The Issue The issues presented for consideration by the hearing officer were as follows: Whether the project would adversely the public health, safety, or welfare or the property of others; Whether the project would adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats; Whether the project would adversely affect navigation; Whether the project would adversely affect the fishing or recreational values in the vicinity of the project; Whether the project would be of a temporary or permanent nature; and Whether the project would adversely affect the current condition and relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by the proposed activity.
Findings Of Fact On February 21, 1985, the Respondent, John Spang, applied to the Department of Environmental Regulations, Department of natural Resources and the Army Corp. of Engineers for permits necessary to construct two docking facilities, one on each side of the east end of Coronado Bridge, commonly known as the "North Bridge" on the Indian River, north in New Smyrna Beach, Volusia County, Sections 55 and 9, Township 17 South, Range 34 East. The proposed docks include a total of 24 boat slips. The proposed docks are within 25 feet of the right-of-way of the Coronado Bridge on both the north and south sides. The proposed docks consist of four piers. The piers, from south to north, are 101 feet, 102 feet, 122 feet and 122 feet in length respectively. See Respondent's Exhibit #2. The piers south of the bridge are 75 to 80 feet from the east edge of the channel of the Intracoastal Waterway. The piers north of the bridge are 60 to 65 feet from the east edge of the channel of the Intracoastal Waterway. The proposed docking facilities shall service commercially zoned properties `to which they shall be attached and, in particular, the Riverview Hotel and Charlie's Blue Crab Restaurant, at the Riverview. The Petitioners, Grover Ryan and Margaret Ryan, own the commercially zoned property adjacent to the subject property to the south, located at 100 West Columbus Avenue, New Smyrna Beach, Florida. The Ryans operate a commercial business. On March 17, 1986, the Ryans filed a petition for an administrative hearing. Panet E. and Jerrie L. Peterson of 200 Canova Drive, New Smyrna Beach, Florida own the real property located on the river adjacent to the Ryans but not adjoining the proposed docking area or the property of the applicant. On April 15, 1986, the Ryans filed a petition for an administrative hearing. On February 14, 1986, the Department of Environmental Regulation issued Permit Number 64-099806-4, to construct the proposed docking facilities, subject to specific modifications and conditions to those applications. Issuance of the permit was based upon the following: The Army Corp. of Engineers assessed the proposed docking facilities and determined that the project will not impede navigation or otherwise cause danger to the health, safety or welfare of vessels and persons traveling in the Intracoastal Waterway. On April 18, 1986, the Army Corp. of Engineers issued Permit No. 85IPL-20644 for construction of piers pursuant to the applicant's proposal for docking facilities. The harbor and dockmaster for the City of New Smyrna Beach determined that the proposed docking facilities would not impede or endanger navigation of the river and Intracoastal Waterway, if pilots entering and leaving the docking area carefully follow the rules of road. Actual testing of the proposed site by the Department of Environmental Regulation revealed no seagrasses or rooted macrophytes which might be destroyed by the proposed docks. Flushing in the river was found to be excellent and would alleviate any short-term turbidity problems and would further mitigate against any pollutants from the docking areas to the extent that no water quality violations were anticipated. The United States Department of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service determined that the area of the proposed docking facility would not have an adverse affect on the manatee otherwise endanger them. Although the dock will restrict fishing from the bridge between the shore and channel, it will not significantly affect adversely the recreational uses. Generally, bridge fishing is being restricted in Florida due to the hazards to fishermen from traffic. The fishing from boats will be unaffected. There is no marine production in the area. The boat traffic in the vicinity of the proposed docking facility is considered heavy, and there are no restrictions on boating speed. The bridge is raised frequently, but heavy traffic requires boats to wait on weekends. The bridge fenders and concrete abutments of the bridge block the lateral view of boaters as they approach, pass under and leave the Coronado Bridge, and likewise obscures the boats in the bridge area from boaters in the proposed dock area. The closest dock to the south of the proposed docks is owned by the Ryans. Mr. Ryan has used his dock for forty-seven (47) years and uses it to dock his large commercial shrimp boat. Mr. Ryan operates a wholesale/retail seafood store on the property which he owns adjoining the Spang's property. As originally proposed, the southernmost dock sought by the Spang's would interfere with Ryan docking his boat at Ryan's dock. The next dock to the south of the proposed docks and Mr. Ryan's dock is owned by the Petersons. This a forty (40) foot dock which is used for noncommercial purposes. Because it does not protrude as far into the water as Ryan's dock, there is no hazard created by the proposed docks. A conditioned modification to the application was the reduction in size of the southernmost docking facility by 15 feet and the construction of handrails on the outer edges of each dock to prevent mooring of boats along the outer edges. The reduction of the southernmost dock by 15 feet, together with handrails and prevention of mooring of boats on the outside of the docks provided reasonable assurance that there was no impediment to navigation, to include Ryan docking his boat. However, the design of the exits to the two proposed docking areas promotes direct entry at right angles into the Intracoastal Waterway. This is potentially hazardous. Petitioner Ryan has an easement over the Spang property to permit public access to Ryan's property from the right-of-way of the bridge and highway. Spang's restaurant, which has already been built at the site, actually traverses the easement, not the proposed docking facility. The proposed facility does not interfere with the easement the Ryans hold landward of the mean high waterline from the highway right-of-way south to the Ryan's business.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation issue Permit No. 64-099806-4 with the size limitation and requirements for handrails established by the agency and that the layout of the docks be modified as drawn in Appendix B to discourage exiting the docking areas at right angles to the channel of the Intracoastal Waterway. DONE AND ORDERED this 18th day of July 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 86-0992 The following action was taken with regard to the proposed findings of fact submitted in behalf of John Spang: Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 2. Rejected. Paragraph 5 of Ryan's proposed findings of fact adopted as more complete and accurate. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 6. 5,6. Adopted and combined as Recommended Order paragraph 7. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9. Adopted substantially as Recommended Order paragraph 7. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 8. 10,11. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(a). Rejected as conclusion of law and irrelevant because the current proceeding is a de novo proceeding. Rejected as conclusion of law and irrelevant because the current proceeding is a de novo proceeding. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9 (d). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9 (b). Irrelevant. Effect on the persons named is not a basis for review. The following action was taken with regard to the proposed findings of fact submitted in behalf of the Ryans and Petersons: Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 1. Rejected because the applicants' finding cited 24 which was adopted thereby binding the applicant to the lower number. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 3. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 4. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 5. Adopted in part and included in Recommended Order paragraph 12. 7,8. Rejected in favor of Recommended Order paragraph 11. 9. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 11. 10,12. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 13. 11,13. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 14. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 11. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 12. Rejected as a list of actors without any conclusion stated. 18,19. Rejected in favor of Recommended Order paragraph 10 which more accurately summarizes the more credible facts regarding fishing. 20,21,22. Rejected in favor of paragraph 9(d) which more accurately summarizes the more credible facts regarding danger to manatees. Rejected as contrary to the facts. Rejected as contrary to the facts. Adopted in part in Recommended Order paragraph 16. Rejected as contrary to the facts. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. The following action was taken with regard to the Agency's proposed findings of facts. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 1. Adopted in part in Recommended Order paragraph 16 and in part in Recommended Order paragraph 10. 1st sentence: Rejected as irrelevant in light of the Agency's subsequent issuance. Remainder: Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(c). Adopted generally as Recommended Order paragraph 16. 5,6. Adopted generally as Recommended Order paragraph 14. Adopted generally as Recommended Order paragraph 15. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(d). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(a). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(b). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 17. COPIES FURNISHED: Victoria Tschinkel Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mary F. Smallwood, Esquire General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William F. Hathaway, Esquire Post Office Drawer H New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32070-1586 Vivian F. Garfein, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Hal Spence, Esquire 221 N. Causeway Post Office Box 1266 New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32070-1266
The Issue Whether Petitioner carried his burden of proving his good moral character and entitlement to a yacht salesperson's license under chapter 326, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, the oral and documentary evidence, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Stipulated Facts Respondent is the state agency charged with enforcing chapter 326, the Yacht and Ship Brokers Act, and the administrative rules promulgated thereunder. On June 8, 2016, Petitioner submitted to Respondent an application for a yacht salesperson's license. On Petitioner's application, the application question, number 14, relating to criminal history, was answered "yes." Petitioner failed to attach a complete and signed statement of the charges and facts, together with the dates, names, and location of the court in which the proceedings were held or were pending, as required by the application for the yacht salesperson's license. On October 12, 2012, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud, a felony, in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, Miami Division, in case number 1:1220156CR-UNGARO. On October 12, 2012, Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud in case number 1:1220156CR-UNGARO. On October 12, 2012, Petitioner was sentenced to 57 months' incarceration in the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons in case number 1:1220156CR-UNGARO. On October 12, 2012, Petitioner was sentenced to three years of supervised release following incarceration in case number 1:1220156CR-UNGARO. On October 12, 2012, Petitioner was ordered to pay $6,567,496.00 in restitution in case number 1:1220156CR-UNGARO. On April 22, 2016, Petitioner was released from incarceration and placed under supervised release, set to expire on or about April 21, 2019. Petitioner failed to certify to Respondent that Petitioner has never been convicted of a felony in Petitioner's application for a yacht salesperson's license. Petitioner timely received a copy of Respondent's Notice of Intent to Deny License Application on July 19, 2016. Petitioner completed programs in Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program, the Wellness Program, and the Community Treatment Services Program at Dollan Mental Health Clinic. Petitioner served his time without issue. Petitioner has been sponsored by a South Florida yacht broker who is going to supervise his activity as a yacht salesman. Facts Adduced at the Hearing Pursuant to chapter 326, Respondent has regulatory jurisdiction over yacht and ship licensees and is responsible for the approval or denial of applications for licensure for yacht salespersons and yacht brokers. Petitioner's younger sister, Beatriz Llorente, who is a practicing real estate and criminal defense attorney, testified. She described Petitioner as a "father figure" to her. She testified that Petitioner's conviction for conspiracy to commit bank fraud "devastated" her, because she felt that her reputation was being questioned.1/ When she drove him to federal prison, Petitioner "asked her for forgiveness." She was familiar with his prison experience. As far as she knew, Petitioner had no disciplinary problems in prison and was awarded maximum gain time. Furthermore, his 57-month sentence was reduced to less than two and one-half years. Despite his incarceration and current probation status, she stated that he is very active with his children and shares a great deal of time with them. He told her, "I will work for the rest of my life to regain your trust." His sister is convinced that Petitioner has overcome his faults, and she emphatically stated he is of good character. On cross-examination, she testified that Petitioner had no drug or alcohol problems when he was growing up, but they arose during the years preceding his conviction. An attorney friend of Petitioner's, Francisco Pines, testified. Pines has known Petitioner since 1988. They attended school together. More recently, their families have interacted and spent time together. They participated together in recreational activities, such as boating and fishing, before Petitioner's incarceration for the federal crime. Since Petitioner was released from prison, Pines has had contact with him three or four times. Pines was also asked about Petitioner's character. In his view, Petitioner knows that what he did was wrong and has made changes to get his life in order. Pines testified that Petitioner is very loving, caring and nurturing with his children. The witness has seen a "change for the better." According to him, Petitioner has always demonstrated a strong work ethic, more so now than before the criminal incident. A licensed mental health counselor, Sandra Rico, was also called by Petitioner. Beginning in 2011, she provided mental health therapy and counseling to Petitioner related to his anxiety due to a crisis in his marriage. She determined that he used and abused alcohol to relieve this anxiety. She treated him on and off until 2013. She also emailed him while he was in federal prison to make sure that he was getting continued treatment for his anxiety and alcohol abuse issues. After he was released from prison, Rico counseled him once a month from July 2016 through the fall of 2016. Her current treatment with him is more in the nature of prevention and maintenance, and to help him develop coping skills. She testified that the therapy he received in prison helped him and that Petitioner changed while in prison. As examples, she cited that he is more involved and willing to do more of her treatment assignments and that he now journals his feelings. Rico related that she is surprised by Petitioner's progress and that she believes he is no longer drinking. He is making better choices and being more careful. She opined that he gathers his thoughts more deliberately now, primarily because he wants to impress his children and reach "goals" he has set for himself. In her opinion, he is of good character now. His treatment with her continues "as needed." Lazaro R. Navarro is the chief executive officer at Florida Yachts International and manages approximately ten sales associates. He has known Petitioner's family for over 15 years. When Petitioner was released from federal prison, the family asked Navarro if he would consider employing Petitioner and sponsoring him. He gave Petitioner a job doing "online marketing," which involved managing leads and performing back office work. Navarro characterized Petitioner as a great asset to his company and trustworthy. He has no doubts about Petitioner and his work habits. Petitioner arrives at work early and is usually the last one to leave. Petitioner has exceeded all of his expectations, and is a very dedicated employee. As the employing yacht broker, Navarro supervises Petitioner and ensures that all of his work is done correctly. Although no details were offered, Navarro testified that Petitioner has accepted full responsibility for his criminal conduct and is a great father. Based upon the financial procedures and protocols used at Navarro's yacht company, he testified that Petitioner would not need to handle or accept any cash as a part of his sales responsibilities. Instead, finances and money exchanges are handled and processed by a closing specialist and the chief financial officer.2/ Navarro commented that he would trust Petitioner with money handling, if that occasion arose. Petitioner offered his own testimony. He received a Florida real estate license in February 2005 and worked for his cousin as a real estate salesperson until 2008. He was indicted for conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud in March 2012. This federal indictment stemmed from activities in 2006 while he worked as a licensed real estate salesperson. He confirmed that he visited with Rico for mental health counseling related to problems with his wife, as well as anxiety related to the government's criminal investigation of him in 2009. Although his prison sentence did not include mandatory alcohol or drug treatment, he followed the advice of a psychiatrist at the prison and voluntarily enrolled in a residential drug and alcohol abuse treatment program. He also participated in a health and nutrition wellness class for nine weeks. He completed both programs successfully. While in prison, he took several foreign language classes, thinking they would be useful for the yachting business. He also participated in a hazmat (hazardous materials) program outside the prison on a naval base. Apparently, a Navy Admiral retained him for the program. Also, while in prison, he was hired on the naval base to provide cleaning and maintenance services at a dormitory. He was allowed to serve a reduced prison sentence-- 32 months of his 57-month sentence, and he was released six months early to go to a halfway house. While there, he became eligible for home confinement. He was released from home confinement in April 2016. Although he is still under supervised release (probation), he is no longer required to make personal visits and can report to his probation officer remotely through the Internet. He is jointly and severally liable for over $6 million in restitution with the other defendants in his criminal case. It was undisputed that he is current with his restitution payments of $151.00 each month. Petitioner is active in his Catholic Church and gave "his testimony" at a recent church retreat. He characterizes his relationship with his children as being one of honesty and emphasized that it is important to have God in his life. When Respondent called requesting additional information for his application, he promptly provided his federal Termination Report and Certificates of Completion. Pet. Exs. 3, 4, and 5. Petitioner expressed a passion for boating and believes he is good at sales. He wants the yacht salesperson's license, in part, so that he can pay off the criminal restitution more quickly. He claims to no longer act impulsively and believes that his children are the most important thing in his life. On June 8, 2016, Petitioner submitted to Respondent an application for a yacht and ship salesperson's license. On Petitioner's application, he answered question number 14 "Yes," indicating that he had a criminal history.3/ Applicants who answer "Yes" to question number 14 on the application are directed to attach a complete and signed statement of the charges and facts, together with the dates, names, and location of the court in which the proceedings were held or are pending.4/ However, Petitioner failed to submit this statement. When asked about this omission, Petitioner testified, "I turned back for the next one (question), and I didn't bother looking. It shows part of impulsive behavior." Petitioner thought the information request at the bottom of the page he overlooked was simply a part of the next question.5/ Respondent obtained a Florida Department of Law Enforcement criminal background check on Petitioner, which indicated that, on October 12, 2012, Petitioner pled guilty to conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud. Resp. Ex. 4. Certified court records obtained by the Division indicated that Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, a felony, and sentenced to 57 months' incarceration in the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons with three years of supervised release following incarceration. Petitioner was ordered to pay $6,567,496.00 in restitution.6/ Notably, Petitioner's federal "Judgment In A Criminal Case" included Special Conditions of Supervision. This included a "Related Concern Restriction." Petitioner testified that this provision prohibited him from "touch[ing] funds" while under supervised release. His employer at Florida Yacht International wrote a letter, ultimately filed with the probation office, that Petitioner "would not be dealing with any funds." Resp. Ex. 1, pp. 1-7.7/ Petitioner certified on his application that, in February 2005, he was licensed as a real estate sales associate in the state of Florida, having been issued license number SL3111375. Petitioner testified that, in order to become a real estate sales associate, he completed a pre-licensing course; applied with and was approved to take the state licensing exam by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation; and passed the Florida Real Estate Sales Associate Examination. Petitioner stated that, at the time, he was familiar with the laws regulating the profession of real estate contained in chapter 475, Florida Statutes.8/ Petitioner testified that between 2005 and 2008, he worked as a real estate sales associate for Llorente Realty Group, under a supervising broker, Petitioner's cousin. While employed there as a Florida licensed real estate sales associate, Petitioner engaged in an illegal real estate fraud scheme which lead to his 2012 federal criminal conviction. On several occasions, Petitioner provided up to $150,000.00 of his own funds to make seven or eight improper short-term loans of approximately ten to 15 days each. Petitioner made a profit of approximately eight to ten percent per loan.9/ Petitioner testified that these transactions involved buying houses under an individual's name (the straw buyer) and, after closing, executing a quitclaim deed to transfer title of the property to one of the co-conspirators, to whom Petitioner had made the loan. The property was subsequently transferred to the co-conspirator's family trust, leaving the outstanding mortgage in the name of the straw buyer. When the straw buyer failed to pay the outstanding mortgage, the lender would initiate foreclosure proceedings against the straw buyer who was no longer in possession of the property. This fraudulent scheme was carried out against several lending institutions. After the lenders became aware of the scheme, a criminal investigation was initiated. The government characterized his involvement as a breach of his fiduciary duty. In mid-2009, Petitioner was notified that he was under federal investigation for his involvement in the "straw buyer" scheme. After finding out about the investigation, Petitioner began to have relationship problems with his wife and to abuse alcohol. This prompted him to see Rico, a licensed mental health counselor. On March 8, 2012, Petitioner was indicted on eight counts related to the bank fraud scheme. On October 12, 2012, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty and was adjudicated guilty of conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud, a felony, in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, Miami Division, in case number 1:1220156CR-UNGARO. Resp. Ex. 1. Petitioner was incarcerated at Pensacola Prison Camp beginning March 1, 2013. Petitioner earned eight months' "gain time" off of his sentence. Additionally, while incarcerated, Petitioner completed the RDAP, Residential Drug and Alcohol Treatment Program, which qualified Petitioner for a 12-month reduction in his sentence. Due to these reductions and good behavior, Petitioner served only 32 months of his 57-month sentence in federal prison. During his incarceration, Petitioner also completed a nine-week wellness course on various subjects such as nutrition and exercise and worked at Naval Air Station Pensacola, Corry Station Naval Technical Training Center, and the Pensacola Prison Camp. On October 27, 2015, Petitioner was released to a halfway house and shortly thereafter began working for Navarro at Florida Yacht International as a clerk. On November 10, 2015, Petitioner became eligible for home confinement, and, by April 18, 2016, Petitioner completed TDAPT, a transition recovery program. On April 21, 2016, Petitioner was released from custody, and, on April 22, 2016, he was placed under supervised release, currently set to expire on April 21, 2019. Petitioner testified that he has paid $6,000.00 towards the restitution he owes in the amount of $6,567,496.00. As previously mentioned, this restitution is owed with several co- conspirators who are jointly and severally liable with him. Resp. Ex. 1, p. 5. Petitioner testified that he is up to date on required payments pursuant to the order of restitution. Navarro monitors and supervises Petitioner's work and is ultimately responsible for Petitioner under his own yacht broker license. Petitioner is also currently employed as a part- time driver for Uber. In compliance with the Related Concern Restriction of his criminal conviction, Petitioner has not been placed in a position of trust or responsibility over sums of money at Florida Yachts International. Petitioner stated that upon obtaining a job as a clerk with Florida Yachts International, Navarro was required to certify to Petitioner's supervisors through the halfway house that Petitioner "would not be dealing with any funds," pursuant to the "Related Concern Restriction" of Petitioner's Special Conditions of Supervision.10/ Resp. Ex. 1, p. 4; Resp. Ex. 4, p. 51. Following his release from incarceration, Petitioner continues to see Rico for therapy sessions on a monthly basis. Rico provided a letter of recommendation for Petitioner. As mitigation and in an effort to show his good moral character, Petitioner testified that he is not abusing alcohol anymore, has made substantial efforts to reconnect with his children, and has maintained a close relationship with his sister both before and after his incarceration. Licensed yacht salespersons are not restricted and may work under any licensed yacht broker. They may also switch their registered broker if they wish to work for someone else. Additionally, salespersons become eligible to apply for their own yacht and ship broker license after two years as a salesperson. A representative of Respondent, Chelisa Kirkland, testified for Respondent. A yacht salesperson's license is only required for the sale of used or pre-owned vessels in excess of 32 feet. Vessels less than 32 feet and new vessel sales of any size do not require a license. Kirkland confirmed that Petitioner's probation, or court supervision, does not end until April 2019. Applying the statutory and rule criteria, Respondent denied Petitioner's application for a yacht salesperson's license. More specifically, Respondent was concerned about the nature and seriousness of the federal crime, particularly because Petitioner held a professional real estate license at the time the criminal bank fraud offenses were committed. Additionally, as of the date of the application, Petitioner's government supervision and probation had not been completed, and there was a very significant amount of restitution still owed, in excess of $6,000,000.00. Finally, Respondent felt that there had not been a significant passage of time since the conviction in 2012. As a result of the totality of these circumstances, Kirkland recommended that Petitioner's application be denied. She acknowledged that her recommendation was based solely on the conviction for conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud. She conceded that Florida law does not impose an "automatic" denial just because Petitioner owes restitution, is still under supervision, or was convicted of a federal crime.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes, confirm its previous denial and enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a yacht salesperson's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of February, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of February, 2017.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Swiss national, who resides in Jamaica. His business in Jamaica involves water sports and vacation tours, primarily for European tourists. Petitioner attended a boat show in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, in order to locate a suitable boat for entertainment and tour purposes for use by his business in Jamaica. There, he saw The Lady, a vessel being brokered by Anchorline Yacht and Ship Brokerage, Inc., of St. Petersburg, Florida. On February 28, 1980, Petitioner purchased The Lady from Anchorline for $120,000. Prior to that date, a survey was conducted by Wilkinson Company, marine surveyors, and repairs indicated by that survey were completed at South Pasadena Marina, Inc. At the time that Petitioner purchased The Lady from Anchorline, he advised the broker that he was taking the vessel out of the country. Accordingly, the broker required Petitioner to sign an affidavit that Petitioner had read the provisions of Section 212.05, Florida Statutes, and no tax was collected on the sale and purchase of The Lady. As The Lady was journeying from St. Petersburg across the State of Florida to West Palm Beach in order to reach Jamaica, she started taking on water. She was taken to Lantana Boatyard, where another marine survey was conducted. That survey concluded that The Lady was not seaworthy and, therefore, could not be taken to Jamaica at that time. As one of the required repairs, her engines needed to be overhauled by Cummins in Miami. Accordingly, after the repairs to be made at the Lantana Boatyard were completed, The Lady was taken to the Keystone Point Marina in North Miami, Florida, so that the work on her Cummins engines could be undertaken. During this time, Petitioner attempted to register The Lady in Jamaica; however, the Jamaican Government refused to license or register the vessel since she was not in Jamaica but was still physically located within the State of Florida. As a result of discussion between Petitioner and a Mr. Mathews at Anchorline, on September 18, 1980, the Petitioner made application for a Florida boat Certificate of Title at a tag agency. He reported the purchase price as ten dollars and, accordingly, paid forty cents tax on the transaction. Cummins started the repair work necessary on The Lady's engines while she had been docked at the Keystone Point Marina. On occasion, Petitioner has stayed overnight on The Lady for security purposes. He has had a telephone attached to the vessel for his personal use while on board. On January 7, 1981, Respondent Department of Revenue issued a Warrant for Collection of Delinquent Sales and Use Tax against the Petitioner in the total amount of $9,967.37, representing the follows: Tax $4,799.60 Penalty 4,799.60 Interest 350.17 Filing Fee 18.00 $9,967.37 On January 19, 1981, Petitioner made payment to Respondent Department of Revenue in the amount of $5,167.77, which payment was made under protest and which payment represents the amount of tax, interest, and filing fees, but does not include the amount of penalty. Pursuant to its warrant, the Department of Revenue has chained The Lady to the dock at the Keystone Point Marina. Accordingly, the work being performed by Cummins on her engines has not been completed, and no sea trial can be conducted. As stipulated by the parties, since the Petitioner purchased The Lady, she has been under repair and has never left Florida waters.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED THAT: A final order be entered denying Petitioner's claim for a refund, finding the Petitioner liable for a sales tax equal to four percent of the purchase price, together with interest and filing fees, but finding the penalty assessed against Petitioner to be erroneous and therefore invalid. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October 1981 in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Lechtman, Esquire 801 N.E. 167th Street, Suite 301 North Miami Beach, Florida 33162 John Browdy, III, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Randy Miller Executive Director Department of Revenue 102 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Gerald A. Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Respondent Heidt Neil "Cap" Fendig, Jr., and his corporate alter ego, Go Fish, Inc., do business under the name Golden Isles Charter Company. Aside from operating the marina he leases on St. Simons Island, Georgia, Mr. Fendig hires out as a captain (for $175 a day), arranges charters, and acts as a yacht broker in Georgia. When Kirby J. Bourgeois acquired the Westwind, a 55-foot "Ocean Super Sportfisherman," the man to whom the boat had previously belonged recommended respondent to Mr. Bourgeois, an Oklahoman who knew little about boats, as somebody who could assist him. When Messrs. Fendig and Bourgeois met on October 5 or 6, 1990, respondent agreed to register the Westwind in the name of a corporation (Mandela Corp.) Mr. Bourgeois specified, and to equip the boat in accordance with Coast Guard requirements. Later he took Mr. Bourgeois out on "training trips." For each of these services, respondent prepared invoices which Mr. Bourgeois paid in due course. Around Thanksgiving of 1990, Mr. Fendig acted as the Westwind's captain on a cruise Mr. Bourgeois took to the Bahamas. They left the boat docked in Marsh Harbor. In January of 1991, Mr. Bourgeois told Mr. Fendig on the telephone that he wanted to sell the Westwind. At that time, if not before, Mr. Fendig mailed Mr. Bourgeois a packet of information about selling boats, which included a form yacht brokerage agreement. Instead of signing the yacht brokerage agreement, Mr. Bourgeois decided to show the Westwind at the Third Annual Brokerage Yacht Show in Miami Beach, one of the alternatives Mr. Fendig had suggested. Mr. Fendig, who had once inquired of petitioner DBR about obtaining a Florida yacht broker's license, and been told he was ineligible because he lived and worked out of state, advised Mr. Bourgeois that he was not licensed in Florida and could not act as a yacht broker in Florida. From conversations he had with petitioner's employees at the time he discussed obtaining a Florida license, Mr. Fendig understood that Florida law permitted him to accompany and assist yacht owners in the sale or purchase of yachts in Florida so long as he did not buy or sell as an owner's agent. Mr. Fendig agreed to bring the Westwind over from Marsh Harbor for the show, which began on February 14, 1991, a Thursday. On January 23 or 24, 1991, respondent sent Mr. Bourgeois a facsimile transmission, described as confirmation of a telephone conversation, in which he wrote: "As per your instructions, I will transport the boat to the Miami show and look for your arrival in Miami at [sic] sometime during the show." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. Although Mr. Bourgeois had informed respondent "that he would not be able to be there the first day" (T.24), Mr. Fendig arrived before the show began. He also filled out a form application and a contract for exhibit space, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, which, together with the application fee, had reached Yachting Provisions, Inc. in Ft. Lauderdale, on February 1, 1991. Mr. Bourgeois, whose name did not appear on the application and contract, later reimbursed him the fee. Reportedly delayed by a snowstorm, Mr. Bourgeois did not reach Miami before Saturday evening. Until Mr. Bourgeois arrived, Mr. Fendig stayed with the boat, moored at slip 221 on Collins Avenue. Available to anybody who visited the Westwind while he was on board were copies of his business card, which included the words "YACHT SALES-YACHT MANAGEMENT." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. Also available to show goers (including those to whom respondent never spoke) were one page fliers describing the Westwind and concluding: "Asking $350,000 Looking for serious offers contact H. N. "Cap" Fendig, Golden Isles Yacht Sales & Charter Co. 912 638-7717 St. Simons Island, Ga." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5. Respondent had asked his brother to make up this flier. Like other paid captains, respondent told anybody who inquired the owner's asking price. When, on the first day of the boat show, investigators in petitioner's employ posed as potential buyers, Mr. Fendig told them they would have to speak to the owner, who would be arriving later in the show. He told "everybody that, if they wanted to make an offer, the owner was coming and they could drop by later in the show and . . . talk to him." T. 36. While at the boat show, Mr. Fendig slept on the boat, which was an economic benefit for him, at the same time it afforded the vessel a measure of security, which was an economic benefit for the owner. Mr. Bourgeois paid him for bringing the boat to Miami Beach, but not for the time he spent there. He had wanted to go to the boat show for his own purposes, in any event. The yacht show closed on Monday without the Westwind's changing hands. Mr. Bourgeois still owned the Westwind on March 11, 1991, when he signed a yacht brokerage agreement with respondent Fendig. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. Before that time Mr. Fendig had no agreement for or expectation of any compensation on account either of the Westwind's sale or of his efforts to accomplish a sale (other than bringing the boat to Miami, for which he received a fixed amount.)
Recommendation It is, accordingly recommended that petitioner dismiss the notice to show cause. RECOMMENDED this 5th day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-3108 Petitioner's proposed findings of facts Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 6, he was off and on the boat during the last two days. Before Mr. Bourgeois' arrival, it had been necessary to stay with the boat for security reasons. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 7, the proof did not show that anybody asked the owner's name, address or phone number. Respondent testified he did not distribute this information because it "wasn't necessary, because the owner was going to be there." T.36. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 10, the taking of evidence had closed and respondent was making legal argument. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 15, respondent (who appeared pro se) answered a speculative question about what "could" happen. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Bell, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1007 H. N. "Cap" Fendig 205 Marina Drive St. Simons Island, GA 31522 Henry M. Solares, Director Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000 Donald D. Conn, General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000
The Issue At issue herein is whether or not the Petitioner, Kelly Boat Service, Inc.'s and Cape Kennedy Charter Boats, et al's activities fall within the admissions tax liability imposed by Section 212.04, F.S. (1973). Based upon the pleadings filed herein, the documentary evidence introduced during the course of the hearing, the other evidence of record including the arguments of counsel, the following relevant facts are found.
Findings Of Fact In the instant matter, the Department of Revenue issued two sales tax assessments. The first such assessment is against Cape Kennedy Charter Boats and covers the audit period of March 1, 1973, through February 29, 1976. The Department also assessed Kelly Boat Service, Inc., in a series of three separate assessments covering the audit periods August 1, 1970, through January 31, 1976. Based on such assessments, a tax liability resulted in the amount of $25,072.37. Of this amount, $10,000 was paid by the tax payer on July 21, 1976 (Respondent's Composite Exhibit No. 1). The remaining tax liability plus interest which has accrued from July 21, 1976, is outstanding and continues to accrue. During the course of the hearing, the parties agreed that the specific liabilities as set forth in the assessment were not at issue. Rather, Petitioner solely challenged the legal authority of the Department of Revenue to impose the assessments in question. The Petitioners are owners and operators of a fleet of deep sea fishing boats in and around Destin, Florida, which, for a fee, carry individual fishermen to certain fishing banks which lie beyond the three-league limit in the Gulf of Mexico. While there, the Petitioners sell food and drinks to the fishermen and rent them fishing equipment. The fishing is done at the snapper banks in the Gulf of Mexico or in the vicinity of those banks. The fishing equipment and tackle used on these trips are mainly used beyond the three-league limit in the waters of the Gulf of Mexico; and most, if not all, of the food and drinks sold at the galley of the refreshment stand on the boat was outside the three-league limit of the State of Florida. In an earlier summary final judgment, the Circuit Court of Appeal declared, as authorized by Chapter 86, Florida Statutes, 1973, the liability of Kelly Boat Services, Inc., for payment of the admissions tax by Section 212.04, F.S., 1973, from which the Department of Revenue filed an appeal. In that decision, the Court held that Kelly, whose boats take on passengers at Destin for fishing in the Gulf of Mexico beyond the territorial limits of Florida, is taxable at the statutory rate on the admission fare charged at the dock, but that the State is foreclosed from assessing Kelly for taxes that should have been paid between August, 1970, and the first day of August, 1973, the period in which the Department demanded the production of Kelly's records for audit. Section 212.14(6), F.S., 1973. Kelly cross-appealed and urged that its activities were not subject to the tax, citing Straughn v. Kelly Boat Service, Inc., 210 So.2d 266 (Fla.App. 1st 1968). In its decision, the First District Court of Appeal in Dept. of Revenue v. Kelly B Boat Service, Inc., 324 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1976), indicated that the trial court was correct in its reading of its decision in Dept. of Revenue v. Pelican Ship Corp., 257 So.2d 56 (Fla.App 1st 1972), Cert. Denied, 262 So.2d 682 (Fla. 1972), Cert. Dismissed, 287 So.2d 93 (Fla. 1974), and in hold that Kelly's commercial activities, as evidenced by the record, render it liable to assessment for the admissions tax. The Court noted that the trial court was incorrect, however, in foreclosing the Department of Revenue from making the assessment for the full three-year period authorized by Subsection 212.14(6), F.S., 1973. The decision goes on to read that the State is not foreclosed by reason of the Court's 1968 decision in Straughn v. Kelly Boat Service, Inc., or otherwise to assert that on the facts evidenced by record, Kelly should satisfy its full tax liability incurred three years prior to August 1, 1973. North American Company v. Green, 120 So.2d 603 (Fla. 1960); Jackson Grain Company v. Lee, 139 Fla. 93, 190 So. 464 (1939). Based on the above decision of the First District Court of Appeal, the Department's assessment, which the parties admit is factually correct, is valid both as to the August 1, 1970, through July 31, 1973, and the August 1, 1973, through January 31, 1976, audit periods. Since this matter has previously been adjudicated, the same is res judicata as to the legal validity of the Department's assessment. Further, since the assessment relative to Cape Kennedy Charter Boats is based upon the same factual circumstances and legal authority as the one against Kelly Boat Service, Inc., which was upheld as aforementioned in the case of the Dept. of Revenue v. Kelly Boat Service, Inc., supra, there is no factual challenge to the validity of the Department's assessment and there being no assertion by the Petitioner that any rules of law other than those enunciated by the District Court of Appeal in Dept. of Revenue v. Kelly Boat Service, Inc., supra, are applicable, such assessment must likewise be upheld. I shall so recommend. 1/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Revenue's assessment in the instant matter against the Petitioners be UPHELD. Additionally, in view of the Petitioners' letter of April 11, 1979, Petitioners' motion to treat this matter as a class action is hereby DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of May, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
The Issue Whether Respondent, while acting as pilot aboard the M/V Itanage in the St. John's River, Jacksonville, Florida on August 29, 1990, engaged in a practice which did not met acceptable standards of safe piloting. (F.S.A. s. 310.101(1)(k))
Findings Of Fact Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed pilot in the State of Florida. (Petitioner's Request for Admissions paragraph 1) Respondent has been issued license number SP0000032. (Petitioner's Request for Admissions paragraph 2) On or about August 29, 1990, Respondent was piloting the M/V Itanage outbound in Jacksonville, Florida. (Petitioner's Request for Admissions paragraph 4) The Itanage is a 12,000 gross ton, Brazilian registered diesel powered container vessel. (Transcript p. 164) From May 1988 to August 1990 the Itanage entered and exited the port of Jacksonville under pilotage fifteen times without navigational incident. (Transcript pp. 21, 22) The same crew abroad the Itanage at the time of the allision was on the Itanage on its previous voyage of the Itanage. (Transcript p. 22) Respondent has piloted the Itanage or similar vessels many times previously. (Transcript p. 355) The Itanage was equipped with an overhead rudder angle indicator which is visible from the bridge wing. The rudder angle indicator exhibits the degree angle of the rudder and is color coded red for port and green for starboard so the pilot can glance up and see whether port or starboard rudder is applied. 2/ (Transcript pp. 166, 167) Each bridge wing of the Itanage was equipped with an RPM indicator which shows whether the engine was going ahead or astern and the number of revolutions per minute. (Transcript p. 168) The Itanage was equipped with an engine room telegraph which was operated by the second mate to communicate engine commands to the engine room. 3/ On August 29, 1990, the docking master, Captain Meers, undocked the vessel from Jacksonville Port Authority berths 3 and 4, turned, headed down the river on slow ahead, and disembarked around Coastal Petroleum. (Statement of Captain Steele; DPR Report, p. 2) Respondent assumed responsibility for directing the ship at 1454 hours with the vessel parallel to and favoring the west bank of the river. (Statement of Captain Steele; DPR Report, p. 8; engine bell book, Transcript p. 175) It was a clear day, the ride was at or near slack water, the weather was perfect. (Transcript pp. 92. 169, 170, 198) Respondent gave commands to the second mate who remained positioned by the engineroom telegraph on the bridge. The second mate repeated the commands in English then repeated the commands to the helmsman in Portuguese. (Transcript pp. 195, 337); Statement of Second Mate) The second mate spoke very little English and the helmsman did not speak any English. (Transcript p. 331) At 1454 the Respondent ordered course 320 degrees and slow ahead, which was executed. At approximately 1456, Respondent ordered a course of 310 degrees and full speed ahead. (Transcript pp. 82, 83, 191, 192; DPR Report p. 8; engine bell book; Statements of the Second Mate, Helmsman, Master, and Chief Mate; Statement of Captain Steele) Respondent's orders issued at 1456 were executed, and the engine speed was set at full ahead and the Helmsman steered 310 degrees. (Transcript p. 186; DPR Report p. 8; Statements of the Second Mate, Helmsman, Master, and Chief Mater; engine bell book; Statement of Captain Steele; Petitioner's Request for Admissions paragraph 8) Respondent was in the wheelhouse and observed the master-gyro-compass. (Transcript p. 331; Statement of Captain Steele) Because the view forward was blocked by the deck cargo, Respondent went to the starboard wing to observe Buoy 71. (Statement of Captain Steele) At 1455 Respondent ordered "10 degrees port" from the starboard wing. (Transcript pp. 337, 338; Statements of the Second Mate, Helmsman) The helmsman steered 10 degrees to port (left). (Transcript p. 192; Statements of the Second Mate, Helmsman) After the order of "10 degrees port", Respondent remained on the starboard wing and had a radio conversation using a hand held marine radio with the master of the tug "Ann Moran" which took approximately 45 seconds about a ship they had handled the previous day. (Transcript pp. 338, 340, 247) At 1456 as Itanage approached Buoy 71, at point "D" on Hearing Officer Exhibit 1, from the starboard bridge wing, Respondent ordered hard right (starboard) rudder and engine ahead full. (Transcript p. 343) This was to start the turn around Buoy 71. (Transcript p. 384) Captain Steele did not at that time, however, go to the pilot house. Captain Steele remained on the wing to observe the response of the vessel. (Transcript p. 395) After a few seconds, Captain Steele observed the bow of the vessel swinging to port (left) not to starboard (right). (Transcript p. 345) He immediately rushed to the pilot house, repeating his hard starboard (right) rudder order as he did so. (Transcript p. 345) The rudder angle indicator in the pilot house, however, indicated the actual position of the rudder was passing from port (left) 20 degrees to starboard when Captain Steele entered the pilot house. (Transcript p. 345) Captain Steele did not alter the prior order for ahead full. Captain Steele reached the helm console and grabbed the helm. By that time, the helm was already in the hard starboard position. The only explanation as to how the rudder got to 20 degrees port (left) was that when Captain Steele gave the command hard to starboard, the helmsman actually went hard to port (left), then the helmsman realized his error and was correcting it when Captain Steele entered the pilot house. No one suggests that any other command was given which would account for the port swing of the vessel. (Transcript p. 235) Captain Steele again went to the wing to observe the response of the vessel. When it became apparent the vessel would not make the turn, Steele ordered full astern and ordered both anchors dropped. The vessel continued to make way in a sweeping curve alliding with the Shell Oil Terminal on the western edge of the Chaseville turn at approximately 1459 hours. The allision was not caused by a mechanical failure, weather, or tide. (Transcript p. 69). The allision was set up by the helmsman's turning the ship to port (left) instead of starboard (right). However, the Respondent contributed to this error by failing to give the steering command, "Right, full rudder," as required by the Rules of Road. See 33 USC 232. The Coast Guard conducted an investigation and prepared a report (Petitioner's Exhibit 1), the second page of which is a data sheet taken from the ship's bridge. This data sheet contains a diagram of the ship's turning circle to both port (left) and starboard (right) at half and full speeds. An overlay in proper scale was prepared and attached to Hearing Officer Exhibit 1 at the point where the turn was executed, Point D. The scaled extract of the Coast Guard report is attached to the back of Hearing Officer Exhibit 1. The overlay reveals that the vessel could not make the turn at full speed from Point D because the vessel's course takes it almost exactly to the point of allision. If the vessel's course is offset slightly to the left due to the helmsman's mistake and the vessel's turning circle adjusted for less speed, as would have occurred if the vessel went from half speed to full speed when the order for the turn was given, the vessel's projected track would again place the vessel at the point of the allision. The primary cause of the allision was Respondent's use of full speed in the turn. Although there was controversy about whether the vessel proceeded north the entire way at full speed or whether full speed was ordered as the turn was ordered approaching Buoy 71 (Point D on Hearing Officer Exhibit 1), there is no controversy that Captain Steele intended to execute the turn at full speed. The distance from where Captain Steele assumed control of the ship to where it came to rest is approximately 1 and 1/8 nautical miles. According to the logs, the vessel covered this distance in between four and five minutes. In order to cover that distance in that time, the ship was at or close to its full speed, adjusted for a dirty hull, of 15 knots. The advance and transfer of the ship was extended at full speed in such a way that the vessel could not make the turn in the sea room available. Referring again to the overlay, the vessel could have turned within the searoom available from Point D at half speed. The ship might have completed the turn at half speed from a point left of and forward of Point D, its track as the result of the helmsman's error, particularly with the reserve of thrust available to assist in turning after the emergency developed. The Chaseville turn is a tight turn without a great amount of sea room, and requires care to be exercised by pilots. (Transcript pp. 354, 362, 170, 171). The Respondent's failure to maintain proper speed caused the allision with the Shell Oil Terminal.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Board of Pilot commissioners issue a final order suspending Captain Henry A. Steele for three (3) months and levying a civil penalty of $5,000 against him. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 1992.
The Issue The issue presented is whether the Respondent, David Hirshberg acted as a yacht salesman without being licensed in accordance with Chapter 326, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times material to this proceeding, the Respondent was not licensed as a yacht broker or as a yacht salesman in accordance with Chapter 326, Florida Statutes, commonly referred to as the "Yacht and Ship Broker's Act". The Division is the state agency statutorily authorized to regulate yacht and ship brokers and salesmen. At all times material to this proceeding, the Respondent was employed by Tampa Bay Marine Repossession Center (Center). Respondent's main responsibility was the sale of new Chris Craft boats and occasionally used boats. However, other than giving directions or explaining procedures at the boat show as set out in Finding of Fact 11 the Respondent was not involved with the sale of yachts. The Center is a division of Hirsh Marine, Inc., and acts as the showing agent between banks owning the repossessed boats and the boat buyer. At all times material to this proceeding, Center was not licensed as a yacht broker in accordance with Chapter 326, Florida Statutes, but was licensed as a boat dealer. On Sunday, March 10, 1991, the Center maintained a display booth at the Ninth Annual Suncoast Boat Show (Show) at Sarasota, Florida. The Center's display booth at the Show on March 10, 1991 contained listings offering boats for sale which had been repossessed by banks. One of those listings was for a 34-foot Mainship Trawler (Trawler). Listing of boats on a display board at boat shows is a common method of offering brokerage boats for sale. At the time Center was offering the Trawler for sale on March 10, 1991, the Center did not own, hold title to or have a secured interest in the Trawler. On March 10, 1992, the Trawler was owned by a lending institution that had foreclosed its security interest in the Trawler. The Trawler had been delivered to the Center by the lending institution to be offered for sale. The Trawler was held for sale by the Center for the owner in expectation of compensation for the sale. Ron Hirshberg testified that after the Center negotiated the sale of a repossessed boat with a buyer, the Center paid the lending institution off and title to the boat was transferred to the Center which in turn transferred title to the buyer. Based on material available at Center's display booth, this does not appear to be the procedure used by the Center in handling a sale. The material available at the Center's display booth advises the potential buyer, among other things, that: (a) Center acts as the showing agent between the boat owner (bank) and buyer; (b) certain guidelines are imposed by the bank; (c) no offers will be submitted to the bank without a 10% refundable deposit on initial offer; (d) offers are subject to bank's acceptance; and (e) if repairs are needed, this will be negotiated between bank and buyer. Respondent had his business cards on the table at the display booth which indicated he was associated with the Center. Also, on the display board was a notice that read "Any questions, come out to Chris Craft in-water display and ask for Dave". Dave is the Respondent herein. Upon inquiry, Respondent would direct the person to the marina where the repossessed boats were stored and explain the procedure on how to make an offer or purchase a repossessed boat. There was insufficient competent substantial evidence to establish facts to show that the Respondent was employed by the Center as a yacht salesman or that the Respondent acted as a yacht salesman on behalf of Center as the term "salesman" is defined in Section 326.082(4), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner, Department of Business Regulation, Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes enter a final order dismissing the order to show cause. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in the case. Rulings on Proposed Finding of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 6 and 7. Adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 8. - 5. Adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 3 and 11. Rejected as not being supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. Adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 and 5. Adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 9. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent The Respondent did not submit any Proposed Findings of Fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark Henderson, Esquire Department of Business Regulation Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 David R. Hirshberg 6035 30th Avenue West Bradenton, Florida 34209 Henry M. Solares, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Donald D. Conn, General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000
Findings Of Fact In June 1986, Petitioner purchased a 55 Ft. Ocean Yacht Super Sport from South Jersey Yacht Sales for $577,055 and took delivery in New Jersey. Although Petitioner is not a dealer, a dealer's license was used to purchase this vessel and Petitioner paid no sales tax to New Jersey on this sale. The boat was named "SEABURY", entered Florida waters in November 1986 and remained for 105 days, proceeded to Bahama Islands February 22, 1987 and returned to Florida April 7, 1987, and remained in Florida for 31 additional days before returning north. From bridge logs maintained by bridge tenders over the Intracoastal Waterway and docking receipts at Bahia Mar and other berthing spaces it was concluded the vessel was used in Florida. Respondent established a prima facie case that the M/V SEABURY entered Florida waters within 6 months of its purchase in New Jersey and was used in this state. No evidence to rebut this prima facie case was presented by Petitioner.
