The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board under Chapter 681, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On November 30, 1993, Petitioner took delivery of a new, 1994 Mercedes Benz SL600, bearing vehicle identification number WDBFA76EORF093081. The selling dealer was Regency Autohaus, Inc. in Naples, Florida, which is where delivery to Petitioner took place. Petitioner experienced numerous mechanical problems with the vehicle starting shortly after taking delivery. Problems during the first year of ownership included air conditioning that would not work and a transmission problem that would not permit use of gears other than third. On February 22, 1995, Petitioner sent to Mercedes Benz a Motor Vehicle Defect Notification. Petitioner continued to experience problems with the car and, on May 9, 1996, sent Mercedes Benz a second Motor Vehicle Defect Notification. Despite repeated attempts by Mercedes Benz to repair largely recurring problems with the car, Petitioner was unable to obtain satisfactory repairs. Twice, the Mercedes Benz dealer in Louisville, Kentucky, where Petitioner lives part of the year, towed the car to the shop to repair a failure of the car to start. Keeping the car 11 days the first time and six days the second time, the Louisville dealer could not determine the source of the problem. Later, in September 1996, the Louisville dealer kept the car for 13 days trying to fix several problems. At this time, the car had 23,692 miles on it. The issue in this case is whether Petitioner made a timely demand for arbitration under the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board, Chapter 681, Florida Statutes. The Motor Vehicle Defect Notifications that Petitioner sent to Mercedes Benz are not demands for arbitration. The forms state that, under the Florida Lemon Law, the purchaser is “requesting that [the manufacturer] make a final attempt to correct the continuing substantial defect(s) or condition(s).” In the spring of 1996, Petitioner spoke with several representatives of Mercedes Benz and Respondent about arbitration and procedures under the Florida Lemon Law. By letter to a national Mercedes Benz representative dated April 24, 1996, Petitioner complained about the car and the discourteous treatment he had received from another Mercedes Benz employee. The letter explains why Petitioner does “not want to keep this vehicle” and warns that, if Petitioner did not hear from someone at Mercedes Benz within five days, he would “have no alternative but take further action.” By letter dated May 9, 1996, Petitioner sent the Office of the Attorney General a letter with a copy of the second Motor Vehicle Defect Notification. The letter notes that the car was in the shop for repairs for more than 15 days prior to the expiration of 18 months and thus appears to be covered by the Florida Lemon Law. The letter concludes: “I have requested that the purchase price be refunded or that the vehicle be repaired.” By letter dated May 23, 1996, Petitioner informed a Mercedes Benz representative in St. Petersburg, Florida, that Petitioner had researched his rights under the Florida Lemon Law. Petitioner stated that Mercedes Benz had to replace the vehicle or refund the purchase price. Petitioner added, “If your company fails to do this, then the only alternative would be to arbitrate the matter . . ..” The letter concludes: “It would seem to me that your company should be willing to go ahead and do this rather than go through the arbitration and be ordered to do something that you could voluntarily do. Please advise your thoughts on the matter.” On July 5, 1996, Petitioner filed a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. Immediately above Petitioner’s signature, which is dated June 28, 1996, the form warns that persons making false statements with the intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his official duty are guilty of misdemeanor violations of cited Florida Statutes. The form adds: I hereby request arbitration of my case with the Florida New Motor Vehicle Board. I certify that all statements made in connection with this request are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. I understand that this document and its attachments are public records. The letters of April 29 and May 9 and 23 are not demands for arbitration. They are demands for the remedies that are available under the Florida Lemon Law, but they are not demands for arbitration. Nowhere in these three letters does Petitioner, who is an attorney, make a definitive demand of Mercedes Benz or Respondent for arbitration. The letters mention Mercedes Benz’s liability under the Florida Lemon Law and the remedies available under the law. The letters implicitly warn of arbitration, but continue to reflect Petitioner’s strategy during this period to try to work out this matter without the necessity of legal proceedings. Mercedes Benz does not maintain a certified procedure for the resolution of disputes of the type involved in this case.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order denying Petitioner’s request for arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board under Chapter 681, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of January, 1997. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert L. Bertram Post Office Box 25 Jamestown, Kentucky 42629-0025 Attorney Rhonda Long Bass Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Room 515, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue Whether Petitioner's request for arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Danielle Manfredo (Manfredo), purchased a 1992 Mitsubishi Eclipse from Leheman Mitsubishi in Miami, Florida, on November 5, 1992, and took possession of the vehicle on the same date. When Manfredo purchased the automobile she was given an owner's manual for a 1993 Mitsubishi Eclipse. She did not receive a brochure concerning the Florida Lemon Law nor was she provided any information by the car dealer concerning her rights under the Florida Lemon Law. In January, 1993, Manfredo began experiencing problems with the vehicle and continued experiencing problems into 1995. The two primary problems dealt with the transmission and the car pulling to the right. Manfredo continued to take the car in for repairs. In August, 1995, Manfredo obtained a Lemon Law form from her future mother-in-law. On August 25, 1995, Manfredo sent a Motor Vehicle Notification to the manufacturer and to the Attorney General. Respondent, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Affairs, Division of Consumer Affairs (Department) is the state agency charged with the responsibility to receive and evaluate Requests for Arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board for referral to the Attorney General for further processing and action. On September 27, 1995, Manfredo called the Department to get an application for arbitration. On October 17, 1995, she filed a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. By letter dated November 8, 1995, the Department denied Manfredo's request for arbitration, stating that the request was not timely. The latest possible date Manfredo could have filed a request for arbitration was May 5, 1995. Manfredo's request for arbitration was not timely filed. The Vehicle Defect Notification and the Request for Arbitration are not the same document and do not serve the same purpose. Mitsubishi does not have a state-certified manufacturer procedure.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Danielle Manfredo's request for arbitration. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of April, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 96-192 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. No proposed recommended order was filed. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Paragraphs 1-12: Accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Danielle Manfredo 1412 Southwest 129th Court Miami, Florida 33184 Rhonda Long Bass, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner has leased the motor vehicle that is the subject of the instant controversy, a 1992 Merdedes-Benz 300SE (hereinafter referred to as the "subject vehicle"), from Bill Ussery Motors, Inc., an automobile dealership located in Coral Gables, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the "Dealership"), since October 30, 1991, when he took delivery of the vehicle. At the time of delivery, the subject vehicle was new. Thereafter, various problems developed with the subject vehicle. Petitioner reported these problems to the Dealership, but the Dealership was unable to completely rectify them within 18 months of the date of delivery. Petitioner drove the vehicle less than 24,000 miles during this 18-month period. Some of the problems that Petitioner reported during the first 18 months of his possession of the vehicle still persist today. On or about April 23, 1993, Petitioner sent a completed Motor Vehicle Defect Notification form to the manufacturer requesting that it "make a final attempt to correct the . . . reported . . defects." The manufacturer responded by sending the following letter, dated April 27, 1993, to Petitioner: This will acknowledge the Motor Vehicle Defect Notification form you completed, which was received by this office today. This letter shall serve as a written request to provide Mercedes-Benz of North America ("MBNA") with an opportunity to inspect, verify and if necessary, repair your vehicle. As you are aware, Bill Ussery Motors, Inc., located in Coral Gables, Fl., is a reasonably accessible repair facility. Mr. Eric Moore, Field Service Manager, will contact you to make an appointment to meet with you. If you have any questions or wish to discuss this matter further, please do not hesitate to call me at (904)443-2150. In or about December of 1993, Petitioner retained Joseph Portuondo, Esquire, who sent, on Petitioner's behalf, the following letter, dated December 13, 1993, to the manufacturer: As you know, Mr. Palaez has experienced such difficulty with his automobile that it led to his filing of a Motor Vehicle Defect Notification with you on April 23, 1993. Thereafter, on April 27, 1993, you directed Mr. Palaez to Bill Ussery [Motors], Inc. of Coral Gables, Florida, to attempt the last chance repairs to his automobile. Mr. Palaez complied with your instructions. However, the defects in the automobile remain unresolved and out of service days are well in excess of those required under the Lemon Laws of this state. Simply put, Mr. Palaez has a lemon for which we demand a remedy. As such, we hereby demand that Mr. Palaez be immediately refunded the full purchase price of the vehicle. In the event that you do not immediately provide a refund, we hereby demand that this matter be referred to the appropriate state-certified settlement program. Needless to say, if we are unsatisfied with this matter, we will proceed for relief to the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board of the Office of the Attorney General. We trust that our position in this matter is clear. It is truly unfortunate that Mercedes-Benz and its dealer have chosen to treat Mr. Palaez so poorly as a customer that he has had to resort to judicial relief. In response to Portuondo's letter, the manufacturer sent him the following letter, dated December 21, 1993: We are writing in response to the correspondence received by this office today, regarding your client's vehicle. Mercedes-Benz of North America is concerned in this matter and as a result, your concerns have been assigned to Mr. Eric Moore, Field Service Manager, a member of our staff for handling. You will, if not already, be contacted by him in the near future. Thank you for bringing this matter to our attention. On or about December 29, 1993, Portuondo sent Petitioner a copy of the manufacturer's December 21, 1993, letter, along with the following cover letter: Enclosed herein please find a letter recently received [with respect to the above-referenced] subject matter. I will let you know if there is any progress. Petitioner waited until August 12, 1994, to file with the Department his Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. He did not file a request sooner because, from April of 1993, the manufacturer and Dealership had repeatedly made representations to him, upon which he relied, that they would either make the necessary repairs to the subject vehicle or otherwise resolve the matter to his satisfaction so that there would be no need for him to resort to arbitration or litigation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding that Petitioner's request for arbitration is not time-barred. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th day of March, 1995. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 1995.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Petitioner is eligible to participate in arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board concerning his purchase of a 1995 Saturn automobile.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Respondent, Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, was the state agency responsible for the administration of matters regarding the implementation of the Lemon Law for motor vehicles in this state. Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, deals with motor vehicle sales warranties, and incorporates Florida’s Lemon Law as it is pertinent to this matter. Petitioner, Marshall E. Pitts, III, a resident of Groveland, Florida, purchased a 1995 Saturn SLI automobile on or about March 14, 1995, from Saturn of Orlando. The purchase order/contract for sale bears a date of March 14, 1995. The purchase price of the vehicle was $13,750. Petitioner had a trade-in valued at $8,400, which left a difference of $5,350 to be paid. In his request for arbitration, Petitioner indicated the purchase date as March 16, 1995, and the Department, giving him the benefit of the doubt in calculating the allowable time for filing under the Lemon Law, considered the March 16, 1995, date as the date of purchase/delivery which initiates the running of the time for filing a request for arbitration. The Lemon Law calls for filing for arbitration within 18 months or 24,000 miles of delivery. Therefore, the initial filing deadline was September 16, 1996. The vehicle reached 24,000 miles on the odometer sometime in November 1996. The Lemon Law statute allows an extension of six months for filing if a nonconformity has been reported but not cured by the manufacturer or its representative by the expiration of the Lemon Law period. Petitioner took the vehicle in for repairs to the safety belt three times starting sometime in October 1995. Exact dates are not shown. He also took it in for repairs to the transaxle three times, on March 21, 1996, September 19, 1996, and on January 31, 1997. The trouble with the transaxle was not corrected within the Lemon Law rights period. Because of this, a six-month extension for triple reports of difficulty was implemented. This extended the filing deadline to March 16, 1997. Petitioner was afforded an additional six-months extension because of the wording of the statute which grants an individual six months after the expiration of the Lemon Law Rights period to request arbitration. Application of this additional six months extended the filing deadline to September 16, 1997. Petitioner submitted his request for arbitration on October 29, 1997, and it was received in the Department on November 5, 1997. At the time of filing the request, there were 77,000 miles on the vehicle’s odometer. Petitioner claims he did not receive any notification of his rights under the Lemon Law from the dealer at the time he took delivery of the vehicle. He claims it was only when talking with an attorney late in the process that he learned of the existence of the arbitration procedure. A dealer of new cars is required by law to provide the purchaser of a new vehicle with a copy of the Department’s brochure which outlines the Lemon Law program. Petitioner also recites a litany of complaints regarding the vehicle and the treatment he received from both the selling dealer and the manufacturer. Unfortunately, traumatic as these problems must have been to him, they have no relevance to the issues here.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order denying Petitioner’s request for arbitration under the Florida Lemon Law as untimely filed. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Marshall E. Pitts, III 3831 Soto Road Groveland, Florida 34736 Rhonda Long Bass, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner's Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board pursuant to Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, should be denied on the ground that the request was not timely filed with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Consumer Services (hereinafter referred to as the "Department").
Findings Of Fact On May 20, 1993, the Petitioner took delivery of a new 1993 Volvo (the subject vehicle) from Gold Coast Volvo in Pompano Beach, Florida. The Petitioner put 24,000 miles on the subject vehicle on or before October 2, 1995. The Petitioner had problems with the subject vehicle, the most serious of which were that on an intermittent basis the vehicle would stall at slow speeds or would hesitate and stall when acceleration was attempted. During the first 18 months following delivery of the subject vehicle, the dealer made several (more than three) unsuccessful attempts to repair the hesitation and stalling problems. The Petitioner's initial Lemon Law rights period ended on November 19, 1994. As a result of the unsuccessful attempts to repair the hesitation and stalling problems during the initial Lemon Law rights period, the Petitioner was entitled to a six month extension of the Lemon Law rights period. That extension ended on May 19, 1995. Consumers are entitled to file for relief under the subject statutory provisions for a period of six months after the expiration of the Lemon Law rights period. In this case, that filing period ended on November 19, 1995. Prior to the expiration of the filing period that ended on November 19, 1995, the Petitioner had a copy of the pamphlet titled "Preserving Your Rights Under the Florida Lemon Law." The Petitioner attempted to comply with the instructions contained in that pamphlet. Following the expiration of the initial Lemon Law rights period, and following the expiration of the six month extension of that period, the dealer continued to make attempts to repair the continuing intermittent problems and continued to make assurances that eventually the problems would be resolved. In reliance on these attempts and assurances, the Petitioner postponed taking action to enforce his rights under the Lemon Law. On January 10 or 11, 1996, representatives of Volvo told the Petitioner they were unable to fix the intermittent hesitation and stalling problems on the subject vehicle. On January 15, 1996, the Petitioner filled out and signed a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. The Petitioner sent the request for arbitration to the Department, where it was received on January 26, 1996. By letter dated February 7, 1996, the Department advised the Petitioner that it intended to deny his request for arbitration because his "application was not submitted in a timely manner." Volvo does not have a certified procedure for the resolution of consumer complaints. The Vehicle Defect Notification form and the Request for Arbitration form are separate documents with separate functions.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a Final Order in this case denying the Petitioner's Request for Arbitration as untimely. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Louis E. Martucci 5100 North Springs Way Coral Springs, Florida 33076 Rhonda Long Bass, Esquire Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Office of the General Counsel Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent properly denied Petitioners' request for arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility to receive and evaluate customer complaints and requests for arbitration in disputes with automobile manufacturers and dealers doing business in the state of Florida. Respondent's duty includes determining whether a request for arbitration qualifies under Section 681.109, Florida Statutes, for referral to the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. Petitioners took delivery of a new Ford motor vehicle on February 3, 1992. Thereafter, Petitioners began having problems with the automobile's engine, windshield wipers, driver's window and power steering. Petitioners reported these problems to the authorized service agent for the first time on or about January 13, 1993. The mileage on the automobile was approximately 11,000 miles at that time. The authorized dealer attempted to repair the subject motor vehicle on January 13, 1993, February 9, 1993, and December 1, 1993. In January of 1994, the automobile had been operated for 24,000 miles. The authorized dealer again attempted to repair the subject vehicle on March 9, 1994. Petitioners completed a Vehicle Defect Notification on August 15, 1994. The purpose of this notice was to inform the manufacturer of the unsuccessful repair attempts. Ford Motor Company received this notice on August 18, 1994. The mileage on the automobile at that time was 29,569 miles. On August 23, 1994, the authorized dealer made a final attempt to repair the subject automobile. At all times material to this proceeding, Ford Motor Company participated in a state certified dispute settlement program. On October 5, 1994, Petitioners completed a Dispute Settlement Board Application. The Dispute Settlement Board received Petitioners' application on October 17, 1994. Petitioners took their automobile to the authorized dealer on October 27, 1994, because the engine light was on. The Dispute Settlement Board considered Petitioners' case on November 17, 1994. By letter dated November 19, 1994, the Dispute Settlement Board notified Petitioners that Ford Motor Company would repair the automobile's window and windshield wipers with no expense to Petitioners. The Dispute Settlement Board also informed Petitioners that Ford Motor Company would not be required to repair the engine, speaker, and rear view mirror concerns because, according company and authorized dealer reports dated October 31, 1994, those problems were resolved. On December 17, 1994, Petitioners completed a Request for Arbitration form. Respondent received this request on December 22, 1994. Respondent's letter of January 23, 1995, informed Petitioners that their arbitration application was not properly documented concerning the vehicle finance agreement. Respondent directed Petitioners to re-file their application with the proper documentation. Respondent also advised Petitioners that the application might be rejected as untimely. On or before February 3, 1995, Petitioners re-submitted their arbitration application. Respondent rejected Petitioners' arbitration application as untimely. Subsequently, Petitioners filed a request for an administrative hearing to contest the denial of their application. Upon receipt of Petitioners' request for administrative hearing, Respondent reviewed Petitioners' file again. After this review, Respondent sent Petitioners a May 25, 1994, letter which erroneously determined that Petitioners' request for arbitration was eligible for referral to the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. This letter correctly determined that the subject vehicle reached 24,000 after January 1, 1994. However, it incorrectly determined that the Lemon Law rights period had been extended to January 1, 1995. By letter dated June 8, 1995, Respondent corrected its erroneous decision, withdrew the letter of May 25, 1995, and reinstated the letter of February 3, 1995. The initial Lemon Law rights period expired on August 3, 1993, eighteen (18) months after the date of delivery of the subject motor vehicle. Therefore it is irrelevant that the car did not accumulate 24,000 miles until January of 1994. Respondent correctly extended the initial Lemon Law rights period for six (6) months, until February 3, 1994, because: (1) Petitioners notified the authorized dealer about the automobile's nonconformance with warranty within the initial Lemon Law rights period; and (2) The authorized dealer did not cure the defects within the initial Lemon Law rights period. In order to be eligible for arbitration, Petitioners had to file their claim with the certified dispute settlement board within six (6) months of the expiration of the extended Lemon Law rights period which, in this case, was August 3, 1994. Petitioners were not entitled to file their request for arbitration within thirty (30) days after final action of the certified dispute settlement procedure because they did not even start that procedure until the time to file a request for arbitration had expired.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioners' Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board on grounds that the request was not timely. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. SUZANNE HOOD, HEARING OFFICER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 95-4772 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-11 are accepted in substance as restated in Findings of Fact 1-20 of this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED Carlton and Patricia Jones 804 Pheasant Court West Jacksonville, FL 32259 Rhonda Long Bass, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 The Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810
