Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Robert Lowenthal as Trustee, trading as Cotton Apartments, is licensed by the Petitioner, the Division of Hotels and Restaurants, Department of Business Regulation, and is in business at 41 East Eighth Street in Hialeah, Florida. Robert Lowenthal is the owner and trustee of said business. A Notice to Show Cause was issued by Petitioner on September 1, 1978, notifying Respondent that certain evidence, which, if true, is good and sufficient cause pursuant to Section 509.261, Florida Statutes, to assess a civil penalty against the Respondent, or to suspend or revoke the license, for failure to return a security deposit of $215.00 to Juana Abijalil and failure to provide a written notice to tell said tenant how the security deposit was being held. The Notice to Show Cause indicated at that date five (5) percent interest, or a total of $44.70, was due. No answer was received by Petitioner, and an Administrative Hearing was requested. Juana Abijalil rented an apartment at Respondent Cotton Apartments on June 16, 1974, from the then manager of said apartments, Howard Jenkins. She rented apartment #17 and paid a rental of $165.00 for the month of June 16, 1974, to July 16, 1974. At the same time she paid $165.00 on her last month's rent. Ms. Abijalil lived in said apartment until May of 1978, when she moved. Prior to April 16, 1978, she told the then manager of said apartment and his wife, Mr. and Mrs. Blanco, that she intended to move and wanted to use the last month's rent she had previously paid on June 16, 1974, for payment for the month of April 16, 1978, to May 16, 1978. She was assured that there would be no problem with a refund, and she then paid the regular monthly rental on April 16, 1978. Prior to her move, and prior to May 16, 1978, Ms. Abijalil again orally requested to be reimbursed in the amount she had prepaid in 1974. She was not paid, but she moved from the apartment owned by Respondent Lowenthal on May 15, 1978. She has made numerous oral demands upon Respondent to be reimbursed, but she has not been reimbursed for the amount she prepaid. The testimony of the witness as to the foregoing facts was unchallenged. Submitted into evidence without objection was a receipt for rental payments dated June 16, 1974, on which it was stated "Received from Juana Abijalil $165.00 for rent on last month's rent." Said receipt was signed by Howard Jenkins, who is now dead. It is obvious that said receipt was altered, and "$50.00 security" was written in, hence the demand for $215.00. The Petitioner Division submitted a memorandum of law. This instrument was considered in the writing of this order. To the extent the proposed memorandum has not been adopted in, or is inconsistent with, factual findings in this order it has been specifically rejected as being irrelevant or not having been supported by the evidence.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Respondent, Robert Lowenthal, be assessed a fine of $500.00. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of December, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mary Jo M. Gallay, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Bernard F. Siegel, Esquire 370 Minorca Avenue Coral Gables, Florida 33134
The Issue The ultimate issue is whether Emergency Rule 10 CER 80-11 is valid. Petitioner alleges that this rule is an invalid exercise of validly delegated legislative authority because it is over-broad and excludes Public Housing Authorities which have reserve funds when such reserve funds are required by rules and regulations of the federal housing authorities.
Findings Of Fact Dade County HUD is a Public Housing Authority (PHA). Dade County HUD applied for LIEAP benefits and was denied upon a determination that it was "fully compensated" pursuant to Emergency Rule 10 CER 80-11, Florida Administrative Code. Dade County HUD has standing to make this challenge on the rule. The U.S. Congress enacted as federal law 42 U.S.C. ..8607 which provides for the LIEAP program. The provisions of the federal statutes place payments to PHAs on an equal footing with those to individual households. See Section 308(b)(3)(A) and (B), 42 U.S.C. 8607. The State of Florida authorized the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to administer this program in Florida through Florida Statutes 409.508, which also authorizes DHRS to enact rules to implement this federal program. Pursuant to this authority, the Department prepared draft rules and regulations which were approved as required by the federal authorities and adopted in accordance with applicable state statutes as Emergency Rule 10 CER 80-11. The portion of Rule 10 CER 80-11.10, Florida Administrative Code, specifically challenged in this case, provides in pertinent part regarding PHAs: (2) The project must not be fully com- pensated. A low rent public housing authority project is not fully compensated when the sum of the project's reserve and approved subsidy does not equal or exceed the pro- ject's expenses less revenue. Other pro- jects are not fully compensated when the sum of the project's approved subsidy and revenue does not equal or exceed the pro- ject's expenses. The effect of this rule is to exclude from LIEAP benefits any PHA whose revenues and reserves exceeded its expenses. Pursuant to federal guidelines, the Department first arrived at a percentage of potentially eligible recipients in Florida residing in PHAs. It allocated to PHA this percentage of the $23 million available to Florida. This amounted to less than $700,000. Recognizing that all PHAs had been adversely affected by the increased cost of operation to include energy cost, the Department further determined that only the most vulnerable, i.e., those PHAs whose tenants might suffer the most in the absence of LIEAP payments, should be eligible. The Department adopted the objective criteria, as required by the federal authorities, set forth in Rule 10 CER 80-11.10, Florida Administrative Code. This criteria provided payments only to those PHAs who lacked money to pay heating bills. All the monies paid to PHAs were paid to paid to PHAs meeting the criteria stated in Rule 10 CER 80-11.10, supra. The rule and payments made under them were procedurally and substantively in accord with the applicable state and federal statutes.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Petitioner received appropriate relocation assistance for her home and business as a result of the Department’s taking.
Findings Of Fact For several years during the mid to late 1990’s, and specifically during 1996 and 1997, the Department of Transportation was engaged in acquiring property in Pasco County, Florida, for the construction of the Suncoast Parkway, a new corridor which, when completed, will extend approximately 42 miles from the Veteran’s Expressway in Hillsborough County in the south to a connection with US Highway 98 in Hernando County in the north. In support of that project, it became necessary for the Department to acquire approximately 639 individually owned parcels of land. To facilitate the planning for and purchase of this property, the Department utilized the services of several engineering firms, including the firm of Post, Buckley, Schuh, and Jernigan, Inc., (PBS&J). PBS&J’s manager for this project was Norris Smith, who has been employed with the company in this type of work for approximately eight years. PBS&J, as general consultant for the Turnpike District, also manages other firms working on road construction projects for the Department. Included among these firms utilized on the Suncoast Parkway project were Gulf Coast Property Acquisitions (Gulf Coast), and Universal Field Services (Universal). In acquiring the identified individual parcels which make up a specific project, the procedure usually followed calls for a relocation specialist to make the original calculation of the relocation payment to the property owner. This calculation is then put through a review process during which it is evaluated for approval by the project manager. In the instant case, the initial relocation specialist was Gary South, an employee of Gulf Coast, who made the initial relocation contact with the Petitioner. However, Mr. South took ill in January 1997, and was replaced on this project by David Cole. Mr. Cole has worked with Gulf Coast as a relocation specialist since 1993, and, since 1970, has worked as a relocation specialist under the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act (Act) in five states. He has participated in relocations involved in approximately 70 parcel acquisitions on the Suncoast Parkway project. Relocations of individuals displaced as a result of property acquisitions for road construction are accomplished under the guidelines of the Uniform Relocation Assistance Program memorialized in 24 C.F.R., Part 24. These guidelines have been adopted by the State of Florida and are incorporated in the Department of Transportation’s Rule 14-66. Once the Department is tasked to undertake a construction project in which land is to be acquired or businesses are to be relocated, it conducts one or more public hearings in the area of development to explain the scope and dimensions of the project. After that, relocation specialists visit each residence and business to speak with the resident or business owner and conduct a needs assessment survey which is supposed to be used as a guide to determine the type of relocation assistance necessary. It is at this visit that the relocation specialist provides the resident or business owner with a relocation brochure which explains the process and the displacee’s rights and responsibilities in detail. The displacee’s prior term of tenancy of the property determines his/her eligibility level for relocation assistance payments. If the resident/occupant has been in the property for 180 days or more, he or she is eligible for relocation payments of up to $22,500 in addition to benefits to cover moving personal property to the new dwelling. If the resident/occupant has been a tenant in place for 90 to 179 days, he or she is eligible for a rental assistance payment not to exceed $2,500 which may be used either FOR rent payments on a replacement rental property or as a down payment on the purchase of a new home. Consistent with the described procedure, Gary South conducted the needs assessment survey of Petitioner’s household in February 1996 during which he informed Ms. Dornseif of the relocation services available. It was determined during that survey that there were two residences as well as three business on the Dornseif property. One of the residences was occupied by Petitioner and her family. The other residence was occupied by Petitioner’s father, Mr. DeClue. Mr. DeClue was determined to be a 180-day homeowner/occupant eligible for benefits, while Petitioner was classified as a 90-day tenant and eligible for rental assistance payments and move costs. This information was conveyed to Petitioner by Mr. South. After Mr. South became ill and Mr. Cole took over from him as relocation specialist for this property, Mr. Cole met with Petitioner to update the survey and determine that the information previously developed by Mr. South was still accurate. Cole also reiterated the relevant information regarding the relocation advisory services for which Petitioner was eligible. Included in this advice was the information regarding rental assistance payments, as well as the information necessary to calculate that figure. Mr. Cole specifically advised Petitioner that she could utilize the rental assistance payment as down payment on a home. In connection with this move, Mr. Cole updated the household survey relating to the number of people in the home and the number of rooms contained in the house. He also delivered to Petitioner the residential relocation brochure, explained his participation in the process, and delivered the original Notice of Eligibility. He also delivered a statement of eligibility and gave Petitioner a briefing of the amount of money available as a rent supplement and how it was calculated. In addition, he provided Petitioner with a list of available properties. In addition to the verbal communication by Mr. Cole, all the pertinent and necessary information regarding relocation assistance was also included with a Notice of Eligibility which the Department served on Petitioner on July 19, 1996. By this notice, Petitioner was advised of her eligibility for a relocation assistance payment, but because the specific amount of payment is dependent upon financial input from the individual being displaced, the exact dollar amount of the payment may not be available when the eligibility notice is issued. That was the case here. Ms. Dornseif acknowledged receipt of her Notice of Eligibility on July 19, 1996, but because she had not submitted all relevant and required financial information to the Department by the time of eligibility determination, the exact amount of payment had not been determined. Petitioner was informed of that fact and the reason for it. In fact, the required rental and income information needed to calculate the amount of payment to be made was not received by the Department until approximately one year later, when it was submitted by Petitioner’s attorney. Once the required financial information was received by the Department, however, a revised Notice of Eligibility was issued on June 17, 1997, which included the amount to be paid by the Department. According to the Department’s calculations, based on information submitted by the Petitioner, Ms. Dornseif was to receive a rental assistance payment of $7,440.12. This figure was based on the difference between the rental and utility costs at the former dwelling and the rental plus utility costs at the replacement dwelling. Under the formula for calculating payment, the difference is multiplied by 42 so as to provide displacement costs to cover 42 months. In implementing the formula, the replacement rental is based on the rental costs of a comparable dwelling on the market at the time of the assessment. It appears that though the land on which the mobile home occupied by Petitioner was located was owned by her, her husband, and her father, Mr. DeClue, the actual residence was owned by her father. It was for that reason that Petitioner was eligible for the rental supplement as opposed to the other allowance. She claims she made all this information known to the Department in advance and was assured it was “OK,” but now asserts she did not know, and was not told at the time, that there was a maximum for rental supplements. The maximum cap for rental assistance payments is set by law at $5,250. This is less than the amount received by the Petitioner. However, there is a provision in the law for exceeding the cap upon justification by the Department in writing to the federal government. Because of market conditions at the time of the search for comparables for Petitioner, the comparable used in the calculation was the best available. This information regarding the regulatory cap, the calculations made in this case, and the effect that current market conditions had on the calculations, were explained to Petitioner by Mr. Cole. With regard to the actual move by Petitioner from the former residence to the replacement dwelling, Petitioner after being fully briefed both in writing and by Mr. Cole on the procedure to be followed, chose to be reimbursed for the actual costs of the move by a commercial mover. She was instructed to obtain estimates from two commercial movers and advised she would be reimbursed the lower of the two estimates. This was $5,728.62. After the move was completed, Petitioner submitted receipts for the commercial move totaling approximately $6,074.94, but she was reimbursed the $5,662.94. The reduction was made because of some duplications and claims for ineligible items, but Petitioner was dissatisfied with the amount paid. Petitioner also was eligible for reimbursement for the move of her business. In this case, she chose an “in lieu of” payment instead of actual reimbursement for a commercial move. She elected to do this after she had been personally briefed by Mr. Cole on the options available to her for this part of the move. She claims she was told by Department personnel she would receive a fixed amount for the business plus a reimbursement for the business move, but she now contends she received no reimbursement. Petitioner is not satisfied with the relocation assistance payments made to her, claiming that the amounts finally offered were approximately one-half the amount initially estimated by Department personnel. She asserts that all the original estimates by Department personnel were reduced and cut, and she received far less than she was led to expect. She claims her neighbors, who had resided nearby for a far shorter time than she got far more than she did. Petitioner requested that the Department’s calculations of the amounts to be paid to her be independently reviewed. Niether individual who performed the recalculations made any changes to the amounts determined payable. Petitioner then requested another review by a higher authority, and the matter was referred to Paula Warmath, at the time the Right-of Way Manager for the Turnpike District. After her review of the matter, Ms. Warmath did not make any changes to the payment amounts. Petitioner’s next appeal was to Richard Eddleman, the Department’s State Relocation Administrator, the final review authority for relocation assistance appeals. Mr. Eddleman obtained the complete relocation files maintained by the Department on this case, carefully reviewed it, spoke with relevant Turnpike district personnel, and recalculated the relocation assistance payments. Based on his review of the file, Mr. Eddleman concluded that the relocation assistance payments for Petitioner had been properly calculated according to the established rules. This decision was communicated to Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order affirming the relocation assistance payments previously calculated for Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Vlenda Dornseif 15331 Penny Court Spring Hill, Florida 34610 Andrea V. Nelson, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Suite 562 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioners in violation of the Fair Housing Act by failing to release them from a 20-year affordable housing deed restriction.
Findings Of Fact No dispute exists that Mr. Discher is handicapped, as indicated in his medical records, for purposes of the Fair Housing Act. John and Ruth Discher own the property located at 22916 Bluegill Lane, Cudjoe Key, Florida, with the following legal description: Lot 32, Block 10, Cudjoe Ocean Shores, as recorded in Plat Book 6, Page 76, of the Public Records of Monroe County, Florida. At the time of hearing, the Dischers did not live in the residential home on the property but rented it. No dispute exists that Monroe County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida having regulatory jurisdiction over the Dischers’ property. Since around 1979, Monroe County has been designated as an Area of Critical State Concern (ACSC). As an ACSC, increased State oversight of and involvement in local planning decisions is required by the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Florida Administrative Commission, and the Department of Community Affairs (DCA), as the State land planning agency. The Florida Legislature imposed a series of “principles for guiding development” in the Florid Keys. § 380.0552(7), Fla. Stat. One of the principles for guiding development imposed by the State is “to make available adequate affordable housing for all sectors of the population of the Florida Keys.” § 380.0552(7)(j), Fla. Stat. In 1992, the Rate of Growth Ordinance (ROGO) was adopted by the Florida Administrative Commission on behalf of Monroe County in order to limit growth in the Keys. The purpose and intent of ROGO was to facilitate implementation of goals, objective and policies set forth in Monroe County’s comprehensive plan relating to many areas of concern, including the protection of the environment (including endangered species and species on the concerned list), residents, and visitors; hurricane evacuation; road improvement; property and property development. ROGO consists of a competitive point system, based on a complex scoring system, and those who obtain the top points receive allocations. Point values are accessed on and using a number of criteria. Under the ROGO system, property owners, who wish to build houses on vacant land, must compete to receive a limited number of residential allocations. The yearly number of building allocations is limited by state administrative rule. Property owners seeking building allocations compete against each other in order to receive one of the limited number of allocations. In 1996, Monroe County’s comprehensive plan was effective. Prior to 1996, Monroe County received very few applicants for ROGO; however, after the comprehensive plan became effective the competition under ROGO increased tremendously. Developers and persons with high economic means became the majority of those able to receive points in order to obtain the majority of the limited allocations. With the increase in competition, affordable housing became a concern. The ultimate goal of Monroe County under the ACSC program is for it (Monroe County) to get into the position of being able to protect the environmental resources, provide for hurricane evacuation, and do everything that is required in Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and be removed or “de-designated” as an ACSC. Applicable to the instant matter, affordable housing was defined in Monroe County Code, Land Development Regulations, Section 9.5-4, which provided in pertinent part: (A-5) Affordable housing means housing which: * * * With respect to a housing unit to be occupied by moderate-income persons, that monthly rents, or monthly mortgage payments, including taxes and insurance, do not exceed thirty (30) percent of that amount which represents one hundred twenty (120) percent of the median adjusted gross annual income for households within Monroe County, divided by 12 for a period of twenty (20) years. The dwelling unit must also meet all applicable requirements of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development minimum property standards as to room sizes, fixtures, landscaping and building materials, when not in conflict with applicable laws of Monroe County. For the purposes of this section, “adjusted gross income” means all wages, assets, regular cash or noncash contributions or gifts from persons outside the household, and such other resources and benefits as may be determined to be income by rule of the department of community affairs, adjusted for family size, less deductions allowable under section 62 of the Internal Revenue code; and In which, if permitted by law, preference is given to local contractors. The threshold for a household’s income to qualify for affordable housing was set by this regulation. Further, Monroe County Code, Land Development Regulations, Section 9.5-266, applicable to the instant matter, provided in pertinent part: (a) Affordable Housing: (1) Notwithstanding the density limitation in section 9.5-262, the owner of a parcel of land shall be entitled to develop affordable housing as defined in section 9.5-4(A-5). . . . * * * Before any certificate of occupancy may be issued for any structure, portion or phase of a project subject to this section, restrictive covenant(s), limiting the required number of dwelling units to households meeting the income criteria described in paragraph (4)(a)-(f) of this subsection (a) running in favor of Monroe County and enforceable by the county, shall be filed in the official records of Monroe County. The covenant(s) shall be effective for twenty (20) years but shall not commence running until a certificate of occupancy has been issued by the building official for the dwelling unit or units to which the covenant or covenants apply. In order for the owner of a parcel of land to be entitled to the incentives outlined in this section, the owner must ensure that: a. The use of the dwelling is restricted to households that derive at least seventy (70) percent of their household income from gainful employment in Monroe County; and * * * e. The use of the dwelling is restricted for a period of at least twenty (20) years to households with an income no greater than one hundred twenty (120) percent of the median household income for Monroe County . . . . This regulation sets the limitation for covenants at 20 years, with the time period beginning to run at the issuance of the certificate of occupancy by the building department. Under the ROGO plan, a person was awarded additional points if the person agreed to the imposition of an affordable housing deed restriction. Being awarded the additional points meant that a person would receive an allocation in a shorter period of time. At that time, Mrs. Discher was an employee of the Monroe County Sheriffs Department. The Dischers completed a ROGO application. They wanted to be awarded additional points to reduce the period of time for them to receive an allocation for the construction of their home. The Dischers completed an Annual Affidavit of Qualification for Affordable Housing (Residential Dwelling Unit). The Affidavit provided, among other things, an acknowledgement by the Dischers that the Affidavit was a waiver of payment of the required impact fees; that Mrs. Discher was an employee of the Monroe County Sheriff’s Department and at least 70 percent of the household’s income was derived from that employment; that the single family home was restricted for 20 years to household’s with adjusted gross income of a certain amount; that the Dischers would file an approved deed restriction indicating “that, either (1) the deferred impact fees shall become due and owing if the unit no longer qualifies as Affordable Housing, or, (2) that the dwelling unit shall be restricted by the affordable housing criteria for twenty years commencing from the issuance of the certificate of occupancy”; and that the Dischers understood that, if affordable housing was used to gain points in the allocation system, the single-family home would be restricted by the covenants for 20 years. Mr. Discher prepared an affordable housing deed restriction for a residential dwelling unit in 1997. The Affordable Housing Deed Restriction, prepared by Mr. Discher, was executed by the Dischers on July 2, 1997. Provision II of the Affordable Housing Deed Restriction provided, among other things, an acknowledgement that “fair share impact fees” shall be paid by any person prior to receiving a building permit for any new land development. Provision III of the Affordable Housing Deed Restriction provided, among other things, an acknowledgement by the Dischers that they were being exempt from payment of their fair share impact fees for the single family home to be constructed by them on their property. Provision IV of the Affordable Housing Deed Restriction provided, among other things, that the sale, transfer or rental of their single family home shall only be to persons who qualify under Monroe County’s current affordable housing eligibility requirements as established and amended from time to time. Provision V of the Affordable Housing Deed Restriction provides, among other things, that the covenants shall be effective for 20 years and shall begin to run at the issuance of certificate of occupancy by the building department. Provision VI of the Affordable Housing Deed Restriction provides, among other things, that the Dischers used the affordable housing program to gain additional points in the permit allocation system. The Affordable Housing Deed Restriction contains no provision for removal of the affordable housing deed restriction. The Dischers were given additional points. Their wait-time for an allocation was reduced, and they received an allocation to build their single family home. The Dischers attempted to pay impact fees on or about October 2, 1997. They were informed by the building department that they were not required to pay the impact fees and their check for the impact fees was returned to them. They obtained a mortgage loan and completed their single family home. A certificate of occupancy was issued on June 30, 1999. Mr. Discher testified at hearing that the only reason that he and his wife applied for the ROGO program and that he prepared and he and his wife executed the Affordable Housing Deed Restriction was because an employee of the Monroe County Building Department informed him that they (the Dischers) could be released from the affordable housing deed restriction simply by paying the fair share impact fee at any time. Before ROGO, Monroe County had an affordable housing ordinance that permitted the removal from affordable housing by paying the impact fees. A household benefited by not initially paying impact fees; but, the household could later decide to pay the impact fees, come forward and pay the impact fees, and be removed from affordable housing. However, after ROGO was adopted, the option to later pay the impact fees and be removed from affordable housing no longer existed. ROGO contained no mechanism for a person to pay the impact fees and be removed from affordable housing before the time limit expired or to be removed from affordable housing before the time limit expired. At hearing, the building official was identified but did not testify. Insufficient evidence was presented to ascertain whether the building official had the apparent authority to allow the Dischers to pay the impact fees and remove them from the affordable housing restrictions prior to the 20 years. Consequently, the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that the Dischers reasonably relied upon the building official’s representation to support a release from the affordable housing restrictions. No copy of any release from the affordable housing deed restrictions recorded in the official records of Monroe County was presented at hearing. The evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that Monroe County had released any persons from affordable housing deed restrictions. In 2005, the Dischers made a request to Monroe County for removal of the affordable housing deed restrictions. The Dischers were notified by Monroe County that no provision existed in the Monroe County Code or Monroe County’s Comprehensive Plan for removal of the affordable deed restrictions prior the effective date of their expiration or termination and that its Comprehensive Plan provided that affordable housing projects shall be required to maintain the project as affordable housing on a long-term basis in accordance with deed restrictions. Furthermore, the Dischers were notified by Monroe County that prospective occupant(s) of the affordable housing must meet the qualifications for affordable housing. The Dischers attempted to pay the impact fees in order to be released from the affordable housing deed restrictions. They attempted to pay the impact fees on at least two occasions— March 20, 2006, and February 20, 2007. On each occasion, their payment was refused by Monroe County. Monroe County determined that payment of the impact fees would not release the Dischers from the affordable housing deed restrictions, and, therefore, refused and returned the Dischers’ payments. Moreover, no provision in the Monroe County Code permitted the removal of the affordable housing deed restrictions. Monroe County admits that, under the guidelines in place when the Dischers obtained affordable housing, the Dischers are not restricted to a selling or renting price for their single family home. However, they are restricted as to the income of prospective buyer(s) or renter(s), i.e., the prospective buyer(s) or renter(s) must meet the income guidelines set forth in the Monroe County Code. Prior to and during the entire process involving the ROGO program, Mr. Discher was disabled. A copy of a letter written by the Dischers in September 1997, in which Mr. Discher indicated his disability, was forwarded to Monroe County. After the completion of the Dischers’ home, Mr. Discher’s health deteriorated. At hearing, Mr. Discher admitted that, prior to filing the discriminatory fair housing complaint, he had never mentioned his disability to Monroe County in relation to having the affordable housing deed restrictions removed. Moreover, at hearing, he admitted that Monroe County had not discriminated against him on the basis of his disability by refusing to remove the affordable housing deed restrictions. Mr. Discher’s physicians recommended to him that he move away from the Keys to improve his health. Furthermore, eventually, Mr. Discher needed to be closer to the locations where he was receiving his medical treatments, which were outside of the Keys. The Dischers finally moved away from the Keys to be closer to the locations where Mr. Discher was receiving his medical treatments. They rented their single-family home in Monroe County. Mrs. Discher was forced to return to work. If the Dischers are released from the affordable housing deed restrictions or if the affordable housing deed restrictions are removed, the Dischers would sell the single-family home. A Senior Planner with DCA, Ada Mayte Santamaria, testified at hearing as an expert in community planning. Ms. Santamaria testified that neither Monroe County’s Comprehensive Plan nor its Land Development Regulations allow for the removal of the Dischers’ affordable housing deed restrictions; and that, if the affordable housing deed restrictions were released, DCA would probably issue a notice of violation against Monroe County for not properly implementing its Comprehensive Plan and Land Development Regulations and probably recommend to the Administration Commission that Monroe County’s allocations for the year following such release be reduced because of the failure of Monroe County to enforce and implement its Comprehensive Plan and Land Development Regulations. Ms. Santamaria further testified that Monroe County is allowed to submit two proposed comprehensive plan amendments per year; and that, because of the process involved in proposed amendments, including review by DCA, a proposed amendment by Monroe County to release affordable housing deed restrictions would take a minimum of six months and could take up to a year and a half to complete the process. At a Monroe County Commission meeting held on January 17, 2007, the Dischers requested to be released from their affordable housing deed restrictions based on hardship due to Mr. Discher’s medical conditions. At the meeting, copy of his medical documents, identifying his disability, was distributed to the Commissioners. The Commissioners denied the Dischers’ request. However, the Commissioners also decided that they wanted to address extreme hardship situations and unanimously voted to direct its staff to begin work on an “exit strategy” for affordable housing deed restrictions on the basis of extreme hardship situations. The Commission staff represented at the meeting that such a process would take at least three months and indicated that Monroe County’s Comprehensive Plan may have to be amended in conjunction with what the Commission wanted. At the time of the final hearing in the instant matter, approximately a year and a half later, no “exit strategy” had been brought before the Commission. No evidence was presented that the Commission had decided that it no longer wanted to develop an “exit strategy.” No evidence was presented as to why the process had not begun. The Dischers are convinced that Monroe County wants to take their property. The evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that Monroe County wants to take the Dischers’ property.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Monroe County Commissioners did not commit a discriminating housing practice against John and Ruth Discher in violation of the Fair Housing Act by failing to release or remove the affordable housing deed restrictions. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 2008.
The Issue Whether applicant is eligible for relocation assistance monetary benefits pursuant to Public Law 91-646 and Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970. Although notice of hearing was provided to Mr. and Mrs. Limegrover on March 26, 1976, they did not appear at the time of hearing. Upon telephonic inquiry on June 8th by a representative of the Department of Transportation, Mr. Limegrover advised that he had received the notice and although he had intended to call the Department of Transportation concerning the matter, he had forgotten to do so. He stated that he desired a continuance of the case. His request was objected to by counsel for the Department of Transportation. The request for continuance was denied as being untimely and good cause not having been shown therefor. The hearing was conducted as an uncontested proceeding.
Findings Of Fact By letter of October 20, 1975, Mr. and Mrs. Richard Limegrover of Courtly Manors Mobile Home Park, Hialeah Gardens, Florida, were advised by the Florida Department of Transportation that it was in the process of acquiring right-of-way for State Road #25 (U.S. 27) in their area, and that the mobile home lot the Limegrovers occupied as tenants would be required for construction of the facility. The letter provided the Department's assurance that they would not be required to move until at least 90 days had elapsed from the date of receipt of the letter, and that they would receive a further notice specifying the actual date by which the property must be vacated at least 30 days prior to the date specified. The letter concluded by an expression of the Department's desire to assist in relocation and to answer any questions concerning such matters. On December 8, 1975, a further letter was sent to the Limegrovers by the Department of Transportation assuring the addressees that the prior letter had not been a notice to move and that no one at the Courtly Manors Mobile Home Park would be required to move until negotiations with the owner had been completed or monies placed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Dade County by court order. It further stated that in the interim period relocatees living within Courtly Manors who were eligible and decided to move on their own initiative would be assisted by the Department in their relocation. Limegrover called Mr. Carl Moon, Right-of-Way Agent, Department of Transportation, Ft. Lauderdale, on December 11, requesting assistance in arrangements for moving his mobile home. Moon discovered that Limegrover wanted to move before January 1, 1976, as he had reserved a lot in another mobile home park. However, Limegrover told him that when he advised his current landlord on December 11 of the projected move on December 30, the landlord stated that in the absence of 30 days notice, Limegrover must forfeit his $90.00 security deposit. Limegrover told Moon that he felt the Department of Transportation should pay the $90.00 security deposit since he was being forced to move by that agency. Moon told him that he was not required to move that soon, but Limegrover was unwilling to wait, fearing that he would not be able to find a satisfactory place later on. Accordingly, Moon assisted him in his moving arrangements and Limegrover was paid for his moving expenses in the amount of $640.00 and smaller sums for reinstallation of his telephone and disconnection and reconnection of his gas equipment. Inasmuch as the Department of transportation declined to pay the $90.00 representing alleged forfeiture of the security deposit, Limegrover filed this relocation appeal. (Testimony of Moon, Exhibits 1 & 2).
Recommendation That the appeal of Richard and Jane Limegrover, in the amount of $90.00, be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of July, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Phillip Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Room 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida Richard S. and Jane E. Limegrover Lot F4, Haven Lakes Mobile Home Park 11201 S.W. 55th Street Miramar, Florida 33025
The Issue The issue in Case No. 98-3441RX is whether a 15 percent penalty provision of the Florida Housing Finance Corporation's 1998 Application Package for Low Income Housing Tax Credits, adopted and incorporated into the Florida Administrative Code, by reference pursuant to Rules 67-48.002(10) and 67-48.004(1), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The issue in Case No. 98-3873 is whether Respondent appropriately applied the 15 percent penalty to Petitioner on its 1998 Application for Low Income Housing Tax Credits.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, Lakewood Senior Apartments Limited Partnership (hereinafter referred to as "Lakewood"), was an applicant for 1998 Low Income Housing Tax Credit funding. Respondent, the Florida Housing Finance Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "FHFC"), has been designated by the State of Florida to administer a Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program. Section 420.5099, Florida Statutes. FHFC is governed by a nine-member board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board"). The members of the Board are appointed by the Governor. Intervenors, LCA Development, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "LCA"), The Gatehouse Group, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Gatehouse"), Vestcor Equities, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Vestcor"), and The Wilson Company (hereinafter referred to as "Wilson"), were all applicants for 1998 Low Income Housing Tax Credit funding. The Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program. To encourage the development of low-income housing for families, Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, creates federal income tax credits that are allocated to each of the states for award through state-administered programs to developers of rental housing for low-income and very low-income families. Tax credits allocated to developers through the program may be sold by the developer to generate a substantial portion of the funding necessary for construction of low-income housing projects. The program has been in existence in Florida since 1987. Since its inception, in excess of 43,000 affordable housing units have been produced in Florida through the program. Every year each state receives an annual allotment of tax credits. Generally, Florida's annual allotment of tax credits is apportioned among three county groupings based on population: large counties, medium counties, and small counties. Applicants compete for the tax credits allocated to a group based upon which county an applicant's proposed housing is to be located in. Section 420.5099, Florida Statutes, establishes FHFC's responsibility for the allocation of Florida's share of tax credits: The corporation shall adopt allocation procedures that will ensure the maximum use of available tax credits in order to encourage development of low- income housing in the state, taking into consideration the timeliness of the application, the location of the proposed housing project, the relative need in the area for low-income housing and the availability of such housing, the economic feasibility of the project, and the ability of the applicant to proceed to completion of the project in the calendar year for which the credit is sought. Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, requires that each state ensure that the minimum amount of tax credits necessary for an applicant to implement a proposed project are awarded in order to ensure the maximum use of a state's available credits. How tax credits are allocated is required to be reviewed at three distinct phases in order to carry out this goal: the first phase is the initial application/allocation phase; the second phase is a credit underwriting carryover stage; and the last phase is a final cost certification stage. Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, requires that each state establish a qualified allocation plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Allocation Plan") establishing the procedures to be followed in awarding low income tax credits allocated to the state. Consistent with this requirement, FHFC has adopted an Allocation Plan for Florida through the adoption of Chapter 67-48, Florida Administrative Code. The Allocation Plan establishes a competitive application process intended to carry out the first stage required by the Internal Revenue Code. The actual application (hereinafter referred to as the "Application") used to carry out the first stage of the allocation process provided for in the Application Plan is revised by FHFC on an annual basis. The Application is adopted as part of an Application Package, which includes the Application, tabs, and instructions thereto adopted by FHFC. The Application Package is amended each year to refine and clarify the Application Package, and to implement any new directives from the Board. Once revised, the Application Package is adopted by rule. Once the annual Application Package is adopted and an annual application cycle opens, the adopted Application Package is made available to interested persons for completion and submission to FHFC. Completed Applications received by FHFC are evaluated and scored pursuant to the Application Package, projects are ranked within their respective county groupings, and the highest ranked projects are invited to participate in the second stage of the allocation process, credit underwriting. Once an applicant completes credit underwriting and receives a Preliminary Allocation Certification indicating the amount of tax credits preliminarily allocated to the project, the applicant may proceed to construct the project. Once the project is completed, the applicant enters the final phase of the process, the Final Cost Certification phase. The Internal Revenue Code requires that all credits allocated to a state for a particular year must be allocated by December 31 of that year. Any credits not allocated go into a national pool consisting of all credits not used by December 31. All states that use all their credits by December 31 are then eligible to share in the credits available in the national pool. FHFC makes every effort to ensure that it allocates all of Florida's allocated credits so that the State may participate in the national pool. The Application Process. Prior to each application cycle, FHFC revised its previous year's Application Package and adopts an Application Package for the upcoming year by rule. After adopting the Application Package by rule, FHFC opens the cycle and makes the Application Package available. All Applications are required to be fully completed and filed by a date certain specified in the rules. Information contained in the Application is required to be certified true and accurate by the applicant. All submitted Applications are evaluated and scored by a Review Committee pursuant to the procedures established in the rules. See Rule 67-48.004, Florida Administrative Code. In 1998, the Review Committee was a committee of eight persons designated by the rules to organize the scoring of all applications. The Review Committee was made up of seven members of the staff of FHFC appointed to by the Board and one member of the staff of the Department of Community Affairs. Rule 67- 48.002(80), Florida Administrative Code. Following the notification of preliminary scores, applicants are given a week to review the scores of all applicants. See Rule 67-48.005, Florida Administrative Code. Once notified of the preliminary scores, applicants have the right to file a written Notification of Possible Scoring Error (hereinafter referred to as a "NOPSE"). A NOPSE could be filed to point out a possible scoring error on the applicant's score or on any other applicants' score. All NOPSE's filed during the 1998 cycle were reviewed by FHFC to determine if any modification in an applicant's score should be made. Following the resolution of all NOPSE's, the preliminary scores of all applicants are reviewed by the Board. After the Board's review and approval of the preliminary scores and the ranking of applicants, notice of intended funding is provided to each applicant. Following approval of preliminary scores by the Board, applicants are given a second opportunity to challenge their preliminary score or the preliminary score of any other applicant by filing a Direct or Competitive Appeal. See Rule 67-48.005, Florida Administrative Code. No authority for re-scoring any Application, other than as the result of the filing of a NOPSE or a Direct or Competitive Appeal, was authorized for the 1998 cycle pursuant to Chapter 67- 48, Florida Administrative Code. Following the resolution of all Direct or Competitive Appeals, the Board approves the final scores awarded to each Application by final order of the FHFC. Final scores are ranked by county grouping and a "funding line" is determined. The funding line is the point on the ranking sheet for each county group which represents the cut- off between those applicants that will be funded and those that will not. Applicants ranked above the funding line are given the opportunity to advance to the next two phases of the process required for them to receive funds. See Rule 67-48.026, Florida Administrative Code. For example, for the large county group, the amount of tax credits requested by the highest ranked applicant is deducted from the total tax credits available for the large county group. The amount of tax credits sought by the next highest ranked applicant is then deducted from the remaining tax credits. This process is followed until all the tax credits available for the large county group are allocated. The Credit Underwriting Phase. Those applicants to whom tax credits are tentatively allocated during the application process are next invited to "credit underwriting." Rule 67-48.026, Florida Administrative Code. A "credit underwriter" is defined in Rule 67- 48.002(25), Florida Administrative Code, as follows: (25) "Credit Underwriter" means the legal representative under contract with [FHFC] having the responsibility for providing stated credit underwriting services. Such services shall include, but not be limited to, reviewing the financial feasibility and viability of Projects and proposing to the Corporation the amount of a SAIL or HOME loan and/or the amount of Tax Credit needed, if any. The credit underwriter provides a comprehensive analysis of the preliminarily approved Applications, the applicant, the real estate market, the development economics, and the project's ability to proceed. The credit underwriter verifies the accuracy of information contained in the Application, confirms that the Application complies with applicable statutory and rule requirements of the FHFC, and determines whether the project is financially feasible as presented. Although Applications are required by the rules to be reviewed on their face, during the credit underwriting phase the credit underwriter is allowed to look at pertinent information not contained within the submitted Application. The credit underwriter verifies the accuracy and reasonableness of the information provided in an Application. The credit underwriter looks at the availability of financing, the structure of the proposal, and the estimated total project cost. The credit underwriter may adjust the financial projections set forth in the Application. Historically, the credit underwriter typically increases project costs. Ultimately, the credit underwriter recommends a preliminary allocation of tax credits to each applicant above the funding line. The amount of tax credits recommended may differ from that requested by the applicant. The amount initially requested by the applicant, however, cannot be exceeded. The applicant is limited to the lower of the amount applied for, the lowest amount needed for financial viability, or the qualified basis calculation amount. FHFC may accept, modify, or reject the credit underwriter's recommendations. Rule 67-48.026(10), Florida Administrative Code. Applicants successfully completing the credit underwriting phase are issued a Preliminary Allocation Certification which indicates the amount of tax credits preliminarily allocated to the project. The Final Cost Certification Phase. Construction of the project typically takes two to three years from the submittal of the Application. If a project cannot be completed by the end of the calendar year, the applicant must enter into a Carryover Agreement. Pursuant to this agreement, FHFC promises to allocate a "not to exceed" amount of tax credits to the project if it is completed within two years in accordance with the Carryover Agreement. Once the project is completed, the applicant is required to submit a Final Cost Certification. The Final Cost Certification details the actual costs incurred in completing the project, verified by an independent certified public accountant. Prior to 1998, the Final Cost Certification had to be certified by a credit underwriter. One purpose for the Final Cost Certification is to ensure that actual costs are consistent with, and do not exceed, those allowed by federal and state requirements. The applicant is issued an IRS Form 8609 which establishes the amount of tax credits allocated to the applicant. The amount of tax credits allocated after the Final Cost Certification may be less than the originally approved tax credits for the project. The 1998 Application Package; Project Funding & Economic Viability (Project Cost Pro Forma), Form 4. Effective January 6, 1998, FHFC adopted by reference in its rules the 1998 Application Package, "Form CAP98." Rules 67- 48.002(10) and 67-48.004(1), Florida Administrative Code. The adoption of the 1998 Application Package and the allocation of tax credits through the application phase was consistent with the description of the application process, supra. Among the forms required to be submitted as part of the 1998 Application was Form 4, "Project Funding & Economic Viability (Project Cost Pro Forma)." The purpose of Form 4 is to ensure that an applicant had firm commitments for funding from financially capable sources sufficient to cover the costs of the project which would not be covered by tax credits. A total of 150 points were available for the information on Form 4. This was the highest possible single award of points in the 1998 Application. To the extent that firm commitments were not demonstrated on Form 4, an applicant was to be awarded less than 150 points. In two places on Form 4, applicants are informed that they could not request a developer fee in excess of the limits established by the FHFC rules and the 1998 Application Package. For Lakewood's Application, the maximum developer fee was 20 percent of project cost. The parties stipulated that Lakewood's Form 4 demonstrated that all necessary funding for its project was firmly secured. Therefore, the parties agreed that, but for the imposition of the penalty provision at issue in this proceeding, Lakewood was entitled to an award of 150 points for Form 4. The 15% Penalty. The following provision appears on Form 4 of the 1998 Application: FULL POINTS WILL BE AWARDED ONLY IN THE EVENT THAT ALL INFORMATION REQUIRED BY THIS FORM IS PROVIDED IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH THE FORM'S REQUIREMENTS. FAILURE TO PROVIDE COMPLETE, ACCURATE INFORMATION IN THE FORMAL AND LOCATIONPRESCRIBED BY THIS FORM WILL RESULT IN A 15% REDUCTION OF POINTS FOR FORM 4. ONLY INFORMATION CONTAINED WITH THIS APPLICATION WILL BE CONSIDERED FOR PURPOSES OF POINTS AWARDED OR APPEALED. (This provision will hereinafter be referred to as the "15% Penalty"). The 15% Penalty appears in materially identical form on Forms 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, and 22 of the 1998 Application. The Development of the 15% Penalty. Since the inception of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program in Florida, the application process has become increasingly competitive and litigious. For example, for the 1998 cycle FHFC received Applications for approximately 72.6 million dollars but only approximately 10.7 million dollars of tax credits available. Consequently, only eleven of the ninety Applications will likely be funded from the 1998 cycle. Because of the increased competitiveness and the litigious nature the application process, the Board appointed a Combined Cycle Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "Cycle Committee") to work with the staff of FHFC to improve the Application and application process for the 1998 cycle. The Board also instructed staff to strictly construe the Application, make sure forms in the 1998 Application were as clear as possible, and to implement a penalty for failures to follow the instructions. The development of the 1998 Application Package began in the spring of 1997. On July 14, 1997, the first rule development workshop was held. The purpose of the workshop, which was attended by approximately forty individuals, was to provide a forum for comments and suggestions from developers and other interested persons concerning the Application Package and the process. Following the July 1997 workshop, FHFC prepared a draft of the 1998 Application Package. The draft consisted of the 1997 Application Package with changes proposed for the 1998 cycle noted with strike-through for deleted language and underlining for added language. See Respondent's Exhibit 2, the "Red Book." Among the proposed changes to the 1997 Application Package contained in the Red Book was the inclusion of the following language on Page 1 of the Instructions: FULL POINTS WILL BE AWARDED ONLY IN THE EVENT THAT ALL INFORMATION REQUIRED BY EACH FORM IS PROVIDED IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS. FAILURE TO PROVIDE COMPLETE, ACCURATE INFORMATION IN THE FORMAT AND LOCATION PRESCRIBED BY THE APPLICATION WILL RESULT IN A REDUCTION OF POINTS AS INDICATED ON EACH FORM. ONLY INFORMATION CONTAINED WITH THIS APPLICATION WILL BE CONSIDERED FOR PURPOSES OF POINTS AWARDED OR APPEALED. This language was repeated throughout the Red Book, modified only to specify that the penalty was 15 percent and to refer to the specific section or form the language was included in. The 15% Penalty applied only to the points available for a form on which an error or omission occurred. The penalty applied regardless of the number of errors or omissions on a form and regardless of the significance of the error or omission. FHFC was aware at the time that it was considering the 15% Penalty that the point difference between the highest and lowest point totals above the funding line for the 1997 cycle for the large county category was 43.03 points. FHFC also knew that historically only a half point to two points separated funded applicants and unfunded applicants. The 15% Penalty modified the previous treatment of errors or omissions on Applications. Prior to 1998 if an error was made in an Application, the Application was either rejected if the error related to certain specified "threshold requirements" or staff simply corrected the error. For example, if an applicant requested a developer fee in excess of the developer fee cap, scorers would adjust the claimed fee downward. No penalty would be imposed on the applicant. Copies of the Red Book were made available to interested persons to review before and during a second rule development workshop held on September 22, 1997. The purpose of this workshop was to review the proposed changes in the Red Book and to give the approximately sixty-five individuals that attended the workshop an opportunity to make comments and suggestions as to how to improve the Application Package and the application process. The 15% Penalty was specifically explained during the September 22, 1997, workshop. Lakewood was represented at the meeting. The following explanation of the 15% Penalty was given: Before we go on into rules and QAP things, I want to add one more global comment to be sure everybody in this room understands the new big change in the application whereby you [sic] if you don't fill it out exactly the way the instructions tell you, you're going to get penalized then and there, okay? There's a 15% penalty on many of these forms. On Form 3 we set out a chart for you to show that if you don't give all the information exactly where you say it is in the application, all your T's are crossed and your I's dotted, you're going to get reduced points. Now, the whole purpose of this is not to make your life miserable or to make our lives miserable. It is to make you pay attention to the application and to reduce appeals, okay? FHFC Exhibit 11. In addition to the two workshops, two public meetings were held by the Cycle Committee to discuss the proposed Application Package. Questions and comments concerning the proposed Application Package were invited. FHFC staff were also available to answer questions concerning the 1998 Application Package and the process at any time up until the deadline for submittal of the 1998 Application. Throughout the period of time during which the 1998 Application Package was being developed, FHFC staff emphasized the need for accuracy on the Application and explained to prospective applicants that the 15% Penalty existed. FHFC formally adopted the 1998 Application Package containing the 15% Penalty. No challenges to the rule which incorporated the 1998 Application Package were filed before the rule became effective. Full-day workshops were subsequently conducted by FHFC throughout the State to explain how to complete the 1998 Application and to answer questions thereon. The 15% Penalty was explained during these workshops. Purpose for the 15% Penalty. It is important for Applications to be complete and accurate during the application phase. The application phase is FHFC's first opportunity to analyze proposed projects in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code and FHFC's rules. The Internal Revenue Code requires that the minimum number of tax credits necessary to complete a project be determined during the application phase. Therefore, even though modifications may be made during the credit underwriting and final phases, FHFC is still required to make sure that Applications approved in the application phase are as accurate as possible. FHFC's purpose for adopting the 15% Penalty was described by Gwen Lightfoot, Deputy Development Officer for FHFC: Well, it's - we have to go into a little bit of history in order to really understand from whence this approach came. When I first came to the Agency, that was in 1992, we had enough credits that everybody that applied that was really ready to go would be able to get the credits. And there were times at the end of the year when staff would be frantically calling up developers and saying, Do you have a site, are you ready to go? You know, you told me that you were going to turn this application in and we didn't get it and we need one more to secure the national pool. And so, you know, that was the atmosphere under which the credit program was operating six years ago. It was critical for us to get the national pool in those days because that would add, oh, $6 million to the amount of credits that we would have, which is thousands of unit. So, each year we got more and more competitive, more and more developers learned about the program, more and more developers realized that they could make a good living with, you know, affordable housing. The mechanism that the code creates encourages public/private partnerships, so this is a good way for the private community to provide affordable housing and make a living. So, the competition became more and more intense. In 1997, by then, it was extremely contentious, litigious, extremely competitive. I can remember - I think it was in 1996, it might have been the year before, we had over 300 issues on appeal, and that's just insanity. So in this scope of things we tried to come up with a way to make sure that this application was accurate and complete and - well, I guess those are the best words - because we have a mandate in the Federal code and in the State code that we can allocate no more credits than is absolutely necessary for the project viability. That means it is critical for us to have an accurate and complete application. The overall purpose of the app is to be an objective mechanism by which we can maximize the use of the credits. We have got to have a way to be sure that we are getting the best bang for our buck, I guess is a good way to say it. So, when we laid the penalty over the entire application, we were searching for a rational, fair, objective approach which was designed to reduce appeals, to be fair to everybody, come up with a mechanism by which we could award partial points for people who had done, you know, the main thrust of the particular question but had for some reason not done it perfectly, rather than make them lose all of the points for an issue, we only make them lose a%age of the points. The other big thing that played into the decision to go with this penalty approach is that in the six years that I have been reviewing these applications there is a very strong and direct correlation between an applicant's ability to put together a complete, thorough, accurate, well thought out and organized application. And the product that they produce and the way that they handle the compliance period. These properties are not just coming in the door, getting their credits and going out the door and never seeing the agency again. We have to monitor them for 50 years. So, the attention to detail is so critical that, in addition to being a mechanism to select between really good applicants, it is also - it lets them know, it helps teach the applicant what they are in for with regard to detail and long-term commitments. It is just the whole thing to help us get an accurate and complete application so we can accurately allocate credits. (Transcript 71) By its terms, the 15% Penalty applied regardless of the magnitude of the error committed on an Application. For example, if an amount was overstated by $1.00, a 15 percent penalty applied. The application of the 15% Penalty was based upon an objective determination of whether an error occurred. The staff had no discretion to make a subjective determination as to the significance of an error or omission. Although it was not the intent of FHFC for the imposition of the 15% Penalty to be the determining factor in whether an applicant was awarded tax credits, the effect of the 15% Penalty can have that impact. Imposition of the 15% Penalty on Lakewood. On or about March 10, 1998, Lakewood submitted a completed 1998 Application to FHFC for 1998 tax credit funding. Lakewood sought approximately 1.14 million dollars in tax credits for a 150-unit apartment complex to be located in Orange County, Florida. Lakewood's Application was completed by Don Paxton, an employee of the developer, contractor, and management company for Lakewood. Mr. Paxton attended the September 22, 1997, rule development workshop. Mr. Paxton was aware and understood that the 15% Penalty had been included in the 1998 Application and that it was intended to punish for inaccuracies contained in submitted Applications. He also was aware that the 15% Penalty applied to inaccuracies on Form 4. Finally, Mr. Paxton was aware that the developer fee available for Lakewood's proposed project was limited to 20 percent of project cots. On Form 4 of Lakewood's Application, Lakewood claimed a developer fee in excess of the 20 percent of project cost limitation Lakewood was subject to. The developer fee requested by Lakewood was $1,959,714.00, or $240,000.00 in excess of the maximum developer fee Lakewood could request. The excess amount included in the developer fee cost claimed by Mr. Paxton represented an advisory fee which Lakewood had agreed to pay to Affordable Housing, an advisory group specializing in the development and marketing of tax credit- financed housing for senior citizens. Nothing in Lakewood's submitted 1998 Application informed FHFC that the excess amount included as a development fee by Lakewood was attributable to Affordable Housing. Based upon what was provided to FHFC by Lakewood in its Application, it was reasonable for FHFC to conclude that Lakewood was requesting a developer's fee in excess of 20 percent of project cost. Mr. Paxton included the advisory fee because of an instruction of page 10 of Form 4 that "Consulting fees, if any, must be paid out of the developer fee." Mr. Paxton knew, however, that Affordable Housing was not a consultant as the term "consultant" is used in the 1998 Application Package. Mr. Paxton's interpretation of the instruction concerning the payment of consultant fees on page 10 of Form 4 was not reasonable. Mr. Paxton also included the advisory fee as part of the developer fee because that was the only way for Lakewood to treat the $240,000.00 fee as a cost eligible for tax credit reimbursement. While it was a part of the total project cost, it was not part of the project cost eligible for reimbursement with tax credits. The inclusion of the advisory fee as part of the developer fee did not diminish the fact that Lakewood's Form 4 demonstrated secure financing and, consequently, the economic feasibility of its project and its ability to proceed. Due to the excessive developer fee included by Lakewood on Form 4, the scorers of Lakewood's Application imposed the 15% Penalty. A total of 22.5 points was deducted from the 150 points Lakewood would otherwise have been entitled to for Form 4. With the reduction of Lakewood's total score by 22.5 points, Lakewood fell below the funding line for the 1998 cycle. Without the 22.5 point penalty, Lakewood would have been above the funding line. Other Applications of the 15% Penalty. FHFC applied the 15% Penalty to other applicants during the 1998 cycle for errors on Form 4, including the inclusion of developer fees in excess of applicable limits. For example, the penalty was imposed on Applications 8, 9, 30, 58, and 59. FHFC initially imposed the 15% Penalty on the Application of Kay Larkin because the requested developer fee combined with the requested consulting fee, which was separately listed, exceeded the applicable developer fee. FHFC took this position even though the separately listed consulting fee was included as an ineligible cost. Kay Larkin challenged the 15% Penalty. FHFC subsequently agreed to remove the penalty because it was decided that FHFC should not have combined the eligible developer costs and the ineligible consulting fee. The developer fee standing alone did not exceed the developer fee cap. The Kay Larkin matter is distinguishable from this matter because Lakewood listed the entire amount as an eligible developer fee. In the case of the 1998 Application filed by Harvard House, FHFC did fail to impose the 15% Penalty for the inclusion of a developer fee in excess of the developer fee cap. It failed to impose the penalty through oversight. Although Lakewood pointed this error out in a NOPSE it filed concerning its score, no NOPSE or direct or competitive appeal was filed by any applicant concerning the Harvard House Application. FHFC, therefore, had no authority pursuant to the 1998 Application to modify the score it had awarded Harvard House. FHFC committed the same error in scoring the Application submitted by Orchid Trace, which had included a developer fee in excess of the limit of $1.00. Again, although Lakewood raised this error in a NOPSE concerning its score, no NOPSE or direct or competitive appeal concerning Orchid Trace's score was filed. FHFC's imposition of the 15% Penalty to Applications which included developer fees in excess of the developer fee caps was consistent except to the extent that FHFC inadvertently failed to impose the penalty on Harvard House and Orchid Trace. Some applicants failed to include a general contractor fee on the Project Cost Pro Forma of Form 4. General contractor fees were limited to 14 percent of project cost. FHFC did not, however, impose the 15% Penalty on those applicants for their omission. Two applicants above the funding line, Magnolia Pointe and Nantucket Bay, failed to include any general contractor fee on the appropriate line. Most applicants, including Lakewood, left some line blank on the 1998 Application and were not penalized. The following instruction was included on page 1 of the 1998 Application: BE SURE TO ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS, FOLLOW ALL INSTRUCTIONS AND FILL IN ALL LINES. DO NOT LEAVE ANY BLANKS. IF AN ITEM IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS PROJECT, INDICATE BY USING "N/A". INCOMPLETE OR BLANK ITMES WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF POINTS. Applicants were not specifically required to report a general contractor fee on their Form 4. In some cases, applicants did not incur general contractor fees. Consequently, on those forms where the applicant did not include a general contractor fee, the FHFC had to assume that the applicant did not intend to pay a general contractor fee. Where a particular item was not specifically required or FHFC could not know whether an item had been left off in error, FHFC interpreted the 15% Penalty to not require the imposition of a penalty for merely failing to mark the item "N/A." Intervenors' Standing. Intervenors are engaged in the business of providing affordable residential rental units for low income and/or very low income persons. Intervenors, through subsidiaries or affiliates, submitted Applications to FHFC seeking allocation of tax credits from the 1998 combined cycle pursuant to Section 420.5099, Florida Statutes (1998). Intervenors, through subsidiaries or affiliates, also submitted Applications seeking tax credits from one or both of the preceding two cycles (1996 and 1997), and anticipate filing Applications in the 1999 cycle. For the 1998 cycle, Intervenors, through subsidiaries or affiliates, submitted the following Applications for projects located in FHFC's large county group and were awarded the following points: Company Project Scores LCA 050C - Magnolia Pointe 652.75 Gatehouse 075CS - Nantucket Bay Apartments 644.47 077C - The Rosemary 656.00 Vestor 040C - Courtney Manor Apartments 640.75 Wilson 047C - Windermere Apartments 640.75 The scores for Intervenors' projects were based upon FHFC staff's comparative review and scoring of the Applications submitted in the 1998 cycle, resolution of all direct and competitive appeals, informal hearings conducted by FHFC designated Hearing Officers, and Board action at its August 21 and September 11, 1998, meetings. At the commencement of the final hearing in these cases, the Board had not entered final orders on the scoring of the 1998 Application. The projects of LCA and Gatehouse, however, were above the funding line and were issued "at risk" invitations to credit underwriting. The projects of Vestcor and Wilson were tied with a third applicant for the remaining tax credits for the large county group, which was not sufficient to fund all three projects. On October 16, 1998, the Board voted to issue final orders confirming the scores of all applicants except Lakewood. The Board issued final orders for the funding of all of Intervenors' projects. If Lakewood prevailed in this proceeding and the 15% Penalty was not imposed, its score would rank it ahead of Vestcor's and Wilson's projects. Based upon the Board's action at the October 16, 1998, meeting, however, the projects of Vestcor and Wilson will still be funded.
The Issue Whether the Applicant is entitled to compensation in the amount of $2,500, to pay for "fill dirt" which was installed on the Applicant's real estate in relocating his homestead, after his former homestead was bought as right-of-way for Interstate Highway 75. This claim is under the guise of a relocation appeal, in accordance with the Uniform Relocation Assistance And Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (42 USC, 4601 - 4655).
Findings Of Fact In November, 1974, the Florida Department of Transportation paid the Applicant $32,500 in a negotiated purchase for the Applicant's property which was located in the line of construction for Interstate Highway 75. This price was for a mobile home 24' wide and 40' long, with appurtenances to the mobile home, to include a screen room, privacy paneling and carport. Prior to the November, 1974 sale of the property to the Department of Transportation, the Applicant had purchased another parcel of land in late 1973 or early 1974. It was on this parcel of land that was purchased at that time, that the Applicant relocated his home. The amount of payment for the new lot was between $2,800 and $2,900. In order to comply with certain standards of the DeSoto County, Florida Health Department, ten inches of "fill dirt" were required to be implaced to have the septic tank meet requirements for a drain field. The cost of the application of the "fill dirt" was $2,500. The expenditure of $2,500 for "fill dirt" is the item of controversy between the Applicant and the Respondent. The Applicant is claiming that the $2,500 should be reimbursed to him as part of a relocation assistance payment. The Respondent denies that the $2,500 is a proper item of compensation under the governing law on relocation assistance payments. The Respondent's denial is based upon the fact that it believes that "fill dirt" is not a compensable item. More specifically, the Respondent regards the selection of this piece of property by the Applicant as being a matter of choice, which did not have to be made. The Respondent is persuaded that other parcels of property were available, which did not require "fill dirt" to be brought in, in order to comply with health requirements and the Applicant failed to purchase such a parcel, therefore, the Applicant must defray the expense of his selection, in terms of the $2,500 which was spent to bring the property up to health standards. The history of the payments that were made by the Respondent can be derived by the application of the formula utilized. The Respondent looked at three comparable pieces of land , one for $32,500, a second for $28,500 and a third for $32,900. The closest comparable to the home that the Applicant sold, was the comparable listed at $32,500. The Respondent compared these comparable figures with the so called, "carve out" figure of a typical mobile home with equipment, on a typical mobile home site, which would have been a price of $25,721. Based upon this figure for a "carve out", and taking the figure for the closest comparable $32,500, the amount of maximum relocation reimbursement would have been $6,779. This figure is arrived at by subtracting the amount of the "carve out" figure from the closest comparable. In fact the Respondent spent $27,372 for the land purchased and other compensable items, thus entitling him to $1,651 in relocation reimbursement, according to the Respondent's calculations. Although, in the course of the hearing the Applicant was questioned about taking $1,651 as settlement. The Applicant said that he was only interested in the $2,500 figure. It should be stated that the $1,651, is an amount which does not contemplate the payment for "fill dirt". It is in fact a figure arrived at for payment of other items considered to be compensable. The question then becomes one of whether or not the Applicant is entitled to a $2500 payment for "fill dirt" which is not associated with the $1,651 which the Respondent claims the Applicant is entitled to. One final factual comment should be made. That comment is that the Respondent's acquisition and relocation assistance officer, David Nicholson, saw the Applicant's new property after the twenty five hundred dollars worth of fill dirt had been installed. At that time, Mr. Nicholson said that the property appeared to meet the criteria for a decent, safe and sanitary dwelling. The witness, Nicholson had not seen the property prior to the installation of the "fill dirt". Consequently, the Respondent can not challenge the statement by the Applicant to the effect that the "fill dirt" was necessary in order to achieve a decent, safe and sanitary dwelling.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent deny the payment of $2,500 to the Applicant for installation of "fill dirt" at the Applicant's present homesite. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of April, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Herman A. Beyer Post Office Box 382 Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Office of Legal Operations Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, at times pertinent hereto, was a resident of Scott's Mobile Home Park (Park), located in Duval County, Florida. She lived in the Park with William Scott, the son of the Park owners, their child, and four other children who are Ms. Allen's natural children. The Petitioner, Mr. Scott, and the five children lived in a three-bedroom, double-wide mobile home, at the pertinent time in 1993. It had been provided by Mr. Scott's parents, the owners of the Park. The Department acquired certain property in Duval County, Florida, in 1993, as a result of an inverse condemnation action of which the property known as Scott's Mobile Home Park was a part. The Department, in due course, notified the Park residents that it would be closed and that efforts would be undertaken to relocate the residents. The Department staff obtained information from Ms. Allen and Mr. Scott, as well as from the other Park residents, in order to determine the amount of relocation assistance funds each displaced resident should receive, in accordance with the legal authority cited below. The Allen-Scott family were determined to be "90-day occupants" of the Park, as that term is used in applicable regulatory provisions. In calculating the relocation assistance amount to which the Petitioner may be entitled, the Department follows certain procedures set out in the Code of Federal Regulations, adopted by reference in its own rules and procedures. It must find replacement housing and then pay displaced residents a lump sum equal to 42 months of the difference between the new higher rent, if that be the case, and utility payments and what the displaced residents had been paying for rent and utilities prior to being displaced. The Department initially located replacement housing for the Allen- Scott family on Phillips Highway in Jacksonville, Florida. While the family had been living in a three-bedroom mobile home, the standards adopted by the Department for decent, safe, and sanitary housing for a family of seven required four bedrooms, which is the type residence the Department sought. The rent and utilities amount for the mobile home suitable to those standards, located on Phillips Highway, was $691.00 per month. The Allen-Scott family, however, desired a mobile home on the west side of Jacksonville, Florida. In order to calculate the amount due to the Petitioner, the Department had to subtract from the $691.00 per month figure for the property on Phillips Highway, the rent and utility total amount that the family had been paying at the Park. The evidence shows, however, that the living arrangements under which they occupied that dwelling in the Park were not the result of an arms-length transaction and that, in reality, the family was not paying any rent for the premises. Therefore, the Department had to impute a rental figure for them. Accordingly, Mr. William Kelbaugh, a Property Appraiser for the Department, made that imputed calculation, based upon the square footage of the Allen-Scott mobile home and the amount per square foot paid for other decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings in the same area, or comparable residences. After establishing that the average rent for mobile homes was approximately $.41 per square foot, Mr. Kelbaugh multiplied the square footage of the Allen-Scott family mobile home by that figure and, after making a deduction because of the condition of the Park, in terms of the actual rental value of the premises they had been living in, he arrived at a "market rental" of $375.00 per month. He then reduced the "market rental" figure by 15 percent based upon his observation of the premises, its condition, and his experience of 20 years or more in making such appraisals. The Department also had to include utility payments in its calculation. It received information from two utility companies about the family's utility bill over the prior 12-month period and computed an average monthly utility payment amount of $202.29. The Department also attempted to establish the family's income. It was required to do so because, in calculating the payment to be made for relocation assistance, the Department must subtract from the new rent and utility payment the smaller of the sums equal to the rent paid or, in the Petitioner's case, imputed, or 30 percent of gross monthly family income. In trying to determine their income amount, the Department asked the Petitioner and Mr. Scott to provide income information on its income certification form, which the Petitioner and Mr. Scott signed and dated March 10, 1993. The Petitioner represented that their income came from Aid to Families with Dependent Children and other welfare benefits, which are not considered income for purposes of the Department's calculation of relocation assistance. Mr. Scott represented that he earned $3,764.25 in income and $3,000.00 in "income from rental" for 1992, which is the year used in making the calculation. The Department asked repeatedly for verification of their income figures in the form of tax records, payroll stubs, or statements from employers. Mr. Scott, however, worked for his parents, the former owners of the Park. They were asked to provide pay stubs and other verification of his income but did not do so at any time during 1993. Relocating the family was a protracted affair because the family required a four-bedroom mobile home, and such dwellings for rental are scarce. On September 14, 1993, the Department delivered an updated income certification form, since the one that the Petitioner and Mr. Scott had signed in March 1993 had expired. The Petitioner signed that form on September 14, 1993, and Mr. Scott signed it on September 22, 1993. That form indicated that Mr. Scott's income was certified by him as gross wages and salaries equal to $3,764.25. No verification of this income had been provided, however, so the Department calculated the relocation assistance due the family by using the market rental figure of $375.00, plus $202.29 for utilities. The Petitioner and Mr. Scott refused to accept this figure and appealed the determination to the Department's "central office". While their appeal was pending in the Department's process, the Department, at the Petitioner's request, located another four-bedroom mobile home for rent on Beaver Road in Jacksonville, Florida. This was with the assistance of Robert Scott, Mr. William Scott's father. The Department re- calculated the Allen-Scott family relocation assistance eligibility supplement. The re-calculated amount was $6,161.82. That amount was presented to the Petitioner and Mr. Scott, but they refused to accept it. On December 7, 1993, Mr. Bud Eddleman, the Department's Administrator of Relocation Assistance, made his decision concerning the Petitioner's appeal and concluded that the $6,161.82 sum to be correct. On February 17, 1994, the Department received a handwritten note signed by Vivian Scott, William Scott's mother, stating that William Scott had been paid $842.25 in cash in 1992 and was furnished rent in lieu of salary equal to $3,000.00. (See Exhibit 8 in evidence). The Petitioner, thus, took the position that that was the totality of income of the family during the calculation period in question, as that relates to the calculation of the amount of relocation benefits they felt they should receive. The Department takes the position that this verification is not accurate and acceptable for a number of reasons. The Allen-Scott household had numerous possessions that suggested a lifestyle that could not be supported by a discretionary income of $842.25 annually. The family could apparently afford $202.79 per month as an average utility payment. Further, the family acquired a second car during the time period that Department employees were on the premises in the process of making its calculation and appraisal. The family had the funds to acquire and operate two cars, pay the utilities throughout 1993; and their personal property included certain items of antique furniture, at least four televisions, and three videocassette recorders. The Petitioner contended at hearing that Mr. Scott had no income because of the inverse condemnation proceedings because his work had been as a maintenance man for the operating Park. This is irrelevant in the context of relocation assistance, which concept is not designed to include considerations of whether the displacee is rendered unemployed by the taking of the property involved. It is also irrelevant factually because the year in question was 1992, and the relocation of people from the Park could not begin until 1993. Even then, Mr. Scott's maintenance duties would be needed for a certain period of time. Thirdly, there is also evidence that Mr. Scott worked on projects other than those located in the Park, for which he earned income. Mr. Scott did not provide tax returns, pay stubs, bank records, or a statement from his employer (his parents) despite numerous entreaties by the Department to do so. No more defining, verified evidence of the family income was offered at hearing. Accordingly, the income figures which the Petitioner provided are not credible. The family lifestyle and possessions evidence much more income than Mr. Scott would admit. The only evidence produced to verify Mr. Scott's income was sent from his mother some two months after the Department denied the "appeal". The statement is not credible, as Mrs. Scott alleged that in 1992, her son had been paid $842.25 for his work as a maintenance man. Mr. Scott's parents paid another resident of the Park $4,609.92 for performing the same type of work, at the same time. Further, the Petitioner testified inconsistently at hearing regarding income. She said on the one hand that Mr. Scott's parents "took the rent out of his paycheck", and on the other hand, said that he made approximately $127.00 per week as a maintenance man and Mrs. Scott "sometimes wrote him a check" and "would take out, you know, a little bit each week". This testimony demonstrates that, with the other evidence referenced above, the Allen-Scott family has not been forthcoming concerning its income. The totality of the evidence shows that Mr. Scott and his parents, as his employer, the source of the Petitioner's relevant income, had not been acting in good faith. Accordingly, it is reasonable to compute the relocation assistance payments by ignoring the 30 percent factor and instead merely subtracting the old rent and utilities from the new rent and utilities chargeable at the new premises occupied by the Allen- Scott family. The income figures presented by the Petitioner are simply unverified and are not credible. Another candidate for relocation assistance, Kirk Kostenko, a resident of the Park, refused to provide income verification. In his situation, as in that of the Allen-Scott family, represented by the Petitioner, the income figures presented by the Petitioner were not accepted by the Department. In the Kostenko situation, no relocation assistance was paid. While the Petitioner argued and made reference to other families allegedly receiving much larger sums for relocation assistance from the Park, the Petitioner produced no evidence that different standards or criteria were applied in those situations, as opposed to those applied to her family situation involved in the relocation assistance payment question. She adduced no evidence that would demonstrate that the Department had acted in a manner departing from the standards of its rules and procedures or in a manner aberrant from its normal policy in calculating the relocation assistance payments in the manner found above. The relocation assistance program is not a social welfare program based upon actual financial need of a family or based upon the number of dependents involved. Rather, it is a program to compensate persons forced to find replacement housing because the Department acquires their private property, either through eminent domain or inverse condemnation. The assistance is based upon what the family was paying for its rent and utilities and what it would have to pay for them after relocation. The final figure presented and supported by the Department in this proceeding was calculated by applying the regular, accepted criteria set out in the Department's rules, regulations and procedures.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that the relocation assistance benefit, which the Department proposes to award the Petitioner in the amount of $6,161.82, is reasonable and should be awarded. The Petition should be dismissed in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-4899 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact The Petitioner presented no discreetly set forth proposed findings of fact. Rather, in essence, the Petitioner's post-hearing "pleading", in letter form, consists essentially of argument concerning the quantity and quality of evidence. Therefore, specific rulings on proposed findings of fact cannot be made. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact The Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbers 1-34 are accepted, to the extent consistent with those made by the Hearing Officer. Those proposed findings of fact which are not consistent with those made by the Hearing Officer are rejected as being either not supported by preponderant evidence of record, being irrelevant, immaterial or unnecessary to the resolution of the disputed issues. COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Emma Allen 3523-1 Alcoy Road Jacksonville, FL 32221 Thomas H. Duffy, Esq. Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Attn: Diedre Grubbs, M.S. 58 Thornton J. Williams, Esq. General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her national origin or ethnicity in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Fabiola Heiblum ("Heiblum") is a Hispanic woman who, at all times relevant to this action, has owned Unit No. 5C in the Carlton Bay Condominium, which is located in North Miami Beach, Florida. She purchased her unit in 2004 and has resided there continuously since some time in 2005. Respondent Carlton Bay Condominium Association, Inc. ("Association") is the entity responsible for operating and managing the condominium property in which Heiblum's unit is located. In March 2008, the Association's Board of Directors ("Board") approved a special assessment, to be levied against all unit owners, the proceeds of which would be used to pay insurance premiums. Each owner was required to pay his share of the special assessment in full on April 1, 2008, or, alternatively, in three equal monthly installments, due on the first of April, May, and June 2008, respectively. Heiblum's share of this special assessment was $912.81. At or around the same time, the Board also enacted a procedure for collecting assessments, including the special insurance assessment. According to this procedure, owners would have a grace period of 15 days within which to make a required payment. After that period, a delinquent owner would be notified, in writing, that the failure to pay his balance due within 15 days after the date of the notice would result in referral of the matter to an attorney for collection. The attorney, in that event, would file a Claim of Lien and send a demand letter threatening to initiate a foreclosure proceeding if the outstanding balance (together with costs and attorney's fees) was not paid within 30 days after receipt of the demand. This collection procedure applied to all unit owners. Heiblum did not make any payment toward the special assessment on April 1, 2008. She made no payment on May 1, 2008, either. (Heiblum concedes her obligation to pay the special assessment and does not contend that the Association failed to give proper notice regarding her default.) The Association accordingly asked its attorney to file a Claim of Lien against Unit No. 5C and take the legal steps necessary to collect the unpaid debt. By letter dated May 8, 2008, the Association's attorney notified Heiblum that a Claim of Lien against her property had been recorded in the public records; further, demand was made that she pay $1402.81 (the original debt of $912.81 plus costs and attorney's fees) to avoid foreclosure. On or around May 10, 2008, Heiblum gave the Association a check in the amount of $500, which the Association returned, under cover of a letter dated May 16, 2008, because its attorney was now in charge of collecting the overdue debt. Heiblum eventually paid the special assessment in full, together with costs and attorney's fees, thereby obviating the need for a foreclosure suit. Heiblum believes that the Association prosecuted its claims for unpaid special assessments more aggressively against Hispanics such as herself than persons of other national origins or ethnicities, for which owners the Association allegedly showed greater forbearance. Specifically, she believes that the Association did not retain its attorney to undertake collection efforts against non-Hispanic unit owners, sparing them the costs and fees that she was compelled to pay. There is, however, no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that the Association did not commit any prohibited discriminatory act vis-à-vis Heiblum.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding the Association not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Heiblum no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2009.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the Florida Housing Finance Corporation (“Florida Housing”) employed an unadopted rule when it used rounding on a competing application to place Petitioner’s application for Low Income Housing Tax Credits (“HC” or “Tax Credits”) in the 2004 Universal Application Cycle in the “B” leveraging tie-breaker group, and if so, whether Florida Housing complied with the requirements of Section 120.57(1)(e), Florida Statutes, when it employed rounding.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida limited partnership. Reliance- Andrews, LLC, the sole general partner of Petitioner, is a non- profit entity under Florida Administrative Code Rule 67- 48.002(81). Petitioner’s address is 516 Northeast 13th Street, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304. The affected agency is the Florida Housing Finance Corporation (“Florida Housing”), 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000, Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329. Florida Housing is a public corporation organized under Part V, Chapter 420, Florida Statutes, to provide and promote the public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing and refinancing houses and related facilities in Florida in order to provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing to persons and families of low, moderate, and middle income. Petitioner filed an application, number 2004-102C, with Florida Housing for tax credits under the Housing Credit (“HC”) program for a proposed development in Broward County, Florida, known as Flagler Point. Under the HC program, successful applicants receive a dollar-for-dollar reduction in federal tax liability in exchange for the development of units to be occupied by low-income households. Florida Housing is designated as the housing credit agency for the State of Florida and is authorized to establish procedures necessary for the allocation of Tax Credits under Section 420.5099, Florida Statutes. Florida Housing scores and ranks applications for the HC program pursuant to the Universal Application Package Instructions ("Application Instructions") which are adopted as rules pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 67- 48.002(111). The applicants for housing credits are sophisticated, and the application process is highly competitive. Most applicants achieve a perfect score on applications, so Florida Housing has created a series of “tiebreakers” to determine which projects receive allocations of tax credits. These include “leveraging,” (the amount of requested funding over the number of set-aside units), proximity to services, proximity of other Florida Housing developments, and, finally, a lottery. Petitioner and numerous other applicants for the HC program received the maximum score on the application, 66 points. Florida Housing then ranked the applications that received perfect scores to determine priority for funding according to certain Ranking and Selection Criteria as outlined in the Application Instructions. Part of the Ranking Selection Criteria process includes "tie-breakers" as enumerated in the Application Instructions. The first of the applicable tie-breakers separates the applications into groups A and B based upon a formula used by Florida Housing to determine funding request per set-aside unit. Group A is comprised of the 80 percent of applications with the lowest amount of total funding request per set-aside unit. The 20 percent of applications with the highest per unit request amount are placed in Group B. Applications in Group A receive preference over Group B. The A/B leveraging tiebreaker alone does not determine who gets funded. Some leveraging Group B projects are funded. The total number of set-aside units for each Application is computed by multiplying the total number of units within the proposed development by the highest total set- aside percentage the applicant committed to in the Set-Aside Commitment section of the Application. Florida Housing rounded up the total set-aside units on application 2004-084C from 182.7 (the product of the total number of units (203) and the highest total set aside percentage (90%)) to 183. Rounding this figure produces a lower per unit funding request amount for application 2004-084C ($51,857.95 instead of $51,943.10). Petitioner's per unit funding request is $51,882.28, which would be lower than application number 2004-084C if the total set-aside unit figure was not rounded. Petitioner's application was placed in Group B instead of Group A. On May 7, 2004, Petitioner filed a Notice of Possible Scoring Error ("NOPSE") requesting correction of the set-aside unit rounding, which Petitioner contended was in error. Respondent did not adopt Petitioner’s NOPSE, and on May 28, 2004, issued its scoring summary for application number 2004- 084C indicating a per unit Florida Housing funding request of $51,857.95. On July 9, 2004, Respondent issued the 2004 Final Score Corporation Funding Per Set-Aside for A and B Groups indicating that Petitioner had been placed in Leveraging Group B. Florida Housing has used rounding to determine the number of set-aside units in the same manner each year from the 2002 Universal Application Cycle through the 2004 Universal Application Cycle. Applicants are encouraged to, and more often than not do, set aside 100 percent of the units for low or very low income tenants. As most applicants for Tax Credits do just that, rounding is not often an issue. The number of set-aside units represents a commitment the developer makes in return for funding, and the number in the application is the number of set aside units the developer must provide, and is used to determine whether the development is in compliance with its commitment to Florida Housing, and to the Internal Revenue Service. As a practical matter, the number of set-aside units cannot be a fraction of a unit. Rounding up to the next whole number is the only option, because if the unit number is rounded down, the percentage of set-aside units would be below the set- aside commitment, the IRS would deem that the property had not met its set-aside commitment, and the investors would not receive their tax credits. Florida Housing revises its Universal Cycle Application and Instructions through the rulemaking process each year, in response to stakeholder input, in reaction to litigation, and to clarify issues which arise during the year. During the rulemaking process, there is considerable dialogue between developers and Florida Housing. Public hearings (rule development workshops) are noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly, with the agendas being posted on Florida Housing’s website and also made available for distribution at the public hearings. The affordable housing development community is small and its members pay close attention to Florida Housing’s application process, which is intensely competitive. Petitioner is an experienced developer, and has previously received funding from Florida Housing. Petitioner is a member of a coalition of affordable housing developers, which meets before the rule development workshops to discuss the agenda, and to attempt to reach consensus on agenda issues. Petitioner is part of the development community, which normally participates in the rule development process, and Petitioner has been an active participant in the 2005 rule development process. An active member of the affordable housing developer’s coalition, and a veteran participant in the Florida Housing application and funding process, would have been aware of Florida Housing’s use of rounding to determine the number of set-aside units to which each applicant committed. The rounding issue that is at the heart of this proceeding has been addressed by Florida Housing in its proposed rule amendments to Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-48.002 for the 2005 Universal Application Cycle.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued in this case dismissing the petition and denying all relief sought by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 2004.
