The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (Department) is a state agency charged with the duty and responsibility for regulating the pari-mutuel wagering industry in Florida and those licensed under Chapter 550, Florida Statutes. At all times material hereto, Respondent, Jack J. Garey, held pari-mutuel wagering license number 1470144-1081, was a licensed thoroughbred owner, and was a permitholder authorized to conduct horseracing at permitted facilities in the State of Florida. Calder Race Course (Calder) was, at all times material hereto, a permitholder authorized to conduct horseracing in the State of Florida. Incident to the operation of that business, Calder extended check cashing privileges to trainers, owners and other pari-mutuel wagering licensees. On or about November 3, 1997, Respondent endorsed and presented to Calder for payment two checks, each in the amount of $500.00, which were payable to Respondent and drawn on the account of Karin Montejo and Ramiro Montejo at Barnett Bank. Both checks, which Calder paid, were returned unpaid because the account was closed. On or about November 12, 1997, Respondent endorsed and presented to Calder for payment a check in the amount of $1,600.00 which as payable to Respondent and drawn on the account of Karin Montejo and Ramiro Montejo at Barnett Bank. The check, which Calder paid, was, as the previous check drawn on such account, returned unpaid because the account was closed. In late November 1997, Michael Abes, the vice president of finance at Calder, spoke with Respondent regarding the returned checks and demanded repayment. In turn, Respondent acknowledged the debt and promised to repay it; however, no payments were forthcoming. On or about December 27, 1997, Respondent endorsed and presented to Calder two more checks for payment. One check was in the amount of $2,000.00 and the other in the amount of $500.00, and each was payable to Respondent and drawn on the account of Karin Montejo and Ramiro Montejo at Barnett Bank. The checks, paid by Calder, were, as with the previous checks drawn on the same account, returned unpaid because the account was closed. Given the return of the previous checks and his discussion with Mr. Abes, it cannot be subject to serious dispute that Respondent knew when he presented the checks to Calder for payment, that the account on which the checks were drawn had been closed and that they would not be honored by the bank. Despite numerous demands, Respondent did not pay any portion of the outstanding obligation owed Calder until February 1998, when a payment of $300.00 was remitted. Subsequently, on June 5, 1998, the balance of the outstanding obligation due Calder was paid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent guilty of violating the provisions of Subsection 550.105(6), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count I of the Administrative Complaint and imposing, as a penalty for such violation, an administrative fine of $300.00, a 30-day suspension, and exclusion from all pari-mutuel facilities in the state for the period of suspension. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March, 1999.
The Issue Whether Petitioner committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what discipline should be imposed against Respondent's Pari-Mutuel Wagering Occupational License?
Findings Of Fact Respondent submitted an application to Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (Division) on or about October 6, 2004, for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license. The Division issued license number 7244830-1021, at Ocala Jai-Alai to Respondent. The nature of the license is an "owner's license" regarding owning racehorses. The Division is the state agency charged with regulation of pari-mutuel wagering pursuant to Chapter 550, Florida Statutes, and is responsible for licensing employees of pari-mutuel facilities. The following question appeared on Respondent's application for licensure: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to, even if you received a withhold of adjudication? This question applies to any violation of the laws of any municipality, county, state or nation, including felony, misdemeanor and traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection, or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, were paroled, or pardoned. If you intend to answer "NO" because you believe those records have been expunged or sealed by court order pursuant to Section 943.058, Florida Statutes, or applicable law of another state, you are responsible for verifying the expungement or sealing prior to answering "NO." YOUR ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION WILL BE CHECKED AGAINST LOCAL, STATE AND FEDERAL RECORDS. FAILURE TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION ACCURATELY MAY RESULT IN THE DENIAL OR REVOCATION OF YOUR LICENSE. IF YOU DO NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND THIS QUESTION, CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY OR CONTACT THE DEPARTMENT. If an applicant answers "yes" to the above question, he or she is then required to complete form 0050-1. Respondent answered "yes" to the question and submitted form 0050-1 which contained the following explanation: Offense: Tax Evasion County: New York State: New York Penalty/ Disposition: Restitution misdemeanor-probation Date of offense: 1985 Have all sanctions been satisfied: yes Description: Sold property failed to pay tax liens-ultimately bank was money damaged so I had to pay restitution + serve 2y probation.[1/] In April 1995, the United State District Court for the Western District of New York issued a Judgment against Respondent finding him guilty of the crime of Bank Larceny and Theft. The Judgment lists the date the offense concluded as "03/03/89." Respondent was ordered to pay a special assessment of $25, restitution in the amount of $59,000 in installments to Empire of America, and was placed on one year probation. Steven Toner is an investigator for the Division. He was assigned Respondent's case and conducted an interview of Respondent. During cross-examination, Mr. Toner described part of the interview: Q: Did Mr. Paradelo in the course of your interview in my office indicate to you that the entire thing on his application for 1985 tax evasion, which he stated to you for the 1995 conviction, was all a single case? A: It was told to me that it was a run-on. Now, I'm not trying to be evasive, but it was a run-on between the criminal and the civil matters that were in the Landlord/Tenant things that were going, that were happening during that period of time. Respondent described the general chain of events leading up to the 1995 Judgment: in 1985, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) filed a tax lien against Respondent; in 1988 Respondent applied to Empire of America Bank to refinance apartments which he owned; at the closing for the refinancing, the tax lien was revealed to the bank and to Respondent; the closing went forward; Respondent filed for bankruptcy in 1991; the bank failed and was taken over by a trust company; in 1991, the IRS commenced foreclosure proceedings based upon the 1985 tax lien; the matter was ultimately resolved in the criminal case which resulted in the Judgment wherein Respondent was required to pay $59,000 in restitution. Respondent considers the Judgment as a continuation of, and not distinct from, the tax lien matter that initially arose in the 1980's. The undersigned finds Respondent's testimony in this regard to be credible. The details of the events leading up to the 1995 judgment are important to the extent that they lend support to Respondent's position that he did not falsify the license application. Respondent answered "yes" to the question that he had a criminal conviction. He disclosed that he sold property, had to pay tax liens, had to pay restitution, and was placed on probation. While Respondent's description of his criminal conviction was imprecise, it was not false.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 2006.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was convicted of unarmed robbery before the courts of the State of Massachusetts in 1960. The Petitioner has applied for a pardon so that his civil rights can be restored, and it is probable that his civil rights will be restored. Apparently the process for accomplishing a restoration of civil rights is time consuming in the State of Massachusetts. The Petitioner failed to reflect on his application that he was arrested for robbery in 1962. He was not convicted of that crime. It does not appear that the Petitioner deliberately falsified his application.
The Issue The issue is whether Proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-2.026(4) and (6) is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, pursuant to sections 120.52(8) and 120.56(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to chapter 550, Florida Statutes, Petitioner Second Chance operates jai alai games at its facility in Marion County, and Petitioner WFA owns and operates a greyhound permit and summer jai alai permit at its facility in Miami-Dade County. Petitioner WFA also indirectly owns a summer jai alai permit at the Miami Jai Alai in Miami-Dade County and owns partial interests in two jai alai permits operated at the Dania Jai Alai facility in Broward County. Pursuant to chapter 550, Intervenor owns and operates a jai alai permit at its facility in Seminole County, where it conducts live jai alai permits. Petitioners and Intervenor are regulated by the proposed rules that they challenge in these cases. Proposed rule 61D-2.026(4) (the Court Rule) provides: Jai alai games must be conducted on a three-walled court meeting the following requirements: The side wall must be at least 175 feet long and at least 35 feet in height; The front wall and back wall must be at least 35 feet in width and height; The front wall must be made of granite. All courts must have sufficient overhead coverage to ensure for the operation of scheduled performances. All courts must have a live viewing area for games. Proposed rule 61D-2.026(6) (the Roster Rule) provides: "Jai Alai permit holders must utilize a rotational system of at least eight different players or teams." The rulemaking authority cited for the Court Rule and the Roster Rule is sections 550.0251 and 550.105(3) and (10)(a). The law implemented cited for the Court Rule and the Roster Rule is sections 550.0251, 550.105, and 550.70.
The Issue This is a rule challenge proceeding in which the following specific issues are presented: Whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4-12.006 is an invalid delegation of legislative authority, and Whether application of the provisions of Section 112.011(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by the Construction Industry Licensing Board in its quasi-judicial capacity constitutes an agency statement of general applicability that requires rulemaking by the agency.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Goode “Buddy” Yeoman, is 64 years of age, and is an individual who has applied to the CILB for an individual certified general contracting license. Petitioner Yeoman has a prior felony conviction and his civil rights have not been restored. Petitioner Yeoman's felony conviction was imposed approximately 20 years ago in 1985 and was unrelated to the contracting practice or trade. Petitioner Yeoman was required to, and did, submit a completed form DBPR CILB 4359. Petitioner’s application was denied by the Construction Industry Licensing Board (“CILB” or “Board”), and on June 14, 2004, the CILB entered its “Notice of Intent to Deny” Petitioner Yeoman’s application for initial certified general contractor. Petitioner Yeoman has separately filed a petition for administrative proceedings regarding the CILB's denial of his initial certified general contractor license. As such, by operation of law no final agency action has to date been taken on Petitioner Yeoman's application. The license denial proceeding has been continued. This will allow the parties in that case to have the benefit of the final order in this rule challenge case. The sole basis for the denial of Petitioner Yeoman’s application was that his civil rights had not been restored. The CILB’s “Notice of Intent to Deny” stated: “You have not provided proof to the Board that your civil rights have been fully restored subsequent to a previous felony conviction as required by Section 112.011(1)(b), Florida Statutes.” The requirement that a restoration of civil rights be obtained which is expressed in the challenged existing rule and the challenged agency statement defined as a rule negatively affect Petitioner Yeoman’s substantial interests by denying him a certified general contracting license. As such, Petitioner Yeoman has standing to bring his challenge to Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4-12.006(2) and the agency statement defined as a rule (Form “DBPR CILB 4359"). Intervenor Smith's felony conviction was for a drug offense in 1989 and was unrelated to the contracting business or trade. Intervenor Smith filed an application with the CILB, including form “DBPR CILB 4359.” On May 4, 2004, the CILB refused to consider his application because his civil rights have not been restored. As such, Intervenor Smith has standing to bring his challenge to Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4-12.006(2), and the agency statement defined as a rule (Form "DBPR CILB 4359"). Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4-12.006 was adopted pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, on January 6, 1980, and lists and incorporates by reference DBPR/CILB/025 (Rev. 01/01) entitled “Certifications: Certification Change of Status.” This agency form is applicable to applications for certified licenses and change of status applications, and requires individuals applying for initial contracting licenses to provide proof that their civil rights have been restored if they have been convicted of a felony. The form states in the “Financial Responsibility/Background Questions” section: “NOTE: IF YOU, THE APPLICANT/LICENSEE, HAVE HAD A FELONY CONVICTION, PROOF THAT YOUR CIVIL RIGHTS HAVE BEEN RESTORED WILL BE REQUIRED PRIOR TO LICENSURE.” Form “DBPR CILB 4359" has an effective date of March 24, 2004, but has not been adopted as a rule under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The form is available for download on the agency’s web-page as “Initial Issuance of Licensure for Certified Contractor Application Package.” Applicants for licensure as a contractor must submit form “DBPR CILB 4359" to the DBPR. Within the “DBPR CILB 4359" package is the form “DBPR CILB 4357 - Qualified Business (QB) License Application and Qualified Business Change of Status Application,” which requires an applicant previously convicted of a felony to provide proof that his/her civil rights have been restored. This form states: “IF YOU HAVE BEEN CONVICTED OF A FELONY, YOU MUST SUBMIT PROOF OF REINSTATEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS,” and also: “Note: If you, the applicant/licensee, have had a felony conviction, proof that your civil rights have been restored will be required prior to Licensure.” Both the challenged Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4-12.006(2) and the form “DBPR CILB 4359" are generally applicable to every individual applying for a contracting license from the CILB. The CILB has previously approved applications for initial licenses, and change of status licenses, to applicants who did not have their civil rights fully restored, subject to probation until the applicant's civil rights have been restored. Neither the type of crime for which a felony conviction has been imposed, the recency of the conviction, nor the completion of any punishment, have been a factor in the CILB’s denial of applications to individuals previously convicted of a felony crime but whose civil rights have not been fully restored. The sole reason for denial is the lack of civil rights. The lack of civil rights is the standard, expressed in Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4-12.006(2) and in “DBPR CILB 4359," by which the CILB has denied contractor license applications, including Petitioner Yeoman’s application, and Intervenor Smith's application, under the CILB’s interpretation of Section 112.011(1)(b), Florida Statutes. The CILB has not revoked any previously granted licenses due solely to a subsequent felony conviction and lack of civil rights of any licensee. The CILB is a collegial body composed of 18 members, 16 of whom are professionals and two of whom are consumer members. Each member is limited to two 4-year terms, and no member may serve more than two consecutive 4-year terms. If a member is appointed to fill an unexpired vacancy, the new appointee may not serve for more than 11 years. The current members of the Board, and their terms, are as follows: Elizabeth Karcher; term 01/10/02-10/31/04 Barry Kalmanson; term 11/01/02-10/31/07 c. Lee-En Chung; term 09/01/99-10/31/06 Paul Del Vecchio; term 01-10-02-10-31-05 Michelle Kane; term 01-10-02-10/31/05 f. Joan Brown; term 03/14/00-10/31/07 Michael Blankenship; term 11/01/02-10/31/06 Carl Engelmeler; term 11/01/02-10/31/06 Jacqueline Watts; term 01/10/02-10/31/04 John Smith; term 11/01/02-10/31/06 (resigned effective 11/01/04) Raymond Holloway; term 01/10/02-10/31/05 Edward Weller; term 11/21/02-10/31/06 Thomas Thornton; term 08/16/04-10/31/07 Robert Stewart; term 08/16/04-10/31/07 o. Doris Bailey; term 08/16/04-10/31/05 A quorum (51 percent) of the appointed members of the Board is necessary for the Board to conduct official business. The CILB meets 11 times each year. On November 8, 1999, the CILB denied the application of Michael A. Helish for the certification examination on the grounds that his civil rights had not been restored. This decision was per curiam affirmed in Helish v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 766 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). The CILB has previously approved applications for initial licenses, and change of status licenses, to applicants whose civil rights had not been fully restored, at times subject to probation until the applicant’s civil rights have been restored, as follows: On June 14, 2004, the Respondent granted an initial contractor license to Robert F. Jones, subject to probation until his civil rights are fully restored. On May 28, 2004, the Respondent granted an initial contractor license to William P. Campbell, subject to probation until his civil rights are fully restored. On May 28, 2004, the Respondent granted an initial contractor license to Glenn Kasper, subject to probation until his civil rights are fully restored. On May 28, 2004, the Respondent granted an initial contractor license to Danny Mitchell, subject to probation until his civil rights are fully restored. On March 3, 2004, the Respondent granted an initial contractor license to Timothy Burke, subject to probation until his civil rights are fully restored. On February 9, 2004, the Respondent granted an initial contractor license to Anthony Nicholas, Jr., subject to probation and the condition that his civil rights be fully restored within two years. On June 25, 2003, the Respondent granted an initial contractor license to Andrew Dittenber, stating: “The Board permitted licensure with conditions in this case where applicant did not have his civil rights restored, because of the number of years that have passed since the conviction and evidence that application for restoration has been made.” On June 25, 2003, the Respondent granted an initial contractor license to Robert W. Fleming, stating: “The Board permitted licensure with conditions in this case where applicant did not have his civil rights restored, because of the number of years that have passed since the conviction and evidence that application for restoration has been made.” On December 1, 2003, the Respondent granted an initial contractor license to James D. Munroe, Jr., subject to probation until his civil rights are fully restored. On October 21, 2002, the Respondent granted an initial contractor license to Daryl F. Strickland subject to probation and the condition that his civil rights be fully restored within three years. On September 4, 2001, the Respondent granted an initial contractor license to John Richard Brown, subject to probation and the condition that his civil rights be fully restored within three years. On June 24, 2004, the Respondent amended its initial order and again placed John Richard Brown’s license on probation until such time as his civil rights are restored.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner's application for a Pari-Mutuel Wagering occupational license and request for a waiver should be granted or denied for the reasons set forth in the Respondent's letter dated August 20, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Division is the state agency responsible for issuing occupational licenses to employees of pari-mutuel facilities in Florida. See § 550.105(1), Fla. Stat. On or about April 2, 2009, Ms. Jennings submitted an application for a pari-mutuel wagering license, specifically for a cardroom license that would allow her to be a dealer in the poker room of a pari-mutuel facility. Ms. Jennings indicated on the application form that she had never held a pari-mutuel license in Florida. In the section of the license application entitled "To Be Completed by Cardroom Applicants Only," Ms. Jennings answered "no" to the following question: "Have you ever been convicted of, or had adjudication of guilt withheld for, a felony or misdemeanor involving forgery, larceny, extortion or conspiracy to defraud or filing false reports to government agency, racing or gaming commission or authority, in this state or any other stated under the laws of the United States?" In the section of the application entitled "Background Information", Ms. Jennings answered "no" to the following question: "Have you ever been convicted of or had adjudication withheld for any crime, or pled guilty or nolo contendere to any criminal charges against you? If yes, give details in the space provided below." In the space provided, Ms. Jennings wrote: "Had adjudication; As part of a prosecution of someone else, I cooperated and gave testimony. However, I was personally not convicted of any wrongdoing." Upon investigation, the Division learned that Ms. Jennings had been adjudicated guilty of one count of grand theft in the third degree on January 26, 1995, in Brevard County, Florida. She was sentenced to two years' probation and required to report monthly to her probation officer. Ms. Jennings spent approximately three months in jail prior to her conviction because she could not pay for her bail. On April 22, 2009, Ms. Jennings submitted a request for a waiver from the Division so she could obtain her pari-mutuel wagering license. A waiver must be obtained by, among others, any new applicant for a Florida pari-mutuel license who has been convicted of any felony. Ms. Jennings was 27 years of age when she was convicted of grand theft. She explained that, at the time of the offense, she was involved with a boyfriend who had threatened to kill her and her family when she first became involved with him. She stated that she became "brainwashed and co-dependent on him and basically scared for my life."2 As a result, Ms. Jennings did whatever her boyfriend wanted her to do. According to Ms. Jennings, she was charged with grand theft because, at her boyfriend's direction, she obtained a cell phone under a false name. Ms. Jennings testified that she answered "no" to the question asking if she had been convicted of a crime because she was told by a federal prosecutor named Larry Turner that she would "have a clean record" if she testified against her boyfriend, who had been charged with murder.3 Ms. Jennings testified, and her boyfriend was convicted. Ms. Jennings assumed, therefore, that she would not have "anything in [her] background as a criminal record."4 Ms. Jennings gave the following testimony at the final hearing: She told the Division's investigators about the circumstances of her criminal conviction but did not tell them that she believed her criminal record had been sealed. She was shocked when the Division's investigators told her they had found records of her conviction: "I was like, Huh?"5 She had to go look up the records of the conviction and then her recollection of the arrest and conviction "came back to [her] . . . eventually."6 She was shocked when the Division's investigators told her they had found this conviction because she thought the conviction had been erased. Ms. Jennings has a high school education. After her conviction, Ms. Jennings tried to go to school, but she did not finish. For a time, she worked at a restaurant as a waitress; she had a part-time job doing promotional work for night clubs; and she also worked as a blackjack dealer at a nightclub where blackjack was played for entertainment. When asked what she had done with her life, Ms. Jennings responded: "I had boyfriends and long-term relationships and basically I was taking care of them."7 Ms. Jennings's current boyfriend, her sister, and her best friend testified that Ms. Jennings had always been honest with them. The totality of the evidence presented by Ms. Jennings is insufficient to establish she is rehabilitated and possesses good moral character: She failed to disclose her conviction for grand theft in her application for licensure; her explanations of the reasons for failing to disclose the conviction are inconsistent; her explanation of the act underlying her conviction of grand theft, procuring a cell phone under a false name, is unconvincing; and her vague description of her life since the conviction fails to demonstrate any accomplishments or any positive change in her circumstances since her conviction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, enter a final order denying the application of Soon Young P. Jennings for a pari-mutuel wagering license. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 2010.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Section 550.2415(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1996)1 by allowing a greyhound with a drug, medication, stimulant, depressant, hypnotic, narcotic, or local anesthetic, in its system to enter and complete a race and, if so, what, if any, disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's pari-mutuel wagering occupational and business licenses.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating the pari-mutuel industry in the state, including the regulation and discipline of licensees such as Respondent. Respondent holds an Unrestricted "U1 " Professional individual pari-mutuel wagering occupational license, number 0526562-1081, and a business occupational pari-mutuel wagering license, number 1364008-1080, for Ron Runge Kennel. Respondent is the trainer of record for Prunella Scales ("Prunella"), a greyhound. On February 22, 1997, the Respondent entered Prunella in the thirteenth race at Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club (the "race") and allowed Prunella to complete the race. Prior to the start of the race, urine sample number 267912 was taken from Prunella. The urine analysis conducted by the Bureau of Laboratory Services revealed the presence of ecgonine methyl ester in sample number 267912. Ecgonine methyl ester is a metabolite of cocaine. Cocaine is a topical anesthetic and a class 1 drug. Respondent violated Section 550.2415(1)(a) by entering Prunella in the race with an impermissible drug in its system and allowing Prunella to complete the race in such a condition. As the trainer of record, Respondent is responsible for of the condition of a greyhound that he or she enters in a race. Respondent has an extensive disciplinary history. In August 1994, Petitioner fined Respondent $25.00 for racing a greyhound on an impermissible drug and redistributed the purse money. In September 1994, Petitioner fined Respondent a total of $50.00 for racing two greyhounds on an impermissible drug. In one instance, Petitioner redistributed the purse money. In November 1994, Petitioner fined Respondent $25.00 for racing a greyhound on an impermissible drug. Respondent's pari-mutuel occupational license was suspended until he paid the fine. In September 1995, Petitioner fined Respondent a total of $50.00 for racing two greyhounds on an impermissible drug. In one instance, the purse money was redistributed. In January 1996, Petitioner fined Respondent $100.00 for racing a greyhound on an impermissible drug and suspended Respondent's pari-mutuel occupational license until Respondent paid the fine. In March 1996, Petitioner fined Respondent $50.00 for racing a greyhound on procaine, an impermissible substance. In March 1997, Petitioner summarily suspended Respondent's licenses and denied Respondent all access to pari-mutuel grounds during the period of suspension. In addition to the foregoing drug violations, Respondent was found guilty of improperly using rabbits in the training of racing greyhounds in November 1991. He was fined $250.00 for that violation. On March 11, 1995, Respondent was fined $50.00 for presenting the wrong greyhound at the weigh-in, and on July 30, 1996, he was fined $50.00 for failure to present the proper greyhound at the weigh-in. Prior disciplinary action has been ineffective in rehabilitating Respondent. Respondent persists in the prohibited practice of racing animals on impermissible substances. License suspension and fines have no deterrent effect on Respondent. Respondent is not a viable candidate for rehabilitation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order and therein find Respondent guilty of violating Section 550.2415(1)(a) by racing an animal with an impermissible drug in its system and revoke Respondent's licenses. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Hearings Hearings DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 9th day of January, 1998.
