The Issue The issue is whether Proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-2.026(4) and (6) is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, pursuant to sections 120.52(8) and 120.56(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to chapter 550, Florida Statutes, Petitioner Second Chance operates jai alai games at its facility in Marion County, and Petitioner WFA owns and operates a greyhound permit and summer jai alai permit at its facility in Miami-Dade County. Petitioner WFA also indirectly owns a summer jai alai permit at the Miami Jai Alai in Miami-Dade County and owns partial interests in two jai alai permits operated at the Dania Jai Alai facility in Broward County. Pursuant to chapter 550, Intervenor owns and operates a jai alai permit at its facility in Seminole County, where it conducts live jai alai permits. Petitioners and Intervenor are regulated by the proposed rules that they challenge in these cases. Proposed rule 61D-2.026(4) (the Court Rule) provides: Jai alai games must be conducted on a three-walled court meeting the following requirements: The side wall must be at least 175 feet long and at least 35 feet in height; The front wall and back wall must be at least 35 feet in width and height; The front wall must be made of granite. All courts must have sufficient overhead coverage to ensure for the operation of scheduled performances. All courts must have a live viewing area for games. Proposed rule 61D-2.026(6) (the Roster Rule) provides: "Jai Alai permit holders must utilize a rotational system of at least eight different players or teams." The rulemaking authority cited for the Court Rule and the Roster Rule is sections 550.0251 and 550.105(3) and (10)(a). The law implemented cited for the Court Rule and the Roster Rule is sections 550.0251, 550.105, and 550.70.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a registered building contractor, having been issued license number RB 0010555. On December 12, 1980, Benjamin Kyler entered into a contract with Sweet E. Glover to construct a house for her at 2020 Southwest First Street, Ocala, Florida. At no time material hereto was Benjamin Kyler properly licensed to perform contracting in the State of Florida. The Respondent obtained the building permit to enable Benjamin Kyler to perform the construction contract with Sweet Glover. Benjamin Kyler received approximately $1,650, but he performed only a minimal amount of construction on the Glover residence. The Respondent knew that Benjamin Kyler was engaged in the construction of a residence for Sweet Glover, and the Respondent also knew that Benjamin Kyler was not licensed to contract in the State of Florida. The Respondent was paid a fee for pulling the building permit for Benjamin Kyler.
Recommendation From the foregoing Findings of fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Isaac Butler, be found guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(e) and 489.129 (1)(f), Florida Statutes, and that his license be revoked. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 1st day of February, 1983. WILLIAM B. THOMAS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: John O. Williams, Esquire 547 North Monroe Street Suite 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Isaac Butler RFD 1, Box 752 Anthony, Florida 32617 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James Linnan, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202
The Issue This is a rule challenge proceeding in which the following specific issues are presented: Whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4-12.006 is an invalid delegation of legislative authority, and Whether application of the provisions of Section 112.011(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by the Construction Industry Licensing Board in its quasi-judicial capacity constitutes an agency statement of general applicability that requires rulemaking by the agency.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Goode “Buddy” Yeoman, is 64 years of age, and is an individual who has applied to the CILB for an individual certified general contracting license. Petitioner Yeoman has a prior felony conviction and his civil rights have not been restored. Petitioner Yeoman's felony conviction was imposed approximately 20 years ago in 1985 and was unrelated to the contracting practice or trade. Petitioner Yeoman was required to, and did, submit a completed form DBPR CILB 4359. Petitioner’s application was denied by the Construction Industry Licensing Board (“CILB” or “Board”), and on June 14, 2004, the CILB entered its “Notice of Intent to Deny” Petitioner Yeoman’s application for initial certified general contractor. Petitioner Yeoman has separately filed a petition for administrative proceedings regarding the CILB's denial of his initial certified general contractor license. As such, by operation of law no final agency action has to date been taken on Petitioner Yeoman's application. The license denial proceeding has been continued. This will allow the parties in that case to have the benefit of the final order in this rule challenge case. The sole basis for the denial of Petitioner Yeoman’s application was that his civil rights had not been restored. The CILB’s “Notice of Intent to Deny” stated: “You have not provided proof to the Board that your civil rights have been fully restored subsequent to a previous felony conviction as required by Section 112.011(1)(b), Florida Statutes.” The requirement that a restoration of civil rights be obtained which is expressed in the challenged existing rule and the challenged agency statement defined as a rule negatively affect Petitioner Yeoman’s substantial interests by denying him a certified general contracting license. As such, Petitioner Yeoman has standing to bring his challenge to Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4-12.006(2) and the agency statement defined as a rule (Form “DBPR CILB 4359"). Intervenor Smith's felony conviction was for a drug offense in 1989 and was unrelated to the contracting business or trade. Intervenor Smith filed an application with the CILB, including form “DBPR CILB 4359.” On May 4, 2004, the CILB refused to consider his application because his civil rights have not been restored. As such, Intervenor Smith has standing to bring his challenge to Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4-12.006(2), and the agency statement defined as a rule (Form "DBPR CILB 4359"). Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4-12.006 was adopted pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, on January 6, 1980, and lists and incorporates by reference DBPR/CILB/025 (Rev. 01/01) entitled “Certifications: Certification Change of Status.” This agency form is applicable to applications for certified licenses and change of status applications, and requires individuals applying for initial contracting licenses to provide proof that their civil rights have been restored if they have been convicted of a felony. The form states in the “Financial Responsibility/Background Questions” section: “NOTE: IF YOU, THE APPLICANT/LICENSEE, HAVE HAD A FELONY CONVICTION, PROOF THAT YOUR CIVIL RIGHTS HAVE BEEN RESTORED WILL BE REQUIRED PRIOR TO LICENSURE.” Form “DBPR CILB 4359" has an effective date of March 24, 2004, but has not been adopted as a rule under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The form is available for download on the agency’s web-page as “Initial Issuance of Licensure for Certified Contractor Application Package.” Applicants for licensure as a contractor must submit form “DBPR CILB 4359" to the DBPR. Within the “DBPR CILB 4359" package is the form “DBPR CILB 4357 - Qualified Business (QB) License Application and Qualified Business Change of Status Application,” which requires an applicant previously convicted of a felony to provide proof that his/her civil rights have been restored. This form states: “IF YOU HAVE BEEN CONVICTED OF A FELONY, YOU MUST SUBMIT PROOF OF REINSTATEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS,” and also: “Note: If you, the applicant/licensee, have had a felony conviction, proof that your civil rights have been restored will be required prior to Licensure.” Both the challenged Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4-12.006(2) and the form “DBPR CILB 4359" are generally applicable to every individual applying for a contracting license from the CILB. The CILB has previously approved applications for initial licenses, and change of status licenses, to applicants who did not have their civil rights fully restored, subject to probation until the applicant's civil rights have been restored. Neither the type of crime for which a felony conviction has been imposed, the recency of the conviction, nor the completion of any punishment, have been a factor in the CILB’s denial of applications to individuals previously convicted of a felony crime but whose civil rights have not been fully restored. The sole reason for denial is the lack of civil rights. The lack of civil rights is the standard, expressed in Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4-12.006(2) and in “DBPR CILB 4359," by which the CILB has denied contractor license applications, including Petitioner Yeoman’s application, and Intervenor Smith's application, under the CILB’s interpretation of Section 112.011(1)(b), Florida Statutes. The CILB has not revoked any previously granted licenses due solely to a subsequent felony conviction and lack of civil rights of any licensee. The CILB is a collegial body composed of 18 members, 16 of whom are professionals and two of whom are consumer members. Each member is limited to two 4-year terms, and no member may serve more than two consecutive 4-year terms. If a member is appointed to fill an unexpired vacancy, the new appointee may not serve for more than 11 years. The current members of the Board, and their terms, are as follows: Elizabeth Karcher; term 01/10/02-10/31/04 Barry Kalmanson; term 11/01/02-10/31/07 c. Lee-En Chung; term 09/01/99-10/31/06 Paul Del Vecchio; term 01-10-02-10-31-05 Michelle Kane; term 01-10-02-10/31/05 f. Joan Brown; term 03/14/00-10/31/07 Michael Blankenship; term 11/01/02-10/31/06 Carl Engelmeler; term 11/01/02-10/31/06 Jacqueline Watts; term 01/10/02-10/31/04 John Smith; term 11/01/02-10/31/06 (resigned effective 11/01/04) Raymond Holloway; term 01/10/02-10/31/05 Edward Weller; term 11/21/02-10/31/06 Thomas Thornton; term 08/16/04-10/31/07 Robert Stewart; term 08/16/04-10/31/07 o. Doris Bailey; term 08/16/04-10/31/05 A quorum (51 percent) of the appointed members of the Board is necessary for the Board to conduct official business. The CILB meets 11 times each year. On November 8, 1999, the CILB denied the application of Michael A. Helish for the certification examination on the grounds that his civil rights had not been restored. This decision was per curiam affirmed in Helish v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 766 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). The CILB has previously approved applications for initial licenses, and change of status licenses, to applicants whose civil rights had not been fully restored, at times subject to probation until the applicant’s civil rights have been restored, as follows: On June 14, 2004, the Respondent granted an initial contractor license to Robert F. Jones, subject to probation until his civil rights are fully restored. On May 28, 2004, the Respondent granted an initial contractor license to William P. Campbell, subject to probation until his civil rights are fully restored. On May 28, 2004, the Respondent granted an initial contractor license to Glenn Kasper, subject to probation until his civil rights are fully restored. On May 28, 2004, the Respondent granted an initial contractor license to Danny Mitchell, subject to probation until his civil rights are fully restored. On March 3, 2004, the Respondent granted an initial contractor license to Timothy Burke, subject to probation until his civil rights are fully restored. On February 9, 2004, the Respondent granted an initial contractor license to Anthony Nicholas, Jr., subject to probation and the condition that his civil rights be fully restored within two years. On June 25, 2003, the Respondent granted an initial contractor license to Andrew Dittenber, stating: “The Board permitted licensure with conditions in this case where applicant did not have his civil rights restored, because of the number of years that have passed since the conviction and evidence that application for restoration has been made.” On June 25, 2003, the Respondent granted an initial contractor license to Robert W. Fleming, stating: “The Board permitted licensure with conditions in this case where applicant did not have his civil rights restored, because of the number of years that have passed since the conviction and evidence that application for restoration has been made.” On December 1, 2003, the Respondent granted an initial contractor license to James D. Munroe, Jr., subject to probation until his civil rights are fully restored. On October 21, 2002, the Respondent granted an initial contractor license to Daryl F. Strickland subject to probation and the condition that his civil rights be fully restored within three years. On September 4, 2001, the Respondent granted an initial contractor license to John Richard Brown, subject to probation and the condition that his civil rights be fully restored within three years. On June 24, 2004, the Respondent amended its initial order and again placed John Richard Brown’s license on probation until such time as his civil rights are restored.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner has jurisdiction over the Respondent and, if so, whether Respondent committed the offenses alleged in the administrative complaint and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The administrative complaint that underpins this proceeding was filed June 20, 1996. At that time, the Respondent was the holder of pari-mutuel wagering occupational license number 0541161-1081 as a trainer. This occupational license was the renewal of a pre-existing license for a period of one year that expired June 30, 1996. There was no evidence that the occupational license that expired June 30, 1996, was renewed by the Respondent. In 1986, 1987, and 1988, Dr. Douglas Slavin was the owner of thoroughbred race horses that raced in Florida. Respondent was, during those years, employed by Dr. Slavin as the trainer for his race horses. In 1988, Respondent purchased from Dr. Slavin a race horse named Political Regent. Respondent had trained Political Regent for racing at pari-mutuel facilities in Florida. This transaction occurred in Florida. In 1988, Respondent and Respondent’s son, Gregory Sacco, took to New Jersey a horse named Political Pocket. This horse was owned by Dr. Slavin and had been trained by Respondent for racing at pari-mutuel facilities in Florida. Dr. Slavin had given Respondent and his son permission to take Political Pocket to New Jersey. Without Dr. Slavin’s permission and unknown to him, Respondent and his son sold Political Pocket to a third party in New Jersey. Respondent failed to pay Dr. Slavin for Political Regent or for Political Pocket. After Dr. Slavin discovered that Political Pocket had been sold, he instituted a lawsuit in the Circuit Court in and for Dade County, Florida, against Respondent and his son, Gregory Sacco. The Case Number for this suit was 89-14563 CA 08. On June 24, 1992, a final judgment was entered against Respondent and his son, Gregory Sacco, based, in part, on the transactions involving Political Pocket and Political Regent. This judgment was entered on a joint and several basis.1 As of the time of the formal hearing, the judgment entered in Case No. 89-14563 CA 08 had not been satisfied.2
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein. It is further recommended that the final order declare Respondent to be ineligible for licensure in the State of Florida so long as his debt to Dr. Slavin remains unpaid. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 1997
The Issue The issue in the case is whether Clifford McCullough (Petitioner) was the subject of unlawful discrimination by Nesco Resources (Respondent) in violation of chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2015)1/.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a company that refers pre-screened job candidates to employers upon request by an employer seeking to fill a specific position. The Petitioner is an African-American male, born in 1959, who sought employment through the Respondent. The Respondent does not make the hiring decision. The actual decision is made by the employer requesting referrals from the Respondent. The Respondent is compensated by the employer if and when the employer hires an applicant referred by the Respondent. On occasion, the Respondent publishes advertisements seeking applications to fill specific positions, such as “forklift drivers.” The fact that the Respondent seeks applications for specific positions does not mean that an employer has contacted the Respondent seeking referrals for such positions. The advertisements are used by the Respondent to create an inventory of applicants who can be referred to employers. On December 20, 2013, the Petitioner submitted a job application to the Respondent seeking a “forklift driver” position. At that time, the Petitioner indicated to the Respondent that he was available to perform “warehouse, packing, production, shipping and receiving tasks.” Several weeks prior to the Petitioner’s application, the Respondent had referred job candidates to an employer seeking to fill an available forklift driver position. The employer filled the position by hiring an African-American male born in 1961 who was referred to the employer by the Respondent. As of December 20, 2013, the Respondent had no pending employer requests seeking referrals to fill forklift driver positions. The evidence fails to establish that the Respondent had any employer requests at that time which were consistent with the Petitioner’s skills. The Respondent’s general practice when contacted by a prospective employer is to recommend applicants who have maintained ongoing contact with the Respondent’s staff after the submission of an application. There was minimal contact between the Petitioner and the Respondent after the Petitioner submitted his application in December 2013. The Respondent presumes that some people who submit applications subsequently relocate or obtain employment elsewhere. Accordingly, the Respondent requires that previous applicants periodically submit new employment applications so that the Respondent’s inventory includes only active job seekers. On April 8, 2014, the Petitioner submitted another application to the Respondent. Also in April 2014, an employer contacted the Respondent to obtain referrals to fill another forklift driving position. The employer filled the position by hiring an African- American male born in 1964, who was referred to the employer by the Respondent. Prior to his referral for the forklift driver position, the successful applicant routinely contacted the Respondent’s staff, in person and by telephone, regarding available employment opportunities. The evidence fails to establish whether the Respondent was included within the applicants who were referred to the requesting employer. There is no evidence that the Respondent’s referral process reflected factors related to any applicant’s race, color, sex, or age. The Petitioner has also asserted that his application should have been referred to an employer who, on one occasion, was seeking to fill an available cleaning position. The position was a part-time job paying an hourly wage of $10. The Petitioner had not submitted an application for such a position. Nothing in the information provided by the Petitioner to the Respondent indicated that the Petitioner was interested in such employment. Through the Respondent’s referrals, the employer filled the cleaning position by hiring an African-American male.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petitioner's complaint of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 2016.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent, Richard Tortora (Tortora), held pari-mutuel wagering occupational license number 0066650, as a thoroughbred trainer. Tortora has been licensed since 1979, and has not previously been the subject of a disciplinary proceeding. Tortora was a participating trainer during the 1956 thoroughbred meet at Calder Race Course, an association authorized to conduct thoroughbred racing in the State of Florida. On August 2, 1986, Tortora was the trainer of the horse "Chief Again," the winner of the fourth race at Calder Race Course that day. Immediately following the race, the Division, consistent with its standard practice, took a urine sample from "Chief Again" for analysis by the Division's laboratory. The parties have stipulated that the chain of custody of the urine sample was not breached, and that the urine sample was properly taken, packaged and delivered to the Division's laboratory for testing. The parties have further stipulated that a portion of the urine sample was delivered to Dr. Richard Sams, Equine Testing Laboratory, College of Veterinary Medicine, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, for testing on behalf of Tortora, and that such sample was properly taken, packaged, and delivered. Upon analysis, the urin sample taken from "chief Again" proved positive for the presence of the drug butorphanol, a schedule 3 narcotic. Butorphanol is a potent analgesic, traditionally used to control the intestinal pain associated with equine colic. In therapeutic dosage, butorphanol renders the animal immobile, however, at low dosages it will act as a stimulant. In reaching the conclusion that "Chief Again" was shown to have raced with the narcotic butorphanol in his system, the evidence offered on behalf of Tortora, through Drs. Sams and Maylin, has not been overlooked. Such evidence failed, however to detract from the credible and compelling nature of the Division's proof. The Division's analysis was composed of sequential screening procedures designed to initially identify the presence of an unusual substance and ultimately identify the compound. Throughout the Division's initial procedures, the urine taken from "Chief Again" was consistently identified as containing an opiate with characteristics consistent with those of butorphanol. Ultimately the Division subjected the sample to gas chromatographic/mass spectral analysis. This refined analysis confirmed the presence of butorphonal. The consistency of the Division's findings at all levels of its testing provides compelling evidence that the urine sample taken from "Chief Again" did contain the narcotic butorphonal. Following the Division's testing, Tortora requested that it furnish the balance of the urine sample taken from "Chief Again", approximately 2om1, to Dr. Richard Sams for analysis. Dr. Sams subjected the sample to gas chromatographic/mass spectral analysis and found no evidence of butorphanol. While finding no evidence of butorphanol, Dr. Sams did not conclude that the sample did not contain the narcotic, but merely that he was unable to detect its presence. According to Dr. Sams, the limited volume of urine available for testing compromised his ability to detect the presence of butorphanol. He affirmatively concluded, however, that the Division's data was properly prepared and adequate to support a positive finding of butorphanol in the sample. Dr. Maylin's testimony was premised on a review of Dr. Sams' and the Division's written test reports, he undertook no independent analysis, and was not privy to any testimony offered at hearing. Dr. Maylin opined that if butorphanol were present Dr. Sams should have detected it and, based on certain assumptions, that the Division reported a false finding because of laboratory contamination. Dr. Maylin's opinions are rejected. Dr. Sams is familiar with the equipment and procedures he utilized. He of all people is most familiar with the capabilities and reliability of that analysis. Dr. Maylin's opinion that the analysis ran by Dr. Sams had more import than Dr. Sams ascribed to it is not credible. Dr. Maylin's opinion that the Division reported a false finding is likewise not credited. Dr. Maylin's opinion was predicated on the assumption that proper testing procedures were not followed. Dr. Maylin's assumptions were incorrect. While "Chief Again's" urine was found to test positive for butorphanol, Tortora denies any knowledge of how the narcotic could have been introduced into the horse's system. According to Tortora he was unfamiliar with this narcotic until these charges were brought, and "Chief Again" was not under any medical treatment. Tortora offered no evidence, however, of what provisions he took, if any, to supervise or otherwise protect "Chief Again's" integrity.
The Issue Whether the Proposed Amendment of Rule 7E-6.007, Florida Administrative Code, is arbitrary and capricious and thus constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Hialeah, Inc., operates a race track (hereinafter referred to as the "Track") located in Dade County, Florida. The Petitioner is licensed by the Respondent. In December, 1981, the Petitioner was granted permission by letter from Bob Smith, then Director of the Respondent, the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, to operate Tel-A-Betting. Robert Rosenburg, Director of the Respondent after Mr. Smith, also approved Tel-A- Betting in a letter to the Petitioner. The Petitioner has continuously operated Tel-A-Betting for more than six years. The Petitioner instituted Tel-A-Betting in reliance on the Respondent's approval of Tel-A-Betting. If approval had not been granted to the Petitioner from the Respondent, the Petitioner would not have established Tel-A-Betting. Tel-A-Betting is a procedure for placing wagers on races at the Petitioner's Track. Persons utilizing this system (hereinafter referred to as "Account Holders"), open an account with the Petitioner by making a deposit of $100.00 or more with the Petitioner and paying a $25.00 fee. The funds deposited with the Petitioner are received and accounted for in accounts maintained at the Track. Once an account is opened, a plastic card which contains, among other information, an account number and an "800," toll-free, telephone number is issued to the Account Holder. Wagers may then be placed with the Petitioner by the Account Holder calling the "800" number and placing a wager with a telephone operator/pari-mutuel clerk located at the Track. The Account Holder identifies himself or herself by giving the operator the account number and a code name designated by the Account Holder when the account is opened. The account number is programmed into a computer to determine whether the Account Holder has sufficient funds in the account to make the wager. If the funds in the account are sufficient to cover the wager, the wager is entered into the computer. If the Account Holder wins the wager, the payoff is entered into his or her account. Calls to place wagers through the Tel-A-Betting program can be made from anywhere in Florida and the person making the call and wager need not be physically present at the Track to make the wager. Wagers taken through Tel-A-Betting are only made on races at the Track. Tel-A-Betting allows the Petitioner to receive wagered funds as part of its pari-mutuel pool from persons located anywhere in the State of Florida. When a wager is made through Tel-A-Betting, the operator/pari-mutuel clerk cannot establish the age or identity of the person placing the wager. The Petitioner is the only race track permit holder in the State of Florida which employs Tel-A-Betting. The Proposed Amendment of Rule 7E-6.007, Florida Administrative Code, if valid, will prohibit the Petitioner from continuing the use of Tel-A-Betting. The Respondent has not received any complaints about the use of Tel-A- Betting by minors or any other abuses. No evidence was presented that minors have made, or attempted to make, wagers through the use of Tel-A-Betting. The Respondent has not received any objections to Tel-A-Betting or complaints about unfair competition from other racetrack permit holders.
