The Issue The central issues in this case are whether the Respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was certified by the Petitioner as a law enforcement officer on April 1, 1997, and was issued certificate number 170935. At all times material to the issues raised in the Administrative Complaint, the Respondent was employed by the Martin County Sheriff’s Office as a deputy sheriff. On June 1, 2004, at approximately 11:30 a.m., the Respondent was on-duty and drove to an address in Martin County to respond to a trespassing complaint. The Respondent met with Jack Moore, the property manager for a parcel of land that included a lake. Mr. Moore complained that trespassers were fishing in the lake. The Respondent and Mr. Moore went to the area adjacent to the lake in Respondent’s assigned Martin County Sheriff’s Office vehicle, and made contact with Maxwell Boley and Frank Preston, who were fishing in the lake. The Respondent told Mr. Preston and Mr. Boley that they were trespassing on the property and if they wanted to “leave without handcuffs” they would have to give the Respondent some of their property. Mr. Preston understood the Respondent to mean that, if he and Mr. Boley did not give the Respondent some of their fishing equipment, they would be arrested and be taken to jail. Mr. Preston readily turned over his rod and reel. He estimated that it was valued at $50 to $60 dollars. Mr. Boley was hesitant to turn over his fishing equipment because it was more valuable than Mr. Preston’s. Mr. Boley estimated that his two rods and reels were worth $250 dollars each. The Respondent told Mr. Boley that he was “stupid” because giving up his fishing gear was a lot better than going to jail. The Respondent told Mr. Boley that, if he were arrested, his fines and court costs would likely exceed $1,000 dollars and Mr. Boley would have to serve a term of probation. The Respondent told Mr. Boley that he would be “better off” to simply give the Respondent half of his fishing gear and “be done with it.” When Mr. Boley still hesitated to comply, the Respondent told Mr. Boley he was going to jail, to give his car keys to his friend (Mr. Preston), and to turn around. The Respondent then reached for a set of handcuffs. When it became apparent to Mr. Boley that the Respondent meant to make good on his threat, Mr. Boley relented and gave the Respondent one of his rods and reels. Subsequent to the contact with the Respondent and Mr. Moore, Mr. Boley and Mr. Preston turned over a total of two fishing rods and reels. After both Mr. Boley and Mr. Preston turned over their fishing equipment to the Respondent, the Respondent did not arrest or charge either of them with an offense and permitted them to leave. A short time after meeting with Mr. Boley and Mr. Preston, the Respondent and Mr. Moore made contact with Melvin Oliver and Joseph Crawford. Mr. Oliver and Mr. Crawford were also fishing at the same lake. The Respondent told Mr. Oliver and Mr. Crawford that they were trespassing on the property. Mr. Oliver told the Respondent that he, Oliver, would take his stuff, leave, and never come back. The Respondent then suggested that perhaps Mr. Oliver could “work something out” with Mr. Moore in exchange for not being arrested. The Respondent stated that Mr. Moore wanted to “press charges.” The Respondent and Mr. Moore discussed, in Mr. Oliver’s presence, the comparative costs to Mr. Oliver if he were arrested in contrast to the value of his fishing equipment. When Mr. Oliver rejected the idea of such a trade, the Respondent persisted with the proposal of Mr. Oliver and Mr. Crawford giving up their property to avoid going to jail. While the Respondent continued to discuss the matter with Mr. Oliver and Mr. Crawford, Mr. Moore walked over to Mr. Oliver’s boat and retrieved the trolling motor and fishing poles from the boat. Seeing this, Mr. Oliver verbally protested and repeatedly pleaded with the Respondent not to take his property and to simply allow himself and Mr. Crawford to leave. Mr. Moore and the Respondent did not return the property and instead loaded the motor and the fishing poles into the Respondent’s patrol car. The Respondent then told Mr. Oliver never to return to the lake. Once the fishing gear was loaded in the patrol car, the Respondent and Mr. Moore got into the Respondent's patrol car and drove away. The Respondent did not arrest or charge Mr. Oliver or Mr. Crawford with an offense. Instead, he permitted them to leave. As a result of the contact with the Respondent and Mr. Moore, Mr. Oliver and Mr. Crawford turned over a total of four fishing rods and reels and one electric trolling motor. Three of these fishing rods and reels as well as the trolling motor belonged to Mr. Oliver. One fishing rod and reel belonged to Mr. Crawford. After returning Mr. Moore back to his residence, the Respondent set aside one fishing rod and reel and stated that he was keeping it for himself. The Respondent said he had been working a great deal of late and had not had the time to go and purchase a rod and reel. Although the Respondent had initially kept only one fishing rod and reel, Mr. Moore told him to take some more because he (Moore) had plenty. The Respondent agreed and took two more of the fishing rods and reels, remarking that he would give them to his buddies. The Respondent then left Mr. Moore at his residence and drove away. Of the total of six fishing rods and reels and one electric trolling motor turned over by the four fishermen on June 1, 2004, three of the fishing rods and reels were retained in the Respondent’s Martin County Sheriff’s Office vehicle, and Mr. Moore retained the other three fishing rods and reels and the electric trolling motor. Later, on the evening of June 1, 2004, Mr. Boley encountered a Palm Beach County deputy sheriff at a convenience store. Mr. Boley told the deputy about the incident with the Respondent earlier in the day and asked the deputy if it was “right." Based on his conversation with the Palm Beach County deputy, Mr. Boley reported the incident with the Respondent to the Martin County Sheriff’s Office the following day. On June 2, 2004, the Respondent’s supervisor, Lieutenant Glenn Zirkle, contacted the Respondent and instructed him to bring the fishing equipment to Lieutenant Zirkle’s office at the Martin County Sheriff’s Office. In response to Lieutenant Zirkle’s question to the Respondent as to what had occurred, the Respondent told Lieutenant Zirkle that in lieu of arresting the trespassing fishermen, their fishing rods had been taken by the property owner. The Respondent told Lieutenant Zirkle that he had merely “stood by.” The Respondent also told Lieutenant Zirkle that he would go to Mr. Moore’s residence and retrieve the fishing equipment. The Respondent did not inform Lieutenant Zirkle that the Respondent had retained some of the fishing equipment himself. In response to Lieutenant Zirkle’s order, the Respondent went back to Mr. Moore’s residence and retrieved the other three fishing rods and reels and the electric trolling motor. The Respondent then delivered the six fishing rods and reels and the electric trolling motor to Lieutenant Zirkle’s office at the Martin County Sheriff’s Office on June 2, 2004. Approximately one week after his encounter with the Respondent and Mr. Moore, Mr. Oliver filed a complaint with the Martin County Sheriff’s Office. On August 26, 2004, the Respondent gave a sworn statement to Detective Gary Bach of the Martin County Sheriff’s Office concerning an internal investigation into complaints filed against the Respondent by Mr. Oliver and Mr. Boley concerning the fishing equipment. In his statement, the Respondent denied initiating any “deals” with the trespassing fishermen and stated that any arrangements regarding the fishermen giving up their property were between the fishermen and Mr. Moore. The Respondent also stated in his sworn statement that although he was reluctant to keep any of the fishermen’s property, Mr. Moore persuaded the Respondent to accept three of the rods and reels. The Respondent indicated that he relented and accepted the additional fishing gear from Mr. Moore in an effort to be “polite” to Mr. Moore. The Respondent said in his sworn statement that he took the three rods and reels home in his patrol car. The following day, he loaded them into the bed of Deputy Shawn Green’s personal pickup truck. The Respondent stated that he did so without Deputy Green’s knowledge.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent be found guilty of two violations of Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and that Respondent’s certification be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 2006.
Findings Of Fact 5. The Division hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the Findings of Fact numbered 1 through 14 as set forth in the Recommended Order.
Conclusions The Director of the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes (Division) enters this Final Order in the above referenced matter.
Appeal For This Case Ye ee eee THIS FINAL ORDER CONSTITUTES FINAL AGENCY ACTION AND MAY BE THIS FINAL ORDER UCONN YI ES TINA eee e———EESeaeeweorose APPEALED BY_ANY PARTY SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER APPEALED BY_ANY FARK] Y olUpolANyA.T oaoes--- Oo ——o PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND RULE 9.1 10, FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, BY FILING A NOTICE OF APPEAL CONFORMING TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 9.110(d), FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, BOTH WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT _OF APPEAL, ACCOMPANIED BY THE APPROPRIATE FILING FEE, AND WITH THE AGENCY CLERK, DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS _ AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, AT 1940 NORTH MONROE STREET, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-1007 WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF THE RENDITION OF THIS ORDER. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Page 3 of 4 Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes v. Fernando Fernandez DOAH Case No. 04-0771; BPR 2003089755 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE | HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by U.S. Certified Mail to Fernando Fernandez, 15397 Southwest 168" Terrace, Miami, Florida 33187, this day of , 2004. Robin McDaniel, Docket Clerk Copies furnished to: Division of Administrative Hearings Janis Sue Richardson, Office of the General Counsel Robert Badger, Section Head, Yacht & Ship Regulation Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Page 4 of 4 Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes v. Fernando Fernandez DOAH Case No. 04-0771; BPR 2003089755
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations and admissions of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at hearing, I make the following findings of fact. Facts admitted by all parties The water quality standards contained in Rule 17-3.111, Florida Administrative Code will not be violated by this project. There are no aquatic macrophytes located in the area of the proposed project. The proposed project is located within 500 feet of the incorporated municipality of Horseshoe Beach, Florida. The proposed project is located within Class II waters of the State not approved for shellfish harvesting. The project will not adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats. The proposed project will be of a permanent nature. The project will not adversely affect or will not enhance significant historical or acheological resources under the provisions of Section 267.061, Florida Statutes. The rest of the findings The Applicant, Dixie County, applied for a dredge and fill permit to construct a dock which would expand the existing public dock at Horseshoe Beach. In accordance with the revised plans dated October 23, 1986, the proposed facility would consist of a pier 6 feet wide and 120 feet long designed to accommodate six boat slips, each 30 feet wide and 40 feet long. The boundaries of the boat slips will be demarcated by pilings set 10 feet apart. Four of the boat slips would be primarily for the use of commercial fishing boats and commercial shrimping boats. The other two boat slips (the two slips closest to the land) would be reserved for the exclusive use of recreational and other small vessels. By adding a catwalk 3 or 4 feet wide down the middle of the two slips reserved for recreational vessels, the usefulness of those slips to recreational vessels would be greatly enhanced and the narrowness of the resulting slips would preclude their use by large vessels. Adding the two catwalks would be a minor addition to the proposed project which would greatly enhance the usefulness of the project and at the same time avoid the possibility that large vessels in the two slips closest to the land would impede ingress and egress at the nearby boat lift, boat fueling facility, and boat ramp. Adding a reasonable number of permanent trash or garbage containers would also enhance the usefulness of the proposed project and minimize the possibility of improper disposal of trash and garbage which is generated by the normal use of a dock by fishermen and boaters. The proposed project site is located in the Gulf of Mexico at Horseshoe Beach, Florida, and would extend into the waters of the Gulf, which is a tidally influenced water body adjacent to Dixie County, Florida. The water along the shoreline of the area is shallow for a considerable distance waterward, except where basins and channels have been dredged. The Horseshoe Beach area is relatively unpolluted. The existing public dock at Horseshoe Beach is used primarily by recreational vessels, but there is also extensive commercial fishing and Shrimping boat activity in the area. The project is located at the mouth of a canal with direct access to the Gulf. Several commercial fishhouses operate from the canal bank, which generates extensive commercial boat traffic past the proposed project site. Large numbers of commercial shrimp boats presently dock along the canal that ends near the proposed project site. The proposed project requires no dredging. The only filling required by the proposed project is the placement of pilings into the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico. Even though the plans do not specify whether concrete or wooden pilings will be used, this lack of specificity in the plans is irrelevant. Regardless of what types of pilings are used on this project, the filling activity will not violate the water quality criteria contained in Rule 17- 3.051(1), Florida Administrative Code. The placement of the pilings will not adversely affect the public health, safety, and welfare. Further, the proposed project will not adversely affect any property interests of the Petitioners within the scope of Chapter 403, Florida Statutes. The Gulf bottom in the area of the proposed project has already been disturbed. The presently existing suspension of particulate material in the water column, a natural occurrence in the area of the project, results in low visibility which means that seagrass beds and other marine vegetation, which provide shelter and detrital deposits for fish and other marine resources, will not grow. Coast Guard regulations prohibit commercial fishing vessels from depositing materials into the water within three miles of the coast line. Commercial fishing vessels must prominently display a sticker reciting that regulation and it is the practice of commercial fishing vessels operating in the vicinity of Horseshoe Beach to comply with this Coast Guard no discharge requirement by cleaning nets and scrubbing decks outside the three mile limit. It is not the practice of Commercial fishing vessels to deliberately discharge diesel fuel, fish parts or other material into the water while docked. Further, the limited number of commercial fishing vessels which could dock at the proposed facility at the same time cannot reasonably be expected to create discharges in amounts creating a nuisance, posing any danger to the public health safety or welfare, or violating the water quality criteria contained in Rule 17-3.051(1), Florida Statutes. Although small amounts of diesel fuel can become mixed with bilge water and be discharged by automatic bilge pumps while commercial fishing vessels are docked, there is no evidence that this would be in amounts Sufficient to create a nuisance or violate water quality criteria. To the contrary, notwithstanding a large amount of commercial boat traffic past the proposed site and notwithstanding the fact that large numbers of shrimp boats dock up the canal from the proposed site, the water in the area of the proposed site has remained relatively unpolluted. The proposed project will not affect the normal wind and wave action in the area of the proposed project. Such wind and wave action presently results in free exchange between the waters of the open Gulf and the waters near the shore. This free exchange of waters means that any pollutant discharges in the area of the proposed project will be diluted and rapidly dispersed into the Gulf of Mexico. There will be no measurable difference in the wind and wave action, or in the water exchange, after the proposed project is built. No harmful shoaling or erosion is expected to result from construction of the proposed project. Any docking structure extending out into the Gulf of Mexico will obviously have some effect on navigation in the area of the dock, but there is no evidence that the proposed dock will present a hazard to navigation or any significant interference with customary navigation patterns. The distance between the nearest channel marker and the waterward end of the proposed project is more than 200 feet. The angle of the proposed dock and its Spatial relation to the main Horseshoe Beach turning basin cause no impediment to navigation. The placement of Coast Guard Safety lights on the dock would minimize any potential for impeding navigation or posing a danger to the public health or safety during hours of darkness.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, I recommend that the Department of Environmental Regulation issue a Final Order in this case granting the permit applied for by Dixie County. It is also recommended that the permit be made subject to the following additional conditions: That one or more Coast Guard safety lights be placed on the proposed expansion to the dock; That catwalks be added down the middle of the two most landward of the proposed boat slips; and That a reasonable number of trash or garbage receptacles be permanently located on the proposed expansion to the dock to minimize the possibility of trash and garbage being thrown overboard. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-1448 The following are my specific rulings on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by all of the parties. The paragraph numbers referred to below are references to the paragraph numbers in the parties' respective proposed recommended orders. Ruling on findings proposed by the Petitioners: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Accepted. Paragraph 3: Accepted. Paragraph 4: First sentence is rejected as appearing to be more in the nature of an introduction to a discussion of legal issues than a proposed finding of fact. Second and third sentences are rejected as repetitious Paragraph 5: Entire paragraph rejected as unnecessary speculative generalizations in light of the other evidence in this case. Paragraph 6: Entire paragraph rejected as unnecessary speculative generalizations in light of the other evidence in this case. Paragraph 7: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 8: Entire paragraph is rejected as appearing to be more in the nature of an introduction to a discussion of legal issues than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 9: Entire paragraph rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence; construction of the dock may be expected to bring about some changes in the nature of the boat traffic in the immediate area, but nothing of the nature or magnitude suggested by these proposed findings. Paragraph 10: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 11: First sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Second sentence is accepted in part and rejected in part. Rejected portion is irrelevant. Third sentence is rejected as irrelevant. Fourth Sentence is accepted. Fifth sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and as repetitious Sixth sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 12: Entire paragraph rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rulings on findings Proposed by the Respondent: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 3: First two sentences accepted in substance. Last sentence rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 4: Accepted. Paragraph 5: Accepted. Paragraph 6: Accepted. Paragraph 7: Rejected as unnecessary recitation of opposing party's contentions and not proposed finding of fact. Paragraph 8: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 10: Accepted. Paragraph 11: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 12: Accepted. Paragraph 13: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence accepted in part and rejected in part; rejected portion concerns riparian rights, which are irrelevant to whether this permit should be issued. Paragraph 14: Entire paragraph rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 15: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 16: Accepted. Paragraph 17: Accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick M. Bryant, Esquire Moore, Williams & Bryant, P.A. Post Office Box 1169 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 J. Doyle Thomas, Esquire County Attorney Post Office Box 339 Cross City, Florida 32628 Ann Cowles-Fewox, Legal Intern Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Karen Brodeen, Esquire 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dale Twachtmann, Secretary Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
The Issue Whether Respondent's license should be revoked as set forth in the Notice of Intent to Revoke License.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating yacht salesmen and brokers. Such authority includes the discipline of yacht salesman as set forth in Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Respondent has been licensed as a yacht salesman in the State of Florida. Respondent first applied for licensure in June of 1994. This license request was granted and Respondent was issued a license for the two-year period 1994-1996. In June of 1996, Respondent applied to renew the license. This license request was also granted and Respondent was issued a yacht salesman's license for the period 1996-1998. On or about April 28, 1997, Respondent was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, a federal violation, and a felony. As a result, Respondent was sentenced and incarcerated. In July of 1998, Respondent applied to the Department to renew the yacht salesman's license. Based upon the information submitted to Petitioner at the time he sought renewal, the Department had no direct information of the felony conviction. In telephone conversations with the Department staff, Respondent did not disclose he had been incarcerated, was living in a halfway house as part of his sentence, and was a convicted felon. In August of 1998, a third party advised the Department that Respondent had the felony conviction. Thereafter, upon such notice, Petitioner took action to seek revocation of Respondent's license. The license renewal for 1998 filed by Respondent was executed on July 7, 1998. Technically, his license expired on June 14, 1998, but he was afforded a grace period within which to process the renewal. To this end the Department attempted to accommodate the renewal applicant. On the license renewal card Respondent submitted conflicting answers. To question (3) which read: Have you been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendere, since initial licensure? Respondent answered "Y." To question (4) which read: Has any judgment or decree of a court been entered against you or is there now pending any case in this or any other state, in which you were charged with any fraudulent or dishonest dealing? Respondent answered "N." An undated letter from Respondent accompanied the renewal card which referred to a prior correspondence with the Department of June 6, 1996, as the explanation for question (4). As to question (3), the letter stated: "a conviction was made on 4/28/98 in the U.S. District Court Southern Florida." Respondent's answer to question (4) was false. Moreover, the manner in which Respondent answered the two questions did not disclose that Respondent had been convicted of a felony or conspiracy to commit wire fraud. More telling of Respondent's attempt to mislead the Department, however, is his failure to disclose any of the foregoing circumstances during telephone conversations with staff seeking to assist him to renew the license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order revoking Respondent's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip Nowick, Director Florida Land Sales, Condos, Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Scott K. Edmonds, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Tracy J. Sumner, Esquire Tracy J. Sumner, P.A. 1330 Thomasville Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303
Findings Of Fact In his application for registration as a real estate salesman submitted August 21, 1972 (Exhibit 1), Respondent, in response to Question 9 which asked if he had ever been arrested for, or charged with, the commission of an offense against the laws of any municipality, state or nation, answered yes and listed "1958 W. Va--traffic, 1964 So. Carolina-Traffic, 1/16/70 Fla--Traffic, 6/2/71 Fla--Traffic, and 9/17/71 Fla-- Traffic." In his application for registration as a real estate broker submitted February 4, 1972 (Exhibit 3), Respondent answered the same Question 9 exactly as he had done on his application for salesman. Court records from South Carolina (Exhibit 2) show that Ernest Clyde Bourne, Jr., was arrested on a warrant charging him with stealing a boat and trailer of the value of more than $200; that on November 30, 1964, he posted an appearance bond in the amount of $9,000; that he was indicted on March 3, 1965, on an indictment alleging that Bourne, on August 12, 1964, at Georgetown, S.C., feloniously did steal, take and carry away one 25 foot Bertran boat and one six wheel trailer of the value of more than fifty dollars the proper goods and chattels of Earnest Mohler, Jr.; and that on September 21, 1965, he pleaded nolo contendere to receiving stolen goods, the Court entered judgment that he be confined for six months or pay a fine of $500, and that the fine was paid on September 21, 1965. In his defense, Respondent testified that, prior to acquiring the boat he was charged with stealing, he had owned two or three boats, the last of which was destroyed in a fire while at a Princeton, West Virginia, storage during the winter of 1964; and that he was looking for a replacement for the boat. While enroute from his home in Princeton to Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, he stopped at Columbia, South Carolina, to visit a boat yard and, while looking at a boat, was approached by a person representing himself as a salesman. The salesman told him that he knew of a 25 foot Bertram boat in an estate that may be for sale. When Bourne showed interest, he advised that he would know in about a week and Bourne was to call him. In due course, Bourne called the "salesman" who said he had the boat and arranged for Bourne to pick up the boat at Columbia. The address at which Bourne came for the pick up was a corner containing a Texaco station and a wrecked car lot. After inspecting the boat Bourne paid $5,000 cash and executed a lien on a trailer for $2,300. No record was subsequently found that the lien had been recorded and Bourne retained no copy. Bourne towed the boat and trailer to his home in West Virginia where the boat was registered and used by Bourne during the remainder of the summer. At this time Bourne was enrolled at Stetsen Law School in Florida, where his mother resided. Bourne returned to West Virginia in November, 1974, and enroute back to Florida with the boat in tow, he was stopped by the police and arrested at Orangeburg, South Carolina, and charged with larceny of the boat. The sheriff from Georgetown, South Carolina, picked up and drove Bourne to Georgetown where he spent the weekend in jail awaiting the posting of bond. At his trial in September, 1965, Bourne appeared, represented by his lawyer from West Virginia, and a South Carolina attorney. The attorneys arranged for a nolo contendere plea which Bourne entered under the impression he was pleading to an attempt to commit a misdemeanor. Exhibit 4, the deposition of the attorney who represented Bourne at the trial, confirmed that Bourne pleaded nolo contendere to an attempt to commit a misdemeanor in a negotiated plea worked out with the prosecuting attorney. Although the attorney characterized the charge to which Bourne pleaded as "no offense," the negotiated settlement included a $500 fine. This was described in the deposition as a forfeiture of a $500 bond (apparently connected to the $5,000 appearance recognizance previously entered to get Bourne released from jail) and as "the [law] firm check in the amount of $500 which was left with the clerk of the court when the clerk presented a blank form for Bourne to sign. It is presumed the "blank form" subsequently became the judgment page of Exhibit 2 on which Bourne plead nolo contendere to receiving stolen goods and the judge signed the sentence to be confined at hard labor for six (6) months or pay a fine of five hundred dollars ($500).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility to administer and to enforce the Florida Yacht and Ship Broker's Act, Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At times prior to June 21, 1991, Respondent Bongiovi was licensed by Petitioner as a yacht broker. Respondent Bongiovi did not hold any license as a yacht broker at any time after June 21, 1991. Respondent AJB Yachts was not licensed as a yacht broker at any time pertinent to this proceeding. Respondent Bongiovi does business as AJB Yachts or AJB Yacht Sales, Inc. There was no evidence that AJB Yacht Sales, Inc., is legally incorporated. On various dates in September and October 1994, Respondent Bongiovi placed two separate advertisements in the classified ads section of the Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Sun-Sentinel newspaper. The first of these ads offered for sale a 41' Hatteras yacht for the sum of $150,000. The second of these advertisements offered for sale a 43" Portofino yacht for the sum of $125,000. Both advertisements contained the Respondent's telephone number, 305-942-7425. On or about May 28, 1993, Respondent, acting as a yacht broker, represented Charles Robbins in the purchase of a 66' Pacemaker yacht named the Sea Cow. The owner of the yacht, Dennis Gaultney, was represented by Mauch Yacht Sales, Inc., the listing broker. As part of the offer made by Mr. Robbins, he gave to Respondent Bongiovi a check in the amount of $33,000 as earnest money. Respondent Bongiovi deposited this money in a bank account at First Union National Bank of Florida, Pompano Beach branch on June 1, 1993. This account is entitled "AJB Yacht Sales, Inc., Escrow Account." Respondent Bongiovi was the sole signatory on this account. Respondent Bongiovi immediately began making withdrawals from this account that were not related to the Robbins transaction. 1/ As of June 10, 1993, the balance in this account was $29,575.54. As of June 21, 1993, the balance was $23,570.83. As of June 30, 1993, the balance was $21,554.04. Negotiations for the sale of the Sea Cow continued between the purchaser and the owner until July 20, 1993. The final version of the owner's proposal was a response to the last proposal made by Mr. Robbins and contained several changes to the last offer made by Mr. Robbins, including a change in the price of the vessel and an extension of the closing date to July 22, 1993. These changes were initialed by the owner of the boat, but they were not initialed by Mr. Robbins. Mr. Robbins never received a signed copy of the final proposal from the owner of the Sea Cow. A survey to evaluate the condition of the vessel was conducted and a copy of the inspection report faxed to Respondent Bongiovi by Jan Mauch of Mauch Yacht Sales on June 9, 1993. The transmittal note that accompanied the fax stated the following: "Here is the 'Schedule A' 2/ to go with the contract. After Charlie sees the survey, have him sign this and Acceptance of Vessel on contract and fax back both to me and I'll have Denny sign." Included in the inspection report was the following information: ". . . an engine inspection did not include a detailed mechanical inspection or test of components. A complete engine survey by a qualified mechanic is recommended in all cases." Mr. Robbins thereafter requested that Respondent Bongiovi arrange for an inspection of the vessel's engines before he accepted the vessel. Mr. Robbins never received an inspection report for the engines, he did not obtain his own financing for the vessel, and he never tendered the balance of the purchase price. The transaction involving Mr. Robbins did not timely close because the inspection of the engines were not completed. Because there was a delay in closing the transaction, the owner sold the yacht to another buyer. Neither Mr. Gaultney nor Mauch Yacht Sales demanded a portion of the $33,000 earnest money deposit. Mr. Robbins demanded the return of his money from the Respondent after he learned that the Sea Cow had been sold to another purchaser. Respondent Bongiovi refused to return the deposit and asserted the position that he was entitled to keep all of the deposit as liquidated damages because the transaction had not closed. Respondent Bongiovi relies on Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the form agreement for his contention that he was entitled to retain the $33,000 deposit as liquidated damages. Those provisions are as follows: The purchase of the vessel is subject to survey - seatrial - capt (sic) - inspection showing condition subject to purchasers (sic) sole judgment and approval to be conducted as soon as practicable after execution of this agreement at the option and expense of the PURCHASER. The PURCHASER shall give written acceptance or rejection of the Vessel by June 10, 1993, and if written notification is not received by the BROKER (A.J.B. Yacht Sales) on or before said date, it shall be construed as acceptance of the Vessel by PURCHASER. In the event, after written or construed acceptance of the Vessel, the PURCHASER fails to pay the balance of the purchase price and execute all papers necessary to be executed by him for the completion of his purchase, pursuant to the terms of this contract, on or before July 10, 1993, the sum this date paid shall be retained by A.J.B. Yacht Sales as liquidated and agreed damage and the parties shall be relieved of all obligations under this contract. In paragraph 2 of the agreement executed by Mr. Robbins on May 28, 1993, there was a provision that the offer submitted by Mr. Robbins was withdrawn if not accepted by June 5, 1993. There was no evidence that there was a final and complete agreement sufficient to bind the parties by June 5, 1993, or at any time thereafter. The agreement executed by Mr. Robbins on May 28, 1993, also contained the following provision: In the event that this sale is not consummated by reasons of unsatisfactory survey . . . the deposit shall be returned, providing all expenses incurred by the PURCHASER against the Vessel have been paid, and this agreement shall be null and void. Mr. Robbins verbally notified Respondent Bongiovi that he would require additional testing on the engine before accepting the vessel. Mr. Robbins did not receive the results of those additional tests and learned soon thereafter that the vessel had been sold to another purchaser. Following the failure and refusal of the Respondents to return the deposit, Mr. Robbins sued the Respondents in the Circuit Court in and for Broward County, Florida, pursuant to the provisions of Sections 772.11 and 812.014, Florida Statutes. Based on the evidence presented, the Circuit Judge in that civil proceeding entered a final judgement for treble damages ($99,000) in favor of Mr. Robbins and against the Respondents based, in part, on the following: . . . On the evidence presented, the Court finds: * * * Plaintiff (Mr. Robbins) gave Defendants (Mr. Bongiovi and his corporation) a check in the amount of $33,000.00 on May 28, 1993, to be held in escrow as a deposit pending accep- tance by the owner of a vessel for the purchase of said motor vessel. Said $33,000.00 was deposited into a bank account owned and/or controlled by Defendants. The owner of the vessel failed to accept Plaintiff's offer within the time provided in the written contract attached to the Amended Complaint; and, therefore, Plaintiff was entitled to return of his $33,000.00 deposit. Plaintiff demanded return of said $33,000.00 deposit, but Defendants failed and refused to return same, which sum has been due with interest since June 5, 1993. Defendants breached the Purchase Agree- ment on June 5, 1993, by failing and refusing to return Plaintiff's deposit of $33,000.00 when the offer to purchase the vessel was not accepted by the owner by that date. Defendants had a fiduciary responsibility to Plaintiff as escrow agents under the Purchase Agreement, and they breached their fiduciary responsibility by failing and refusing to return the $33,000.00 deposit when the offer to purchase the vessel was not accepted by the owner by June 5, 1993. . . .
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order in this proceeding that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law and which imposes an administrative fine jointly and severally against the Respondents in the amount of $10,000 for the violations of Count I and imposes an additional administrative fine jointly and severally against the Respondents in the amount of $10,000 for the violation of Count II. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 1995.
The Issue The issues presented for consideration by the hearing officer were as follows: Whether the project would adversely the public health, safety, or welfare or the property of others; Whether the project would adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats; Whether the project would adversely affect navigation; Whether the project would adversely affect the fishing or recreational values in the vicinity of the project; Whether the project would be of a temporary or permanent nature; and Whether the project would adversely affect the current condition and relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by the proposed activity.
Findings Of Fact On February 21, 1985, the Respondent, John Spang, applied to the Department of Environmental Regulations, Department of natural Resources and the Army Corp. of Engineers for permits necessary to construct two docking facilities, one on each side of the east end of Coronado Bridge, commonly known as the "North Bridge" on the Indian River, north in New Smyrna Beach, Volusia County, Sections 55 and 9, Township 17 South, Range 34 East. The proposed docks include a total of 24 boat slips. The proposed docks are within 25 feet of the right-of-way of the Coronado Bridge on both the north and south sides. The proposed docks consist of four piers. The piers, from south to north, are 101 feet, 102 feet, 122 feet and 122 feet in length respectively. See Respondent's Exhibit #2. The piers south of the bridge are 75 to 80 feet from the east edge of the channel of the Intracoastal Waterway. The piers north of the bridge are 60 to 65 feet from the east edge of the channel of the Intracoastal Waterway. The proposed docking facilities shall service commercially zoned properties `to which they shall be attached and, in particular, the Riverview Hotel and Charlie's Blue Crab Restaurant, at the Riverview. The Petitioners, Grover Ryan and Margaret Ryan, own the commercially zoned property adjacent to the subject property to the south, located at 100 West Columbus Avenue, New Smyrna Beach, Florida. The Ryans operate a commercial business. On March 17, 1986, the Ryans filed a petition for an administrative hearing. Panet E. and Jerrie L. Peterson of 200 Canova Drive, New Smyrna Beach, Florida own the real property located on the river adjacent to the Ryans but not adjoining the proposed docking area or the property of the applicant. On April 15, 1986, the Ryans filed a petition for an administrative hearing. On February 14, 1986, the Department of Environmental Regulation issued Permit Number 64-099806-4, to construct the proposed docking facilities, subject to specific modifications and conditions to those applications. Issuance of the permit was based upon the following: The Army Corp. of Engineers assessed the proposed docking facilities and determined that the project will not impede navigation or otherwise cause danger to the health, safety or welfare of vessels and persons traveling in the Intracoastal Waterway. On April 18, 1986, the Army Corp. of Engineers issued Permit No. 85IPL-20644 for construction of piers pursuant to the applicant's proposal for docking facilities. The harbor and dockmaster for the City of New Smyrna Beach determined that the proposed docking facilities would not impede or endanger navigation of the river and Intracoastal Waterway, if pilots entering and leaving the docking area carefully follow the rules of road. Actual testing of the proposed site by the Department of Environmental Regulation revealed no seagrasses or rooted macrophytes which might be destroyed by the proposed docks. Flushing in the river was found to be excellent and would alleviate any short-term turbidity problems and would further mitigate against any pollutants from the docking areas to the extent that no water quality violations were anticipated. The United States Department of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service determined that the area of the proposed docking facility would not have an adverse affect on the manatee otherwise endanger them. Although the dock will restrict fishing from the bridge between the shore and channel, it will not significantly affect adversely the recreational uses. Generally, bridge fishing is being restricted in Florida due to the hazards to fishermen from traffic. The fishing from boats will be unaffected. There is no marine production in the area. The boat traffic in the vicinity of the proposed docking facility is considered heavy, and there are no restrictions on boating speed. The bridge is raised frequently, but heavy traffic requires boats to wait on weekends. The bridge fenders and concrete abutments of the bridge block the lateral view of boaters as they approach, pass under and leave the Coronado Bridge, and likewise obscures the boats in the bridge area from boaters in the proposed dock area. The closest dock to the south of the proposed docks is owned by the Ryans. Mr. Ryan has used his dock for forty-seven (47) years and uses it to dock his large commercial shrimp boat. Mr. Ryan operates a wholesale/retail seafood store on the property which he owns adjoining the Spang's property. As originally proposed, the southernmost dock sought by the Spang's would interfere with Ryan docking his boat at Ryan's dock. The next dock to the south of the proposed docks and Mr. Ryan's dock is owned by the Petersons. This a forty (40) foot dock which is used for noncommercial purposes. Because it does not protrude as far into the water as Ryan's dock, there is no hazard created by the proposed docks. A conditioned modification to the application was the reduction in size of the southernmost docking facility by 15 feet and the construction of handrails on the outer edges of each dock to prevent mooring of boats along the outer edges. The reduction of the southernmost dock by 15 feet, together with handrails and prevention of mooring of boats on the outside of the docks provided reasonable assurance that there was no impediment to navigation, to include Ryan docking his boat. However, the design of the exits to the two proposed docking areas promotes direct entry at right angles into the Intracoastal Waterway. This is potentially hazardous. Petitioner Ryan has an easement over the Spang property to permit public access to Ryan's property from the right-of-way of the bridge and highway. Spang's restaurant, which has already been built at the site, actually traverses the easement, not the proposed docking facility. The proposed facility does not interfere with the easement the Ryans hold landward of the mean high waterline from the highway right-of-way south to the Ryan's business.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation issue Permit No. 64-099806-4 with the size limitation and requirements for handrails established by the agency and that the layout of the docks be modified as drawn in Appendix B to discourage exiting the docking areas at right angles to the channel of the Intracoastal Waterway. DONE AND ORDERED this 18th day of July 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 86-0992 The following action was taken with regard to the proposed findings of fact submitted in behalf of John Spang: Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 2. Rejected. Paragraph 5 of Ryan's proposed findings of fact adopted as more complete and accurate. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 6. 5,6. Adopted and combined as Recommended Order paragraph 7. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9. Adopted substantially as Recommended Order paragraph 7. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 8. 10,11. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(a). Rejected as conclusion of law and irrelevant because the current proceeding is a de novo proceeding. Rejected as conclusion of law and irrelevant because the current proceeding is a de novo proceeding. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9 (d). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9 (b). Irrelevant. Effect on the persons named is not a basis for review. The following action was taken with regard to the proposed findings of fact submitted in behalf of the Ryans and Petersons: Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 1. Rejected because the applicants' finding cited 24 which was adopted thereby binding the applicant to the lower number. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 3. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 4. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 5. Adopted in part and included in Recommended Order paragraph 12. 7,8. Rejected in favor of Recommended Order paragraph 11. 9. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 11. 10,12. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 13. 11,13. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 14. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 11. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 12. Rejected as a list of actors without any conclusion stated. 18,19. Rejected in favor of Recommended Order paragraph 10 which more accurately summarizes the more credible facts regarding fishing. 20,21,22. Rejected in favor of paragraph 9(d) which more accurately summarizes the more credible facts regarding danger to manatees. Rejected as contrary to the facts. Rejected as contrary to the facts. Adopted in part in Recommended Order paragraph 16. Rejected as contrary to the facts. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. The following action was taken with regard to the Agency's proposed findings of facts. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 1. Adopted in part in Recommended Order paragraph 16 and in part in Recommended Order paragraph 10. 1st sentence: Rejected as irrelevant in light of the Agency's subsequent issuance. Remainder: Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(c). Adopted generally as Recommended Order paragraph 16. 5,6. Adopted generally as Recommended Order paragraph 14. Adopted generally as Recommended Order paragraph 15. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(d). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(a). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(b). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 17. COPIES FURNISHED: Victoria Tschinkel Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mary F. Smallwood, Esquire General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William F. Hathaway, Esquire Post Office Drawer H New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32070-1586 Vivian F. Garfein, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Hal Spence, Esquire 221 N. Causeway Post Office Box 1266 New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32070-1266
