speak to Mr. Roosevelt Faison, first telling him, "It's just slow business, and we're just cutting back," (T.129) then referring him to Willie Barr, who was not at work that day. The next day, when Roosevelt Faison spoke to Mr. Barr by telephone, Mr. Barr rescinded the lay-off. Although he had not recommended the lay-off, (T.277) Mr. Barr had written the note to Mr. Faison ("on Roosevelt's time card" T.305) at Mr. Utz's behest. T.307. Mr. Roosevelt Faison did not work that week, but he was paid for a half day (presumably because he had come in Monday.) He resumed working his wonted Mondays and Tuesdays the following week. McCants Charlie McCants, who is black, went to work for respondent or a predecessor in interest in 1959 in the deer park, feeding and otherwise taking care of the animals there. He also mended fences and did other maintenance, until his transfer in 1985 to the wildlife section of the attraction. There he did much the same thing, although for different animals, among them giraffes, to whom he had to give shots. He was paid the same thing in the wildlife section as he was making in the deer park before the transfer, although he never supervised anybody in the wildlife section, as he once did for a while in the deer park, without actually holding a supervisor's position. He and Bill White, who is white, were relocated at the same time. Management felt they had both become too often hard to find in the deer park. Emma Hawkins Emma Hawkins began work at Silver Springs in the food and beverage department in May of 1974. In September of 1976, she resigned to go to junior college, but she returned to her job in November of 1977, and was promoted the following month to lead. She was promoted a second time -- to unit coordinator -- in March of 1979, and a third time -- to supervisor -- in August of the same year. She viewed her transfer in February of 1990 to the food and beverage department at Wild Waters as a fourth promotion. T.185, 198. She did not, however, receive every promotion for which she applied. She was passed over in favor of another black person for a job "managing the warehouse," (T.188, 489) and lost out, again to another black applicant, when she applied for an administrative position in the front office. T.188, 489. In January of 1989, she received the last in a series of merit pay raises. More than once, she applied unsuccessfully to become assistant manager of the food and beverage department. The last time she applied to be assistant manager of the food and beverage was the spring of 1989. T.188. The position remained open until Shari Wynkoop, a white woman who had not previously worked at Silver Springs, began as assistant manager of the food and beverage department on June 28, 1990. T.479. At the time of her transfer to Wild Waters, Ms. Hawkins had charge of a restaurant at Silver Springs, The Outback, where she supervised some 20 employees, more in the summertime. T.299-301. At Wild Waters, she had responsibility for five food facilities and up to 50 employees. Id. She had "charge of hiring, firing, inventory purchasing, schedules, supervising, cooking, [and] cash control." T.186. At least after the transfer, many of the assistant manager's duties devolved on Ms. Hawkins, until Ms. Wynkoop took over. A few months before the transfer, Robert Santillana, the food and beverage director, had given Ms. Hawkins a written reprimand because Tina Balboni, whom she supervised, had been permitted to work with "NO HAT, SCARF OR NAME TAG." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 8. On a "CAST MEMBER COUNSELING FORM," Mr. Santillana warned that another such dereliction would result in further counseling. Id. Money Bags The Wild Waters operations manager's morning routine included a trip from Silver Springs to Wild Waters with locked bags full of cash for the various Wild Waters cash registers. He put the money bags needed for the operations Ms. Hawkins supervised in a milk crate in his office. She usually took the crate herself from there to her office in the back of the Surf's Up restaurant, before distributing the money to cashiers. Ms. Hawkins had a door lock installed -- there was none when she started at Wild Waters -- but she did not always lock her office door. An electronic timing device for one of the water slides at Wild Waters was located in her office, and the operations manager needed access to reset the timer. She spent a certain amount of time out of her office but in close proximity. Ms. Hawkins was told on her return (after two days off) to work on or about August 10, 1990, that $98.16 had not been accounted for on or about the evening of August 8, 1990, and that a cashier had quit the day after the loss was discovered. She relayed this information to Mr. Santillana, who did not seem particularly concerned at the time. But Mr. Santillana gave her a written reprimand when, sometime within a few days of August 8, 1990, approximately $400 was taken from an unlocked money bag a cashier left in her unlocked office, in violation of prescribed procedure and apparently without Ms. Hawkins' knowledge. This loss occurred on a Friday. Mr. Santillana, who did not learn of it until the following Monday, was angry that Ms. Hawkins had not succeeded in reaching him over the weekend. She had standing instructions to report major losses to him as soon as possible. On August 16, 1990, he and Ms. Wynkoop went to Ms. Hawkins' office and found it unlocked. Nobody was in the office, but a milk crate full of money bags was in plain sight. He went straight to the front of the restaurant and asked Ms. Hawkins to come to his office the following day. Later he wrote a memorandum, memorializing his findings on August 16, 1990, recounting the loss a week or so before of $98.16, and terminating her employment. August 16, 1990, was the last day Ms. Hawkins' worked for respondent. Ms. Hawkins was not the first to lose a job with respondent for (apparent) failure to abide by prescribed cash handling procedures. On occasion employees were discharged for a single (apparent) breach of such procedures. Ms. Hawkins (who had not yet clocked in when Mr. Santillana accosted her on the morning of August 16, 1990) noticed that a trusted employee had a good view of her office door, but did not bother to check whether it was locked, before going to help elsewhere in the facility, where she was needed.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order denying the petition for relief. That FCHR enter a final order denying the petition to intervene. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1992. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1-10, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 24, 25, 32, the first two sentences of No. 33, Nos. 34, 35, 57, 58, 63, 64, 65, 69- 74, 77-82, 84, 86, 87, 90-93, 95, 98, 99, 100, 105-112, 115, 116, 117, 120-124, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132, 134, 138 and 139 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 11, the CEO was Jim Schorr. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 12, 13, 14, 20, 22, 26, 28-31, 59-62, 66, 67, 68, 76, 83, 85, 88, 89, 94, 102, 103, 104, 118, 119, 126, 128, 135, 136, 140, 143 and 144 pertain to subordinate matters. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 19, the weight of the evidence established that petitioner did not give the warning on June 20, 1989. With respect to petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 23, 36, 37, 96, 97, 101, 125 and 142, the witnesses testified as reported. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact No. 27, the last sentence, of No. 33, Nos. 75, 113 and 141 have been rejected as unsupported by the weight of the evidence. With respect to petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 36-56, the case has been decided on the assumption, pro hac vice, that race discrimination did take place at some point. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 114, the transfer occurred in February. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 137, she had not been performing as assistant manager for ten years. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 through 5 pertain to the procedural posture of the case, apart from evidence adduced at final hearing. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 6-8, 12-15, 17-20, the first sentence of No. 21, Nos. 25, 27, 28, 31-34, 36, 37, 39-47, 49-56, 60, 61, 62, 64, 67, 69-75 and 76 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 9, 10 and 11, it is not clear whether Faison was present and heard Mr. Schorr's remarks, or that he was ever told of any deadline. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 16, it is not clear whether FLAC intended not to hide the fact that one of its employees was videotaping petitioner. With respect to the last sentence of paragraph No. 21 and Nos. 22, 23 and 24, petitioner was fired for perceived refusal to use the script, whether or not he had time enough to learn it. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 26, 29, 30, 35, 38, 48, 58, 63, 77, 78 and 79 pertain to subordinate matters. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 57 is interally inconsistent. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 59, it is unnecessary to decide this question in order to decide the case. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 65, the position was filled on June 28, 1990. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 66, see paragraphs 46-51 the findings of fact. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 67, the evidence was in equipoise on the question of where Ms. Hawkins was when the loss was discovered. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary C. O'Rourke P. Kent Spriggs Spriggs and Johnson West College Avenue Tallahassee, FL 32301 Loren E. Levy Bruce Kaster Cove, Green and Kaster P.O. Box 2720 Ocala, FL 32678 Margaret Jones, Clerk Commission on Human Relations John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4113 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4113 Lewis E. Shelley 117 S. Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issues in these cases are whether Respondent violated sections 489.129(1)(i), 489.129(1)(o), and 489.1425, Florida Statutes (2007 & 2009),1/ and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the administrative complaints, Mr. Organo was licensed as a certified general contractor in the State of Florida, having been issued license number CGC 1512005. At all times material to the administrative complaints, Mr. Organo was the primary qualifying agent for Bennett Marine Contracting and Construction, Inc. (Bennett Marine). On or about September 29, 2007, Jean Walker (Ms. Walker) entered into a contract with Bennett Marine to construct a dock and a tiki hut at 12305 Boat Shell Drive. The contract (the Walker contract) provided that the contractor would make application for a permit from Lee County, Florida. Mr. Organo signed the Walker contract for Bennett Marine. It is undisputed that the Walker contract did not include a written statement explaining Ms. Walker's rights under the Florida Homeowners' Construction Recovery Fund. On October 24, 2007, Bennett Marine applied for a permit to construct the dock. The application was denied October 29, 2007, because the site plan contained the tiki hut. When the tiki hut was removed from the application, the dock permit was approved. Ms. Walker paid Bennett Marine draws on the construction project. The payments were given to Mr. Organo. The payments totaled $9,200. By February 2008, a tiki hut had been constructed on Ms. Walker's property without a permit. Because the tiki hut was built without a permit, and it was in an illegal location, Lee County required that the tiki hut be removed. By April 2008, the tiki hut had been removed, and another tiki hut had been built in its place. Again, no permit was pulled for the tiki hut, and it was placed in an illegal location. Again, Lee County required that the tiki hut be removed. Mr. Organo subcontracted the construction of the tiki hut to Rick Fewell Chickees. Mr. Fewell of Rick Fewell Chickees, a Seminole Indian,2/ applied for a permit to build a tiki hut, but the application was rejected because the plot plan was not to scale, and the tiki hut did not meet the setback requirements from the water. Another tiki hut was built, and, in March 2009, Lee County again cited Ms. Walker for not having a permit for the tiki hut and for not meeting the setback requirements. In 2010, a permit was finally issued for the construction of a tiki hut on Ms. Walker's property. The permit was issued to Ms. Walker. Bennett Marine commenced work on the tiki hut without obtaining a building permit. On January 5, 2010, Bennett Marine entered into a contract with Chris Bevan (Mr. Bevan) to remove an existing dock, uninstall an existing boatlift, construct a dock, construct a tiki hut, and to reinstall the boatlift. The contract (the Bevan contract) required that the contractor obtain a City of Cape Coral building permit. The Bevan contract was signed by Mr. Organo for Bennett Marine. It is undisputed that the Bevan contract did not contain a written statement explaining Mr. Bevan's rights under the Florida Homeowners' Construction Recovery Fund. On March 17, 2010, Bennett Marine showed up on Mr. Bevan's property and commenced work, by knocking down a cantilever dock that was hanging over a seawall, removing old decking from the boatlift, and rough-framing part of the new dock. Bennett Marine worked until approximately March 25, 2010. That was the last that Mr. Bevan heard from Mr. Organo or Bennett Marine. Mr. Organo applied for a building permit for the Bevan contract on April 1, 2010. The permit was approved on April 13, 2010, but it was not issued. On May 14, 2010, the City of Cape Coral placed a stop-work order on the Bevan project. Mr. Bevan applied for an owner-builder permit for the dock construction, and the permit was issued on June 9, 2010. Mr. Bevan completed the dock construction at additional expense.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Mr. Organo violated sections 489.129(1)(i), 489.129(o), and 489.1425; imposing a fine of $250 each for the Walker contract and the Bevan contract for a total of $500, for failure to advise the owners of the recovery fund; imposing a fine of $3,000 and placing Mr. Organo on probation for two years for beginning work without a permit for the Walker contract; and imposing a fine of $1,000 and placing Mr. Organo on probation for one year for beginning work on the Bevan contract without a permit with the one-year probation to run concurrently with the probation imposed for the Walker contract. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of April, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of April, 2011.
The Issue At issue herein is whether or not the Petitioner, Kelly Boat Service, Inc.'s and Cape Kennedy Charter Boats, et al's activities fall within the admissions tax liability imposed by Section 212.04, F.S. (1973). Based upon the pleadings filed herein, the documentary evidence introduced during the course of the hearing, the other evidence of record including the arguments of counsel, the following relevant facts are found.
Findings Of Fact In the instant matter, the Department of Revenue issued two sales tax assessments. The first such assessment is against Cape Kennedy Charter Boats and covers the audit period of March 1, 1973, through February 29, 1976. The Department also assessed Kelly Boat Service, Inc., in a series of three separate assessments covering the audit periods August 1, 1970, through January 31, 1976. Based on such assessments, a tax liability resulted in the amount of $25,072.37. Of this amount, $10,000 was paid by the tax payer on July 21, 1976 (Respondent's Composite Exhibit No. 1). The remaining tax liability plus interest which has accrued from July 21, 1976, is outstanding and continues to accrue. During the course of the hearing, the parties agreed that the specific liabilities as set forth in the assessment were not at issue. Rather, Petitioner solely challenged the legal authority of the Department of Revenue to impose the assessments in question. The Petitioners are owners and operators of a fleet of deep sea fishing boats in and around Destin, Florida, which, for a fee, carry individual fishermen to certain fishing banks which lie beyond the three-league limit in the Gulf of Mexico. While there, the Petitioners sell food and drinks to the fishermen and rent them fishing equipment. The fishing is done at the snapper banks in the Gulf of Mexico or in the vicinity of those banks. The fishing equipment and tackle used on these trips are mainly used beyond the three-league limit in the waters of the Gulf of Mexico; and most, if not all, of the food and drinks sold at the galley of the refreshment stand on the boat was outside the three-league limit of the State of Florida. In an earlier summary final judgment, the Circuit Court of Appeal declared, as authorized by Chapter 86, Florida Statutes, 1973, the liability of Kelly Boat Services, Inc., for payment of the admissions tax by Section 212.04, F.S., 1973, from which the Department of Revenue filed an appeal. In that decision, the Court held that Kelly, whose boats take on passengers at Destin for fishing in the Gulf of Mexico beyond the territorial limits of Florida, is taxable at the statutory rate on the admission fare charged at the dock, but that the State is foreclosed from assessing Kelly for taxes that should have been paid between August, 1970, and the first day of August, 1973, the period in which the Department demanded the production of Kelly's records for audit. Section 212.14(6), F.S., 1973. Kelly cross-appealed and urged that its activities were not subject to the tax, citing Straughn v. Kelly Boat Service, Inc., 210 So.2d 266 (Fla.App. 1st 1968). In its decision, the First District Court of Appeal in Dept. of Revenue v. Kelly B Boat Service, Inc., 324 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1976), indicated that the trial court was correct in its reading of its decision in Dept. of Revenue v. Pelican Ship Corp., 257 So.2d 56 (Fla.App 1st 1972), Cert. Denied, 262 So.2d 682 (Fla. 1972), Cert. Dismissed, 287 So.2d 93 (Fla. 1974), and in hold that Kelly's commercial activities, as evidenced by the record, render it liable to assessment for the admissions tax. The Court noted that the trial court was incorrect, however, in foreclosing the Department of Revenue from making the assessment for the full three-year period authorized by Subsection 212.14(6), F.S., 1973. The decision goes on to read that the State is not foreclosed by reason of the Court's 1968 decision in Straughn v. Kelly Boat Service, Inc., or otherwise to assert that on the facts evidenced by record, Kelly should satisfy its full tax liability incurred three years prior to August 1, 1973. North American Company v. Green, 120 So.2d 603 (Fla. 1960); Jackson Grain Company v. Lee, 139 Fla. 93, 190 So. 464 (1939). Based on the above decision of the First District Court of Appeal, the Department's assessment, which the parties admit is factually correct, is valid both as to the August 1, 1970, through July 31, 1973, and the August 1, 1973, through January 31, 1976, audit periods. Since this matter has previously been adjudicated, the same is res judicata as to the legal validity of the Department's assessment. Further, since the assessment relative to Cape Kennedy Charter Boats is based upon the same factual circumstances and legal authority as the one against Kelly Boat Service, Inc., which was upheld as aforementioned in the case of the Dept. of Revenue v. Kelly Boat Service, Inc., supra, there is no factual challenge to the validity of the Department's assessment and there being no assertion by the Petitioner that any rules of law other than those enunciated by the District Court of Appeal in Dept. of Revenue v. Kelly Boat Service, Inc., supra, are applicable, such assessment must likewise be upheld. I shall so recommend. 1/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Revenue's assessment in the instant matter against the Petitioners be UPHELD. Additionally, in view of the Petitioners' letter of April 11, 1979, Petitioners' motion to treat this matter as a class action is hereby DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of May, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
The Issue Whether Respondent, while acting as pilot aboard the M/V Itanage in the St. John's River, Jacksonville, Florida on August 29, 1990, engaged in a practice which did not met acceptable standards of safe piloting. (F.S.A. s. 310.101(1)(k))
Findings Of Fact Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed pilot in the State of Florida. (Petitioner's Request for Admissions paragraph 1) Respondent has been issued license number SP0000032. (Petitioner's Request for Admissions paragraph 2) On or about August 29, 1990, Respondent was piloting the M/V Itanage outbound in Jacksonville, Florida. (Petitioner's Request for Admissions paragraph 4) The Itanage is a 12,000 gross ton, Brazilian registered diesel powered container vessel. (Transcript p. 164) From May 1988 to August 1990 the Itanage entered and exited the port of Jacksonville under pilotage fifteen times without navigational incident. (Transcript pp. 21, 22) The same crew abroad the Itanage at the time of the allision was on the Itanage on its previous voyage of the Itanage. (Transcript p. 22) Respondent has piloted the Itanage or similar vessels many times previously. (Transcript p. 355) The Itanage was equipped with an overhead rudder angle indicator which is visible from the bridge wing. The rudder angle indicator exhibits the degree angle of the rudder and is color coded red for port and green for starboard so the pilot can glance up and see whether port or starboard rudder is applied. 2/ (Transcript pp. 166, 167) Each bridge wing of the Itanage was equipped with an RPM indicator which shows whether the engine was going ahead or astern and the number of revolutions per minute. (Transcript p. 168) The Itanage was equipped with an engine room telegraph which was operated by the second mate to communicate engine commands to the engine room. 3/ On August 29, 1990, the docking master, Captain Meers, undocked the vessel from Jacksonville Port Authority berths 3 and 4, turned, headed down the river on slow ahead, and disembarked around Coastal Petroleum. (Statement of Captain Steele; DPR Report, p. 2) Respondent assumed responsibility for directing the ship at 1454 hours with the vessel parallel to and favoring the west bank of the river. (Statement of Captain Steele; DPR Report, p. 8; engine bell book, Transcript p. 175) It was a clear day, the ride was at or near slack water, the weather was perfect. (Transcript pp. 92. 169, 170, 198) Respondent gave commands to the second mate who remained positioned by the engineroom telegraph on the bridge. The second mate repeated the commands in English then repeated the commands to the helmsman in Portuguese. (Transcript pp. 195, 337); Statement of Second Mate) The second mate spoke very little English and the helmsman did not speak any English. (Transcript p. 331) At 1454 the Respondent ordered course 320 degrees and slow ahead, which was executed. At approximately 1456, Respondent ordered a course of 310 degrees and full speed ahead. (Transcript pp. 82, 83, 191, 192; DPR Report p. 8; engine bell book; Statements of the Second Mate, Helmsman, Master, and Chief Mate; Statement of Captain Steele) Respondent's orders issued at 1456 were executed, and the engine speed was set at full ahead and the Helmsman steered 310 degrees. (Transcript p. 186; DPR Report p. 8; Statements of the Second Mate, Helmsman, Master, and Chief Mater; engine bell book; Statement of Captain Steele; Petitioner's Request for Admissions paragraph 8) Respondent was in the wheelhouse and observed the master-gyro-compass. (Transcript p. 331; Statement of Captain Steele) Because the view forward was blocked by the deck cargo, Respondent went to the starboard wing to observe Buoy 71. (Statement of Captain Steele) At 1455 Respondent ordered "10 degrees port" from the starboard wing. (Transcript pp. 337, 338; Statements of the Second Mate, Helmsman) The helmsman steered 10 degrees to port (left). (Transcript p. 192; Statements of the Second Mate, Helmsman) After the order of "10 degrees port", Respondent remained on the starboard wing and had a radio conversation using a hand held marine radio with the master of the tug "Ann Moran" which took approximately 45 seconds about a ship they had handled the previous day. (Transcript pp. 338, 340, 247) At 1456 as Itanage approached Buoy 71, at point "D" on Hearing Officer Exhibit 1, from the starboard bridge wing, Respondent ordered hard right (starboard) rudder and engine ahead full. (Transcript p. 343) This was to start the turn around Buoy 71. (Transcript p. 384) Captain Steele did not at that time, however, go to the pilot house. Captain Steele remained on the wing to observe the response of the vessel. (Transcript p. 395) After a few seconds, Captain Steele observed the bow of the vessel swinging to port (left) not to starboard (right). (Transcript p. 345) He immediately rushed to the pilot house, repeating his hard starboard (right) rudder order as he did so. (Transcript p. 345) The rudder angle indicator in the pilot house, however, indicated the actual position of the rudder was passing from port (left) 20 degrees to starboard when Captain Steele entered the pilot house. (Transcript p. 345) Captain Steele did not alter the prior order for ahead full. Captain Steele reached the helm console and grabbed the helm. By that time, the helm was already in the hard starboard position. The only explanation as to how the rudder got to 20 degrees port (left) was that when Captain Steele gave the command hard to starboard, the helmsman actually went hard to port (left), then the helmsman realized his error and was correcting it when Captain Steele entered the pilot house. No one suggests that any other command was given which would account for the port swing of the vessel. (Transcript p. 235) Captain Steele again went to the wing to observe the response of the vessel. When it became apparent the vessel would not make the turn, Steele ordered full astern and ordered both anchors dropped. The vessel continued to make way in a sweeping curve alliding with the Shell Oil Terminal on the western edge of the Chaseville turn at approximately 1459 hours. The allision was not caused by a mechanical failure, weather, or tide. (Transcript p. 69). The allision was set up by the helmsman's turning the ship to port (left) instead of starboard (right). However, the Respondent contributed to this error by failing to give the steering command, "Right, full rudder," as required by the Rules of Road. See 33 USC 232. The Coast Guard conducted an investigation and prepared a report (Petitioner's Exhibit 1), the second page of which is a data sheet taken from the ship's bridge. This data sheet contains a diagram of the ship's turning circle to both port (left) and starboard (right) at half and full speeds. An overlay in proper scale was prepared and attached to Hearing Officer Exhibit 1 at the point where the turn was executed, Point D. The scaled extract of the Coast Guard report is attached to the back of Hearing Officer Exhibit 1. The overlay reveals that the vessel could not make the turn at full speed from Point D because the vessel's course takes it almost exactly to the point of allision. If the vessel's course is offset slightly to the left due to the helmsman's mistake and the vessel's turning circle adjusted for less speed, as would have occurred if the vessel went from half speed to full speed when the order for the turn was given, the vessel's projected track would again place the vessel at the point of the allision. The primary cause of the allision was Respondent's use of full speed in the turn. Although there was controversy about whether the vessel proceeded north the entire way at full speed or whether full speed was ordered as the turn was ordered approaching Buoy 71 (Point D on Hearing Officer Exhibit 1), there is no controversy that Captain Steele intended to execute the turn at full speed. The distance from where Captain Steele assumed control of the ship to where it came to rest is approximately 1 and 1/8 nautical miles. According to the logs, the vessel covered this distance in between four and five minutes. In order to cover that distance in that time, the ship was at or close to its full speed, adjusted for a dirty hull, of 15 knots. The advance and transfer of the ship was extended at full speed in such a way that the vessel could not make the turn in the sea room available. Referring again to the overlay, the vessel could have turned within the searoom available from Point D at half speed. The ship might have completed the turn at half speed from a point left of and forward of Point D, its track as the result of the helmsman's error, particularly with the reserve of thrust available to assist in turning after the emergency developed. The Chaseville turn is a tight turn without a great amount of sea room, and requires care to be exercised by pilots. (Transcript pp. 354, 362, 170, 171). The Respondent's failure to maintain proper speed caused the allision with the Shell Oil Terminal.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Board of Pilot commissioners issue a final order suspending Captain Henry A. Steele for three (3) months and levying a civil penalty of $5,000 against him. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 1992.
The Issue On February 28, 1996, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (Petitioner) issued a Notice To Show Cause to Robert O'Brien (O'Brien) alleging that O'Brien violated Section 326.006(2)(e)7, Florida Statutes. Specifically, O'Brien was charged with allowing an unlicensed person to attempt to sell a 52' Hatteras known as "Watermellon" on behalf of O'Brien Yacht Sales. The issue is whether this violation occurred and, if so, what penalty is appropriate. On May 15, 1996, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (Petitioner) issued an Amended Notice To Show Cause to David Sandmann (Sandmann) alleging that Sandmann violated Section 326.004(1), Florida Statutes. Specifically, Sandmann was charged with offering or negotiating to sell a 52' Hatteras, known as "Watermellon". The issue is whether this violation occurred and, if so, what penalty is appropriate. RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S EXCEPTIONS TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S FINDINGS OF FACT Petitioner filed an exception to the Administrative Law Judge's Finding of Fact number 15. Section 120.57(1)(j), Florida Statutes, states that: The agency may not reject or modify the findings of fact unless the agency first determines from a review of the entire record, and states with particularity in the order, that the findings of fact were not based upon competent substantial evidence. A thorough review of the record has been made. The Division adopts and incorporates by reference the first sentence of the Administrative Law Judge's Finding of Fact number 15. Petitioner's exceptions to the remainder of Finding of Fact number 15 are accepted because the remainder of the Administrative Law Judge's Finding of Fact number 15 is not supported by competent substantial evidence. The second sentence, "The conflict as to whether Respondent Sandmann's acts, considered collectively, establish that he was attempting to sell the boat is resolved by finding that he was not attempting to sell the boat." is rejected because, the Petitioner presented testimony which proved that Sandmann: offered "to help" the Division investigators when they approached the boat. (T. 20, 38-39). gave the Division investigators a business card with his name and O'Brien Yacht Sales, Inc. written on it. (T. 19, 38-19, 52)( P's Exh. 2) gave the Division investigators a spec sheet containing information about the boat. (T. 21, 32, 39, 52). (P's Exh. 3). told the Division investigators that the price of the boat was negotiable. (T 22, 29-30, 39-40, 52). told the Division investigators that the commission would be paid by the seller. (T 21, 22, 29-30, 32, 34, 40, 43) had a copy of a blank sales contract faxed to him (from O'Brien Yacht Sales, Inc.) at the boat show. (T. 22- 23, 41, 52) Also at Recommended Order, page 5, paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12. Additionally, there was no competent substantial evidence to support the Hearing Officer's Finding of Fact that Respondent Sandmann was not offering or negotiating to sell the boat, because these actions were uncontroverted. Respondent Sandmann never denied that he was offering or negotiating to sell the boat. Furthermore, the sentence in question is not a Finding of Fact, but rather a Conclusion of Law. The Administrative Law Judge's characterization of this as a Finding of Fact, does not make it so. In Hernicz v. State Dept. of Professional Reg., 390 So.2d 194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), facts were undisputed that a nurse practitioner had done certain acts, and when the Board concluded that the actions were a violation of the statute, the court held that that amounted to a Conclusion of Law and not a Finding of Fact. The "facts" were the individual actions that were taken by the Respondent, whether these acts violated the statute was a Conclusion of Law. As stated above, the acts, themselves, in this case were neither denied nor disputed. The second sentence in Finding of Fact number 15 is stricken in its entirety. The third sentence in Finding of Fact number 15 states that "[I]t is clear that Respondent Sandmann was at no time acting as an employee of Mr. Mellon or Respondent O'Brien or with the expectation of receiving compensation for his acts". The "expectation of receiving compensation" was the argument relied on by the Respondents at hearing as their defense to participating in the boat show. Because "compensation" is an integral part of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes, its interpretation should be left to the expertise of the agency. It is a well settled principle that the interpretation of a statute by the agency responsible for its enforcement is entitled to great weight, and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Department of Environmental Regulation v. Goldring, 477 So.2d 532 (Fla. 1985); Shell Harbor Grou, Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, 487 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). The Division believes that "compensation" can be other than a monetary commission, as claimed by Respondents. "Compensation" can be "perks" such as transportation or use of a house or yacht, or something intangible, such as friendship and affection. The existence of a quid pro quo is what is looked for. Furthermore, from a thorough reading of the record, it was proven by substantial competent evidence that a commission was anticipated being paid, because Petitioner's investigators were told that "the commission would be paid by the seller". (T 21, 22, 29-30, 32, 34, 40, 43). Possibly, no monetary commission was paid to Sandmann, because the yacht did not sell. Regardless, the Division finds that the friendship between Mr. Mellon and Sandmann was adequate compensation under Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. The third sentence of Finding of Fact number 15 is stricken in its entirety. The fourth sentence, "Respondent Sandmann was at the Boat Show and on the `Watermellon' solely as a friend of Mr. Mellon, the owner", is also rejected. The Division does not dispute the long standing friendship of Respondent Sandmann and Mr. Mellon, however being someone's "friend", does not exempt them from Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. There was uncontroverted testimony that Respondent Sandmann was offering or negotiating to sell the boat. That is all that is necessary for him to be within the jurisdiction of the Division, and require him to have a license. Although his friendship could be his motivation or compensation for being on the yacht, his actions, while there, show that he was offering or negotiating to sell the "Watermellon". The fourth sentence of Finding of Fact Number 15 is stricken in its entirety. RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S EXCEPTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Petitioner filed an Exception to Conclusion of Law number 23 contained in the Recommended Order. This conclusion stated that the Petitioner had failed to meet its burden as to Sandmann because it failed to establish that he was attempting to sell the yacht, and, if the case against Sandmann failed, then the case against O'Brien failed. The Division rejects this Conclusion of Law because it believes that Petitioner proved by substantial competent evidence that Sandmann was offering or negotiating to sell the "Watermellon", and that friendship is adequate compensation.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida that administers and enforces the Florida Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act, Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent O'Brien has been licensed as a Yacht and Ship Broker pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. Respondent O'Brien owns and operates O'Brien Yacht Sales. Respondent O'Brien resides in and has his principal place of business in Palm Beach County, Florida. Mr. Sandmann is a resident of Essex, Connecticut. He has never been licensed as a yacht salesman or as a yacht broker. Mr. Sandmann makes his livelihood as the owner of a dog collar manufacturing business. Henry Mellon, the boat's owner, held a salesman's license issued by Petitioner that expired in August 1994. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Mr. Mellon was not licensed by the Petitioner. Respondent Sandmann, Respondent O'Brien, and Mr. Mellon have been close friends for many years. Mr. Mellon formerly worked for O'Brien Yacht Sales. Mr. Mellon and Respondent Sandmann are old friends from college. The Fort Lauderdale International Boat Show permitted only new yachts or brokered yachts. Individuals were not supposed to sell boats in this show. Respondent O'Brien was aware of this restriction. In October 1995, Respondent O'Brien had the boat "Watermellon" displayed and listed for sale at the 36th Annual Fort Lauderdale International Boat Show. The asking price for the sale of the Watermellon was $425,000. Mr. Mellon is neither an officer or a director of O'Brien Yacht Sales. Mr. Mellon signed a form styled "Application and Contract for Exhibit Space" so that the Watermellon could be exhibited at the boat show and on this application represented that he was a vice president of O'Brien Yacht Sales. Neither Respondent O'Brien or his company paid to put the Watermellon in the Boat Show and neither expected to receive any commission from the sale of the Watermellon. Respondent O'Brien was acting out of friendship with Mr. Mellon. 1/ On October 27, 1995, Peter Butler and Robert Badger, in their official capacities as employees of the Petitioner, attended the Boat Show and went to the Watermellon. They observed a sign on the back of the boat that advised that the boat was being offered by O'Brien Yacht Sales and gave its telephone number. Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger approached the boat and asked a person, later identified as Respondent Sandmann, whether Respondent O'Brien was aboard. Respondent Sandmann told Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger that Respondent O'Brien was not aboard, asked if he could help them, and gave them a business card with his name and the name of O'Brien Yacht Sales on it. No licensed salesman was on board at this time, but Mr. Mellon, the owner of the boat, was aboard. 2/ Respondent Sandmann gave Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger a copy of a printed sheet containing basic information about the Watermellon. This sheet, referred to as a spec sheet, contained errors that Respondent Sandmann verbally corrected when he gave them the sheet. In response to questions, Respondent Sandmann told Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger that the price of the boat was negotiable and that the commission would be paid by the seller. Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger asked Respondent Sandmann if they could see a copy of the contract that a buyer would need to sign if he purchased the boat. In response, Respondent Sandmann contacted the O'Brien Yacht Sales office and had someone fax to him a copy of the contract used by O'Brien. Respondent Sandmann then gave the form contract to Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger. The business card given by Respondent Sandmann to Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger was printed in 1994 when Respondent Sandmann, who is fluent in French, Spanish, and Italian, accompanied Mr. Mellon to a boat show in Europe. Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger did not inquire as to the amount of the commission that would have been paid by the seller of the Watermellon because Petitioner does not regulate commissions. None of Respondent Sandmann's acts, when considered individually, required a license from the Petitioner. 3/ The conflict as to whether Respondent Sandmann's acts, considered collectively, establish that he was attempting to sell the boat is resolved by finding that he was not attempting to sell the boat. It is clear that Respondent Sandmann was at no time acting as an employee of Mr. Mellon or Respondent O'Brien or with the expectation of receiving compensation for his acts. Respondent Sandmann was at the Boat Show and on the Watermellon solely as a friend of Mr. Mellon, the owner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order as to these consolidated cases that dismisses the charges filed against these respondents. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of August, 1996.
Findings Of Fact The applicant proposes to construct a concrete boat ramp on the south bank of the Eau Gallie River in Brevard County. The Eau Gallie River is a tributary of the Indian River and is a Class III water body as defined in Chapter 17-3, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.). 1/ The ramp would be 17 feet wide and 64 feet long. Approximately half the length would extend into waters of the Eau Gallie River over which DER has. Jurisdiction under Chapters 403 and 253, F.S. The construction would involve the removal of 47 cubic yards of soft bottom material waterward of ordinary high water and the filling of 35 cubic yards of compacted material also waterward of ordinary high water. In addition, 38 cubic yards would be excavated landward and 72 cubic yards would be filled landward of ordinary high water. The boat ramp is to be a private facility not once to the general public. The applicant sought this permit in conjunction with the upland development of its river front property. The applicant's property extends for approximately one-half mile along the north bank of the Eau Gallie River. At build out, the applicant estimates that the property will contain several hundred apartment units which may eventually be converted to condominiums. The lessees or condominium owners would have access to the proposed boat ramp. Petitioner, Tom Hall, is an adjacent property owner who is concerned that increased boat traffic on the Eau Gallie River in the vicinity of the boat ramp would adversely impact manatee and other wildlife and marine resources. At various times of the year, manatees can be observed in the Eau Gallie River in the vicinity of the proposed boat ramp. The river also contains a variety of fish and supports a local population of water fowl. The river in the vicinity of the proposed boat ramp is generally not more than one to two feet in depth. The boat ramp is designed to launch only small craft such as canoes, rowboat or jonboats with small trolling motors. The application does not request the issuance of a permit to dredge a navigational channel to enable the beat ramp to accommodate larger power craft. The testimony of DER's expert witness established that the small craft which could be launched from the boat ramp would not pose a threat to the manatees that frequent the area. Rather, it is the larger power boats that endanger this marine mammal. There are no other wildlife or marine resources which would be impacted significantly by the construction of the boat ramp. Additionally, it should be noted that this project would benefit the several hundred residents of Brevard County who would eventually have access to the boat ramp. The testimony of DER's expert witness established that there would be no long-term violations of DER water quality standards as a result of the construction and use of the boat ramp. Short-term impact during construction would be minimal since turbidity screens are to be employed. Thus, the applicant has provided reasonable assurance that the short-term and long-term effects of the construction and use of the boat ramp will not result in violation of DER's water standards. It is important to note that, as long as no dredging of filling is involved, there is no legal impediment preventing riparian landowners from launching boats from their river front property or engaging in recreational boating activities in the portion of the boat ramp could cause continuous turbidity problems and damage valuable habitat along the river front. By confining the alteration of the littoral zone to such a small area as that involved in the application and thus guaranteeing adequate, comfortable access for the riparian owner, the survivability of the remaining littoral in its natural state would be significantly enhanced. Petitioner Hall theorizes that boats who would otherwise use downstream public boat ramps will instead launch at the site of the proposed ramp. However, there was no evidence submitted to support this theory. Given the ease with which small boats could be launched without any ramp at this site, it does not appear that the ramp itself would generate additional activity involving canoes and other small craft. Since the launching of power boats is not feasible because of the shallow river depth, such traffic is not likely to be affected by construction of the proposed ramp.
