The Issue Whether Respondents (private schools participating in certain scholarship programs) engaged in fraud and/or failed to comply with provisions required of private schools participating in such scholarship programs and, if so, whether Petitioner (Commissioner) should suspend or revoke Respondents’ rights to participate in the scholarship programs.
Findings Of Fact Barrington and Barrington II are private schools located in Florida City. They are located in the same facility under the same administration. Both have been eligible to receive McKay and FTC Scholarships for qualified students. Gwendolyn Thomas is the long time administrator of Barrington, which has been in existence for approximately 25 years. Ms. Thomas is also the administrator of Barrington II, which has been in existence for approximately two years. For medical reasons, Ms. Thomas did not participate in the day-to-day operation of either school between October 2010 and November 2013. During her absence, Mack Brown, the assistant principal, was in charge of both schools until he left in June 2013 to start a competing school. Ms. Thomas has been in charge of the day-to-day operation of Barrington and Barrington II since November 2013. McKay Scholarship payments are disbursed on a quarterly basis.2/ Pursuant to sections 1002.39(8)(b) and 1002.421(2)(d), any private school participating in the McKay Scholarship Program is required to affirmatively verify to the Department of Education that each scholarship student is regularly enrolled in the school at least 30 days prior to the issuance of any quarterly scholarship payment. Pursuant to section 1002.39(9)(f), McKay Scholarship checks are made payable to the parent of a scholarship student, which only the parent can sign. Private school personnel cannot sign such a check on behalf of the parent, even with the parent’s permission. Prior to June 9, 2011, Student A was enrolled in Barrington and received a McKay Scholarship. On June 9, 2011, Student A left Barrington and has not been a student at Barrington since June 9, 2011. Between August 26, 2011, and August 23, 2013, nine checks, totaling $12,230.25, were issued to the mother of Student A pursuant to the McKay Scholarship Program. Those checks were issued on the following dates in the following amounts: August 26, 2011 $1,336.75 October 27, 2011 $1,336.75 January 24, 2012 $1,336.75 March 21, 2012 $1,336.75 August 21, 2012 $1,382.50 October 22, 2012 $1,382.50 January 23, 2013 $1,382.50 March 20, 2013 $1,382.50 August 23, 2013 $1,353.25 9. The back of each check contains an endorsement that appears to be the name of Student A’s mother. Student A’s mother did not sign any of these checks. Each check was signed by an employee of Barrington or Barrington II. Each check was deposited into an account owned by Barrington. For each of these payments, Barrington submitted documentation to the Department of Education that Student A was attending Barrington prior to the issuance of the payment, without verifying that Student A was in attendance. As noted above, Student A was not in attendance. On October 4, 2013, the Commissioner filed her Administrative Complaint against Barrington and suspended Barrington’s participation in the McKay and FTC Scholarship Programs. The Commissioner had information that Student A was not enrolled in Barrington and had probable cause to believe that Barrington Academy had engaged in fraudulent conduct.3/ Afterwards, many of the Barrington students were administratively transferred to Barrington II, and continued to receive scholarship payments. Prior to June 7, 2013, Student B was enrolled in Barrington II and received a McKay Scholarship. On June 7, 2013, Student B was taken into the custody of the DJJ and enrolled in a residential facility in Greenville, Florida. Student B was in the custody of DJJ until March 7, 2014.4/ Between September 25, 2013, and January 23, 2014, three checks, totaling $8,316.75, were issued to the mother of Student B pursuant to the McKay Scholarship Program. Those checks were issued on the following dates in the following amounts: September 25, 2013 $2,772.25 October 23, 2013 $2,772.25 January 23, 2014 $2,772.25 The back of each check contains an endorsement that appears to be the name of Student B’s mother. Student B’s mother did not sign any of these checks. Each check was signed by an employee of Barrington or Barrington II. Each check was deposited into an account owned by Barrington. For each of these payments, Barrington II submitted documentation to the Department of Education that Student B was attending Barrington II prior to the issuance of the payment, without verifying that Student B was in attendance. As noted above, Student B was not in attendance. On February 19, 2014, the Commissioner filed her Amended Administrative Complaint against Barrington and Barrington II and suspended their participation in the McKay and FTC Scholarship Programs. The Commissioner had information that Student B was not enrolled in Barrington II and had probable cause to believe that Barrington II had engaged in fraudulent conduct. Barrington has reimbursed the Department of Education for the McKay Scholarship payments made on behalf of Student A. Barrington II has deposited with its attorney sufficient funds to reimburse the Department of Education for the McKay Scholarship payments made on behalf of Student B. Although Ms. Thomas had returned as administrator when at least two of the McKay Scholarship payments at issue were processed by a school employee, she testified, credibly, that she had not authorized that action and was unaware of the misconduct before the Administrative Complaint and the Amended Administrative Complaint were filed. The persons responsible for the deficiencies discussed above have either voluntarily left their employment or have been fired. Barrington and Barrington II have hired a person to ensure compliance with McKay and FTC Scholarship Programs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Education revoke the participation of Barrington Academy and Barrington Academy II in the McKay Scholarship Program and the FTC Scholarship Program. It is further RECOMMENDED that both schools be permitted to re- apply to participate in these programs after the Department of Education has been reimbursed for the scholarship payments made on behalf of Student B and after both schools demonstrate that they have personnel and written procedures that will ensure compliance with all applicable rules and statutory provisions. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of May, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 2014.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondents, as the owner and operator of a charter school or a private school, or both, engaged in fraudulent activity or otherwise ran the school(s) in a manner contrary to the health, safety, or welfare of students or the public; and, if so, whether Petitioner should revoke Respondents' participation in several scholarship programs that provide financial assistance to eligible students who choose to attend private schools.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Silva of South Florida, Inc. ("SSF"), is a Florida nonprofit corporation that, at all times relevant to this case, operated a private school known as New Horizons (the "School"). An employee of SSF, Yudit Silva ("Silva"), served as the School's principal or administrator at all times relevant. The Department of Education ("Department") administers the Gardiner Scholarship Program and the John M. McKay Scholarships for Students with Disabilities Program. See §§ 1002.385 & 1002.39, Fla. Stat. The Department has some administrative responsibilities in connection with the operation of the Florida Tax Credit ("FTC") Scholarship Program as well. See § 1002.395, Fla. Stat. Gardiner, McKay, and FTC scholarships defray tuition and other qualified educational expenses for eligible students who attend private schools in the state of Florida. It is not necessary to make detailed findings about these scholarship programs. There is no dispute that, during the relevant time, the School participated in the three programs mentioned, and was therefore eligible to accept, and did receive, scholarship funds paid on behalf of its students on scholarships. As will be discussed more thoroughly below, the Commissioner of Education possesses the authority to immediately suspend payment of McKay and FTC scholarship funds to a private school if he or she finds probable cause for believing that, inter alia, the school has engaged in "fraudulent activity." In addition, or alternatively, the commissioner may suspend or revoke a private school's continued participation in the McKay and FTC programs for wrongful conduct, including the operation of an "educational institution" by the private school's owner or operator "in a manner contrary to the health, safety, or welfare of the public." Finally, the commissioner may suspend or revoke a private school's participation in the Gardiner Scholarship Program "for a violation of . . . section" 1002.385, Florida Statutes. On March 30, 2017, Petitioner Pam Stewart, as Commissioner of Education (the "Commissioner"), issued an Administrative Complaint against Silva and SSF stating that she had determined there was probable cause for believing that Silva and SSF had engaged in fraudulent activity during the years 2013 through 2016 while operating a charter school known as Pathways Academy K-8 Center ("Pathways"). On May 2, 2017, the Commissioner issued an Amended Administrative Complaint wherein she expanded the original charges with new allegations that, in 2017, Silva and SSF had engaged in fraudulent activity while operating the School. Based on the alleged wrongdoing of Silva and SSF, the Commissioner immediately suspended payment of all scholarship funds to the School and gave notice of her intent to revoke the School's participation in the Gardiner, McKay, and FTC programs. The Commissioner's immediate and intended actions rested substantially on allegations of misconduct that the Broward County School Board ("BCSB") had asserted previously as grounds for terminating the charter school agreement between BCSB and SSF under which SSF operated Pathways. BCSB had given notice to SSF of its intent to terminate this agreement in April 2016, prompting SSF to request a formal administrative hearing. SSF's request had led, in turn, to the initiation of Broward County School Board v. Silva of South Florida, Inc., DOAH Case No. 16-2576 ("Pathways"). Over the course of several days in July and August 2016, Judge Robert E. Meale had conducted the Pathways hearing. In his Recommended Order dated January 9, 2017, Judge Meale had recommended that BCSB terminate SSF's charter. SSF had submitted exceptions to the Recommended Order, but on February 27, 2017, before BCSB had taken final agency action, SSF filed a Notice of Voluntary Withdrawal of Petition for Hearing, stating that SSF planned not to renew its charter and would, instead, close Pathways. BCSB evidently accepted this notice as sufficient to conclude the Pathways litigation, for it failed to issue a final order. The upshot is that Judge Meale's findings of fact never achieved administrative finality.1/ The relevant BCSB allegations, as the Commissioner summarized them in the administrative complaints, were quoted above in the Preliminary Statement. To prove them, the Commissioner relied primarily on two witnesses: Andrew Ramjit and Patrick Reilly. Neither provided evidence persuasive enough to support findings confirming the BCSB allegations. Mr. Ramjit is a former employee of SSF. He worked at Pathways as an assistant principal for a few months in the summer of 2015, between school years. His brief tenure at the charter school was apparently an unhappy one for all concerned, and when Mr. Ramjit left this job, he took with him (i.e., stole) original files belonging to SSF, to use as evidence of the wrongdoing he would accuse SSF of committing. He later filed several complaints against SSF with the Department, which in August 2015 referred the matter to BCSB to investigate, since BCSB was Pathways' sponsor. BCSB assigned the task of conducting the investigation to Mr. Reilly, a CPA who conducts audits for the school district. Mr. Reilly's months-long investigation resulted in findings that were detailed in an Internal Audit Report presented to the school board in March 2016. Mr. Reilly concluded that Mr. Ramjit's allegations were "substantiated" and that BCSB had good cause to terminate Pathways' charter school agreement. BCSB agreed and, as already noted, took steps to do just that. As a witness at hearing, Mr. Ramjit at times came across as a disgruntled ex-employee anxious to settle some scores. Despite the evident bias, however, the undersigned finds Mr. Ramjit's testimony to be more or less believable, as far as it goes. The problem is, Mr. Ramjit's testimony is superficial or conclusory, or both. For example, he asserts that he observed SSF employees "forging" teacher and parent signatures on various documents, but none of these supposedly falsified documents was produced, no forgery "victim" testified, and no expert testimony about disputed signatures was adduced. Mr. Ramjit claims that Silva and another administrator directed him to "artificially lower" teacher evaluation scores——but, really, what does this mean? Mr. Ramjit, who worked at Pathways during the summer months only, could not himself have evaluated any teacher (for he had not been there to observe anyone teach at the charter school), and therefore, he cannot truly have known whether a particular score was "artificial" or not. Mr. Ramjit accuses SSF personnel of spending public funds on goods purchased for private use, but the items in question, insect repellant and plants, are not inherently personal in nature and could reasonably have been purchased for the school, as Silva testified.2/ This testimony, at bottom, does not amount to much. Mr. Reilly's testimony (which was presented in the form of a transcript from the Pathways hearing) has more substance but is deficient in a different way. Mr. Reilly related the granular findings of his investigation, but he, himself, possesses no personal, firsthand knowledge of the facts he had found. In other words, what he knows, he did not witness or experience; rather, he searched for proof, as an investigator does, and reached conclusions based on the evidence obtained. To be sure, if Mr. Reilly's testimony had consisted in relevant part of expert opinions based on hearsay, such opinions might have been competent substantial evidence. His testimony, however, concerned matters of historical fact that did not require expertise to understand (or, at least, not expertise in accounting). Mr. Reilly's testimony, in short, establishes persuasively that he believes the BCSB allegations to be true, but, consisting largely of hearsay, is insufficient to prove to the undersigned the truth of the allegations. The Commissioner alleged that, while working at the School in March 2017, Silva sent a handful of suspicious faxes to the Broward County School District's Office of Exceptional Student Education. These faxes transmitted eight letters, each of which purported to be from the parent of a student receiving a McKay scholarship. The letters were identical (a form, obviously) and unsigned. In them, the parent (or "parent") complained that the district had "illegal[ly]" changed his or her child's "IEP Matrix Level" from "level 4" to "level 1" "without notifying [the parent] and without an IEP meeting." The letter urged the district to "[p]lease change the IEP Matrix Level back to its correct level within 5 business days" and requested that all future communications be in writing "only through email." Without getting into unnecessary detail, the "IEP Matrix Level" reflects the intensity of services provided to a student with disabilities. The higher the level, the greater the number of services required. There is a correlation between the matrix level and the level of funding available under the McKay scholarship program, so that a reduction in the matrix level might affect a student's McKay scholarship. The requests to increase the matrix level from 1 to 4, therefore, might have been prompted by a concern that, without such action, the students in question would see their scholarships diminished. There was nothing wrongful per se about the form letters at issue; sure, the contentions therein that the district had acted illegally and was preventing students from receiving necessary services might have been overblown or mistaken, but ultimately the decision whether to change the matrix level back to 4, as rather politely, if firmly, requested, was the district's alone to make. If there were a wrongful act, it would have been that Silva sent the letters on the parents' behalf without their approval. On this charge, the only nonhearsay evidence of record is the deposition of E.M., a parent who supposedly sent one of the form letters. E.M. disclaimed knowledge of the letter and denied having authorized the School to write and send it for him. At the same time, though, he professed to know nothing about the scholarship programs and freely acknowledged that he relied entirely upon the School to take care of all the paperwork required "to get that money." E.M.'s testimony persuades the undersigned that regardless of whether E.M. had any involvement in the form letter, he certainly would have expected the School to prepare and submit such "paperwork" if the School believed it necessary to "get that money." Based on this evidence, the undersigned cannot find that the School committed fraud. The remaining allegations against SSF and Silva concern several dozen FTC scholarship applications submitted to Step Up for Students ("SUFS"), a nonprofit scholarship funding organization that helps administer the FTC and Gardiner Scholarship Programs. FTC scholarships are intended to benefit students who, without financial assistance, would be unable to attend private school due to low household income. Because household income is an important factor in determining an FTC scholarship award, any knowingly false, misleading, or incomplete representations made in an application that bear on this material fact would constitute an act of fraud——a point that is stressed in the application forms. The Commissioner argues that, in at least 39 applications, Silva falsely represented facts regarding the household income of students of the School. The disputed applications were submitted, online, in several tranches. Six were submitted between 8:28 p.m. and 9:55 p.m. on February 22, 2017. Five were sent on February 24, 2017, between 11:15 a.m. and 3:48 p.m. On the night of March 12, 2017, from 7:20 p.m. through 11:59 p.m., 12 of these applications were submitted, followed by 13 more on March 13, 2017, sent between 9:22 a.m. and 2:53 p.m. A final group of three was submitted on the morning of March 14, 2017, between 11:29 a.m. and 11:52 a.m. Because it is unlikely that 39 parents acting independently would happen to file their applications in bunches like this, the reasonable inference, which the undersigned draws, is that the School's staff coordinated these submissions. SSF and Silva admit, at any rate, that the School's staff assisted the parents with these scholarship applications, providing them with email addresses and computer access. Other details about these applications, however, suggest that the assistance provided by the School's staff was more hands-on than SSF and Silva have admitted. The application asks the parent completing the online form to identify his or her "birth city" as the answer to a security question. Every parent gave the same answer, "miami." While it is doubtful that every parent was, in fact, born in Miami, the truth of this assertion is immaterial. Still, that every applicant typed in "miami" raises an eyebrow; that all of them failed, idiosyncratically, to capitalize the proper name strongly implies a common agency, the most likely being the School——an inference further reinforced by the probability that the School's staff did not know the actual birthplace of every parent, and thus would have found it convenient simply to make Miami the ubiquitous choice by default. Another common denominator of the applications is that every parent reported his or her marital status as, "Single. I have never been married." This emphatic statement of lifelong singlehood seems peculiar, suggesting a common hand, but the response might have been a selection from a dropdown menu, a possibility which undermines the inference. Nevertheless, it would be unusual if, in this group of 39 single parents of young children, not one had ever been married——so unusual, in fact, that the undersigned deems that situation highly unlikely; some of these responses, it is inferred, were untrue. That being said, the materiality of the representation that the parent had never been married is unknown, for the record is silent on this point. Like the ubiquitous answer to the "birthplace" security question, however, the shared response to the martial status inquiry implies a common agency——the most obvious candidate being, again, the School. The evidence reviewed so far supports the inference, which the undersigned has drawn, that School personnel provided assistance to the parents in completing applications for FTC scholarships, including supplying requested information. In so doing, the School made each parent say he or she had never been married, making a representation of fact that was probably false in at least some instances. Because that fact was not shown to be material, however, it cannot be concluded, without more, that the School committed fraud. Unfortunately, there is more. Each parent claimed in the application to have "zero" household income. This was a material representation. Obviously, to be a single parent without any income is to experience extreme poverty. While it is theoretically possible that all 39 of the subject parents were destitute, this is highly improbable,3/ and, not surprisingly, the number of zero- income applications coming from the same private school caught the attention of SUFS, which in due course launched an investigation.4/ Meantime, however, SUFS sent the parents two forms, on paper, to be competed and returned. One was called Verification of Household Composition ("Verification Form"), and the other was titled Statement of No Household Income ("Explanation Form"). The Verification Form needed to be filled out by someone neither related to nor living with the applicant, e.g., a friend or neighbor, who was capable of listing, as requested, the names of all adults and children residing in the applicant's household, together with their respective ages and relationships to one another. On the Explanation Form, the parent (applicant) was required to "explain in the space provided how you are able to pay for rent, food, and clothing, etc." with "a household income of zero ($0.00)." Alternatively, if "the entry of a household income of zero ($0.00) was a mistake," the applicant was to "provide proof of the most recent 30 days of income for each person receiving income in your household." Silva completed, signed, and submitted to SUFS a Verification Form for each of the 39 parents. Every form she signed was dated March 15 or March 17, 2017, except for one dated March 21, 2017. The only adult listed on any of these completed forms is the parent or guardian (applicant). The only other members of the households at issue whom Silva listed are minor children. In other words, to be clear, every household Silva described in these 39 Verification Forms consisted of one parent or guardian plus that adult's minor child or children—— and no one else. Above Silva's signature on these forms is a certificate, printed in boldface, which declares: Under penalties of perjury, I certify that the information presented is true and accurate, the persons listed above are personally known to me and the household as shown above is accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand that providing false representations constitutes an act of fraud. False, misleading or incomplete information may result in the denial of the scholarship application or revocation of a scholarship award. Each completed Explanation Form that SUSF received bears a signature purporting to be that of the parent or guardian and has the same date as the corresponding Verification Form. On every form, except one, the parent states that he or she is able to survive on zero income because "I live with family members" or similar words to the same effect.5/ Above each signature on these forms is a certificate, printed in boldface, which declares: Under penalties of perjury, I certify that the information presented is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. The undersigned further understands that providing false representations herein constitutes an act of fraud. False, misleading or incomplete information may result in the denial of the scholarship application or revocation of a scholarship award. As an explanation for how one is able to get by with zero household income, the statement that "I live with family members" can only be read to mean that the income-less person and his or her dependents are residing in (and thus belong to) the household of generous relatives who have the wherewithal to provide financial support for their impecunious kin; otherwise, it would be nonresponsive to the question posed by the Explanation Form. So understood, however, the statement——if true——logically refutes the applicant's assertion that his or her "household income" is zero because the family members supporting him or her must have had an income, which should have been reported and substantiated per the instructions on the Explanation Form. It seems impossible that not one of the 39 applicants noticed that SUFS was interested in household income as opposed to parental income, and thus likely that some of them (assuming any personally completed these forms) would have been aware that their responses (if true) were contradictory and incomplete to the point of being, arguably, fraudulent. But this inconsistency is of passing interest, as it does not necessarily inculpate the SSF, Silva, or the School. A different discrepancy implicates the School in wrongdoing. The statements of household composition in the Verification Forms that Silva signed, all of which describe a household consisting of one adult (the applicant) and his or her minor dependent(s), belie the statements in the Explanation Forms claiming that the applicant lives with, and relies financially upon, his or her relatives——relatives who, in this context, cannot plausibly be understood as being the applicant's minor children. These statements, clearly, are mutually exclusive and, therefore, cannot both be true. If an applicant lived with family members who supported the applicant's family, as represented in every Explanation Form at issue, then Silva provided false information to SUFS in every Verification Form she executed. While a few instances of inaccurate reporting on Silva's part might be written off as honest mistakes, an error rate of 100 percent would suggest that something else was going on. The other possibility that must be considered, however, is that Silva was truthful, and the applicants (unknown to her) were not. In this scenario, the applicants——operating individually or in concert——falsely claimed to be living with family members (presumably to maintain the "zero income" fiction) without informing Silva of this deception. The undersigned regards this latter possibility as incredible. There is no reasonable likelihood that 39 applicants separately decided to commit the exact same fraud using essentially the very same language; such a coincidence is simply inconceivable. As a practical matter, the applicants would have needed to conspire with one another. But to infer such a conspiracy, one must assume that all 39 applicants (not only the one(s) who came up with the scheme) were sufficiently dishonest to participate and disciplined enough to keep their mouths shut about it. These assumptions defy credulity. This is not to say that the statements in the Explanation Forms were likely truthful. To the contrary, the undersigned infers that they were false or intended to mislead. That is, in all likelihood, the applicants' households were, in fact, composed (for the most part) of the persons listed in the Verification Forms, and the false statements of material fact were that the applicants had no household income and were financially dependent upon family members with whom they lived. It is found, further, that Silva, not any applicant(s), was the driving force behind this deception, because, in view of all the circumstances, no other reasonable inference can account for the fact that 39 applicants happened to make the very same false statements in their applications. Whether the parents, or any of them, knowingly participated in Silva's fraudulent scheme is unclear——but is ultimately immaterial for purposes of this case.6/ Ultimate Factual Determinations The greater weight of the evidence establishes that, to increase the chances that the School's students would receive the maximum amount of FTC scholarship funding, Silva engaged in fraudulent activity, to wit: Silva falsely represented to SUFS that 39 FTC scholarship applicants had "zero household income" and were forced, as a result, to live with family members. Silva made these statements of material fact knowing they were false or in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the representations, which were in fact false.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner enter a final order revoking Respondents' participation in the McKay, FTC, and Gardiner scholarship programs. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of December, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 2017.
The Issue Whether Petitioner has defaulted on student loans and, if so, the principal amounts due on the loans, as well as accrued interest, and collection costs. Whether Petitioner's employer should be required to withhold payments from Petitioner's pay pursuant to Section 112.175, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Johnny Martin. Petitioner's mailing address is 11431 Quailhollow Drive, Jacksonville, Florida. Respondent is the Florida Department of Education. The Department's business address is 325 West Gaines Street, Tallahassee, Florida. The Department is a guarantee agency which holds the loan account in question after paying the claim of the lender on July 28, 1994. All loans in this proceeding are Supplemental Loan(s) for Students (SLS), also known as Florida Auxiliary Loans. SLS loans are not subsidized by the federal government. Therefore, the federal government has no responsibility for payment of interest during periods of deferment or forbearance and there is no grace period for SLS loans. During any period of deferment or forbearance, such as when a borrower is unemployed, the borrower's repayment obligation may be suspended; however, interest accrues to the account for which the borrower is responsible. When the deferment or forbearance ends, the outstanding interest is capitalized on the loan. SLS loans accrue interest at the rate of 12 percent per year from the date of disbursement. Persons eligible to receive SLS loans include parents of dependent undergraduate students. As set forth below, Petitioner, as parent of an eligible dependent undergraduate student, received four SLS loans. Loan 1: Petitioner applied for and received Loan A000000442 in 1983. This loan, in the amount of $3,000.00, will be referred to as Loan 1. Although the Department is the guarantor of Loan 1, the lender never declared the loan in default or sold it to the Department. Therefore, Loan 1 is not at issue in this proceeding. Loan 2: Petitioner applied for and received Loan A000001064 in 1984. This loan, in the amount of $3,000.00, will be referred to as Loan 2. The lender declared Petitioner in default and sold Loan 2 to the Department as guarantor. Because Loan 2 was in repayment status for more than seven years, exclusive of suspensions of the repayment period, Loan 2 was discharged in bankruptcy. Therefore, Loan 2 is not at issue in this proceeding. Loan 3: Petitioner applied for and received Loan A000003767 in 1985. This loan, in the amount of $3,000.00, will be referred to as Loan 3. The lender declared Petitioner in default and transferred Loan 3 to the Department as guarantor. Because Loan 3 was in repayment status for more than seven years, exclusive of suspensions of the repayment period, Loan 3 was discharged in bankruptcy. Therefore, Loan 3 is not at issue in this proceeding. Loan 4: On or about August 5, 1986, Petitioner executed an Auxiliary (SLS) Loan application on behalf of his daughter, Kelly Aleta Martin, an eligible dependent undergraduate student. On or about September 8, 1986, Petitioner executed the promissory note for this loan. This SLS Loan was in the amount of $3,000.00. This loan was disbursed on or about October 9, 1986. The Department guaranteed this loan. Throughout exhibits presented by the Department, the loan number for this SLS Loan is A000007005; however, for convenience, herein this loan will be referred to as Loan 4. Loan 4 is the only loan at issue in this proceeding. Petitioner's first payment for Loan 4 was due October 25, 1986. The payment due date later changed to the 20th of each month. Petitioner's last payment to the lender was made on July 17, 1990. However, as Petitioner was behind in his payments, this payment was applied to the payment due May 20, 1990. The Petitioner is considered in repayment status for 44 months, from October 1986 through May 1990. A borrower is not considered in repayment status during any suspension of the repayment period, including any period of forbearance or deferment. Petitioner applied for and received an unemployment deferment on September 18, 1990. This deferment was for the period from July 21, 1990 through December 28, 1990. Because Petitioner was not current in his payments, he requested and received a forbearance from the lender for the payments due on June 20 and July 20, 1990, in order to qualify for the unemployment deferment. The forbearance together with the unemployment deferment brought Petitioner current in his payments; however, they suspended the repayment period for Loan 4 for seven months (two months for the forbearance and five months for the deferment). Petitioner failed to make any payments following the deferment period ending December 28, 1990. Petitioner applied for and received an unemployment deferment on April 23, 1991. This deferment was for the period from February 24 through July 23, 1991. Because Petitioner failed to make any payments following the deferment ending December 28, 1990, he again requested and received a forbearance for the payments due January 20 and February 20, 1991. The forbearance and unemployment deferment brought Petitioner current in his payments; however, they again suspended the repayment period for Loan 4 by another seven months (two months for the forbearance and five months for the deferment). Following Petitioner's unemployment deferment ending July 1991, he failed to resume payment to the lender beginning August 20, 1990. Thereafter, the lender declared Petitioner in default and made application to the Department for claim payment based on the guarantee. However, the Department refused to pay the lender's claim citing due diligence violations, and as a result, Petitioner is considered in repayment status from August 20, 1991 through April 20, 1992, or nine months, even though no payments were actually received by virtue of his Fresh Start Application. Petitioner submitted a Fresh Start Application to the lender dated May 13, 1992. This document reaffirmed the student loan obligation and, when received by the lender on May 19, 1992, reinstated the Department's guarantee of Loan 4. In an application dated May 24, 1992, Petitioner requested another unemployment deferment. The lender refused Petitioner's request for an unemployment deferment due to the fact that Petitioner was working at the time. However, the lender granted Petitioner a forbearance. This forbearance covered payments due from May 20 through December 20, 1992. Thereafter, Petitioner again requested and was granted forbearance of payments due through June 20, 1993. These forbearances, from May 20, 1992 through June 20, 1993, suspended the period Loan 4 is in repayment status by 14 months. Petitioner failed to resume payments beginning July 20, 1993, the final due date at default. In 1994, the lender declared Petitioner in default on Loan 4 and made application to the Department for claim payment based on the guarantee. The Department paid the default claim on Loan 4 on July 28, 1994. Although no payments were received from July 20, 1993 through July 20, 1994, or 13 months, Petitioner is considered in repayment status for that time because there was no forbearance or deferment in place. When the Department acquired Loan 4, Petitioner owed $2,195.68 in principal and $290.19 in accrued (claim) interest. These figures were capitalized by the Department and yield the figure of $2,484.18 in capitalized principal which is subject to interest at the rate of 12 percent per year. Beginning in 1995, Petitioner entered into a voluntary wage garnishment agreement with the Department. Under this agreement and through the period Petitioner was under the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, a total of $383.95 was received by the Department and applied to Petitioner's account in accordance with Title 34, Code of Federal Regulations Section 682.404(f), relating to how borrower payments will be applied. The entire amount received was applied to outstanding interest. Prior to filing bankruptcy, Petitioner's Loan 4 was considered in repayment status from July 29, 1994 through January 5, 1995, during the time it was held by the Department. The Petitioner was credited for being in repayment status for five months, even though he made no payments. Additionally, Petitioner was credited for being in repayment status for 12 months in 1995, whether or not regular payments were received under Petitioner's voluntary wage garnishment agreement. Because Petitioner filed for bankruptcy prior to the January 20, 1996, the payment due date, the month of January 1996 cannot be counted as being in repayment status. Petitioner filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection on January 11, 1996. The Department filed a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court for Loans 2, 3, and 4 in the principal amount of $5,571.91, the amount of capitalized principal due on the accounts. The Department filed with the court the claim of $5,647.02 due on the accounts through date of filing the case. See item 5 on page 2 of Department's Exhibit 5. This amount was the capitalized principal and interest due. On February 4, 1999, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division, issued an "Order Discharging Debtor After Completion of Chapter 13 Plan" in Petitioner's case, number 96-00175-3F3. That order provides in pertinent part, "The debtor is discharged for all debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under 11 U.S.C. [Section] 502, except any debt . . . for a student loan or educational benefit overpayment as specified in 11 U.S.C.[Section]523(a)(8)." In 1996, Title 11 United States Code Section 523(a) provided in pertinent part: A discharge under . . . this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-- for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution, or for an obligation to repay funds received as an education benefit, scholarship or stipend, unless-- such loan, benefit, scholarship, or stipend overpayment first became due more than 7 years (exclusive of an applicable suspension of the repayment period) before the date of the filing of the petition . . . Pursuant to this order, Petitioner's debt to the Department for Loans 2 and 3 was discharged. The first payment for Loan 4 was due October 25, 1986. Petitioner filed for bankruptcy on January 11, 1996, nine days prior to the payment due date of January 20, 1996. There were 111 months from the month the first payment of Loan 4 was due through the month prior to the filing of bankruptcy (the month that bankruptcy was filed cannot be counted if the payment due date was after the date Petitioner filed for bankruptcy). Petitioner was in forbearance or deferment status for 28 months which suspends the period Loan 4 is considered in repayment status. Petitioner was in repayment status on Loan 4 for 83 months regardless of whether he actually made payments on the account. Therefore, Loan 4 was not discharged. Section 682.410(b)(2) of Title 34, Code of Federal Regulations, provides that the Department shall impose collection costs as follows: Collection charges. Whether or not provided for in the borrower's promissory note and subject to any limitation on the amount of those costs in that note, the guarantee agency shall charge a borrower an amount equal to reasonable costs incurred by the agency in collecting a loan on which the agency has paid a default or bankruptcy claim. These cost may include, but are not limited to, all attorneys fees, collection agency charges, and court costs. Except as provided in [Sections] 682.401(b)(27) and 682.405(b)(1)(iv), the amount charged borrower must equal the lesser of -- The amount the same borrower would be charged for the cost of collection under the formula in 34 CRF 30.60; or The amount the same borrower would be charged for the cost of collection in the loan was held by the U.S. Department of Education. The Department established that the amount of the annual collection cost mandated by Title 34 Code of Federal Regulations Section 682.410(b)(2) for the loan at issue in this proceeding should be calculated at least annually at the rate of 25 percent of the outstanding principal and accrued interest. Petitioner agreed to pay these costs in the application and promissory note he executed. Petitioner is employed by the Duval County School Board, a political subdivision of the State of Florida. As an employee of a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Petitioner is subject to the provisions of Section 112.175, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 28-40, Florida Administrative Code. These provisions pertain to employees of the State of Florida or its political subdivisions who have defaulted on an education loan made or guaranteed by the State of Florida. The Department notified Petitioner by letter dated August 13, 1999, that he had one or more student loans in default and offered him the opportunity to make voluntary payments on the loans. The letter also advised Petitioner that the Department would seek to make involuntary withholdings if he did not make voluntary payments. Petitioner elected to request the formal hearing which triggered this proceeding. As stated above, the capitalized principal due the Department for Loan 4 is $2,485.87. This amount reflects the principal due and the outstanding interest accrued on the account at the time the Department acquired the loan from the lender. All payments received by the Department were applied to outstanding interest which accrued on the account after the loan was bought by the Department, and no payment was applied to the capitalized principal. The capitalized principal accrues interest at the rate of 12 percent per year of $.82 per day. As of February 4, 1999, after taking into consideration the $383.95 received by the Department, the unpaid accrued interest for Loan 4 was $881.74. Pursuant to federal regulations collection costs assessed at the rate of 25 percent of principal and interest due as of February 4, 1999, were $867.08. Therefore, as of February 4, 1999, the total principal, interest, and collection costs due for Loan 4 totaled $4,234.69. Interest continues to accrue to the account as provided by law and collection costs may be reassessed as provided by law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein, finds that Petitioner, as of February 4, 1999, owes the sum of $4,234.69, and orders the involuntary wage withholding of Petitioner's pay through his employer, Duval County School Board, pursuant to Section 112.175, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 28-40, Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Johnny Martin 11431 Quailhollow Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32218-3621 Ronald G. Stowers Assistant General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Honorable Tom Gallagher Commissioner of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael H. Olenick, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Respondent Department of Revenue is entitled to intercept $1,000 in proceeds won in the Florida Lottery by Petitioner and to apply the proceeds to reduce an outstanding administrative debt owed to the Florida Department of Revenue.
Findings Of Fact Mr. James is a resident of Jacksonville who, prior to June 11, 2003, won $1,000 in one of the Department of Lottery's games of chance. The Department is an agency of the Florida government and is charged with enforcing court orders relating to child support, in addition to other duties. As a result of a Complaint to Determine Paternity filed in the Circuit Court of the Eighth Judicial Circuit in and for Baker County, Florida, a case where Mr. James was named as defendant, a Final Judgment of Paternity for Plaintiffs was entered on October 29, 1992. The Judgment, among other things, required Petitioner to pay to the State of Florida $192.00, no later than six months from the date of the Judgment. In an Order of Contempt entered in the Circuit Court of the Eighth Judicial Circuit in and for Baker County, Florida, dated October 12, 1994, nunc pro tunc to September 26, 1994, Petitioner was ordered to pay to the State of Florida $662.03 within 12 months, which included the amount of $352.00 previously ordered and unpaid. In an Order of Arrearages entered in the Circuit Court of the Eighth Judicial Circuit in and for Baker County, Florida, dated June 28, 1995, nunc pro tunc to June 6, 1995, Petitioner was ordered to pay to the State of Florida $882.09, within twelve months. This order recited that the $882.09, amount, included the amount of $772.06, previously ordered but not paid. In an Order of Contempt entered in the Circuit Court of the Eighth Judicial Circuit in and for Baker County, Florida, dated November 20, 1995, nunc pro tunc to October 25, 1995, Petitioner was again ordered to pay to the State of Florida $882.09. This order required payment no later than June 31, 1995. In an Order of Commitment for Contempt Commencement Deferred entered in the Circuit Court of the Eighth Judicial Circuit in and for Baker County, Florida, dated October 19, 1998, Petitioner was ordered to pay the sum of $300.00 to the State of Florida within 180 days of the order. In an Order of Commitment for Contempt Commencement Deferred entered in the Circuit Court of the Eighth Judicial Circuit in and for Baker County, Florida, dated December 7, 1998, Petitioner was ordered to pay the sum of $110.03 to the State of Florida within 180 days of the order. In a Money Judgment entered in the Circuit Court of the Eighth Judicial Circuit in and for Baker County, Florida, dated December 7, 1998, Petitioner was ordered to pay the sum of $130.03 to the State of Florida within 180 days of the order. The documentary evidence, which was elucidated by the testimony of Ms. Ash, indicates that Petitioner is currently in debt to the State of Florida in the amount of $1422.15, and that amount has not been paid. The debt was in connection with Petitioner's failure to pay sums incurred as part of the effort to collect child support from Petitioner. Petitioner was notified that his debt was $1,307.14. Both the sum he was advised was due and owing, and the sum found by the evidence in this Recommended Order, are greater than the $1,000 won by Petitioner. It is appropriate that the proceeds of. Mr. James' good luck inure to the benefit of the State of Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department retain the $1,000.00 won by Mr. James. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph James 4121 Clyde Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32208 Chriss Walker, Esquire Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement Post Office Box 8030 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-8030 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 David Griffin, Secretary Department of Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ken Hart, General Counsel Department of Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner's lottery prize is subject to an outstanding debt to a state agency.
Findings Of Fact By letter of June 9, 1997, the Department of Education, Office of Student Financial Assistance (Department), notified the Department of the Lottery (Lottery) that Petitioner owed the Department $26,356.28, as of June 9, 1997, as a consequence of outstanding defaulted student loans. Thereafter, pursuant to Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes, the Lottery transmitted the prize amount ($24,781.66), less Federal income tax withheld ($6,938.86), to the Department. By letter of June 10, 1997, the Department notified Petitioner that it was in receipt of his prize money, less Federal income tax withheld, and that, since the amount owed the Department exceeded the amount of the prize, it planned to apply the entire sum it had received ($17,842.80) to the outstanding indebtedness. The Department's letter also advised Petitioner of his right to request a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, to contest the Department's decision. Petitioner filed a timely request for a formal hearing to contest the Department's decision, and the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the assignment of an administrative law judge to conduct the formal hearing Petitioner had requested. At hearing, the proof demonstrated that Petitioner was the recipient of three student loans, each of which was funded by Centrust Savings Bank (Centrust) and guaranteed by the Department. The first loan (No. 7701) was in the amount of $3,000, which was disbursed on December 19, 1986. The second loan (No. 557720) was in the sum of $5,000, which was disbursed on January 29, 1987. The third loan (No. 631534) was for $5,000; however, only $2,500 was disbursed. That disbursement occurred on November 26, 1987. Petitioner defaulted on the student loans, and Centrust filed a claim with the Department. The Department, as guarantor, paid the lender the amounts due on the loans as follows: A.) On August 12, 1993, the Department paid the claim on Loan No. 557720. At the time, the principal due was $5,021.562 and interest due was $1,942.59, for a total of $6,964.15. B.) Also on August 12, 1993, the Department paid the claim on Loan No. 631534. At the time, the principal due was $2,510.78, and interest due was $971.29, for a total of $3,482.07. C.) Finally, on January 20, 1994, the Department paid the claim on Loan No. 7701. At the time, the principal due was $3,118.28, and interest due was $2,458.40, for a total of $5,576.68. As of June 9, 1997, the date the Department received the proceeds of Petitioner's lottery prize, the balance due on the defaulted loans, with accrued interest, was as follows: Loan No. 7701, $7,842.80; Loan No. 557720, $9,096.52; and Loan No. 631534, $4,548.25. In total, as of June 9, 1997, Petitioner owed the Department $21,487.57, as principal and accrued interest owing on the defaulted loans.3
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which approves the application of the $17,842.80 of Petitioner's lottery prize the Department received toward the partial satisfaction of the debt owing the Department. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of January, 1998.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Petitioner, Raymond J. Holmes, is entitled to the entire $5,000.00 won by him in the Florida Lottery or whether a portion thereof should be withheld for reimbursement of public assistance payments previously paid for the support of his child.
Findings Of Fact On May 7, 1993, a Judge of the Circuit Court of the 20th Judicial Circuit In and For Collier County, Florida, entered, in case No. 93-1327, an Order Determining Obligation And Repayment of Public Assistance for the repayment of support and repayment of foster care payments, made on behalf of Petitioner's child, Allen J. Holmes, against Petitioner, "Ray" Holmes and his wife, Rachel Holmes, in the amount of $5,439.46 plus costs in the amount of $88.20 and attorneys fees of $176.40, This amount was to be paid at a rate of $80.00 plus $3.20 clerk's fee ($83.20) per month, beginning on June 1, 1993, payments to continue until "all prior public assistance has been completely repaid." This Order was acknowledged in writing by both Petitioner and his wife. The Order also provided: ... the State of Florida, or any political subdivision thereof, or the United States, is directed to deduct from all moneys due and payable to the Respondent [Petitioner, Holmes] the amount of child support ordered above. This income deduction shall be effective immediately, and shall become binding on ... [a] comptroller or disbursing officer, the State of Florida, ... two weeks after receipt of service of this order. None of the money called for under the Court's Order has been repaid. Petitioner's one-half of the joint obligation was $2,807.93. On or about August 2, 1993, Petitioner purchased a scratch-off lottery ticket which carried a prize of $5,000.00. Petitioner immediately submitted a claim form for the award of the prize. He listed his social security number as 144-53-7433 on the form. The social security account card issued in his name reflects the correct number to be 144-52-7433 but there is no doubt the Petitioner was the individual who purchased the winning ticket. The claim form was submitted for payment to Lottery headquarters in Tallahassee. In the course of routine coordination between agencies to determine if any obligations to the state were owing by a lottery winner, the above-noted Court Order was identified and when the Petitioner's winnings were transmitted to the Department of Banking and Finance for payment, his half of the obligation was withheld and only the net amount of $2,192.07 forwarded. Thereafter, by state warrant 4-02 909 875, dated August 20, 1993, this net amount was paid to Petitioner. This figure was arrived at by deducting the amount owed by Petitioner, ($2,807.93) from the gross winnings, ($5,000.00). Petitioner was notified by letter dated August 24, 1993 accompanying the warrant of the reason for the deduction. Petitioner thereafter demanded hearing and this hearing ensued.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner, Raymond J. Holmes' request for payment of $2,807.93 withheld from his lottery prize of $5,000.00 by the Department of Banking and Finance. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of December, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Raymond J. Holmes 3397-2 Sacramento Way Naples, Florida 33942 Scott C. Wright, Esquire Department of Banking & Finance The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel Department of Banking & Finance Room 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Louisa Warren, Esquire Department of Lottery 250 Marriot Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dr. Marcia Mann, Secretary Department of Lottery 250 Marriot Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ken Hart General Counsel Department of Lottery 250 Marriot Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Chriss Walker, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Robert L. Powell, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Kim Tucker General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Petitioner, David Oness, is eligible to receive the remuneration from the 2015 state of Florida Best and Brightest Scholarship program.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Oness is employed by the SCSB and is in his 11th year as a teacher at Sarasota High School. The 2015 Florida Legislature Appropriations Act created the Best and Brightest Teacher Scholarship Program (the scholarship), chapter 2015-232, p. 27, Item 99A. The eligibility pre-requisites for applying to and being awarded the scholarship (up to $10,000) were established in the scholarship. The scholarship provided the following: Funds in Specific Appropriation 99A are provided to implement Florida's Best and Brightest Teacher Scholarship Program. The funds shall be used to award a maximum of 4,402 teachers with a $10,000 scholarship based on high academic achievement on the SAT or ACT. To be eligible for a scholarship, a teacher must have scored at or above the 80th percentile on either the SAT or the ACT based upon the percentile ranks in effect when the teacher took the assessment and have been evaluated as highly effective pursuant to section 1012.34, Florida Statutes, or if the teacher is a first-year teacher who has not been evaluated pursuant to section 1012.34, Florida Statutes, must have scored at or above the 80th percentile on either the SAT or the ACT based upon the percentile ranks in effect when the teacher took the assessment. In order to demonstrate eligibility for an award, an eligible teacher must submit to the school district, no later than October 1, 2015, an official record of his or her SAT or ACT score demonstrating that the teacher scored at or above the 80th percentile based upon the percentile ranks in effect when the teacher took the assessment. By December 1, 2015, each school district, charter school governing board, and the Florida School for the Deaf and the Blind shall submit to the department the number of eligible teachers who qualify for the scholarship. By February 1, 2016, the department shall disburse scholarship funds to each school district for each eligible teacher to receive a scholarship. By April 1, 2016, each school district, charter school governing board, and the Florida School for the Deaf and the Blind shall provide payment of the scholarship to each eligible teacher. If the number of eligible teachers exceeds the total the department shall prorate the per teacher scholarship amount. Mr. Oness timely filed an application to participate in the scholarship. Mr. Oness was evaluated as “highly effective” pursuant to section 1012.34, Florida Statutes. Mr. Oness was raised and educated in Canada. Mr. Oness did not take either the ACT3/ or the SAT4/ when he went to college, as it was not necessary in Canada. Mr. Oness took the ACT in Las Vegas, Nevada, on September 12, 2015. On “The ACT® Student Report” (pages 6 and 7 of Exhibit A), it recorded Mr. Oness’s ACT score as: Composite Score 24 U.S. RANK 74%|STATE RANK 81% No credible testimony or evidence was received from any authoritative figure from the ACT entity or otherwise that clearly establishes what is meant by the “STATE RANK” percentile. The form provides: U.S. Rank and State Rank: Your ranks tell you the approximate percentages of recent high school graduates in the U.S. and your state who took the ACT and received scores that are the same as or lower than yours. It remains unclear whether the term “STATE RANK” means: the state of Nevada, where Mr. Oness took the ACT; the state of Florida, where Mr. Oness lives and works; or some other state. On November 13, 2015, SCSB’s Human Resources Salary Specialist, Mary McCurry, advised Mr. Oness that he did not qualify for the scholarship award “because your ACT test scores do not reflect the 80th national percentile or higher.” Mr. Oness asked Respondent to review the non- qualification determination by e-mail dated November 13, 2015, and received an e-mail in return from the SCSB’s Employee Relations and Equity Administrator, Al Harayda, advising that the DOE provided “the percentiles that we had to use” in determining eligibility. The DOE provided guidance to the SCSB that “the national percentile score should be used to meet eligibility requirements.”
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Sarasota County School Board enter a final order that Petitioner is not eligible for a Best and Brightest Scholarship. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 2016.
The Issue Whether the State of Florida, through its agencies, collected the money owed it by the Petitioner prior to receipt of a letter from her doctor certifying her disability.
Findings Of Fact On or about June 21, 1990, the Petitioner, Therese L. Hodge, applied for a student loan to pursue educational courses at Career City College in Gainesville, Florida. The loan applied for was a Stafford Loan, a student loan administered by the Department of Education (DOE) through the Office of Student Financial Assistance (OSFA). Under the Stafford Loan program, DOE through OSFA, serves as the guarantee agent performing its responsibilities in accordance with regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Education (USDOE). The essential elements and operation of the loan program are that a participating bank or financial institution agrees to make a loan to a student on the condition that the DOE will issue a written guarantee that it will repay the loan to the lender if the student defaults on the loan. When DOE repays a defaulted loan to the lender, DOE acquires the promissory note and the right to collect from the student. DOE is required by USDOE to pursue collection in order to receive reimbursement from USDOE of the amount paid to the lender. On or about July 7, 1990, OSFA issued its guarantee of a student loan to the Petitioner, and Florida Federal loaned her $1,213.00. While enrolled in her first term at college, the Petitioner suffered a stroke. The Petitioner was observed at the hearing and it was apparent that she had some moderate limitations on her ability to communicate, comprehend, and remember. Petitioner lives on Social Security disability income. Her brother- in-law, who had accompanied her to the hearing, assisted in presentation of Petitioner's case without objection from the Respondents. After the Petitioner defaulted on her student loan, the Petitioner won $5,000 in a Florida lottery game. The Petitioner made demand for payment of the prize money. The Department of Lottery checks winnings of more than $600 to determine if the winner owes any money to the State. In the course of its comparison, the Department of Lottery determined that the Petitioner owed the State money on the defaulted student loan. The Department of Lottery confirmed the indebtedness with the Department of Education, and it was determined that the Petitioner owed $1,231.98 including interest on the defaulted student loan. On January 9, 1993, the Department of Lottery forwarded the $5,000 to the Office of the Comptroller, and notified the Petitioner of her right to request a formal hearing to controvert the Department's collection of the indebtedness. On January 12, 1993, the Petitioner called the Department of Lottery and advised the Department that she was disabled. The Department forwarded to the Petitioner medical forms on January 20, 1993. Subsequently, the Petitioner's physician certified to the state that she was totally and permanently disabled. Documents introduced at hearing show that the Petitioner advised the lending bank on June 17, 1991 that she was disabled due to a stroke and unable to work. The bank sent the Petitioner medical forms in order for her to have her disability certified. The Petitioner did not return the forms due to her financial inability to obtain the required physical. After the Department of Education had repaid the student loan and had turned the matter over to a collection agency, the Petitioner advised the collection agency that she was disabled and the collection agency sent her medical certification forms which she did not have completed due to her financial inability. After she had won the lottery, the Petitioner had the medical certification forms which were forwarded to her by the Department of Education completed by a physician and these were returned to the State after the end of January, 1993 certifying that the Petitioner was totally and permanently disabled.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Office of the Comptroller return to the Petitioner the amount $1,231.98. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of June, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 93-1218 The Petitioner's sister wrote a letter in the Petitioner's behalf which was read and considered, and is treated as a final argument. The Department of Education filed a proposed order which was read and considered. The following proposed findings were adopted, or rejected for the reason stated: Respondent's (DOE) Proposed Findings: Recommended Order: Paragraph 1-6 Adopted Paragraph 7 Irrelevant Paragraph 8 Adopted Paragraph 9 The Department was on notice of the Petitioner's disability. Total and permanent disability is a medical determination based upon medical certification. The lender was on notice of Petitioner's disability on June 17, 1991. The purpose of the bank sending Petitioner the medical forms was to confirm the medical determination. Paragraph 10-15 Adopted COPIES FURNISHED: Therese L. Hodge and 5855 West Wood Lawn Street Post Office Box 36 Dunnellon, FL 34433 Ocklawaha, FL 32179 Charles S. Ruberg, Esquire Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0400 Louisa Warren, Esquire Department of Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, FL 32301 Leslie A. Meek, Esquire Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 Gerald Lewis, Comptroller Department of Banking and Finance Tha Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350
The Issue Whether or not the Department of Banking and Finance is required by law to transmit $2,159.41 to the State of Florida Department of Education or $2500.00 to the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact DOE, through its Office of Student Financial Assistance, functions as a guarantee agency for purposes of the guaranteed student loan programs. In this capacity, DOE issues a loan guarantee to a participating lender, such as a bank, when the lender has applied for the guarantee in connection with making a student loan to a student borrower. If the student borrower defaults on repaying the loan to the lender, the lender submits to DOE a claim for DOE to repay the loan to the lender. When DOE repays the loan to the lender, the promissory note evidencing the debt is assigned to DOE which then pursues collection of the loan against the defaulting student borrower. On or about November 18, 1988, Petitioner Leonard K. Williams applied for a guaranteed student loan to be made by the Florida National Bank. On or about December 11, 1988, DOE issued its guarantee and the loan was made by the bank to Petitioner. Petitioner's first payment to repay the loan was due on February 1, 1990. He made no payments then or thereafter. On July 1, 1990 he was in default. DOE, as the guarantee agency, paid the bank's claim on December 27, 1990 and the bank assigned the promissory note evidencing Petitioner's indebtedness to DOE. Petitioner purchased a winning Florida Lottery ticket for the Play 4 drawing of November 19, 1991. On November 26, 1991, Petitioner submitted his claim to DOL to claim the prize of $2,500.00. On November 26, 1991, DOE certified to DOL that Petitioner had an outstanding defaulted student loan and requested that the lottery prize money won by Petitioner be transmitted to the Comptroller to be credited toward the Petitioner's student loan debt. The total principal and interest accrued on that debt as of December 11, 1991 was $2,159.41. On December 4, 1991, Petitioner requested from DOE a form captioned, "Physician's Certification of Borrower's Total and Permanent Disability." On January 3, 1992, DOE received the completed form signed by Petitioner's physician, Anne L. Rottman, M.D. Dr. Rottman treated Petitioner from August 18, 1986 through July 19, 1990, treating him for chronic cervical and lumbar spinal pain. She was unable to state when Petitioner's condition began or when he became unable to work, as the condition and disability commenced prior to the date she first saw him on August 18, 1986. Petitioner's condition was static during the time she treated him. Petitioner was unable to work during the time she treated him.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a final order which withholds $2,159.41 from Petitioner's lottery winnings and transmits that sum to the Department of Education and which also transmits the balance of $340.59 to Petitioner. Since the money has already been effectively transmitted as recommended, the Final Order could simply ratify those prior transmittals. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 17th day of September, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Scott C. Wright ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The De Soto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17 day of September, 1992. Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Leonard K. Williams 1425 NE 13th Street Gainesville, Florida 32601 Leonard K. Williams Post Office Box 490955 College Park, Georgia 30349 Louisa Warren, Esquire Department of Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Charles S. Ruberg Assistant General Counsel State Board of Education The Capitol, Suite PL-08 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
