The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent failed to maintain the good moral character requisite to continued certification as a correctional officer in violation of Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is Dennis W. Zeighler, holder of Corrections Certificate Number 145432 issued March 25, 1994. Respondent was employed as a sworn Corrections Officer with the Hamilton Correctional Institution (HCI) from March 25, 1994 to September 22, 1994. During his employment with HCI, Respondent came to know Luis Nieves, an inmate at the institution. Nieves offered to sell Respondent a gold Seiko watch for $15. Respondent was uncertain as to whether he should buy the watch, but accepted it from Nieves and placed it in his desk drawer at HCI. Later, on the way home, Respondent mailed a money order for $15 to Nieves in an envelope bearing the return address of Nieves’ sister-in-law. Following discussion that evening with his brother, also a correctional officer, Respondent became concerned about the transaction. Respondent consulted his copy of the Department of Corrections Policy Manual and realized he wanted no part of the transaction. Upon his return to work the next morning, Respondent removed the watch from his desk and returned it to inmate Nieves. Respondent told Nieves that the transaction was "not right" and that he, Respondent, did not want to lose a job that he loved. Respondent also told Nieves to keep the money.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of unprofessional conduct and placing his certification on probationary status upon such reasonable conditions and for such reasonable period of time as shall be determined appropriate by The Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Karen D. Simmons, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Dennis W. Zeighler 1301 Campbell Street Lake City, Florida 32055 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Respondent, a certified correctional officer, failed to maintain good moral character as required by chapter 943, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B- 27.011, and if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of certifying correctional officers and taking disciplinary action against them for failing to maintain good moral character as required by section 943.13(7). § 943.1395, Fla. Stat. (2009).2/ Respondent was certified as a correctional officer by Petitioner on July 8, 2009, and holds Correctional Certificate Number 284876. In February through May, 2010, the time frame relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was employed as a correctional officer at Miami-Dade Correctional Institute ("Miami-Dade CI"). Incident Giving Rise to this Proceeding On or about July 29, 2010, Captain Eric Parrish, a midnight shift supervisor at Miami-Dade CI, convened a meeting of several employees under his supervision. Among those present at the meeting were Respondent and Officer Demetrices Demeritte. The purpose of the meeting was to address rumors regarding alleged sexual activity among staff members while present or on duty at Miami-Dade CI.3/ Ultimately, these rumors were determined to be unsubstantiated. However, at the meeting, Demeritte informed Parrish that Respondent had exposed his penis to her while they both were on duty at Miami-Dade CI. Respondent verbally admitted at the meeting that he did show Demeritte his penis, but stated that she had wanted to see it. Parrish ordered everyone in attendance at the meeting to complete an incident report after the close of the meeting.4/ Consistent with Petitioner's standard practice regarding the completion of incident reports, Parrish requested that the reports be submitted by the end of the shift.5/ This gave the employees approximately four hours to complete their reports. Ultimately, Parrish collected completed incident reports from all in attendance at the meeting, including Respondent. In his incident report, Respondent stated that he and Demeritte had engaged in discussions regarding sexual matters on more than one occasion. Respondent acknowledged that he exposed his penis to Demeritte on one occasion when they had discussed its size, and that upon seeing it, Demeritte took off in her post vehicle. The next day she asked him not to do that again because he was not "her man." Respondent stated that he apologized to Demeritte and considered the matter resolved between them as friends. Based on the information provided in the incident reports, Parrish recommended that Respondent and others be reviewed for disciplinary action. On or about December 6, 2011, Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent, alleging that he had failed to maintain good moral character, as required by section 943.17, by having engaged in acts that constitute indecent exposure pursuant to section 800.03. Violation of section 800.03 is a misdemeanor of the first degree. § 800.03, Fla. Stat. (2009). There is no evidence in the record that Respondent was arrested or prosecuted for, convicted of, or pled guilty or nolo contendere to, a violation of section 800.03. Evidence Adduced at the Final Hearing At hearing, Demeritte testified that while she and Respondent were on duty inspecting the fence line or refueling vehicles or at other posts, Respondent exposed his penis to her on four separate occasions. In doing so, he would tell her to "look" and would watch her while exposing himself. Demeritte testified that on one of these occasions, he stroked his penis. Demeritte testified that she was uncomfortable and offended by Respondent's actions, that she considered his actions vulgar, and that on each occasion, she drove away. After she finally confronted Respondent, he apologized and never exposed himself to her again. The undersigned finds Demeritte's testimony credible and persuasive. Demeritte reported the incidents to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. However, not until the July 29, 2010, meeting did she report the incidents to Petitioner. Demeritte claimed that she did not report the incidents due to a "breach of confidentiality." No specific explanation was provided regarding what the breach of confidentiality entailed or why it deterred Demeritte from reporting the incidents before July 29, 2010. At the hearing, Respondent recanted his statement in his July 29, 2010, incident report that he had exposed his penis to Demeritte on one occasion. Respondent testified that the statements in his report were "sarcastic" and that he had needed more time to complete his incident report. However, Parrish credibly testified that near the end of the shift, Respondent told him he was still working on the incident report, but that at the end of the shift, Respondent provided the completed, signed, dated report and did not ask for more time to complete the report. Respondent denied having exposed his penis to Demeritte while on duty, and testified that he previously had performed as a dancer at private functions and that she may have seen his penis under those circumstances. Respondent's testimony on these points was not credible. Consistent with his incident report, Respondent testified that he and Demeritte engaged in discussions of a sexual nature on several occasions. There is no other evidence in the record directly corroborating or refuting this claim. However, the evidence does establish that around the time of the incidents at issue in this proceeding, there was discussion of, and rumors regarding, sexual matters between officers employed on the midnight shift at Miami-Dade CI. Under these circumstances, the undersigned finds credible Respondent's account that he and Demeritte engaged in discussions of a sexual nature. The undersigned does not find credible any claim by Respondent that Demeritte wanted or asked him to expose his penis to her. However, the undersigned finds it plausible that Respondent may not have understood that Demeritte was offended by his actions, particularly if they engaged in discussions of a sexual nature, and also given that she did not tell him, until after the fourth incident, to not expose himself to her. Indeed, once she told him not to expose himself to her, his behavior ceased and he apologized. There is no evidence in the record that Respondent previously has been subject to disciplinary action by Petitioner. Findings of Ultimate Fact Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent exposed his penis to Demeritte on four separate occasions, in violation of section 800.03, and that in doing so, he failed to maintain good moral character, as required by section 943.13(7). Respondent's behavior in exposing himself to Demeritte was inappropriate and unacceptable. However, the undersigned finds that the circumstances afoot around the time of Respondent's actions——specifically, discussions and rumors of sexual matters between staff, discussions of a sexual nature between Respondent and Demeritte, and the fact that Demeritte did not tell Respondent to stop exposing himself to her until after he had done so four times——may have created an atmosphere that led Respondent, mistakenly, to believe that such behavior was not a significant departure from the accepted norm on the Miami-Dade CI midnight shift at that time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, enter a final order suspending Respondent's correctional officer certification for a period of six months, imposing two years' probation, and ordering Respondent to undergo counseling. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of August, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings This 6th day of August, 2013.
The Issue The issue is whether the certification as a correctional officer issued to Willie L. Tillman (Tillman) should be revoked or otherwise penalized based on the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Tillman is certified as a correctional officer by the Commission, having been issued certificate number C-3171 on October 7, 1977. At all times relevant to the charges, Tillman was employed by the Volusia County Department of Corrections (VCDC) as a correctional officer at the Daytona Beach Correctional Facility. In June of 1988, Tillman held the rank of corporal, a promotional rank. His chain of command ran from Sergeant (now Lieutenant) Fitts through Lieutenant (now Captain) Bolton, his shift commander. Tillman knew or should have known that he had a duty to immediately report any use of force against an inmate and to obtain medical attention for any inmate against whom force was used. This duty to immediately report such an incident and to seek medical attention for the inmate involved is important for the health of the inmate and for the protection of the correctional institution and correctional officer against unwarranted claims of injury. At all times material to these charges, the policy and rules of the VCDC, as taught to correctional officers, required that correctional officers avoid one-on-one physical confrontations with inmates and recommended that a correctional officer faced with a potentially hostile or aggressive inmate attempt to disengage himself from the confrontation, diffuse the threat through conversation if possible, and obtain assistance from other officers before approaching or making physical contact with the inmate. The only exception to this rule of disengagement is in the case of a sudden or spontaneous attack by an inmate. On June 22, 1988, Tillman, a very large and muscular man, was making a head count at about 11:00 p.m. Tillman thought that inmate George Hoover had squirted toothpaste on his back as he walked past Hoover's cell. Tillman told the officer who was working with him to open the cell. Tillman then entered the cell and struck Hoover in the jaw and face with a closed fist. Hoover fell on to his bunk. Tillman did not report the incident and he did not seek medical attention for Hoover. Tillman had no valid reason for his failure to report the incident and he was not excused from reporting the use of force that night before leaving the job site. Hoover requested medical attention, which brought the use of force to the attention of the VCDC. Hoover suffered a loosened tooth from being struck by Tillman. When confronted with the matter, Tillman said that he entered Hoover's cell to remove contraband, namely cups of water and coffee. Hoover assumed a boxing stance and Tillman struck him in response to that perceived aggression. Tillman's stories then and at hearing are simply unbelievable. The incident report that Tillman finally wrote said he removed contraband cups of water and coffee from the cell. The officer with Tillman that night never saw any cups removed. At hearing for the first time Tillman said that the contraband consisted of cups of urine and feces which added to the level of threat which he felt. Tillman's testimony in this regard is contrary to his own reports prepared in 1988 and is contrary to anything Tillman had said or reported before the hearing. As the trier of fact, the undersigned simply finds that Tillman was not truthful in his testimony on this and other matters. It is also not believed that Hoover, a small man weighing about 150 pounds, assumed an aggressive boxing stance with Tillman, a man about twice his size. From the evidence it can only be concluded that Tillman engaged in an unprovoked and unnecessary use of force by striking Hoover with his fist. Based on the rules, policies and procedures of the VCDC, Tillman should not have entered Hoover's cell in a one-on- one confrontation after Hoover squirted toothpaste on him. After he had entered the cell, Tillman should have withdrawn and disengaged from the situation to avoid a confrontation even if Hoover had assumed an aggressive stance. Finally, after the use of force occurred, Tillman should have reported it and should have sought medical attention for Hoover immediately following the incident and should not have left work that night without doing these things. Tillman was verbally counselled about the rules and policies related to disengagement and reporting of use of force. On October 14, 1988, while supervising a group of inmates returning from eating, Tillman became involved in a vocal argument with inmate William F. Elmore. Tillman repeatedly goaded Elmore to hit him, but Elmore attempted to withdraw from Tillman. Tillman hit Elmore in the jaw with his closed fist. Elmore attempted to walk away from Tillman, but Tillman pursued him and threw him up against a wall more than once. Elmore was between 5'7" and 5'10" and weighed between 165 and 180 pounds. Tillman claimed that Elmore approached him with raised hands in a semi-boxing stance. No other witness, either officer or inmate, mentioned any such aggressive approach or stance on the part of Elmore. One officer said that he thought that Elmore tried to kick Tillman. One inmate said that Elmore may have flinched or something, but that he did not see any aggressive posture or movement by Elmore. Tillman did not disengage or attempt to avoid the one- on-one confrontation with Elmore, even when Correctional Officer Zima called to Tillman to offer help. Instead, Tillman was aggressive and abrasive with Elmore. Tillman then over-reacted to the situation which he had provoked and used excessive force against Elmore. As a result of this incident, Tillman was recommended for termination, but he successfully appealed the termination and was instead suspended for ten days. Tillman was counseled that his interpretation of the use of force rules was erroneous and was told that when an inmate assumes an offensive posture such as a boxing stance, Tillman was not to strike the inmate. In the early morning of July 15, 1989, Tillman instructed Correctional Officer Trainee Anderson to open the cell door of inmate Michael P. Frascella, so that Frascella could clean up a mess he had made in and around his cell. Frascella was in an observation cell because of an earlier disturbance he had created. After cleaning up, Frascella was returning to his cell and noticed an apple on the desk. He reached for it and Tillman told him to put it back. Tillman then hit Frascella in the face with a closed fist. Frascella fell to the floor. Anderson heard the sound of the fall, looked over, and saw Frascella laying on the floor, glassy-eyed and bleeding from the mouth area. Tillman denies that he touched Frascella in any way and says he never saw Frascella on the floor or with blood on his face. This is why he says no use of force report was ever filed. Frascella's testimony is more credible regarding this incident than is that of Tillman. While it is clear that Frascella bears ill feelings toward Tillman because of the incident, his statements are more consistent with those of Anderson. Tillman clearly did not tell the truth regarding the incident with inmate Hoover and there is considerable doubt about his truthfulness regarding Elmore. There is no reason to believe that Tillman has been any more forthright about what happened with Frascella. Based on the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, it is concluded that Frascella's version is the closest to the what actually happened that morning. Former inmate and trustee Dwight Jensen testified about an incident in which Tillman struck an inmate with no justification. While it cannot be determined whether that inmate was Frascella, the testimony of Jensen is probative regarding Tillman's moral character and suitability to retain his certification as a correctional officer. From Jensen's testimony it can only be concluded that on an occasion which may or may not have been the one involving Frascella, Tillman struck an inmate in the face and nose in retaliation for verbal abuse from that inmate. That inmate's nose was so badly injured that Jensen was required to mop up considerable blood from the floor. That inmate was provided with no medical attention because he was placed on a bus to Starke within a couple of hours after he was struck. Jensen was incarcerated from 1988 to March of 1990. Since Tillman was suspended following the incident with Frascella until his termination, it is further concluded that Jensen's testimony relates to the same time frame as that relevant to this complaint.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order and therein revoke certificate no. C-3171 issued to Willie L. Tillman. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of October, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of October, 1992. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-3263 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(1); 2(2); 3&4(3); 5(6); 6&7(4); 8(5); 9(6); 14&15(7); 23&24(16); 25&26(17); 27(18); 29(21); 30(22); 31&32(23); 33(24); 34&35(25); and 38(26). Proposed findings of fact 10-13, 16-22, 28, 36, and 37 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: John P. Booth Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Willie L. Tillman 2400 Spring Hollow Drive Orange City, Florida 32763 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore, Commissioner Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in one or more of the following ways: by discriminating against Petitioner based on her race and/or gender; (b) by subjecting Petitioner to a hostile work environment; and (c) by retaliating against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Respondent hired Petitioner, a black female, as a correctional officer on or about February 25, 2002. Petitioner was initially assigned to the Hernando County Jail. After a series of transfers at Petitioner's request, Respondent assigned Petitioner to the Lake City Correctional Facility in July 2005. Petitioner continued to serve at that facility until she was terminated. On multiple occasions during her employment, Petitioner received copies of Respondent's Harassment/Sexual Harassment policy and Respondent's Code of Ethics policy. Petitioner received formal training relative to the substance of these policies when she was hired and annually thereafter. In October 2007, Petitioner filed two grievances against Captain Michael Register and Chief Daniel Devers. The grievance against Chief Devers alleged a "hostile" work environment. Specifically, Petitioner asserted that Chief Devers created a divide-and-conquer environment by telling new staff that "several dirty officers work for Respondent and that the new staff are to tell on them and replace all the old staff members." The grievance against Captain Register alleged race and gender harassment. Specifically, Petitioner claimed that Captain Register did not relieve Petitioner on time "for three weeks straight." Petitioner believed that Captain Register's alleged conduct was due to his dislike for her and favoritism toward other staff members. Petitioner did not allege that Captain Register or Chief Devers ever said anything to Petitioner or anyone else regarding her race or gender. In response to Petitioner's grievances, Respondent performed an in-house investigation. Subsequently, Petitioner's grievances against Captain Register and Chief Devers were denied as unfounded. Petitioner alleges that she was sexually harassed by Officer/Correctional Counselor Roderick Polite. As a Correctional Counselor, Officer Polite did not have authority to change the terms and conditions of Petitioner's employment except that it was possible for Petitioner to receive work orders from a Correctional Counselor. Petitioner went on two consensual dates with Officer Polite prior to his alleged harassment. The first date was in late November 2007. The second date was in early December 2007. At the time that Petitioner went on these dates, she was temporarily broken up with Correctional Officer Darian Blue. In late November and early December 2007, Petitioner worked the 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. shift. Officer Polite was assigned to the 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. shift. Petitioner refused to go to Respondent's December 14, 2007, Christmas party with Officer Polite. Thereafter, Officer Polite called Petitioner's house continuously for three days. In a telephone conversation on December 17, 2007, Officer Polite allegedly told Petitioner that he "just had sex with a girl." Officer Polite also allegedly stated that his fascination with her would be over if she would just give him oral sex. Petitioner told Officer Polite "no" and ended the conversation. Petitioner claims that Officer Polite began to harass her at work after the December 17, 2007, telephone conversation. According to Petitioner, the harassment continued until January 10, 2008. Specifically, Petitioner claims that Officer Polite was critical of her work performance and changed the procedures she was to follow regarding mail distribution and the cleaning of pods by inmates. Officer Polite allegedly also accused Petitioner of improperly counseling an inmate. Petitioner alleges that Officer Polite "wrote her up" on one occasion. However, Petitioner admits that she never saw the alleged write-up. Petitioner also admits that she never suffered any adverse action as a result of the alleged write-up. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Officer Polite never filed a disciplinary action against Petitioner. Petitioner did not complain about Officer Polite's conduct until January 9, 2008. On that date, Petitioner spoke with Captain Joseph Ruby about Officer Polite's alleged conduct. Respondent’s sexual harassment policy prohibits physical and verbal harassment, including inappropriate threats and requests. The policy also set forth the procedure by which employees should utilize to complain about harassment and states that complaints will be promptly and thoroughly investigated. Accordingly, on January 10, 2008, Petitioner was interviewed by Respondent's in-house investigator. Petitioner told the investigator about Officer Polite's alleged harassment but stated that she did not want to file a formal grievance against him. Petitioner simply requested that she be allowed to return to work and that she not have to work with Officer Polite. Officer Polite subsequently resigned his position as a Correctional Counselor and stepped down to a Correctional Officer position. Additionally, Respondent changed Officer Polite to the 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. shift. If there were occasions when Petitioner's and Officer Polite's shifts overlapped, Respondent granted Officer Polite's requests not to work around Petitioner. In March 2008, Petitioner applied for one of three open positions as a Correctional Counselor. Based on the interview panel's recommendation, Warden Jason Medlin selected a white female and two black females for the positions. Petitioner was not selected for one of the positions because of her personnel and disciplinary record, including a prior allegation of excessive force against inmates. Moreover, there is no evidence regarding the personnel and disciplinary records of the three females selected for the positions. On March 30, 2008, Petitioner was assigned to the control room in the South 2 Unit. Her primary duty was to maintain the log and to open doors for other officers. At some point during her shift, Petitioner removed an inmate from his cell, took him to master control, and left him there. A Lieutenant requested another Correctional Officer, Amanda Sanders, to escort the inmate back to his cell and assist Petitioner with a search of the inmate's cell. When Officer Sanders and Petitioner arrived at the cell, the inmate's cellmate, Jose Sandoval, was sitting on his bunk bed. Officer Sanders told Inmate Sandoval to leave the cell. When Inmate Sandoval did not comply, Petitioner ordered him to stand up to be handcuffed. Inmate Sandoval continued to sit on his bunk bed. Petitioner then told Officer Sanders to call a "code red," a request for assistance from other officers. Officer Sanders did not comply immediately with Petitioner's request because Officer Sanders did not believe there was a need for assistance or a reason to handcuff Inmate Sandoval. Next, Petitioner grabbed Inmate Sandoval by his arm, physically removed him from his bed, and placed him face first into the wall. Officer Sanders did not have any contact with Inmate Sandoval when Petitioner removed him from his bed. Inmate Sandoval somehow turned to face Petitioner who had her back to Officer Sanders. Officer Sanders heard a "smack" and concluded that Petitioner had struck Inmate Sandoval. Officer Sanders then saw Inmate Sandoval spit at Petitioner. Officer Sanders immediately called a "code red" and assisted Petitioner in placing Inmate Sandoval on the floor and handcuffing him. Other officers arrived and removed Inmate Sandoval from his cell and the unit. As recorded on the facility's video cameras, the officers carried Inmate Sandoval by his neck, two or three feet off the floor. The officers choked him and slammed him onto the floor. The cameras recorded Inmate Sandoval in the medical department, so incoherent that he had to be held up to prevent him from falling over. When force is used against an inmate, the incident report must be sent to the Florida Department of Corrections' Inspector General (IG). In this case, the IG performed an investigation, concluding that Inmate Sandoval was assaulted by the facility's officers and that blood was cleaned off the walls to hide the assault. Respondent subsequently received a copy of the IG's report. On April 11, 2008, Respondent terminated all officers involved, including Petitioner, for violation of Respondent's Code of Ethics. Specifically, Respondent terminated Petitioner for physically abusing the inmate, for failing to report the extent of abuse on the inmate in written reports and during the IG's investigation, and for failing to call into the facility as directed while on administrative leave after the incident. Other officers that were terminated included the following: (a) Correctional Officer Darian Blue (black male) for use of excessive force; (b) Lieutenant Phillip Mobley (white male) for failure to accurately report the extent of abuse; (c) Captain/Shift Supervisor Joseph Ruby (white male) for failure to accurately report the extent of abuse; (d) Correctional Officer Grace Davie (white female) for failure to accurately report the extent of abuse; (e) Correctional Officer Melissa Fontaine (white female) for failure to accurately report the extent of abuse; and (f) Correctional Officer Eunice Cline (white female) for failure to accurately report the extent of abuse. Respondent did not terminate Officer Sanders. The IG's report did not show that she violated any of Respondent's policies during the incident.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR dismiss the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Chelsie J. Roberts, Esquire Ford & Harrison LLP 300 South Orange Avenue, Suite 1300 Orlando, Florida 32801 Dafney Cook 2445 Dunn Avenue, Apt 610 Jacksonville, Florida 32218 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway. Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues to be determined are whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character as required by Section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be used?
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations of the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was certified as a correctional officer by the Commission, having been issued Correctional Officer Certificate number 144670. On or about January 14, 2009, Respondent was employed by Tomoka Correctional Facility (Tomoka). He had been employed by the Department of Corrections (DOC) for approximately 15 years. At some point during the day, Inmate William Cash became disorderly and disruptive in his cell, and a psychological emergency was called. Officer James Hinds and Respondent came to Cash's cell to transport him to a holding cell where he could be seen by a psychologist. In preparing for the transfer, Respondent and Officer Hinds restrained Inmate Cash using handcuffs, leg irons, a waist chain, and a black box which secured Cash's handcuffs. After restraints were applied, Inmate Cash was transported to a holding cell, with Captain Darlene Taman observing the transfer. Consistent with DOC protocols, the transfer of Inmate Cash from his cell to a holding cell was videotaped. Once they arrived at the holding cell, Respondent had Inmate Cash sit down on a bench in the cell. Inmate Cash attempted to twist and pull away from Respondent's grasp. In response, Respondent reasserted his grip and raised one arm, placing his hand against Inmate Cash's neck. The inmate continued pulling away from Respondent until he was lying down on his side. Respondent did not report the incident to his Captain or complete any type of incident report regarding the events occurring in connection with the transport. Captain Taman did not actually see the interaction between Respondent and Inmate Cash, because she was attempting to monitor several situations simultaneously. Consistent with DOC procedure, the warden at Tomoka reviewed the videotape of the transfer. After reviewing the videotape, the warden filed a complaint with John Joiner, Senior Prison Inspector with the DOC Office of Inspector General to investigate whether there was excessive use of force with respect to the interaction between Respondent and Inmate Cash. A use of force occurs when a correctional officer touches an inmate who is offering resistance, applying force to overcome the inmate's resistance. Touching alone does not constitute use of force. It is the application of force to overcome resistance that is key to determining whether a use of force has occurred. When a use of force occurs, a correctional officer is required to report the use of force to his or her commanding officer; to complete a Use of Force report; and to complete an incident report on the use of force. Use of Force reports are to completed within 24 hours. Correctional officers are trained regarding use of force and the required reporting of use of force on an annual basis. Respondent did not report the incident to his supervisor and did not complete a use of force report. In his view, no use of force occurred because Inmate Cash was pulling away from him and he was not applying force to overcome Inmate Cash's resistance. According to Respondent, he attempted to get a better grip on Inmate Cash and then allowed him to lie down on his side on the bench where he was sitting. He described the event as follows: MR. DONOVAN: . . . Use of force, because you place your hands on an inmate, it does not necessarily incur a use of force. It is the resistance to that, me overcoming his resistance is what determines if there is or is not a use of force. The inmate initially pulled away from me. I reasserted my grasp and put my arm up to defend myself. Like I indicated in my interview, that is why my arm went up. He sat back down on his own and he pulled away and started leaning down on the bench to lay down. And after he got down on the bench, after the whole thing was over is when I gave him more orders to stop pulling away, because he continued to pull away from me. I knew he was restrained -- completely restrained, i.e., leg irons, black box, the waist chain and the -- the handcuffs, which is why I didn't use the force. I just wanted to be sure that I had control of the situation, that I had control of him, so that I didn't get hurt or he didn't get hurt. I have been kicked by inmates. I have been spit on and head-butted by inmates, who were completely restrained, such as Mr. Cash was restrained that day. And I know through my training, that just because you touch an inmate, it's not use of force; that you have to -- you have to overcome the resistance that he's presenting to you in order for it to be a use of force. I did not do that. I did not force him to sit down. As he tugged away, he sat down on his own. And then after I reasserted my grasp to make sure that I had ahold of him and was in control of the situation, he laid down on his own. I do not know why; if it was just an attempt to continue to try to get away from me. However, he did all of that on his own. I did not push him down. The video of the incident was observed by both Captain Taman, Respondent's supervisor, and by Inspector Joiner. Both believed, as did Officer Hinds, that the exchange between Respondent and Inmate Cash involved a use of force. It is found that there was a use of force, but that the force used was not excessive. Inspector Joiner interviewed Respondent as a part of the investigation of the incident on January 19, 2010. His response during the interview was consistent with his testimony at hearing: that he did not file a report on use of force because he did not believe a use of force occurred and that, in his view, there was nothing to report. Respondent's testimony was candid, credible and sincere. He believed what he said in the interview and at hearing. However, his ultimate conclusion regarding the use of force was in error.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel W. Donovan Kerra A. Smith, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Crews, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact Petitioners and Respondent have stipulated to the following facts: The three petitioners are inmates at Union Correctional Institution, Raiford, Florida, in the custody of the Department of Corrections. All three of the petitioners have had their PPRD's established by the respondent-commission as follows: In June of 1982, Mr. Piccirillo's PPRD was established by the commission to be September 30, 1986. In January of 1982, Mr. Adams' PPRD was established by the commission to be November 11, 1991. In December of 1982, petitioner Hemming's PPRD was established by the commission to be September 29, 1993. Subsequent to the commission having established their PPRD's, all three of the petitioners have been transferred from one Florida penal institution to another state institution as follows: Mr. Piccirillo was transferred from Polk Correctional Institution to Union Correctional Institution on August 18, 1982. Mr. Adams was transferred from Polk Correctional Institution to Union Correctional Institution on August 18, 1932. Mr. Hemming was transferred from Avon Park Correctional Institution to Union Correctional Institution on February 16, 1983. The petitioners were not transferred to Union Correctional Institution because of any unsatisfactory institutional conduct at their former institutions. Petitioners are currently scheduled by the commission for biennial interviews to review their established PPRD's as follows: Mr. Piccirillo is scheduled for a biennial interview in March of 1984. Mr. Adams is scheduled for a biennial interview in October of 1983. Mr. Hemming is scheduled for a biennial interview in September of 1984. The following additional findings are made from evidence presented at the hearing: The respondent-commission has not made a finding that any of the petitioner's institutional conduct has been unsatisfactory under the challenged rule nor has respondent extended their PPRD's or refused to authorize their EPRD's. In applying the challenged rule, the fact that an inmate has been transferred to a higher custody or higher level institution is only considered to be unsatisfactory institutional conduct where the commission receives documentation evidencing institutional misconduct as the basis for the transfer. Petitioners transfers from other institutions to Union Correctional Institution would not be considered unsatisfactory institutional conduct under the challenged rule because there is no documentation of institutional misconduct which led to these institutional transfers.
The Issue Should Respondent Division of Retirement grant Petitioner's request to be included for retirement purposes in the Special Risk Class (SRC) from July 1, 1981 through October 24, 1985? Should Respondent Division of Retirement grant Petitioner's request to be included in the Special Risk Administrative Support Class (SRASC) for the period October 25, 1985 until January 1, 1998?
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Alachua County employed a jail facility Director who had overall supervision of correctional officers and special risk employees and who was ultimately responsible for restraint of inmates. Petitioner was continuously employed by the Alachua County Department of Corrections at the Alachua County Jail from the date of his initial employment as a Correctional Officer I on April 22, 1974, to his lay-off as Assistant Director of the Alachua County Jail on January 1, 1998. Political opponents of Petitioner raised the issues of his eligibility for SRC and SRASC classification and the validity of his correctional officer certification beginning approximately in 1996. Petitioner began work April 22, 1974, as a Correctional Officer I (uniformed line officer) and was recommended by his employer Alachua County and approved by Respondent for SRC membership, effective April 22, 1974. Respondent reviews applications for SRC and SRASC for completeness with no audit beyond the certification by the member and the employer. Respondent may approve, retroactive to the date specified in the application. If at any time it is determined that a member is not eligible for inclusion in a particular retirement category, the member is removed, retroactive to the date of ineligibility. Petitioner was certified as a correctional officer by the Council of Correctional Standards on July 1, 1974. Petitioner was promoted to an Administrative Assistant I position, effective May 18, 1981. The Administrative Assistant I position did not require certification as a correctional officer. On May 18, 1981, Petitioner was a certified correctional officer in a position that did not require certification. Effective July 1, 1981, the Florida Legislature merged the Council of Correctional Standards, which had certified Petitioner on July 1, 1974, with the Law Enforcement Standards Council, to form the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (CJSTC), an arm of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE). In so doing, the Legislature provided Section 943.19(3), Florida Statutes, to "grandfather-in" certain correctional officers' certifications. On July 1, 1981, Petitioner was a certified correctional officer in a position that did not require certification. Sometime later in 1981, the newly-formed CJSTC requested that Alachua County send the CJSTC a list of all certified correctional officers in its employ. Such a list was prepared by Alachua County personnel and forwarded to the CJSTC. The list prepared by the County did not include Petitioner's name, presumably because at that time, as an Administrative Assistant I, he was not serving in a position requiring certification as a correctional officer. Petitioner was promoted to the position of Administrative Operations Supervisor, effective March 22, 1982. This position also did not require correctional officer certification. Although Petitioner was employed as an Administrative Assistant I beginning May 18, 1981, and as an Administrative Operations Supervisor beginning March 22, 1982, he did not make application for inclusion in SRASC until March 17, 1986. On April 23, 1986, Alachua County recommended Petitioner's SRASC classification. Kim Baldry, Director of Personnel for Alachua County since 1983, signed off on a form stating that Petitioner: Was employed for training and/or career development . . . and is subject to reassignment at any time to a position qualifying for special risk membership. Respondent approved Petitioner's SRASC membership retroactive to October 25, 1985. Petitioner's November 13, 1987, application for inclusion in SRC as "Assistant Director/Administrative Support," was neither recommended by Alachua County, nor approved by Respondent. In July 1994, the Administrative Operations Supervisor position was reclassified, without any change in job description or duties, as Assistant Director/Administrative Support, and Petitioner served in that capacity until his lay-off in 1998. The position never required a correctional officer certification. Petitioner was not employed as a uniformed correctional officer from May 18, 1981, to his lay-off in 1998. Petitioner did not hold a position for which the minimum requirements included certification as a correctional officer from May 18, 1981, until his lay-off in 1998. Kim Baldry testified that although Petitioner had many job titles during his 1981 to 1998 employment, his actual duties from 1981 to 1998 were consistently over personnel, budget, and fiscal matters; that he primarily supervised fiscal assistants and accounting clerks; and that he was never a jail "supervisor" as such. She did, however, concede that she had dealt with him over correctional officer discipline from 1983 to 1998. Petitioner and Ms. Baldry concurred that from 1981 to 1998, his duties remained basically the same, and that at various times, he was known as "Acting Assistant Director" and "Assistant Director" and when the Director was out of town, Petitioner served as "Acting Director." Petitioner testified without refutation that from 1981 to 1998, his duties always included personnel oversight of line correctional officers; overseeing payroll leave and timecards for such officers; and screening, interviewing, and processing applications for new correctional officers. One of his job descriptions confirms this. Petitioner also testified that he had daily contact with inmates of the Alachua County Jail in the commissary, medical services area, and food preparation area, and with trustees in support services, and that he regularly appeared before the County Commission concerning budget, jail crowding, and the need for more correctional officers. Petitioner's daily primary duties and responsibilities after May 18, 1981, were neither the direct custody, nor the physical restraint, of prisoners or inmates at Alachua County Jail. His daily primary duties were fiscal, budgeting, accounting, and personnel administration in nature. He was not a line officer on the floor with special risk officers and inmates on a daily basis, although he did consult with some line and special risk correctional officers on personnel matters, including disciplinary matters. Actual discipline went through correctional officer captains and lieutenants. Petitioner stated that when he was an Administrative Assistant I, he was subject to reassignment as a line correctional officer at any time and that when he was Administrative Operations Supervisor, there were two other supervisors who oversaw work release and jail supervision, respectively, on a day-to-day basis. At some point, one position was eliminated and one was assigned to the court system. From 1994 to 1995, when Petitioner was Assistant Director, there was one other Assistant Director. Both Assistant Directors reported directly to the Director of Alachua County Jail, who had total oversight of the jail operation. However, when both the Director and the other Assistant Director were out of town, or later, when Petitioner was the sole Assistant Director, the Director delegated his duties to Petitioner for the interim, and Petitioner was left directly in charge of all functions, including security, supervision of correctional officers, and supervision of inmates. When questions concerning his certification and retirement status arose in 1996, Respondent requested that Alachua County personnel look into the matter because he considered it to be his employer's problem and not his own. Alachua County formally requested review by the Respondent of Petitioner's retirement designation, indicating that it did not believe that Petitioner should continue in SRC or SRASC, because he was serving the employer in an administrative capacity. After considerable correspondence back and forth, FDLE, the agency that houses the CJSTC which has the responsibility and authority to certify correctional officers, advised Alachua County by a May 24, 1996, letter that: . . . A review of the files in the Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training indicates that Mr. Krank was a certified correctional officer with the Corrections Council. That council was merged with the Law Enforcement Standards Council to form the Criminal Justice and Training Commission (CJSTC) in 1981. Officers employed in correctional officer positions were "grandfathered" into the CJSTC at that time. Mr. Krank was not employed as a correctional officer at the time of the merger, and, therefore, was not grandfathered into the CJSTC. It is suggested that if Mr. Krank requests more specific information concerning the grandfather clause in the statute, that he contact the State Department of Corrections. I have enclosed a copy of the 1983 Florida Statutes reference [sic] the "Saving Clause." However, it does not go into any detail as to what the process was at that time. (Joint Composite Exhibit 5) (Emphasis supplied.) Respondent received a May 21, 1998, letter from FDLE, stating: After a thorough search of the Automated Training and Management System (ATMS2), historical databases, and records stored on microfiche, there is no record of Mr. Krank working as an officer in Florida. Citing Rule 11B-27.0026, Florida Administrative Code, first enacted in 1994, FDLE went on to say that it considered Petitioner to be a certified correctional officer separated from employment and not re-employed within four years after the last date of separation, who therefore needed to reactivate his certification. (Joint Exhibit 10). The undersigned's research shows that Rule 11B-27.0023, Florida Administrative Code, new in 1982, provided that a certified correctional officer separated from employment and not re-employed within four years must reactivate his or her certification and that Rule 11B-27.0026, Florida Administrative Code, cited in FDLE's letter, actually explains how to reactivate certification. In reliance on FDLE correspondence, Respondent removed Petitioner from the SRC and SRASC classifications. Subsequent to being laid-off by Alachua County in 1998, Petitioner accepted a job as a correctional officer trainee with the Florida State Prison on February 2, 1999. Petitioner was hired as a correctional officer trainee at Florida State Prison, pending resolution of the instant case. Petitioner's arrangement with Florida State Prison personnel was that he would attend training from February 22, 1999, through May 25, 1999, after which he would have to pass a test administered by FDLE on June 29, 1999, in order to become a certified correctional officer and continue in the correctional officer position for which he had been hired.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement enter a Final Order removing Petitioner from SRC and SRASC classification from July 1, 1981 to October 24, 1985, and from October 25, 1985 to January 1, 1998, respectively. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of August, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1999.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on February 11, 1983, and issued certificate number 19-82-502-08, which he still holds. For approximately the past eight years, Respondent has been employed by the Metro-Dade County Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department). During the first six years of his employment with the Department, he held the position of Correctional Officer I. His duties as a Correctional Officer I included supervising crews of inmates performing lawn maintenance work on public grounds outside the correctional facility in which they were housed. One of Respondent's supervisors was Jerry Meese, the Director of the Department's Operations Division. On September 26, 1986, while returning to his office from a lunchtime excursion, Meese observed a Department truck used to transport inmate work crews parked outside a private residence. The truck's presence in the residential area aroused Meese's suspicion. He therefore stopped to investigate. He soon discovered that Respondent and some inmates were in the area. One of the inmates was found to have some chewing gum in his possession. The inmate told Meese that Respondent had given him money to purchase the gum at a nearby store. A short walking distance from where Meese had encountered the inmate was a bag containing seven containers of beer. The containers were cold to the touch. Meese went to the store to which the inmate had referred and spoke to the store clerk. The store clerk advised Meese that the inmate, a short time before, had bought the beer that Meese had found in the bag. Meese discussed the matter with Respondent. It appeared to Meese that Respondent's speech was slurred and that his eyes were red. Upon his return to the office, Meese was provided with statements from inmates supervised by Respondent in which the inmates indicated that they had drank beer and smoked marijuana with Respondent. Shortly thereafter Meese learned that the inmates had tested positive for drugs. The Department had a policy which required a correctional officer to submit to drug testing if there existed a reasonable suspicion that the officer was involved in the illicit use of drugs. Based upon what had occurred that afternoon, Meese justifiably believed that he had grounds to invoke this policy and he therefore directed Respondent to submit to a drug test. He gave Respondent until Monday, September 29, 1986, to take the test. On September 29, 1986, prior to submitting to the test, Respondent was interviewed by Robert Sobel, an investigator with the Department's Internal Affairs Unit. Respondent freely admitted to Sobel that he "smok[ed] marijuana on a regular basis" and that he "would like to enroll in a program to overcome this problem." Later that day, at 3:10 p.m., in compliance with Meese's directive, Respondent went to the Consulab facility at the Cedars Medical Center in Miami and gave a urine specimen. The sample was screened by the use of an enzyme immunoassay testing procedure. The screening test was performed twice. On both occasions, the sample tested presumptively positive for cocaine and marijuana. The sample was then subjected to confirmatory testing. The thin layer chromatography (TLC) method was used. When performed by a competent technologist, TLC testing is accurate 95 to 99 percent of the time. The two technologists who tested Respondent's urine sample using the TLC method were highly competent. Their tests, which were completed at about 4:50 p.m., revealed the presence of cocaine metabolites 1/ and cannabinoids (marijuana). 15. The tests were accurate. Respondent had knowingly used cocaine and marijuana on or about the date of the testing. Notwithstanding the results of the testing, Respondent was not terminated by the Department. Instead, he was suspended. As a condition of continued employment, he was required to participate in a drug rehabilitation program and to remain drug-free. Respondent has met these requirements to the satisfaction of the Department. Not only has Respondent remained in the employ of the Department, he how occupies the position of corporal, a supervisory position to which he was promoted approximately two years ago. His post-September, 1986, employment record reveals that he has taken full advantage of the opportunity given him by the Department to rehabilitate himself.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order (1) finding Respondent guilty of having failed to maintain "good moral character" in violation of Section 943.1395(5), Florida Statutes, by virtue of his unlawful use of cocaine and marijuana on or about September 26, 1986; and (2) based upon such a finding, (a) suspend Respondent's certification for 30 days, (b) place Respondent on probation for a period of two years to commence upon the expiration of this 30-day suspension, and (c) include among the terms and conditions of his probation the requirements that Respondent submit to scheduled and monthly drug testing and that he agree to release the results of such testing to the Commission or its designee. DONE and ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 30th day of May 1990. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May 1990.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following findings of fact: l. The Petitioner, Terry Wooden, a black male, was hired by the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Corrections, on December 5, 1980 as a Correctional Officer I at River Junction Correctional Institution. River Junction Correctional Institution (RJCI) is a secure facility responsible for the care, custody and control of certain inmates. Correctional Officers are assigned to security posts which are located throughout the facility. Some "inside" security posts are located within inmate dormitories. Outside perimeter security posts, which are small tower-like buildings, are located along the perimeter fence and are the last observation posts between containment and possible inmate escape. For security reasons, the Respondent prohibits sleeping on the job and requires its correctional officers to remain alert at all times. Supervisors (generally employees holding the rank of sergeant) often make "rounds" of the facility wherein security posts are visited to ensure that the officer on, duty at that post is alert. RJCI procedure requires that an officer on duty at a security post "challenge" a supervisor or other correctional officer who approaches the security post. When a supervisor enters a dormitory, the officer assigned to that post is required to challenge that person by immediately leaving the officer's station (located within the dormitory) to meet the approaching person. If the officer is on the telephone or engaged in some activity, it is acceptable for the officer to wave his hand to the approaching person or indicate in some other manner that he is aware that someone has entered the area. When a supervisor approaches an outside security post, the officer on duty is required to meet the approaching individual at the door of the building. Discipline of employees at RJCI is based on a progressive system. During the time the Petitioner was employed at RJCI, a sergeant was required to report a sleeping/unalertness violation by a correctional officer to the shift lieutenant (supervisor of all employees on a particular shift). There were no written guidelines and the reporting officer was required to exercise some discretion in determining whether he believed that an offense had been committed. On the first incident, the shift lieutenant would counsel the employee about the infraction, but no written report was made. On the second report of an offense to the shift lieutenant, a written report of the incident would be prepared by either the reporting officer or the shift lieutenant. The shift lieutenant would interview the employee about the alleged violation and refer the report to the department head (correctional officer chief). The department head would then submit the written report to the personnel manager with recommendations. Upon receiving a written report of an infraction from the department head, the personnel manager would gather information pertaining to the offense and give it to the superintendent, along with recommendations for disposing of the case. The superintendent would then schedule a "predetermination conference", confront the employee with the allegations and determine the disciplinary action to be taken. Prior to 1979 and until June 1982, L. C. McAllister, a white male, was superintendent at RJCI; from June 1982 to December 10, 1982, George Ragans, a white male, was acting superintendent at RJCI; from December 13, 1982 through August 1983, Ken Snover, a white male, was superintendent at RJCI. Each superintendent was responsible for determining the particular penalty to be imposed using guidelines set forth in Chapter 33, Section 9 of the Rules of Personnel. Generally, the employee's first sleeping/unalertness violation reported to the personnel manager, and ultimately, the superintendent, would result in counseling (oral reprimand); the second violation would result in a written reprimand; the third violation would result in a suspension; the fourth violation would result in a longer suspension or dismissal; and, the fifth violation would result in dismissal. Major Miles, a white male, is a department head and functions as the overall supervisor of correctional officers at RJCI. Miles assigns posts and shifts to correctional officers. Major Miles usually assigns new correctional officers to midnight shift after they complete orientation. After Petitioner completed his orientation period, he was placed on midnight shift (12:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m.) and assigned to Post 23 in "G" dormitory. The Petitioner completed his one year probationary period on December 5, 1981. The Petitioner was assigned an overall rating of "satisfactory" by his shift supervisor, Lieutenant Carter, a black male. The evaluation stated that Petitioner got along well with supervisors and fellow employees. In December of 1981, Lieutenant Childs, a white male, became the Petitioner's shift supervisor. Initially, the Petitioner and Lieutenant Childs enjoyed a friendly relationship. Lieutenant Childs drove the Petitioner to work on several occasions and both men shared a common interest in sports. On December 13, 1981 an officer made a routine check of "G" dormitory and found Petitioner asleep in the officer's station. The Petitioner was counseled about this first infraction. Shortly after Petitioner's sleeping incident of December 13, 1981, Major Miles changed Petitioner's post assignment from dormitory to Perimeter Post 3. Major Miles changed Petitioner's post because several inmates had complained to him that a lot of stealing was taking place and that Petitioner was not watchful enough to prevent it. The inmates also complained that Petitioner's counseling style seemed like harassment. After Petitioner's post was changed from "G" dormitory to Perimeter Post 3, his relationship with Lieutenant Childs began to turn sour. The Petitioner was "concerned" because he believed that Lieutenant Childs had input into Major Miles' decision to reassign him. On May 10, 1982, Lieutenant Childs found the Petitioner unalert at Perimeter Post 3. The Petitioner received a written reprimand for this second infraction. On August 19, 1982, Sergeant Pollock, a black male, found Petitioner unalert while on duty at Perimeter Post 3. Sergeant Pollock reported the incident to Lieutenant Childs but suggested that Petitioner be counseled rather than "written-up". Sergeant Pollock believed that a lesser punishment might encourage Petitioner's improvement. Lieutenant Childs told Pollock to think about it for a couple of days. On August 21, 1982, Sergeant Parks and Sergeant Tharpe found Petitioner unalert at his post. When Sergeant Pollock discovered this incident, he changed his mind about his previous recommendation to Lieutenant Childs. Childs told Pollock to submit a written report. The Petitioner was suspended for 3 days for these third and fourth sleeping/unalertness infractions. On September 2, 1982, Lieutenant Childs completed an employee rating evaluation on Petitioner for the period September 1, 1981 to September 2, 1982. Petitioner was given an overall rating of "satisfactory", but Lieutenant Childs noted several areas of concern. Lieutenant Childs mentioned that Petitioner seemed to interpret counseling sessions "as personal threats conspired, for no bonafide reason to harass him." However, Lieutenant Childs went on to note that Petitioner's attitude and work performance was improving and that Petitioner was "making a definite and positive effort to correct his shortcomings." On October 28, 1982 an inmate escaped from RJCI. At the time of the inmate's escape, Petitioner was on duty at Perimeter Post-3 and William Chessher, a white correctional officer, was on duty on Perimeter Post 2. Major Miles, the department head, recommended that both men be disciplined for being unalert. Because the inmate's escape route took him through Perimeter Post 3's primary area of responsibility, Major Miles recommended that Petitioner be dismissed; Miles recommended that Chessher be reprimanded or suspended because the escape route was along Perimeter Post 2's secondary area of responsibility. On November 18, 1982, Acting Superintendent George Ragans held a predetermination conference concerning Petitioner's October 28, 1982 unalertness charge. Mr. Ragans found that the offense was substantiated but did not follow Major Miles' recommendation that Petitioner be dismissed. Ragans suspended the Petitioner for fifteen (15) days for this fifth sleeping/unalertness violation. Immediately following the November 18, 1982 predetermination conference, Ragans suggested to Petitioner that Petitioner should request a shift change. However, Petitioner explained to Ragans that he had a new baby at home, was taking college courses and did not want a shift change at that time. When Petitioner returned to work on December 16, 1982 after his fifteen (15) day suspension he had decided that he wanted a shift change. Petitioner went to the control room to find out how to submit a shift change request. In the control room, Petitioner spoke with a female officer concerning the procedures for requesting a shift change. The female officer agreed to type a shift change request for Petitioner. The female officer typed the request and gave Petitioner a copy. Shift change requests are directed to the shift lieutenant, in this instance, Lieutenant Childs, who then passes the request to Major Miles for final action. The female officer told Petitioner that she would put the original request for shift change in Lieutenant Childs' box in the control room. For some reason, Lieutenant Childs never received Petitioner's written request for shift change. In January 1983, the Petitioner spoke with the new superintendent, Ken Snover, regarding a shift change. Mr. Snover told Petitioner to proceed through the change of command and if he was still not satisfied, to return and speak with him again. One night, while on duty sometime after December 16, 1982 Petitioner asked Lieutenant Childs about a shift change. Lieutenant Childs told Petitioner that there were going to be a lot of changes made. Petitioner spoke to Major Miles on one occasion after December 16, 1982 and asked about a shift change. Major Miles told Petitioner to submit a written request. Major Miles never received a written request for shift change from Petitioner. Sometime prior to August 1, 1983, Petitioner was temporarily assigned to "G" dormitory and worked with officer Gano, a white male. Gano complained to Lieutenant Childs that Petitioner was sleeping on duty. Before Gano complained to Childs, Childs had received allegations of Petitioner being asleep from other correctional officers. Because of those complaints, Childs had instructed two sergeants to closely review Petitioner's dormitory work habits. On one occasion, the sergeants told Lieutenant Childs that Petitioner appeared to be asleep while on duty. On August 1, 1983, Lieutenant Childs instructed officer Gano to let him know if Petitioner was sleeping by giving a pre-arranged signal. Officer Gano found Petitioner asleep or "non-alert" and gave the pre-arranged signal. Lieutenant Childs entered the dormitory without Petitioner challenging him and found Petitioner unalert. Lieutenant Childs wrote a report on Petitioner's sixth sleeping infraction. Superintendent Ken Snover held a predetermination conference concerning Petitioner's August 1, 1983 unalertness charge. Snover ordered the Petitioner's dismissal, effective August 18, 1983. Steve Williams, a white Correctional Officer I, was caught sleeping on April 20, 1981 and was given an oral reprimand for this first offense. Williams was caught sleeping again on June 21, 28, and July 31, 1981. Because of the personnel manager's vacation a predetermination conference letter could not be sent until after the third occurrence and all three violations were addressed at the same conference. Williams was given a written reprimand for this second sleeping infraction. Thomas Jackson, a black Correctional Officer I, was caught sleeping on October 29, 1982 and was given an oral reprimand for this first offense. On May 13, 1983, Jackson was caught sleeping a second time and was given an official reprimand. On August 10, 1983, Jackson was caught sleeping a third time and was suspended for one week (5 working days). Jackson was offered and accepted a shift change, from midnight to evening shift. Dennis Edwards, a white Correctional Officer I, was caught sleeping in July 1982 and was counseled for this first offense. In Apri1 1983, he was caught sleeping again and was given a written reprimand. In July 1983, Edwards was suspended for 5 working days because of his third offense of sleeping while on duty. Larry Garrett, a black Correctional Officer I, was counseled for sleeping on duty for his first offense, but no documentation was made to his personnel file. On September 5, 1981 Garrett was caught sleeping a second time and was given a written reprimand. On December 3, 1981, Garrett was caught sleeping a third time and was suspended for three days. Garrett was offered a shift change, but declined because he was taking classes and had a newborn baby. On December 16, 1981, Garrett was caught sleeping for the fourth time and was terminated. Michae1 Weeks, a white Correctional Officer I, was caught sleeping on June 9, 1981 and was given a written reprimand for this first offense. On May 10, 1982 he was caught sleeping a second time and was given a written reprimand. Weeks was caught sleeping again on August 1, 8 and 10, 1982. Weeks was given a predetermination conference letter, but before the hearing was held, he was caught sleeping again on August 18, 1982. Weeks voluntarily resigned on August 18, 1982. Warren Harris, a black Correctional Officer I, was caught sleeping on November 29, 1979 and was given a written reprimand for this first offense. On June 13, 1981, Harris was caught sleeping again and was given another written reprimand. On September 9, 1981, Harris was caught sleeping for the third time and was suspended for three days. Harris was caught sleeping again on October 28 and 29, 1981 for his fourth offense. Harris was given a letter of termination, but resigned before the termination took effect. Harold Bailey, a white Correctional Officer I, was caught sleeping on June 14, 1982 and was counseled for this first offense. Bailey was caught sleeping again on July 17, 1982 and was given a written reprimand. On January 5, 1983 Bailey was caught sleeping on duty for the third time and was suspended for five days. On April 2, 1983, Bailey was charged with a fourth offense but Superintendent Snover found the allegations "unsubstantiated." Nevertheless, Bailey was counseled and documentation of the incident was placed in his personnel file. Bailey was offered a shift change but he refused it. Bailey's shift was later changed. In an effort to assist employees who were working midnight shift and having problems staying awake, the personnel manager and the superintendent would sometimes offer the employee a shift change or encourage the employee to seek a shift change. At various times, both black and white employees were offered, or encouraged to seek shift changes when they were having trouble on midnight shift. From time to time, correctional officers would submit requests for shift and/or post changes. Major Miles, the department head, usually made shift or post changes based on an individual's written request and the needs of the institution to have certain security posts staffed. Major Miles made some shift and post changes without a written request and over the objection of the employee if it was required by the needs of the institution. Shift and post changes at RJCI were given to both white and black employees in a substantially similar manner. Lieutenant Childs, upon receiving a request for a shift or post change, was required to forward the request to Major Miles for final action. Lieutenant Childs would forward a request for shift or post change with a favorable recommendation only if he believed the employee "earned" the recommendation by good performance on his current shift or post. As shift lieutenant, Childs was authorized to make some temporary post re-assignments for employees on his shift. During the last several months of Petitioner's employment, Petitioner was permanently assigned to Perimeter Post 3, but Lieutenant Childs temporarily assigned him to a post in "G" dormitory. While Petitioner was temporarily assigned to "G" dormitory, Lieutenant Childs became aware through "the grapevine" that Petitioner wanted to have Mondays and Tuesdays off, rather than Tuesdays and Wednesdays. Because different post assignments, carried different days off, a change in days off would have required a post change. Lieutenant Childs told Sergeant Pollock to tell Petitioner that he would arrange for Petitioner to have the desired days off as soon as possible if Petitioner's work performance improved. In January 1983 a new Department of Corrections directive required that certain correctional officers receive 160 supplementary hours of training. A majority of the staff at RJCI was required to complete the supplemental training. From January 1983 through August 1983, personnel at RJCI were engaged in the on-going training program. One set of training classes were scheduled from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.mand another set of classes were scheduled from 6:30 p.m. until 10:30 p.m., five days a week. During the period from January 1983 through August 1983, shift and post changes were made primarily to allow correctional officers the opportunity to attend the training sessions as required. As superintendent of RJCI, Ken Snover conducted "predetermination conferences" wherein he was required to review allegations, determine whether or not the charges were substantiated and then decide what disciplinary action to take. Superintendent Snover did not apply a lesser standard of proof at predetermination conferences where Petitioner was charged with sleeping/unalertness violations than he applied when white officers were involved. On one occasion Snover found that the allegations of sleeping were not sufficient to warrant disciplinary action against two white employees, Harold Bailey and Walter Dean, where the allegation was made by one sergeant but denied by both correctional officers. At the predetermination conferences that Snover conducted where Petitioner was charged, the allegations were all substantiated by one or more individuals and denied only by Petitioner. Perimeter Post 3 as well as other perimeter posts, are isolated outside security posts and are generally not considered to be the most desirable security post assignments. Both black and white officers were assigned to Perimeter Post 3 and other perimeter posts. A slight majority of the correctional officers permanently assigned to perimeter posts were black. There was no indication that correctional officers were assigned to Perimeter Post 3 on a racial basis nor as a "set up" to achieve dismissal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the complaint and the petition for relief filed by Mr. Terry Wooden. DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of September, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day September, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED::: Drucilla E. Bell, Esq. Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32301 Marva Davis, Esq. 379 E. Jefferson Street P. O. Drawer 551 Quincy, FL 32351 Louie L. Wainwright Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32301 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303 Dana Baird, Esq. General Counsel Florida Commission on. Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 3230 APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in Findings of Fact 1 and 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. The first sentence is rejected as a recitation of testimony. The second sentence is rejected as not supported by Competent substantial evidence. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 31 and 32. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as a recitation of testimony. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 20 and 30. Matters not contained therein are rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Matters not contained therein are rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence and/or misleading. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. 14A. Rejected as subordinate. 14B. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 47. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. 15A. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 22 and 23. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. 15B. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. 16A. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. 16B. Rejected as misleading and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or misleading. Rejected as misleading and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Findings of Fact 25 and 26. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 27,^ 28 and 29. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 26, 27, 28 and 29. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as misleading and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 39, and 41. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate, misleading and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. (No paragraph 34). Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 43. Matters not contained therein are rejected as a recitation of testimony. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 48. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as subordinate. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Rejected as subordinate. Adopted in Findings of Fact 12 and 15. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 16 and 17. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5 and 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 19. - Adopted in Findings of Fact 19 and 20. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 22 and 23. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. Adopted in Findings of Fact 27, 28 and 29. Adopted in Finding of Fact 44. Adopted in Finding of Fact 48. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 31 and 32. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Adopted in Findings of Fact 39 and 47. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 47. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 37. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Adopted in Finding of Fact 35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 36. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 41. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Adopted in Finding of Fact 33. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 41. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Adopted in Finding of Fact 38.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Subsections 943.1395(6), 943.1395(7), and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2003),1 and Florida Administrative Code Rules 11B-27.0011(4)(a), 11B-27.0011(4)(b), and 11B-20.0012(1)(f), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact On December 13, 1991, Ms. Sanders was certified as a correctional officer in the state of Florida. Her correctional officer certificate is numbered 122576. On January 30, 2004, Ms. Sanders was employed as a sergeant by the Florida Department of Corrections at the Brevard Correctional Institution (Brevard), where Joseph Sonntag was an inmate. Mr. Sonntag is a diabetic, who must have insulin injections two times each day. On the morning of Friday, January 30, 2004, Bertie Gladys Florich, a correctional officer at Brevard, went to Mr. Sonntag's cell to awake him to take him to the medical unit for his insulin injection. Mr. Sonntag pulled the cover over his head and did not get up. Ms. Florich told Ms. Sanders that Mr. Sonntag would not get up and asked her to tell him to get up for his injection. Ms. Sanders went into Mr. Sonntag's cell, pulled the cover from Mr. Sonntag, and told his cell mate to leave the cell. Ms. Sanders snatched Mr. Sonntag by the collar of his shirt and flung him across the cell. As he landed, his leg hit the sink. Ms. Florich, who was on the next cell level, heard a thump. She looked at Mr. Sonntag's cell and saw Ms. Sanders helping Mr. Sonntag up. Mr. Sonntag had landed too far from his bunk to have fallen from his bunk. After Ms. Sanders left the cell, Mr. Sonntag told Ms. Florich that Ms. Sanders had pulled him forcibly off his bunk and that he had hurt his leg. Ms. Florich called Sergeant Carter, who was a superior officer. Sergeant Carter went into Mr. Sonntag's cell and came out later, stating that Mr. Sonntag needed to be taken to the medical unit. Mr. Sonntag told a male sergeant that Ms. Sanders had thrown him off the bunk. The male sergeant told Mr. Sonntag that if he made such an allegation that an investigation would be conducted and he would be placed in confinement while the investigation was being conducted. Because he feared being placed in confinement, Mr. Sonntag filled out an incident report, stating that he sustained his injuries by falling off his bunk. Mr. Sonntag was taken to the medical unit for treatment, and he also told medical personnel that he had fallen from his bunk. In an effort to cover up her injury to Mr. Sonntag, on January 30, 2004, Ms. Sanders completed and signed a Report of Injury or Illness, which was submitted to Brevard, indicating that Mr. Sonntag fell off his bunk. The report was false. On Sunday, February 1, 2004, Mr. Sonntag's mother came to visit him at Brevard. He told her that Ms. Sanders had thrown him off his bunk, causing the injury to his leg. Apparently, Mr. Sonntag's mother informed officials at Brevard of her son's allegations, because on Monday, February 2, 2004, Mr. Sonntag was asked by officials at Brevard to give another statement detailing the events that led to his injury. Senior Prison Inspector Barry Glover was assigned to investigate Mr. Sonntag's allegations. As part of the investigation, Mr. Glover interviewed Ms. Florich, who did not actually see how Mr. Sonntag sustained his injuries. While the investigation was being conducted, Ms. Sanders approached Ms. Florich in an attempt to get their stories straight. Ms. Sanders tried to get Ms. Florich to tell the investigator that Mr. Sonntag had either fallen off the bed or jumped off the bed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Lucinda Sanders did not violate Subsection 943.1395(6), Florida Statutes, or Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-20.0012(1)(f); finding that Lucinda Sanders did violate Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes; suspending her Correctional Officer Certificate for two years; placing her on probation for two years following the suspension of her certificate; and requiring her to complete such training courses as deemed appropriate by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2006.
