The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should deny the application for renewal of Respondent's foster home license because “skinny dipping” with a foster child at the foster home violates Section 409.175, Florida Statutes (2001), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-13. (All section references are to Florida Statutes (2001). All references to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code in effect on the date of this Recommended Order.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster homes in Florida. A foster home license is valid for a period of one year and must be renewed annually. Various privatized entities supervise licensed foster homes, review applications for foster home licenses, and make recommendations to Petitioner regarding the applications. However, the recommendations are not binding on Petitioner. Petitioner, rather than the private entity, is the licensing agency. For example, Petitioner rejected the recommendation from the private entity with responsibility for reviewing the application at issue in this proceeding. Petitioner first issued a foster home license to Respondent on January 28, 2000. Petitioner licensed Respondent to operate a therapeutic foster home. A therapeutic license authorized Respondent to operate a foster home for children with psychological or emotional disorders and for children without such disorders. Therapeutic foster homes operate under the auspices of a private entity known as Personal Enrichment through Mental Health, Inc. (PEMHS). PEMHS recommended that Petitioner issue the original foster home license on January 28, 2000, and a renewal license that Petitioner issued on January 28, 2001, for the second year. The second therapeutic foster home license expired on January 27, 2002. Petitioner never took action to discipline or revoke Respondent’s therapeutic foster home license. In July 2001, Respondent applied for a non- therapeutic foster home license. The non-therapeutic license that Respondent seeks authorizes a licensee to operate a foster home only for children without psychological or emotional disorders. Non-therapeutic foster homes operate under the auspices of a private entity known as Family Continuity Programs (Family Continuity). Family Continuity recommended that Petitioner approve the application for a non-therapeutic foster home license. However, Petitioner did not follow the recommendation of Family Continuity and denied the application. Petitioner's denial of Respondent's application for a non-therapeutic foster home license is the proposed agency action that is at issue in this proceeding. Respondent's application for a non-therapeutic foster home license is not an application for a new license. Rather, it is an application for renewal of an existing license. Both the therapeutic license that Respondent held at the time of the application and the non-therapeutic license that Respondent seeks authorize the licensee to operate a foster home for children without psychological or emotional disorders. By applying for a non-therapeutic foster home license before the expiration of his therapeutic foster home license, Respondent sought to renew his license to operate a foster home for children without psychological and emotional disorders. The non-therapeutic license that Respondent seeks does not impose any requirements in addition to those that Respondent had already satisfied when Petitioner granted the therapeutic license to Respondent. The requirements for the therapeutic license are more stringent than those that must be met to qualify for a non-therapeutic license. The requirements for a therapeutic license are more comprehensive, and Petitioner requires an applicant for a therapeutic license to have more training than an applicant for a non-therapeutic license. A non-therapeutic license does not impose requirements in addition to those imposed for a therapeutic license. Petitioner proposes to deny the application for renewal of Respondent's foster home license on the sole ground that Respondent went "skinny dipping" with two minor males. One of those males was a foster child assigned to Respondent. The foster child is a victim of past sexual abuse and has psychological and emotional disorders. The child suffers from oppositional defiance disorder and mood disorder. The symptoms of the disorders include self-injury, such as head banging, aggression, anger, and low self-esteem. However, many of the behavioral problems diminished during the 15 months that the foster child was in Respondent's care. The "skinny-dipping" events occurred between six and nine times during the 15 months that the foster child was in Respondent's care. During that time, the foster child was between 12 and 14 years old. The foster child swam nude in the swimming pool at Respondent's residence and bathed nude in the hot tub adjacent to the pool. On some of those occasions, Respondent was nude in the hot tub and swimming pool with the foster child and at other times the two were in the swimming pool and hot tub independently of each other while both were nude. The local sheriff's office investigated the foster home and found no indicators of abuse. Once PEMHS learned of the "skinny dipping" events, neither PEMHS nor Petitioner sought to revoke Respondent's therapeutic foster home license or to provide Respondent with remedial training. Rather, PEMHS removed the foster child from the foster home and refused to assign any more foster children to Respondent's foster home. At the administrative hearing, Petitioner sought the post-hearing deposition testimony of Dr. Cotter for several purposes. One of those purposes was to show the impact on the foster child from the "skinny dipping" events. Another purpose was to show that the "skinny dipping" was "grooming behavior" for future pedophilia. The ALJ sustained Respondent's objection to the admissibility of the expert deposition testimony for the purpose of showing the impact on the foster child and for the purpose of showing that the "skinny dipping" was "grooming behavior" for future pedophilia. Dr. Cotter could not render an opinion concerning the actual impact on the foster child from the "skinny dipping" events or whether those events were actually intended by Respondent as "grooming behavior" for future pedophilia. Dr. Cotter did not intend to evaluate either the foster child or Respondent before rendering his opinions and, in fact, never evaluated either individual. Any expert opinion by Dr. Cotter concerning "grooming behavior" for pedophilia was not relevant to the grounds stated in the Notice of Denial. That expert opinion was relevant only to grounds not stated in the Notice of Denial. Nudity in a swimming pool and hot tub are not synonymous with "grooming behavior" for pedophilia. Nudity and "grooming behavior" for pedophilia are separate grounds for denying the application for renewal of Respondent's license to operate a foster home. Petitioner failed to provide adequate notice prior to the administrative hearing that Petitioner sought to deny the renewal of Respondent's license on the separate ground that Respondent engaged in "grooming behavior" for pedophilia. Fundamental principles of due process prohibit a state agency from notifying a regulated party of the allegations against the party and then, at the hearing, proving-up other allegations. One of the primary functions of an ALJ is to assure that an administrative hearing is a fair hearing. Respondent was not prepared at the administrative hearing to submit evidence, including expert testimony, to refute any allegation not stated in the Notice of Denial. The admission of evidence relevant to allegations not stated in the Notice of Denial would have required a continuance of the administrative hearing to provide Respondent with an opportunity to refute the allegation. A continuance would have denied Respondent a remedy during the period of continuance, increased the economic burden on Respondent, and frustrated judicial economy. Nothing prevents Petitioner from bringing a separate proceeding against the licensee based on the allegation that Respondent engaged in "grooming behavior" for pedophilia. The ALJ limited the testimony of Dr. Cotter to those grounds for denial that Petitioner stated in the Notice of Denial. In relevant part, the Notice of Denial states: After careful review and consideration, your application has been denied. Our decision is based on the following: Your admission that you and two minor boys, one of which was a foster child under your supervision, participated in several "skinny dipping" incidents during your recent licensure as a foster parent for Pinellas Enrichment Through Mental Health Services (PEMHS). As you are aware, the nature of a boy's early experiences may affect the development of his sexual attitudes and subsequent behavior. Therefore, foster parents are expected to provide opportunities for recreational activities appropriate to the child's age. "Skinny dipping" in a hot tub with two minor boys violates the intent of this rule. These incidents reflect poor judgment for a person who is a licensed foster parent. Respondent's Exhibit 1. The Notice of Denial essentially states four grounds for denying the application for renewal of Respondent's license. One ground is the impact on the development of the foster child's sexual attitudes and subsequent behavior. Another ground is nudity between a foster parent and a foster child. A third ground is that Respondent exercised poor judgment. The remaining ground is that Respondent provided recreational activities that were not appropriate to the foster child's age. No evidence shows that the "skinny dipping" events had any adverse impact on the development of the foster child's sexual attitudes and subsequent behavior. Dr. Cotter did not evaluate the foster child to determine the actual impact of the events on the foster child. Contrary to the statements in the Notice of Denial, Petitioner's representative testified at the hearing that Petitioner did not consider the impact on the child that resulted from skinny dipping with Respondent. The preponderance of evidence shows that the actual impact of the foster care provided by Respondent during the 15 months in which the "skinny dipping" events occurred was positive. Many of the foster child's behavioral problems greatly diminished. The foster child made remarkable progress in his behavior both at home and at school. The foster child bonded with Respondent, and Respondent was an exemplary foster parent. The placement of the child with Respondent was so successful that Family Continuity published an article in their magazine about the successful match between the foster child and Respondent. Family Continuity considers Respondent to be an exemplary foster parent and wishes to have Respondent in its foster care program. If Petitioner grants the application for renewal, Family Continuity intends to return the foster child to Respondent for adoption. The second ground stated in the Notice of Denial is nudity between the foster parent and foster child. Without considering the impact on the foster child, Petitioner determined that being naked in the presence of a foster child, without more, was sufficient to close a foster home, remove a child, and revoke a foster home license. Petitioner cited no written statute or rule that prohibits nudity between a foster parent and foster child; or that establishes intelligible standards for regulating such nudity. Petitioner failed to submit competent and substantial evidence to explicate an unwritten policy that prohibits or regulates nudity. Rather, some evidence shows that nudity between foster parents and foster children is generally unavoidable and common. The third ground stated in the Notice of Denial is that Respondent exercised poor judgment. Several witnesses at the hearing and Dr. Cotter opined that Respondent exercised poor judgment. It is unnecessary to determine whether Petitioner exercised poor judgment because Petitioner cited no written rule or policy that defines or prohibits "poor judgment." For reasons stated in the Conclusions of Law, Petitioner must base a denial of a license application on a finding that the applicant violated a specific statute or rule. Petitioner cannot use the Notice of Denial to invent requirements that are not authorized by statute or rule. Petitioner cited no statute or rule that defines "poor judgment" or that establishes intelligible standards to guide the discretionary determination of whether an applicant has exercised poor judgment. In the absence of intelligible standards, the determination of whether an applicant has exercised poor judgment is necessarily an exercise of unbridled agency discretion. The use of unbridled agency discretion to make findings of fact violates fundamental principles of due process. Unbridled agency discretion creates the potential that agency decision-makers may define poor judgment by relying on their personal predilections rather than on those standards authorized by the legislature. Even if it were determined that poor judgment is a standard authorized by the legislature and that Respondent violated that standard, the determination is not dispositive of whether Petitioner should renew Respondent's license to operate a foster home. For example, representatives for Family Continuity and PEMHS agreed in their testimony that Respondent exercised poor judgment. However, Family Continuity recommends that Petitioner issue the non- therapeutic foster home license while PEMHS recommends against renewal of the license. The remaining allegation in the Notice of Denial is that "skinny dipping" is not an age-appropriate recreational activity. Rule 65C-13.010(1)(b)8a. states: 8. Recreation and community. a. The substitute parents are expected to provide opportunities for recreational activities for children. The activities must be appropriate to the child's age and abilities. Swimming in a swimming pool and bathing in a hot tub are recreational activities within the meaning of Rule 65C- 13.010(1)(a)8a. Swimming nude and bathing nude in a hot tub with a nude adult are not appropriate for a child who is between 12 and 14 years old and whose psychological and emotional abilities are diminished by past sexual abuse.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner enter a final order finding that Respondent violated Rule 65C-13.010(1)(b)8 and granting Respondent’s application for a therapeutic foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Frank Nagatani, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 11351 Ulmerton Road, Suite 314 Largo, Florida 33778-1630 Gary A. Urso, Esquire 7702 Massachusetts Avenue New Port Richey, Florida 34653 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner's foster care license should be renewed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Cathy Taylor (Petitioner) was issued a foster care license by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Respondent). On October 25, 1994, Petitioner signed an "Agreement to Provide Substitute Care for Dependent Children (Substitute Care Agreement) with Respondent, agreeing to abide by or with certain conditions which were considered essential for the welfare of foster children in her care. The Substitute Care Agreement provided in pertinent part: We are fully and directly responsible to the department for the care of the child. * * * 6. We will not give the child into the care or physical custody of any other person(s), including the natural parent(s), without the consent of a representative of the department. * * * 9. We will accept dependent children into our home for care only from the department and will make no plans for boarding other children or adults. * * * 11. We will notify the department immediately of any change in our address, employment, living arrangements, family composition, or law enforcement involvement. * * * We will comply with all requirements for a licensed substitute care home as prescribed by the department. * * * We will immediately report any injuries or illness of a child in our care to the department. * * * 19. We will abide by the department's discipline policy which we received during the MAPP training. On October 13, 1993, Petitioner received a certificate from Respondent for successful completion of the MAPP training. On October 25, 1994, Petitioner signed a "Discipline Policy Agreement" (Discipline Agreement). The Discipline Agreement provides in pertinent part: [T]he following disciplinary practices are FORBIDDEN on our children. FAILURE OF THE FOSTER PARENT(S) ... TO COMPLY MAY RESULT IN THE REMOVAL OF THE CHILD(REN) FOR AN INVESTI- GATION AND RESULT IN THE CLOSURE OF YOUR HOME. * * * Hitting a child with ANY object. Slapping, smacking, whipping, washing mouth out with soap, or ANY other form of physical discipline. * * * (6) Delegating authority for punishment to another child or person that is not the Foster Parent(s) ... NO OTHER CHILD, ADOLESCENT, OR ADULT IN THE HOUSEHOLD SHALL HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DISCIPLINE. On October 11, 1995, Petitioner and Trevor Barnes signed a "Bilateral Service Agreement" (Bilateral Agreement) with Respondent, agreeing to abide by or with several conditions which were considered essential for the welfare of the children placed in the foster home. The Bilateral Agreement provides in pertinent part: 2. We are fully and directly responsible to the Department for the care of the child. * * * We will not give the child into the care or physical custody of any other person(s), including the natural parent(s), without the consent of a representative of the department.... * * * 8. We will accept dependent children into our home for care only from the Department and will make no plans for boarding other children or adults. We will notify the Department if any adult relative or family members returns to live in the home. * * * 10. We will notify the Department immediately of any change in our address, employment, living arrangements, arrest record, health status or family composition, as well as any special needs of the child (i.e. health, school problems, emotional problems). * * * We will comply with all requirements for a licensed foster home as prescribed by the Department. * * * We will provide a nurturing, supportive, family- like home environment. * * * We understand that any breach of the Agreement may result in the immediate removal of the child(ren) and revocation of the license. At that time, Trevor Barnes was Petitioner's fiance. They were married in January 1996 and have, therefore, been married for less than one year. On October 11, 1995, Petitioner and Trevor Barnes signed a Discipline Agreement. The pertinent language of the Discipline Agreement was no different from the one signed on October 25, 1994. In December 1994, minor foster child N.R. was placed in the care of Petitioner. In 1995, minor foster children V.M. and J.M., two sisters, were placed in the care of Petitioner. Petitioner was responsible for the supervision and care of the foster children. Petitioner allowed her sister, an adult, and her sister's son, who was not placed with her under foster care, to live in her home. At the time, her relatives had no other place to live. Petitioner did not inform Respondent that her relatives were living with her. Petitioner violated the Substitute Care Agreement and the Bilateral Agreement. At times, Petitioner left the children under the supervision and in the care of Mr. Barnes and her sister, thereby, violating the Substitute Care Agreement and the Bilateral Agreement. On November 23, 1995, Thanksgiving day, one of Respondent's representatives, who was transporting V.M. and J.M. to visit with their prospective adoptive family, became aware of marks on one of V.M.'s legs. Respondent's representative overheard V.M. tell J.M. to look at what "mommy" had done. Respondent's representative examined V.M.'s leg and discovered marks on V.M.'s leg. She questioned V.M., regarding the marks, and V.M. confirmed what Respondent's representative had overheard. Also, V.M. informed Respondent that Petitioner spanked both she and her sister, J.M. Respondent's representative determined that the marks were consistent with marks which would result from striking the child's leg with a metal hanger. However, she could not determine if the marks were fresh or recent or old scars because she was not trained to make such a determination. There was no other evidence as to any other observations made regarding the marks. Respondent's counselor, assigned to V.M. and J.M., reported the incident. An investigation was begun by Respondent for alleged abuse. Neither V.M. nor J.M. testified at the hearing. The investigator who conducted the investigation on the alleged abuse did not testify. Petitioner denies striking V.M. with a metal hanger or with any object. Moreover, she denies having ever inflicted corporal punishment on the children. Her method of punishing the children was taking away their privileges to do the things that they enjoyed. Further, Mr. Barnes questioned V.M., regarding the marks, who told Mr. Barnes that the natural mother inflicted the marks on V.M. Respondent was unable to provide evidence as to the last period of time that the children had visited with their natural parent(s). Petitioner did not report the marks on V.M.'s leg to Respondent. Petitioner violated the Substitute Care Agreement. Regarding spanking the children, prior to the discovery of the marks on V.M.'s leg, Respondent suspected that Petitioner was spanking the children. Respondent's counselor to V.M. and J.M. questioned Petitioner as to whether she was spanking the children. Petitioner denied any spanking and responded with her method of punishment as indicated above. But, also, Petitioner informed Respondent's counselor that perhaps Mr. Barnes or her sister had spanked the children. Petitioner presented no evidence that she had confronted both her sister and Mr. Barnes as to whether they were spanking the children and that she had instructed them not to do so, as such action was violative of the Discipline Agreement. Further, there is no evidence that Respondent questioned Petitioner's sister or Mr. Barnes. There is insufficient evidence to find that Petitioner used corporal punishment. However, the circumstances presented causes concern to the extent that Respondent was justified in questioning the suitability of Petitioner to be a foster care parent. At all times material hereto, Mr. Barnes did not live with Petitioner. He lived with Petitioner's grandmother. Petitioner never indicated to Respondent that Mr. Barnes either lived in the foster home or did not live in the foster home. Although he spent considerable time at Petitioner's home, the evidence is insufficient to show that he lived with her. Even if Mr. Barnes was living with Petitioner, Respondent became aware of it in October 1995. Respondent's counselor, who was assigned to N.R., believed that Mr. Barnes was living with Petitioner and informed him that, if he was going to live with Petitioner, she had to perform a background check on him. Respondent's counselor obtained the necessary information from Mr. Barnes to perform the background check. At that time, Respondent was aware that Petitioner and Mr. Barnes were planning to be married. Petitioner received a monthly allowance from Respondent for the care of the minor foster children. Petitioner became unemployed. Petitioner did not report her unemployment to Respondent. However, Respondent's counselor, who was assigned to V.M. and J.M., was aware of Petitioner's unemployment but assumed that Mr. Barnes was Petitioner's husband and that he was supporting the family. However, Petitioner and Mr. Barnes were not married, he was not living in Petitioner's home, and he was not supporting the family. Regardless, Petitioner violated the Substitute Care Agreement and the Bilateral Agreement. Petitioner paid too little attention to V.M. and J.M.'s hygiene and personal appearance. The hygiene was inappropriate to the point that the children's school contacted Respondent. The children frequently appeared to be unkept, and Respondent did not observe the children with any new clothes. Because of her unemployment, Petitioner had insufficient income to adequately support the minor foster children. Because of the marks on V.M.'s leg, because of V.M.'s statement to Respondent that Petitioner inflicted the injury to her leg and had spanked both she and her sister, and because Respondent had determined that Petitioner had violated its rules and regulations, Respondent removed the minor foster children from Respondent's home. Furthermore, Respondent refused to renew Petitioner's foster care license. Petitioner no longer wishes to renew her license.3 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this proceeding and the parties thereto pursuant to Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that her foster care license should be renewed. Department of Transportation v. J. W. C. Company, 396 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Balino v. Department of Health and Rehabilitatives, 348 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Section 409.175(1), Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: The purpose of this section is to protect the health, safety, and well-being of all children in the state who are cared for by family foster homes, residential child-caring agencies, and child-placing agencies, by providing for the establishment of licensing requirements for such homes and agencies and providing procedures to determine adherence to these requirements. Rule 10M-6, Florida Administrative Code, sets forth the minimum standards by which foster parents must be evaluated. Rule 10M-6.012 provides in pertitnent part: Section 409.175, F.S., mandates that the department establish minimum standards, or rules for the types of care defined in the statute. The standards, once promulgated, have the full force and effect of law. The licensing rules specify a level of care below which programs will not be able to operate. Rule 10M-6.024 provides in pertinent part: (4) Responsibilities of the Substitute Care Parents to the Department. * * * (b) The substitute care parents are required to participate with the department in relicensing studies and in ongoing monitoring of their home, and must provide sufficient information for the department to verify compliance with all rules and regulations. * * * (g) The substitute care parents must notify the department regarding changes which affect the life and circumstances of the shelter or foster family. Rule 10M-6.025 provides in pertinent part: Length of Marriage. If married, substitute care parents should have a stabilized, legal marriage of at least one year prior to being licensed. Income. Substitute care parents must have sufficient income to assure their stability and the security of their own family without relying on board payments. The substitute family must have sufficient income to absorb four to six weeks of a foster child's care until a board payment is received. Petitioner has failed to meet her burden of proof. Petitioner has failed to meet the minimum standards of Rule 10M-6. In addition, during the course of her licensure, Petitioner violated several provisions of the Substitute Care Agreement and the Bilateral Agreement. Regardless, Petitioner has indicated that she no longer wishes to renew her foster care license.4
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order denying the renewal of Cathy Taylor's foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of November 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November 1996.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should revoke Respondents' foster home license for use of corporal punishment of a foster child in violation of Section 409.175(8), Florida Statutes (2001), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-13.010. (Citations to statutes are to Florida Statutes (2001), and citations to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code in effect on the date of this Recommended Order.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster homes in Florida. Respondents are licensed foster parents. On November 1, 2001, Petitioner's Child Protection Team received an abuse report alleging that Respondent, Yvonne Lindsay, had administered corporal punishment to a foster child under Mrs. Lindsay's care and identified in the record as D.J. D.J. was born on May 6, 1997. D.J. urinated in the van owned by Respondents. D.J. urinated in the van regularly. Mrs. Lindsay became angry and grabbed D.J. forcefully by the arm. Mrs. Lindsay testified that she did not spank D.J. Mrs. Lindsay's denial concerning corporal punishment is neither credible nor persuasive. On November 2, 2001, members of the Child Protection Team examined D.J. at one of their offices. One team member who observed D.J. is an Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner (ARNP). The ARNP has specialized in family practice since 1980 and was the supervising nurse practitioner in the examining room when other members of the Child Protection Team examined D.J. The ARNP observed fresh red contusions on D.J.'s back as well as numerous healed lesions on D.J.'s buttocks from old injuries. The ARNP observed D.J. herself and supervised the examination.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a Final Order finding that Mrs. Lindsay used corporal punishment against one of her foster children in violation of Section 409.175 and Rule 65C-13.010 and revoking Respondents' foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of March, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Cato, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 400 West Robinson Street Suite S-1106 Orlando, Florida 32801-1782 J. William Masters, Esquire 2901 Curry Ford Road, Suite 207 Orlando, Florida 32806 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Jerry Regier, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 1, Room 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Respondent, Delores Wilson, committed the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, whether her foster care license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was first licensed as a foster parent in Florida, in or about 2003, after she applied for and was granted a foster care license through Camelot Community Care, Inc. (Camelot), a foster parent licensing agency located in Tampa, Florida. Prior to receiving a foster care license through Camelot, Respondent signed a Letter of Agreement with Camelot. Pursuant to the terms of the Letter of Agreement, Respondent agreed to comply with Camelot's policies. Additionally, the letter advised Respondent that if she violated the policies, foster children would be removed from her home, and the Department would make decisions regarding the revocation of her license. After Respondent was licensed, two foster children, T. and D., were placed in her home. T., a girl, was placed in Respondent's home in November 2003, and D., a boy, was placed there in December 2003. In November 2004, Camelot staff met with Respondent to discuss the foster children who had been placed in her home. At the time of this meeting, D. was 15 or 16 years old and T., who was about 18 years old, was pregnant and due to deliver the baby in a few months. D. had a history of sexually acting out. Because of D.'s history, Camelot's policy was that D. not be placed in a home with younger children. In light of D.'s history and Camelot's policy related thereto, during the November 2004 meeting, Camelot staff told Respondent that when T.'s baby was born, the baby could not live in the same house with D. Therefore, Camelot staff advised Respondent that she would have to choose whether she wanted to continue to work with D. (have D. remain in her home) or assist T. with her baby. Respondent was also told to notify Camelot when the baby was born. In December 2004, Respondent was informed that it was likely that T.'s baby would be adopted or put in foster care upon birth due to T.'s extensive disabilities. Respondent had also been told that the baby would not be given to the mother while she was in the hospital. On January 29 or 30, 2005, T., who was then 19 years old, gave birth to her baby at a hospital. It is unknown what happened at the hospital to alter the proposed adoption or foster care plan for the baby. However, while T. was in the hospital, the baby was given to her. On or about February 1, 2005, T. and the baby left the hospital. Both T. and her baby then went to Respondent's home and lived with her. The reason Respondent allowed T. and the baby to stay with her was because she wanted to help T. Despite regular communications with Camelot staff during the time period after the baby was born, Respondent never told anyone associated with Camelot or the Department that T. had given birth to the baby. Camelot found out about the birth of the baby only after being notified "indirectly" by another waiver support coordinator. D's initial placement with Respondent remained unchanged until February 7, 2005, when Camelot first received reports that T.'s baby was living with Respondent. On that day, Camelot removed D. from Respondent's home. On February 16, 2005, Camelot staff, D.'s waiver support coordinator, a Hillsborough Kids, Inc., case manager, and Respondent met to discuss the situation which resulted in D.'s being removed from Respondent's home on February 7, 2005. At this meeting, the subjects of the November 2004 and December 2004 meetings described in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 above, were also reviewed and discussed. A summary of the February 16, 2005, meeting was reported in a letter dated February 28, 2005, written by Camelot's clinical director, who attended that meeting. A copy of the letter was furnished to several persons who attended the meeting, including Respondent. The letter expressly stated that anyone who had further comments or concerns should contact the clinical director. Respondent never contacted the clinical director or anyone at Camelot regarding the contents of the February 28, 2005, letter. The discussion at the February 16, 2005, meeting focused on D. and the circumstances surrounding his removal from Respondent's home. Camelot staff specifically discussed Respondent's decision to allow T. and T.'s baby to live with Respondent, after being told that this should not happen and her failure to notify Camelot that the baby had been born and was in her home. During this meeting, Respondent never denied the foregoing facts. Rather, Respondent explained that she allowed T. and her baby to stay with her was so that she (Respondent) could help T. As a result of Respondent's failure to disclose to Camelot staff that T. had given birth to the baby and that both T. and the baby were living with Respondent, Camelot placed Respondent's foster home license on inactive status in or about late February 2005. Camelot advised Respondent of this decision at the February 16, 2005, meeting. In addition to placing Respondent's license on inactive status, Camelot also recommended that Respondent not be re-licensed as a foster parent. Respondent's foster care license was set to expire on July 31, 2005. After Respondent's foster care license issued by Camelot expired, she applied to Florida Mentor, another foster care licensing agency, for licensure as a foster parent. Florida Mentor reviewed Respondent's application for foster care licensure. As part of its review, Florida Mentor conducted a home study, the results of which were summarized in a report titled, "Annual Re-Licensing Home Study-2005" (Home Study Report or Report), which was completed on or about October 27, 2005. During the review process, Florida Mentor learned that Respondent had been previously licensed by Camelot and that the license had been placed on inactive status and allowed to expire. Based on information obtained from the Department's licensure file on Respondent and/or information provided by Respondent, Florida Mentor also learned about the circumstances discussed in paragraph 13, that caused Camelot to remove a foster child from Respondent's home and to place her foster care license on inactive status. Florida Mentor staff met with Respondent and discussed the situation involving D., T., and T.'s baby that occurred when she was licensed by Camelot. Respondent did not deny that she had violated Camelot's policy and had brought T. and T's baby to her home when D. was still there. Instead, Respondent acknowledged that she realized that her decision to bring T.'s baby home resulted in her clients being removed from her home and Camelot's decision to place her license on inactive status. Notwithstanding Respondent's admitting that she had failed to adhere to Camelot's policy regarding allowing T.'s baby in her home when D. was still there, she expressed to the Florida Mentor staff her desire to continue to work as a foster parent. Florida Mentor staff acknowledged Respondent's desire to serve as a foster parent. However, in light of her failure to comply with Camelot's policies and procedures, Florida Mentor staff discussed with Respondent the importance of communication and honesty with the foster care agency and the adherence to the policies and decisions of the agency. Florida Mentor considered several factors in its review of Respondent's application for a foster care license. These factors included Respondent's prior foster care experience with Camelot, including her admission that her violation of Camelot's policy was the reason her license was placed on inactive status; Respondent's statement of her desire to be a foster parent; and her apparent understanding that it was important that she comply with the policies of the foster care agency. Based on its review of the application and the findings and conclusions in the home study report, Florida Mentor recommended that Respondent be re-licensed as a therapeutic foster parent. Based on Florida Mentor's recommendation, Respondent was granted a new foster parent license, which was effective on November 1, 2005. It is that license which is at issue in this proceeding. Prior to issuance of Respondent's November 1, 2005, foster care license, Respondent was required to sign a Bilateral Service Agreement (Bilateral Agreement). That Bilateral Agreement set forth the terms and conditions with which all affected parties, the Department, the foster care agency, and Respondent must comply. The Bilateral Agreement was executed by Respondent and by a Florida Mentor staff person, on behalf of the Department, on October 4, 2005. Pursuant to the Bilateral Agreement, Respondent agreed to "notify the Department immediately of a potential change in . . . living arrangements or family composition (who is in the home), employment, significant health changes or any other condition that may affect the child's well being." In November 2005, after Respondent received her new foster care license, foster children were placed in Respondent's home. One child, M.J., was placed with Respondent on November 15, 2005. Two other children, S.C. and M.C., who were brothers, were place with Respondent on December 19, 2005. On January 8, 2006, M.J., S.C., and M.C., the three foster children who had been placed with Respondent in November and December 2005, were still living in Respondent's home. On January 8, 2006, a child protective investigator with the Department conducted a home study of Respondent's home. The purpose of the home study was to determine whether Respondent's home was a safe placement for her two grandchildren, and, if so, should the grandchildren be placed with Respondent. A placement for the two children was necessary because they had been taken from their mother, Respondent's daughter, for alleged abuse, neglect, or abandonment. The child protective investigator completed the home study on January 8, 2006, and reported the information she obtained during the home study on a seven-page Department form titled, "Caregiver Home Study." The completed Caregiver Home Study document was signed by Respondent and her son-in-law, Richard Davis, on January 8, 2006. Two categories included on the Caregiver Home Study form required Respondent to provide information regarding members of her household. One of the categories on the form required Respondent to provide the names of adults living or frequently in the prospective caregiver's home. The other category required that Respondent also list or provide the names, sex, and ages of children living in her home. On the Caregiver Home Study form, Richard Davis, Respondent's son-in-law, was listed as an adult who lived in or was frequently in Respondent's home. Based on information Respondent provided to the child protective investigator on January 8, 2006, the child protective investigator recorded on the Caregiver Home Study form that there were two foster children living in Respondent's home, A.C. and his brother, M.C. On January 8, 2006, in addition to A.C. and M.C., there was a third foster child, M.J., also living with Respondent. However, although there were three foster children living with Respondent on January 8, 2006, she never told the child protective investigator that M.J. was living in her home. Therefore, M.J. was not listed on the Caregiver Home Study form as a child living in Respondent's home. The Caregiver Home Study form required that Mr. Davis, the other adult living or frequently in the prospective caregiver's home, and Respondent sign the completed form. Both Respondent and Mr. Davis signed the Caregiver Home Study form on January 8, 2006. By signing the form, both Respondent and Mr. Davis acknowledged that to the best of their knowledge, "I have given the Department truthful information on all questions asked of me." On March 14, 2006, the assigned caseworker for A.C. and his brother M.C., two of the three foster children in Respondent's home, made an unannounced home visit to Respondent's home to check on those two children. During this visit, the case worker observed A.C. and M.C., as well as two other children there. The other two children the caseworker observed were Respondent's grandchildren who had been placed in Respondent's home after the Caregiver Home Study was completed on January 8, 2006. Respondent's two grandchildren had been placed with her since January 2006 and were still living with her on March 14, 2006. However, during the case worker's unannounced visit on March 14, 2006, Respondent told the caseworker that the two grandchildren did not live with her, but that she was babysitting them until their mother got off from work. After the March 14, 2006, visit to Respondent's home, the caseworker searched HomeSafe Net to determine the status of Respondent's grandchildren. That search revealed that the grandchildren were actually sheltered and living with Respondent. The caseworker also contacted an employee of the Safe Children Coalition, an agency which has a contract with the Department, to obtain information regarding the status of Respondent's grandchildren. An employee with Safe Children Coalition confirmed that the Sheriff's Office had placed Respondent's grandchildren with Respondent on January 8, 2006, and that, as of March 14, 2006, Respondent's grandchildren were still living with her. At the time of the March 14, 2006, 30-day visit, and at no time prior thereto, Florida Mentor was unaware that Respondent's grandchildren were living with Respondent. Respondent never notified Florida Mentor or the Department that her grandchildren had been placed with her and were living in her home. By failing to notify the Department or Florida Mentor of the change in the family composition, the people living in the home, Respondent violated the terms of the Bilateral Agreement. In order to provide for the safety and health of all the children placed in Respondent's care, it is imperative that the agency placing the foster children be immediately advised of any potential or actual change in the family composition, those living in the home. Since being licensed as a foster parent in Florida, Respondent repeatedly disregarded her obligation to advise the foster care agency of important and required changes. In three instances, Respondent failed to inform the appropriate agency of the changes in the composition of persons living in her home. The second and third incidents occurred after and while Respondent was licensed by Florida Mentor, after she had been specifically advised of the importance and need to communicate and be honest with the foster care agency and to adhere to the agency's policies. First, Respondent failed to advise Camelot staff when T.'s baby was born, and Respondent allowed T. to bring her newborn baby to Respondent's home to live. Respondent ignored or disregarded the directive of Camelot staff, who had told her that T.'s baby could not live in Respondent's home because of the sexual history of D., a foster child placed in Respondent's home. Respondent testified that D. was not in her home on February 1, 2005, when T.'s newborn baby was brought home, because Camelot had placed D. in respite care. According to Respondent, D. returned for one day, before he was permanently removed from her home and placed in another foster home. Respondent's testimony, discussed in paragraph 45 above, is not credible and is contrary to the competent evidence which established that D. was removed from Respondent's home on February 7, 2005, and then placed in another home. Even if D. were not physically in Respondent's house when T.'s baby was there, because D. was still a foster child placed in Respondent's home, she was responsible for notifying the Department of the change in the composition of her household. However, Respondent failed to notify Camelot or the Department and, in doing so, violated a Department rule and a specific directive of the foster care agency. In the second incident, Respondent failed to disclose to the child protective investigator that she had three foster children. Respondent testified that she was not untruthful to the child protective investigator about the number of foster children who were living in her home. According to Respondent, she never said how many foster children lived in her home. Instead, Respondent testified that the child protective investigator made that presumption after she (the investigator) saw two "yellow jackets" (files about the foster children) on a table in Respondent's house. Respondent's testimony, discussed in paragraph 47, is not credible and ignores the fact that Respondent signed the Caregiver Home Study form indicating that she had only two foster children living in the home. Moreover, having served as a foster parent for about ten years and in two states, Respondent knew the importance and significance of providing accurate information regarding the composition of the family and how that information might impact additional placements (i.e., the placement of her grandchildren) in Respondent's home. In the third instance, while licensed by Florida Mentor, Respondent failed to notify that agency or the Department of a change in the family composition (i.e., who is in the home) that occurred on January 8, 2006, when Respondent's two grandchildren were placed in her home. The agency first learned that Respondent's grandchildren lived with her only after a case worker made an unannounced visit to Respondent's home on March 14, 2006, and saw Respondent's grandchildren there, and later verified that the grandchildren were living with Respondent. Respondent does not deny that she failed to notify the Department that her grandchildren were living with her. However, Respondent testified that she never told the case worker that her grandchildren did not live with her and that she was babysitting them while their mother worked. This testimony by Respondent is not credible and is contrary to the credible testimony of the case worker and the supporting documentary evidence. Respondent was aware of the policy that required her to immediately notify the Department or foster care agency of a potential change in family composition. In fact, Respondent signed a Bilateral Agreement in which she agreed to provide such notification to the Department or the Department's representative. Nonetheless, on two occasions, after being licensed by Florida Mentor and having foster children placed in her home, Respondent failed to notify the Department of actual changes in her family's composition. Respondent deliberately violated the terms of the Bilateral Agreement that required her to notify the Department or the foster care agency of any potential, and certainly any actual, changes in her family composition. This provision is designed to better ensure the health and safety of the foster children placed with foster parents, such as Respondent. There is no indication that the children placed in Respondent's home at the time relevant to this proceeding were harmed or injured. Nonetheless, the harm which the Department's policy is designed to prevent is not only possible, but more likely to occur when the composition of the foster parent changes and the Department is not notified of that change. Without such knowledge, the Department lacks the information it needs to make decisions regarding the placement and/or continued placement of foster children in a particular foster home. As a result of Respondent's failing to provide information relative to her family composition, she also failed to provide information necessary and required to verify her compliance with the Department's rules and regulations.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Children and Family Services, enter a final order revoking Respondent, Delores Wilson's, foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 2007.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Respondents' foster care license should be renewed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondents operated a foster home in Broward County, Florida, pursuant to a license that was issued by the Department in January, 1994. In March, 1994, the Department placed a foster child, M.A.G., in the Respondents' home. This child, M.A.G., was an extremely troubled girl whose interfering biological family kept her in an emotional state of constant turmoil. The "Visitation Reports" introduced into evidence by the Department reflect that the child's adjustment to placement with the Respondents went from "good" to "fair." As the contacts with her family continued, the child's progress with the Respondents deteriorated. The evaluation reflects that the placement went from meeting the child's needs to not meeting the child's needs as of a December 14, 1994 visit. In fact, Respondents asked the Department to remove M.A.G. from their home. Ms. Suppa described the family relationship between M.A.G. and the Respondents as "tumultuous." The contacts between M.A.G. and her biological family caused severe unrest within the home as M.A.G. was torn between her biological family and her growing interest in the Respondents. M.A.G.'s emotional problems were not unusual for children in the custody of the Department. In fact, many foster children in the custody of the Department have emotional problems. Ms. Suppa was involved in family therapy with the Respondents and M.A.G. from October, 1994, to the time M.A.G. was removed from the Respondents' home on January 6, 1995. Ms. Suppa verified that the Respondents did not abuse M.A.G. Ms. Suppa acknowledged that Respondents did not provide the necessary emotional support that M.A.G. needed, and recommended to the Department that the placement be changed. Ms. Suppa could not state what the Respondents could have done, which they did not try, to avoid the incident complained of by the Department. M.A.G. spoke of suicide on occasions but Respondents did everything asked of them to assist the girl. On December 18, 1994, M.A.G. was voluntarily admitted to the Florida Medical Center for psychological testing following an incident that occurred in the Respondents' home. On this occasion, M.A.G. had a knife in her hands and threatened to kill herself. The Respondents called the police to assist them. On release, M.A.G.'s emotional state continued to deteriorate despite Respondents' best efforts. Respondents took M.A.G. to counseling. They never missed a counseling session and willingly agreed to explore any options that were suggested. When M.A.G. chose to spend the 1994 holidays with Respondents, she was cursed by her sister and ignored by her grandmother. This caused a serious depression. M.A.G.'s biological mother did not attend her appointed counseling sessions. M.A.G. was disappointed since she had hoped to see her mother. On December 28, 1994, M.A.G. missed one dose of her medication. No conclusion is reached that this omission led to, or caused, the incident of January 3, 1995. On January 3, 1995, M.A.G. had to be Baker Acted. She was again admitted to the Florida Medical Center for psychological testing and treatment following an incident that occurred in the Respondents' home. Once again M.A.G. had threatened to kill herself with a knife. Since being moved from Respondents' home M.A.G. has progressed and is no longer on medication. No conclusion is reached from this progress, however, since M.A.G.'s biological family's contact with her is unknown. M.A.G. had a strong loyalty to her biological family. Respondents have been foster parents for many years in New York. This was the first incident wherein a foster child could not adjust to the Respondents' home. The Respondents tried everything within their control to make the foster relationship with M.A.G. work out.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order approving Respondents' request for licensure renewal. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-1556 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, and 11 are accepted. Paragraphs 4, 5, 8, 10, 12, 13 and 14 are rejected as irrelevant or not supported by the weight of credible evidence. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondents: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, and 9 are accepted. Paragraphs 6, 7, 10, 11, and 12 are rejected as irrelevant or comment. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert L. Powell Agency Clerk Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Kim Tucker General Counsel Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Carole C. Wilhelm Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 201 W. Broward Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Carole A. and Alex Lezdey 9711 N.W. 20th Street Coral Springs, Florida 33701
The Issue Did Respondent violate Section 409.175(8)(b)1, Florida Statutes, or Rule 65C-13.011(d) and (f)1, Florida Administrative Code, and, if so, should Respondent's license as a foster home be revoked?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed as a foster home, having been issued such license on October 23, 1997. The Department is the agency of the state charged with the responsibility and duty to carry out and enforce the provisions of Chapter 409, Florida Statutes. Respondent received the Department's Model Approach to Partnership Parenting (MAPP) training to become a foster parent between September 1995 and December 1995. The Department provides MAPP training to teach persons how to become foster parents. The MAPP training that Respondent received included instructions concerning appropriate sleeping arrangements, namely that an adult should not sleep in the same bed with a foster child. Respondent agreed that the MAPP training was very useful and that he gained insight from that training on how to be a foster parent. Respondent received his foster care license on October 23, 1997, and the Department placed its first foster child with Respondent in January 1998. Foster child D.D., born October 23, 1985, was placed with Respondent by the Department January 20, 1998, and stayed with Respondent until March 12, 1998, when he was removed by the Department. Foster child E.T., born December 12, 1984, was placed with Respondent on January 12, 1998, and stayed with Respondent until January 21, 1998, when he was removed by the Department. E.T. was again placed by the Department with Respondent on January 23, 1998, and stayed with Respondent until March 12, 1998, when he was removed by the Department. Foster child R.M., born October 10, 1984, was placed with Respondent by the Department on March 2, 1998, and stayed with Respondent until March 9, 1998, when he was removed by the Department due to an alleged incident between R.M. and E.T. which occurred on March 9, 1998. The incident resulted in the Department's conducting an investigation concerning an alleged abuse on the foster child, E.T. by the foster child, R.M.. It appears from the record that the allegations were unfounded. In any event, R.M. was removed from Respondent's foster home on March 9, 1998, because his record indicated that in an earlier incident R.M. had sexually victimized another child (not E.T.). Also, because E.T. had been sexually victimized by another child (not R.M.) previous to being placed in Respondent's care the Department decided to remove E.T. from Respondent's home. It should be noted that the Department was aware of these prior incidents concerning R.M. and E.T. and the sleeping arrangements at Respondent's foster home at the time these foster children were placed with Respondent by the Department. Foster children, B.B. and C.L., dates of birth not in evidence, were placed with the Respondent by the Department on February 24, 1998, and stayed with Respondent until February 25, 1998, when they were removed by the Department. During the investigation concerning the alleged abuse incident involving R.M. and E.T. and at the hearing, Respondent admitted to sleeping in the same bed as E.T. and D.D. Respondent testified that on at least five occasions E.T. had slept in the same bed as Respondent. The facts surrounding this sleeping arrangement was that E.T. was suffering from an upper respiratory problem and would go to sleep on Respondent's bed before Respondent, who stayed up late reading, was ready for bed. As a result Respondent would sleep with E.T. to keep from waking him. There was no allegation, and certainly no evidence, that Respondent sexually or otherwise molested E.T. at any time. Respondent also admitted to sleeping in the same bed as D.D. on one occasion. Again, there was no allegation, and certainly no evidence, that Respondent sexually or otherwise molested D.D. At the time the Respondent applied for and was granted a foster home license and during the intervening time, the Department's personnel who worked with Respondent were well aware of the lack of sleeping spaces in Respondent's home. In fact, one of the Department's employees upon being advised of Respondent's sleeping arrangements commented that "it was better than sleeping on the floor at HRS." Upon being advised of the restriction on adults sleeping with foster children, the Respondent did not at first fully understand the risk of harm to the children. However, after being reminded of his MAPP training and the risk of harm to children in such a sleeping arrangement, Respondent realized his mistake in allowing such sleeping arrangements. Under Respondent's tutelage, E.T. and D.D. thrived academically and have continued to thrive since they left Respondent's home. The Department had some concern that Respondent's son was living in the home and that it had not been made aware of that circumstance. However, the Department knew, when Respondent's license was issued, that his son was living in the home.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the mitigating circumstances, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order suspending Respondent's foster home license for a period of one year, staying the suspension and imposing such reasonable conditions as the Department deems necessary to further educate Respondent as to his responsibilities as a foster parent. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th of July, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack E. Farley, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 4720 Old Highway 37 Lakeland, Florida 33813-2030 Thomas D. Wilson, Esquire Law Office of Gregory Ruster 1525 South Florida Avenue Suite 3 Lakeland, Florida 33803 Gregory D. Venz. Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Petitioners, K.W. and L.A.W., should be granted a license to be foster parents.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of facts are made: Petitioners are a married couple who applied to Respondent for a foster home license. Petitioners have three children. The background investigation conducted by Respondent revealed reports of incidents of domestic violence and battery involving Petitioners and their children. On October 4, 1999, police officers responded to Petitioners' home after receiving a report of domestic violence. The officer's investigation revealed that one of the Petitioners, L.A.W., had been battered by her son. The child had been involved in pastoral counseling for his aggressive behavior. Petitioner, K.W., advised the police officer that the child, W.A.W., would be moving from the residence because of his continuing inappropriate behavior. On April 7, 2002, another incident of domestic violence was reported and investigated. On this occasion, the two younger children of Petitioners were involved in an altercation that resulted in Petitioner, K.W., being rendered unconscious by a blow to the head with an object delivered by one of the children, C.W. C.W. was arrested for aggravated battery. In February 2003, Petitioners desired to keep a six- month-old, unrelated child in their home. The child was placed in the home contingent on C.W.'s moving from the home and not residing in the home. Petitioners agreed to this contingency of placement, and the child was placed in Petitioners' home. On November 5, 2003, Petitioners applied to be licensed as foster parents. Ten days after Petitioners applied to be licensed, another incident of domestic violence occurred. On November 15, 2003, two of Petitioners' adult children got into a fistfight which resulted in one having a broken nose. As a result, W.A.W. was arrested. At the time of the altercation, W.A.W., 21 years old and the oldest child who had moved out at an earlier time as a result of his behavior, was residing at Petitioners' residence. Although the police report indicates that the incident occurred at Petitioners' residence, the testimony indicated that it occurred "down the street." All three of Petitioners' children continue to reside locally and frequent their parents' home. Petitioners are highly recommended by a representative of The Children's Home Society, a Guardian ad Litem, and their pastor. Respondent has the responsibility of placing foster children in a safe setting. But for the behavior of their children, Petitioners would qualify for licensure. As long as Petitioners' children frequent Petitioners' residence, any child placed in that residence is at risk. As a result, Petitioners are not qualified to be licensed as foster parents.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order denying the foster care license application of Petitioners. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas J. Thompson, Esquire Thomas Thompson, P.A. 100 South Washington Avenue Titusville, Florida 32780 Richard Cato, Esquire Department of children and Family Services 400 West Robinson Street, Suite S-1106 Orlando, Florida 32801-1782 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for renewal of her family foster home license should be denied on the grounds set forth in the June 20, 1995, letter from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), Respondent's predecessor, to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is (as was its predecessor, HRS) a state government licensing and regulatory agency. From September of 1989 to June 30, 1995, Petitioner was licensed by HRS (on a yearly basis) to operate a family foster home at her residence in Palm Beach County. In May of 1994, as part of the licensure renewal process, Petitioner signed an "Agreement to Provide Substitute Care for Dependent Children" (Agreement). In so doing, she agreed that she would, as a licensed foster parent, among other things, "comply with all requirements for a licensed substitute care home as prescribed by the department," "immediately report any injuries or illness of a child in [her] care," and "abide by the department's discipline policy." The previous day (May 23, 1994), Petitioner had received and signed a copy of HRS's "discipline policy," which provided as follows: FOSTER PARENT(S): You are aware that for some time, Health and Rehabilitative Services has discouraged the use of Physical punishment, including spanking, for children in foster care. Now, however, we have an Administrative Rule statewide which prohibits foster parents from using corporal punishment on foster children. This section of administrative Rule 10M- 6, which deals with discipline is reproduced in the following paragraph. "Licensing and relicensing procedure developed by the Department shall include the presentation of written foster care disciplinary policies to applicants and licensed foster parents to ensure that appropriate nonabusive disciplinary practices are used in dealing with foster children's behavior. Discipline is a training process through which the child develops the self- control, self-reliance and orderly conduct necessary for them to assume responsibilities, make daily living decisions and live according to accepted levels of social behaviors. The purpose of discipline is education and rational. It focuses on deterring unacceptable behavior by encouraging the child to develop internal controls. Foster parents are expected to define rules which establish limits and types of acceptable behavior. These rules must be clearly explained to each child and applied equally to all children. Prohibited disciplinary practices include group punishments for misbehavior of individuals; withholding of meals, mail or family visits; hitting a child with an object; spanking a child; physical, sexual, emotional and verbal abuse; humiliating or degrading punishment which subjects the child to ridicule; being placed in a locked room; and delegation of authority for punishment to other children or persons not known to the child. The use of isolation shall be used only for short periods of time as a therapeutic measure when a child's behavior is temporarily out of control. Such periods of isolation shall be observed and supervised by the foster parent to ensure the safety of the child." If you have problems with this new rule, please discuss this with your licensing counselors who will be able to help you work out alternative disciplinary techniques for each child, according to his/her needs. My signature acknowledges that I have read this statement, that I understand the content and agree to abide by it. A. G. is a 12 year-old foster child who currently resides in Boys Town in Tallahassee. Before entering the foster care system, he had been the victim of abuse. In 1994, A. G. lived in Petitioner's family foster home along with three other male foster children, J. W., M. M., and B. P., all of whom were teenagers with troubled pasts and juvenile records. On or about December 15, 1994, the day before A. G. was scheduled to leave Petitioner's home for another foster home, the other boys angrily reported to Petitioner that A. G. had misappropriated a gift certificate that belonged to M. M. and a watch that belonged to B. P. M. M. was particularly upset and angry about what A. G. had done. Upon receiving this report, Petitioner instructed the boys to "take care of" the matter. The boys then went to A. G.'s room and proceeded to hit A. G. with their hands and a belt. A. G. sustained a number of bruises on his buttocks and the back of his legs as a result of the attack. A. G. yelled and screamed as he was being hit. Petitioner was in her bedroom, which was adjacent to the room where the beating took place. At no time during the attack did she leave her bedroom to tell the boys to stop beating A. G., nor did she take any other action to stop the beating. Petitioner exercised extremely poor judgment in instructing the older boys to "take care of" the matter. She should have realized that the carte blanche she gave J. W., M. M., and B. P., who were upset and angry with A. G., placed A. G.'s physical safety at risk. She compounded her error by not carefully monitoring the older boys subsequent activities to make sure that they resolved the matter appropriately without harming A. G. The following morning, A. G. left Petitioner's home for another foster home, that of Janet Kerimoglu and her husband. A. G. arrived at the Kerimoglu home with very few belongings. Moreover, his physical appearance concerned Ms. Kerimoglu. A. G. appeared to be very thin. Furthermore, he had head lice and fresh bruises on his body. When asked about the bruises, A. G. explained that he had been beaten up by some teenagers the day before at Petitioner's home. A report that A. G. had been the victim of abuse while at Petitioner's home was made to HRS's abuse registry. The report was investigated by HRS's protective services investigative unit. On January 10, 1995, following the completion of the investigation, FPSS Report No. 94-117809 issued. The report classified as "proposed confirmed" the allegation that Respondent was guilty of neglect in connection with the beating that A. G. received at her home on or about December 15, 1994. According to the report, the beating occurred "because of [Petitioner's] lack of supervision and [her] failure to protect [A. G.]," a finding which is supported by the preponderance of the record evidence in the instant case. A request to expunge or amend the report was denied on June 6, 1995. By letter dated June 20, 1995, Petitioner was advised that her foster family home license would not renewed because of the finding of neglect made in FPSS Report No. 94-117809.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's application for renewal of her family foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of September, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of September, 1998.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner's foster home license should be renewed.
Findings Of Fact From August 24, 2004, and throughout the period material to this proceeding, Petitioner Jannifer Thompson ("Thompson") and her husband, Dalkeith, held a license that authorized them to operate a family foster home under the supervision——and within the regulatory jurisdiction——of Respondent Department of Children and Family Services ("DCF"). Like all licensed foster parents, Thompson and her husband had entered into a written contract with DCF known as the "Bilateral Service Agreement" ("Agreement"), most recently as of April 30, 2006. This Agreement, by its terms, "reflect[ed] standards of care that are current requirements in Florida [law]." On September 14, 2006, a counselor named Elboney Ojobor, who was employed by a private agency to whom DCF had delegated various responsibilities pursuant to contract, made a routine quarterly visit to Thompson's home. Ms. Ojobor was covering for a colleague (Rondalyn Woulard) who was on maternity leave; she had not met Thompson previously. While interviewing Thompson, Ms. Ojobor learned that Thompson was the only adult living in the home at the time, and that Thompson was getting divorced from Dalkeith. Ms. Ojobor understood this to mean that Mr. Thompson had moved out of the home permanently. In fact, Mr. Thompson was away from the home then not because he had moved to another residence ahead of a divorce, but because his job with a shipping company had required him to be out of town for an extended period. Nevertheless, the couple was estranged; Mr. Thompson would leave the marital home for good in the middle of October 2006. Ms. Ojobor's visit was not the first occasion on which Thompson had notified DCF (through its private-sector agent) that her marriage to Dalkeith was in trouble. During an earlier home visit (probably around June 2006, during the quarter immediately preceding Ms. Ojobor's visit in September), Thompson had told her regular counselor, Ms. Woulard, that she might divorce Dalkeith. Ms. Ojobor was not aware of this previous communication, however, and thus she reported the apparent change in circumstances (Mr. Thompson's absence) to her supervisor. The upshot was that on September 15, 2006, Ms. Ojobor called Thompson to inform her that, if she were to continue operating the foster home as a single parent, she would need to obtain a new license. As it happened, whatever steps Thompson took thereafter to become re-licensed came quickly to naught because, in early October 2006, DCF received an allegation that children in Ms. Thompson's home were being physically abused. Having brought up the abuse report, the undersigned believes it necessary here to interrupt the narrative flow of the findings, to call attention to some important points. The most serious charge against Thompson in this case is that she used "excessive" corporal punishment on foster children in her care. The accusation is not that Thompson was found by some other agency or investigator to have abused a foster child or children. The distinction is critical. Because DCF has alleged that Thompson used corporal punishment excessively, it is not sufficient (or even necessary) for DCF to prove that someone else, after investigating allegations of abuse, concluded that Thompson had inflicted some sort of physical injury on a foster child. Rather, DCF must prove that Thompson, in fact, actually used corporal punishment, which is a different fact. Indeed, that someone else found Thompson guilty of physical abuse is not especially probative, in this de novo proceeding, of the salient factual dispute, namely whether Thompson used corporal punishment on foster children.2 Against this backdrop, the undersigned finds that, on October 9, 2006, DCF referred a report of abuse concerning Thompson to the local Child Protective Team ("CPT"). DCF requested that the CPT examine the allegedly abused foster child and make an assessment of the situation. One member of the CPT who took part in this particular assessment was Karl Dorelien. Though not a medical provider, Mr. Dorelien was present for the medical examination of the child in question, whose name is T. P. The examination was performed by an advanced registered nurse practitioner ("ARNP"). Mr. Dorelien testified at hearing. The ARNP did not. At the time of the examination, Mr. Dorelien saw some bruising on T. P.'s forearm. T. P. told Mr. Dorelien and the ARNP that she had been struck by a belt. The CPT did not independently investigate T. P.'s statement. Mr. Dorelien and the ARNP accepted at face value T. P.'s statement about the cause of her injury. The ARNP found that T. P.'s wound was "not accidental." (Mr. Dorelien specifically denied having the expertise to ascertain whether a bruise was caused accidentally or intentionally. There is, it should be added, no persuasive evidence that the ARNP possesses such expertise, either.) Based on the medical examination, the CPT concluded that Thompson had struck T. P. with a belt. (It is not clear how the CPT determined that Thompson——as opposed to someone else——caused T. P.'s injury.3) The evidence shows, in short, that the CPT found Thompson had caused bodily injury to T. P., a foster child then in her care, whom (the CPT determined) Thompson had hit with a belt. There is, however, no persuasive evidence upon which the undersigned independently can find that Thompson actually hit T. P. with a belt (or otherwise). How can this be? First, no one claiming to have personal knowledge of the matter testified at hearing that Thompson had struck T. P. with a belt. (T. P. was not called as a witness.) Thompson denied having perpetrated the alleged misdeed. Second, although there is competent and credible evidence (Mr. Dorelien's testimony) that T. P.'s forearm was bruised, the only evidence as to the cause of this injury was hearsay: (1) T. P.'s statements to the CPT revealing that she had been struck with a belt and (2) the ARNP's opinion (which Mr. Dorelien repeated at hearing) that the wound was not accidental. This uncorroborated hearsay is not a legally sufficient basis for any finding of fact, and even if it were, the undersigned, as the trier of fact, would give it too little weight to support a finding.4 Finally, even if there were sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that T. P. had been struck with a belt (and there isn't), there yet would be nothing but Mr. Dorelien's ambiguous testimony concerning the substance of T. P.'s out-of-court statement, coupled with inference or speculation (based on uncorroborated hearsay), tending to establish that Thompson did the striking. Again, such "proof" is neither legally sufficient nor, in any event, logically persuasive enough to support a finding that Thompson was at fault for the child's injury. DCF alleges that, in addition to striking T. P. with a belt (which allegation was not proved, as just found), Thompson also spanked J. D. F. and his brother, O. F. Both of these boys, respectively aged 8 and 7 years at the time of hearing, testified against their former foster mother. Each claimed that Thompson had spanked him with a belt. As witnesses, however, the boys did not inspire confidence in the truth of their accounts. Each gave testimony that was confusing, sometimes inconsistent, and lacking in precision. Neither one seemed distinctly to remember the important events at issue, much less any of the details surrounding them, causing the undersigned to wonder, at times, whether the boys were independently recalling the underlying events or, rather, testifying from the memory of what someone might have told them was alleged to have occurred. Doubtless many of these boys' shortcomings as witnesses stemmed from their youth and immaturity. Even so, all witnesses, regardless of age and experience, must be measured according to the same standards of credibility; the bar can be neither lowered nor raised to conform to a particular witness's capacity for giving testimony, for doing so would put a thumb on the scales of justice. At bottom, the accounts of J. D. F. and O. F., though not inherently incredible, nevertheless lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to produce in the undersigned's mind a firm belief or conviction that Thompson had spanked them with a belt. The undersigned hesitates to say more than that such is a possibility. Against the shaky testimonies of the boys was offered the decidedly stronger testimony of their sister, Sancia Jeantil, who swore that while she was living in Thompson's home (which admittedly was not at all times her brothers were there), she never saw Thompson spank either J. D. F. or O. F. She further testified that neither of her siblings had ever complained to her about being beaten. The undersigned has accorded considerable weight to Ms. Jeantil's testimony, because it seems unlikely that she would prevaricate to protect Thompson at her brothers' expense. Although Ms. Jeantil was not always present in the home, her testimony, which the undersigned accepts, is persuasive proof of the pertinent negative proposition, i.e. that Thompson did not use corporal punishment on the boys. Thompson herself testified at hearing and denied having used corporal punishment on J. D. F., O. F., or any other foster child. Mr. Thompson, too, testified that corporal punishment had not been used on any of the foster children in their home. Thompson's own child, J. T., said the same. None of these witnesses conclusively proved the negative of DCF's allegation regarding corporal punishment, but then again it was not Thompson's burden to disprove the charge. What these witnesses did do, effectively, was establish a credible, if simple, theory of innocence: Thompson never beat the foster children in her care. The undersigned has determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the evidence as a whole fails to produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, that Thompson used corporal punishment on any of the foster children under her care. Aside from the allegations regarding corporal punishment, DCF has charged Thompson with the lesser offense of failing immediately to notify DCF that her husband had moved out of the home. The evidence shows, however, that Thompson satisfied her duty to notify DCF concerning changes that might affect the life and circumstances of the foster children residing in her home. To recap, briefly, the material facts, Thompson informed DCF's agent, Ms. Woulard, of the possibility that she and Dalkeith might divorce; thus, DCF was on actual notice of a potential change in Thompson's marital status. Thompson likely gave DCF this advance warning in June 2006; in any case, she spoke up long before Dalkeith established a new residence and before the divorce proceeding commenced. There is no clear proof that the couple's situation had changed materially as of September 14, 2006, when Mr. Ojobor visited the home. Without question, Mr. Thompson was away at that time——but he worked for a shipping company and thus extended absences were part of his routine. Having all the evidence of record in view, the undersigned is not convinced that Mr. Thompson had "moved out" of the home as of mid-September 2006 in the sense of having permanently relocated from that residence, which is what DCF maintains. While there is some evidence that such was the case, there is also persuasive evidence that Mr. Thompson did not leave the home for good until October 2006——evidence sufficient to preclude the undersigned from finding, without hesitancy, that DCF's allegation is accurate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DCF enter a final order approving the renewal of Thompson's foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2007.
The Issue The determinative issue in this cause is whether Petitioners "abused" and "neglected" foster children in their care, as those terms are defined in Sections 39.01(2) and 39.01(45), Florida Statutes (2000). As a result of the alleged abusive neglect, two subsequent issues are raised: (1) whether Petitioners' foster home license should be revoked for the reasons as stated in the Administrative Complaint dated July 20, 2001; and (2) whether Respondent's denial of Petitioners' requests to adopt the "M" sibling and to adopt the "T/S" sibling foster children, based primarily upon the allegations in the Administrative Compliant dated July 20, 2001, as explained in a denial letter dated January 18, 2002, was appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying in person and by taped interviews, the documentary materials received in evidence, stipulations by the parties, evidentiary rulings during the final hearing, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant and material facts are found. At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Respondent, the Department of Children and Family Services, was the state agency responsible for receiving and approving applications for foster care licenses and for monitoring, regulating, and if necessary, suspending or revoking foster parent licenses pursuant to Section 409.175, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Respondent, the Department of Children and Family Services, was the state agency responsible for receiving, evaluating, approving or denying applications for adoption of foster children pursuant to Section 63.062, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 65C-16, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners' Foster Care Licensure History Petitioners are married and are the parents of two biological children. Mrs. Sawyer was reared with foster children and has always desired to become a foster parent. Petitioners were initially licensed by the Agency as foster parents in October of 1986, and six months later on April 20, 1987, Petitioners voluntarily closed their foster home due to Mrs. Sawyer's complications with the pregnancy of their second child. During the above six-month licensed period, Petitioners successfully fostered ten children, the last child was removed by the Agency from the foster home in March 1987. In December 1986, two months after initial licensing, Petitioners were the subject of an abuse report alleging spanking a child. The Agency's investigation concluded that the abuse report was "unfounded,"4 and closure was recommended by the Agency's investigator. On September 7, 1987, the Agency again licensed Petitioners as foster parents. Eight months thereafter, on May 23, 1988, the Agency again closed Petitioners' foster home. On August 10, 1988, three months later, the Agency, for the third time, licensed Petitioners as foster parents. Mrs. Sawyer acknowledged using corporal discipline on a foster child during the 1988 licensure period. As a result of the corporal punishment incident in 1988, the Agency required Petitioners to attended its Model Approach to Partnership in Parenting (MAPP) classes, which Petitioners attended and completed. The 1988 licensure of Petitioners as foster parents was specifically granted for the "T/S" sibling group who, with voluntary permission of their biological parents, had been living with Petitioners for approximately two months before their official placement with Petitioners by the Agency. Since 1988, the Agency has annually renewed Petitioners' foster care license.5 Responding to the requests of the Agency, Petitioners on occasions fostered as many as 16 to 20 foster children. Petitioners' foster home was frequently used by the Agency for unannounced "overnight" foster care, many of which extended into protracted foster care periods. During periods when the Agency's need for foster home beds was pressing, the Agency's rule-of-five was waived by the Agency's District Administrator so that Petitioners could and did house more children.6 The record reflects no evidence of complaints of abuse or any other complaints during the periods the Agency needed and made use of Petitioners' home to foster children. The evidence of record, viewed chronologically, reflects a protracted period of intense investigation of allegations which, if true, were apparently ongoing over a period of months prior to the filing of Abuse Report 2000-198255, the basis of the Agency's intended revocation of Petitioners' foster care license. Petitioners' latest license was issued on August 24, 2000, and was effective until August 24, 2001. This August 24, 2000, foster home license is the subject of the Agency's revocation notice, which states: The revocation is based on the following reasons: Between December 21, 2000 and March 1, 2001, the Department of Children and Families investigated eleven reports of abuse and neglect involving your home. In Florida Abuse Hotline Report 2000-198255[7] it was concluded that there were verified findings of excessive corporal punishment and confinement, bizarre punishment and excessive restraint committed by Cynthia Sawyer towards several foster children in her care. The report also noted several instances of inappropriate physical punishment, which is a violation of the foster parent disciplinary policy. These incidents are considered "an intentional or negligent act materially affecting the health and safety of children in the home or agency" and a violation of the licensing rules promulgated pursuant to section 409.175, Florida Statutes. Section 409.175(8)(b) 1 and 2 Florida Statutes; 65C- 13.010(1)(b)5 Florida Administrative Code. (emphasis added) The Agency's allegations of neglect and abuse revolved around four specific types of disciplinary activities that are alleged to have occurred on or after August 24, 2000, the date the current foster care license was issued, and to have terminated on or before March 1, 2001, the date the Agency removed children from Petitioners' home. The four specific types of disciplinary activities are: (1) excessive corporal punishment and confinement, (2) inappropriate physical punishment, (3) bizarre punishment, and (4) excessive restraints.8 In support of those allegations, the Agency presented the testimonies of several foster children, video- taped interviews of three foster children made in March 2001, approximately one month after removal from Petitioners' home; the testimony of another foster care parent; the testimony of a Guardian Ad Litem; and the testimonies of several of the Agency's employees. Mike Katz, agency employee, prepared the Administrative Complaint but had no personal knowledge of the abuse allegations contained in Abuse Report 2000-198255, which formed the basis for the Administrative Complaint he prepared. Mr. Katz acknowledged that his understanding of the Agency's practice and policy was that "one incident of corporal punishment" did not equate to foster care license revocation. According to Mr. Katz, evaluating corporal punishment allegations requires all factors be taken into consideration and the totality of circumstances be reviewed; the intended result is a fact specific determination for each case of alleged corporal punishment. Kate Kimball's, the Sawyers' family service counselor, testimony was primarily concerned with agency reports dating from December 3, 1996, through the year 2000. Her testimony regarding and relating to matters that occurred prior to December 21, 2000, are not relevant nor material to issues of foster home license denial as stated in the Administrative Complaint that is challenged by Petitioners. However, Ms. Kimball's testimony regarding the Sawyers' life-style during the period she was their case worker is relevant and material to the issue of denial of the Sawyers' application to adopt the "M" children. The record reflects that in 1999, while fostering the "T/S" and the "M" siblings under the Agency's District Administrator's waiver of the rule-of-five policy, Petitioners were given an "Above Satisfactory" evaluation by the assigned foster care case worker, Kim Bryant. Ms. Bryant reported that the Sawyers are "very involved, supportative of the children's extra curricular activities and educational needs; show children much needed attention and affection; children and foster parents seem very fond of each other and there is much improvement with the children educationally and emotionally and they appear to have adjusted well in the home." Ms. Bryant's report is undisputed and credible. One year later, Hotline Report 2000-078274 was filed containing an allegation of medical negligence against Mrs. Sawyer as a result of her attempt to refill a prescribed medication for a foster child in her care after the child had taken all the medication. In this particular instance, the Agency had failed to provided Mrs. Sawyer with the child's medical record when the child was placed in her foster home. This medical negligence allegation was resolved when the case worker assigned to the Sawyers secured from the child's file the physician's prescription refill order. The Hotline Report was closed by the Agency with "No indicators of alleged maltreatment-or abuse/neglect." On June 26, 2000, and after the Sawyers added separate bedrooms and bathrooms for the girls and separate bedrooms and bathrooms for the boys to their home to accommodate 16 children, their case worker, Ms. Kimball, wrote, "It appeared that the Department has continued to utilize their home, as we have had no alternatives." The home study case worker's comments are revealing and reliable. It is reasonable to infer that the Agency was satisfied with the Sawyers' methods of disciplining foster children in their home, when they met the Agency's need for foster beds. However, when the Agency's need for foster beds were apparently met by other resources their prior position of satisfaction with the Sawyers, for reasons not entirely clear from the record, took a sudden 180-degree turn-about from satisfaction to dissatisfaction, within a six-month time period from June 26, 2000, to December 21, 2000. The case worker assigned to the "M" children, Anjanet Stilwell, reported that the Sawyers' foster home was "a wonderful foster home--they were very cooperative and caring." Case worker, Karen Braden, who was in the home twice weekly regarding kids assigned to her, wrote, "Cindy is great! I have no concerns regarding placement of my kids. I truly don't know how she does it!" I find Ms. Stilwell's and Ms. Braden's opinions acceptable and reflective of the Agency's approved satisfactory view of the Sawyers as foster parents for many children who were housed solely by the Agency's waiver of its rule-of-five policy and for its benefit. One foster care referral report regarding the "T/S" children written by case worker Heather Blair was considered at the Adoption Applicant Review Committee (AARC) staffing. In her report, Ms. Blair summarized Psychologist Lisa Gaise's conclusions that: "3 T/S children reported being paddle [sic] and 'the context in which these clear disclosures were made was so natural as to dispel any questions of the veracity of their statements.'" Apparently the AARC staffing considered Ms. Gaise's comments credible in their decision to deny the adoption application. The fact of the matter is that Ms. Blair's statement regarding the "truth" and acceptance of Lisa Gaise's opinion that the child's statement were true, is not accepted for the truth asserted and, therefore, is not credible.9 Bobby Cooper, another agency witness, commenced his investigation of Abuse Report 2000-198255, on December 21, 2000, at 4:00 p.m. Mr. Cooper's investigation consisted entirely of reviewing reports of other agency investigators. Mr. Cooper had no personal knowledge nor had he personally sought independent collaboration of statements contained in the reports he reviewed. His testimony is not credible. Kate Kimball, the case worker assigned to Petitioners' foster home, often made announced and unannounced visits to Petitioners' foster home, as required by Agency policy. Ms. Kimball was in close and constant contact with the foster children and the foster parents during her visits to the home. Ms. Kimball was required to (1) observe the foster children, speak in confidence with each child individually, immediately report any "signs" of abuse or "suspected abuse," and to (4) cause "removal" of a child or children from abusive foster home situations. Ms. Kimball never requested nor caused removal of a child from Petitioners' foster home during the period of December 21, 2000, through March 2001, the period the abuse reports were allegedly "verified." Detective Christi Esquinaldo was assigned to investigate this case by Hillsborough County Sheriff's Department. Her investigation consisted of interviewing foster child L.S., reviewing the abuse reports, and creating a matrix from those reports. The matrix consisted of Detective Esquinaldo's listing the names of children who were alleged to have been subjected to a specific abusive discipline crossed referenced by the names of the children who made the allegations. According to Detective Esquinaldo, L.S. told her that the Sawyers "made children stand in a corner for three to four hours" as punishment, and Lil David was restrained to a chair for "three to four hours." However, during her testimony at the hearing, L.S. denied having made those statements to Detective Esquinaldo. L.S.'s testimony at the final hearing is credible. In closing her investigation, Detective Esquinaldo recommended to the State Attorney's Office the direct filing of a felony charge of Aggravated Child Abuse against the Sawyers. The Hillsborough County State Attorney's Office, citing "numerous inconsistencies in the statements of the children," declined to file any charges against the Sawyers and closed their files on the matter. After reviewing the children's testimonies of record, I am compelled to agree with the Hillsborough County State Attorney Office that the "inconsistencies of the statements of the children" render their collective testimonies unreliable and insufficient to provide a preponderance of evidence necessary to establish a fact. None of the adult witnesses, presented by the Agency, possessed knowledge acquired through collaboration of the children's stories from independent sources and/or their investigations regarding the abuse allegations alleged in the Complaint. The Agency's employees' initial and total acceptance of the children's recollection of time, i.e. as "all day" and "all night," should have, but did not raise reasonable concern regarding each child's ability to differentiate between fantasy and reality and the child's accuracy of recall as well. The children's story-line, that Petitioners forced each of them to walk, to stand in time-outs, to dig holes, to sleep in their beds or do any other activities "all day" or "all night," was testified to as a form of punishment and not discipline for acting up. Accepting as true, accurate, and realistic, their identical versions of four specific experiences from the several children without more does not equate to credible nor collaborative evidence. The testimonies presented by several foster children at this hearing were, at best, confusing, conflicting and contradictory. When asked specific questions about the several forms and methods of discipline, the unanimity of their responses were: stand in the corner "all night," dig holes "all day," walk in circles "all day," and sleep in the bed "all day." The fact that the children's testimonies clustered in a certain position (sibling groups wanting to stay together as a group and those sibling groups wanting to be moved to another foster home as a group gave almost identical answers to questions relating to specific disciplines) does not mean nor imply that their testimonies were necessarily accurate, realistic, or true. In fact, the record reflects that several of the testimonies initially given by the children to the Agency were in conflict with their testimonies subsequently given to the Agency representatives and testimony given at the final hearing. Considering the children's testimonies in the context of the children's ages; the children's physical sizes; the physical improbability of a small child actually squatting, with knees bent, against a wall with both arms held out in front of the body or held out to the sides of their bodies all day; and their description of time as "all day" and "all-night," rendered their collective testimonies unrealistic, unreliable and, therefore, not credible. Steve Barber, Petitioners' pastor and the one who has interfaced with the foster children, based upon his experience as a former high school football coach, gave undisputed testimony that the physical size and stature of the young children made it physically impossible for any of them to "stand, squat, dig or walk in circles, all day." Based upon the testimony of Mr. Barber and the unrealistic testimonies of the several children, Respondent has failed to prove that Petitioners committed "excesses" in administering policy discipline, by imposing time-outs, separation from other children, grounding, loss of privileges, and by assigning other chores. I find that the cumulative testimonies of the foster children found in the Agency reports in evidence and of those children who testified at the final hearing unreliable, inconsistent, devoid of details, physically impossible in most instances and, therefore, insufficient to establish by a preponderance that the Sawyers subjected them to: (1) excessive corporal punishment and confinement, (2) inappropriate physical punishment, (3) bizarre punishment, and (4) use of excessive restraints as punishment as alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed in this cause. Of the three video-taped interviews reviewed by the undersigned, the interview of D.I. revealed a reliable and detailed account of the daily life and activities of the foster children in the Sawyers' home from an articulate child with personal knowledge and accurate recall of events. First, D.I. was in the Sawyers' foster care for a period of seven months. Second, D.I. appeared to be bright, intelligent, articulate, straight-forward, and he was definite and clear in his responses to questions asked by the Agency's spokesperson. Third, D.I.'s memory of details was complete, uncompromising, realistic, and reasonable. Fourth, D.I. acknowledged that his possibility of being reunited with his biological mother was nonexistent, and he would probably be in foster care until his majority, if not adopted, preferably by the Sawyers. Fifth, he is familiar with and aware of foster children, individually and as sibling groups "working the foster care system for their desired ends by telling stories." During his seven months' stay in foster care with the Sawyers, D.I. testified that he never saw nor was he made aware by other children of any child punished by the Sawyers in the form of being forced to stand in time-out "all day," forced to dig holes "all night," or forced to walk in circles "all day." D.I. knew that Lil L.S. pooped in her pants and smeared the poop over the walls of the foster care residence. He knows this because he was one of the older children who volunteered to clean the poop off the walls; he remembers these incidents because the walls had "white spots" where the cleaning solutions were used. He also remembered because Mrs. Sawyer would put white powder on the bedroom floor leading from Lil L.S.'s room to other parts of the house. In the morning when Lil L.S. was awaken and asked about poop on the walls, she would blame other children, but her foot prints would prove contradiction of the story of not having gotten out of bed during the night. According to D.I., Lil L.S. was never "hosed down outside" the house after pooping on herself. Each time Lil L.S. pooped on herself, Mrs. Cindy would require her to go into her bathroom10 and bathe herself. When asked about household chores and work around the house as a form of punishment, D.I. answered that older children would be offered the opportunity to "work outside" with Mr. Sawyer on "things around the house," only if that child wanted to work outside. If not, the child was given the option to stay outside and play or to go inside and watch T.V., play games, or do other things. D.I. was emphatic that the opportunity to do other things was made available to each child only after that child completed his or her homework. Homework was always first, and some children got in trouble because of not doing or completing their homework. According to D.I., the younger children who played outside would customarily play in the round-about driveway, the yard, and on the Jungle Jim play set. The older children would customarily do other things. D.I.'s examples of "doing things around the house" were: helping Mr. Sawyer work on his truck; putting together and/or repairing the Jungle Jim swing-slide play set; helping to dig a trench line to lay pipe for the new water heater connection; tending to and caring for the animals; planting trees and stuff; and painting and building additional bathrooms and bedrooms onto the house. According to D.I., all outside activities were made available to any children who wished to participate in them instead of playing among themselves. When asked, D.I. was empathic in his answer that no child, "as a form of punishment," was forced to assist Mr. Sawyer in "doing things around the house," if they wanted to help they could, if not, then other activities were available and that no child was handcuffed nor had he seen any (metal) handcuffs at the Sawyers' house, save his pair of red plastic toy handcuffs that came with a toy set the Sawyers gave him. D.I., from observation, knew Lil David to be self-mutilating.11 D.I. recalls that "Lil David would sometimes just pick himself to make himself bleed." During his seven-month stay and on more than one occasion, in passing, D.I. would see Lil David in bed at night with velcro restraints on his wrists and the bed to stop him from picking himself and making himself bleed. "Mrs. Cindy did this to keep Lil David from picking himself when he was asleep."12 Regarding meal times and meals at Mrs. Cindy's, D.I. stated that all the children ate the same meal at the same time "cause there was so many of us and Mrs. Cindy had no time for separate meals and we [older children] helped to feed the young children, we did help." When asked about peanut butter sandwiches as a form of punishment, D.I. responded, "Those children who had been bad or were in time-out at mealtime were separated from the other children and given peanut butter sandwiches to eat while in their time-outs. But Mrs. Cindy would say to them 'say you are sorry and you can join us.'" He never saw nor knew of a child in time-out (against the wall) for "hours." The longest time-out he could recall was about "20 minutes," and that was because the child was "acting up" in the time-out and had additional time added to the time-out. D.I. was familiar with the "T/S" and (other) siblings. He knew from personal experience in foster care that older siblings would instruct their younger siblings on all matters: what to say, when to say it, how to act, and how to act up. D.I. was personally familiar with "foster homes" and the means and methods of "getting out of one" and "staying together" as a sibling group and getting into another as a group. When asked about "corporal punishment" i.e. spanking with a wooden paddle and/or slapping with hands, D.I. testified that during his seven-month stay, he knew of no child to have gotten spanked with a wood paddle. "I never saw a wood paddle." Regarding "getting slapped by Mrs. Cindy" as punishment, D.I. answered that Ms. Cindy would "tap" you on the back of the head, butt, or shoulder "to get your attention, like if she was talking to you and you were watching T.V. and not answering her but she never slapped any of us for punishment." This method of getting one child's attention by touching is reasonable when considered in the context of the Agency's waiver of its rule-of- five policy so as to place as many as 16 to 20 children in the Sawyers' foster care home. 13 The video testimony of D.I. is accurate, detailed, reasonable, realistic, based upon his personal knowledge, undisputed and, therefore, credible. Based in part upon the video testimony of D.I., Respondent has failed to establish by a preponderance of evidence that the Sawyers subjected a foster child in their care to: (1) excessive corporal punishment and confinement, (2) inappropriate physical punishment, (3) bizarre punishment, and (4) use of excessive restraints for the time period alleged in the Administrative Complaint. The Sawyers' admitted use of velcro restraints on Lil David was neither excessive, punitive nor disciplinary, but rather was for Lil David's protection from harming himself. The Sawyers' used velcro restraints on Lil David during the day only when he was in time-out and sitting in a small rocking chair and during the night when he was put to bed. The evidence of record by testimonies of virtually every witnesses who knew Lil David knew him to be a self-mutilator. The use of restraints is an acceptable, preventative method for protection in this situation. The record contains no evidence that the Agency provided the Sawyers with an evaluation report of Lil David upon his placement nor during his stay within their foster home. Lil David's medical report would have advised the Sawyers of Lil David's self-mutilation problem. It is a reasonable assumption that had the Agency provided Lil David's medical records, the Sawyers would have been alerted to Lil David's self-mutilation problem and would have had the benefit of the Agency's instructions regarding care and protection for Lil David's problem of self-mutilation. The Sawyers' admitted use of velcro restraints reflects a caring and sincere effort of the foster parents to protect the child from hurting himself. In the absence of information from the Agency regarding Lil David's condition, the Sawyers' use of an acceptable, safe and preventative method of care for this particular problem reflects their efforts to comply with the "spirit" of the rules regarding foster parent responsibilities. The record contains no evidence that the Sawyers' use of velcro restraints to prevent Lil David's self- mutilation was "willfully harmful" or "neglect" or an "abusive" act of intentional punishment. Bobby Cooper's, child protection investigator, reported findings and conclusions were based entirely upon statements provided by individuals he interviewed. The record contains no evidence of collaboration to substantiate testimonies of the children. Therefore, Mr. Cooper's testimony is hearsay without support and therefore, not credible. Finally, consideration is given to what is not in evidence. First, the record in this case contains no evidence of a child alleged to have suffered ongoing neglect and abuse in the form of excessive, bizarre,14 and inappropriate punishment, or to have borne body marks or bruises resulting from the alleged treatment by the Sawyers. Second, the record in this case contains no evidence of a Sawyer-housed foster child to have suffered "physical, mental or emotional injury" as the result of the alleged negligent and abusive treatment. Third, the record contains no evidence from which it could be inferred that a foster child removed from Petitioners' home suffered a "discernible and substantial impairment in the ability to function within the normal range of performance and behavior" as a direct result of the alleged abusive discipline.15 The evidence of record supports a reasonable conclusion that Mrs. Sawyer was proactive in seeking the assistance of local politicians and state officials to accomplish her apparent goal of responsive and exceptional services from the Department for her foster children. It is undisputed that the Sawyers, with the advice and consent of the Department, had more foster children than was reasonable to expect only two adults to provide a minimal of custodial care. Permitting the Sawyers to house as many as 16 to 20 foster children, plus their two biological children, at any point in time, was permissive and self serving by the Department and was overreaching acceptance by the Sawyers. It is a reasonable inference that in this case both the Department and the Sawyers engaged in a mutual course of conduct to satisfy their respective needs and desires. When the mutually beneficial relationship came to a close, a reversal of opinions and recommendations from the Department regarding the Sawyers occurred. The Sawyers, who had been described by the Department as "unbelievable foster parents," became merely unbelievable when confronted with and evaluated by conflicting stories of 14 foster children removed from their home. Denial of Adoption Application for the M sibling group Turning to evidence in the record regarding the denial of Petitioners' application to adopt the four "M" siblings, the fact that some animosity existed between Ms. Gains16 and Mrs. Sawyer, became readily apparent during Ms. Gains' testimony. The existence of animosity was further confirmed by Ms. Gains' detailed chronology of alleged abusive acts and omissions by Mrs. Sawyer over a period in excess of one year. When answering questions asked by the Agency's representative regarding Ms. Gains' statements and opinion of Mrs. Sawyer, D.I. answered: "She [sic] said handcuffs and other things about Mrs. Cindy so as to get kids moved out of Mrs. Cindy's house to her house." Based upon D.I. testimony above, Ms. Gains' testimony given at the hearing and her written report in evidence is biased and unreliable. In the evaluation and review of Petitioners' adoption request, Respondent appropriately engaged in a holistic evaluation of all abuse reports filed, investigative reports, personal opinions, and comments from Department employees, community members and other foster parents, dating from as early as 1986 to the date of the adoption denial. Respondent, in reevaluation of Petitioners' adoption request for the "M" children, should hereinafter be guided by the Findings of Fact herein that allegations of excessive discipline as contained in the Administrative Compliant herein were not proven by the testimonies of the Agency's witnesses and documentary evidence. Therefore, allegations found in Abuse Report 2000-198255 reported or alleged to have occurred within the time period of December 21, 2000, through March 1, 2001, shall not be considered by the Agency in its reevaluation of the Sawyers' application to adopt the "M" siblings; being mindful that the "M" siblings' desire to be adopted by the Sawyers is in the "M" child(ren)'s best interest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order granting renewal of Petitioners' Foster Care License. It is further RECOMMENDED, that in accord with the expressed desires of the "M" siblings to be adopted by Petitioners, that the Department enter a final order granting Petitioners' application to adopt the "M" siblings. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 2002.
