The Issue The issue is whether any of the respondents is guilty of unlawful discrimination against Petitioner in the rental of a dwelling, in violation of section 760.23(2), Florida Statutes (2018).
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Petitioner has been an individual with a disability because he is infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). He is required regularly to take medication to control the disease. At all material times, Respondent Scandinavian Properties, LLC (Respondent Scandinavian) has owned a small complex of rental units in Miami Beach consisting of one or more Airbnb units at the back of the property and two duplex units at the front of property in a two-story building. This case involves one of the two-bedroom, one-bath duplexes with the address of 7910 Byron Avenue, Unit 1 (Unit 1), which was the ground-floor duplex. At all material times, Respondent Renes has been a managing principal of Respondent Scandinavian, and Respondent Bourguigne has been an employee of a property management company retained by Respondent Scandinavian to manage the complex. In an effort to find a suitable rental unit, Petitioner employed the services of a real estate broker or associate, who contacted Respondent Renes to discuss the rental of Unit 1, which had just undergone extensive renovations of two years' duration. Petitioner was recovering from recent surgery, so, as a favor to the real estate agent, Respondent Renes agreed to rent Unit 1 to Petitioner with a background check, but not the customary face-to-face meeting that Respondent Renes required with prospective tenants. Thus, Respondent Renes had limited, if any, contact with Petitioner during the lease negotiations. Petitioner and Respondent Scandinavian entered into a 12-month lease commencing November 1, 2018 (Lease). The Lease prohibited keeping any pets, smoking "in the Premises," creating any "environmental hazards on or about the Premises," keeping any flammable items "that might increase the danger of fire or damage" on the premises without the consent of Respondent Scandinavian, destroying, defacing, damaging, impairing or removing any part of the premises belonging to Respondent Scandinavian, and making any alterations or improvements to the premises without the consent of Respondent Scandinavian, although Petitioner was allowed to hang pictures and install window treatments. The Lease required Petitioner to ensure that all persons on the premises acted in a manner that did not "unreasonably disturb any neighbors or constitute a breach of the peace" and permitted Respondent Scandinavian to adopt or modify rules for the use of the common areas and conduct on the premises. The Lease assigned to Petitioner the responsibility for maintaining smoke detectors, locks, keys, and any furniture in the unit. The Lease permitted "[o]ccasional overnight guests," who could occupy the premises for no more than seven nights per month, and required written approval for anyone else to occupy the premises. Among the rules of the complex was a prohibition against disabling smoke detectors. However, without reference to the Lease provision applicable to pets, one rule allowed one dog or one cat. Another rule assured that management would help tenants gain access to their units when locked out. Within a few weeks of the commencement of the Lease, Petitioner's visitors violated two provisions of the Lease by smoking outside and allowing a dog to run loose in the common area. Respondent Renes or Bourguigne advised Petitioner of the violations, which do not appear to have resulted in any penalties. Admitting to the presence of the dog, Petitioner testified only that the video of the dog violation, if not also the smoking violation, led him to believe that he was being watched. Petitioner's complaint of individual surveillance became an ongoing issue--in his mind. The minimal staffing and small area occupied by the small complex, as a practical matter, both precluded individual operation of cameras to trace the movements of Petitioner and his visitors in the common area and facilitated the surveillance of all, or nearly all, of the common area with relatively few cameras. The evidence fails to support Petitioner's claim that the respondents at any time conducted video surveillance particularly of Petitioner or his visitors. Subsequently, Respondent Renes or Bourguigne advised Petitioner that someone had been shouting his name outside the gate of the complex during the evening hours. This incident is not prohibited by the Lease because the person, while perhaps acquainted with Petitioner, was not his invitee onto or about the premises. Nonetheless, Petitioner's sole reported reaction to this disturbance was to demand a copy of any video--and complain when the respondents failed to comply with his demand. Another of Petitioner's visitors parked a car outside the gate in a space reserved for occupants of the Airbnbs. When, evidently in the presence of Petitioner, Respondent Bourguigne confronted the visitor, the visitor replied that he had only been parked there for 20 minutes. Respondent Bourguigne stated that she had seen the car parked in the spot for 43 minutes. Again, Petitioner's sole response was not to deal with the violation, but to complain about surveillance, evidently of the parking area. The most serious violations of the Lease were discovered on January 28, 2019, when Respondent Renes conducted an inspection of Unit 1. Respondent Renes inspected all rental units of the complex every two or three months to check for safety issues that could imperil tenants or the complex itself. In her inspection, Respondent Renes found that Petitioner had disconnected the smoke alarms and encased them in plastic tape to render them inoperative. She also found that Petitioner had crowded the unit with furniture to the point of impeding egress and constituting a fire hazard. Although not involving safety issues, Respondent Renes found that Petitioner had attached screws to metal doors and kitchen cabinets, damaging these new fixtures. Additionally, Respondent Renes noted the presence of a cat. As noted above, the rules conflicted with the Lease as to the presence of a single dog or cat. In any event, by this time, the respondents were aware that the cat, as well as a human, routinely shared Unit 1 with Petitioner, and the respondents had impliedly consented to these cohabitations. Again, Petitioner's reaction to the Lease violations found by Respondent Renes on January 28 was not to address the problems. Instead, he objected to the inspection as singling him out. By letter delivered to Petitioner on February 14, 2019, Respondent Scandinavian advised that he was in violation of the Lease for allowing an unauthorized person and a cat to occupy the unit, for wrapping the smoke detectors in plastic, for damaging the unit's fixtures by attaching screws into the metal doors and kitchen cabinets, and by cluttering the interior of the unit so as to impede internal movement. The letter demands that Petitioner correct the violations within seven days, or else Respondent Scandinavian would terminate the lease. Respondent Bourguigne's main involvement with this case involves an incident that occurred on the evening of February 15, 2019, when Petitioner locked his keys in his unit and was unable to unlock the door or otherwise enter the unit. Petitioner called the office, but Respondent Bourguigne, who responds to such requests during her normal working hours of Monday through Friday from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., did not receive the call until the following morning when she listened to messages. Respondent Bourguigne promptly called Respondent Renes for guidance, and Respondent Renes directed her to summon the complex's handyman, who, as soon as he could, which was 1:00 p.m. on February 16, drove to the complex and opened Unit 1 for Petitioner. Rather than call a locksmith when the respondents failed to respond immediately to his call to the office, Petitioner and a companion attempted to break into Unit 1 with a screwdriver at about 1:30 a.m. Although unaware of the lockout, Respondent Renes learned of the attempted break-in through an automated security system, so she called the police, who reported to the scene and, after briefly interrogating Petitioner, determined that no crime had taken place. Petitioner wrongly concluded that Respondent Renes had been watching him in real time and called the police, knowing that the apparent perpetrator was really Petitioner and no crime was taking place. While locked out of his unit, Petitioner had also sent emails to Respondent Renes. In one of them sent on February 16, Petitioner advised for the first time that he was diagnosed with HIV and dependent on medication that was locked in his unit. Respondent Renes testified that she did not see these emails until days later. At minimum, it is clear that, prior to February 16, no respondent was on notice of Petitioner's disability, so the seven-day notice letter delivered two days earlier could not have been motivated by a discriminatory intent. Despite the seven-day deadline contained in the letter of February 14, by email or text dated February 21, Petitioner advised Respondent Renes that, by 2:00 p.m. on February 22, he "will have remedied each of the … listed [violations]." This was one day past the deadline. Because Petitioner failed timely to meet the conditions of the February 14 seven-day notice letter, Respondent Scandinavian commenced an eviction proceeding on February 22 and, after a hearing, obtained a judgment ordering the eviction of Petitioner. Petitioner failed to prove any discriminatory intent on the part of any of the respondents in their dealings with him, any incidental discriminatory effect in their acts and omissions, or any failure or refusal to accommodate Petitioner's disability. To the contrary, as to discrimination, Respondent Renes chose to forego eviction and instead give Petitioner a chance timely to remedy the Lease violations; when Petitioner failed to do so, Respondent Scandinavian proceeded to evict Petitioner. Nor has any act or omission of any respondent had a discriminatory incidental effect on Petitioner. Lastly, the availability of Respondents Renes and Bourguigne or other employees of Respondent Scandinavian to open units to locked-out tenants and occupants was reasonable and in no way constituted a failure to accommodate Petitioner's disability, for which Petitioner never requested or, on these facts, needed an accommodation.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding the respondents not guilty of the charges set forth in the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Philip Kim, Esquire Pensky & Kim, P.A. 12550 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 401 North Miami, Florida 33181 (eServed) Jack Wilson 17560 Atlantic Boulevard, Apartment 515 Sunny Isles Beach, Florida 33160 (eServed) Cheyenne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents discriminated against Petitioners based on race regarding the renting of a house.
Findings Of Fact LM Rentals owns 80 houses, which it rents. Mr. Peeples manages LM Rentals. LM Rentals contracts with Vantage to provide management of the rental properties, and Ms. Mossow is employed by Vantage. LM Rentals rented a house to the Odoms for approximately eight years, beginning in 2003. Mrs. Odom is a Native American. Mr. Odom is White and is not a Native American. No evidence was presented to establish that either anyone from LM Rentals or Ms. Mossow was aware that Mrs. Odom is a Native American. Mrs. Odom's physical appearance, her speech, and her surname could reasonably lead one to think that she is not a Native American. Her appearance would lead one to believe that she is White. The application which the Odoms filled out to rent the house did not require the Odoms to state their race. Mrs. Odom never informed employees of LM Rentals or Ms. Mossow that she is a Native American. Mrs. Odom claims that her children have darker skin than she, and, therefore, Ms. Mossow and employees of LM Rentals should have known that she is a Native American by looking at her children. However, no testimony was presented that Ms. Mossow or anyone from LM Rentals ever met Mrs. Odom's children prior to the filing of the discrimination complaint. Ms. Mossow did not meet any of Mrs. Odom's children until a short time before the final hearing when she delivered copies of exhibits to the Odoms' home. Mr. Peeples, the representative of LM Rentals, did not meet the Odoms' children and never met the Odoms until a few days before the final hearing. The house which the Odoms rented from LM Rentals developed a mold problem. Instead of bringing the mold problem to the attention of Ms. Mossow or anyone at LM Rentals, the Odoms contacted the Polk County Health Department (Health Department), which sent an environmental specialist to investigate the mold situation in January 2010. LM Rentals received a letter from the Health Department concerning the mold. LM Rentals hired a third-party testing company to test the house for mold. The coils on the air conditioner were replaced. The Odoms were not satisfied and requested that Ms. Mossow find them another rental house in the same school district in which they currently resided. LM Rentals has an average vacancy rate of five percent, which equates to about four houses at any given time. At the time that the Odoms requested to be relocated, there was only one house vacant in the school district which the Odoms wanted. The Odoms did not like the house and refused to relocate. Mrs. Odom claims that there were other houses available, but could not point to any specific house. Her claim is based on sheer speculation. The Odoms requested that the carpet be replaced, but, based on the tests of the third-party testing company, LM Rentals refused to do so. About the time they were having the mold problems, the Odoms' daughter was suspended from school. Mrs. Odom attributes the suspension to discrimination by Respondents. Mrs. Odom called, as a witness, the teacher who made the referral which resulted in Mrs. Odom's daughter being suspended. The teacher did not know Ms. Mossow and did not know Mr. Peeples. The teacher, who is also an attorney, was not sure if she had ever represented LM Rentals in the past as an attorney. The suspension was totally unrelated to any mold problems and any alleged discrimination. Mrs. Odom also claims that her son was arrested for disorderly conduct about the time of the mold problem, and she lays the arrest at the door of Respondents. Her rationale for her claim is that the arrest happened at the time they were dealing with the mold issues and that LM Rentals knew people. There is not a scintilla of evidence to connect the arrest of the Odoms' son to any actions by Respondents. In April 2010, during the period in which the mold was an issue, a code enforcement inspector saw a small grill on the Odoms' driveway, which was apparently a code violation. The inspector told the Odoms that the grill needed to be removed. LM Rentals received a letter from the code enforcement department stating that LM Rentals would be fined if the violation was not corrected. Ms. Mossow contacted the Odoms in an attempt to get the grill removed in order to avoid being fined. Mrs. Odom claims that Ms. Mossow and LM Rentals caused the code enforcement inspector to come to the Odoms' home and ask that the grill be removed. Mrs. Odom's claim is without merit. It is unlikely that Ms. Mossow or LM Rentals would request a code enforcement inspector to find a code violation which would result in LM Rentals, as owner of the property, being fined. No evidence was presented to show that Respondents treated non-minorities any differently than the Odoms were treated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Lawrence and Candace Odom's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN BELYEU KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2011.
The Issue Whether Cindy Cammarota and Quail Oaks Apartments violated the Hillsborough County Human Rights Ordinance (Ord. 88-9 as amended) by discriminating on grounds of race and religion against Petitioners, Reverends William and Jacqueline Caractor with respect to an attempted eviction action.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Cammarota is the resident manager of Quail Oak Apartments. Respondent Quail Oak is an apartment complex in Hillsborough County which is subject to the Hillsborough County Human Rights Ordinance. Petitioners, who are black, are husband and wife. They are ordained ministers, who reside in Quail Oaks. They have used the community center at the apartment complex for services and frequently pray with other residents. They wear clerical garb and read their Bible in common areas at the complex. At all times material to these proceedings, Respondent Cammarota knew Petitioners were ministers at Mt. Carmel African Methodist Espiscopal Church. On July 30, 1990, a written rental agreement was entered into between Quail Oaks, lessor, and Petitioners, lessees, for an apartment at the complex. The term of the lease was from September 1, 1990 through August 31, 1991. At the option of Quail Oaks, payment of rent could be accepted conditionally by means of a personal check from the lessees. If the check was rejected for insufficient funds, Quail Oaks could require rent plus late charges to be paid by cashier's check, certified check or money order. In addition, Quail Oaks could terminate the lease for nonpayment of rent. Prior to leaving for vacation in November 1990, Petitioner Jacqueline Caractor issued a check in the amount of $645.00 for the November rent. The check was drawn upon the personal checking account belonging to her and her husband at Citizens and Southern National Bank (C & S). It was payable upon demand to Quail Oaks. Although a C & S counter check was used, all of the information on the check was correct. This check was accepted by Respondent Cammarota on behalf of Quail Oaks. It was presented to Barnett Bank of Tampa (Barnett) for collection and the bank was instructed to deposit the funds in Quail Oaks' account at the bank. Barnett Bank did not exercise ordinary care in regard to the check as required by the Uniform Commercial Code. Instead of collecting the funds from the payor bank, Barnett returned the check unpaid to Quail Oaks on November 5, 1990. Notice of the bank's dishonor was sent to Quail Oaks in a notice of debit with respect to the instrument together with the check itself. No reason was given by the bank for the dishonor. The provisional settlement of the check made by Barnett with Quail Oaks was revoked and the amount of credit given was charged back to Quail Oaks' account. Respondent Cammarota, who managed the Quail Oaks account with Barnett, misinterpreted this activity in the account as nonpayment of rent. A "three day notice" was issued by Quail Oaks to Petitioners for payment of rent or possession of the premises on November 7, 1990. The deadline for payment was November 13, 1990. Petitioners received actual notice on November 16, 1990, when they returned from vacation and found the notice posted on the front door of their apartment. A message concerning the matter was also on their answering machine. The message advised them that their check had been returned for insufficient funds. Petitioners went to their bank to determine why their check had not been honored. They had always paid their rent on time and they were concerned about the current state of affairs. The C & S Bank investigated the matter and discovered the check had never been submitted to it for payment. While Petitioners were present, a representative of the bank telephoned Respondent Cammarota and told her a bank error must have occurred as sufficient funds had always been available in Petitioners' account to cover the check, which had never been submitted to C & S for collection. Once Petitioners established that insufficient funds was not the basis for a dishonor of their personal check, they went to Respondent Cammarota to discuss the resolution of the problem. Respondent Cammarota was asked to resubmit the personal check for payment. She refused and requested a money order that included additional charges for the costs Quail Oaks incurred as a result of Barnett Bank's dishonor of the check. Respondent did not believe Petitioners' claim that the original check was a good check. Petitioners advised that they would not pay additional charges because they had complied with all of their responsibilities. They asked for the return of the original check and offered to pay the rent only by money order. Respondent Cammarota refused this potential solution of the problem. Respondent Cammarota did not believe Petitioners were at the office in order to make the check good. She did not believe that Petitioners were merely asserting their legal rights under the lease and negotiable instruments law. As a result, she was suspicious and unyielding during the discussion. She wanted them to pay late fees in order to remain in possession of their apartment. Petitioners, who were tired from their journey and surprised by Respondent Cammarota's lack of receptiveness to very reasonable requests, became somewhat excited by the fact that the process to remove them from their home had begun and they were being told to pay more money than they legally owed to remain in possession. In their response to the situation, Petitioners reminded Respondent Cammarota that they were Reverends. A suggestion that Respondent Cammarota should listen to God was construed by her as "preaching". The excited utterances from Petitioners caused the leasing agent in the office to ask them to leave, which they refused to do until they had read the notice of debit Respondent had received from Barnett Bank about their check. After the notice of debit was read and returned to Quail Oaks, Petitioners began to take their leave. At this point, Respondent Cammarota said something like, "And you people call yourself ministers". On November 20, 1990, Petitioner Jacqueline Caractor gave Quail Oaks a second November 1990 rent payment in the form of a money order. A letter dated the same day from Quail Oaks advised Petitioners that the money order could not be accepted because their account had already been turned over to Quail Oaks' attorney for eviction proceedings. On November 21, 1990, eviction proceedings were filed against Petitioners by Respondent Quail Oaks for nonpayment of rent. On November 28, 1990, Petitioners filed a housing discrimination complaint against Respondents. Attempts to resolve the housing discrimination complaint through conciliation was unsuccessful. Respondent Cammarota uses the term "you people" in conversation whenever she refers to two or more people in her presence. Ordinarily, it is not used to differentiate blacks from whites. In her conversation with the Petitioners, however, the term referred to their race or religion or both. It is Respondent Cammarota's opinion that ministers should behave differently than the Petitioners were behaving when they were asserting their legal rights in her office on November 16, 1990. Respondents did not articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the eviction action for non-payment of rent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board of County Commissioners enter a Final Order finding that an unlawful discriminatory housing practice occurred when Respondent Cammarota, agent for Respondent Quail Oaks, unlawfully discriminated against Petitioners because of race or color and religion. That Respondents be required to pay a $500 fine to Hillsborough County. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of September, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1992. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See See HO HO #2. #11. 4. Accepted. See HO #3. 5. Accepted. See HO #5. 6. Accepted. See HO #10. 7. Accepted. See HO #11. 8. Accepted. See HO #12. 9. Accepted. See HO #13. 10. Accepted. See HO #14. 11. Accepted. See HO #14. 12. Accepted. See HO #14. 13. Accepted. See HO #18. 14. Accepted. See HO #20. 15. Accepted. See HO #21. 16. Accepted. 17. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Docket speaks for itself. See HO #22. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #22. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact and loose agreements. Rejected. Inconclusive evidence. Accepted. See HO #7. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #16. Rejected. Argumentative. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. Accepted. #17. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. See HO #2. Rejected. Redundant. 49.-57. Rejected. Irrelevant. Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #3. Accepted. See HO #5, #7 and #8. Accepted. See HO #9. Accepted. See HO #11. Accepted. See HO #12. Accepted. See HO #13-#14. Rejected. Self serving. Accepted. See HO #21. Accepted. See HO #22. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Contrary to lease. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact and legal test for unlawful discrimination. COPIES FURNISHED: Cretta Johnson, Director Hillsborough County Equal Opportunity and Human Relations Department P.O. Box 1110 Tampa, FL 33601 John McMillan, Esquire Levin & McMillan 9385 N. 56th Street, #200 Temple Terrace, FL 33617-5594 Catherine P. Teti, Esquire Assistant County Attorney P.O. Box 1110 Tampa, FL 33601 Reverend William Caractor Qualified Representative 4747 W. Waters Avenue #3807 Tampa, FL 33614
The Issue The issue to be resolved is whether Petitioners were the victims of a discriminatory housing practice, by allegedly being denied the opportunity to renew the lease of an apartment from Respondents, based upon their race.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners Vernon and Glenda Shaw are husband and wife. They and their children are African-Americans. Respondent EPI Townsend, LLC owns an apartment community located in Gainesville, Florida, known as Uptown Village. Respondent Epoch Management, Inc. (Epoch) manages Uptown Village on behalf of EPI Townsend, LLC. On June 25, 2010, Ms. Shaw submitted an application to lease an apartment at Uptown Village. She listed herself, her husband, and her two children as the proposed occupants. Ms. Shaw noted the family had a dog. She provided her email address on the application, as requested. At the time of application, prospective tenants of Uptown Village are given a document entitled ?Epoch Management, Inc. Rental Application Approval Criteria.? It contains an ?Equal Housing Opportunity? statement and displays the ?Equal Housing? logo approved by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (?HUD?). When she submitted her application, Ms. Shaw acknowledged receipt of the Rental Application Approval Criteria form. The Shaws’ application was approved, and Ms. Shaw subsequently signed a one-year lease (?the Lease?) agreement on June 26, 2010. Soon thereafter Ms. Shaw moved into Apartment 2- 201 of Uptown Village with her children and their dog. Mr. Shaw was living in Alabama at the time and planned on moving to Gainesville at a later date to join his family.1/ At the time the Shaws began their tenancy at Uptown Village, Rhonda Hayden served as the property manager and Stacy Brown as the assistant property manager for Epoch. Both were experienced property managers and both had received Fair Housing training. Ms. Hayden and Ms. Brown testified that Epoch tries to create a sense of community among its tenants. Its efforts include hosting monthly breakfasts and other events for tenants. Information about upcoming community events is sent to all tenants with email addresses on file via Constant Contact, an on-line social and business networking platform. The email address provided on Ms. Shaw's rental application was entered into Epoch’s Constant Contact list. The Uptown Village Lease The Lease contained several provisions intended to ensure a safe and peaceful living environment for tenants. For example, paragraph 4 of the Lease provided that a resident shall ?. . . not permit any disturbance, noises or annoyance whatsoever detrimental to the comfort and peace of any of the inhabitants of the community or its Landlord.? Similarly, paragraph 30(G) provided that the ?Resident shall ensure that the pet(s) does not, at any time, disturb any other Resident of the apartment community.? The Lease reserved to Epoch the right to determine, in its sole discretion, whether a pet was disturbing residents. The Lease also incorporated a code of community rules (?the Rules?) for Uptown Village, which provided in pertinent part, ?all garbage, refuse and other types of waste shall be placed in garbage receptacles? and that ?loud and boisterous noise or any other objectionable behavior by any Resident or guests is not permitted.? The Rules also noted that the "quiet time" hours of the complex were from 10:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. Paragraph 12 of the Lease provided that a tenant must give 60 days’ advance notice of his or her intent not to renew the Lease. If notice was not given, then the Lease would renew on a month-to-month basis at the then current market rate, plus $50.00. The Shaws' Neighbors The Alcubilla family, who are Hispanic, lived across from Petitioners’ apartment, in Apartment 2-202. The Alcubilla family included a husband and wife, as well as the wife’s mother (Mrs. Alcubilla), who spoke little English. A Caucasian graduate student, Amanda Watson, lived on the third floor of the building directly above the Shaws in Apartment 3-201. A Hispanic tenant, Angelo Caruso, lived with his girlfriend on the same floor as Ms. Watson. In October 2010, four months after the Shaws became residents, the Kohl family moved into Apartment 2-101, the first floor apartment directly beneath the Shaws’ apartment. Trouble in Paradise The Shaws' first rent check, dated July 9, 2010, was returned for insufficient funds. This was a Lease violation. On July 14, 2010, Epoch issued a reminder to Ms. Shaw advising her that a neighbor had complained about her dog barking all hours of the day. This was a violation of the Lease and the Community Rules. Mr. Shaw joined his family at Uptown Village on or about August 8, 2010. On the day he moved in, Epoch leasing agent Breanne Parks was conducting a survey of the community grounds and noticed empty boxes outside the Shaws’ apartment on the walkway, as well as trash outside another tenant’s apartment. She issued a warning notice to the Shaws and the other tenant in the building. Leaving trash outside of an apartment is a violation of the Lease and Community Rules. On August 20, 2010, the Shaws’ rent check was returned for insufficient funds. This was a Lease Violation. On October 8, 2010, the Shaws were notified by Epoch that they were being assessed a late fee for failure to pay their rent on time. One week later, on October 15, 2010, Epoch sent the Shaws notification about an outstanding balance on their account. The notices concerned Lease violations. On October 21, 2010, Ms. Watson complained to the office about loud arguments and sounds emanating from the Shaws’ apartment the night before. One of the noises sounded like someone or something had been thrown against a wall. Though she feared that someone was being physically abused due to the intensity of the impact, she decided not call the police. In response to Ms. Watson's complaint, Epoch posted a notice on the Shaws’ door for a second time warning them about noise and asking them to be considerate of their neighbors. The noise violation was considered a violation of the Lease and Community Rules. The same day Epoch posted the noise violation notice on the Shaws' door, Ms. Shaw called the management office and lodged a retaliatory noise complaint against Ms. Watson. As a consequence of this complaint, a warning notice was sent by Epoch to Ms. Watson. The noise violation was considered a violation of the Lease and Community Rules. On November 4, 2010, the Shaws’ rent check was returned for insufficient funds. This was a Lease violation. Epoch allows sworn officers from the Gainesville Police Department to reside on the premises in exchange for services to the community as a Courtesy Officer. At some point during the Shaws' tenancy, Courtesy Officer Farah Lormil, an African-American female police detective, noticed a car belonging to the Shaws parked in an area that was not a designated parking space. This was a violation of Community Rules. Detective Lormil testified that she left a note on the car asking the owner to move the vehicle because "your car doesn't belong here." Detective Lormil also included her name and badge number on the note. At hearing, Ms. Shaw testified that the note read "you don't belong here." Inasmuch as Petitioners did not offer the note in evidence, and given the context in which the note was written (a parking violation), the testimony of Detective Lormil as to the actual wording of the note is the more credible. On December 27, 2010, leasing agent Erin Napolitano wrote a memo to Ms. Parks reporting that Mrs. Alcubilla’s daughter, Mater Alcubilla, had come to the management office the prior weekend to complain about an incident involving Ms. Shaw. Consistent with her memo, Ms. Napolitano testified that Mater Alcubilla had told her that Ms. Shaw had screamed at her family, followed them up and down the stairs to their apartment, and loudly knocked on their door. Mater Alcubilla also accused Ms. Shaw of stating that she knew what type of vehicles the Alcubillas drove and dared them to call the police. The memo recorded Ms. Alcubilla’s daughter as stating the police were called but when they arrived at Building 2, Ms. Shaw already was gone and therefore, no enforcement action was taken. Ms. Napolitano ended her memo to Ms. Parks with a personal observation: ?I just don’t know what to do about all of this but it certainly seems to be escalating.? Whatever the source of the friction between the two families, Ms. Napolitano testified that she had no reason to believe there was any racial animus on the part of the Alcubillas. On December 30, 2010, Ms. Hayden invited Mater Alcubilla to the office to discuss the incident with Ms. Shaw. Following their meeting, Ms. Hayden notated the date of the meeting and substance of their discussion in the Alcubilla’s resident conversation log. Ms. Hayden recorded in her own handwriting: ?Resident very frightened, Resident plans on moving at the end of her lease-Resident claimed Ms. Shaw yelled at her and threatened her and told her she needed to return to her country.? Ms. Hayden considered this to be an interpersonal dispute between the Alcubillas and Ms. Shaw. Also on December 30, 2010, Ms. Hayden and Ms. Parks invited Ms. Shaw to the management office to discuss the Alcubillas’ complaints. Ms. Hayden recorded in the Alcubilla’s resident log that Ms. Shaw denied the Alcubillas’ accusations, became upset and told Ms. Hayden and Ms. Parks that her neighbors needed to mind their own business. Ms. Hayden also noted that the meeting ended when Ms. Shaw got up, stated, ?you wait? and left the office. Based on what she perceived as a threat by Ms. Shaw of continuing trouble with the Alcubillas, Ms. Hayden recorded her intent to notify a Courtesy Officer of the situation. On February 15, 2011, the Shaws received a three-day notice from Epoch for failure to pay rent, and a notice of an outstanding balance due. This was a Lease violation. Three weeks later, on March 4, 2011, the Shaws were issued another three-day notice for failure to pay rent. This concerned a Lease violation. Ms. Watson continued to hear the Shaws' dog barking and loud voices and other noises, included stomping and footsteps, emanating from the Shaws' apartment. On one occasion, the Shaws left Gainesville for the weekend and placed their dog out on the balcony because it barked continuously. The noise and barking interfered with Ms. Watson’s ability to study and to enjoy her residence. On March 5, 2011, Epoch posted a letter on the Shaws' door regarding complaints received from the Shaws' neighbors about the dog barking for hours at a time, often late at night and in particular on March 3, 2011. This concerned a Lease violation. The loud barking, stomping, and talking within the Shaws' apartment did not abate, and on March 9, 2011, Epoch sent the Shaws a "Seven Day Notice to Cure Lease Violation" which cited their violation of Lease Provision 30 and Community Rule Y. On March 17, 2011, Epoch send the Shaws an ?Urgent Outstanding Balance Due? notice regarding their outstanding unpaid utility bill. This concerned a Lease violation. Also on March 17, 2011, an email was generated by Epoch’s answering service which reported that Tara Kohl of Apt. 2-101 had called. The generated message stated Ms. Kohl’s complaint as, ?Apt. Above Very Noisy/Heavy Walking Again.? On March 19, 2011, Ms. Napolitano printed off the email note and called Ms. Kohl to get more information about the complaint. Ms. Napolitano recorded hand-written notes about the conversation on a printed copy of the email which read: ?Last couple nights—beating down on floor–jumping/walking. 3-4 am can hear them all the time.? The email with Ms. Napitano’s hand- written notes was placed in the Kohl’s tenant file. Immediately following Ms. Kohl’s complaint, Ms. Shaw wrote the following note and faxed it to the management office: To Uptown Village On Saturday night, March 19, 2011, I noted a very loud bumping noise coming from my floor. I was home alone and very afraid. I even feared calling the office or security in fear of retaliation. From past experiences when I have voiced a complaint, I receive notes on my door alleging that my dog was barking, that I had trash beside my door, we were stomping, we were too loud and have even found handwritten notes on my car. My family and I can no longer live in such turmoil. Please accept this letter as a formal complaint regarding harassment. If these occurrences continue, I will have no other choice than to contact HUD. Thank you in advance for your help. Glenda Shaw Prior to the date of the faxed letter neither Petitioner had ever complained about discrimination of any kind to anyone at Epoch. Ms. Hayden and Ms. Brown discussed the content of Ms. Shaw's fax and how to handle its allegations. They viewed Ms. Shaw’s complaint against the Kohls as retaliation against the Kohls for making a complaint about noise from the Shaws’ apartment the day before, and therefore a personal dispute. They also considered whether to respond to Ms. Shaw’s allegation of harassment by Epoch, and decided that any response would just be viewed by Ms. Shaw as evidence of further harassment. They decided to place the faxed letter in the Shaw’s tenant file and take no other action. It was a normal business practice of Epoch to generate a list of tenants whose leases were due to expire within the following 90 days. The list was used to create flyers reminding those tenants to contact the management office regarding renewal. Flyers were sent to each tenant on the list regardless of whether the tenant was in default of the lease or potentially a candidate for non-renewal. A renewal flyer was placed on the Shaws’ door in late March and a second renewal flyer was posted on the Shaws' door the following month. Neither renewal notice elicited a response from the Shaws. On March 25, 2011, Epoch sent the Shaws an ?Urgent Outstanding Balance Due Notice? regarding their overdue utility bill. This concerned a Lease violation. Just prior to Easter, 2011, an Uptown Village tenant asked the management office for permission to hold a private Easter egg hunt for their friends on the community’s volleyball court. Epoch approved the request. Uptown Village residents were not notified of the event through Constant Contact because the Easter egg hunt was not an Epoch-sponsored event. The individual who organized the event made the decision whom to invite. On May 10, 2011, Ms. Shaw came to the management office and was assisted by Ms. Brown. Ms. Shaw accused Brian Kohl of confronting her daughter and calling her ?two-faced.? Ms. Shaw demanded that Epoch take action against Mr. Kohl and stated that if Epoch would not do anything about the situation, she was going to call the police or the Florida Department of Children and Families. Before Ms. Shaw left, Ms. Brown asked about the Shaws' intentions to remain residents upon the expiration of their Lease. Ms. Shaw did not give a definitive answer. Ms. Brown then told Ms. Shaw that if the Shaws decided not to renew, Epoch would not hold them to the 60-day advance notice required by the Lease. Three days after this meeting, Ms. Brown notified Ms. Shaw that Epoch could not send a notice of violation to Mr. Kohl because the accusations against him were not Lease violations. However, Ms. Brown offered to discuss the allegations with Mr. Kohl, a truck-driver who was often on the road. On May 18, 2011, Ms. Brown met with Brian Kohl to discuss Ms. Shaw’s complaint. Mr. Kohl gave his side of the story. After he left, Ms. Brown entered the following note in the Kohl’s resident conversation log: Brian came in wanting to break lease b/c [because] daughter is being harassed by girls in 2-111 and 2-1012/ so badly that she won’t go outside. Told him that one 2-111 should be finish soon (they are on NTV [Notice to Vacate] and the other may too, (2-101) lease expires 6/25. Otherwise would do what I can and to give us the opportunity to help before he moves. Ms. Brown also made an entry in the Shaws' resident conversation log regarding Mr. Kohl’s allegation that the Shaws' daughter was bullying the Kohl’s daughter. The following day, May 19, 2011, Ms. Watson came to the management office and gave notice that she was moving out of Uptown Village when her lease expired in August 2011. She was asked to complete a form entitled ?Notice to Vacate from Resident.? In her own handwriting, she wrote the reason for vacating as ?loud tenants.? The Notice to Vacate from Resident was placed in Ms. Watson’s tenant file as part of Epoch’s regular business practices. At hearing, Ms. Watson testified that she and her fiancé had considered living in her apartment after they married and decided they could not live there due to the continued noise and disturbances emanating from the apartment below. With Ms. Watson’s notice to vacate, Ms. Hayden and Ms. Brown came to the realization that three tenants in Building 2 had levied complaints against the Shaws and two had made decisions to move out in whole or in part due to the Shaws’ conduct. Ms. Hayden and Ms. Brown then conducted a more thorough review of the Shaws’ tenant history, and discussed whether the Shaws should continue to reside at Uptown Village. They called Epoch’s attorneys to get legal advice and left a message. On May 29, 2011, Epoch received a handwritten letter from Tara Kohl making numerous complaints against the Shaws, including loud noises late at night, and the Shaws parking one of their cars in a handicapped parking space. On June 8, 2011, the management office received a hand-written letter from Brian Kohl giving notice of his family’s intent to break their lease and move out. The reasons given all centered on the noise being generated in the Shaws' apartment, and alleged threats that had been made by Ms. Shaw against Ms. Kohl. On June 17, 2011, Ms. Shaw called the management office and spoke with Ms. Brown. Ms. Shaw asked for a copy of her lease, inquired about the shortest lease term possible, and the amount of any rent increase. Ms. Brown did not commit that the Shaws' lease would be renewed nor did she quote a renewal rate. Ms. Shaw continued to press the issue and Ms. Brown finally stated that a normal rent increase on renewal was $100 a month. On June 20, 2011, Ms. Hayden and Ms. Brown spoke to Epoch’s attorneys regarding options for ending the Shaws' tenancy. A decision was made to non-renew their lease as that would cause the least disruption to the Shaws. Ms. Hayden prepared a non-renewal letter, and it was posted on the Shaws' door the same day. Later that afternoon, Mr. and Ms. Shaw came to the management office, met with Ms. Brown, and demanded to know the reason why their Lease would not be renewed. Ms. Shaw insisted that Ms. Brown had told her their Lease would be renewed at a rate of $937.00. Ms. Brown denied she made this statement. Ms. Brown asked Ms. Hayden to intervene in the dispute. Ms. Hayden explained that Epoch had a right to issue a non-renewal notice and that the decision was based on the numerous complaints received about the Shaws. Ms. Shaw insisted that if there were grounds to terminate the Lease for cause, Epoch should issue them a seven-day notice to vacate. Ms. Hayden explained that they had decided to issue a non- renewal notice rather than a notice to vacate to allow the Shaws more time to make arrangements and to foster an amicable parting. Epoch has sent non-African-American, White and Hispanic tenants notices of violation regarding excessive noise and non-payment of rent and fees, and also has terminated leases (through eviction) on these bases. There is no competent substantial evidence in this record to even suggest that the decision to non-renew the Shaws' lease was in any way related to their status as African-Americans. On June 23, 2011, Mr. Caruso’s girlfriend was walking their dog outside Building 2 off leash (in violation of the Rules) when it began to chase the Shaws' son. The dog nipped at their son’s leg but did not draw blood or break his skin. When Mr. Caruso learned of the incident, he came to the Shaws' apartment to apologize. He later returned and asked to take a photo of their son’s leg because he feared Ms. Shaw might bring legal action against him, given her hostility after he had offered her a bag to clean up her dog’s waste on a previous occasion. Ms. Shaw refused to allow Mr. Caruso to photograph her son’s leg. Instead, she told him if he did not leave she would call the police, and if his dog ever attacked again she would report him and have the dog put to sleep. On June 27, 2011, a second non-renewal letter was posted on the Shaws' door to ensure that Petitioner’s understood their lease would not be renewed. The following day the Shaws returned to the management office and insisted that at the end of the June 20th meeting, they had been told their lease would be renewed. Ms. Hayden denied this and reiterated that their lease was being non-renewed based on complaints from neighbors. As the meeting continued, Ms. Shaw became increasingly agitated; she turned to Ms. Brown and asked if Ms. Brown found her to be confrontational. Ms. Brown responded that she thought Ms. Shaw had a ?strong personality.? To that, Ms. Shaw replied, ?It’s my culture.? As the meeting continued, Ms. Shaw began to inject the issue of race into the conversation. For example, in response to Ms. Hayden’s remark that the decision to non-renew was not personal, since she would not even recognize Ms. Shaw if she saw her at a mall, Ms. Shaw stated that ?white people think we all look alike.? As the conversation was taking an uncomfortable turn, Ms. Hayden ended the meeting and referred the Shaws to Epoch’s attorneys if they had any further questions or concerns. In early July 2011, Mr. Caruso was returning to Building 2 after walking his dog on leash and encountered Mr. Shaw. Mr. Shaw told Mr. Caruso to keep his dog away or he would kick it. On July 11, 2011, Ms. Shaw complained to the management office about Mr. Caruso’s dog charging at her while it was on a leash. She noted this was the second incident involving the dog. Ms. Brown told Ms. Shaw she would look into the matter, since this would be considered a violation of the Lease and Community Rules. On July 12, 2011, Ms. Brown spoke with Mr. Caruso’s girlfriend and cautioned her to keep the dog under control. Ms. Brown noted their conversation in both the Shaws’ and Mr. Caruso's resident conversation log. On August 4, 2011, Ms. Watson completed a "Move Out Survey" and in response to a question about what could have been done by management to encourage her to stay, wrote in her own hand-writing: ?Dealt with loud neighbors more consistently and effectively . . .? She added that her reason for leaving was ?loud, inconsiderate tenants.? The Shaws refused to move out by the date given in their non-renewal notice and stopped paying rent. On August 3, 2011, the Shaws dual-filed a charge of housing discrimination (race and color) with the Commission and the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development. The charge alleged that Epoch had refused to rent to them, made discriminatory statements, and had offered them less favorable terms, conditions, privileges, services or facilities than other non-African-American tenants. The facts supporting their charge were that they were not invited to the Easter egg hunt; that they had been told their lease would be renewed yet it was not; and that Ms. Hayden had made racist statements. The Shaws did not pay rent for July 2011,3/ and on August 4, 2011, were sent a "Notice to Pay Rent" by Epoch. The Commission investigated the Shaws' charge of housing discrimination and issued a determination on August 31, 2011, finding there was no probable cause to support the claims. On September 29, 2011, the Shaws filed a Petition for Relief from an alleged discriminatory housing practice, giving rise to the instant proceeding. During the pendency of this matter, the Shaws were evicted from Uptown Village for non- payment of rent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations, determining that Respondents did not commit a discriminatory housing practice based upon Petitioners’ race and that the Petition be dismissed in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of October, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of October, 2012.
The Issue Whether Respondent, a place of public accommodation, violated Chapter 760 and Section 413.08, Florida Statutes (2006), by failing to accommodate Petitioner, an individual with a disability.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the formal hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner, Ricky Krell, is physically disabled and entitled to the protection of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Respondent is the owner of Dustin's Barbeque, which is a structure for public accommodation. On June 5, 2007, Petitioner, accompanied by his wife and his service dog, Zsa-Zsa, visited Respondent restaurant for the purpose of eating therein. Petitioner and his wife were seated and ordered their meal without incident. Zsa-Zsa was on a leash which was several feet in length, long enough to allow the dog to "sniff" other customers and food. Zsa-Zsa began "sniffing" contiguous customers and their food. The lease was stretched across the aisle between tables. On one occasion, a waitress almost tripped over the leash. Respondent's employees, who were familiar with service dogs having been in the restaurant, opined that the dog did not conduct itself as a trained service dog. As a result of the dog's activities and concern for the health and safety of other customers and employees, Respondent's on-site manager requested that Petitioner control the dog. Petitioner was unwilling or unable to control the dog, and the dog's inappropriate conduct continued. As a result, the manager asked Petitioner to take the dog outside. Petitioner would have been able to complete his meal if he had been able to control the dog or he had opted to take the dog outside and return to his meal without the dog. Petitioner refused the request to take the dog outside and became loud and used profanity. Petitioner finished his meal. The request that Petitioner remove the dog from the restaurant was reasonable under the existing circumstance and did not reflect a discriminatory act against Petitioner. The City of Melbourne police were called and when the officer arrived, she issued a trespass warning to Petitioner and his wife.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing with prejudice the Petition for Relief for failure to establish an unlawful discriminatory act by Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Katherine Hurst Miller, Esquire Kelly V. Parsons, Esquire Cobb Cole 150 Magnolia Avenue Post Office Box 2491 Daytona Beach, Florida 32115-2491 Ricky Krell 1889 Cedarwood Drive Melbourne, Florida 32935
The Issue The issues in this case are, one, whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her alleged handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act; and, two, whether Respondent subjected Petitioner to acts of coercion or retaliation as a result of Petitioner's exercise, or attempted exercise, of a protected housing right.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Maria Thornhill ("Thornhill") owns and lives in a unit in the Admiral Farragut Condominium Apartments. Respondent Admiral Farragut Condominium Association, Inc. ("AFCA"), manages the property of which Thornhill's condominium is a part. This case continues a dispute between Thornhill and AFCA which began in 1997, when Thornhill——without first securing AFCA's permission——installed three wooden steps leading from her rear balcony down to a patio located about 30 inches below. AFCA disapproved of the steps and directed Thornhill to remove them, which was done long ago. In the past, Thornhill has alleged, among other things, that AFCA and its individual directors unlawfully discriminated against her in denying her many requests to reinstall the steps, which she claims are needed as a reasonable accommodation for her handicap.2 Consequently, the parties have been pitted against each other for years in one legal proceeding after another, in various forums including DOAH. Thornhill has lost many battles in this protracted litigation——and consequently been ordered to pay tens of thousands of dollars in sanctions, court costs, and attorney's fees. Still, she presses on. In this case, Thornhill argues, as she has for more than a decade, that she needs to attach steps to her rear balcony because she is physically unable to traverse the 30 inches which separate the balcony from the ground and hence would be trapped if a fire were to block both of the unit's two doors to the outside. Not for the first time, Thornhill alleges here that AFCA discriminated against her on the basis of handicap when it denied her request(s), the most recent of which was made in January 2004, for approval of the steps. In addition to her claim involving the steps, Thornhill alleges that AFCA has discriminated or retaliated against her, in some unspecified way(s), in connection with a boat slip, which she is, evidently, "next in line" to rent, once the lease expires under which another unit owner currently enjoys the right to use the slip. Finally, Thornhill contends that, in its efforts to collect the various money judgments it has been awarded, AFCA has retaliated against her unlawfully. Determinations of Ultimate Fact With regard to the steps, Thornhill presented no evidence suggesting that such a modification is reasonable, nor any proof that installation of such steps is necessary to ameliorate the effects of her particular handicap. There is no evidence that any of AFCA's decisions concerning the boat slip were motivated in any way by discriminatory animus directed toward Thornhill. There is likewise no evidence that AFCA ever undertook to execute or otherwise enforce the judgments it has obtained against Thornhill because of discriminatory animus. In sum, there is not a shred of competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination, coercion, or retaliation could possibly be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that AFCA did not commit any prohibited act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order finding AFCA not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Thornhill no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 2010.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent engaged in a discriminatory housing practice by allegedly excluding Petitioner from participating in a homeowner’s meeting on January 14, 2009, or ejecting Petitioner from the meeting, based on Petitioner’s religion and alleged handicap, in violation of Section 760.37 and Subsections 760.23(2), 760.23(8), 760.23(8)(2)(b), and 784.03(1)(a)(l), Florida Statutes (2008),1 and, if not, whether Respondent is entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2009).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a condominium association defined in Section 718.103, Florida Statutes. Respondent manages a condominium development, identified in the record as Tregate East Condominiums (Tregate). Tregate is a covered multifamily dwelling within the meaning of Subsection 760.22(2), Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a Jewish male whose age is not evidenced in the record. A preponderance of the evidence presented at the final hearing does not establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of religion, ethnicity, medical, or mental disability, or perceived disability. Rather, a preponderance of the evidence shows that Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner in the association meeting on January 14, 2009. In particular, the fact-finder reviewed the videotape of the entire meeting that took place on January 14, 2009. The meeting evidenced controversy, acrimony, and differences of opinion over issues confronting the homeowners present. However, the video tape did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on Petitioner’s religion, ethnicity, or alleged handicap. Respondent seeks attorney’s fees in this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2009). Pursuant to Subsection 120.595(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2009), this Recommended Order finds that Petitioner has participated in this proceeding for an improper purpose. Petitioner participated in this proceeding for a frivolous purpose within the meaning of Subsection 120.595(1)(e)1., Florida Statutes (2009). The evidence submitted by Petitioner presented no justiciable issue of fact or law. Petitioner provided no evidence to support a finding that he suffers from a handicap defined in Subsection 760.22(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner claims to have a disability based on migraine headaches but offered no medical evidence to support a finding that Petitioner suffers from migraine headaches or any medical or mental disability. Petitioner’s testimony was vague and ambiguous, lacked precision, and was not specific as to material facts. Petitioner called four other witnesses and cross-examined Respondent’s witnesses. Petitioner’s examination of his witnesses and cross-examination of Respondent’s witnesses may be fairly summarized as consisting of comments on the answers to questions and argument with the witnesses. Petitioner repeatedly disregarded instructions from the ALJ not to argue with witnesses and not to comment on the testimony of a witness. Petitioner offered no evidence or legal authority that the alleged exclusion from the homeowners meeting on January 14, 2009, was prohibited under Florida’s Fair Housing Act.3 Petitioner offered no evidence that he is a “buyer” or “renter” of a Tregate condominium within the meaning of Section 760.23, Florida Statutes. Rather, the undisputed evidence shows that Petitioner is not a buyer or renter of a Tregate condominium. Petitioner attended the homeowners meeting on January 14, 2009, pursuant to a power of attorney executed by the owner of the condominium. If a preponderance of the evidence were to have shown that the owner’s representative had been excluded from the meeting, the harm allegedly prohibited by the Fair Housing Act would have been suffered vicariously by the condominium owner, not the non-owner and non-renter who was attending the meeting in a representative capacity for the owner. The condominium owner is not a party to this proceeding. A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner has standing to bring this action. Petitioner was neither an owner nor a renter on January 14, 2009. Petitioner’s only legal right to be present at the meeting was in a representative capacity for the owner. The alleged exclusion of Petitioner was an alleged harm to the principal under the Fair Housing Act. Respondent is the prevailing party in this proceeding, and Petitioner is the non-prevailing party. Petitioner has participated in two or more similar proceedings involving Respondent. The parties resolved those proceedings through settlement. The resolution is detailed in the Determination of No Cause by the Commission and incorporated herein by this reference. Respondent seeks attorney’s fees totaling $3,412.00 and costs totaling $1,001.50. No finding is made as to the reasonableness of the attorney fees costs because Respondent did not include an hourly rate and did not submit an affidavit of fees and costs. However, the referring agency has statutory authority to award fees costs in the final order pursuant to Subsection 760.11(7), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief and requiring Petitioner to pay reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in the amounts to be determined by the Commission after hearing further evidence on fees and costs in accordance with Subsection 760.11(7), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 2010.
