Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: East Pasco Medical Center (EPMC) is a non-profit 85-bed acute care hospital facility located in the East Pasco subdistrict of HRS District V. There are only two hospitals in the subdistrict -- EPMC in Zephyrhills and Humana in Dade City, which is approximately ten miles north. Humana is a 120- bed acute care hospital facility. Both facilities offer the same services and share the same medical staff. On or about September 17, 1987, EPMC submitted an application for a Certificate of Need to add 35 medical/surgical beds via a fourth floor addition to its existing facility. Its existing 85 beds are located in private rooms, and it is proposed that the additional 35 beds will also be placed in separate rooms. The application submitted to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) projected a total project cost of $4,531,000. This figure was revised at the hearing to a project cost of $2,302,900. With regard to acute care services, the State Health Plan seeks to assure geographic accessibility. All residents of East Pasco County currently have access to acute care hospital services within the travel times suggested by the State plan. The State Health Plan also seeks to promote the efficient utilization of acute care services by attaining an average annual occupancy rate of at least 80 percent. The District V Local Health Plan emphasizes that additions to inpatient acute care beds in a subdistrict should not be considered unless a numeric bed need is shown and certain occupancy thresholds have been met. The recommended occupancy thresholds for medical/surgical beds are 80% for the subdistrict and 90% for the facility seeking to add beds. Application of the bed need methodology contained in HRS's Rule 10- 5.011(1)(m), Florida Administrative Code, indicates a numeric need for 57 additional acute care medical/surgical beds in the East Pasco subdistrict for the planning horizon period of July, 1992. The rule provides that HRS will "not normally approve" additional beds unless average occupancy in the subdistrict is greater than 75 percent. However, the rule permits HRS to award additional beds when there is a calculated need, notwithstanding low occupancy in the subdistrict, if the applicant had a minimum of 75% average occupancy during the 12 months ending 14 months prior to the Letter of Intent. Rule 10- 5.011(1)(m)7.e., Florida Administrative Code. The rule also permits HRS to award additional beds where the calculated numeric need substantially exceeds the number of existing and approved beds in the subdistrict and there is an access problem related to travel time. For the relevant time period, the acute care occupancy rate for the East Pasco subdistrict was below 75% percent. Indeed, over the past few years, the average occupancy rate in that subdistrict has been 54 to 58 percent. Humana only operates at about a 55% occupancy. The East Pasco subdistrict does experience seasonal fluctuations in medical/surgical occupancy, with the season for high occupancy beginning in late October and ending in mid- to late April. In addition to tourists, it is expected that the revival of the citrus industry in East Pasco County will bring more migrant pickers to the area during the peak season months. The seasonal increase in occupancy directly corresponds with a large increase in seasonal population, particularly in the Zephyrhills area. The Zephyrhills area population is much older than the Dade City population and is also much older than the State average. The HRS acute care bed need rule includes considerations of seasonal peak demands. When considering both hospitals in the subdistrict, there has been a decline in peak seasonal occupancy rates over the past few years. While the population of the East Pasco subdistrict has grown, and is expected to increase by approximately 7,200 in 1992, there is a trend of declining utilization in the subdistrict. This decline is due to increased used of outpatient services and shorter lengths of hospital stay attributable to the current reimbursement system. The medical/surgical use rate fell from 454 patient days per 1,000 population in 1986 to 414 patient days per 1,000 population in 1988. There was a similar decline in the acute care use rate. Assuming a constant medical/surgical use rate, the projected demand for 1992 would be 2,980 additional medical/surgical patient days in the subdistrict according to population projections, and about 4,267 incremental patient days according to local health council projections. EPMC's Letter of Intent to add 35 additional beds was filed in mid- July, 1987. Its acute care occupancy rate for the period of April, 1986 through March, 1987 was 75.3 percent. Occupancy at EPMC from May, 1986 to April, 1987 was 73.6%; occupancy from June, 1986 through May, 1987 was 73%; and occupancy from July, 1986 to June, 1987 was 72.2 percent. EPMC does experience periods of high occupancy during the peak season months. High occupancy levels have a greater impact upon smaller hospitals due to their lesser degree of flexibility. On occasion, during the winter months, EPNC is required to refuse admittance to patients due to crowded conditions within its facility. Patients are sometimes transferred or referred to other facilities, including Humana, although the necessity for such transfers or referrals is occasionally due to a lack of intensive or critical care beds as opposed to a lack of medical/surgical beds. During the periods of time when EPMC had high occupancy levels, beds were available at Humana. EPMC's current payor mix includes a high level of Medicare (over 60%), and it is committed, through both its Christian mission and an agreement with the County, to treat indigent and Medicaid patients. The actual amount of indigent or charity care provided by EPNC was not established. In any event, EPMC desires to increase its bed size in order to help maintain a proper payor mix at the hospital so as to ensure the financial survival of the hospital. It is felt that a greater number of beds, given the rise in population, and particularly elderly population, would allow EPNC to serve a greater number of private and/or third party insurance paying patients. While the evidence demonstrates that EPMC may operate with a less favorable payor mix than Humana, the evidence was not sufficient to demonstrate that EPMC will suffer financial ruin without additional beds. Likewise, it was not established that the patients which EPNC must turn away in the winter months are consistently paying patients. Increasing the number of beds at EPNC to 120 beds does not necessarily mean that its profitability would be improved. Volume and payor mix are the most critical factors in determining whether a hospital will be profitable. There is currently a nursing shortage throughout the nation. Rural areas, such as the eastern portion of Pasco County, experience even greater difficulty in attracting nursing personnel to the area. Due to the shortage of nurses, as well as the seasonal demand, EPMC is required to use contract care nurses throughout the year. While it would prefer to employ its own nursing staff, EPMC will use contract staff due to the seasonal variations in its nursing requirements. The use of contract or registry nurses costs 50% to 60% more on a daily basis; however, lower occupancy during the off-peak months does not justify year- round employment for as large an in-house nursing staff. For its proposed 35 beds, EPMC projects nurse manpower requirements as follows: 1 nurse manager, 4.2 R.N. charge nurses, 15.1 R.N. staff and 14.1 L.P.N. staff, for a total of 34.4 full time equivalent nursing positions. The recruiting efforts of EPNC to fill these positions will include advertising, visiting nursing schools and colleges, utilizing student nurses at the hospital and use of the Adventist Health System international network. Humana currently has 15 vacancies, or 12 to 13% of its nursing staff. Humana's nursing salaries have increased 20% over the past eighteen months. As noted above, EPNC and Humana compete for the same nursing personnel. Humana's personnel director believes that if EPNC increases its nursing staff by 34 FTEs, Humana's nursing staff will be approached to fill those positions. As a consequence, Humana will experience additional nursing shortages and will be required to further increase salaries. It is proposed that the project cost of adding 35 beds to EPMC will be financed with 100% debt financing through a bond issue. The financing will be part of a much larger bond issuance intended to finance several other projects within the Adventist hospital system. No evidence was adduced that such a bond issuance had been prepared or approved, and there was no evidence concerning the other projects which would be financed in conjunction with this project. In 1987, EPNC was carrying about five million dollars of negative equity. The hospital is currently greater than 100% financed. As noted above, the original Certificate of Need application filed with HRS listed the total project cost to be $4,531,000. In its response to omissions, EPMC stated that the construction cost would be $175 per square foot. In the updates submitted at the hearing, EPNC proposed a project cost of $2,302,900, which included a construction cost of $85 per square foot. A more reasonable cost for the addition of a floor to an existing facility would be $125 per square foot, plus an inflation factor of 6% and architectural and engineering fees of 6 to 7%. The proposed equipment list submitted by EPNC fails to include major equipment items such as an overhead paging system, a nurse call system, examination room equipment, medication distribution equipment, bed curtains, shower curtains, patient and staff support lounge items, and IV pumps. EPNC's updated equipment cost budget fails to include tax, freight, contingency and installation costs. The projected equipment costs should be tripled to adequately and reasonably equip a 35-bed nursing unit. The projected utilization and pro formas submitted by EPMC are not reasonable and were not supported by competent substantial evidence. EPMC's projected utilization for the proposed 35-bed unit is 8,950 patient days in the first year of operation and 9,580 in the second year of operation. Applying the current use rate to the population projections submitted by EPMC's expert in demographics and population projections produces only about 2,980 additional patient days in the year 1992. Given the fact that EPMC's current market share is approximately 54%, there is no reason to believe that Humana would not absorb at least some of those projected additional patient days. There are many months of the year in which additional patient days could be filled within the existing complement of 85 beds at EPNC. Depending upon the ultimate cost of the project, the break even point for financial feasibility purposes would be approximately 3,500 to 4,000 patient days. The concept behind a pro forma is to develop a financial picture of what operations will be in the first two years of operation. EPMC stated its revenues and expenses in terms of 1988 dollars and used its current revenue- to-expense ratios for projecting operations four years into the future. This is improper because gross revenues are going up, reimbursement is not increasing as rapidly and expenses, particularly salaries and insurance, are increasing. In addition, EPMC's projected 1992 salaries in several categories were less than they are currently paying for such positions. EPMC currently provides good quality of care to its patients. The only future concern in this realm is the fact that in the winter months, its intensive and critical care unit beds are often full and there is no room for additional patients. Additional medical/surgical volume from the proposed 35- bed unit would lead to additional intensive and critical care bed demand.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of East Pasco Medical Center for a Certificate of Need to add 35 acute care beds to its existing facility be DENIED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 30 day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. (Case No. 88-1227) The proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties have been carefully considered and are accepted, incorporated and/or summarized in this Recommended Order, with the following exceptions: Petitioner: Third sentence rejected as not established by competent, substantial evidence. Accepted, but not included as irrelevant to the ultimate resolution of the issues. Rejected. The Personnel Director of Humana presented testimony in this proceeding. Accepted as an accurate restatement of testimony, but rejected as an erroneous conclusion of law. 16. Second sentence rejected as an erroneous conclusion of law. A18. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 20. First sentence rejected as an erroneous conclusion of law. First sentence rejected as an erroneous conclusion of law. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. 27 and 30. Accepted as an accurate restatement of testimony, but rejected as an erroneous conclusion of law. Rejected as immaterial to the issue of need in the year 1992. First sentence rejected as not established by competent substantial evidence. First and third sentences rejected as not established by competent substantial evidence. 37 and 38. Rejected as not established by competent substantial evidence. 44. Last sentence rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence. Accepted only if the factors of volume and payor mix are also considered. Partially rejected as speculative and not supported by competent substantial evidence. All but first two sentences rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence and an erroneous conclusion of law. Rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence and an erroneous conclusion of law. Last sentence rejected as unsupported by the evidence. Rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence. Second sentence rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. 58. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. 60. Rejected as not established by competent substantial evidence. 62 - 67. The actual figures regarding total costs, projected utilization and those figures utilized in the pro formas were not established by competent substantial evidence and, therefore, the findings regarding the financial feasibility of the project are rejected. 71. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. 74. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. 77. Rejected as an improper factual finding and contrary to the evidence. 78 and 79. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. First sentence rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence. Last sentence rejected as unsupported by the evidence. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Respondent: 2 and 6. Partially accepted with the additional considerations of the applicant's occupancy levels and geographic accessibility. 9. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 19(a) Interpretation of rule not sufficiently explicated at hearing. 56 - 58. Actual figures are not established by competent evidence due to the failure to establish with reliability the total costs of the project. Intervenor: Second sentence accepted with the additional considerations of the applicant's occupancy levels and geographic accessibility. Third sentence rejected. Interpretation of rule not sufficiently explicated at hearing. First sentence rejected, but this does not preclude a consideration of such a period. Third sentence rejected as not established by the greater weight of the evidence. 31. Second sentence rejected as speculative. 40 and 41. Accepted as factually correct, but not included due to the showing of unused capacity within the East Pasco subdistrict. 55 and 56. Actual figures are not established by competent evidence due to the failure to establish with reliability the total costs of the project. 63 and 72. Same as above with regard to second sentence. 92. Rejected as an overbroad statement or conclusion. 97. Second sentence rejected as overbroad and not supported by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: E.G. Boone and Jeffrey Boone 1001 Avenida del Circo Post Office Box 1596 Venice, Florida 34284 Stephen M. Presnell Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly Post Office Box 82 Tallahassee, Florida 323a2 James C. Hauser Messer, Vickers, Caparello, French & Madsen, P.A. Post Office Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Esquire General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue is whether Hialeah Hospital, Inc. may be licensed for a 21-bed psychiatric unit, without first obtaining a certificate of need, on the basis that it provided psychiatric services before a certificate of need was statutorily required.
Findings Of Fact Background of the Controversy The Parties The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (the Department) is responsible for determining whether health care projects are subject to review under the Health Facility and Services Development Act, Sections 381.701- 381.715, Florida Statutes. It also licenses hospitals under Chapter 395, Florida Statutes. The Department's Office of Community Medical Facilities renders decisions about requests for grandfather status which would exempt a psychiatric service offered at hospital from certificate of need review. The Department's Office of Licensure and Certification issues licenses but does not grant grandfather exemptions. A hospital will not receive separate licensure for psychiatric beds unless a certificate of need has been obtained for those beds, or the beds are in a psychiatric unit which had been organized before certificate of need review was required. See Section 381.704(2), Florida Statutes (1987). A hospital can provide inpatient psychiatric services to a patient in one of three ways: a) as a patient housed among the general hospital population, b) as a patient housed in a special unit organized within the hospital and staffed by doctors, nurses and other personnel especially to serve patients with psychiatric diagnoses, or c) in a hospital organized as a psychiatric specialty hospital. Serving patients through methods b and c requires special certificate of need approval and licensure. Most community hospitals place psychiatric patients among the general patient population; few hospitals create a distinct psychiatric unit; fewer hospitals still specialize as psychiatric hospitals. Hialeah Hospital, Inc. is a 411-bed general hospital in Hialeah, Florida. It does not currently hold a certificate of need for licensure of a distinct psychiatric unit. As a result, its reimbursement for psychiatric services from the Federal government for Medicare patients is limited. The Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA) generally reimburses hospitals for services based upon flat rates which are paid according to categories known as diagnostic related groups. Hialeah Hospital now receives reimbursement for services it renders to psychiatric patients on this basis. If it is entitled to a grandfather exemption from certificate of need review, and its distinct psychiatric unit is separately licensed by the Department, Hialeah Hospital will receive cost-based reimbursement for services to psychiatric patients, which will result in higher income to the hospital. Approval of the grandfathering request will not result in a) any capital expenditure by the hospital, b) the addition of staff, or c) a change in the type of services currently offered at the hospital. Just before July 1, 1983, the hospital had an average daily census of 16-17 psychiatric patients. If the psychiatric services the hospital has offered do not qualify for grandfathering, Hialeah Hospital may apply for a certificate of need for a distinct psychiatric unit. Even without a psychiatric certificate of need, Hialeah is still entitled to continue to serve patients with psychiatric diagnoses among its general population, and to receive the lower diagnostic related group reimbursement for those services from HCFA. Palmetto General Hospital is a licensed general hospital with 312 acute care beds and 48 separately licensed psychiatric short-term beds operated as a distinct psychiatric unit. It is located near Hialeah Hospital, and both hospitals serve the same geographic area. The primary markets of both hospitals overlap. They compete for patients, including psychiatric patients. Agency Action Under Review From 1973 to 1979 the license issued to Hialeah Hospital by the Department bore a designation for 21 psychiatric beds, based on information submitted in the hospital's licensure application. The hospital then dropped the psychiatric bed count from its licensure applications. This change probably was caused by a problem generated by an announcement from the Northwest Dade Community Health Center, Inc., the receiving facility for psychiatric emergencies in northwestern Dade County, which includes Hialeah. That center had written to the Hialeah Police Department, informing the police that when the center was not open, it had a crisis worker at the Hialeah Hospital emergency room, and that persons needing involuntary psychiatric hospitalization should be taken to the Hialeah Hospital emergency room. The only other hospital in Hialeah treating psychiatric patients was Palmetto General Hospital, which did not accept, as a general rule, patients who could not pay for care. The Hialeah Police Department thereafter began dropping psychiatric patients at Hialeah Hospital, much to the distress of the Hialeah Hospital emergency room staff. The Hospital thereafter dropped the designation of any of its beds as psychiatric beds on its annual licensure applications. It still received psychiatric patients from Jackson Memorial Hospital when that hospital reached its capacity for psychiatric patients. On its 1980 licensure application Hialeah Hospital collapsed all of its medical, surgical and psychiatric beds into a single figure. This was consistent with its practice of serving medical, surgical and psychiatric patients throughout the hospital. Hialeah Hospital filed similar licensure applications in 1981, 1982, 1983. In 1984 there was a dispute over the total number of beds to be licensed, which was resolved in early 1985. In 1985, after a change in the licensing statute which is discussed below, the Department informed Hialeah Hospital that its application for licensure was incomplete and could not be processed until Hialeah explained its basis for seeking separate licensure for 20 short-term psychiatric beds. In its response, Hialeah's Vice President stated: [W]e felt it was appropriate to indicate that Hialeah Hospital did accept psychiatric admissions. These patients have been randomly placed in the institution, many times based on other primary or secondary diagnoses. The application indicates bed usage, not that it is currently a discrete unit. Hialeah Hospital does currently have a Letter of Intent [on file] for establishment of a discrete med/psych unit. Hialeah Ex. 24a On August 1, 1985, the Department's Office of Licensure and Certification informed Hialeah Hospital by certified mail that the application for licensure of 20 short-term psychiatric beds was denied for failure to have obtained a certificate of need for them or to have obtained an exemption from review [both could only come from the Department's Office of Community Medical Facilities]. The hospital was provided a clear point of entry to challenge this determination through a proceeding under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, but Hialeah filed no petition for review of that decision. Instead, Hialeah pursued the certificate of need application which it had filed in April, 1985 for separately licensed psychiatric beds. There was no reason to challenge the August 1, 1985, denial because the factual bases alleged by the Department were true--the hospital had no certificate of need for psychiatric beds and had not yet asked the Department's Office of Community Health Facilities to decide whether Hialeah qualified for grandfathered beds. On October 21 and 23, 1986, Hialeah Hospital wrote to the Office of Community Health Facilities seeking a determination that it was entitled to have 21 pyschiatric beds grandfathered on its license. In certificate of need application 4025 Hialeah Hospital sought the establishment of a distinct 69 bed psychiatric unit at Hialeah, with separately licensed beds. The application went to hearing and was denied on its merits on February 17, 1987, in DOAH Case 85-3998. In his recommended order, the Hearing Officer discussed the issue of whether Hialeah Hospital was exempt from certificate of need review because it already had a psychiatric unit. He found that the issue was not appropriately raised in the proceeding before him, which was Hialeah Hospital's own application for a certificate of need to establish a psychiatric unit. He therefore found he lacked jurisdiction to consider the grandfathering issue. Hialeah Hospital v. HRS, 9 FALR 2363, 2397, paragraph 5 (HRS 1987). The Department adopted that ruling in its May 1, 1987, final order. Id. at 2365. A letter dated December 5, 1986, from the Office of Community Medical Facilities denied Hialeah's request to grandfather 21 short-term psychiatric beds on its license and thereby exempt them from certificate of need review, as requested in Hialeah's letters of October 21 and 23, 1986. The Department denied the grandfathering request for four reasons: When the Department conducted a physical plant survey on June 1, 1980, there were no psychiatric beds in operation at the hospital; The hospital bed count verification form returned to the Department on January 31, 1984 by the Director of Planning for Hialeah, Gene Samnuels, indicated that the hospital had no psychiatric beds; An inventory of psychiatric beds had been published by the Department in the Florida Administrative Weekly on February 17, 1984 which showed that Hialeah Hospital had no psychiatric beds, and Hialeah never contested that inventory; The Department had not received evidence demonstrating that psychiatric services were provided "in a separately set up and staffed unit between 1980 and 1985." This letter again gave Hialeah a point of entry to challenge the Department's decision to deny licensure of psychiatric beds and it was the genesis of Hialeah's petition initiating this case. It is significant that the Department's Office of Community Health Facilities gave Hialeah a clear point of entry to challenge the December 5, 1986, grandfathering denial with full knowledge that the Department's Office of Licensure and Certification had denied a request from Hialeah Hospital on August 1, 1985, to endorse psychiatric beds on Hialeah's 1985 license. The Departmental personnel knew that those two denials involved different issues. Once the Office of Licensure and Certification told the hospital it had to produce either a certificate of need or a grandfathering approval to have psychiatric beds endorsed on its license, the hospital had to turn to the Office of Community Health Facilities to get a ruling on its grandfathering claim. The letter of December 5, 1986, was the first ruling on the merits of Hialeah Hospital's claim that it was entitled to have 21 beds grandfathered. History of the Department's Specialty Bed Recognition Psychiatric Beds in Florida Hospitals Before July 1, 1983 Before April 1, 1983 no state statute or Department rule required that psychiatric beds in a hospital be located in physically distinct units. Psychiatric patients could be located throughout a hospital. They were not required to be placed in rooms having distinguishing characteristics, or to use group therapy rooms, dining rooms, or other rooms exclusively dedicated to use by psychiatric patients. There were, of course, hospitals that had distinct psychiatric units, and some entire hospitals which were specifically licensed as psychiatric hospitals. After 1983, a hospital had to obtain a certificate of need to organize what had previously been diffuse psychiatric services into a distinct unit dedicated to serving patients with psychiatric diagnoses. Today no special certificate of need is required to serve psychiatric patients in the general hospital population, but without separate licensure the hospital receives Medicare reimbursement from the federal government for psychiatric patients at the level established by the diagnostic related groups, not cost based reimbursement. Before July 1, 1983 annual hospital licensure application forms asked hospitals to identify their number of psychiatric beds as an item of information. The hospital licenses issued, however, were based on the hospital's total number of general medical-surgical beds, a category which included psychiatric beds. The 1983 Amendments to the Florida Statutes and the Department's Rules on Specialty Beds In April of 1983, the Department adopted a rule which established a separate need methodology for short-term psychiatric beds, Rule 10-5.11(1)(o), Florida Administrative Code. Thereafter, the Legislature amended the statutes governing the hospital licensing, Section 395.003, Florida Statutes (1983) by adding a new subsection (4) which read: The Department shall issue a license which specifies the number of hospital beds on the face of the license. The number of beds for the rehabilitation or psychiatric service category for which the Department has adopted by rule a specialty bed need methodology under s. 381.494 shall be specified on the face of the hospital license. All beds which are not covered by any specialty bed need methodology shall be specified as general beds. Section 4, Chapter 83-244, Laws of Florida (underlined language was added). In the same Act, the Legislature amended the planning law to require hospitals to apply for certificates of need to change their number of psychiatric and rehabilitation beds. Section 2, Chapter 83-244, Laws of Florida, codified as Section 381.494(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1983). The Department's rules defined short-term psychiatric services as: [A] category of services which provide a 24- hour a day therapeutic milieu for persons suffering from mental health problems which are so severe and acute that they need intensive, full-time care. Acute psychiatric inpatient care is defined as a service not exceeding three months and averaging a length of stay of 30 days or less for adults and a stay of 60 days or less for children and adolescents under 18 years. Rule 10- 5.11(25)(a), Florida Administrative Code (1983), effective April 7, 1983. A minimum size for any new psychiatric unit was prescribed in Rule 10- 5.11(25)(d)7., which states: In order to assure specialized staff and services at a reasonable cost, short-term inpatient psychiatric hospital based services should have at least 15 designated beds. Applicants proposing to build a new but separate psychiatric acute care facility and intending to apply for a specialty hospital license should have a minimum of 50 beds. After the effective date of the rule, April 7, 1983, no hospital could organize its psychiatric services into a distinct psychiatric unit using specialized staff unless the unit would have at least 15 beds. This did not mean that a hospital which already had organized a distinct psychiatric unit using specialized staff had to have at least 15 beds in its unit to continue operation. Whatever the number of beds, whether fewer or greater than 15, that number had to appear on the face of the hospital's license. Section 395.003(4), Florida Statutes (1983). To change that number, the hospital had to go through the certificate of need process. Section 381.494(1)(g) Florida Statutes (1983). Those hospitals whose pre-existing units were endorsed on their licenses can be said to have had those units "grandfathered". There is no specific statutory exemption from certificate of need review for pre-existing units, but such treatment is implicit in the regulatory scheme. The Department's Grandfather Review Process To know which hospitals were entitled to continue to operate discrete psychiatric units without obtaining a certificate of need, the Department's Office of Community Medical Facilities had to identify hospitals which had separate psychiatric units before the July 1, 1983, effective date of Section 395.003(4), Florida Statutes (1983). An inventory of beds in the existing psychiatric units also was necessary to process new certificate of need applications. The Department's rule methodology authorized additional beds in psychiatric units based upon a projected need of 15 beds per 10,000 population. Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)1., Florida Administrative Code (1983). The Legislature approved the psychiatric service categories which the Department had already adopted by rule when it enacted Section 4 of Chapter 83- 244, Laws of Florida. The Legislature thereby validated a process the Department had initiated in 1976 with its Task Force on Institutional Needs. That group had developed methodologies to be used throughout the state to determine the need for different types of medical services, because local health systems agencies were reviewing CON applications based upon idiosyncratic methodologies. To develop review criteria for psychiatric services, the Task Force had to both define psychiatric services and determine how it should measure them. In doing so, the Department looked for assistance to publications of entities such as the American Hospital Association and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. According to the American Hospital Association, psychiatric services are services delivered in beds set up and staffed in units specifically designated for psychiatric services. In the Task Force report, a psychiatric bed was defined as: A bed in a clinical care unit located in a short-term, acute care hospital or psychiatric hospital which is not used to provide long-term institutional care and which is suitably equipped and staffed to provide evaluation, diagnosis, and treatment of persons with emotional disturbances. An inpatient care unit or clinical care unit is a group of inpatient beds and related facilities and assigned personnel in which care is provided to a defined and limited class of patients according to their particular care needs. HRS Exhibit 14 at 92 and 1-5. The definition of a psychiatric bed in the Report of the Department Task Force on Institutional Needs is compatible with the requirements of the Florida Hospital Cost Containment Board in its Florida Hospital Uniform Reporting Manual. Reports made by hospitals to the Hospital Cost Containment Board include information about services provided in separately organized, staffed and equipped hospital units. The information provided to the Board assisted the Department in determining which Florida hospitals already were providing psychiatric services in separately organized, staffed and equipped hospital units before separate licensure became necessary. The Department surveyed hospitals to determine the number of existing beds in distinct psychiatric units. It also looked to old certificates of need which referenced psychiatric services at hospitals, reports hospitals had made to the Florida Hospital Cost Containment Board, to past licensure applications the Department had received from hospitals, and to the Department's 1980 physical plant survey. These sources of information were, however, imperfect, for the reasons which follow: 1. Certificates of Need Issued 22. Before July 1, 1983, certificates of need were required for the initiation of new services which involved capital expenditures above a certain threshold dollar amount. Hospitals which had a long-standing psychiatric units would have had no occasion to request a certificate of need for psychiatric services. Review of certificates issued would not turn up a hospital with a mature psychiatric service. 2. Hospital Cost Containment Board Information 23. The reports from hospitals during the early years of the Hospital Cost Containment Board are not entirely reliable, because the hospitals did not yet have uniform accounting systems in place, despite the Board's attempt to establish uniform accounting methods through its reporting system manual. Hospitals commonly made errors in their reports. If the reports were prepared correctly, they would identify hospitals with discrete psychiatric units. Hialeah's HCCB Reports for 1981, 1982 and 1983 indicated that the hospital had no active psychiatric staff, no psychiatric beds and no psychiatric services. 3. Departmental Survey Letters 24. In Spring, 1983, the Department tried to verify the existing inventory of beds for specialty services such as psychiatric services, comprehensive medical rehabilitation services and substance abuse services. There is no record, however, that this survey letter was sent to Hialeah Hospital. In late 1983 or early 1984, the Department again attempted to establish inventories for psychiatric beds and rehabilitation beds. It distributed a cover letter and a form entitled "Hospital Bed Count Verification", which asked hospitals to confirm the Department's preliminary count of the hospital's "number of licensed beds". Hialeah's planner returned the form verifying that Hialeah Hospital was licensed for 411 "acute general" beds and that it had no short or long term psychiatric beds. The answer was correct, for that is the figure which appeared on Hialeah's license at that time. The Department did not ask the hospitals for an average daily census of short-term psychiatric patients. The cover letter for the survey form told hospital administrators that the Department was seeking to verify its preliminary bed count for services for which a special bed need methodology had been established, viz., long and short term psychiatric beds, substance abuse beds and comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds. The cover letter drew attention to the Department's intention to use the data collected from the responses to the form as a beginning inventory for short-term psychiatric beds. The cover letter also cautioned hospitals that when completing the form, they should "keep in mind the service definitions". Copies of the definitions were attached to the form. The appropriate inference to be drawn from the answer given by Hialeah Hospital to the survey form was that in January, 1984, the hospital had no beds organized into a short term psychiatric unit. This is consistent with the later letter from the hospital's vice president quoted in Finding of Fact 6, above. The Department published on February 17, 1984, its base inventory of psychiatric and rehabilitation beds in the Florida Administrative Weekly. The publication stated that "any hospital wishing to change the number of beds dedicated to one of the specific bed types listed will first be required to obtain a certificate of need." 10 Florida Administrative Weekly at 493. Hialeah was shown as having no psychiatric beds. Id. at 498. The notice did not specifically inform the hospitals of the right to petition for a formal hearing to challenge the inventory figures published. 4. Licensure Files 25. Although, the Department's licensure application form listed "psychiatric" as a possible hospital bed utilization category before 1983, these categories were set up for informational purposes only. No definitions were given to hospitals describing how beds should be allocated among the categories available on the form, making those figures unreliable. Before 1980 Hialeah Hospital had listed psychiatric beds on its licensure applications, see Finding of Fact 5, above. Since 1980 it listed no psychiatric beds. 5. Physical Plant Survey The Department performed a physical plant survey in 1980 to determine the total number of beds in service at each hospital. That survey did not attempt to make distinctions between different types of services listed on the survey form. The Department's architect who performed the survey did not attempt to evaluate the quality or intensity of the psychiatric services provided at any hospital. Each of the types of information the Department examined to determine the existing inventory of short-term psychiatric beds in 1983 had weaknesses, and no single source is dispositive. It is difficult to credit the assertion that Hialeah Hospital had a distinct psychiatric unit before July, 1983 which was not reflected in any of these sources of information. The use of multiple sources of information served as a cross-check on information from each source. It is understandable that Hialeah would not have applied for a certificate of need to operate a separate psychiatric unit. Before 1983, no such application was needed if the establishment of the unit entailed an expenditure of money below a threshold amount. All of its reports to the Hospital Cost Containment Board, however, indicate that there was no separate psychiatric service at the hospital and that the hospital had no active psychiatric staff. With respect to the Department's survey letters, while the 1984 survey form itself did not specifically inform hospital administrators that their responses would be used to establish a base inventory of psychiatric beds, the cover letter did make that clear. This should have put the hospital's planner, who filled out the form, on notice that if Hialeah had a discrete, short-term psychiatric service the number of beds in that unit should be listed. What is perhaps the most significant point is that the hospital reported no psychiatric beds on its licensure application at all from 1980 to 1985. Medical doctors in general practice can and do treat psychiatric patients, in addition to doctors who specialize in psychiatry. No doubt patients commonly were admitted to the hospital who had primary diagnoses of psychiatric illnesses. The hospital's licensure filings, however, since 1979 fail to record any psychiatric beds. This is important evidence that the hospital did not regard itself as having any distinct unit organized to provide psychiatric care. The Hospital's 1985 correspondence from the Hospital's vice president to the Department, quoted in Finding of Fact 6 confirms this. The failure to list any psychiatric beds at Hialeah on the Department's 1980 physical plant survey is not significant, since determining the number of psychiatric beds was not the focus of that survey. It is true that the Department never conducted site visits at all hospitals to determine whether they had a) distinct psychiatric units, b) psychiatric medical directors, c) written psychiatric admission and treatment policies, or d) psychiatric policy and procedures manuals. The efforts the Department did make to establish the beginning inventory of psychiatric beds were reasonable, however Hialeah Hospital's Licensure History and Efforts to Obtain Grandfather Status The entries on Hialeah's applications for annual licensure from the Department are cataloged above, and need not be repeated. During the years 1980-84, after it ceased listing psychiatric beds on its licensure application, psychiatric services were still being provided to patients throughout the hospital. In 1984, the hospital engaged in correspondence with the Department over the appropriate number of licensed beds for the hospital as a whole. Ultimately the hospital and the Department agreed that 411 beds should be licensed. In its 1985 licensure application, Hialeah then requested that 20 short-term psychiatric beds be listed on the license. The Office of Licensure and Certification questioned this. Ultimately, the Office of Licensure and Certification refused to endorse those 20 psychiatric beds on the license because there was no certificate of need on file for them, nor any statement from the Office of Community Medical Facilities granting the hospital an exemption from that licensure requirement. Hialeah Hospital did not challenge that decision in a proceeding under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The discussions between the hospital and the Department's Office of Community Medical Facilities continued, and by late October, 1986, Hialeah requested the Department to approve 21 short-term psychiatric beds at the facility, and sent the Department backup material which it believed justified a grandfather determination. After review, the Department denied the grandfather request by letter dated December 5, 1986. The Department's Action Regarding Other Grandfathering Requests Hialeah's is not the first request the Department received for grandfathering beds. After June of 1983, when the Legislature required CON approval for hospitals to change their number of psychiatric or rehabilitation beds, a number of institutions made similar requests. 1. Comprehensive Medical Rehabilitation Beds The rule on comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds was developed by the Department at the same time as the rule on psychiatric beds. The Department used a similar process to determine the existing inventory of both types of beds. The Department determined that preexisting comprehensive medical rehabilitation units at Parkway General Hospital, Naples Community Hospital, Orlando Regional Medical Center, Holy Cross Hospital, and University Community Hospital entitled those facilities to grandfathering of their comprehensive medical rehabilitation services. The Department has also determined that a preexisting distinct psychiatric unit at Palmetto General Hospital entitled that institution to grandfather status for its psychiatric beds. Parkway General Parkway General Hospital did not specify rehabilitation beds on its licensure applications for the years 1980 through 1984. The Department denied Parkway's request for endorsement of 12 comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds on its 1985 license because Parkway had not obtained a certificate of need for them or an exemption from review. The Department thereafter determined that Parkway had been providing comprehensive medical rehabilitation services before June, 1983 in a physically distinct and separately staffed unit consisting of 12 beds. It then endorsed 12 beds on Parkway's license, even though the rule which became effective in July, 1983 would require a minimum unit size of 20 beds for any hospital organizing a new comprehensive medical rehabilitation unit. See Rule 10-5.011(24), Florida Administrative Code. Naples Community Hospital The Department granted Naples Community Hospital a grandfather exemption for its rehabilitation beds in February, 1987. In had not listed the rehabilitation beds on its license application for the years 1983-1985, had not returned the Department's bed count verification form, nor did it challenge the bed count which the Department published in the Florida Administrative Weekly. The hospital had applied for and received a certificate of need in January of 1981 to establish a 22-bed rehabilitation unit and that unit began operation in late 1982. The Department ultimately determined that the hospital had provided rehabilitation services in a physically distinct unit and the services were organized and delivered in a manner consistent with applicable regulatory standards. It granted a grandfather request in February, 1987. Orlando Regional Medical Center A grandfather exemption for 16 rehabilitation beds was granted to Orlando Medical Center in 1986. The 16-bed brain injury unit had been authorized by the Department through certificate of need number 2114 before the Department had adopted its rule governing comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds in 1983. The services were provided in a physically distinct unit. The Department determined the 20-bed minimum size for a new unit did not apply to a unit which qualified for grandfathering. Holy Cross Hospital The Department granted a grandfather exemption for comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds to Holy Cross Hospital after a proceeding was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings to require the Department to recognize the existence of a 20-bed comprehensive medical rehabilitation center. The Department determined by a site visit that Holy Cross had established a separate unit, probably in 1974, long before the Department's comprehensive medical rehabilitation unit rule became effective in July, 1983. The unit had its own policy manual, quality assurance reports, patient screening criteria, and minutes of multidisciplinary team staff conferences. The hospital had neglected to report the unit in its filings with the Hospital Cost Containment Board but the hospital contended that it never treated the unit as a separate unit for accounting purposes, and had not understood the need to report the unit as a distinct one under Hospital Cost Containment Board reporting guidelines. The hospital corrected its reporting oversight. The grandfathering is consistent with the hospital's actual establishment of the unit long before the Department's rules went into effect. University Community Hospital A dispute over whether to grandfather a comprehensive medical rehabilitation unit which went through a Chapter 120 administrative hearing and entry of a final order involved University Community Hospital (UCH). The Department initially determined that the nine comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds at UCH had been in existence before July, 1983 and were exempt from certificate of need review. That decision was challenged in a formal administrative proceeding by a competing hospital, Tampa General. The competitor was successful, for both the Hearing Officer in the recommended order and the Department in the final order determined that University Community Hospital's 9 bed rehabilitation unit was not entitled to be grandfathered. University Community Hospital v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 11 FALR 1150 (HRS Feb. 14, 1989). In determining that grandfathering was inappropriate, the Department found that the hospital had not prepared separate policies and procedures for its rehabilitation unit before the rule on comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds became effective, and that the unit did not have a physical therapy room on the same floor as the patients. The beds supposedly dedicated to rehabilitative care were mixed with non- rehabilitative beds, so that a semiprivate room might have one bed used for rehabilitative care and another for an unrelated type of care. This conflicted with the requirement that the rehabilitation unit be physically distinct, with all patients and support services located on the same area or floor, rather than scattered throughout the hospital. The Department also determined that many hospitals offer physical therapy, occupational therapy, or speech therapy, but that to qualify as a comprehensive medical rehabilitation center, these services had to be coordinated in a multidisciplinary approach to the patient's needs, which had not been the case at University Community Hospital. The common strand running through the grandfathering decisions on comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds is that grandfathering is appropriate when a hospital demonstrates that before the comprehensive medical rehabilitation rule became effective in July, 1983, it had a separate unit which met the standards and criteria for a comprehensive medical rehabilitation unit (other than the minimum size for new units). Psychiatric Beds Tampa General Hospital Only two cases involve a decision on whether psychiatric services at a hospital qualify for grandfathering. Tampa General Hospital, which was owned by the Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, operated 93 psychiatric beds in 1981, 71 at Hillsborough County Hospital and 22 at Tampa General Hospital. A certificate of need granted in 1981 authorized the expenditure of $127,310,000 for the consolidation of both hospitals and an overall reduction of 14 psychiatric beds after the hospitals were integrated. When the Hillsborough County Hospital Authority obtained its certificate of need, it was not necessary to differentiate between general acute care beds and psychiatric beds for licensure purposes. Increased demand for acute care beds led Tampa General to close its psychiatric unit and make those 22 beds available for ordinary acute care. After the 1983 statutory and rule changes regarding the separate licensure of psychiatric beds, the Hillsborough County Hospital Authority told the Department that Tampa General had no psychiatric beds in operation. On its 1985 licensure application, the Hillsborough County Hospital Authority applied for licensure for 22 psychiatric beds at Tampa General and 77 at Hillsborough Hospital. The Department denied the request for the psychiatric beds at Tampa General. The Final Order entered in Hillsborough County Hospital Authority v. HRS, 8 FALR 1409 (Feb. 16, 1986), determined that there had been a discontinuation in the use of psychiatric beds at Tampa General, and that to allow Tampa General to add psychiatric beds after the statutory and rule changes in 1983 would frustrate the certificate of need process and would be detrimental to good health care planning. Palmetto General Hospital Palmetto General Hospital participated in an administrative hearing in 1975 regarding the disapproval of its proposed expansion, which included the dedication of one floor and 48 beds as a psychiatric unit. The Hearing Officer found that there was a need for psychiatric beds in the community and recommended that the Secretary of the Department issue a certificate of need "for that portion of the applicant's proposed capital expenditures relating to the addition of a 48 bed psychiatric unit". Palmetto General Exhibit 32, at 12, paragraph 2. The order of the Hearing Officer was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal in Palmetto General Hospital, Inc. v. Department of HRS, 333 So.2d 531 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). The approval of the 48 psychiatric beds is clear only from a review of the Hearing Officer's order. Certificate of Need 292X was issued for the 48 psychiatric beds. Palmetto General exhibit 45. Palmetto received Medicare certification for its psychiatric inpatient unit, and listed 48 short-term psychiatric beds on its licensure applications each year from 1979 to 1983. It failed to show its psychiatric beds on the bed count verification survey form sent by the Department. Palmetto General's chief financial officer told the Department on June 10, 1983 that Palmetto General did not have psychiatric beds in a separately organized and staffed unit. This resulted in the issuance of a license which showed no psychiatric beds. The Department itself wrote to the administrator of Palmetto to learn why the 48 short-term psychiatric beds had not been listed on Palmetto's application for licensure in 1985. Palmetto wrote back and acknowledged that it did have 48 short-term psychiatric beds. A license showing those 48 beds was then issued. Thereafter, staff from the HRS Office of Comprehensive Health Planning took the position that the 48 short-term psychiatric beds should not have been listed on the license, and the Department's Office of Licensure and Certification requested that the 1985 license containing the endorsement for those 48 psychiatric beds be returned to the Department for cancellation. Palmetto then sought an administrative hearing on the attempted cancellation of the license. Palmetto and the Department entered into a Final Order dated March 9, 1986 which agreed that Palmetto met all the requirements for the designation of 48 short-term psychiatric beds on its license. Palmetto, had, in fact, operated a 48 bed psychiatric unit on its third floor since 1981, but moved that unit to the sixth floor in 1985. It was dedicated exclusively to psychiatric patients and there were specific policy and procedure manuals developed and used in dealing with psychiatric patients since 1981. The history of Palmetto's licensure is certainly one replete with contradictions. It is inexplicable that the chief financial officer of the hospital would have told the Department in 1983 that it had no separately organized and staffed psychiatric unit when, in fact, it had such a unit. It was also unclear why it would have shown no psychiatric beds on the bed count verification form returned in late December or early January, 1984, or why its April, 1983, and its 1985/1986 license application forms listed no psychiatric beds. Nonetheless, it had obtained a certificate of need for a psychiatric unit after administrative litigation and an appeal to the District Court of Appeal. The unit was opened and remained continuously in existence. It had appropriate policies and procedures in place for a distinct psychiatric unit as the 1983 statutory and rule amendments required for separate licensure of psychiatric beds. History of Psychiatric Bed Services at Hialeah Hospital Since at least 1958, Hialeah Hospital has had psychiatrists on its medical staff, and the number of psychiatric physicians on staff has increased. Thirteen psychiatrists had admitting privileges at the hospital by 1983; there are now 23 psychiatrists with privileges. As is true with most community hospitals, physicians specializing in psychiatry would admit patients to the general population at Hialeah Hospital if they needed intensive psychotherapy or medication which needed to be monitored by nurses. Patients who were homicidal, suicidal or intensely psychotic were not admitted to Hialeah Hospital. Those patients need a more intensive psychiatric environment, either in a locked psychiatric unit or in a psychiatric specialty hospital. The persons physicians placed at Hialeah through 1983 did not need the intensive services of a discrete psychiatric unit. Hialeah Hospital indicated on its licensure application to the Department that it had 21 psychiatric beds throughout the 1970's, but ceased this listing in the 1980's as set forth in Finding of Fact 5 above. The nature of the services available at the hospital had remained constant. Under the psychiatric diagnosis coding system published in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual III, (which is commonly used by psychiatrists) Hialeah Hospital had an average daily census of 25 patients with primary or secondary psychiatric diagnoses in 1980, and 18 in 1981. Only about 25 percent of those patients had a primary psychiatric discharge diagnosis. The additional patients had secondary psychiatric diagnoses. Hialeah must rely on these secondary diagnoses to argue that its average daily census for psychiatric patients approached 21 beds. It was not until 1985 that Hialeah consolidated its psychiatric services to a medical/psychiatric unit. That unit serves patients with medical and psychiatric diagnosis as well as patients with solely psychiatric diagnoses. Before 1983, there was no medical director of psychiatry at Hialeah Hospital, and no separate policies and procedures for the admission of patients to a psychiatric unit, nor any staff dedicated to the care of psychiatric patients. To be sure, the hospital was in a position to provide quality psychiatric care to patients whose needs were psychotherapy, monitored medication, or individual counseling by psychiatric physicians and nurses. This reflects the reality that not all patients who need to be placed in the hospital for psychiatric care require the services of a separate medical/psychiatric unit. Patients with more acute psychiatric illness do need interdisciplinary approaches to their care. These interdisciplinary approaches are more expensive than serving psychiatric patients in the general hospital population. This is why the Federal government provides higher, cost-based reimbursement to the hospitals with specialty psychiatric licenses. Hialeah has not proven that the psychiatric services it was providing before 1983 were significantly different from those provided in typical community hospitals which did not have distinct psychiatric units. Hialeah's long-standing relationship with the Northwest Community Mental Health Center is not especially significant. Certainly, the Center was aware that Hialeah was a potential source of psychiatric care. Baker Act patients who needed hospitalization were taken there between 1980 and 1983. There was a flow of patients back and forth between the Center and the hospital's inpatient population, and discharge plans by Hialeah's social workers included referrals back to the Mental Health Center for follow-up and outpatient care. Similarly, the Dade-Monroe Mental Health Board knew that Hialeah was a potential provider of inpatient psychiatric services. The predecessor to the current local health council, the health systems agency of South Florida, recorded that there were psychiatric admissions at Hialeah Hospital in the early 1980's, and the health systems agency recommended a conversion of existing beds to psychiatric services because of a need for additional psychiatric services in the area. None of this, however, means that Hialeah had operated a distinct psychiatric unit before 1983 which entitles it to grandfather status.
Recommendation It is recommended that the application of Hialeah Hospital for grandfather status for 21 short-term psychiatric beds, and the inclusion of those short-term psychiatric beds on its license and on the Department's bed inventory be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of October, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 1989.
The Issue Whether Certificate of Need Application Number 9099, filed by Columbia/JFK Medical Center, L.P., d/b/a JFK Medical Center, to convert 20 skilled nursing beds to 20 acute care beds, meets the criteria for approval.
Findings Of Fact Columbia/JFK Medical Center, L.P., d/b/a JFK Medical Center (JFK) is the applicant for Certificate of Need (CON) Number 9099 to convert a 20-bed hospital-based skilled nursing unit (SNU) to 20 general acute care or medical/surgical beds. The construction cost is approximately $117,000, of the total project cost of $151,668. JFK is an affiliate of Columbia Hospital System (Columbia), the largest for-profit hospital chain in the United States. The Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) is the state agency which administers the CON program for health care services and facilities in Florida. JFK is a 343-bed hospital located in Atlantis, Florida, in Palm Beach County, AHCA District 9, Subdistrict 5. Pursuant to a previously approved CON, an additional 24 acute care beds are under construction at JFK, along with 12 CON-exempt observation beds, at a cost of approximately $4 million. In August 1998, JFK was allowed to convert 10 substance abuse beds to 10 acute care beds. Other acute care hospitals in District 9 include the Petitioners: St. Mary's Hospital, Inc. (St. Mary's), and Good Samaritan Hospital, Inc. (Good Samaritan), which are located in northern Palm Beach County, AHCA District 9, Subdistrict 4, approximately 11 and 9 miles, respectively, from JFK. The remaining hospitals in District 9, Subdistrict 5, in southern Palm Beach County, and their approximate distances from JFK are as follows: Wellington (8 miles), Bethesda (7 miles), West Boca (18 miles), Delray (12 miles), and Boca Raton Community (17 miles). JFK and Delray are both "cardiac" hospitals offering open heart surgery services, with active emergency rooms, and more elderly patients in their respective service areas. The parties stipulated to the following facts: JFK's CON application was submitted in the Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA") second hospital batching cycle in 1998, and was the only acute care bed application submitted from acute care bed District 9, Subdistrict 5. AHCA noticed its decision to approve JFK's CON 9099 by publication in Volume 25, Number 1, Florida Administrative Weekly, dated January 8, 1999. Good Samaritan and St. Mary's each timely filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Proceeding challenging approval of JFK's CON application. By Order dated March 17, 1999, the cases arising from those petitions were consolidated for the purposes of all future proceedings. JFK has the ability to provide quality care and has a record of providing quality of care. §408.035(1)((c), Fla. Stat. JFK's CON application, at Schedule 6 and otherwise, projects all necessary staff positions and adequate numbers of staff, and projects sufficient salary and related compensation. See, §408.035(1)(h). JFK has available the resources, including health personnel, management personnel, and funds for capital and operating expenditures, for project accomplishment and operation. See, §408.035(1)(h), Fla. Stat. JFK's CON application proposal is financially feasible in the immediate term. §408.035(1)(i), Fla. Stat. JFK's CON application proposal is financially feasible in the long term, except, Good Samaritan and St. Mary's contend as it relates to projected utilization. §408.035(1)(i), Fla. Stat. Schedules 9 and 10 and the architectural schematics in JFK's application are complete and satisfy all applicable CON application requirements. Schedule 1 in the application is complete, reasonable, and not at issue. JFK's proposed construction/renovation design, costs, and methods of construction/renovation are reasonable and satisfy all applicable requirements. See, §408.035(1)(m), Fla. Stat. JFK's CON application satisfies all minimum application content requirements in Section 408.037(1), Florida Statutes; except that Good Samaritan and St. Mary's contend that subsection (1)(a), is not satisfied. JFK certified that it will license and operate the facility if its CON proposal is approved. See, §408.037(2), Fla. Stat. JFK's Letter of Intent was timely filed and legally sufficient. See, §408.039(2)(a) and (c), Fla. Stat. Good Samaritan does not provide cardiac catheterization services, angioplasty, or open heart surgery. St. Mary's does not provide elective angioplasty or open heart surgery services. JFK is one of the hospitals to which Good Samaritan and St. Mary's transfer patients in need of inpatient cardiac catheterization services, angioplasty, and open heart surgery. Neither Good Samaritan nor St. Mary's have any present plans to apply for CON approval to add skilled nursing beds or acute care beds. The parties also stipulated that Subsections 408.035(1)(e), (f), (g), (h) - as related to training health professionals, (j), (k), and (2), Florida Statutes, are not at issue or not applicable to this proposal. For the batching cycle in which JFK applied for CON Number 9099, AHCA published a fixed need of zero for District 9, acute care subdistrict 5. In the absence of a numeric need for additional acute care beds in the subdistrict, JFK relied on not normal circumstances to support the need for its proposal, including the following: delays in admitting patients arriving through the emergency room to inpatient beds, delays in moving patients from surgery to recovery to acute care beds, and seasonal variations in occupancy exceeding optimal levels and, at times, exceeding 100%. Good Samaritan and St. Mary's oppose JFK's CON application. In general, these Petitioners claimed that other problems cause overcrowding in the emergency room at JFK, that the type of beds proposed will not be appropriate for the needs of most patients, that "seasonality" is not unique to or as extreme at JFK, and that a hospital-specific occupancy level below that set by rule cannot constitute a special or not normal circumstance. If JFK achieves the projected utilization, experts for Good Samaritan and St. Mary's also projected adverse financial consequences for those hospitals. Rule 59C-1.038(5) - special circumstances During the hearing, the parties stipulated that the numeric need for new acute care beds in the subdistrict is zero. The rule for determining numeric need also includes the following provision: (5) Approval Under Special Circumstances. Regardless of the subdistrict's average annual occupancy rate, need for additional acute care beds at an existing hospital is demonstrated if the hospital's average occupancy rate based on inpatient utilization of all licensed acute care beds is at or exceeds 80 percent. The determination of the average occupancy rate shall be made based on the average 12 months occupancy rate for the reporting period specified in section (4). Proposals for additional beds submitted by facilities qualifying under this subsection shall be reviewed in context with the applicable review criteria in section 408.035, F.S. The applicable time period for the special circumstances provision is calendar year 1997. JFK's reported acute care occupancy was 76.29% in 1997, and 79.7% in 1998, not 80%, as required by the rule. JFK and AHCA take the position that other special circumstances may, nevertheless, be and have been the basis for the approval of additional acute care beds. JFK also maintained that the reported average occupancy levels understated the demand for and actual use of its inpatient beds. Due to seasonal fluctuations caused by the influx of winter residents, JFK reached or exceeded 100% occupancy on 5 or 6 days, exceeded 80% occupancy on 20 days, and averaged 90.9% occupancy, in January 1999. In February 1999, the average was 96.5%, but was over 100% on 8 days, and over 90% on 25 days. In March 1999, the average occupancy was 90.1%, but exceeded 100% on one day, and 90% on 17 days. In recent years, the "season" also has extended into more months, from approximately Thanksgiving to Easter or Passover. It also includes flu season which disproportionately affects the health of the elderly. JFK also demonstrated that occupancy varies based on the day of the week, generally highest on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays and lowest on weekends. JFK's acute care beds were also occupied by patients who were not classified as 24-hour medical/surgical inpatients. Others included observation and 23-hour patients, covered by Medicare or health maintenance organizations (HMOs). Some of those patients were classified initially as outpatients to lower reimbursement rates, but routinely subsequently reclassified and admitted as inpatients. In fact, during the applicable time period for determining occupancy, Medicare allowed patients to be classified as outpatients for up to 72-hour hospital stays. Subsequently, Medicare reduced the allowable hospital stay to 48 hours for all "outpatients," according to AHCA's expert witness. When not classified as inpatients, patients are not counted in average occupancy rates which are based solely on the admitted inpatient census, counted each midnight. For example, in February 1999, the average daily census for 23-hour patients was 10.8 patients, which, when combined with 24-hour patients, results in an average occupancy of 99.7% for the month. Due to the Medicare classification system, some but not all of the so- called 23-hour patients affect the accuracy of the inpatient utilization data. According to AHCA's expert witness, however, numeric need cannot be determined because of JFK's failure to quantify the number of Medicare patients who actually affected the acute care bed utilization. The 23-hour or observation patients may use, but do not require CON-approved and licensed acute care beds. Instead, those patients may be held in either non-CON, non-licensed "observation" beds or in licensed acute care beds. As AHCA determined, to the extent that 23-hour patients in reality stayed longer, and adversely affected JFK's ability to accommodate acute care patients, their presence can be considered to determine if special circumstances exist. Combining 24-hour and 23-hour patients, JFK experienced an occupancy rate of 80% in 1996, and 85.7% in 1997. While some of the 23-hour patients were, in fact, outpatients who should not be considered and others stayed from 24 hours up to 3 days and should be considered, JFK's proportion of Medicare services is important to determining whether special circumstances based on acute care utilization exist. With 74% of all JFK patients in the Medicare category, but without having exact numbers, it is more reasonable than not to conclude that the occupancy level is between the range of 76.29% for acute care only and 85.7% for acute care and 23-hour patients. A reasonable inference is that JFK achieved at least 80% occupancy of patients who were in reality inpatients in its acute care beds in 1997. The expert health planner for the Petitioners conceded that bed availability declines, capacity is a constraint, and high occupancy becomes a barrier to service at some level between 80 and 83% occupancy. In a prior CON filed on behalf of Good Samaritan for a 4-bed addition to an 11-bed neonatal intensive care unit (NICU), the same expert asserted that 76% occupancy was a reasonable utilization standard. That occupancy level was based on the desire to maintain 95% bed availability. An exact comparison of the occupancy levels in this and the NICU case, however, is impossible due to the small size of the NICU unit and the fact that the applicant met the occupancy level in that rule for special circumstances. The statistical data on the number patients actually using acute care beds at JFK in excess of 24-hours despite their classification, supports its claim of overcrowding. Emergency Room Conditions JFK described overcrowding in its emergency department as another special circumstance creating a need for additional acute care beds. The emergency room at JFK has 37 bays each with a bed and another 15 to 17 spaces used for stretchers. Eighteen parking spaces are reserved for ambulances in front of the emergency department. It is not uncommon for a patient to wait in the JFK emergency room up to 24 hours after being admitted to the hospital, before being moved to an acute care bed. In February 1999, after having converted 10 substance abuse beds to acute care beds in October 1998, JFK still provided 234 patient days of acute care in the emergency department. The waiting time for patients to receive a bed after being admitted through the emergency department ranged from 10 hours to 5 days in the winter, and from an average of 6 hours up to 24 hours in the summer. While JFK claims that the quality of care is not adversely affected, it does note that patient privacy and comfort are compromised due to the noise, lights, activity, and lack of space for visitors in the emergency room. JFK's patients tend to be older and sicker than the average. As a result, more patients arriving at its emergency room are admitted to the hospital. In the winter of 1998, JFK was holding up to 35 acute care inpatients at a time in the emergency room. Nationally, from 15% to 20% of emergency room patients are admitted to hospitals. By contrast, almost twice that number, or one-third of JFK's emergency room patients become admitted inpatients. Emergency room admissions are also a substantial number of total admissions at JFK. In calendar year 1998, slightly more than 65% of all inpatient admissions to JFK arrived through the emergency room, most by ambulance. Ambulance arrivals at any particular hospital are often dictated by the patient's condition, with unstable patients directed to the nearest hospital. Once patients are stabilized in the emergency room at JFK, those requiring obstetric, pediatric, or psychiatric admissions are transferred from JFK which does not provide those inpatient services. Emergency room patients in need of acute care services provided at JFK, like the neonates at issue in the prior Good Samaritan application, are unlikely candidates for transfer The emergency room at JFK receives up to 50,000 patient visits a year, up from approximately 32,000 annual visits five years ago. JFK operates one of the largest and busiest emergency departments in Palm Beach County. Due to overcrowding in the emergency department at Delray Hospital, in southern Palm Beach County, patients have been diverted to other facilities, including JFK. In terms of square footage, JFK's emergency room does not meet the standards to accommodate the 52 to 54 bays and stretchers and related activities. JFK lacks adequate space for support services which should also be available in the emergency department. The Petitioners asserted that enlarging the emergency room will alleviate its problems. JFK demonstrated, however, that regardless of the physical size of the emergency room, optimal patient care requires more capacity to transfer patients faster to acute care beds outside the emergency department. Conditions in Other Departments Of 343 operational beds at JFK at the time of the final hearing, 290 were monitored or telemetry acute care beds, 30 were critical care beds, and 23 were non-monitored, non-critical care beds. Most of the monitored beds are in rooms equipped with antennae to transmit data from electrodes and monitors when attached to patients. When monitoring is not necessary, the same beds are used by regular acute care patients. The large number of monitored beds located throughout the hospital in various units reflects JFK's largely elderly population and specialization in cardiology. In 1998, 820 inpatient cardiac catheterizations (caths) were performed at JFK. Petitioners Good Samaritan and St. Mary's transferred 90 and 28 of those cath patients, respectively to JFK. In the first five months of 1999, 449 caths were performed, including procedures on 35 patients transferred from Good Samaritan and 16 from St. Mary's. Cath lab patients are held in the lab longer after their procedures when beds are not available in cardiac or the post- anesthesia care units. The Petitioners suggested that cath lab patients could be placed in a 12-bed holding area added to the lab in July 1999; however, that space was expected to be filled by patients being prepared for caths. Open heart surgery is available in Palm Beach County at three hospitals, Delray, JFK and Palm Beach Gardens. Patients admitted to JFK for other primary diagnoses often require cardiac monitoring even though they are not in a cardiac unit. The additional 24 beds which were under construction at the time of the final hearing will also be monitored beds. The 20 beds at issue in this proceeding will not be monitored. The Petitioners questioned whether non-monitored beds will alleviate overcrowding at JFK where so many patients require monitoring. JFK physicians in various specialties testified concerning conditions in other areas of the hospital. A nephrologist, who consults primarily in intensive care units, described the backlog and delay in moving patients from intensive care into acute care beds. A cardiologist noted that patients are taking telemetry beds they do not need because there is no other place to put them. A general and vascular surgeon described the overcrowding as a problem with the ability to move patients from more to less intensive care when appropriate. Elective surgeries have been delayed to be sure that patients will have beds following surgery. The evidence presented by JFK supports the conclusion that the additional acute care beds will assist in alleviating overcrowding in other hospital units, including backlogs in the existing monitored beds. JFK has established as factual bases for special circumstances that its high occupancy exceeds the optimal much of the year, aggravated by seasonal fluctuations; that it has relatively large emergency room admissions over which it has no control; and that its intensive care and monitored beds are not available when needed. Number of Beds Needed With the conversion, in 1998, of 10 substance abuse beds to acute care beds and the 1999 construction of 24 of 40 additional beds requested by JFK, the number of licensed and approved beds at JFK increased to 367. In addition, with CON- exemption, JFK has added observation beds. As a result of AHCA's partial approval of the previous JFK request for new construction and due to unfavorable changes in Medicare reimbursement policies for hospital-based SNUs, JFK now seeks this 20-bed conversion. JFK ceased operating the SNU in October 1998, after Medicare reimbursement changed to a system based on resource utilization groups (RUGs). JFK was unable to operate the SNU without financial losses, that is, unable to cover its patient care costs under the RUGs system. The proposal to convert the beds back to acute care, as they were previously licensed will allow JFK to reconnect existing oxygen lines in the walls and to use the beds for acute care patients. Although Good Samaritan and St. Mary's suggested that JFK can profitably operate a SNU, there was no evidence presented other than its previous occupancy levels which were very high, and the fact that Columbia is not closing all of its SNUs. The Petitioners also question JFK's ability to use its SNU beds for acute care and/or observation patients. AHCA, however, took the position that acute care licensure is required for beds in which acute care patients are routinely treated. Otherwise, the agency would not have accurate data on utilization, bed inventory, and the projected need. In order to demonstrate the number of beds needed, JFK's expert used historical increases in admissions. Some admissions data was skewed because the parent corporation, Columbia, closed Palm Beach Regional in 1996, and consolidated its activities at JFK. Excluding from consideration the increase of 3,707 admissions from 1995 to 1996, JFK's expert considered approximately 800 as reasonable to assume as an average annual increase. That represents roughly the mid-point between the 1996 to 1997 increase of 605, and the 1997 to 1998 increase of 1,076 admissions. A projected increase of 800 admissions for an average 5-day length of stay would result in an increase of 4,000 patient days a year which, at 80% occupancy, justifies an increase of 14 beds a year. Considering the closing of Palm Beach Regional, the number of beds in the subdistrict will have been reduced by 170. At the hearing, JFK's expert also relied on 3.3% annual patient day increase to project the number of beds needed, having experienced an increase of 5.8% from 1997 to 1998. Using this methodology, JFK projected a need for 20 additional acute care beds by 2002, and over 40 more by 2004. That methodology assumed patient growth in the excess of population growth and, necessarily, an increase in market share. JFK's market share increased in its primary service area from approximately 19% in 1993 to 27% in 1997. But the market share also slightly declined from 1997 to 1998. AHCA's methodology for determining the number of beds needed was based on the entire population of Palm Beach County, not just the more elderly southern area. It also assumed that JFK's market share would remain constant. Using this more conservative approach than JFK, AHCA projected a need for 383 acute care beds, or 16 beds added to the current total of 367 licensed and approved beds, at an optimal 75% occupancy by the year 2004. AHCA relied on a projection of 104,959 total patient days in 2004. Using the same methodology, JFK's expert determined that total projected patient days for 1998 would have been 94,225, but the actual total was 98,126 patient days. AHCA's methodology underestimates the number of beds needed, but does confirm that more than 16 additional beds will be needed by 2004. AHCA's reliance on 75% as an optimal future occupancy level as compared to the hospital-specific historical level of 80% was criticized, as was the use of the year 2004 as a planning horizon. The rule requires 80% occupancy for a prior reporting period and does not establish any planning horizon. Good Samaritan and St. Mary's used 80% occupancy in their analysis of bed need. At 80% occupancy, Petitioners projected an average daily census of 265 patients in 331 beds in 2001, or 268 patients in 334 beds in 2002, and 270 patients in 358 beds in 2003, as compared to 367 existing and approved beds. The Petitioners' projection is an underestimate of bed-need based on the actual average daily census of 269 patients in 1998. The Petitioners' methodology erroneously projects a need for fewer licensed beds than JFK has currently, despite the special circumstances evincing overcrowding. At 80% occupancy, based on the special circumstances rule, a hospital exceeds the optimal level and needs more beds. But, according to the Petitioners, 80% is a future occupancy target for the appropriate planning horizon of 2002. As AHCA's expert noted, it is illogical to use 80% as both optimal and as an indication of the need for additional beds. Similarly, it is not reasonable to use a planning horizon which coincides with the time when more beds will be needed. Therefore, the use of 75% for the five-year planning horizon of 2004 is a reasonable optimal target, as contrasted to the need for additional beds when 80% occupancy is reached at some future time beyond the planning horizon. AHCA's underestimate of need at 16 more beds by 2004, and JFK's overestimate of need at 40 more beds by 2004, support the conclusion that the requested addition of 20 beds in this application is in a reasonably conservative range. Rule 59C-1.038(6)(a) and Subsection 408.035(l)(n) - service and commitment to medically indigent; and Rule 59C-1.038(6)(b) - conversion of beds Rule 59C-1.038(6), Florida Administrative Code, also includes the following criteria: Priority consideration for initiation of new acute care services of capital expenditures shall be given to applicants with documented history of providing services to medically indigent patients or a commitment to do so. When there are competing applications within a subdistrict, priority consideration shall be given to the applications which meet the need for additional acute care beds in a particular service through the conversion of existing underutilized beds. Subsection (a) of the Rule, overlaps with District 9 health plan allocation factor one, which must be considered pursuant to Subsection 408.035(1)(a), and with the explicit criterion of Subsection 408.035(1)(n), Florida Statutes. All three require a commitment to and record of service to Medicaid, indigent and/or handicapped patients. JFK agreed to have its CON conditioned on 5% of the care given in the 20 new beds to Medicaid and charity patients. The commitment for the 24 beds under construction is 3% for Medicaid and charity patients. If charity patients are defined as those with family incomes equal to or below 150% of federal poverty guidelines, JFK provided $2.9 million in charity care in calendar year 1998, and $720,000 as of April for 1999. JFK provided an additional 3% to 5% in Medicaid care. The Medicaid total includes Palm Beach County Health Care District patients, who are also called welfare patients. The charity care provided by JFK is equivalent to approximately 1% of its gross revenue. JFK explained its relatively low Medicaid care as a function of its relatively limited services for people covered by Medicaid, particularly, the young who utilize obstetrics and pediatrics. JFK pointed to the differing demographics in Palm Beach County with more elderly, who have Medicare coverage, located in its primary service area. Excluding pediatric and obstetric care, Medicaid covered 6.7% of patients in southern Palm Beach County as compared to 16.3% in northern Palm Beach County. Of the Medicaid patients, 2.9% in the southern area as compared to 6% in the northern area are adults. On this basis, JFK established the adequacy of its historical Medicaid and indigent care, and of its proposed commitment. Subsection (6)(b) of Rule 59C-1.038 is inapplicable when, as in this case, there are not competing applications to compare. Subsection 408.035(1)(a) - other local health plan factors and Subsection 408.035(1)(o) - continuum of care District 9 allocation factor 2, favoring cost containment practices, is enhanced by the proposed conversion rather than the new construction of beds. Within the Columbia group of hospitals, there is an effort to avoid unnecessary duplications of services. JFK caters to an elderly population and to providing cardiology, neurology, and oncology services. Columbia's Palms West provides pediatric and obstetric care. Another Columbia facility in Palm Beach County, Columbia Hospital, specializes in inpatient psychiatric services. The elimination of the hospital-based SNU at JFK does eliminate one level of care in the system, contrary to the criteria. District 9 health plan allocation factor 3 requires favorable consideration of plans, like JFK's, to convert unused or underutilized beds. In this case, the JFK SNU was highly utilized but unprofitable. There is no evidence that alternative placements in free-standing nursing homes are inappropriate or unavailable. Minor inefficiencies result from the time lag for transfers during which skilled nursing patients remain in acute care beds. To some extent, the inefficiencies were already occurring while JFK operated the SNU due to its high average census of 18 or 19 patients in a total of 20 SNU beds. Those inefficiencies are outweighed by the low cost conversion of 20 beds for $117,000, particularly as compared to its prior 24-bed construction for $4 million. In general, the applicable local health plan allocation factors support the approval of the JFK application. Rule 59C-1.030 - needs access for low income, minorities, handicapped, elderly, Medicaid, Medicare, indigent or other medically underserved In general, the proposal is intended to increase access to JFK's services by decreasing waiting times for admissions. The services are used by a large number of elderly patients, who are primarily covered by Medicare. JFK demonstrated that the population in its service area also tends to be wealthier than the population in northern Palm Beach County. Medicaid and indigent access to care at JFK is consistent and reasonable given the demographic data presented. Access for elderly Medicare patients will be enhanced by the proposal. Subsection 408.035(1)(b) - accessibility, availability, appropriateness, and adequacy of like and existing services Good Samaritan and St. Mary's argue that hospitals below 75% occupancy are available alternatives to JFK's patients. Yet, those facilities are not viable alternatives for unstable patients admitted through the emergency room. Neither is it appropriate to transfer patients who need services provided at JFK. JFK does not allege that any problems exist at other facilities, but only that it is affected by special circumstances. From January to June 1998, the closest hospitals to JFK experienced wide-ranging occupancy levels from 92% at Delray, the hospital with services most comparable to those at JFK, to 57% at Bethesda, and 47% at Wellington. The wide range in occupancy rate is further indication of uniqueness of the need for patients to access services available only at Delray and JFK. Subsection 408.035(1)(d) - outpatient care or other alternatives Admitted inpatients have no alternatives to their need for acute care beds. Subsection 408.035(1)(h) - alternative use of resources and accessibility for residents The continued use of the 20 beds as a SNU was suggested as an alternative. As noted, however, that proved to be financially unprofitable at JFK, in comparison to the low cost conversion to acute care beds. AHCA reasonably rejected the idea that of the beds being designated "observation" beds when used for acute care patients. In addition, in 1996, JFK estimated the cost of moving patients from bed to bed in the hospital due to the shortage of appropriate beds, when needed, at up to $1 million. This project is intended to meet a facility-specific need based on the demand for services at JFK from patients who cannot reasonably initially be sent or subsequently transferred to other hospitals. As such, JFK's additional beds do not meet the criterion for accessibility for all residents of the district. Subsection 408.035(1)(i) - utilization and long-term financial feasibility Good Samaritan and St. Mary's contend that JFK's proposal includes unrealistically high utilization projections for the additional 20 beds. Using 98,000 patient days in 1998, which excludes any days attributable to skilled nursing beds, total utilization projected in the second year is 78.4%. For the additional 20 beds, projected utilization is 77.4%. The expert for Good Samaritan and St. Mary's disagreed with the allocation of patient days between the existing and additional beds. If 80% utilization is assigned to existing 367 beds, as he suggested, then the average annual occupancy of the 20 new beds would be only 50%. The financial break-even point for the project, however, is 50 to 75 patient days, or 10 to 15 patients with average lengths of stay of 5 days. Therefore, even with the lower projected occupancy of 50%, or an average of 10 beds at any time, the project is financially feasible in the long-term. In reality, a separate allocation of patient days to the 20 new beds is somewhat arbitrary. It is also less important than total projected utilization, since the 20 beds do not represent a separate unit in which specialized services will be provided. The additional beds will become a part of the total medical/surgical inventory. By demonstrating that there will be sufficient total occupancy to exceed the financial break-even point in the newly converted beds regardless of the allocation of patient days to any particular bed, JFK demonstrated the long- term financial feasibility of the proposal for CON 9099. Subsection 408.035(1)(l) - impact on costs; effects of competition If the JFK proposal is approved, Good Samaritan anticipates a loss of 255 patients, or 1,392 patient days, which is equivalent to a financial loss of over $1.5 million. St. Mary's anticipates losses of 158 patients or 973 patient days, and in excess of $1 million. Both hospitals were experiencing overall operating losses in 1999. But, the estimates of financial losses for both hospitals did not take into consideration all of the expense reductions associated with serving fewer patients. Excluding pediatrics and obstetrics, which are not available at JFK, JFK's overlapping service areas with Good Samaritan and St. Mary's are minimal. Good Samaritan's market share in JFK's primary service area is 4.8%, and St. Mary's is 9.3%. Pediatrics and obstetrics contribute 30.7% of total patients at Good Samaritan, and 49.5% at St. Mary's. Physician overlap among the hospitals is also limited. Although 357 doctors admitted patients to JFK and 464 to St. Mary's in the first two quarters of 1998, the number of overlapping doctors was 28. With a total of 379 admitting doctors at Good Samaritan for the same period of time, only 21 were included in JFK's 357 admitting physicians. In general, doctors in the northern Palm Beach County acute care subdistrict seldom admit patients to hospitals in the southern subdistrict, and vice versa. The absence of overlapping medical staff also reflected the differences in the services. Most of the top twenty doctors who admitted patients to Good Samaritan and St. Mary's were obstetricians and pediatricians. When obstetricians and pediatricians are excluded, the number of overlapping doctors for JFK and Good Samaritan is reduced to 15, and for JFK and St. Mary's to 22. In addition to providing different services, to different areas of the County, doctors who practice primarily in one or the other subdistrict served patients in different payor classification mixes. In 1997, JFK's patients were 74% Medicare, consistent with the fact that a larger percentage of elderly patients live in JFK's service area. By contrast, Medicare patients were approximately 48% of the total at Good Samaritan, and 32% of the total at St. Mary's. Historically, the addition of acute care beds at JFK has not affected other hospitals in the district or even the same acute care subdistrict. After the conversion of 10 substance abuse beds in the fall of 1998, the acute care patient days at every hospital in the same subdistrict increased in early 1999 over comparable periods of time in 1998. The assumption that additional beds at JFK will take patients from other hospitals includes the assumption that JFK will draw a larger share of an incremental increase of patients. The assumption is, in other words, that all patients will be new to JFK. The expert health planner for Good Samaritan and St. Mary's conceded that facility-specific overcrowding can justify projections that the additional beds will accommodate the existing census plus growth attributable to increasing population, and will not generate new patients. The expert assumed, nevertheless that from 1478 to 1486 new patients (depending on whether the length of stay is rounded off) would be associated with JFK's project. From that total, the proportional losses allocated were 255 patients from Good Samaritan and 158 patients from St. Mary's. Another underlying assumption increase is that all of the new patients would go to other hospitals if JFK does not add 20 acute care beds. That assumption suggests that all of the patients could receive the services they need at the other facilities, which is not supported by the facts or current utilization data. More likely, with the addition of beds due to overcrowding, some patients will come from the existing hospital census at JFK. It is not reasonable to assume that JFK will have all new patients, nor that all patients could be treated at other hospitals in the absence of JFK's expansion. The proportion of emergency room admissions at JFK is reasonably expected to continue. Patients who arrive at JFK requiring open heart surgery, angioplasties or invasive cardiac caths are reasonably expected to continue to receive those services at JFK, including patients who are transferred to JFK from Good Samaritan and St. Mary's. Based on the failure to support the assumptions, and the differences in service areas, medical staff, specialties, and patient demographics, Good Samaritan and St. Mary's have not shown any adverse impact from the JFK proposal. On balance, considering the statutory and rule criteria for reviewing CON applications, JFK established, as a matter of fact, that it meets the special circumstance criteria related to emergency room admissions, pre- and post-surgical and intensive care backlogs, and average annual occupancy projections in excess of optimal levels.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED That a final order be entered issuing CON 9099 to convert 20 skilled nursing beds to 20 acute care beds at Columbia/JFK Medical Center, L.P., d/b/a JFK Medical Center, on condition that a minimum of 5% of new acute care patient days will be provided to Medicaid and charity patients. The file of the Division of Administrative Hearings, DOAH Case No. 99-0714 is hereby closed. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of April, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Julie Gallagher, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Richard A. Patterson, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Thomas A. Sheehan, III, Esquire Moyle, Flanigan, Katz, Kolins, Raymond & Sheehan, P.A. Post Office Box 3888 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402 Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire Thomas W. Konrad, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551 Robert D. Newell, Jr., Esquire Newell & Terry, P.A. 817 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303-6313
Findings Of Fact The Parties FRTC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Charter Medical Corporation which proposes to construct and operate a 60 bed intensive residential treatment program (IRTP) in Bradenton, Florida, which is located in the Department's District VI. The Department is the state agency with the authority and responsibility to consider CON applications. Manatee Palms is an existing residential treatment center in Manatee County, Florida which opened in January, 1987 and is currently operating without a CON. It provides services similar or identical to those proposed by FRTC. Manatee Palms was developed by, and is a subsidiary of, Psychiatric Institutes of America. Its primary service area extends beyond District VI from Orlando to Naples. Manatee Palms is a sixty bed facility providing psychiatric, substance abuse and educational services for juveniles up to 18 years of age, and is licensed by the Department as a child caring facility, as a provider of services to the Department, and for subspecialties involving drug and alcohol programs. It is accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals as a residential treatment center. The average length of stay for patients is six months. Occupancy rates have been consistently above projections and have been as high as 97 percent in May, 1987. Manatee Memorial is a full-service acute care hospital and an existing provider of short-term psychiatric services in Bradenton, Florida, with 25 licensed short-term psychiatric beds, nine of which comprise a children's and adolescent unit. It is the Manatee County contract provider of in-patient psychiatric services to the medically indigent, and provides approximately 91 percent of the indigent care in Manatee County. Manatee Memorial does not have, and has never sought, a CON as an IRTP, but does have earlier-batched applications pending for additional short and long term psychiatric beds. Its average length of stay is 35-40 days, and its utilization rate is approaching 100 percent. Manatee Memorial provides services similar or identical to those proposed by FRTC, and its program also utilizes a "levels system" similar to that used by FRTC. The Application and Project On September 15, 1986 FRTC filed a Letter of Intent notifying the Department of its intent to file a CON application for an IRTP for children and adolescents in Bradenton, Florida. On October 14, 1986 FRTC filed CON application number 4825 to obtain specialty hospital licensure as an IRTP. This application was initially approved by the Department on March 10, 1987, after the filing of a completeness response on or about December 23, 1986 at the request of the Department. Manatee Palms and Manatee Memorial timely filed petitions for formal administrative hearings challenging the Department's intent to issue the CON. The project at issue in this case is a 60 bed IRTP situated on a 9.35 acre site. The proposed building will have total gross square footage of approximately 32,000 and has been adapted from a prototype short-term psychiatric hospital design which has been used in approximately 50 locations. The floor plan submitted by FRTC provides for 28 semi-private rooms, three of which are designed to accommodate the handicapped, and one 4- bed assessment unit. Additionally, reasonable and sufficient space is provided for five classrooms, occupational therapy, a gymnasium, three group rooms, three day rooms, a seclusion area, three consult rooms, laundry and storage rooms, a nurses' station, dining room, and an administrative wing. A parking area, multi-purpose court, pool, activities field and drainage retention area are also provided. The parties have stipulated that the building will be energy efficient. Total project cost is reasonably estimated at $4,303,020. As a result of design modifications, the square footage of the project has increased by approximately 1,000 gross square feet and project costs have increased by approximately $69,000 from FRTC's completed application. The Department's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regulation and Health Facilities, John Griffin, testified that for a project of this size these changes are not considered to be "amendments" to the application. The changes in facility design identified at hearing represent refinements and permissible modifications, rather than application amendments. There is no architectural significance to the changes. Rather, they make the design more appropriate for an IRTP. Specifically, a multi-purpose area was converted to a half-court gymnasium, the occupational therapy and interior mechanical spaces were slightly increased for more storage area, a seclusion room was deleted, the nurses' station was reduced, a 4-bed assessment unit was added, and other minor changes were made. FRTC proposes to offer 24-hour psychiatric services to children and adolescents under the age of 18, who are severely emotionally disturbed, and who are admitted voluntarily, after screening, with a history of prior treatment. Its program elements will include occupational therapy, recreational therapy, group and individual therapy, nursing care, an educational component, psychological testing, counseling and family therapy. The FRTC program will be initiated as a locked intensive program whose goal is to return the patient to his family and to life in a natural setting. Patients who are severely retarded, autistic, or with an active diagnosis of substance abuse will not be admitted. The average length of stay for patients is reasonably projected to be one year, with a range of from 6 months to two years. There are no licensed intensive residential treatment programs (IRTP) for children and adolescents in Manatee County, Florida or in the Department's District VI, which includes Manatee County as well as Hardee, Highland, Hillsborough and Polk Counties. There are also no licensed IRTPs in adjoining Districts V and VIII. Stipulations The parties have stipulated that FRTC has the ability to recruit physicians for this project, and also has funds available for FRTC's capital and operating expenditures. In addition, the parties have stipulated that review criteria concerning the need for research and educational facilities, the extent to which the services will be accessible to schools for health professional, and the special needs and circumstances of health maintenance organizations are not applicable to this CON application. Non-Rule Policy For IRTP The Department currently has no rule governing the approval of IRTP applications for a CON. However, since February 1987 the Department has followed a non-rule policy which presumes there is a need for at least one licensed IRTP of reasonable size in each Departmental service district, and which does not consider the existence of unlicensed residential treatment beds in a district in determining if the presumed need has been met. No changes or revisions in this non-rule policy of the Department are under review. The Department applied this non-rule policy in initially approving the CON application. Based upon the testimony of John Griffin, the Department's Deputy Assistant Secretary who administers the CON program and is responsible for health planning, an IRTP applicant does not have to establish "need" in a particular service district where it wants to locate a facility because the non- rule policy presumes there is a need for one IRTP of reasonable size per district. The applicant must, however, establish that there is not presently a licensed IRTP in the district and that it proposed to establish an IRTP of reasonable size. Griffin was not able to explicate this non-rule policy based upon health planning concerns, considerations or factors. Sharon Gordon-Girvin, Administrator of the Department's Office of Community Medical Services and Facilities, was also unable to articulate or explicate a health planning basis for this policy. Rather, the only basis enunciated at hearing by the Department for this non-rule policy was its statutory interpretation of Sections 395.002(8) and 395.003(2)(f), Florida Statutes, as renumbered by Section 34, Chapter 87-92, Laws of Florida. Need And Consistency With State And Local Health Plans There are no licensed IRTPs in District VI. Manatee Palms is a residential treatment center for children and adolescents located in Manatee County, but it is not licensed by the Department as an IRTP. Relevant issues identified in the District VI Local Health Plan are stated as follows: As a general policy, the least restrictive, most cost effective setting and programs should be used. The State of Florida, as a major purchaser of mental health and substance abuse services, can continue to lead the way by encouraging the development of non-hospital alternatives and by purchasing services from them preferentially. Another important issue in psychiatric care is the trend toward hospitalization of children who have behavior and conduct disorders, and who should more appropriately be served through non-hospital alternatives. . . At the present time, the severe emotionally disturbed or emotionally handicapped (SED/EH) child or adolescent is served in a broad range of programs. There are crisis stabilization units (CSUs) for stabilizing the adult client in acute crisis. Currently CSU services for children and adolescents are not adequate throughout the District. Intensive residential, day/night program, group and foster homes are for the client requiring close supervision. Relevant policies set forth in the District Local Health Plan are as follows: The multi-modality approach as expressed in the community mental health (and substance abuse) system should be considered a model of programming, staffing, facility requirements, costs, etc., against which applications for inpatient services should be reviewed. Review of applications for inpatient psychiatric and substance abuse services should include comment from the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Program Offices of DHRS. No additional psychiatric and/or substance abuse beds should be granted approval unless the capacity of current hospital providers is being fully utilized (75 percent occupancy rate annual). Additional psychiatric and/or substance abuse beds should be through conversion of existing beds. The State Health Plan sets forth the following relevant policies and statements: The goal of (mental health) services is (to) . . . provide educational; mental health treatment; and when needed, residential services for severely emotionally disturbed students. It is the intent of the Legislature that the least restrictive means of intervention be employed based on the individual needs of each patient within the scope of available services . . . The program goals for each component of the network are . . . to provide programs and services as close as possible to the child's home in the least restrictive manner consistent with the child's needs. Sufficient funding for the development of residential treatment and community support services is necessary if the state is to fulfill its commitment to providing services for long term mentally ill persons. These services provide, in the long run, a more humane and cost effective means of meeting the mental health needs of Florida residents. Continued development of long and short term inpatient hospital programs for the treatment of adolescents and children is contrary to current treatment practices for these groups and is, therefore, inappropriate without local data to support the need for these services. Such development can contribute to inappropriate placement, unnecessary costs of treatment, and divert scarce resources away from alternative uses. In addition, the following relevant goals are contained in the State Health Plan: Promote the development of a continuum of high quality, cost effective private sector mental health and substance abuse treatment and preventive services. Bring about changes in third party reimbursement policy for psychiatric and substance abuse care which would promote the development of the most appropriate, cost-effective treatment settings . . . Develop a network of residential treatment settings for Florida's severely emotionally disturbed children by 1989 . . . Develop residential placements within Florida for all SED children currently receiving treatment in out of state facilities by 1990. The FRTC application is consistent with the above cited relevant portions of the state and local health plans. It is consistent with the State Health Plan which reflects and emphasizes the trend toward deinstitutionalization and the current emphasis on education, treatment and residential services for severely emotionally disturbed students rather than what has been the traditional approach to treatment in an institutional setting, a generally more costly approach from a capital cost and staffing perspective. The FRTC application promotes treatment within the State and will assist in reducing out of state placements. Through the report and testimony of Ronald T. Luke, Ph.D., J.D., and despite the testimony of Jay Cushman, both of whom were accepted as experts in health planning, FRTC established the need for, and reasonableness of, its 60 licensed IRTP beds in District VI, with 50 percent occupancy in the first year and 60 percent in the second year, using two bed need assessment methodologies. First, using the ratio of licensed IRTP beds in other service districts to population ages 0-17 years old, a range of .07 to 1.33 beds per 1,000 population is identified. Using 1991 population projections for District VI, the 60 bed FRTC facility would result in a bed to population ratio of .17 per 1,000 population aged 0-17 years. Since there are no licensed beds in the current inventory, no adjustment of this ratio must be made to account for existing beds. Thus, the FRTC application is within the range of ratios of currently licensed IRTPs in other districts, and is therefore reasonable. Second, a utilization methodology identifies an intensive residential treatment bed need of 90 in 1987 to 95 in 1991, with target occupancy rates of 90 percent. This methodology is based upon 1987 and 1991 population projections. Using a census rate per 100,000 population of 21.58 which is appropriately and reasonably derived from national data for residential treatment patients aged 0-17, an average daily census of 74 in 1987 and 78 in 1991 is derived. Thus, FRTC has established a need for its facility in District VI, given its projected occupancy levels, and given that there are no licensed beds currently in the District. It is important to recognize that the bed ratio analysis is based upon licensed intensive residential treatment beds in Florida, and is therefore clearly relevant and credible to the issues in this case. The utilization methodology supports and confirms the need found thorough the bed ratio analysis, although it is noted that this methodology, by using national data, is not based upon licensed beds in Florida, and would therefore not be sufficient, in itself, to establish need. It is, however, persuasive and credible in confirming the bed ratio analysis. Accessibility To All Residents FRTC projects only 1.5 percent indigent care and 8 percent bad debt. Its projection for private pay patients is 25 percent and for insurance covered care is 65.5 percent. This is a marginal and insignificant indigent load. There is no provision for services to state-funded patients. FRTC's projected utilization by class of pay is reasonable. The clear purpose of this application is to enable FRTC to become licensed as a hospital under Section 395.002, Florida Statutes, and thereby enable it to be called a "hospital". It was established through the testimony of Dwight Hood, who was accepted as an expert in health care finance and health care third party payments, that if a facility is licensed as a hospital it has a significant advantage for reimbursement from third parties who more readily reimburse for care in a licensed facility than in an unlicensed residential treatment center. Therefore, accessibility will be increased for those children and adolescents in need of this care whose families have insurance coverage, since it is more likely that payments under such third party coverage will be made at an IRTP licensed as a "hospital" than otherwise. Quality of Care The applicant has clearly demonstrated its ability to provide quality care to its patients, based upon the testimony of C. Hal Brunt, M.D., Robert Friedel, M.D. and G. L. Tischler, M.D., who were accepted as experts in psychiatry, and notwithstanding the testimony of Howard Goldman, M.D., and Glen Lewis, M.D., who were also accepted as experts in psychiatry. FRTC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Charter Medical Corporation which has experience in the operation and management of a residential treatment center, Charter Colonial Institute in Virginia, and also has extensive experience in providing quality health care at five hospitals in Florida, including Charter Hospital of Tampa Bay. The treatment program at FRTC will be adapted to local community needs. In providing quality care, FRTC will assign patients to the correct level of care within the facility by insuring that they are seen by a psychiatrist within 24 hours of admission, and by having each case reviewed by an independent utilization review committee, completing appropriate patient assessments and developing integrated treatment programs which are regularly updated, making appropriate treatment outcome assessments, and providing for continuity of care for patients leaving the IRTP through the development of a community-wide continuum of care. Charter has six out-patient counselling centers located within two hours of the FRTC proposed facility. It is both reasonable and appropriate to structure psychiatric treatment and care in a hospital setting within a "levels system" that rewards and reinforces desired behavior, and FRTC will utilize a "levels system" in its highly goal oriented patient treatment programs. Quality of care is not dependent upon a hospital's environment and physical facilities, according to Dr. Goldman. The floor plan proposed by FRTC is functional and is a proto- typical design used by Charter in approximately fifty locations, although not as an IRTP. The criticisms of the floor plan and facility design to which Maxine Wolfe, Ph.D., and Glen Lewis, M.D., testified do not establish that the applicant will be unable to provide quality care in this facility. While the Petitioners might design a facility differently, and specifically provide for a different orientation of the nurses' station relative to the patient wings, a different location for the dining room, more rooms where a patient can have privacy, and more opportunity for individualized treatment, these preferences do not establish that FRTC's floor plan and design will impair the quality of care rendered at this proposed facility. It is also noted that Dr. Wolfe testified critically about residential treatment in general, and expressed the opinion that residential treatment in a hospital is not beneficial and that children should never be treated in a large facility of any kind under any circumstance. Her testimony clearly establishes her bias and impairs her own credibility and the weight to be given to her testimony in this case. Availability and Adequacy of Alternatives Although there are no licensed IRTPs in District VI residential treatment and/or psychiatric services are currently available to children and adolescents through Manatee Memorial (9 beds), Manatee Palms (60 beds), Glenbeigh (14-16 beds), Sarasota Palms (60-70 beds), Sarasota Memorial Care Center (30 beds), Children's Home in Tampa (68 beds) and Northside Center in Tampa (12 beds). The average of length of stay at the significant majority of these facilities is up to 90 days, and they also attract patients from outside District VI. FRTC proposes to serve patients who require an average length of stay of a year. Some of these facilities serve patients with a dual diagnosis that includes substance abuse whereas FRTC will not. Therefore, these facilities do not offer adequate alternatives for the patients which FRTC is seeking to serve. Further, it was not established that outpatient or ambulatory services represent an adequate and appropriate alternative to an IRTP. Availability of Resources The total project cost of $4,303,020 will be funded through an equity contribution from Charter Medical Corporation and through a conventional loan. Assuming a 50 percent occupancy rate (30 beds) in its first year of operation, the proposed facility will have a staff of 43 positions, 27 of which will represent personnel who will be direct nursing or staff support for the patients, including social workers, psychologists, staff registered nurses, mental health workers, patient care coordinator, nursing supervisors, occupational and recreational therapists and special education teachers. A part-time medical director will also be available. This results in a ratio of 1.4 positions per patient. In comparison, Manatee Palms has a 1.8 staffing ratio based on a census of 55 patients. FRTC has proposed a reasonable and adequate staffing pattern and ratio to treat 30 patients. FRTC will recruit personnel through direct advertising, community contacts, posted notices, job fairs, and school visits. It will compete with unlicensed residential treatment centers, as well as short and long term psychiatric hospitals, in attracting staff for its facility. Although only six mental health workers are identified in FRTC's list of manpower requirements, and it would be beneficial to the level of treatment and care to increase this number, nevertheless, the staffing patterns proposed by FRTC will allow it to render quality care to patients at its facility, based upon 50 percent occupancy in its first year of operation. Staff salaries proposed by FRTC are reasonable and realistic, although its proposed salaries for nurses and mental health workers are higher than that available at Manatee Memorial. Existing facilities may have to increase their salaries to the levels proposed by FRTC to continue to retain and attract qualified staff, particularly nurses and mental health workers. Recruitment difficulties have been experienced in the District VI area for nurses, social workers, mental health workers and occupational therapists. However, it appears that FRTC will be able to attract qualified applicants for all positions due to the level of salaries offered and quality of care provided. Financial Feasibility Net revenues from the first year of operation are projected to be $100,000, which represents 2.3 percent of the capital expenditure as a return on investment. In the second year of operation, net revenues are projected to be $302,000, a 7 percent return on investment. Both years show a fair return on investment, and the pro forma establishes the financial feasibility of this project. In preparing the pro forma for this project, William S. Love, who was accepted as an expert in health care finance, used the reasonable assumption of 50 percent occupancy in the first year of operation and 60 percent in the second year. Despite the testimony of Jay Cushman, who was accepted as an expert health planner, it was not established that FRTC's location will preclude these occupancy rates. Love also assumed patient revenues of $300 per day and an average length of stay of one year. Utilization by class of payor was estimated to be 65 1/2 percent insurance, 25 percent private pay, 8 percent bad debt and 1 1/2 percent indigent care. It was assumed there would be no Medicare or Medicaid. Assumptions regarding patient revenues and utilization by class of payor are reasonable based on the testimony of Love, Luke and Dwight Hood, as well as a survey of insurance benefits available through employers, and despite the testimony of Christopher Knepper, who was accepted as an expert in health care finance. Knepper's testimony is applicable to unlicensed residential treatment centers rather than an IRTP. Therefore, his criticism of the pro forma as underestimating bad debt and overestimating the private pay portion is not persuasive since it disregards the fact that a licensed IRTP, due to its status as a specialty hospital, will have an increased ability to attract patients with insurance and with an ability to pay deductibles and other unreimbursed costs for care. It was established that a residential treatment center licensed as a specialty hospital has a significant advantage in terms of an improved payor mix over unlicensed facilities because of its recognized status with insurance companies. In addition, Knepper's testimony at hearing concerning the financial feasibility of this project conflicted with estimates made during discovery, and his explanation of such discrepancy was not credible. This conflict in Knepper's position at hearing and during discovery reduces the weight to be given to his testimony. FRTC assumed it would not be subject to the indigent care tax, but even if it were subject to the tax this would only add $29,000 in expenses, and therefore not affect the financial feasibility of the project. A management fee will be charged by Charter Medical Corporation, although this is not separately shown on the pro forma. It is the position of FRTC that this fee is associated with home office costs which will exist without regard to this facility. However, this fee, as well as additional construction costs of approximately $70,000, will not affect the financial feasibility of this project since salary costs associated with administration, as well as data processing costs have been separately shown and included on the pro forma as expenses, even though they are sometimes included in a management fee. FRTC's estimate of gross patient revenue of $300 per day for the first year of operation is substantially higher than other facilities offering like services. Net revenues per day during the first year of operation are estimated to be $265.30. Total direct expenses are estimated to be $198.70 for the first year, with total expenses per patient day estimated at $250.50 in the first year. A 7 percent inflation factor was used for the second year of operation, and this is a reasonable inflation factor. Impact On Costs and Competition As previously noted, salary estimates for nurses and mental health workers for this project are above those provided at Manatee Memorial, and therefore could reasonably be expected to increase salaries in these categories for some facilities in the area. The all inclusive charge of $300 per day proposed by FRTC is greater than Manatee Palm's average gross charge of between $270 - $280 per day. It is likely that paying patients, including patients with insurance coverage, who would otherwise be treated at Petitioners' facilities, will be treated at FRTC if this application is approved. However, the extent of such a loss in paying patients due to FRTC is unclear since Manatee Palms is recently receiving greater acceptance by insurers for reimbursement purposes, and Manatee Memorial's estimates of patient losses were based upon impact from both Manatee Palms and FRTC. Reasonableness of Costs The equipment cost estimate of $360,015 is reasonable. This finding is based on the testimony of Susan Hickman, who was accepted as an expert in health care facility equipment. The equipment and beds are appropriate for an IRTP of this size. The total cost of $707,897 for telephones, signage, graphics, interior design and equipment is also reasonable. The construction cost estimate of $2,010,823 is reasonable. This finding is based on the testimony of Patrick A. Regan, who was accepted as an expert in health care facility construction budgeting. Due to the conservative nature of the cost figures, a 2 1/2 percent contingency is adequate, rather than the normal 5-6 percent contingency. The contingency could be used for unbudgeted items such as stucco siding and hard ceilings. FRTC owns the facility site, which was purchased for $664,000.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department enter a Final Order approving FRTC's application for CON 4825. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 87-2036, 87-2049 Rulings on the Joint Proposed Findings of Fact filed by FRTC and the Department: 1 Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 27. 2-4 Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 5 Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 6-9 Adopted in Findings of Fact 8, 29, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 10-11 Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8, 47. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 15-16 Adopted in Finding of Fact 46, Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 28, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9, 10 but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 21-22 Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 28, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9, 10, 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. 27-30 Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 27, 28, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 31 Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. 32-34 Adopted in Findings of Fact 27, 28, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 33, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 33, 35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 37. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 39, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 40. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. Adopted in Finding of Fact 40. Adopted in Finding of Fact 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. 50-57 Adopted in Findings of Fact 26, 39, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 58 Rejected as unnecessary. 59-61 Adopted in Finding of Fact 15, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant, unnecessary or as a conclusion of law. 62 Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. 61 Adopted in Findings of Fact 6, 15, 16. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Rejected in Finding of Fact 17. Rejected in Finding of Fact 17, but adopted in part in Finding of Fact 26. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. 69-72 Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 24, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant since the Department's non-rule policy was not explicated and therefore cannot be relied upon. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant since the "reasonableness" of the facility's size is not at issue, the Department having failed to explicate its non-rule policy. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9, 31, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected in Findings of Fact 24, 33, 35, 39. The proposed average length of stay of one year is found to be reasonable in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Findings of Fact 21, 22. 79-81 Adopted in Findings of Fact 19, 23, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 11, 18, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 31. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 11, 26 but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 87-88 Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3, 44, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Rejected as simply a summation of testimony and therefore unnecessary. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 4, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as simply a summation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Rejected as unnecessary and simply a summation of testimony. 95-96 Rejected as irrelevant, unnecessary and in part simply a summation of testimony. 97-98 Rejected as a summation of testimony and otherwise as speculative and irrelevant. 99 Rejected as simply a summation of testimony. 100-103 Rejected as irrelevant. 104 Rejected as a summation of, and argument on, the evidence rather than a Finding of Fact. Rulings on the Proposed Findings of Fact filed by Manatee Palms: Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 7. Rejected as unnecessary, and as simply a statement of position. 9-11 Rejected as unnecessary and as otherwise covered in preliminary procedural matters. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9, 31, but otherwise rejected as simply a summation of testimony and position of the parties. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 10, 25, 39, 44. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14, but rejected in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17, but rejected in Finding of Fact 24. Rejected in Findings of Fact 21, 22, 23. Rejected as simply argument and a statement of position rather than a Finding of Fact. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 25, 39. Rejected in Findings of Fact 21, 22, 23. 24-26 Rejected in Findings of Fact 19, 20, 23. Adopted in Findings of Fact 19, 44, but rejected in Finding of Fact 23. Rejected in Findings of Fact 23, 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Findings of Fact 16, 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. 34-42 Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. This is a de novo proceeding through which final agency action will be taken, and therefore preliminary agency findings are irrelevant to a determination of the issues in this case which must be decided based upon evidence presented at hearing. Rejected as simply a statement of position without any citation to the record. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. 45-46 Rejected in Finding of Fact 24. 47-48 Adopted and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 24. 49-60 Rejected in Finding of Fact 24. Rejected as simply a conclusion of law. Rejected as without citation to the record and as simply a statement of position rather than a Finding of Fact. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 66-70 Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative, since it is established that services are similar or identical to those proposed by FRTC. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3, 44. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected in Findings of Fact. 26, 39 and otherwise as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant and otherwise not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. Rejected as simply a statement of position, without citation to the record. Rejected as simply a conclusion of law. 80-81 Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 8, but otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. 82 Rejected as unnecessary. 83-84 Rejected in Findings of Fact 33 and 35, and otherwise as irrelevant. Rejected as simply a conclusion of law. Rejected in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 37. Adopted in Findings of Fact 34, 36. 89-90 Rejected in Findings of Fact 35, 37. Rejected as simply a conclusion of law. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected in Findings of Fact 38, 39, 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 39, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 98-100 Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. 101-102 Adopted in Findings of Fact 38, 39. 103-109 Rejected in Finding of Fact 39, and otherwise as not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected in Findings of Fact 26, 29. Rejected in Finding of Fact 39. Rejected in Finding of Fact 35, and otherwise as irrelevant. Rejected in Findings of Fact 38, 39, 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. 115-117 Adopted and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 40, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Adopted and rejected in part in Findings of Fact 8, 40, but otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected in Findings of Fact 38-42. Rejected as a conclusion of law. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Findings of Fact 34, 37. Adopted in Finding of Fact 36. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 45. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence and without citation to the record. Rejected as a conclusion of law. 128-129 Rejected as simply a comment on the evidence and not a Finding of Fact. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 8. Rejected in Finding of Fact 47. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 8, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as simply a statement of position and argument. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact filed by Manatee Memorial: 1-2 Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 3-4 Rejected as irrelevant. 5 Adopted in Findings of Fact 8, 29. 6-7 Rejected as irrelevant to a determination of the issues in this case. 8-10 Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 34, 36, 45. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 13-22 Adopted in Finding of Fact 4, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant or unnecessary. Rejected in Finding of Fact 24 and otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 34, 36. Rejected as speculative and not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 5, 10, but rejected in in Finding of Fact 44. 30-32 Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 33 Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. 34-39 Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. 43-45 Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Since Mr. Griffin is the highest level departmental representative who testified at hearing, his statement of the non-rule policy is presumed to be correct. Rejected in Finding of Fact 16. Rejected in Finding of Fact 16 and otherwise as unnecessary and irrelevant. 49-51 Rejected as irrelevant since this is a de novo hearing by which final agency action will be taken. Rejected as simply a conclusion of law. Rejected in Findings of Fact 21-23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. 58-60 Rejected in Findings of Fact 21-23 and otherwise as irrelevant. 61-63 Rejected in Findings of Fact 19, 20, 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30, but rejected in Finding of Fact 31. Rejected in Finding of Fact 39 and otherwise as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25 and rejected in Finding of Fact 26. Rejected in Findings of Fact 26, 39, 42. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 38, 39, 44. Rejected in Findings of Fact 24 and 39. Rejected as speculative, and not based on competent substantial evidence. 71-79 Rejected in Findings of Fact 26, 38, 39 and otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. 80-83 Rejected in Findings of Fact 33, 35. Rejected in Findings of Fact 33, 35, 38, 39, 42. Rejected in Findings of Fact 39, 40. Rejected in Findings of Fact 38-42. Rejected in Finding of Fact 37. Adopted in Finding of Fact 33. Rejected in Finding of Fact 33. Rejected in Finding of Fact 35. Rejected in Findings of Fact 27, 33, 35. Rejected in Finding of Fact 37. Rejected as unnecessary. 94-95 Rejected in Finding of Fact 37. 96 Adopted in Finding of Fact 36. 97-100 Rejected in Findings of Fact 28, 29. 101-102 Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 103-105 Rejected in Finding of Fact 29. 106 Rejected in Finding of Fact 8. 107-109 Rejected in Findings of Fact 27, 28, 29 and otherwise not based on competent substantial evidence. 110 Rejected as irrelevant. 111-112 Rejected in Finding of Fact 9. Rejected in Findings of Fact 9, 27, 28, 29. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 115-116 Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 47. Adopted and rejected in Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8 and rejected in Finding of Fact 47. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted and rejected in Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 3, 4. Adopted in Findings of Fact 25, 39, 45. 125-127 Rejected as speculative and not based on competent substantial evidence. 128-130 Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: John Rodriguez, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Michael J. Glazer, Esquire Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jean Laramore, Esquire Anthony Cleveland, Esquire Bruce A. Leinback, Esquire Post Office Box 11068 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 William Hoffman, Esquire Deborah Winegard, Esquire 2500 Trust Co. Tower 25 Park Place Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Fred W. Baggett, Esquire Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1838 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 John T. Brennan, Jr., Esquire 900 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Suite 600 Washington, DC 20006 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Fl 32399-0700 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as the stipulation of facts entered into by the parties, the following relevant facts are found: Humana of Florida, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Humana, Inc., is the owner of Women's Hospital in Tampa. Women's Hospital presently has 192 licensed beds, of which 96 are used for obstetrical patients and 96 are used for gynecological patients. It is dedicated to meeting the physical, psychological, educational, social and environmental needs of women and newborns and offers a total program of obstetrical, neonatal and gynecological care. Although not designated by the State as a Level III facility, Women's Hospital in Tampa has the personnel and equipment necessary to provide Level III care. It treats many high-risk obstetrical patients and their newborns, as well as premature infants. High-risk infants do not require transfer to another hospital with Level III capabilities. Every practicing obstetrical/gynecological physician in Tampa is on the staff of Women's Hospital. Petitioner submitted an application for a Certificate of Need to add a fifth floor to its existing facility and to increase its licensed obstetrical bed complement from 96 beds to 130 beds. Of the 34 additional obstetrical beds requested, 12 are to be allocated to an antepartum unit. These 12 beds would be organized as a separate self-contained unit to care for obstetrical patients experiencing or likely to experience a complicated pregnancy and/or delivery. The types of obstetrical patients who would utilize a separate antepartum unit would include diabetics, patients who experience difficulties with blood pressure, kidney disorders and conditions associated with the heart and thyroid. In many instances, the antepartum patient is ambulatory or quasi-ambulatory and is thus able to meet many of her own needs. As a result, the intensity of nursing care in an antepartum unit is lower than that which would be expected in a postpartum obstetrical unit, resulting in a cost-savings to the antepartum patient. The total proposed capital expenditure for the addition of a fifth floor and 34 obstetrical beds is approximately $2.8 million. While petitioner is licensed for 96 obstetrical beds, only 62 of those beds were in operation at the time of the final hearing in this proceeding. Based on the 62 beds in operation, the average obstetrical bed occupancy rate was 112 percent from September, 1982 through August, 1983. Due primarily to the temporary discontinuance of obstetrical services at St. Joseph's Hospital located across the street from petitioner, occupancy levels have reached 130 percent since January of 1983. Such occupancy levels create significant problems in terms of patient care and facility, physician and nursing efficiency. The difficulties associated with scheduling surgery and infection control are exacerbated with overcrowded conditions. Because newborns and postpartum mothers are more susceptible to infection, it is medically necessary to separate and segregate postpartum and gynecological patients. Petitioner had 4,600 deliveries last year and projects it will have 5,800 deliveries this year. If all 96 obstetrical beds were currently in operation, petitioner's occupancy levels would be approximately 70 percent. An indication of adequate utilization of obstetrical beds is an average annual occupancy level of 75 percent. Petitioner expects to reach the 75 percent occupancy level of its existing licensed 96 beds within the next year and a half to two years. Petitioner presently has no private obstetrical rooms at its facility. When a patient requires isolation from other patients, one of the beds in the semiprivate room is not available for use. Due to high occupancy levels, petitioner is unable to offer a private room to any of its obstetrical patients when it is not medically necessary to do so. Thus, even without the addition of 34 beds, petitioner desires to construct a fifth floor to allow it to reconfigure its units and convert a number of semiprivate rooms into private rooms by transferring existing licensed beds to the fifth floor. This would enhance the hospital's ability to utilize its bed complement in a more efficient manner. Even without additional beds, petitioner's Executive Director believes that by amortizing construction costs over a period of 20 to 25 years and reducing its operating margin, there would not be a significant impact upon patient charges as a result of the fifth floor addition. Should petitioner be granted a Certificate of Need allowing it to construct a fifth floor with no new beds, petitioner would be willing to accept conditions concerning the conversion of existing semiprivate rooms to private, such as capping over medical gas outlets, deactivating wall outlets and light fixtures for a second bed and furnishing the new rooms on the exclusive basis of a private room. The conversion of semiprivate rooms to private rooms could be a less costly alternative to the addition of new beds in some instances. To the extent that the addition of private beds provides a potentiality for greater utilization of existing services, additional patient revenues can be generated. It is not the policy if the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to grant approval for "shelled in" or "banking" space due to the potential competitive advantage it affords by allowing a future increase of beds without significant cost. Petitioner has the ability to adequately staff its proposed project with all necessary technical, nursing, and medical personnel, and will provide an acceptable level of patient care. Sufficient funds are available to construct and operate the project and the project has immediate and long-term financial feasibility. Its costs and methods for the proposed construction are reasonable, appropriate, and cost-efficient. The respondent HRS has promulgated Rule 10-5.11(23), Florida Administrative Code which establishes a uniform methodology for determining the number of acute care hospital beds needed five years into the future within the eleven HRS service districts throughout the State. The Rule addresses the need for general medical and surgical, intensive care, pediatric and obstetrical acute care services in hospitals and the Department will not normally approve applications for additional beds if the new beds would cause the number of beds in a particular district to exceed the number calculated to be needed under the Rule's methodology. Rule 10-5.11(23) calculates need through a series of formulas by considering the need for the various types of individual services and then adding these figures together to produce a figure indicating the total number of acute care beds which would be needed in a particular District within a five-year time frame. Then, after certain adjustments, all existing licensed and approved acute care beds are subtracted from the total bed need to determine the net bed need within the District. Subdistrict allocations by type of service are to be made by the individual Local Health Councils consistent with the District total acute care bed allocations, with certain adjustments permitted. As of the date of the hearing in this cause, the Sixth District's Local Health Council's plan for the allocation of beds on a service specific or subdistrict basis had not been adopted. The acute care bed need methodology set forth in Rule 10-5.11(23) takes into account the population for the service area projected five years into the future, the historic utilization rate for particular types of service, average lengths of stay, optimal occupancy rates for the various types of services, and, with regard to obstetrical bed projections, the fertility rate of women between the ages of 15 and 44. The Rule sets forth the manner in which the figures for these various components are to be derived. Utilizing the methodology for determining acute care bed need as set forth in the Rule, District VI presently has 950 acute care beds in excess of the beds projected to be needed in the year 1988. By applying the subportion of the Rule relating to obstetrical beds to Hillsborough County, there are presently 47 obstetrical beds in excess of the number needed for 1988. While the petitioner agrees with the basic generic form of the methodology contained in Rule 10-5.11(23), petitioner would substitute different data than that mandated under the Rule and perform certain adjustments. For example, petitioner would adjust the numbers used in the formula by increasing the statewide fertility rate for the years 1979-81 by 5 percent, by factoring in a number of 2 percent to 3 percent to represent the in-migration of obstetrical patients, by increasing the statewide average length of stay from 3.5 to 3.8 days so as to reflect the actual experience at petitioner's facility, by making an adjustment for hospital stays by an obstetrical patient which do not result in a delivery and by making a downward adjustment for those births which do not occur in a hospital setting. Petitioner would also subtract from the number of existing and/or approved beds the 15 obstetrical beds at St. Joseph's Hospital which were taken out of service on an interim basis as of December 31, 1982, pending the development of a comprehensive plan for the delivery of obstetrical services on a decentralized basis. The parties to this proceeding have stipulated that St. Joseph's Hospital contemplates that its future obstetrical service will be centered around birthing rooms, rather than actual labor, delivery and recovery rooms, and that it is reasonable to expect that, once the service is resumed, approximately 360 deliveries will occur with this number increasing over time. After making all these adjustments and utilizing different data in the formula for determining need, petitioner concludes there is a 1988 need in District VI for 26 or 27 additional obstetrical beds. Petitioner's analysis of bed need based both on an institution-specific analysis and a trend analysis resulted in a finding of from 32 to 36 additional beds needed at petitioner's facility by the year 1988.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for a Certificate of Need in its entirety be DENIED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 2nd of December, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: John H. French, Jr., Esquire & James C. Hauser, Esquire Messer, Rhodes & Vickers P.O. Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Claire D. Dryfuss Assistant General Counsel 1323 Winewood Blvd. Bldg. 1, Room 406 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David Pingree Secretary Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue This case concerns four Certificate of Need ("CON") applications ("CONs 9891, 9992, 9893, and 9894") that seek to establish long-term acute care hospitals ("LTCHs") in Miami-Dade County (the "County" or "Miami-Dade County"), a part of AHCA District 11 (along with Monroe County). Promise Healthcare of Florida XI, Inc. ("Promise") in CON 9891, Select Specialty Hospital-Dade, Inc. ("Select-Dade") in CON 9892, and Kindred Hospitals East, L.L.C. ("Kindred"), in CON 9894, seek to construct and operate a 60-bed freestanding LTCH in the County. Miami Jewish Home and Hospital for the Aged, Inc. ("MJH"), in CON 9893, seeks to establish a 30-bed hospital within a hospital ("HIH") on its existing campus in the County. In its State Agency Action Report (the "SAAR"), AHCA concluded that all of the need methodologies presented by the applicants were unreliable. Accordingly, AHCA staff recommended denial of the four applications. The recommendation was adopted by the Agency when it issued the SAAR. The Agency maintained throughout the final hearing that all four applications should be denied, although of the four, if any were to be granted, it professed a preference for MJH on the basis, among other reasons, of a more reliable need methodology. Since the hearing the Agency has changed its position with regard to MJH. In its proposed recommended order, AHCA supports approval of MJH's application. MJH and Promise agree with the AHCA that there is need for the 30 LTCH beds proposed by MJH for its HIH and that MJH otherwise meets the criteria for approval of its application. MJH seeks approval of its application only. Likewise, the Agency supports approval of only MJH's application. Promise, on the other hand, contends that there is need for a 60-bed facility as well as MJH's HIH and that between Promise, Select- Dade and Kindred, based on comparative review, its application should be approved along with MJH's application. Although Promise's need methodology supports need for more LTCH beds than would be provided by approval of its application and MJH's, its support for approval is limited to its application and that of MJH. Like Promise's methodology, Select-Dade and Kindred's need methodologies project need for many more beds than would be provided by the 60 beds each of them seek. Unlike Promise, however, neither Select-Dade nor Kindred supports approval of MJH's application. Each proposes its application to be superior to the other applications; each advocates approval of its respective application alone. Given the positions of the parties reflected in their proposed recommended orders, whether there is need for at least an additional 30 LTCH beds in District 11 is not at issue. Rather, the issues are as follows. What is the extent of the need for additional LTCH beds in District 11? If the need is for at least 30 beds but less than 60 beds, does MJH meet the criteria for approval of its application? If the need is for 60 beds or more, what application or applications should be approved depends on what applications meet CON review criteria and on the number of beds needed (60 but less than 90, 90 but less than 120, 120 but less than 150, 150 but less than 180, 180 but less than 210, and 210 or more) and whether there is health- planning basis not to grant an application even if the approval would meet a bed need and all four applicants otherwise meet review criteria. Finally, based on comparative review, what is the order of approval among the applications that meet CON need criteria? Ultimately, the issue in the case is which if any of the four applications should be approved?
Findings Of Fact The Parties "[D]esignated as the state health planning agency for purposes of federal law," Section 408.034(1), Florida Statutes, AHCA is responsible for the administration of the CON program and laws in Florida. See §§ 408.031, Fla. Stat., et seq. As such, it is also designated as "the single state agency to issue, revoke, or deny certificates of need . . . in accordance with present and future federal and state statutes." § 408.034(1), Fla. Stat. Promise Healthcare of Florida XI, Inc. ("Promise") is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Promise Healthcare, Inc. The applicant for CON 9891, Promise proposes the construction of a 60-bed freestanding LTCH to be located in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Select-Dade, the applicant for CON 9892, proposes the construction of a 60-bed freestanding LTCH to be located in Miami-Dade County, Florida. It is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Select Medical Corporation ("SMC"). The largest operator of LTCHs in the country, SMC operates 96 LTCHs in 24 states. The Miami Jewish Home and Hospital for the Aged is an existing not-for-profit provider of comprehensive health and social services in Miami-Dade County. The applicant for CON 9893, MJH proposes the creation of a 30-bed hospital within a hospital (HIH) LTCH by the renovation of a former acute care hospital building on its existing campus in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Kindred is the applicant for CON 9894 and proposes the construction of a 60-bed freestanding LTCH to be located in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Kindred is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Kindred Healthcare, Inc. ("Kindred Healthcare"). Kindred Healthcare operates 85 LTCHs in the country, eight of which are in the State of Florida. One of the eight is in Miami-Dade County. Twenty-three of Kindred Healthcare's LTCHs are operated by Kindred as well as seven of the eight Florida LTCHs. Kindred has also received CON approval for another LTCH in Florida. It is to be located in Palm Beach County in LTCH District 9. The District and its LTCHs Miami-Dade and Monroe Counties comprise AHCA District The population of Monroe County is 80,000 and of Miami-Dade County, 2.4 million. As to be expected from the population's distribution in the District, the vast majority of the District's health services are located in Miami-Dade County. The greater part of the County's population is in the eastern portion of Miami-Dade County, with population densities there 3-4 times higher than in the western portion of the County. But there is little to no space remaining for development in the eastern portion of the County. Miami-Dade County has an urban development boundary that shields the Everglades from development in the western portion of the County. Still, the bulk of population growth that has occurred recently is in the west and that trend is expected to continue. While the growth rate on a percentage basis is higher in the more-recently developed western areas of the County, the great majority of the population is and will continue to be within five miles of the sea coast on the County's eastern edge. At the time of hearing, there were three LTCHs operating in the District with a total of 122 beds: Kindred- Coral Gables, Select-Miami, and Sister Emmanuel. All three are clustered within a radius of six miles of each other in or not far from downtown Miami. The three existing LTCHs in the District are utilized at high occupancy levels. Kindred's 53-bed facility receives most of its referrals from a within a 10 mile radius. It has operated for the 11-year period beginning in 1995 with an occupancy level from a low of 82.08 percent to a high of 92.86 percent. The occupancy levels for 2004 (82.08 percent) and 2005 (84.90 percent) show occupancy recently at a relatively stable level within the range of optimal functional capacity which tends to be between 80 and 85 percent when facilities are equipped with semi-private rooms. With gender and infection issues in a facility with semi-private rooms, admissions to those facilities are usually restricted above 85 percent. Select operates a 40-bed LTCH on one floor of a health care service condominium building in downtown Miami. It began operation in 2003 as part of legislatively-created special Medicaid demonstration project. Its occupancy levels for the two calendar years of 2004 and 2005 were 83.39 percent and 95.10 percent. Sister Emmanuel Hospital for Continuing Care ("Sister Emmanuel") is a 29-bed HIH located at Mercy Hospital in Miami. It became operational in 2004 with an occupancy level of 82.64 percent, and attained an occupancy level of 85.46 percent in 2005. Kindred's Broward County LTCHs Kindred operates two LTCHs in Broward County (outside of District 11); one is in Ft. Lauderdale, the other in Hollywood. From 1995 to 2003, Kindred-Hollywood's occupancy rate ranged from a low of 65.17 percent to a high of 72.73 percent, generally lower than the state-wide occupancy rate. For the same period, Kindred-Ft. Lauderdale's rate was significantly higher, between 83.69 percent and 91.65 percent. Both LTCHs have experienced occupancy rates significantly lower than the state-wide rates in 2004 and 2005. Kindred-Ft. Lauderdale's occupancy in 2004 fell substantially from earlier years to 66.41 percent and then even farther in 2005 to 57.73 percent. Kindred-Hollywood's rates for these two years were also well below the state's at 59.74 percent and 58.04 percent, respectively. Historically used by residents of District 11, the Hollywood facility served 4,292 patients from Miami-Dade County in the eleven year period from 1995 through 2005. For the same period, the Ft. Lauderdale facility served 275 Miami-Dade residents. Kindred assigns its clinical liaisons to hospitals in a territorial manner to minimize competition for referrals between its two facilities in Broward County and Kindred-Coral Gables. LTCHs A "Long-term care hospital" means a general hospital licensed under Chapter 395, which meets the requirements of 42 C.F.R. Section 412.23(e) and seeks exclusion from the acute care Medicare prospective payment system for inpatient hospital services. § 408.032(13), Fla. Stat. (2005), and Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.002(28). Under federal rules, an LTCH must have an average Medicare length of stay (LOS) greater than 25 days. LTCHs typically furnish extended medical and rehabilitation care for patients who are clinically complex and have multiple acute or chronic conditions. Patients appropriate for LTCH services represent a small but discrete sub-set of all patients. They are differentiated from other hospital patients in that, by definition, they have multiple co-morbidities that require concurrent treatment. Patients appropriate for LTCH services tend to be elderly, frail, and medically complex and are usually regarded as catastrophically ill although some are young, typically victims of severe trauma. Approximately 85 percent of LTCH patients qualify for Medicare. Generally, Medicare patients admitted to LTCHs have been transferred from general acute care hospitals and receive a range of services at LTCHs, including cardiac monitoring, ventilator support and wound care. In 2004, statewide, 92 percent of LTCH patients were transferred from short-term acute care hospitals. That figure was 98 percent for District 11 during the same period of time. The single most common factor associated with the use of long-term care hospitals are patients who have pulmonary and respiratory conditions such as tracheotomies, and require the use of ventilators. There are three other general categories of LTCH patients as explained by Dr. Muldoon in his deposition: The second group is wound care where patients who are at the extreme end of complexity in wound care would come to [an] LTCH if their wounds cannot be managed by nurses in skilled nursing facilities or by home health care. The third category would be cardiovascular diseases where patients compromise[d by] injury or illness related to the circulatory system would come [to an LTCH.] And the fourth is the severe end of the rehabilitation group where, in addition to rehabilitation needs, there's a background of multiple medical conditions that also require active management. (Kindred Ex. 8 at 10-11). Effective October 1, 2002, the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") established a new prospective payment system for long term care hospital providers. Through this system, CMS recognizes the patient population of LTCHs as separate and distinct from the populations treated by short-term acute care hospitals and by other post acute care providers, such as Skilled Nursing Facilities ("SNFs") and Comprehensive Rehabilitation Hospitals ("CMRs"). The implementation by CMS of categories of payment designed specifically for LTCHs, the "LTC-DRG," indicates that CMS and the federal government recognize the differences between general hospitals and LTCHs when it comes to patient population, costs of care, resources consumed by the patients and health care delivery. Under the LTCH reimbursement system, each patient is assigned a Diagnosis Related Group or "DRG" with a corresponding payment rate that is weighted based upon the patient's diagnosis. The LTCH is reimbursed the predetermined payment rate for that DRG, regardless of the costs of care. These rates are higher than what CMS provides for other traditional post-acute care providers. Since the establishment of the prospective pay system for LTCHs, concerns about the high reimbursement rate for LTCHs, as well as about the appropriateness of the patients treated in LTCHs, have been raised by the Medicare Payment Advisory Committee ("MedPAC") and the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services. CMS administers the Medicare payment program for LTCHs, as well as the reimbursement programs for acute care hospitals, SNFs, and CMRs. MedPAC's role is to help formulate federal policy on Medicare regarding services provided to Medicare beneficiaries (patients) and the appropriate reimbursement rates to be paid to health care providers. The 2006 MedPAC report reported that LTCHs were making a good margin or profit, and recommended against an annual increase in the Medicare reimbursement rate for the upcoming fiscal year. In 2006, CMS adopted a reimbursement rate rule for LTCHs for 2007 that did not raise the base rate, and made other changes that reflect the ongoing concerns of CMS regarding LTCHs. 42 C.F.R. Part 412, May 12, 2006. In that rule, CMS found that approximately 37 percent of LTCH discharges are paid under the short-stay outliers, raising concerns that inappropriate patients may be being admitted to LTCHs. CMS made other changes to the reimbursement system which, taken as a whole, actually reduced the reimbursement that LTCHs will receive for 2007. Even with the concerns raised by MedPAC and CMS and recent changes in federal fiscal policy related to LTCHs, the distinction between general hospitals and LTCHs and the legitimate place for LTCHs in the continuum of care continues to be recognized by the federal government. One way of looking at recent developments at the federal level was articulated at hearing by Mr. Kornblat. Federal regulatory changes will reduce the reimbursement LTCHs receive when treating short-term patients (short-term outliers). "On the other end of the spectrum, there are patients who stay significantly longer than would be expected on average, long- stay outliers, and the reimbursement for those patients was also modified." Tr. 163. There have been other changes with regard to LTCH patients who require surgery the LTCHs cannot provide and patients with a primary psychiatric diagnosis or a primary rehab diagnosis. Requiring the LTCH to "foot the bill" for surgery that it cannot provide for its patients and the elimination from LTCHs of patients with a primary psychiatric or rehab diagnosis send a strong signal to the LTCH industry specifically and those who interact with it: LTCHs should admit only the medically complex and severely acutely ill patient who can be appropriately treated at an LTCH. Despite recent changes at the federal level and the clear recognition by the federal government that LTCHs have a place in the continuum of health care services, AHCA remains concerned about LTCHs in Florida. AHCA's Concerns Regarding LTCHs In deciding on whether to approve or deny new health care facilities, the Agency is responsible for the "coordinated planning of health care services in the state." § 408.033(3)(a), Fla. Stat. In carrying out this responsibility, AHCA looks to federal rules and reports to assist in making health care planning decisions for the state. Regarding LTCHs, MedPAC has reported, and CMS has noted that, nationwide, there has been a recent, rapid increase in the number of LTCHs: "It [LTCHs] represents a growth industry of the last ten years." Nationwide there has also been a huge increase in Medicare spending for LTCH care from $398 million in 1993 to $3.3 billion in 2004. AHCA has also become concerned about the recent rapid increase in LTCH applications in Florida. From 1997 through 2001 there were 8 LTCHs in the state. Starting in 2002, there was a marked increase in the number of applications for LTCHs and the number of approved LTCHs rose quickly to the current 14 in 2006. In addition, 9 new LTCHs have been approved and are expected to be licensed in the next 1-3 years. When all of the approved hospitals are licensed the number of available beds will rise from 876 to 1,351 (adding the approved 475 beds), over a 50 percent increase in LTCH beds statewide. In addition, AHCA is concerned that the occupancy level of LTCHs over the entire state appears to be falling over the last 11 years. In response to the rise in LTCH applications over the last several years, and given the decrease in occupancy of the current LTCHs, the Agency has consistently voiced concerns about lack of identification of the patients that appropriately comprise the LTCH patient population. Because of a lack of specific data from applicants with regard to the composition and acuity level of LTCH patient populations, AHCA is not convinced that there is a need for additional LTCHs in the state or in District 11. There are several reasons for this concern. First, AHCA believes, like MedPAC, that there may be an overlap between the LTCH patient populations and the population of patients served in other health care settings, such as SNFs and CMRs. Kindred's expert, Dr. Muldoon, noted that length of stay in the general acute care hospital has been shortened over the last few years because there are new more effective medical treatments, and because the "post-acute sector has emerged as the place to carry out the treatment plan that 20 years ago may been provided in its entirety in the short-term hospital." (Kindred Ex. 8 at 23). To AHCA, what patients enter what facilities in this "post-acute sector" is unclear. In the absence of the applicants better identifying the acuity of the LTCH patient population, AHCA has reached the conclusion that there may be other options available to those patients targeted by the LTCH applicants. In support of this view, AHCA presented a chart showing SNFs in District 11 that offer to treat patients who need dialysis, tracheotomy or ventilator care. These conditions are typically treated in LTCHs. In addition, AHCA believes that some long-stay patients can be appropriately served in the short-stay acute care hospitals, rather than requiring LTCH care. The length of stay in 2005 for the typical acute care hospital for most patients is five to six days. (Kindred Ex. 8, Dr. Muldoon Depo, at 23). Some hospital patients, however, are in need of acute care services on a long-term basis, that is, much longer than the average lengths of stay for most patients. Thus, patients who may need LTCH services often have lengths of stay in the acute care hospitals that exceed the typical stay. AHCA believes that these long-stay patients can be as appropriately served in the short stay acute care hospitals as in LTCHs. AHCA'S Denial of the Four Applications and Change of Position with regard to MJH On December 15, 2005, the Agency issued its SAAR after review of the applications. The SAAR recommended denial of all four applications based primarily on the Agency's determination that none had adequately demonstrated need for its proposed LTCH in District 11. In denying the four applications, AHCA relied in part on reports issued the Congress annually by MedPAC that discuss the placement of Medicare patients in appropriate post-acute settings. Appropriate use of long term care hospital services is an underlying concern that we [AHCA] have and had the federal government has as evidenced by their MedPAC reports and the CMS information in its most recent proposed rule on the subject. (Tr. 2486). The June 2004 MedPAC report states the following about LTCHs: Using qualitative and quantitative methods, we find the LTCH's role is to provide post- acute care to a small number of medically complex patients. We also find that the supply of LTCHs is a strong predictor of their use and those acute hospitals and skilled nursing facilities are the principal alternatives to LTCHs. We find that, in general, LTCH patients cost Medicare more than similar patients using alternative settings but that if LTCH care is targeted to patients of the highest severity, the cost is comparable. Given these concerns, AHCA looked to the four applicants to prove need through a needs methodology that provides sufficient information on the patient severity criteria to better define the patients that would mostly likely be appropriate candidates for LTCHs. AHCA found the need methodologies of three of the four applicants (Kindred, Promise, and Select) "incomplete" because they lacked specific information on the severity level of the patients the applicants plans to admit, and therefore they "overstate need." AHCA pointed to a former LTCH provider that did provide detailed useful information on the acuity level of its patients, and the acuity level of its patients in reference to similar patients in SNFs. Other then MJH, the applicants presented approaches to projecting need that are based, in one way or another, on long- stay patients in existing acute care hospitals. In the Agency's view these methods "significantly overstate need." The method creates a "candidate pool" for the future long-term care hospital users. But it does not include enough information on severity of illness of the patients, in AHCA's view, to give a sense of who might be expected to appropriately use the service. Further, the Agency sees no reason to believe that all long-stay patients in acute care short-stay hospitals are appropriate candidates for long-term hospital services. Lastly, AHCA believes that LTCH applicants should develop an "acuity coefficient or an acuity factor," tr. 2627, to be considered as part of an LTCH need methodology. The need methodology employed by MJH differed substantially from the methodologies of the other three applicants. Because it is more conservative and yields a need "approximately a tenth of what the other three propose," tr. 2500, at the time of hearing AHCA was much more comfortable with MJH's need methodology. By the time AHCA filed its PRO, its comfort with MJH's need methodology had solidified and improved to the point that AHCA changed its position with regard to MJH. Describing MJH's "use rate model" as conservative, see Agency for Health Care Administration Proposed Recommended Order, at 24, AHCA proposed the following finding of fact in support of its conclusion that MJH's application be approved: "Miami Jewish Home projected a reasonably reliable bed need using approved, conservative, but detailed and supportable, need methodologies." Id. at 25. MJH MJH, is an existing not-for-profit provider of comprehensive health and social services in Miami-Dade County. As recited in the Omissions Response to CON 9893: [MJH's] mission is to be the premier multi- component, not-for-profit charitable health care system in South Florida, guided by traditional Jewish values, dedicated to effectively and efficiently serving a non- sectarian population of elderly, mentally ill, disabled, and chronically ill people with a broad range of the highest quality institutionally-based, community-based and ambulatory care services. MJH Ex. 1. Originally founded in 1945 to provide residential care for Jewish persons unable to access services elsewhere, MJH is now in its 62nd year of operation. MJH enjoys a good reputation within its community. MJH is located at Northeast Second Avenue and 2nd Street in north-central Miami in one of the most densely populated areas of the County. Known as “Little Haiti,” the surrounding community is primarily low income, and is a federally designated “medically underserved area.” A “safety net” provider of health care services, MJH's SNF is the largest provider of Medicaid skilled nursing services in the State of Florida. MJH assists its patients/residents in filing Medicaid applications, and also assists individuals in applying for Medicaid for community-based services. This same kind of assistance will also be provided to patients of the MJH LTCH. A 2004 study conducted by the Center on Aging at Florida International University identified unmet needs among elders living within the zip codes surrounding MJH. The study notes that the greatest predictors of need for home and community-based services are poverty, disability, living alone, and old age. Several of the zip codes within the MJH PSA were found to have relatively large numbers of at risk elders due to poverty and dramatic community changes. The study has assisted MJH in identifying service gaps within the community, and in focusing its efforts to serve this at-risk population. Following its most recent JCAHO accreditation survey, both MJH’s hospital and SNF received a three-year “accreditation without condition,” which is the highest certification awarded by JCAHO. MJH is a national leader in the provision of comprehensive long-term care services. MJH has been recognized on numerous occasions for its innovative long-term and post- acute care programs. The awards and recognitions include the Gold Seal Award for Excellence in Long Term Care, the "Best Nursing Home" Award from Florida Medical Business and "Decade of Excellence Award" from Florida Health Care Association. An indicator of quality of care, AHCA’s “Gold Seal” designation is especially significant. Of the 780 nursing homes in Florida, only 13, including MJH, have met the criteria to be designated as Gold Seal facilities. MJH operates Florida's only Teaching Nursing Home Program. Medical students, interns, and other health professionals rotate through the service program in the nursing home and hospital on a regular basis. Specifically, MJH serves as a student and resident training site for the University of Miami and Nova Southeastern University Medical Schools, and the Barry University, FIU, and University of Miami nursing schools. The LTCH would enhance these capabilities and give physicians in training additional opportunities. Not only will this enhance their education, but also will contribute to the high quality of care to be provided in the MJH LTCH. MJH has been the site and sponsor of many studies to enhance the delivery of social and health services to elderly and disabled persons. Most recently, MJH was awarded a grant to do research on fall prevention in the nursing home. MJH is committed to continue research on the most effective means of delivering rehabilitative and long-term care services to a growing dependent population. The development of an LTCH at MJH will enhance the opportunities for this research. MJH operates Florida’s first and only PACE Center (Program of All-inclusive Care for the Elderly) located on the main Douglas Gardens campus. The program provides comprehensive care (preventive, primary, acute and long-term) to nursing home eligible seniors with chronic care needs while enabling them to continue to reside in their own home as long as possible. MJH was recently approved by the Governor and Legislature to open a second PACE site, to be located in Hialeah. The proposed 30-bed LTCH will be located on MJH’s Douglas Gardens Campus. The Douglas Gardens Campus is the site of a broad array of health and social services that span the continuum of care. These programs include community outreach services, independent and assisted living facilities, nursing home diversion services, chronic illness services, outpatient health services, acute care hospital services, rehabilitation, post-acute services, Alzheimer’s disease services, pain management, skilled nursing and hospice. LTCH services, however, are not currently available at MJH. Fred Stock, the Chief Operating Officer of MJH is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the MJH nursing home and hospital and has 24 years experience in the administration of long-term care facilities. An example of Mr. Stock’s leadership is that when he came to MJH, its hospice program had management issues. He assessed the situation and then made a management change which has resulted in a successful turnaround of the program. There are now 462 skilled nursing beds licensed and operated by MJH at the Douglas Garden’s Campus. All of these beds are certified by Medicare. Community hospitals have come to rely on these skilled nursing beds as a placement alternative for their sickest and most difficult-to-place, post-acute patients. The discharges of post-acute patients in the SNF at Douglas Gardens more than doubled from 350 in FY 2002 to 769 in FY 2005. Dr. Tanira Ferreira is the Medical Director of the MJH ventilator unit. Dr. Ferreira is board-certified in the specialties of Internal Medicine, Pulmonary Diseases, Critical Care Medicine, and Sleep Disorders. Dr. Ferreira will be the Medical Director of the MJH LTCH. In addition to Dr. Ferreira, MJH has five other pulmonologists on its staff. MJH also employs: a full-time Medical Director (Dr. Michael Silverman); three full-time physicians whose practices are restricted to MJH hospital and SNF patients; and four full-time nurse practitioners whose practices are restricted to residents of the SNF. MJH employs two full-time psychiatrists, two full-time psychologists, and seven full-time Master’s level social workers. The MJH medical staff also includes many specialist physicians such as cardiologists, surgeons, orthopedists, nephrologists and opthamologists, and other specialists are called for a consultation as needed. A number of the MJH patients/residents are non-English speakers. However, many of the MJH employees, including all of its medical staff, are bilingual. Among the languages spoken by MJH staff are Haitian, Spanish, Russian, Yiddish, French, and Portuguese. This multi-language capability greatly enhances patient/resident communication and enhances MJH’s ability to provide supportive services. The proposed project is the development of a 30-bed LTCH in Miami-Dade County. The LTCH will be located in renovated space in an existing facility and will conform to all the physical plant and operating standards for a general hospital in Florida. The estimated project cost is $5,315,672. The first patient is expected to be admitted by July 1, 2007. The LTCH will be considered an HIH under Federal regulations 42 CFR Section 412.22(e). The LTCH will comply with these requirements including a separate governing body, separate chief medical officer, separate medical staff, and chief executive officer. The LTCH will perform the hospital functions required in the Medicare Conditions of Participation set forth at 42 CFR Section 482. In addition, fewer than 25 percent of the admissions to the LTCH will originate from the MJH acute care hospital, and less than 15 percent of the LTCH operating expenses will be through contracted services with any other MJH affiliate, including the acute care hospital. The separate LTCH governing body will be legally responsible for the conduct of the LTCH as an institution and will not be under the control of the MJH acute care hospital. Finally, less than five percent of the annual MJH LTCH admissions will be re-admissions of patients who are referred from the MJH SNF or the MJH hospital. Each referral to the LTCH will be carefully assessed using the InterQual level-of-care criteria to ensure that the most appropriate setting is chosen. MJH is also a member of the ECIN (Extended Care Information Network) system. As a member of this system, MJH is able to make referrals and place patients who may not be appropriate for its own programs. Only those patients who are medically and functionally appropriate for the LTCH will be admitted to the LTCH program. Many patients admitted to the MJH LTCH will have complex medical conditions and/or multiple-system diagnoses in one or more of the following categories: Respiratory disorders care (including mechanical ventilation or tracheostomy care) Surgical wound or skin ulcer care Cardiac Care Renal disease care Cancer care Infectious diseases care Stroke care The patient and family will be the focus of the interdisciplinary care provided by the MJH LTCH. The interdisciplinary care team will include the following disciplines: physicians, nurses, social workers, psychologists, spiritual counselors, respiratory therapists, physical therapists, speech therapists, occupational therapists, pharmacists, and dietitians. MJH uses a collaborative care model that will be replicated in the LTCH and will enhance the effectiveness of the interdisciplinary team. The direct care professionals in the LTCH will maintain an integrated medical record, so that each member of the care team will have ready access to all the information and assessments from the other disciplines. Nursing staff will provide at least nine hours of nursing care per patient per day. Seventy-five percent of the nursing staff hours will be RN and LPN hours. Therapists (respiratory, physical, speech and occupational) will provide at least three hours of care per patient day. The MJH medical staff includes a wide array of specialty consultants that will be available to LTCH patients. The specialties of pulmonology, internal medicine, geriatrics and psychiatry will be available to each patient on a daily basis. A complete listing of all of the medical specialties available to MJH patients was included with its application. The interdisciplinary team will meet at least once per week to assess the care plan for each patient. The care plan will emphasize rehabilitation and education to enable the patient to progress to a less restrictive setting. The care team will help the patient and family learn how to manage disabilities and functional impairments to facilitate community re-entry. Approval of the LTCH will allow the MJH to "round out" the continuum of care it can offer the community by placing patients with clinically complex conditions in the most appropriate care setting possible. This is particularly true of persons who would otherwise have difficulty in accessing LTCH services. MJH has committed to providing a minimum of 4.2 percent of its patient discharges to Medicaid and charity patients. However, Mr. Stock anticipates that the actual percentage will be higher. If approved, MJH has committed to licensing and operating its proposed LTCH. MJH already has a number of the key personnel that will be required to implement its LTCH, including the Medical Director and other senior staff. In addition, MJH has extensive experience gleaned from both its acute care hospital and SNF in caring for very sick patients. In short, MJH has the clinical, administrative, and financial infrastructure that will be required to successfully implement its proposed LTCH. Approval of the MJH LTCH will dramatically reduce the number of persons who are now leaving the MJH PSA to access LTCH services. The hospitals in close proximity to MJH have LTCH use rates that are very low in comparison to other hospitals that are closer to existing LTCHs. Thus, it is likely that there are patients being discharged from the hospitals close to MJH that could benefit from LTCH services, but are not getting them because of access issues or because the existing LTCHs are perceived to be too far away. A number of hospitals located close to MJH are now referring ventilator-dependent patients to MJH, and would also likely refer patients to the MJH LTCH. Because the majority of the infrastructure required is already in place, the MJH HIH can be implemented much more quickly and efficiently than can a new freestanding LTCH. For example, ancillary functions such as billing, accounting, human resources, housekeeping and administration already exist, and the LTCH can be efficiently integrated into those existing operations on campus. MJH will be able to appropriately staff its LTCH through a combination of its current employees and recruitment of new staff as necessary. In addition, MJH will be establishing an in-house pharmacy and laboratory within the next six months, which will also provide services to LTCH patients. On-site radiology services are already available to MJH patients. MJH has an excellent track record of successfully implementing new programs and services. There is no reason to believe that MJH will not succeed in implementing a high quality LTCH if its application is approved. MJH's Ventilator Unit By the time ventilator-dependent and other clinically complex patients are admitted to a nursing home they have often exhausted their 100 days of Medicare coverage, and have converted to Medicaid. Since Medicaid reimbursement is less than the cost of providing such care, most nursing homes are unwilling to admit these types of patients. Thus, it is very difficult to place ventilator patients in SNFs statewide. The problem is further exacerbated in District 11 by the lack of any hospital-based skilled nursing units. With the recent closure of two SNF-based vent units (Claridge House and Greynolds Park) there are now only three SNF-based vent units remaining in District 11. They are located at MJH, Hampton Court (10 beds), and Victoria Nursing Home. MJH instituted a ventilator program in its SNF in early 2004. Many of the patients admitted into the ventilator program fall into the SE3 RUG Code. On July 1, 2005, there were 24 patients in the SE3 RUG code in MJH. Only one other SNF in District 11 has more than four SE3 RUG patients in its census on an average day. Over 60 percent of the Medicare post-acute census at the MJH SNF falls into the RUG categories associated with extensive, special care or clinically complex services. This mix of complex cases is about three times higher than average for District 11 SNFs. Although some of the patients now admitted to the MJH SNF vent unit would qualify for admission to an LTCH, there are also a number of patients who are not admitted because MJH cannot provide the LTCH level of care required. SNF admissions are required to be initiated following a STACH admission. MJH has actively marketed its vent unit to STACHs. Similarly most LTCH admissions come from STACHs and, like MJH’s efforts, LTCHs also market themselves to STACHs. Hospitals providing tertiary services and trauma care will generate the greater number of LTCH referrals, with approximately half of all LTCH patients being transferred from an ICU. The implementation of the MJH ventilator unit required the development of protocols, infrastructure, clinical capabilities and internal resources beyond those found in most SNFs. Dr. Ferreira conducted pre-opening comprehensive staff education. These capabilities will serve as a precursor to the development of the next stage of service delivery at MJH: the LTCH. MJH’s vent unit provides care for trauma victims, and recently received a Department of Health research grant to develop a program for long-term ventilator rehab for victims of trauma. Jackson Memorial Hospital is experiencing difficulty in placing "certain" medically complex patients, who at discharge, have continuing comprehensive medical needs. MJH is the only facility in Dade County that has accepted Medicaid ventilator patients from Jackson. Mt. Sinai Medical Center also has difficulty placing medically complex patients, particularly those requiring ventilator support, wound care, dialysis and/or other acute support services. Mt. Sinai is a major referral source to MJH and supports its LTCH application. MJH has received statewide referrals, including from the Governor's Office and from AHCA, of difficult to place vent patients. Most of these referrals are Medicaid patients. Ten of the MJH vent beds are typically utilized by Medicaid patients. Although MJH would like to accommodate more such referrals, there are financial limitations on the number of Medicaid patients that MJH can accept at one time. Promise Promise owns and operates approximately 718 LTCH beds outside of Florida and employs an estimated 2,000 persons. Promise proposes to develop and LTCH facility in the western portion of the County made up of 59,970 gross square feet, 60 private beds including an 8-bed ICU, and various ancillary and support areas. The projected costs to construct its freestanding LTCH is $11,094,500, with a total project cost of $26,370,885. As a condition of its CON if its application is approved, Promise agrees to provide three percent of projected patient days to Medicaid and charity patients. Select Select-Dade proposes to locate its 60-bed, freestanding LTCH in the western portion of Miami-Dade County. The Agency denied Select-Dade's application because of its failure to prove need. Otherwise, the application meets the CON review criteria and qualifies for comparative review with the other three applicants. Select-Dade proposes to serve the entire District, but it has targeted the entire west central portion of the County that includes Hialeah, Hialeah Gardens, Doral, Sweetwater, Kendall, and portions of unincorporated Miami. This area is west of State Road 826 (the "Palmetto Expressway"), south of the County line with Broward County, north of Killian Parkway and east of the Everglades ("Select's Target Service Area"). To be located west of the Palmetto Expressway, east of the Florida Turnpike, north of Miller Drive and south of State Road 836, the site for the LTCH will be generally in the center of Select's Target Service Area. Approximately 700,000 people (about 30 percent of the County's population) reside within Select-Dade's Target Service Area. This population of the area is expected to grow almost ten percent in the next five years. The rest of the County is expected to grow about five and one-half percent. Kindred Kindred proposes to construct a 60-bed LTCH in the County. It will consist of 30 private rooms, 20 beds in 10 semi-private rooms, and 10 ICU beds. The facility would include the necessary ancillary service, including two operating rooms, a radiology suite, and a pharmacy. Kindred utilizes a screening process before admission of a patient to assure that the patient needs LTCH level care that includes the set of criteria known as InterQual. InterQual categorizes patients according to their severity of illness and the intensity of services they require. Every patient admitted to a Kindred hospital must be capable of improving and the desire to undergo those interventions aimed at improvement. Kindred does not provide hospice or custodial care. In addition, through its reimbursement process, the federal government provides strong disincentives toward LTCH admission of inappropriate patients. Furthermore, every Kindred hospital has a utilization review (UR) plan to assure that patients do not receive unnecessary, unwanted or harmful care. In addition to the UR plan, the patient's condition is frequently reviewed by nursing staff, respiratory staff and by a multi-disciplinary team. Kindred had not selected a location at the time it submitted its application. Kindred anticipates, however, that its facility if approved would be located in the western portion of the County. Stipulated Facts As stated by Kindred in its Proposed Recommended Order, the parties stipulated to the following facts (as well as a few other related to identification of the parties): Each applicant timely filed the appropriate letter of intent, and each such letter contained the information required by AHCA. Each CON application was timely filed with AHCA. Following its initial review, AHCA issued a State Agency Action Report ("SAAR") which indicated its intent to deny each of the applications. Each applicant timely filed the appropriate petition with AHCA, seeking a formal hearing pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Fla. Stat. In the CON batch cycle that is the subject of this proceeding, Promise XI proposed to construct a 59,970 square foot building at a total project cost of $26,370,885.00, conditioned upon providing 3 percent of its patient days to Medicaid and charity patients. Select proposes to construct a 62,865 square foot building at a total project cost of $22,304,791.00, conditioned upon providing 2.8 percent of its patient days to Medicaid and charity patients. MJHHA proposes to renovate 17,683 square feet of space at a total project cost of $5,315,672.00, conditioned upon providing 4.2 percent of its patient days to Medicaid and charity patients. Kindred proposes to construct a 69,706 square foot building at a total project cost of $26,538,458.00, conditioned upon providing 2.2 percent of its patient days to Medicaid and charity patients. Long term hospitals meeting the provisions of AHCA Rule 59A-3.065(27), Fla. Admin. Code, are one of the four classes of facilities licensed as Class I hospitals by AHCA. The length of stay in an acute care hospital for most patients is three to five days. Some hospital patients, however, are in need of acute care services on a long- term basis. A long-term basis is 25 to 34 days of additional acute are service after the typical three to five day stay in a short-term hospital. Although some of those patients are "custodial" in nature and not in need of LTCH services, many of these long-term patients are better served in a LTCH than in a traditional acute care hospital. Within the continuum of care, the federal government's Medicare program recognizes LTCHs as distinct providers of services to patients with high levels of acuity. The federal government treats LTCH care as a discrete form of care, and treats the level of service provider by LTCHs as distinct, with its own Medicare payment system of DRGs and case mix reimbursement that provides Medicare payments at rates different from what the Medicare prospective payment system ("PPS") provides for other traditional post-acute care providers. The implementation by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") of categories of payment design specifically for LTCHs, the "LTC-DRG," is a sign of the recognition by CMS and the federal government of the differences between general hospitals and LTCHs when it comes to patient population, costs of care, resources consumed by the patients and health care delivery. Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation at 4, 6-7, 9-10. Applicable Statutory and Rule Criteria The parties stipulated that the review criteria in Subsections (1) through (9) of Section 408.035, Florida Statutes (the "CON Review Criteria Statute"), apply to the applications in this proceeding. Subsection (10) of the CON Review Criteria Statute, relates to the applicant's designation as a Gold Seal Program Nursing facility. Subsection (10) is applicable only "when the applicant is requesting additional nursing home beds at that facility." None of the applicants are making such a request. MJH's designation as a Gold Seal Program is not irrelevant in this proceeding, however, since it substantiates MJH's "record of providing quality of care," a criterion in Subsection (3) of the CON Review Criteria Statute. The Agency does not have a need methodology for LTCHs. Nor has it provided any of the applicants in this proceeding with a policy upon which to determine need for the proposed LTCH beds. The applicants, therefore, are responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology of their own. Topics that must be included in the methodology are listed Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(2)(e)2., a. through d. Subsection (1) of the CON Review Criteria: Need Not only does AHCA not have an LTCH need methodology in rule or a policy upon which to determine need for the proposed LTCH beds, it did not offer a methodology for consideration at hearing. This is the typical approach AHCA takes in LTCH cases; demonstration of LTCH need through a needs assessment methodology is left to the parties, a responsibility placed upon them in situations of this kind by Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(2)(e)2. MJH's Need Methodology Unlike the other three applicants, all of whom used one form or another of STACH long-stay methodologies, MJH utilized a use-rate analysis which projects LTCH utilization forward from District 11's recent history of increased utilization. A use-rate methodology is one of the most commonly used health care methodologies. The MJH use-rate methodology projected need based upon all of District 11. The methodology projected need for 42 LTCH beds in 2008, with that number growing incrementally to 55 beds by 2012. Because statewide LTCH utilization data is not reliable when looking at any particular district, MJH developed a District 11 use-rate, by age cohort, to yield a projection of LTCH beds needed. The use-rate is derived from the number of STACH admissions compared to the number of LTCH admissions, by age cohort. Projected demographic growth by age cohort was applied to determine the number of projected LTCH admissions. The historic average LTCH LOS in District 11 was applied to projected admissions and then divided by 365 to arrive at an ADC. That ADC was then adjusted for an occupancy standard of 85 percent, which is consistent with District 11. A number of states have formally adopted need methodologies that use an approach similar to MJH's in this case. Kindred has used a shortcut method of the use rate model in other states for analyzing proposed LTCHs "when there is not much data to work with." Tr. 1744. The methodology used by MJH was developed by its expert health planner, Jay Cushman. The methodology developed by Mr. Cushman was described by Kindred's health planner as "a couple of steps beyond" Kindred's occasionally-used shortcut method. Kindred's health planner described Mr. Cushman's efforts with regard to the MJH need methodology as "a very nice job." Tr. 1745. Mr. Cushman created a use-rate by examining the relationship between STACH admissions and LTCH admissions. The use-rate actually grows as it is segmented by age group, and thus the growth in the elderly population incrementally increases the utilization rate. MJH’s application demonstrated how LTCH utilization has varied greatly statewide, and how the District 11 market has a significant history of utilizing LTCH services. For planning purposes the history of District 11 is a significant factor, and the MJH methodology is premised upon that history, unlike the other methodologies. MJH demonstrated a strong correlation between STACH and LTCH utilization in District 11, where 98 percent of LTCH admissions are referred from STACHs. MJH also demonstrated that the south and western portions of Miami-Dade have overlapping service areas from the three existing LTCHs, while northeastern Miami-Dade has only one provider with a similar service area, Kindred Hollywood in neighboring District 10. This peculiarity explains why the LTCH out-migration trend is much stronger in northeastern portions of the District. The area most proximate to MJH would enjoy enhanced access to LTCH services, including both geographic and financial access, if its program is approved. In short, as AHCA, now agrees, MJH demonstrated need for its project through a thorough and conservative analysis. All parties agree that the number of LTCH beds yielded by MJH's methodology are indeed needed. Whether more are needed is the point of disagreement. For example, Mr. Balsano plugged the 2003 use rate into MJH's methodology instead of the 2004 used by MJH. Employment of the 2003 use rate in the calculation has the advantage that actual 2004 and 2005 data can serve as a basis of comparison. Mr. Balsano explained the result: "The number of filled beds in 2005 in District 11 would exceed by 33 beds what the use rate approach would project as needed in 2005." Tr. 370. The reason, as Mr. Balsano went on to explain, is that the use-rate changed dramatically between 2002, 2003, and 2004. Thus MJH's methodology, while yielding a number of beds that are surely needed in the District, may yield a number that is understated. This is precisely the opposite problem of the need assessment methodologies of the other three applicants, all of which overstated LTCH bed need in the District. The Need Methodologies of the Other Three Applicants The need methodologies presented by the other applicants vary to some degree. All three, however, are based on STACH long-stay data. Long-stay STACH analyses rely upon a number of assumptions, but fundamentally they project need forward from historic utilization of STACHs. The methodologies used by each of these three applicants identify patients in STACHs whose stays exceeded the geometric mean of length of stay plus fifteen days (the "GMLOS+15 Methodologies"), although the extent of the patients so identified varied depending on the number of DRGs from which the patients were drawn. Each of the proponent’s projects would serve only a relatively small fraction of the District 11 patients purported by the GMLOS+15 Methodologies to be in need of LTCH services. The lowest projected need of the three was produced by Promise: 393 beds in 2010. Promise's methodology is more conservative than that of Kindred and Select. Unlike the latter two, Promise reduced the number of potential projected admissions to be used in its calculation. The reduction, in the amount of 25 percent of the projection of 500 beds, was made because of several factors. Among them were anticipation that MedPAC's suggestions for ensuring that patients were appropriate for LTCH admission, which was expected to reduce the number of LTCH admissions, would be adopted. The methodologies proposed by Kindred and Select-Dade did not include the Promise methodology's reduction potentially posed by the impact of new federal regulation. Kindred's methodology projected need for 509 new LTCH beds in District 11; Select-Dade's methodology projected need for 556 beds. One way of looking at the substantial bed need produced by the GMLOS+15 Methodologies used by Promise, Select and Kindred was expressed by Kindred. As an applicant proposing a new hospital of 60 beds, when its need methodology yielded a need in the District for more than 500 beds, Kindred found the methodology to provide assurance that its project is needed. On the other hand, if the methodology was reliable then the utilization levels of the two Kindred hospitals in Broward County in relative proximity to a populated area of District 11 would have been much higher in 2004 and 2005, given the substantial out-migration to those facilities from District 11. The Kindred and Select methodologies are not reliable. Their flaws were outlined at hearing by Mr. Cushman, MJH's expert health planner who qualified as an expert with a specialization in health care methodology. Mr. Cushman attributed the flaws to Promise's methodology as well but as explained below, Promise's methodology is found to be reliable. Comparison of the projections produced by MJH's use rate methodology with the projections produced by the other three methodologies results in "a tremendous disconnect," tr. 1233, between experiences in District 11 upon which MJH's methodology is based and the GMLOS+15 Methodologies' bed need yield "that are three or four or five times as high as have actually been expressed in the existing system." Id. One reason in Mr. Cushman's view for the disconnect is that the GMLOS+15 Methodologies identify all long-stay patients in STACHs as candidates for LTCH admission when "there are many reasons that patients might stay for a long time in an acute care facility that are not related to their clinical needs." Tr. 1234. This criticism overlooks the limited number of long-stay patients in STACHs used by the Promise methodology but is generally applicable to the Select and Kindred methodologies. Mr. Cushman performed detailed analysis of the patients used by Kindred in its projection to reach conclusions applicable to all three GMLOS+15 Methodologies. Mr. Cushman's analysis, therefore, related to actual patients. They are based on payor mix, discharge status, and case mix. The analysis showed that the GMLOS+15 Methodologies are "disconnected from the fundamental facts on the ground," tr. 1240, in that the methodologies produce tremendous unmet need not reconcilable with actual utilization experience. Some of the gaps based on additional case mix testing were closed by Kindred's expert health planner. The additional Kindred test, however, did not completely close the gap between projected unmet need and actual utilization experience. Mr. Cushman summed up his basis for concluding that the GMLOS+15 Methodologies employed by Kindred, Select-Dade and Promise are unreliable: [W]e have an untested method that's disconnected from actual utilization experience on the ground. And it provides projections of need that are way in excess of what the experience would indicate and way in excess of what the applicants are willing to propose and support [for their projects.] So for those reasons, I considered [the GMLOS+15 method used by Kindred, Select-Dade and Promise] to be an unreliable method for projecting the need for LTCH beds. Tr. 1243-44. The criticism is not completely on point with regard to the Promise methodology as explained below. Furthermore, at hearing, Mr. Balsano made adjustments to the Promise GMLOS+15 Methodology ("Promise's Revised Methodology"). Although not sanctioned by the Agency, the adjustments were ones that made the Agency more comfortable with the numeric need they produced similar to the Agency's comments at hearing about MJH's methodology. For example, if the number of needed beds were reduced by 50 percent (instead of 25 percent as done in Promise's methodology) to account for the effect of federal policies and alternative providers and if an 85 percent occupancy rate were assumed instead of an 80 percent occupancy rate, the result would be reduce the LTCH bed need yielded by Promise's methodology to 200. These adjustments make Promise's Revised Methodology more conservative than Select's and Kindred's. In addition, Promise's methodology commenced with a much fewer number of STACH patients because Promise based on its inquiry into the patient population that is "using LTCHs in Florida right now." Tr. 351. Examination of AHCA's database led to Promise's identification of patients in 169 DRGs currently served in Florida LTCHs. In contrast, Select-Dade and Kindred, used 483 and 390 DRGs respectively. Substantially the same methodology was used by Promise in Promise Healthcare of Florida III, Inc. v. AHCA, Case No. 06-0568CON (DOAH April 10, 2007). The methodology, prior to the 25 percent reduction to take into account the effects of new federal regulations, was described there as: Long-stay discharges were defined using the following criteria: age of patient was 18 years or older; the discharge DRG was consistent with the discharge DRGs from a Florida LTCH; and the ALOS in the acute care hospital was at the GMLOS for the specific DRG plus 15 days or more. Applying these criteria reduced the number of DRGs used and the potential patient pool. Id. at 19 (emphasis supplied.) The methodology in this case produced a number that was then reduced by 25 percent, just as Promise did in its application in this case. The methodology was found by the ALJ to be reliable. If the methodology there were reliable then Promise's Revised Methodology (an even more conservative methodology) must be reliable as well as the numeric need for District 11 LTCH beds it yields: 200. Such a number (200) would support approval of MJH's application and two of the others and denial of the remaining application or denial of MJH's application and approval of the three other applications. Neither of these scenarios should take place. However high a number of beds that might have been projected by a reasonable methodology, no more than two of the applications should be granted when one takes into consideration the ability of the market to absorb new providers all at once. Tr. 518-520. Nonetheless, such a revised methodology would allow approval of MJH and one other of the applicants. Furthermore, there are indications of bed need greater than the need produced by MJH's methodology. Market Conditions, Population and History The large majority of patients admitted to LTCHs are elderly, Medicare beneficiaries. Typically, elderly persons seek health care services close to their homes. This is often because the elderly spouse or other family members of the patient cannot drive to visit the patient. This contributes to the compressed service areas observed in District 11. Historic patient migration patterns show that for STACH services, there is nine percent in-migration to Miami- Dade, and only five percent out-migration from Miami-Dade, a normal balance. Most recent data for LTCH service, however, shows an abnormal balance: three percent in-migration and 22 percent out-migration. The current utilization of existing LTCHs in District 11 and the high out-migration indicates that additional LTCH beds are needed. Notably, of the 400 District 11 residents who accessed LTCH care in Broward County in 2004, 114 (over 25 percent) lived in the 15 zip codes closest to MJH. MJH’s location will allow its LTCH to best impact and reduce out- migration from District 11 for LTCH services. Neither Kindred nor Promise has a location selected, and while Select-Dade has a “target area,” its actual location is unknown. None of the existing LTCHs in District 11 or in District 10 have PSAs that overlap with the area around MJH. For example, the Agency had indicated that there was no need in the case which led to approval of the Sister Emmanuel LTCH at Mercy Hospital. It was licensed in July of 2002, barely half a year after the Select-Miami facility was licensed. Both facilities were operating at or near optimal functional capacity less than two years from licensure without adverse impact to Kindred-Coral Gables. The utilization to capacity of new LTCH beds in the District indicate a repressed demand for LTCH services. The demand for new beds, however, is not limited to the eastern portion of the County. The demand exists in the western portion as well where there are no like and existing facilities. Medicare patients who remain in STACHs in excess of the mean DRG LOS become a financial burden on the facility. The positive impact on them of an LTCH with available beds is an incentive for them to refer LTCH appropriate patients for whom costs of care exceeds reimbursement. There were a total of 1,231 adult discharges from within Select-Dade's targeted service area with LOS of 24 or more days in calendar year 2004. Medical Treatment Trends in Post-Acute Service The number of LTCHs in Florida has increased substantially in recent years. The increase is due, in part to the better treatment the medically complex, catastrophically ill, LTCH appropriate patient will usually receive at an LTCH than in traditional post acute settings (SNFs, HBSNUs, CMR, and home health care). The clinical needs and acuity levels of LTCH- appropriate patients require more intense services from both nursing staff and physicians that are available in an LTCH but not typically available in the other post acute settings. LTCH patients require between eight to 12 nursing hours per day and daily physician visits. CMS reimbursement at the Medicare per diem rate would not enable a SNF to treat a person requiring eight to 12 hours of nursing care per day. CMR units and hospitals are inappropriate for long- term acute care patients who are unable to tolerate the minimum three hours of physical therapy associated with comprehensive medical rehabilitation. The primary focus of an LTCH is to provide continued acute care and treatment. Patients in a CMR are medically stable; the primary focus is on restoration of functional capabilities. Subsection (2): Availability, Quality of Care, Accessibility, Extent of Utilization of Existing Facilities There are 27 acute care hospitals dispersed throughout the County. Only three are LTCHs. The three existing LTCHs, all in the eastern portion of the County, are not as readily accessible to the population located in the western portion as would be an LTCH in the west. Approval of an application that will lead to an LTCH in the western portion of the County will enhance access to LTCH services or as Ms. Greenberg put it hearing, "if only one facility is going to be built, the western part of the county is where that needs to go." Tr. 2101. See discussion re: Subsection (5), below. In confirmation of this opinion, Dr. Gonzalez pointed out several occasions when he was not able to place a patient at one of the existing LTCHs due to family member reluctance to place their loved one in a facility that would force the family to travel a long distance for visits. LTCH appropriate patients are currently remaining in the acute care setting with Palmetto General and Hialeah Hospital among the busiest of the STACHs in the County. Both are within Select-Dade's targeted service area. From 2002 to 2005 the number of LTCH beds in the District increased from 53 to 122. During the same period, the number of patient days increased from 18,825 to 37,993. Recently established LTCH facilities in District 11 have consistently reached high occupancy levels, approaching 90 percent at the time of hearing. From 2001 to 2004, the use rate for LTCH services grew from 3.07 per 1,000 to 6.51 per 1,000. The increase in use rate for those aged 65 and over was even more significant; from 19.32 per 1,000 to 41.67 per 1,000. Kindred's Miami-Dade facility is licensed at 53 beds; of those seven are in private rooms; the facility has 23 semi- private rooms. As far back as 2001, the facility has operated at occupancy rates in excess of 85 percent; in 1998 and 1999 its occupancy rate exceeded 92 percent and 93 percent, respectively. More recently, it has operated at an ADC of 53 patients; 100 percent capacity. Several physicians and case managers provided support to Kindred's application by way of form letters, indicating patients would benefit from transfers to LTCHs and "an ever growing need for (these) services." Kindred's daily census has averaged 50 or more patients since 2004. Unlike an acute care hospital, Kindred has not experienced any seasonal fluctuations in its census, running at or above a reasonable functional capacity throughout the year. Taking various factors into consideration, including the number of semi-private beds, the facility is operating at an efficient occupancy level. Looking ahead five years, the capacity at Kindred's facility cannot be increased in order to absorb more patients. As designed, the facility cannot operate more efficiently than it has at 85 percent occupancy. Select's facility, located in a medical arts building, houses 34 private and six semi-private beds. In 2005, Select's facility operated at an average occupancy of almost 88 percent. Unlike Kindred, Select can add at least seven more beds to its facility by converting offices. As a hospital within a hospital, Sister Emmanuel's 29-bed facility is subject to limits on the percentage of admissions it can receive from "host" Mercy Hospital; even with such restrictions, its 2005 occupancy rate was 84.6 percent. Because of gender mix and infection opportunities, among other reasons, it is difficult to utilize semi-private beds. Only three District facilities offer ventilator care: MJHHA, HMA Hampton Court, and Victoria Nursing Home. Other health care facility settings do not serve as reasonable alternatives to the LTCH services proposed here. In 2004, roughly one quarter of District 11 residents, (nearly 400 patients), requiring LTCH services traveled to District 10 facilities. In 2005 that number fell to 369, or about 22 percent. Although there is a correlation between inpatient acute care services and LTCH services, the out-migration of patients requiring LTCH services indicated above differs markedly from the out-migration numbers generated by acute care patients. The primary north-south road configurations in the county are A1A, U.S. 1 and I-95 on the east and the Palmetto Expressway on the west. The primary east-west road configurations are composed of the Palmetto Expressway extension, S.R. 112; the Airport Expressway feeding into the Miami International Airport area and downtown Miami, S.R. 836 to Florida's Turnpike, and the Don Shula Expressway in the southwest. Assuming no delays, a trip by mass transit, used by the elderly and the poor, from various areas in Miami-Dade to the nearest LTCH outside District 11 (Kindred Hollywood) runs two to four hours one way. These travel times pose a special hardship to the elderly traveling to a facility to receive care or visit loved ones. While improvements in the system are planned over the next five years, they will not measurably change the existing travel times. These factors, along with high occupancy levels in District 11 LTCHs, indicate the demand for LTCH services in the District exceeds the existing bed supply. The three existing LTCHs have recently operated at optimal functional capacity or above it. On December 31, 2005, Select Specialty Hospital-Miami was operating with 95 percent occupancy. Subsection (3): Ability of the Applicant to Provide Quality of Care and the Applicant's Record of Providing Quality of Care As discussed above, MJH has the ability to provide high quality of care to its LTCH patients and an outstanding record of providing quality of care. Select-Dade has the ability to provide quality of care to its LTCH patients and a record providing quality of care. In treating and caring for LTCH patients, Select-Dade will use an interdisciplinary team of physicians, dieticians, respiratory therapists, physical therapists, occupational therapists, speech therapists, nurses, case managers and pharmacists. Each will discipline will play an integral part in assuring the appropriate discharge of the patient in a timely manner. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospital Organizations (JCAHO) has accredited all Select facilities that have been in existence long enough to qualify for JCAHO accreditation. Both Select and Promise use various tools, including Interqual Criteria, to assure patients who need LTCH services are appropriately evaluated for admission. All Promise facilities are accredited by JCAHO. Promise has developed and implemented a company-wide compliance program, as well as pre-admission screening instruments, standards of performance and a code of conduct for its employees. Its record of providing quality of care was shown at hearing with regard to data related to its ventilator program weaning rate and wound healing rates. None of the parties presented evidence or argument that any of the other applicants was unable to provide adequate quality of care. The Agency adopted its statements from the SAAR at pages 43 through 45. The SAAR noted the existence of certain confirmed complaints at the two existing LTCH providers in Florida Select and Kindred. The number of confirmed complaints is relatively few. Kindred, for example, had 12 confirmed complaints with the State Department of Health at its seven facilities during a three-year period, less than one complaint per Kindred hospital every two years. Each applicant satisfies this criterion. Subsection (4): Availability of Resources, Health and Management Personnel, Funds for Capital and Operating Expenditures, Project Accomplishment and Operation The parties stipulated that all applicants have access to health care and management personnel. Select-Dade, Kindred and MJH all have funds for capital and operating expenditures and project accomplishment and operation. In turn, each of these three contends that Promise did not demonstrate the availability of funds for its project. This issue is dealt with below under the part of this order that discusses Subsection (6) of the Statutory CON Review Criteria. Subsection (5): Access Enhancement The applicants stipulated that "each of the applicants' projects will enhance access to LTCH services for residents of the district to some degree." All four applicants get some credit under this subsection because approval of their application will enhance access by meeting need that all of the parties now agree exists. Select-Dade and Promise propose to locate their projects in the western portion of the County. Kindred did not indicate a location. Location of an LTCH in the western portion of the County will enhance geographic access. MJH's location is in an area that has reasonable geographic access to LTCH services. But approval of its application, given the unique nature of its operation, chiefly its charitable mission, will enhance access to charity and Medicaid recipients. Approval of Select-Dade's application will also enhance cultural access to the Latin population in Hialeah. A substandard public transportation system for this population makes traveling to visit hospitalized loved ones an insurmountable task in some situations. Select-Dade has achieved a competent cultural atmosphere in its LTCH opened in the County in 2003. It has in excess of 100 multi-lingual employees, many of whom communicate in Spanish. The staff effectively communicates with patients with a variety of racial, cultural and ethnic backgrounds. Every new LTCH must undergo a qualifying period to establish itself as an LTCH for Medicare reimbursement. Specifically, the average LOS for all Medicare patients must meet or exceed 25 days. During the qualifying period the LTCH is reimbursed by Medicare under the regular STACH PPS, that is paid on a DRG basis as if the patient were in an ordinary general acute care hospital with its lower reimbursement. Upon initiation of their LTCH services, Promise, Kindred and Select all intend to restrict or suppress admissions to ensure longer LOS to meet the Medicare 25 day average LOS requirement, and to “minimize the costs” of obtaining LTCH certification and reimbursement. MJH will not be artificially restricting its LTCH admissions during the initial 6 month Medicare qualification period, even though the cost of providing services during this period will likely exceed the STACH Medicare reimbursement. MJH’s opening without suppressing admissions (as in the case of Sister Emmanuel), will enhance access by patients in need of these services during the initial qualification period. Subsection (6): Immediate and Long-term Financial Feasibility a. Short-Term Financial Feasibility Short-term financial feasibility is the ability of an applicant to fund the project. None of the parties took the position that the MJH project was not financially feasible in the short term. MJH's current assets are equal to current liabilities, a short-term position found by AHCA to be weak but acceptable. The financial performance of MJH, however, has been improving in the past three years. Expansion of existing services, improved utilization of services, and the development of new programs have all contributed to a significant increase in operational revenue and total revenue during that period. MJH has a history of receiving substantial charitable gifts (ranging from $6.2 million to $13.2 million annually during the past three years) and can reasonably expect to receive financial gifts annually of between $4-5 million in the coming years. However, MJH is moving away from reliance on charitable giving, and toward increasing self-sufficiency from operations. Approval of the LTCH will play a major role in achieving that goal. In addition, MJH has total assets, including land and buildings, of approximately $150 million. The cost to implement the proposed MJH LTCH is $5,319,647. The projected cost is extremely conservative in the sense of overestimating any potential contingency costs that could be incurred. MJH has the resources available to fund the project through endowments and investments (currently $41 million) as well as from operating cash flow and cash on hand. Select-Dade has an adequate short-term position and Kindred a good short-term position. None of the parties contest the short-term financial feasibility of either Select-Dade or Kindred. In contrast, both Select-Dade and Kindred contested the short-term financial feasibility of Promise. In accord is MJH's position expressed in its proposed recommended order: "Promise did not demonstrate the availability of funds for its project." Miami Jewish Home & Hospital For the Aged, Inc.'s Proposed Recommended Order, at 37. Promise's case for short-term financial feasibility rests on the historical relationship between the principals of Promise, Sun Capital Healthcare, Inc., and Mr. William Gunlicks of Founding Partners Capital Management Company ("Founding Partners.") The relationship has led to great success financially over many years. For example, through the efforts of Mr. Gunlicks, Sun Capital has generated over $2 billion in receivable financing. Founding Partners is an investment advisor registered with the Security Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the National Futures Association and the State of Florida. As a general partner, it manages two private investment funds: Founding Partners Stable Value Fund and Founding Partners Equity Fund. Founding Partners also manages an International Fund for non-U.S. investors. Its base is composed of approximately 130 individuals with high net worth and access to capital. Founding Partners provided Promise with a "letter of interest" dated October 12, 2005, which indicated its interest in providing the "construction, permanent, and working capital financing for the development of a 60 bed long-term acute care hospital to be located in Dade County, Florida." Promise Ex. 3, Exhibit Promise XI, Gunlicks 4, 6-27-06. The letter makes clear, however, that it is not a commitment to finance the project: "The actual terms and conditions of this loan will be determined at the time of your loan request is approved. Please recognize this letter represents our interest in this project and is not a commitment for financing." Id. Testimony at hearing demonstrated a likelihood that Promise would be able to fund the project should it's application be approved. Mr. Balsano opined that this is sufficient to meet short-term financial feasibility: "[I]t's not required at this point that firm funding be in place. . . . [W]e have an appropriate letter from Mr. Gunlicks' organization that they're interested and willing to fund the project. It kind of goes to the second issue, which is, well, what if there were some issue in that regard? Would this project be financed. And I guess I would just have to say bluntly that in doing regulatory work for the last 20-some years, that if an applicant has a certificate of need for a given service, most lending institutions view that as a validation that the project is needed and can be supported. My experience has been that I have never personally witnessed a project that was approved that could not get financing. Tr. 392. Other expert health planners with considerable experience in the CON regulatory arena conceded that they were not aware of a CON-approved hospital project in the state that could not get financing. Despite the proof of a likelihood that Promise's project would be funded if approved, however, Promise failed to demonstrate as MJH, Select-Dade and Kindred continue to maintain, that funds are, indeed, available to fund the project. In sum, Promise failed to demonstrate the short-term financial feasibility of the project. The projects of MJH, Select-Dade and Kindred are all financially feasible in the short-term. b. Long-Term Financial Feasibility Long-term financial feasibility refers to the ability of a proposed project to generate a positive net revenue or profit at the end of the second full year of operation. MJH’s projected patient volumes are both reasonable and appropriate, given its current position in the community, the services it currently provides, and the need for LTCH services in the community. MJH’s projected payor mix was largely based upon the historical experience of the three existing LTCHs in the District, with the exception of the greater commitment to charity and Medicaid patients. The higher commitment to Medicaid/charity is consistent with MJH’s historical experience and status as a safety net provider. Sister Emmanuel is a 29-bed LTCH located within Mercy Hospital. As a similarly-sized HIH, a not-for-profit provider, and an entity with the same kind of commitment to Medicaid/charity patients, Sister Emmanuel is the best proxy for comparison of the financial projections contained in the MJH application. MJH projected its gross revenues based upon Sister Emmanuel’s general charge structure, adjusted for payor mix and inflated at 4 percent per year. The staffing positions, FTEs and salaries contained on Schedule 6 of each of the applications were stipulated to represent reasonable projections. MJH’s Medicaid net revenues were calculated by determining a specific Medicaid per diem rate using the Dade County operating cost ceiling and 80 percent of the capital costs. Given that many LTCH patients exhaust their allowable days of Medicaid coverage, 70 percent of the revenue associated with MJH’s Medicaid patient days were “written off” in total. Similarly, patient days associated with charity care and bad debt reflected no net revenue. MJH's Medicare net revenues were determined using the specific diagnosis (DRG) of each projected patient. For the first six months of operation it was assumed that MJH would receive the short-stay DRG reimbursement, and in the second 6 months and second year of operation would receive the LTCH DRG payment. Net revenues for the remaining payor categories were based upon the historical contractual adjustments of MJH. MJH’s projected gross and net revenues for its proposed LTCH are conservative, reasonable and achievable. However, if MJH has in fact understated the net revenues that it will actually achieve, the impact will be an improved financial performance and improved likelihood of long-term financial feasibility. MJH’s staffing expense projections were derived from its Schedule 6 projections (which were stipulated to be reasonable) with a 28 percent benefit package added. Non- ancillary expense costs were based upon MJH’s historical costs, while ancillary expenses (lab, pharmacy, medical supplies, etc.) were based upon the Sister Emmanuel proxy. Capitalized project costs, depreciation and amortization were derived from Schedule 1 and the historical experience of MJH, as were the non- operating expenses such as G&A, plant maintenance, utilities, insurance and other non-labor expenses. MJH’s income and expense projections are reasonable and appropriate, and demonstrate the long-term financial feasibility of MJH’s proposed LTCH. John Williamson is an Audit Evaluation and Review Analyst for AHCA. He holds a B.S. in accounting and is a Florida CPA. Mr. Williamson conducted a review of the financial schedules contained in each of the four applications at issue. In conducting his review, Mr. Williamson compared the applicants’ financial projections with the “peer group” of existing Florida LTCHs. With regard to the MJH projections, Mr. Williamson noted: Projected cost per patient day (CPD) of $1,087 in year two is at the group lowest value of $1,087. Projected CPD is considered efficient when compared to the peer group with CPD falling at the lowest level. The apparent reason for costs at this level are the low overhead costs associated with operating a hospital-within- a-hospital. MJH Ex.34, depo Ex. 4, Page 3 of 5. Mr. Williamson further concluded that MJH presented an efficient LTCH project, which is likely to be more cost- effective and efficient than the other three proposals. In its application, Kindred projected a profit of $16,747 at the end of year two of operation. Schedule 8A listed interest expense "as a way of making a sound business decision." Tr. 1458. Interest expense, however, is not really applicable because Kindred funds new projects out of operation cash flows. If the interest expense is omitted, profit before taxes would roughly $1.5 million. Taking taxes into consideration, the profit at the end of year two of operation would be roughly $1 million. Promise's projections the facility will be financially feasible in the long term are contained in its Exhibit 2, Schedules 5, 6, 7 and 8A and related assumptions. The parties agreed the information contained in Promise's Schedule 5, and the supporting assumptions, were reasonable. Schedule 5 indicates Promise projects an occupancy rate in Year 2 of 76.1 percent, based on 16,660 patient days and an ADC of 45.6 patients. To reach projected occupancy rates, Promise would have to capture roughly 15-17 percent of the LTCH market in Year 2. AHCA concluded Promise's project would be financially feasible in the long term. Only Select questioned Promise's projected long term financial feasibility. The attack, evidenced by Select Exhibits 12 and 14, was composed of a numbered of arguments, considered below: The estimated Medicare revenue per patient projected by Promise was high, and among other factors, erroneously assumed Medicare would increase reimbursement by an average of 3 percent per year. In determining a project's long-term financial feasibility, AHCA looks to the facility's second full year of operation, and, assuming reasonable projections, determines if there is a net positive profit. The analysis AHCA uses to determine the reasonableness of an applicant's projections in Schedules 7A and 8A begins with a comparison of those figures against a standardized grouping developed over the years and consistently applied by the agency as a policy. In this instance, the grouping consisted of all LTCHs operating in Florida in 2004; a total of 11 facilities; eight operated by Kindred and three operated by Select. The analysis is based on Revenue Per Patient Day (RPPD). Promise estimated it would generate an average RPPD of $1,492 in Year 2, and a net profit for the same period of $2,521.327. Using the above process, AHCA concluded that Promise's projected net income per patient day appeared reasonable. At the time of hearing, other Promise facilities were receiving an average RPPD higher than $1,400; compared to the projected "somewhat over" $1,500 it would expect to receive in Year 2 of its Miami-Dade facility. Approximately half of the existing Promise facilities (including West Valley and San Antonio) received Medicare RPPDs in excess of $1,500. As opposed to total revenue per patient, revenue on a per patient day is the one figure associated with the expenses generated to treat a patient on a given day. A comparison of net RPPDs projected by Promise with those of other applicants and the state median indicate Promise's revenue projections are reasonable. While Medicare recently opted not to increase the rate of LTCH reimbursement for the 2006-07 fiscal year, it is the first year in four that the program has done so. Compared to Promise's assumption that Medicare reimbursement would increase yearly by 3 percent on average, Select assumed a rate of 2.4 percent. The ALOS projected by Promise was too long. In projecting need, Select projected an ALOS similar to Promise's projection. Compared with the statewide ALOS of 35 days, Select's is about 28 days. This is the result of a combination of managing patients and their acuity. Assuming Promise's ability to manage patients in a manner similar to Select and achieve a like ALOS, Promise would have room available to admit more patients. There is no reason to assume Promise could not attain a similar ALOS with a similar population than that served by Select; others have done so. Like other segments of the health care industry, LTCH providers will manage patient care to the reimbursement received from payors. The CMI projected by Promise was too high. The prospective payment system is based to a great extent on how patients' diagnoses and illnesses are "coded," or identified, because the information is translated into a DRG, which, in turn, translates directly into the amount of reimbursement received. Each DRG has a "weight." By obtaining the DRG weight for each patient treated in a hospital, one can obtain the average weight, which will correspond to the average cost of care for the hospital's patients. The term for this average is Case Mix Index (CMI). Each year Medicare determines the rate it will pay for treatment of patients in LTCHs, adjusted for each market in the U.S. to account for variations in labor costs. Mr. Balsano assumed the new facility would experience an average CMI of 1.55 and that Medicare would reimburse the facility based on existing rates with an annual inflation of 3.0 percent. Mr. Balsano then reduced the estimated Medicare RPPD generated by those assumptions by 15 percent. While Select's expert criticized Promise's projected CMI adjusted reimbursement rate for Medicare patients (approximately $50,000) as to high, Select's own Exhibit 12, p. 8, indicates a projected reimbursement of $41,120.44 based on an average CMI of 1.0. However, at hearing it was verified that Select's Miami facility operated at an average CMI of 1.23. Applying a CMI of 1.23 generates an average projected Medicare reimbursement of $50,618 per patient, a number similar to that projected by Mr. Balsano. Select Ex. 14, pages 9-16, contains data on, among other things, the CMI of 161 DRGs used by Promise's expert. The data was taken from each of the existing LTCHs in Florida. In 2004, the statewide average CMI was 1.231. Also in 2004, four of 11 LTCHs in Florida experienced an average CMI of 1.4 or higher. Other Florida facilities have experienced an average CMI at or above 1.59. Indeed, other Florida facilities have experienced average CMIs and ALOS similar to that of the Select facility. While Promises operates no facility with an average CMI of 1.55, it has several with average CMIs of 1.3 or 1.4. Promise expects Medicare will take future steps to restrict the admission of patients with lower CMIs' the effect being more complex patients will access LTCHs than currently do, increasing the average CMI in LTCHs. Reducing the number of lower acuity patients admitted to LTCHs in future years will likely increase the CMI of those admitted. There is a direct correlation between CMI and ALOS. If, in fact, the CMI experienced by Promise's facility is less than 1.55, it will in turn generate a lower ALOS. Applying the reduction in reimbursement advanced by Promise's witness (15 percent) would in turn reduce the projected CMI in Promise's facility from 1.55 to 1.05. Because reimbursement coincides with acuity and ALOS, a representation that reducing one of the three does not likewise affects the others is not realistic. Whatever the CMI and ALOS for LTCHs will be in the future will be governed to a great extent by the policies established by the federal government. The federal government's reimbursement system will drive the delivery of patient services and the efficiencies the system provides, so that, in fact, the providers of care manage patients to the reimbursement provided. Whether the average CMI at Promise's facility reaches 1.55 in the future is subject to debate; however, it is reasonable that the status quo will not likely continue; thus, regardless of a facility's current CMI, more complex patients will access the facility in the future. Various sensitivity analyses generated to test the reliability of Select's criticisms in this area do not indicate any material change in the projected Medicare reimbursement. The interest rate on the loaned funds was 9 percent, rather than 7 percent. The estimated expenses did not include sufficient funds to pay the following: the necessary ad valorem taxes the required PMATF assessment the premiums to obtain premises insurance physician fees housekeeping expenses in Year 1 Using the same standardized "grouping" analysis, AHCA calculated Promise's projected costs per patient day and found them reasonable. Because the projected increase in ad valorem taxes and the PMATF assessment will not be payable until 2010, it is not necessary to borrow additional funds to meet these obligations. Select's expert concluded that, depending on a number of scenarios, the result of the appropriate calculations would produce a loss to Promise's project of between $624,636 and $902,361 of year 2. Assuming they represented sensitivity analyses which included various assumptions based on criticisms from Select. The impact of Select's suggested adjustments, reduced by overstated costs in Promise's application Schedule 8A, increased Promise's projected Year 2 net income from the initial estimate of $2,521,327 to $2,597.453. Even if the 15 percent reduction previously included in Mr. Balsano's assumptions on Medicare reimbursement were not considered, and assuming a lower CMI consistent with the existing statewide average (1.43 vs. 1.23), or that Promise's experience in District 11 will be similar to Select's, Promise's facility would still be financially feasible. Select's witness conceded that if Promise's facility experienced a lower ALOS, the demand for additional LTCH services is high enough to allow the facility to admit additional patients ("backfill"). While assuming a lower reimbursement due to lower acuity patients admitted to Promise's facility, Select's witness did not similarly assume any reduction in expenses associated with treatment of such lower acuity patients. In reality, if revenues are less than expected a facility reduces expenses to generate profits. Select's witness also conceded that Promise could reduce the management fee to reduce costs and generate a profit. The testimony of Promise's Chairman, Mr. Baronoff, established the company would take measures to reduce expenses to assure the profitability, including reducing the facility's corporate allocation. Such a reduction by itself would reduce expenses by between $1 million and $1.5 million. Reduction in corporate allocation has occurred before to maintain the profitability of a Promise facility. With regard to Select-Dade, its forecasted expenses, as detailed on Schedules 7A and 8A of its application are consistent with Select-Miami's historical experience in Miami. Evaluation of the revenues and expenses detailed in Select-Dade's Schedules 7A and 8A (and drawing comparison with SMC's 96 other hospitals, with particular attention paid to the Select-Miami facility), its profitability after year one indicates that Select-Dade's project will be financially feasible in the long term. In sum, all four applicants demonstrated long-term financial feasibility. Subsection (7): Extent to Which the Proposal Will Foster Competition that Promotes Quality and Cost-effectiveness Competition benefits the market. It stimulates providers to offer more programs and to be more innovative. It benefits quality of care generally. Competition to promote quality and cost-effectiveness is generally driven by the best combination of high quality and fair price. The introduction of a new LTCH providers to the market would press Sister Emmanuel, Kindred-Coral Gables and Select-Miami to focus on quality, responsiveness to patients and would drive innovations. Approval of any of the applications, therefore, as the Agency recognizes, see Agency for Health Care Administration Proposed Recommended Order, at 36, will foster competition that promotes quality and cost-effectiveness. Competition that promotes quality and cost- effectiveness will best be fostered by introduction to the market of a new competitor: either MJH or Promise. Between the two, Promise's application for 60 rather than 30 beds proposed by MJH, if approved, would capture a larger market share and promote more competition. On the other hand, MJH's because of its long-standing status as a well-respected community provider, particularly in the arenas of cost-effectiveness and quality of care, would be very effective in fostering competition that would promote both quality and cost-effectiveness. Kindred and Select dominate LTCH services in Florida with control over 86 percent of the licensed and approved beds: Kindred has eight existing LTCHs and one approved LTCH yet to be licensed; Select has three existing LTCHs and six approved projects in various stages of pre-licensure development. In 2005 the District 11 LTCH market shares were: Kindred-Coral Gables: 42 percent; Select-Miami: 35 percent; and Sister Emmanuel: 23 percent. Approval of Promise would only slightly diminish Select-Miami’s market share and would reduce Sister Emmanuel to a 16 percent share. A Select-Dade approval would give the two Select facilities a combined 54 percent of the market. A Kindred approval would give its two Miami-Dade facilities a combined 57 percent market share. An MJH approval would give it about 16 percent of the market, Sister Emmanuel would decline to 19 percent and Select-Miami and Kindred-Coral Gables would both have market shares above 30 percent. MJH's application is most favored under Subsection (7) of the Statutory Review Criteria. Subsection (8): Costs and Methods of Proposed Construction The parties stipulated to the reasonableness of a number of the project costs identified in Schedule 1, as well as the Schedule 9 project costs. All parties stipulated to the reasonableness of the proposed construction schedule on Schedule 10 of the application. Those additional costs items on Schedule 1 of the respective applications that were not stipulated to were adequately addressed through evidence adduced at final hearing. Given the conceptual-only level of detail required in the schematic drawings submitted as part of a CON application, and based on the evidence, it is concluded that each of the applicants presented a proposed construction design that is reasonable as to cost, method, and construction time. Each applicant demonstrated the reasonableness of its cost and method of construction. Accordingly each gets credit under Subsection (8) of the CON Statutory Review Criteria. But under the subsection, MJH's application is superior to the other three applications. The subsection includes consideration of "the costs and methods of energy provision and the availability of alternative, less costly, or more effective methods of construction." § 408.035(8), Fla. Stat. As an application proposing an HIH rather than a free-standing facility, not only can MJH coordinate its operations with other types of service settings at expected energy savings, its application involves less construction and substantially less cost that the other three applications. Subsection (9): Past and Proposed Provision of Services to Medicaid and Indigent Patients A provider's history of accepting the medically indigent, Medicaid and charity patients, influences patients and referral sources. Success with a provider encourages these patients on their own or through referrals to again seek access at that provider. As a safety net provider, MJH has a history of accepting financially challenged patients, many of whom are medically complex. Its application is superior to the others under Subsection (9) of the Statutory Review Criteria. Promise does not have a history of providing care in Florida. It has a history of providing health care services to Medicaid and the medically indigent at some of its facilities elsewhere in the country. As examples, its facility in Shreveport, Louisiana, provides approximately 7 percent of its care to Medicaid patients and a facility in California provides about 20 percent of its service to Medicaid patients. MJH committed to the highest percentage of patient days to Medicaid: 4.2 percent. Promise proposes a 3.0 percent commitment; Select-Dade and Kindred, 2.8 percent and 2.2 percent, respectively. Select-Dade's proposed condition is structured so as to allow it to include Medicaid days from a patient who later qualifies as a charity patient, thus accruing days toward the condition without expanding the number of patients served. Select-Dade's targeted service area, moreover, has fewer proportionate Medicaid beneficiaries identified (13 percent) as potential LTCH patients than identified by the methodologies used by the applicants (21 percent), indicating that Select's targeted area is generally more affluent than the rest of the County. Kindred does not have a favorable history of providing care to Medicaid and charity patients. For example, during FY 2004, Sister Emmanuel provided 6.1 percent of its services to Medicaid and charity patients. During this same period, Kindred-Coral Gables provided only 1.08 percent of its services to Medicaid and charity patients. Of all four applicants, Kindred proposes the lowest percentage of service to such patients: 2.2 percent. It has not committed to achieving the percentage upon its initiation of services. Its proposed condition and poor history of Medicaid and indigent care merit considerably less weight than the other applicants and reflects poorly on its application in a process that includes comparative review. MJH's proposed condition, although the highest in terms of percentage, is not the highest in terms of patient days because the facility it proposes will have only half as many beds as the facilities proposed by the other three applicants. Nonetheless, the proposal coupled with its past provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent, which is exceptional, makes MJH the superior applicant under Subsection (9) of the Statutory Review Criteria. Subsection (10) Designation as a Gold Seal Program None of the applicants are requesting additional nursing home beds. The subsection is inapplicable to this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration issue a final order that: approves Miami Jewish Home and Hospital for the Aged, Inc.'s CON Application No. 9893; approves Select Specialty Hospital-Dade, Inc.'s CON Application No. 9892; denies Promise Healthcare of Florida XI, Inc.'s CON Application No. 9891; and, denies Kindred Hospitals East LLC's CON Application No. 9894. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. Andrew C. Agwunobi, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Suite 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Craig H. Smith, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 W. David Watkins, Esquire Karl David Acuff, Esquire Watkins & Associates, P.A. 3051 Highland Oaks Terrace, Suite D Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5828 Sandra E. Allen, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 F. Philip Blank, Esquire Robert Sechen, Esquire Blank & Meenan, P.A. 204 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mark A. Emanuele, Esquire Panza, Maurer & Maynard, P.A. 3600 North Federal Highway, Third Floor Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire Oertel, Fernandez, Cole & Bryant, P.A. 301 South Bronough Street, Fifth Floor Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1110
Findings Of Fact On April 1, 1986, a letter of intent was filed on behalf of Anthony J. Estevez to apply for a CON in the March 16, 1986, batching cycle for a 120-bed long-term psychiatric hospital in Dade County, Florida, HRS Service District XI. A long-term psychiatric hospital is defined in Rule 10-5.011(p), Florida Administrative Code, as a "category of services which provides hospital based inpatient services averaging a length of stay of 90 days." Subsequently, DHRS notified Mr. Estevez that his letter of intent was effective March 17, 1986; the application was to be filed by April 15, 1986; the application was to be completed by June 29, 1986; and the date for final department action was August 28, 1986. On April 15, 1986, Mr. Estevez filed his CON application with DHRS (designated action #4854). Anthony J. Estevez' name appeared along with Health Care Advisors Corporation on the line of the application which requested "legal name of project sponsor." Mr. Francis A. Gomez, Mr. Estevez' authorized representative, had the responsibility for the preparation and submission of the application. Mr. Estevez signed the CON application as the project sponsor. HCAC Psychiatric Hospital of Dade County was meant to be the name of the proposed facility. HCAC is an acronym for Health Care Advisors Corporation, Inc. HCAC was incorporated as of April 14, 1987, but the name had been reserved prior to that time. HCAC was initially intended to be a health care management corporation owned by Mr. Estevez. However, it is now anticipated that Flowers Management Corporation (Flowers) will manage the project under the HCAC corporate umbrella. Mr. Estevez owns 100 percent of the stock of HCAC and is also its sole director and sole shareholder. Mr. Estevez considered HCAC and himself to be one and the same for the purpose of the CON application. HCAC initially proposed to construct in Dade County, Florida, a freestanding 120-bed long-term psychiatric hospital. HCAC proposed to divide those beds into three groups: (1) 75 beds for adults; (2) 30 beds for geriatrics; and (3) 15 beds for adolescents. On May 15, 1986, DHRS requested additional information from HCAC regarding its CON application. On June 19, 1986, and June 23, 1986, HCAC in two separate filings provided DHRS with responses to its request for additional information which DHRS believed was omitted from the original application. The application was deemed complete effective June 29, 1986. On August 20, 1986, Francis Gomez, Paul McCall, a health care consultant employed by HCAC at that time, and HCAC's attorney, met with Islara Soto of DHRS regarding the CON application. At this meeting, HCAC advised DHRS of its intent to orient the facility programmatically to meet the needs of the Hispanic population of Dade and Monroe Counties. By letter dated August 29, 1986, DHRS notified Mr. Francis Gomez of its decision to deny CON application 4584. HCAC requested a formal administrative hearing to contest the denial. At the formal hearing, HCAC indicated a desire to abandon its proposal to provide 15 beds dedicated to serve adolescent patients and sought to introduce evidence relating to a down-sized 105-bed long-term psychiatric hospital serving only adult and geriatric patients. Charter renewed its prehearing motion to exclude any evidence concerning a 105-bed facility. (Approximately three or four weeks prior to the administrative hearing, HCAC had decided to go forward with a proposal for the 105-bed facility.) The undersigned ruled that HCAC would be allowed to present evidence concerning a down-sized 105-bed facility to the extent that such evidence related to a separate and identifiable portion of the original application. HCAC's Proposal The proposed building site for the facility, although not finally selected, is intended to be within the Northwest Dade Center cachement area which is in the northwest corner of Dade County. The ownership of the proposed facility will be by Mr. Estevez and/or his family or wife. The proposed area to be serviced by the facility is Dade and Monroe Counties (HRS Service District XI). HCAC proposes to offer at its facility a psychiatric inpatient unit, patient support services, diagnostic/treatment services, ambulatory care, administrative services, environmental/maintenance, educational and training services, and materials management. The HCAC facility will be managed by Flowers Management Corporation (Flowers), of which Mr. Estevez is a majority shareholder. Flowers was created approximately three and a half years ago for the purpose of providing management in the psychiatric field. Humana Hospital, a hospital chain, has selected Flowers to manage four of its facilities and is also considering Flowers for an additional two facilities. Those facilities are currently providing short-term psychiatric and substance abuse services. Nelson Rodney will be responsible for the design and implementation of the treatment programs in the HCAC facility. Rodney is employed as Regional Vice President of Flowers and is responsible for the management of the Florida hospitals affiliated with Flowers, including a chemical dependency unit at Humana-Biscayne Hospital and a psychiatric unit at Humana West Palm Beach Hospital. The HCAC facility is intended to provide specialty long-term psychiatric services for chronically mentally disturbed individuals requiring a 90-day or greater average length of stay. Many of the patients would be a danger to themselves and others and will require a very restrictive setting -- a locked facility. The programs proposed to be offered involve a range of inpatient diagnostic services, including an intensive diagnostic work-up done prior to admission for all patients. Each patient will have an individualized treatment plan updated every two weeks. The treatment program will include specialized therapy, such as art, music, milieu therapy and special education. There would also be specialized inpatient and outpatient treatment programs for family members and significant others. Discharge planning from the day of admission to assure continuity of care would be another aspect of the program. The proposed HCAC facility would offer a community-like atmosphere. It would provide both open and locked units. Flower's therapeutic model encourages patient participation in daily activities and in the many decisions of what is occurring at the hospital. One component of the project will be an initial screening process by a multi-disciplinary team who will employ a predetermined set of admissions criteria to assist in appropriate levels of care determination. The multi- disciplinary team would consist of a psychiatrist, psychologist, sometimes a neurologist, social worker, a family social assessment person, the patient, and others. The team will attempt to identify and admit only those patients who will have an expected length of stay greater than 90 days. The HCAC facility would provide seminars and workshops to practitioners in the community as well as its own staff. In-service training will also be offered. HCAC proposes to be flexible in the design of its treatment programs and allow new treatments to be utilized. A variety of therapies will be available to provide individualized treatment plans in order to optimize the chance of successful outcome in the patient's treatment. Currently, Flowers affords an in-house program of evaluation. Peer review serves this function in order to assess quality of care rendered to patients in the facility. The HCAC facility proposes to have an Hispanic emphasis. More than 50 percent of the staff will be bilingual. Upper management will consist of individuals who have an acute understanding of Hispanic culture and treatment implications of that culture. The facility will be more flexible in family visitation than is done in many facilities which is an important aspect of the Hispanic culture. The facility as managed by Flowers would have the required "patient's bill of rights" and will also seek JACH accreditation, although these items were not discussed in the application. The HCAC facility would offer each patient an attending psychiatrist who will be part of the multi-disciplinary team that will determine the individualized plan for each patient. Sufficient health manpower including management resources are available to HCAC to operate the project. Additionally, the facility will provide internships, field placements and semester rotations. PROJECT AND CONSTRUCTION COSTS HCAC's CON application, admitted into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 4, contains 26 tables concerning various aspects of the 120-bed project as well as Exhibit III.D.1., an operating pro forma. In response to a request for omissions by DHRS, HCAC submitted, among other things, a revised Table 7, revised Table 8, and a revised operating pro forma for the 120-bed project. The items making up HCAC's omission responses were admitted into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 5. In conjunction with its desire to complete a 105-bed facility only, HCAC submitted various new tables and a new operating pro forma (forecasted income statement), which were admitted into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 6. Table 1 - Source of Funds The estimated total project cost of the 120-bed facility would be $6,469,500. The estimated project cost of the 105-bed facility would be $5,696,940. The financing of the project is contemplated to be done through NCNB bank which has expressed its willingness to finance the project. It is reasonable to assume that HCAC would and could obtain the necessary financing for the proposed facility. Table 2 - Total Debt Table 2 for both the 120-bed project and the 105-bed project shows that 100 percent of the project costs would be financed by debt at an interest rate of 13 percent. The 13 percent interest rate was projected in 1986 and is higher than current rates. It is reasonable to assume that 100 percent of the costs can be financed at 13 percent for either the 120-bed or 105-bed project. Table 3 - New Purchase Equipment HCAC initially projected that $750,000 would be needed to equip the proposed 120-bed facility. The projected expenditure for the 105-bed facility is $500,000. The projected costs of $750,000 and $500,000 for the equipment needed for the 120-bed and 105-bed facility, respectively, are unreasonably low. For example, of the $500,000 projected for equipment costs for the 105-bed project, $80,000 is for mini-vans, $15,000 is for the security system, $40,000 is for a computerized medical records system, and $40,000 for a computerized on-line nurse care program. This would leave $325,000 for all other necessary equipment. Pharmacy, laboratory services and x-ray equipment would be on contract. The remaining $325,000 would be insufficient to equip the kitchen (which would require $80,000), furnish patient rooms (approximately $150,000) and equip the remainder of the 105-bed facility which would reasonably require housekeeping equipment, exam room equipment, chart racks for the nurses station, seclusion room beds, office furniture and equipment, laundry equipment, lockers or shelving, refrigerators, ice makers, day room furniture and lounge furniture. A more reasonable projection for equipment costs would be in the neighborhood of $850,000 to $900,000. Table 7 - Utilization by Class of Pay Tables 7 and 8 of the original application which dealt with utilization by class of pay and effect on patient charges, were revised by HCAC in their responses to DHRS' Omissions Request. Table 7 reflects estimations of the net revenues which HCAC expects to capture from specific payor mixes, namely, contract/indigent, Medicare and insurance/private pay. There is no Medicaid reimbursement available for psychiatric care rendered in a freestanding psychiatric facility. The proposed payor mix for the 120-bed facility is, in patient days, as follows: Year 1 -- Contract/Indigent 8.64 percent (1989) Medicare 26.10 percent Insurance and Private Pay 65.26 percent Year 2 -- Contract/Indigent 8.48 percent (1990) Medicare 26.15 percent Insurance and Private Pay 65.37 percent The proposed payor mix for the 105-bed facility is, in patient days, as follows: Years 1 and 2 - Medicare 3.3 percent Insurance and Private Pay 90.7 percent Indigent 6.0 percent The change in payor mix was not attributed to down-sizing of the facility, but rather was the result of HCAC's additional research and understanding of what the payor mix would most likely be. The change in payor mix does not represent a substantial change to the original application taken as a whole. Francis Gomez, who prepared the Table 7 and was designated as an expert for HCAC in the area of health care facilities management and financial and marketing operations, conceded that HCAC's Table 7 for the 120-bed facility is not reasonable. The Table 7 for the 105-bed facility is also not reasonable. HCAC's contractual allowances are not reasonable. HCAC projects 3.3 percent for Medicare and nothing for HMOs or PPOs. It is unreasonable for HCAC's proposal to make no provision for HMO and PPO type arrangements in view of its projection of 90.7 percent insurance and private pay. Because the proposed patient mix for the 105-bed project is adults and geriatrics, 20 to 25 percent would be a more reasonable Medicare projection. HCAC's projected 90.7 percent insurance and private patient days is unreasonably high in view of the project's intended emphasis of serving the Hispanic population in HRS Service District XI. In 1980, 27.8 percent of the Hispanics in Dade County had incomes less than 150 percent of the poverty level. The 1987 United States Hispanic market study establishes that 20 percent of the Hispanic adults who are heads of households are either retired, students or unemployed. These groups of individuals would not reasonably fit into the insurance and private pay category in most cases. Thus, the 90.7 percent figure for insurance and private pay would have to be reduced significantly. Table 8 - Effects on Patient Charges HCAC's revised Table 8 for the 120-bed facility lists net revenues rather than gross charges for the specific services listed. In year one (1989), the table lists the following projected charges/rates: daily room charge - $214.61; average daily ancillary charge - $25.00; contract/indigent - $125.00; and Medicare - $229.61. In year two (1990), the table lists the following projected charges: daily room charge - $223.19; average daily ancillary charge - $26.00; contract/indigent - $130.00; and Medicare - $238.79. The Table 8 for the 105-bed facility reflects an all-inclusive gross charge of $300 per day in both years (1989 and 1990) for the daily room charge, Medicaid and Medicare. The $300 per day figure would include ancillary charges but not physician fees. The projected patient charges fall within the range of charges currently in effect at psychiatric hospitals in Dade and Monroe Counties and are reasonable for both the 120-bed facility and the 105-bed project. Table 10 - Projected Utilization The financial feasibility of any proposed hospital is largely tied to the ability of the hospital to generate an adequate level of utilization. Absent an adequate level of utilization, a facility will not generate sufficient revenues to meet expenses. Table 10 for both the 120-bed facility and the 105- bed facility sets forth the projected utilization of the proposed facility, by month and year, in patient days, for the first two years of anticipated operation. Table 10 for the 120-bed facility projects the facility will exceed 80 percent occupancy for two of the last three months of the second year and be at 80 percent occupancy at the end of that year. Eighty percent occupancy of 120 beds yields an average daily census of about 96 patients. Table 10 for the 105- bed facility projects that the facility will arrive at 92 percent occupancy at the end of the first year of operation and remain at 95 percent throughout the second year. Ninety-five percent occupancy of the 105-bed facility equals an average daily census of about 99 or 100 patients. The Table 10 "fill-up" rates for both the 120-bed and 105-bed facilities are unreasonable and not practical to be achieved. There is presently an emphasis on providing psychiatric care in less restrictive settings, a trend favoring reduced lengths of stay and a trend in third-party payors to provide reimbursement for a shorter number of days. In addition, nationwide statistics show that only 4 percent of the patients admitted to psychiatric facilities require treatment longer than 90 days. Table 11 - Manpower Requirements For the 120-bed facility, HCAC projected in the Table 11 a staffing ratio of one full-time equivalent (FTE) per occupied bed of 1.625 for the first year of operation and 1.43 for the second year. For the 105-bed facility, HCAC projected in the Table 11 1.91 FTE per occupied bed ratio for the first year and 1.45 for the second year. The actual average of FTEs available for both facilities would be 1.8 to 2.0. The application figures are lower than the actual average because students and other non-paid personnel were not included. Thus, when all programmatic FTEs are included, the number of FTEs per occupied bed is higher than what is listed in the Table 11 for either project. There is a relationship between the number and quality of staff personnel and a facility's ability to provide quality psychiatric care. The industry standard for FTEs is 1.8 to 2.0 FTEs per occupied bed. HCAC's proposed staffing for both the 120-bed and 105-bed projects are reasonable. For both proposed facilities, HCAC projects 110.5 FTEs for the first year with a total annual salary of $1,932,000 which equals an average salary of approximately $17,400 per FTE. HCAC's projected total annual salary expense is unreasonably low. Specifically, the salary for the occupational therapist is too low and the nursing salaries are too low because of shortages. Table 16 - Areas and Square Feet / Table 18 - Space Requirements HCAC proposes a total 59,603 square feet of gross area for the 120-bed facility and a total of 56,050 square feet of gross area for the 105-bed facility. The decrease in size for the 105-bed facility is attributed to a reduction of the ground floor, a reduction of the second floor by removing the adolescent portion and an increase of ancillary services on the second floor for the geriatric population. HCAC projects 168 feet of net living space in the patient's bedroom for both the 120-bed facility and the 105-bed facility. HCAC's proposal of total area and square feet requirements for both the 120-bed and 105-bed facility are reasonable for the delivery of quality psychiatric care within the proposed facilities. There would be adequate land space for parking at HCAC's facility to forego the necessity of constructing a parking garage. Table 19 - Nursing Unit Area Summary HCAC proposes a total of 34,479 square feet of gross area for the nursing unit in the 120-bed facility and the 105-bed facility. The square footage figures under Table 19 for both the 120-bed facility and 105-bed facility are reasonable. Table 25 - Estimated Project Costs Project Advisors Corporation (PAC), of which Mr. Estevez is the Chief Executive Officer, will be responsible for the design and construction of the proposed facility. PAC is a design and construction company which employs a registered architect, several licensed general contractors, an engineer, two graduate architects and a registered graduate architect. The registered architect and basically 90 percent of the staff have previously been involved in the design and construction of health related facilities. HCAC's projected total cost for the 120-bed facility is $6,469,500 and the projected total costs for the 105-bed facility is $5,696,940. HCAC projected construction costs per square foot of $57.55 for the 120-bed facility and $60.00 per square foot for the 105-bed facility. Although the average construction cost of psychiatric facilities today is around $75 to $95 per square foot, HCAC's projected costs are reasonable and reflect reasonable charges given the fact that PAC, the company which would construct the facility, is controlled by Mr. Estevez. The projected costs of land acquisition are also reasonable. HCAC's projected equipment costs are contained in both Table 25 and Table 2. As previously discussed, the projected equipment costs for both projects are unreasonably low. Table 26 - Project Completion Forecast HCAC projects that construction for both the 120-bed facility and 105- bed facility would be completed approximately one year after DHRS' approval of the construction documents. The project completion forecasts for both projects are reasonable. Exhibit III.D.1.- Operating Pro Forma/Forecasted Income Statement Revised Exhibit III.D.1 sets forth the operating pro forma for the first two years of operation of the 120-bed facility (1989 and 1990). HCAC's pro forma for its 120-bed facility is not reasonable. The supplies and other expenses depicted in the pro forma (year one at $55.60 per patient day and year two at $58.10 per patient day) are unreasonably low. A more reasonable estimate would be approximately $100 per patient day. The pro forma for the 120-bed facility does not include any estimate for the Hospital Cost Containment Board (HCCB) tax. Similar facilities in Florida pay an HCCB tax which is composed of one and a half percent of net revenue. Utilizing the more reasonable estimate of $100 per patient day for supplies and other expenses, and including the appropriate HCCB tax, the total supplies and other expenses would increase approximately $1,100,000 and the HCCB tax would be approximately $85,000 in year one. Instead of showing a profit of $395,012, HCAC would potentially lose approximately $785,000 in that year. In year two, the total supplies and other expenses would increase approximately $1,400,000 and the HCCB tax would be approximately $115,000 to $117,000. Thus, in year two, instead of showing a profit of $919,036, HCAC would potentially lose approximately $617, 000. HCAC's "forecasted income statement" for the 105-bed project is also not reasonable. Specifically, the contractual allowances, the allowance for bad debt, and the salaries, wages and fringe benefits are unreasonable. Contractuals include such things as Medicare, Medicaid, HMOs and PPOs, which all generate discounts which are considered contractual allowances. HCAC estimates its bad debt factor at 1.6 percent. A more reasonable projection would be 6 to 8 percent of gross revenue. CONSISTENCY WITH THE DISTRICT XI HEALTH PLAN AND STATE MENTAL HEALTH PLAN The District XI local health council has produced the 1986 District XI Health Plan. The district plan contains the relevant policies, priorities, criteria and standards for evaluation of an application such as HCAC's. HCAC's application is consistent with some of the applicable sections of the District XI Health Plan but inconsistent with the plan taken as a whole. Policy No. 1 of the District XI health plan states that the district should direct its efforts toward a licensed bed capacity of 5.5 non-federal beds per thousand population ratio by 1989. Presently there are 11,294 beds in District XI which represents a number in excess of 5.5 non-federal beds. HCAC's application is inconsistent with this policy. Policy No. 1, Priority No. 1, states that proposals for the construction of new beds in the district should be considered only when the overall average occupancy of licensed beds exceeds 80 percent. Priority No. 1 refers to certain types of beds, specifically, acute care general beds, short- term psychiatric beds and substance abuse beds. HCAC's application is not inconsistent with this priority because long-term psychiatric beds are not mentioned. Policy No. 1, Priority No. 2 favors the encouragement of projects that meet specific district service needs through the conversion of existing beds from currently underutilized services. Because HCAC is not the operator of an existing hospital and it is not possible for HCAC to convert any beds from other services, HCAC's application is inconsistent with Policy No. 1, Priority No. 2. Policy No. 1, Priority No. 3 would only be relevant in the case of an existing hospital but not in the case of a new hospital where no comparative hearing is involved. HCAC's application is not inconsistent with Policy No. 1, Priority No. 3. Policy No. 1, Priority No. 4 allows for priority consideration for the initiation of new services for projects which have had an average occupancy rate of 80 percent for the last two years and which have a documented history of providing services to Medicaid and/or other medically indigent patients. HCAC's application is not entitled to priority consideration under Policy No. 1, Priority No. 4. Policy No. 2 is a broad policy which provides that service alternatives should be available within the district to meet the needs of community residents, while at the same time maintaining an efficient level of utilization. This policy is necessarily tied to the demonstration of overall need for the facility. If HCAC can show need for the proposed facility, its proposal would be consistent with this policy. Policy No. 2, Priority No. 1(f) (Psychiatric Bed Services) provides for priority consideration to be given to specific institutions which have achieved an 80 percent occupancy rate for the preceding year. HCAC's application is not entitled to priority consideration under Policy No. 2, Priority No. 1(f). Policy No. 2, Policy No. 3(f) states that a CON applicant should propose to provide the scope of services consistent with the level of care proposed in the application in accordance with appropriate accrediting agency standards. In the case of psychiatric bed services the appropriate accrediting agency is the Joint Commission for Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH). Although HCAC neglected to address its ability to comply with JCAH standards in its application, it has established its intent to seek JCAH accreditation. HCAC's proposal is consistent with Policy No. 2, Priority No. 3(f). Policy No. 2, Priority No. 4 gives a preference to those applicants that propose innovative mechanisms such as various complimenting outpatient and inpatient services which are directed toward an ultimate reduction in dependency upon hospital beds. HCAC does not meet this priority because it has not proposed any mechanisms to complement outpatient services with inpatient services directed toward an ultimate reduction in the dependency on hospital beds. Policy No. 2, Priority No. 5 gives a preference to applicants who have based their project on a valid marketing research effort and have placed it in the context of a long-range plan. HCAC does not meet this priority because there was no evidence that the project was based on a valid marketing research plan or placed in the context of a long-range plan. Policy No. 2f Priority No. 6 states that existing facilities as well as applicants for new services should demonstrate a willingness to enter into cooperative planning efforts directed at establishing a system whereby duplication of specialized services is avoided while quality of such services is enhanced. HCAC presented no documentation of transfer agreements with other hospitals and did not substantiate its willingness to enter into cooperative planning efforts with letters of intent, referral agreements or memoranda of understanding. Policy No. 3 provides that services in the community should be made available to all segments of the resident population regardless of the ability to pay. HCAC's proposal is consistent with this policy because a provision for services to indigent patients has been made. Policy No. 3, Priority No. 1 provides that priority should be given to applications proposing services and facilities designed to include Medicaid (Baker Act) patients to the greatest extent possible based on documented history or proposed services. Although Medicaid does not reimburse for freestanding psychiatric services, and Baker Act is only available to short-stay facilities specifically chosen to receive a Baker Act contract, HCAC has not designed its project to include those patients to the greatest extent possible. Thus, HCAC's application is not consistent with Policy No. 3, Priority No. 1. Goal I of the 1986 District XI Goals and Policies for Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services is applicable to HCAC's application. This goal favors mental health services in the least restrictive setting possible. Long- term institutional care may be the least restrictive setting possible in the continuum of mental health care for the treatment of certain more serious types of patients. The concept of "continuum of care" means the full breadth of services available within a community, from least restrictive to most restrictive, from least intensive to most intensive. There must be settings along the full continuum of psychiatric care for patients to receive the level of care they may need. HCAC's application is not inconsistent with Goal I. Issues Relating to CON Recommendations and Priority for Inpatient Psychiatric Services (District XI Health Plan 1986, page 26). In this section of the district health plan, the Planning Advisory Committee states its recommendations and preferences for services for the comprehensive treatment of the mentally ill. The Committee recognizes that long-term hospitalization is a viable form of treatment for some mentally ill patients. However, the Committee expresses a preference for short hospital stays and applicants that project treatment modalities with an average length of stay under 20 days. In addition, the Committee emphasizes a preference for services to be obtained through the conversion of medical/surgical beds, because the district has a large surplus of such beds. Overall, HCAC's project is not consistent with the recommendations and priorities of the Planning Advisory Committee. HCAC's proposal is inconsistent with the goals, objectives and recommendations of the State Health Plan taken as a whole. The State Health Plan contains an important and significant goal that no additional long-term hospital psychiatric beds should be added in the area until the existing and approved beds in the district have achieved an 80 percent occupancy level. The existing long-term hospital psychiatric beds in the district have an occupancy level at approximately 67 percent. AVAILABILITY AND ADEQUACY OF ALTERNATIVES There are available, accessible and appropriate facilities within the service district which can be utilized for the services proposed by HCAC that are presently underutilized. Currently, there are short-term psychiatric providers, a long-term provider, residential facilities, nursing homes and adult congregate living facilities that are available as alternatives in the service district, and in many cases are significantly underutilized. Although the services to be offered by the HCAC facility would be in excess of what is provided in an adult residential treatment facility, nursing home or adult congregate living facility, those facilities could serve as viable alternatives in appropriate cases. In 1986, there were 6,513 existing nursing home beds in District XI and an additional 1,928 approved for opening. There are 24 adult congregate living facilities in District XI with 50 beds or more. The total number of beds for ACLFs in 1986 was 2,620. In addition, Grant Center Hospital has 140 existing and 20 approved long-term psychiatric beds; its occupancy rate is low. THE ABILITY OF THE APPLICANT TO PROVIDE QUALITY OF CARE AND THE APPLICANT'S RECORD OF PROVIDING QUALITY OF CARE The "Flowers Model," made a part of the application, is a description of how, from a clinical perspective, the proposal will be managed. Although Flowers does not presently operate any long-term psychiatric facilities, the Flowers Model is appropriate for a long-term psychiatric care facility. From a clinical and programmatic perspective, the HCAC facility would provide good quality of care. PROBABLE ECONOMIES AND IMPROVEMENTS IN SERVICE WHICH MAY BE DERIVED FROM OPERATION OF JOINT, COOPERATIVE OR SHARED HEALTH CARE RESOURCES HCAC has not demonstrated that there will be any improvements in service which may be derived from operation of joint, cooperative or shared health care resources. The Northwest Dade County proposed location of the HCAC facility would place the project within two hours travel of 90 percent or more of District XI population. Nevertheless, HCAC's facility would increase the number of people who would be within two hours of long-term adult psychiatric facilities by less than 1 percent. The patients in District XI will not experience serious problems in obtaining inpatient care of the type proposed in the absence of the service proposed by HCAC. There is presently adequate and accessible long-term hospital inpatient services for District XI population based on the existing and approved facilities in District X (Southwinds Hospital, Florida Medical Center) and District XI (Grant Center). There are two approved but not yet open long-term psychiatric facilities in District X, Broward County. Florida Medical Center holds a CON for 60 long-term adult psychiatric beds to be located in Lauderdale Lakes and Southwinds Hospital holds a 75-bed CON with 60 beds counted for long-term treatment of adult and geriatric patients to be located in Andy Town. In addition, there are 238 long-term state hospital beds at South Florida State Hospital in Broward County. Although the need for long-term psychiatric beds is assessed on a district-wide basis, it is reasonable to consider psychiatric beds in Broward County (District X) as an alternative to HCAC's proposal because they are within two hours access of individuals within the two counties. Likewise, it is reasonable to consider approved beds because need is projected for a future date. Not counting approved beds would overestimate need and result in duplication of services. FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY HCAC has not demonstrated that the 120-bed project or the 105-bed facility is financially feasible in the short or the long term. The projection of revenues and expenses in the pro forma (120-bed project) and the forecasted income statement (105-bed project) were flawed to such an extent that financial feasibility of the project was not shown. IMPACT ON COSTS AND COMPETITION If HCAC's project were to be built, a likely result is increased charges for the provision of services in the area. HCAC's proposed facility would negatively impact the availability of psychiatric nurses. There is a shortage of psychiatric nurses in Dade County and it is difficult to recruit and hire R.N.s with psychiatric experience. In order to hire nurses in a time of shortage, hospitals must recruit staff from other facilities. Shortages can increase the cost of recruitment and the cost of salaries. Charter is a hospital located in District XI and consists of 88 beds, 80 of which are licensed as short-term psychiatric beds and eight of which are licensed as short-term substance abuse beds. Short-term psychiatric inpatient care is defined in Rule 10-5.011(1)(o), Florida Administrative Code, as "a service not exceeding three months and averaging a length of stay of 30 days or less for adults." HCAC's proposed facility, if approved, would have a negative economic impact on Charter. It is very likely that many of the patients at the proposed HCAC facility would experience lengths of stay between 45 and 60 days. Charter treats a significant number of patients (approximately 15 percent) who stay longer than 30 days. Because of the difficulty of initially identifying patients who would require either short or long-term stays, many of Charter's patients could be lost to the HCAC project. Charter could suffer a loss of up to 657 patient days per year if HCAC's proposed facility is approved. This loss of patients would impair Charter's ability to have certain types of programs, equipment and staff. PROVISION OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES TO MEDICAID PATIENTS AND THE MEDICALLY INDIGENT HCAC's project does not propose a significant amount of indigent care and HCAC has no history of providing health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. OCCUPANCY RATE FOR EXISTING LONG-TERM HOSPITAL PSYCHIATRIC BEDS Grant Center Hospital is the only existing long-term psychiatric facility in District XI. It has 140 beds and specializes in treating children and adolescent patients. Its occupancy rate at the time of review for the preceding year was approximately 67 percent. The appropriate period to calculate occupancy rate of existing facilities in this case is July 1985 to July 1986 because this is the most recent 12-month period preceding application decision. The occupancy rate of all psychiatric beds within District XI was below 80 percent. HCAC'S PROPOSED NEED METHODOLOGY At the hearing, W. Eugene Nelson testified on behalf of HCAC on the need for the proposed long-term adult psychiatric beds. Mr. Nelson was accepted as an expert in the field of health care planning, including psychiatric bed need assessment. Mr. Nelson performed his analysis in District XI using the Graduate Medical Educational National Advisory Committee (GMENAC) methodology. The need methodology proposed by HCAC is inappropriate to adequately and accurately predict need for long-term adult psychiatric beds in District XI. The GMENAC study is a national study based on national data developed to determine physician requirements in 1990 for 23 medical specialities. GMENAC estimates the prevalence of certain psychiatric disorders among the general population and estimates the number of those persons who need care for their conditions in differing treatment settings ranging from outpatient services to 24-hour institutional care. HCAC's methodology, utilizing the GMENAC study, predicted a gross need of 895 beds in District XI in the applicable horizon (July 1991). The total number of existing long-term psychiatric beds in the entire State of Florida is only 836 beds, and the majority of those beds are experiencing occupancy levels under 65 percent. Many of these long-term facilities have been around for a period of at least three years and are still experiencing low occupancy. Therefore, the low levels are probably not based on the fact that the facilities are in a start-up mode. HCAC's bed need computation is as follows: Adult Long Term Psychiatric Bed Requirements (Excludes Alcohol, Drug Abuse, Mental Retardation, Organic Brain Syndrome and "other" Conditions) District XI: July 1991 Condition Admission Rate Schizophrenia & Other Psychoses 99 Affective Disorder Psychosis 20 Affective Disorder Neuroses 60 Neuroses and Personality Disorders 199 20 Projected 1991 Population Age 18+ 1,459,437 Total Projected Admissions 2,904 Average Length of Stay 90 Projected Patient Days Target Occupancy 80.00 261,385 percent Total Beds Required 895 Beds Currently Available 438 South Florida State Hospital (450 X .48) Residential Treatment Facilities 216 233 Net Beds Needed 496 The projected 1991 population for District XI for age 18 and above is 1,459,473. The population projections were received from the Office of the Governor. The anticipated admissions per 100,000 is calculated to be 199 for the conditions listed. The total projected admissions for 1991 is 2,904. The 2,904 projected long-term care admissions when multiplied by the average length of stay of 90 days generates 261,385 projected patient days in the 1991 horizon period in District XI. The 261,385 patient days is then divided by 365 days in the year, and then by 80 percent, the latter of which is contained in the rule as the optimum or desired occupancy for long-term psychiatric beds. This yields a total gross long-term psychiatric bed requirement for adults and geriatrics of 895 beds. In performing his analysis, Mr. Nelson used Table 4, page 22 of the GMENAC Study which lists information for mental disorders requiring care by treatment setting. The prevalence rate of 199 admissions per 100,000 population was based on the study's projection of the mental disorders listed requiring a "24-hour" treatment setting. Nelson used a projected 90-day length of stay in his computations. There is nothing in the GMENAC document that sets forth the average length of stay of persons reflected in the 24-hour column. Therefore, it is misleading to assume that persons admitted subject to the 199 per 100,000 admissions rate will actually experience an average length of stay as long as 90 days. For HCAC's admission rate to be valid, all of the facilities in District XI would have to average a 90-day length of stay. This is an unreasonable assumption. Nationwide, only a small percentage of all psychiatric admissions experience a length of stay as long as 90 days. In computing beds currently available in District XI, Mr. Nelson did not consider nursing home beds, adult congregate living facility beds, or the 135 long-term psychiatric beds that have been approved for two facilities in District X (Broward County). Nelson also did not consider whether short-term facilities were capable or willing to take additional patients for long-term treatment. Thus, the computation of beds currently available in the HCAC methodology is unreasonably low. HCAC's need methodology generated a long-term psychiatric bed to population ratio of .61 per thousand. DHRS' rule for short-term psychiatric beds was a population ratio of .35 per thousand. Short-term care facilities have admission rates two to three times greater than long-term facilities and nationwide statistics establish that only 4 percent of all psychiatric patients stay longer than 90 days. It is not reasonable for the bed rate for long-term adult psychiatric beds to be higher than the rate for short-term psychiatric beds. Mr. Nelson excluded organic brain syndrome diagnosis from his analysis and admission rate based on an assumption that many of those patients are in nursing homes. Nelson did not use nursing home beds in computing his need methodology because he believed that eliminating the organic brain syndrome category from the Table 4, page 22, 24-hour column in the GMENAC study eliminates the need for considering nursing home beds in the inventory. For that approach to be valid, the number of organic brain syndrome patients that go to long-term psychiatric facilities would need to cancel out the number of patients in other diagnostic categories who go to nursing homes. Nelson did not consult or review any data concerning the number or percentage rates of schizophrenics and other mentally ill patients in nursing homes or the number of organic brain syndrome people being treated in long-term psychiatric facilities. In addition, Nelson did not know what percentage, if any, of the GMENAC projected admissions were nursing home admissions. In computing existing beds, Nelson listed two types of facilities previously existing in District XI which were applicable to his methodology: the state hospital (216 beds) and residential treatment facilities (233 beds). The correct number of beds available for adults from District XI in the state hospital is 238. The actual number of beds for residential facilities is 335. Dr. Howard Fagin testified as an expert in health planning and feasibility analysis, including psychiatric bed need assessment and feasibility. In Dr. Fagin's opinion, Nelson's bed need methodology is incorrect and the conclusions drawn are wrong because Nelson used an inappropriate length of stay based on the GMENAC study and also incorrectly identified the applicable beds which should be considered for comparable facilities under the GMENAC study and, therefore, his total numbers in terms of gross and net beds needed are incorrect. Dr. Fagin's critique of Mr. Nelson's bed need methodology is persuasive and credible. HCAC has failed to show that its proposed need methodology could accurately project the need for long-term psychiatric beds in District XI.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that CON Application No. 4854 by Health Care Advisors Corporation, Inc. be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of March, 1988 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Lesley Mendelson, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Fort Knox Executive Center 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 308 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 H. Darrell White, Esquire Gerald B. Sternstein, Esquire Post Office Box 2174 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 William E. Hoffman, Esquire 2500 Trust Company Tower 25 Park Place Atlanta, Georgia 30303 George N. Neros, Jr., Esquire 101 North Monroe Street Monroe-Park Tower Suite 900 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donna H. Stinson, Esquire The Perkins House Suite 100 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 R. S. Power, Esquire Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Petitioner has standing to initiate the instant challenge to the preliminary determination to issue CON 6254 to Respondent Palms West Hospital, Inc.? If so, whether CON 6254 should be granted?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: Palms West Hospital and Wellington Regional Medical Center are general acute care hospitals located five miles apart in western Palm Beach County, Florida (HRS District 9). Due to their proximity to one another, the two hospitals draw from essentially the same patient pool and, as a result, are close competitors. Early on, Wellington was well ahead of Palms West in terms of the number of patient days generated by the facility. Palms West, however, has since surpassed Wellington and now enjoys a slight edge over its competitor in this performance category. Wellington is licensed to operate a total of 120 beds. One-hundred and four of these licensed beds are acute care beds. The remainder are substance abuse beds. Of Wellington's 104 licensed acute care beds, approximately 45 or 46 are staffed. Wellington currently operates at 53% of its licensed total bed capacity and 49% of its licensed acute care bed capacity. During this past calendar year, Wellington has consistently operated at between 50 to 55% of its licensed total bed capacity. Palms West is now, and has been at all times material hereto, licensed to operate 117 acute care beds at its facility in District 9. At no time has Palms West been subject to a license revocation proceeding, nor has it filed any documents with HRS requesting a reduction in its licensed bed capacity. 1/ Palms West's initial license (License No. 1869) was issued on February 17, 1986. The license was effective February 14, 1986, and expired February 13, 1988. Prior to the issuance of License No. 1869, Palms West received a certificate of need (CON 1845) for 117 acute care beds in District 9. Palms West is currently operating under License No. 2701. License No. 2701 was issued on September 1, 1989, with an effective date of September 17, 1989, and an expiration date of September 16, 1991. The license provides, in pertinent part, that Palms West "is authorized to operate a Class I General hospital with 117 Acute beds." License No. 2701 was issued pursuant to a licensure renewal application submitted by Palms West. The application, which had been prepared in May, 1989, made reference to a "renovation" "[b]uilding program . . . in progress" at Palms West with an "[a]nticipated completion date [of] 8/89," but did not provide any additional information regarding the project. The "renovation" project referenced in the application involved the third and fourth floors of the hospital. Space on these floors was being converted to house an eight-bed Labor Delivery Recovery Program. By letter dated February 1, 1989, Palms West, through its Administrator, Paul Pugh, had requested a certificate of need exemption from HRS to initiate this obstetric program at an estimated cost of $1.2 million. Sharon Gordon-Girvin, the then administrator of HRS's Office of Community Health Services and Facilities, sent Pugh a letter, dated February 9, 1989, granting the requested exemption. Girvin explained in the letter that the exemption was being granted pursuant to Section 381.706(3)(f), Florida Statutes, which, she noted, "eliminates Certificate of Need review for initiation or expansion of obstetric services, provided that the licensed bed capacity 2/ does not increase." She also stated in the letter, among other things, that Palms West's "architectural plans [had to] be approved by the Office of Licensure and Certification, Plans and Construction, before construction is undertaken [to] assure conformance with licensure standards." In her letter, Girvin did not purport to authorize a decrease in Palms West's licensed bed capacity. Palms West's architectural plans were approved by Plans and Construction and work on the renovation project commenced. The project's progress was monitored by Plans and Construction. In or around August, 1989, the project was completed. The completed eight-bed obstetric unit occupied space that previously had been used to house 30 general acute care beds. As a result of the project, Palms West no longer had the space necessary to accommodate its licensed complement of 117 acute care beds. It had the physical capacity (hereinafter referred to as "constructed bed capacity") to house only 95 of its 117 licensed beds. Palms West, in undertaking this project, never intended to reduce the number of licensed beds at the facility. While it did not specifically so state in its exemption request, it had every intention of seeking authorization, "sometime soon after the [obstetric] unit was up and going," to expand its facility to accommodate the 22 licensed beds taken out of service as a result of the project. On August 18, 1989, Plans and Construction conducted an inspection of the completed project. The inspection revealed that the project had "permanently reduced" the constructed bed capacity of the facility from 117 to 95 beds. Nonetheless, Plans and Construction found the facility "to be in substantial compliance with the requirements of the licensure regulations." Accordingly, the project was approved for patient care. The first obstetric patient was admitted to the hospital on August 21, 1989. On November 14, 1989, Ira Wagner, an Architect Supervisor in Plans and Construction, sent the following letter to Palms West: 3/ On August 18, 1989 the Plans and Construction Section of the Office of Regulation and Health Facilities ran a final construction survey in your new obstetrical services project. Based on the survey results, we are able to release the area for occupancy. One requirement for the close-out documenta- tion for this type survey is a bed count iden- tifying the previous and new bed capacity. In order for this office to further clarify the information available during the referenced survey, this office would appreciate an in-depth bed count prepared by the facility and forwarded to us. The bed count format should include both the constructed bed count and the licensed capacity (not always the same) both prior and subsequent to this project. Further, the format should be on a floor and bed by bed designation basis. In response to this request, Pugh, on behalf of Palms West, sent Wagner a letter dated December 18, 1989. In his letter, Pugh provided a floor by floor "bed count" showing a total of "117 beds" "[p]rior to 8/18/89" and a total of "95 beds" "[s]ubsequent to 8/18/89" and "as of December, 1989." At Wagner's behest, Pugh sent Wagner a second letter to clarify and confirm the "bed count" figures given in the December 18, 1989, letter. This second letter, which was dated January 1, 1990, contained "bed count" information identical to that which had been reported in Pugh's first letter to Wagner. In neither letter did Pugh indicate whether the pre-8/18/89 and post-8/18/89 "bed counts" reflected licensed bed capacity or constructed bed capacity, or both. It was Pugh's unstated intention, however, to convey in these letters information regarding only the facility's constructed bed capacity. Wagner and Pugh communicated not only in writing, but by telephone as well. During one such telephone conversation, Wagner suggested that Pugh contact Girvin to seek guidance regarding what, if anything, the hospital should do now that its constructed bed capacity had been reduced to 95. Thereafter, Pugh followed Wagner's suggestion and telephoned Girvin. During their telephone conversation, Pugh and Girvin discussed the various alternative courses of action that were available to Palms West given the discrepancy between its licensed bed capacity (117) and its constructed bed capacity (95). Following their conversation, Girvin sent Pugh the following letter, dated January 18, 1990: I enjoyed talking with you by phone on Tuesday, January 9. Our conversation involved various options you have for complying with the licensure requirement that you have the capability for bringing all licensed beds into service within a 24 hour period. At the present time, the obstetrical program utilized existing space within the hospital for expan- sion. The effect was that 22 medical or surgical beds cannot be put into service within the time prescribed by law. Any change in licensed bed capacity is sub- ject to a certificate of need. (Reference Section 381.706(1)(e), F.S.) Therefore, Palms West has no authority to change its licensed bed capacity. Should a licensure inspection occur, the hospital may be found in violation if the 22 beds cannot be put into service. You have four options from which to choose: File a certificate of need application in the next hospital batch (letter of intent due no later than 5:00 p.m. local time on February 26, 1990) to reduce your licensed capacity by 22 beds; File a certificate of need application for a capital expenditure (expedited review) to seek authorization to construct capacity to house the 22 beds (due on or before May 15, 1990); File a letter seeking determination of reviewability if the proposed capital expend- iture to construct the capacity to house the 22 beds is below $1 million; or Do nothing to increase capability which would make the department file an administra- tive complaint to revoke the 22 beds. Based upon our discussion at the time, you found either option 2 or 3 to be the most appropriate one for you. It is similar to the situation at Doctor's Hospital in Coral Gables. I'm enclosing a copy of the corre- spondence between Doctor's Hospital and me. Option 3 would only be applicable if the esti- mated cost of constructing the 22 beds could be accomplished below the $1 million threshold. In my experience, 22 beds including the atten- dant and ancillary space and the equipment exceeds $1 million (especially if any land acquisition is involved.) The situation requires expeditious attention to the matter because the hospital may be found to be in violation. Therefore, I would like to work with you to avoid an adversarial relationship. To that end, the same agreement I reached with Doctor's Hospital is appropriate for Palms West. Please respond in writing by January 31 as to which of the options you will pursue. With any or all of them, I will be glad to discuss them with you or your representative. You may reach me at (904) 488-8673. In declining to take immediate action to institute disciplinary proceedings and instead providing Palms West the opportunity to bring its licensed bed capacity 4/ and constructed bed capacity into balance, HRS was following established non-rule policy and practice. 5/ Because the imbalance was the product of a renovation project that had been undertaken and completed with HRS approval and under its supervision, HRS believed that such a "wait and see" approach was particularly appropriate in the instant case. By letter dated February 2, 1990, Pugh informed Girvin that Palms West intended to pursue the second of the four options presented by Girvin in her January 18, 1990, letter. Pugh's letter read as follows: Thank you for your letter of January 18, 1989 [sic], regarding licensure requirements for Palms West Hospital. I appreciated the infor- mation relative to regulations compliance and the options my facility has at this time to maintain our current licensed capacity at 117 acute care beds. As you know, our recent obstetrical construc- tion project utilized existing space within the hospital for expansion. The effect was that 22 acute care . . . beds cannot presently be placed into service within the time [24 hours] prescribed by law. Accordingly, Palms West Hospital agrees to file a Certifi- cate of Need application for a capital expend- iture (expedited review) to seek authorization to construct capacity to house 22 beds. We agree to file the CON application on or before May 15, 1990. Please call or write my office for clarifica- tion, if necessary. I look forward to confir- mation of our request. Again, my apologies for the delay in our response. Thank you for your input and advice. A very short time after making its decision to exercise this option, Palms West hired a health planning consultant to assist it in preparing the certificate of need application. As promised, on May 11, 1990, Palms West filed the certificate of need application. The application was accompanied by a transmittal letter addressed to Girvin. The letter, which was signed by Palms West's health planning consultant, read as follows: Enclosed is the original copy of an applica- tion for Certificate of Need for the construc- tion of a 23-bed wing of acute care beds to replace a like number of licensed beds which are out of service at Palms West Hospital, Loxahatchee. This application is filed pursuant to an agreement between your office and Mr. Mike Pugh, administrator of the hospital. The filing fee of $10,000 is being submitted under separate cover on May 15, 1990 for attachment to this document, under agreement between Mr. Pugh and your staff. We look forward to working with you on the review of this document. Please contact me at this office for additional information you may need. Contrary to the statement made in the letter, only 22, not 23, of Palms West's licensed acute care beds were "out of service." One of the 23 licensed beds to be housed in the proposed new wing was to be relocated from an area of the existing facility that Palms West intended to convert into a telemetry unit. That bed was at the time of the filing of the application, and still is, operational. In Section I of the application, the project Palms West sought permission to undertake was described as follows: Replacement of existing licensed beds by construction of new bed wing on existing third floor of hospital. Section II of the application contained the following, more detailed description of the proposed project and its purpose: In 1989, in response to rapid service area growth and to local requests for high quality obstetrical service, the hospital opened an eight (8) bed LDRP obstetrical unit on its third floor. This unit and its support areas required conversion or remodeling of twenty-six (26) acute care bed spaces on the third floor. It also required use of another four (4) acute care bed spaces on the second floor for mechan- ical support systems for the C-section room in the third floor obstetrical unit. This reduced available bed space by twenty-two (22) beds. In early 1990, the hospital committed to con- vert one (1) bed space on the second floor to house telemetry equipment for the adjacent nursing unit. When this equipment is placed in service, it will reduce available bed space by an additional bed. As a result, Palms West Hospital will have temporarily lost the use of twenty-three (23) net bed spaces, or some 20% of its licensed bed capacity, in the development of expanded and improved services for patients of its service area. This application proposes to restore the hospital's available bed capacity to its current licensed bed level of one hundred seventeen (117) acute care beds. No addi- tional licensed beds or new services are proposed. The restoration of capacity will be accomplished through construction of a twenty-three (23) bed wing on the second floor of the hospital, containing seven private and eight semiprivate patient rooms. Construction should commence by May of 1991 and be completed by the end of September 1991. The estimated cost of the project is $1,560,888. All required funds will be provided by a cash grant from the applicant's parent company, so that the project itself will not adversely impact the hospital's rates and charges. The project is required if the hospital is to maintain the licensed capacity for which it received CON approval in 1984. Currently only ninety-four bed spaces can be made available for patient occupancy within 24 hours notice. In a high growth service area such as West Palm Beach County, it is not desirable for existing bed resources to be diminished. It is also not appropriate for the hospital to be penalized by reduction in licensure for the development of exempt and appropriate services which improve the quality of care and access to care in its service area. For these and other reasons, the administra- tion of Palms West Hospital and Sharon M. Gordon-Girvin of the Office of Community Health Services and Facilities agreed in early 1990 that the hospital should file this expedited CON proposal to restore its functional bed capacity to the original licensed level. Palms West's application was assigned CON Application No. 6254. In accordance with long-standing HRS non-rule policy and practice, the project proposed in the application was deemed to be a capital expenditure project reviewable only pursuant to subsection (1)(c) of Section 381.706, Florida Statutes, and, as such, it was subjected, not to a full batched comparative review, but to an expedited review that was applicant specific in nature. 6/ Full batched comparative review was considered inappropriate because Palms West was proposing to merely add space to its existing facility in order to accommodate licensed beds for which it had already successfully competed. Inasmuch as they were approved and licensed, these beds, under the bed need methodology established by HRS rule, were already included in the existing acute care bed inventory utilized to determine the number of additional beds, if any, needed in District 9 to meet projected demand (fixed need pool). 7/ Had Palms West's application been subjected to full batched comparative review, it would have been evaluated against this fixed need pool. In declining to subject the application to full batched comparative review, HRS also took into consideration that the bed space Palms West sought to restore had been lost as a result of the hospital's initiation of obstetric services. In the view of the agency, to subject such restoration projects to full batched comparative review would tend to discourage the development and expansion of obstetric programs in the state and therefore run counter to, what it perceived to be, the Legislature's intent in exempting obstetric services projects from certificate-of-need review. On August 17, 1990, following this expedited review of Palms West's application, HRS published a State Agency Action Report in which it announced its preliminary determination to issue the certificate of need requested in CON Application No. 6254.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order (1) dismissing, for lack of standing, the petition filed by Petitioner in the instant case, and (2) issuing CON 6254 to Palms West. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 3rd day of July, 1991. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 1991.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), should grant the application of the Petitioner, RHPC, Inc., d/b/a Riverside Hospital (Riverside), for a certificate of need, CON Action No. 6582, for the addition of 31 acute care beds.
Findings Of Fact The Applicant and the Application. The applicant, the Petitioner, RHPC, Inc., d/b/a Riverside Hospital (Riverside), is a 102 bed acute care hospital 1/ located at 6600 Madison Street, New Port Richey, Florida, in the West Pasco County Subdistrict of HRS Service District 5, which also includes Pinellas County and East Pasco County. Included among its complement of beds are 14 obstetrical (OB) beds. There are no existing pediatric beds. Riverside's application is for a certificate of need to spend approximately $2,000,000 to renovate its existing OB unit, add 14 beds to the OB unit, add 11 medical/surgical beds and add six pediatric beds. The addition of the pediatric unit will be accomplished by relatively minor alterations to existing space and existing beds, and the cost attributable to this phase of the application is negligible. Similarly, the 11 additional med/surg beds will be accomplished by adding beds to existing private rooms, to create semi-private rooms, at a cost of only approximately $44,000. (Gas and electric lines for the additional beds already have been run to the headwall of these rooms and can be connected without difficulty or much expense.) Most of the $2 million total capital expenditure proposed in the application is attributable to the cost of modernizing the OB unit, with the addition of 14 beds in the process. The addition of 14 beds to the unit does not add significantly to what the modernization effort would cost without the addition of the 14 beds. The proposed new OB unit would include private rooms, to go along with the semi-private rooms that make up the existing 14-bed unit. In addition, the proposed modernized 28-bed OB unit would consist of the combined labor/delivery/recovery/post-partum (LDRP) rooms now preferred by most patients. Pertinent State Health Plan Provision. The 1989 State of Florida Health Plan states at the outset of a list of preferences to be utilized in comparing applications for additional acute care beds: No additional acute care beds should generally be approved unless the subdistrict occupancy rate is at or exceeds 75 percent, or, in the event of an existing facility, an applicant shall demonstrate that the occupancy rate for the most recent 12 months is at or exceeds 80 percent. The Need Methodology. Using the F.A.C. Rule 10-5.038 methodology, the district and subdistrict would show numeric need of approximately 201 and 230, respectively. See F.A.C. Rule 10-5.038(5). Regardless of the calculated bed need, HRS does not normally approve additional beds in a subdistrict unless the annual average acute care bed occupancy rate is 75 percent or higher during the 12-month base period of July, 1989, through June, 1990. See F.A.C. Rule 10-5.038(7)(d). The 670 licensed beds in the West Pasco Subdistrict reported only 68.92% occupancy during the 12- month base period, resulting in no projected need for additional acute care beds in the subdistrict for the applicable 1996 planning horizon. Even when a subdistricts's need for additional acute care beds projected by the methodology is zero, an application by an existing hospital still may be approved where that hospital's annual average occupancy rate exceeds 75 percent for the 12-month base period (again, in this case, from July, 1989, through June, 1990.) See F.A.C. Rule 10-5.038(7)(e). During the 12-month base period from July, 1989, through June, 1990, Riverside's occupancy averaged 72.40%, not high enough to be approved under F.A.C. Rule 10-5.038(7)(e). Observation Bed Days. Three types of beds days are included in a category of so-called "outpatient observation bed days." First, "twenty-three hour patients" are patients who are not eligible for inpatient services under the Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA) criteria for the Medicare program. Second, "observation patients" are similar non-Medicare patients. Third, some outpatients (or ambulatory surgery patients) also use beds for part of a day. With new cost containment and review/regulation developments in hospital care, more patients are spending up to 23 hours in the hospital before a decision is made that further hospitalization in not needed. As a result, "observation" bed use has increased. Outpatient observation services have been recognized and defined by HCFA. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida (the Medicare intermediary) and the Health Care Cost Containment Board (HCCCB) have addressed issues such as reimbursement, billing and reporting of observation beds. Services are provided to "observation bed" patients under doctor's orders, including diagnostic services, observation and monitoring by nursing personnel and/or medical intervention or treatment. Calculation of occupancy rates under the HRS need methodology does not take into account the so-called "observation bed days." 2/ There was no evidence that any part of District V or the West Pasco Subdistrict are inaccessible geographically. Other Need Factors. The evidence showed that there is a seasonal peak utilization and occupancy of acute care beds in District V and in the West Pasco Subdistrict during approximately October or November through March or April each year. This seasonal peak is reflected by the statistics. As previously stated, Riverside's occupancy averaged 72.40% during the period from July, 1989, through June, 1990. During the first quarter of 1990, occupancy was 86.83%. Riverside's average occupancy for calendar year 1990 was 73.87%. For the period from March, 1990, through February, 1991, average occupancy for Riverside's acute care beds was 71.2%. 3/ For the period from March, 1990, through February, 1991, occupancy for Riverside's obstetrics beds was 92.9%. There is no acute care pediatric unit in the West Pasco subdistrict. Subdistrict residents (as well as others in Riverside's general service area) needing level II pediatric services generally go to a Pinellas County or East Pasco County hospital for them. Given the choice, some but not all of these patients likely would prefer to get these services at Riverside, depending primarily on the severity of the particular medical needs. But the evidence did not quantify the number predicted to switch to Riverside. Also, occupancy of pediatric beds in Pasco county was less than 15% during 1987 and 1988. Medical Care for the Poor. The State Health Plan also notes that the uncompensated care burden on hospitals has grown during the 1980s because of a growing number of low-income persons; simultaneously, the proportion of persons covered by Medicaid has dropped. Numerous statewide studies, moreover, have shown that hospitals' uncompensated care is increasing at the same time that their ability to absorb the cost of care is decreasing. Riverside's predecessor bought the hospital from Pasco County in 1982. As a condition to the purchase, Riverside's predecessor agreed to provide Medicaid and indigent care for Pasco County in perpetuity. When Riverside purchased the hospital on December 29, 1983, it assumed the contractual obligation to provide Medicaid and indigent care in perpetuity. Riverside is a disproportionate share provider within the meaning of the State and local health plans. Approximately, 13% of Riverside's total annual patient days are for Medicaid patients. In 1990, 2,647 of Riverside's obstetrical, and 4,272 of its non-obstetrical patient days, were Medicaid. Riverside's charity care deduction from gross patient revenue for fiscal year 1990 was 1.07% of gross patient revenue. Riverside's Medicaid deduction from gross patient revenue for fiscal year 1990 was 5.96% of gross patient revenue. Approximately, 14.8% of Riversides's services go to Medicaid and indigent patients. Although Riverside has only 14% of the beds in the West Pasco subdistrict, it does more than 90% of the non-emergency, non-OB Medicaid care. Approval of the Riverside application would enable Riverside to spread its administrative and overhead costs over a larger base, thereby reducing average charges. Approval of the Riverside application also would make Riverside more profitable and thereby better able to absorb the cost of the Medicaid and indigent care it provides. If Riverside converts existing acute care beds to pediatric or OB beds, it probably would have to squeeze out paying patients during seasonal occupancy peaks, thereby losing more revenue and profits. Competition. If the Riverside application is approved, Riverside's share of the market represented by the West Pasco subdistrict will rise from approximately 14% to approximately 18%. HCA controls the rest of the market. There are no existing OB beds in the West Pasco subdistrict other than at Riverside. The HCA hospital in New Port Richey had an OB unit which it recently abandoned. As a result of the grant of Bayonet Point's application, CON Action No. 6583, with which Riverside had been in direct competition in this application review cycle, Bayonet Point now is approved for a seven-bed OB unit as part of its bed complement. Upgrading its existing OB unit and adding 14 more OB beds will enable Riverside to capture more private paying patients, which will better enable it to compete with the HCA hospitals. At present, Riverside's OB unit is utilized almost exclusively by indigent and Medicaid patients because of the hospital's contract with Pasco County. This unit now is operating at close to absolute capacity. With the upgrades and additional beds, Riverside can work to capture some private pay patients; without them, Bayonet Point will capture the private pay patients. Financial Feasibility. Riverside operated at a deficit from 1983 essentially to the present. By the end of 1990, Riverside had accumulated a deficit of $8.8 million. Riverside's corporate parent, American Healthcare Management, Inc. (AHM), was funding the deficit. From 1985 through December, 1989, AHM was in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. During that time period, there was legitimate concern whether AHM would be able to continue to fund Riverside deficits. AHM emerged from bankruptcy in December, 1989, stronger financially. It has since become stronger still. AHM reduced its debt by approximately $88 million. Part of the debt reduction was achieved by the sale of $43 million of underperforming assets. In addition, $45 million of bond debt was exchanged for common stock on September 30, 1991. The interest savings on the bond-for-stock exchange is $6 million a year. As a result, AHM's current debt-to-equity ratio is approximately $160 million to $130 million. AHM's corporate staff has been reduced from about 102 to 65. Its corporate office were transferred from expensive quarters in Dallas, Texas, to less expensive quarters in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. Corporate expenses have been greatly reduced as a result. Accounts receivable have been reduced by better collection methods, and the $43 million of assets sold to reduce corporate debt had been underperforming. AHM had $21 million cash and short-term investments as of December 31, 1989. As of the date of the final hearing, it had $18 million cash and short- term investments. Riverside's gross margin (profit) for the first nine months of 1991 was $4 million. After depreciation, amortization, and interest and home office costs, Riverside generated approximately $1.2 million for the first nine months of 1991. Internal cash flow generated by AHM and Riverside would be sufficient to finance Riverside's application project. Since the capital costs of Riverside's proposed project are relatively small, financial feasibility is relatively easy to achieve. Besides costing relatively little, the 31 new beds will not increase intercompany interest or management fees significantly. In addition, the 31 new beds would enable Riverside to better compete for private pay patients. Given the expected utilization of the new beds, the proposed project will be to the financial benefit of the applicant. The pro forma bears this out. It projects 75.11% occupancy for the 31 new beds in the second year of operation (July, 1994, to June, 1995). (This projection does not include expected "observation bed days.") A profit of $2,477,199 for the 31 beds is projected for the second year of operation (not counting any portion of the preexisting intercompany interest or management fees).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that HRS enter a final order denying the Riverside application for a certificate of need, CON Action No. 6582, for the addition of 31 acute care beds. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1992.
The Issue Kindred Hospitals East, LLC ("Kindred") and Select Specialty Hospital-Palm Beach, Inc. ("Select-Palm Beach"), filed applications for Certificates of Need ("CONs") with the Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA" or the "Agency") seeking approval for the establishment of long-term care hospitals ("LTCHs") in Palm Beach County, AHCA District 9. Select-Palm Beach's application, CON No. 9661, seeks approval for the establishment of a 60-bed freestanding LTCH in "east central" Palm Beach County about 20 miles south of Kindred's planned location. Kindred's application, CON No. 9662, seeks approval for the establishment of a 70-bed LTCH in the "north central" portion of the county. The ultimate issue in this case is whether either or both applications should be approved by the Agency.
Findings Of Fact Long Term Care Hospitals Of the four classes of facilities licensed as hospitals by the Agency, "Class I or general hospitals," includes: General acute care hospitals with an average length of stay of 25 days or less for all beds; Long term care hospitals, which meet the provisions of subsection 59A-3.065(27), F.A.C.; and, Rural hospitals designated under Section 395, Part III, F.S. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59A-3.252(1)(a). This proceeding concerns CON applications for the second of Florida's Class I or general hospitals: LTCHs. A critically ill patient may be admitted and treated in a general acute care hospital, but, if the patient cannot be stabilized or discharged to a lower level of care on the continuum of care within a relatively short time, the patient may be discharged to an LTCH. An LTCH patient is almost always "critically catastrophically ill or ha[s] been." (Tr. 23). Typically, an LTCH patient is medically unstable, requires extensive nursing care with physician oversight, and often requires extensive technological support. The LTCH patient usually fits into one or more of four categories. One category is patients in need of pulmonary/respiratory services. Usually ventilator dependent, these types of LTCH patients have other needs as well that requires "complex comprehensive ventilator weaning in addition to meeting ... other needs." (Tr. 26). A second category is patients in need of wound care whose wound is life-threatening. Frequently compromised by inadequate nutrition, these types of LTCH patients are often diabetic. There are a number of typical factors that may account for the seriousness of the wound patient's condition. The job of the staff at the LTCH in such a case is to attend to the wound and all the other medical problems of the patient that have extended the time required for care of the wound. A third category is patients with some sort of neuro-trauma. These patients may have had a stroke and are often elderly; if younger, they may be victims of a car accident or some other serious trauma. They typically have multiple body systems that require medical treatment, broken bones and a closed head injury for example, that have made them "very sick and complex." (Tr. 27). The fourth category is referred to by the broad nomenclature of "medically complex" although it is a subset of the population of LTCH patients all of whom are medically complex. The condition of the patients in this fourth category involves two or more body systems. The patients usually present at the LTCH with "renal failure ... [and] with another medical condition ... that requires a ventilator ..." Id. In short, LTCHs provide extended medical and rehabilitative care to patients with multiple, chronic, and/or clinically complex acute medical conditions that usually require care for a relatively extended period of time. To meet the definition of an LTCH a facility must have an average length of inpatient stay ("ALOS") greater than 25 days for all hospital beds. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 59A-3.065(34). The staffs at general acute care hospitals and LTCHs have different orientations. With a staff oriented toward a patient population with a much shorter ALOS, the general acute care hospital setting may not be appropriate for a patient who qualifies for LTCH services. The staff at a general acute care hospital frequently judges success by a patient getting well in a relatively short time. It is often difficult for general acute care hospital staff to sustain the interest and effort necessary to serve the LTCH patient well precisely because of the staff's expectation that the patient will improve is not met in a timely fashion. As time goes by, that expectation continues to be frustrated, a discouragement to staff. The LTCH is unlike other specialized health care settings. The complex, medical, nursing, and therapeutic requirements necessary to serve the LTCH patient may be beyond the capability of the traditional comprehensive medical rehabilitation ("CMR") hospital, nursing home, skilled nursing facility ("SNF"), or, the skilled nursing unit ("SNU"). CMR units and hospitals are rarely, if ever, appropriate for the LTCH patient. Almost invariably, LTCH patients are not able to tolerate the minimum three (3) hours of therapy per day associated with CMR. The primary focus of LTCHs, moreover, is to provide continued acute medical treatment to the patient that may not yet be stable, with the ultimate goal of getting the patient on the road to recovery. In comparison, the CMR hospital treats medically stable patients consistent with its primary focus of restoring functional capabilities, a more advanced step in the continuum of care. Services provided in LTCHs are distinct from those provided in SNFs or SNUs. The latter are not oriented generally to patients who need daily physician visits or the intense nursing services or observations needed by an LTCH patient. Most nursing and clinical personnel in SNFs and SNUs are not experienced with the unique psychosocial needs of long-term acute care patients and their families. An LTCH is distinguished within the healthcare continuum by the high level of care the patient requires, the interdisciplinary treatment model it follows, and the duration of the patient's hospitalization. Within the continuum of care, LTCHs occupy a niche between traditional acute care hospitals that provide initial hospitalization care on a short-term basis and post-acute care facilities such as nursing homes, SNFs, SNUs, and comprehensive medical rehabilitation facilities. Medicare has long recognized LTCHs as a distinct level of care within the health care continuum. The federal government's prospective payment system ("PPS") now treats the LTCH level of service as distinct with its "own DRG system and ... [its] own case rate reimbursement." (Tr. 108). Under the LTCH PPS, each patient is assigned an LTC- DRG (different than the DRG under the general hospital DRG system) with a corresponding payment rate that is weighted based on the patient diagnosis and acuity. The Parties The Agency is the state agency responsible for administering the CON Program and licensing LTCHs and other hospital facilities pursuant to the authority of Health Facility and Services Development Act, Sections 408.031-408.045, Florida Statutes. Select-Palm Beach is the applicant for a free-standing 60-bed LTCH in "east Central Palm Beach County," Select Ex. 1, stamped page 12, near JFK Medical Center in AHCA District 9. Its application, CON No. 9661, was denied by the Agency. Select-Palm Beach is a wholly owned subsidiary of Select Medical Corporation, which provides long term acute care services at 83 LTCHs in 24 states, four of which are freestanding hospitals. The other 79 are each "hospitals-in-a- hospital" ("HIH" or "LTCH HIH"). Kindred is the applicant for a 70-bed LTCH to be located in the north central portion of Palm Beach County in AHCA District 9. Its application, CON No. 9662, was denied by the Agency. Kindred is a wholly owned subsidiary of Kindred Healthcare, Inc. ("Kindred Healthcare"). Kindred Healthcare operates 73 LTCHs, 59 of which are freestanding, according to the testimony of Mr. Novak. See Tr. 56-57. Kindred Healthcare has been operating LTCHs since 1985 and has operated them in Florida for more than 15 years. At the time of the submission of Kindred's application, Kindred Healthcare's six LTCHs in Florida were Kindred-North Florida, a 60-bed LTCH in Pinellas County, AHCA District 5; Kindred-Central Tampa, with 102 beds, and Kindred-Bay Area- Tampa, with 73 beds, both in Hillsborough County, in AHCA District 6; Kindred-Ft. Lauderdale with 64 beds and Kindred- Hollywood with 124 beds, both in Broward County, ACHA District 10; and Kindred-Coral Gables, with 53 beds, in Dade County, AHCA District 11. The Applications and AHCA's Review The applications were submitted in the first application cycle of 2003. Select-Palm Beach's application is CON No. 9661; Kindred's is CON No. 9662. Select-Palm Beach estimates its total project costs to be $12,856,139. Select-Palm Beach has not yet acquired the site for its proposed LTCH, but did include in its application a map showing three priority site locations, with its preferred site, designated "Site 1," located near JFK Medical Center. At $12,937,419, Kindred's estimate of its project cost is slightly more than Select-Palm Beach's. The exact site of Kindred's proposed LTCH had not been determined at the time of hearing. Kindred's preference, however, is to locate in the West Palm Beach area in the general vicinity of St. Mary's Hospital, in the northern portion of Palm Beach County along the I-95 corridor. This is approximately 15 to 20 miles north of Select's preferred location for its LTCH. There is no LTCH in the five-county service area that comprises District 9: Indian River, Okeechobee, St. Lucie, Martin, and Palm Beach Counties. There are two LTCHs in adjacent District 10 (to the south). They have a total of 188 beds and an average occupancy of 80 percent. The Agency views LTCH care as a district-wide service primarily for Medicare patients. At the time of the filing of the applications, the population in District 9 was over 1.6 million, including about 400,000 in the age cohort 65 and over. About 70 percent of the District 9 population lives in Palm Beach County. More than 70 percent of the District's general acute care hospitals are located in that county. Kindred's preferred location for its LTCH is approximately 40 to 50 miles from the closest District 10 LTCH; Select-Palm Beach is approximately 25 to 35 miles from the closest District 10 LTCH. The locations of Select Palm-Beach's and Kindred's proposed LTCHs are complementary. The SAAR Following its review of the two applications, AHCA issued its State Agency Action Report ("SAAR"). Section G., of the report, entitled "RECOMMENDATION," states: "Deny Con #9661 and CON #9662." Agency Ex. 2, p. 43. On June 11, 2003, the report was signed by Karen Rivera, Health Services and Facilities Consultant Supervisor Certificate of Need, and Mr. Gregg as the Chief of the Bureau of Health Facility Regulation. It contained a section entitled "Authorization for Agency Action" that states, "[a]uthorized representatives of the Agency for Health Care Administration adopted the recommendations contained herein and released the State Agency Action Report." Agency Ex. 2, p. 44. The adoption of the recommendations is the functional equivalent of preliminary denial of the applications. In Section F. of the SAAR under the heading of "Need," (Agency Ex. 2, p. 40), the Agency explained its primary bases for denial; it concluded that the applicants had not shown need for an LTCH in AHCA District 9. The discussions for the two, although not precisely identical, are quite similar: Select Specialty Hospital-Palm Beach, Inc.(CON #9661): The applicant's two methodological approaches to demonstrate need are not supported by any specific discharge studies or other data, including DRG admission criteria from area hospitals regarding potential need. The applicant also failed to provide any supporting documentation from area physicians or other providers regarding potential referrals. It was further not demonstrated that patients that qualify for LTCH services are not currently being served or that an access problem exists for residents in District 9. Kindred Hospitals East, L.L.C. (CON #9662): The various methodological approaches presented are not supported by any specific DRG admission criteria from area hospitals suggesting potential need. The applicant provided numerous letters of support for the project from area hospitals, physicians and case managers. However, the number of potential referrals of patients needing LTCH services was not quantified. It was further not demonstrated that patients that qualify for LTCH services are not currently being served or that an access problem exists for residents in District 9. Id. At hearing, the Agency's witness professed no disagreement with the SAAR and continued to maintain the same bases contained in the SAAR for the denials of the two applications The SAAR took no issue with either applicant's ability to provide quality care. It concluded that funding for each applicant was likely to be available and that each project appeared to be financially feasible once operating. The SAAR further stated that there were no major architectural concerns regarding Kindred's proposed facility design, but noted reservations regarding the need for further study and revision of Select Palm-Beach's proposed surgery/procedure wing, as well as cost uncertainties for Select Palm Beach because of such potential revisions. By the time of final hearing, however, the parties had stipulated to the reasonableness of each applicant's proposed costs and methods of construction. The parties stipulated to the satisfaction of a number of the statutory CON criteria by the two applicants. The parties agreed that the applications complied with the content and review process requirements of sections 408.037 and 409.039, Florida Statutes, with one exception. Select reserved the issue of the lack of a Year 2 of Schedule 6, (Staffing) in Kindred's application. The form of Schedule 6 provided by AHCA to Kindred (unlike other schedules of the application) does not clearly indicate that a second year of staffing data must be provided. The remainder of the criteria stipulated and the positions of the parties as articulated in testimony at hearing and in the proposed orders that were submitted leave need as the sole issue of consequence with one exception: whether Kindred has demonstrated that its project is financially feasible in the long term. Kindred's Long Term Financial Feasibility Select-Palm Beach contends that Kindred's project is not financially feasible in the long term for two reasons. They relate to Kindred's application and are stated in Select Palm Beach's proposed order: Kindred understated property taxes[;] Kindred completely fails to include in its expenses on Schedule 8, patient medical assistance trust fund (PMATF) taxes [citation omitted]. Proposed Recommended Order of Select-Palm Beach, Inc., p. 32, Finding of Fact 97. Raised after the proceeding began at DOAH by Select- Palm Beach, these two issues were not considered by AHCA when it conducted its review of Kindred's application because the issues were not apparent from the face of the application. AHCA's Review of Kindred's Application Kindred emerged from a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings on April 20, 2001, under a plan of reorganization. With respect to the events that led to the bankruptcy proceeding and the need to review prior financial statements, AHCA made the following finding in the SAAR: Under the plan [of reorganization], the applicant [Kindred] adopted the fresh start accounting provision of SOP 90-7. Under fresh start accounting, a new reporting entity is created and the recorded amounts of assets and liabilities are adjusted to reflect their estimated fair values. Accordingly, the prior period financial statements are not comparable to the current period statements and will not be considered in this analysis. Agency Ex. 2, p. 30. The financial statements provided by Kindred as part of its application show that Kindred Healthcare, Kindred's parent, is a financially strong company. The information contained in Kindred's CON application filed in 2003 included Kindred Healthcare's financial statements from the preceding calendar year. Kindred Healthcare's Consolidated Statement of Operations for the year ended December 31, 2002, showed "Income from Operations" to be more than $33 million, and net cash provided by operating activities (cash flow) of over $248 million for the period. Its Consolidated Balance Sheet as of December 31, 2002, showed cash and cash equivalents of over $244 million and total assets of over $1.6 billion. In light of the information contained in Kindred's CON application, the SAAR concluded with regard to short term financial feasibility: Based on the audited financial statements of the applicant, cash on hand and cash flows, if they continue at the current level, would be sufficient to fund this project as proposed. Funding for all capital projects, with the support of its parent, is likely to be available as needed. Agency Ex. 2, p. 30 (emphasis supplied). The SAAR recognized that Kindred projected a "year two operating loss for the hospital of $287,215." Agency Ex. 2, p. Nonetheless, the SAAR concludes on the issue of financial feasibility, "[w]ith continued operational support from the parent company, this project [Kindred's] is considered financially feasible." Id. The Agency did not have the information, however, at the time it reviewed Kindred's application that Kindred understated property taxes and omitted the Public Medicaid Trust Fund and Medical Assistance Trust Fund ("PMATF") "provider tax" of 1.5 percent that would be imposed on Kindred's anticipated revenues of $11,635,919 as contended by Select-Palm Beach. Consistent with Select Palm-Beach's general contentions about property taxes and PMATF taxes, "Kindred acknowledges that it likely understated taxes to be incurred in the operation of its facility." Kindred's Proposed Recommended Order, paragraph 50, p. 19. The parties agree, moreover, that the omitted PMATF tax is reasonably projected to be $175,000. They do not agree, however, as to the impact of the PMATF tax on year two operating loss. The difference between the two (approximately $43,000) is attributable to a corporate income tax benefit deduction claimed by Kindred so that the combination of the application's projected loss, the omitted PMATF tax, and the deduction yields a year two operating loss of approximately $419,000. Without taking into consideration the income tax benefit, Select-Palm Beach contends that adding in the PMATF tax produces a loss of $462,000. Kindred and Select-Palm Beach also disagree over the projection of property taxes by approximately $50,000. Kindred projects that the property taxes in year two of operation will be approximately $225,000 instead of the $49,400 listed in the application. Select-Palm Beach projects that they will be $50,000 higher at approximately $275,000. Whether Kindred's or Select-Palm Beach's figures are right, Kindred makes two points. First, if year two revenues and expenses, adjusted for underestimated and omitted taxes, are examined on a quarterly basis, the fourth quarter of year two has a better bottom line than the earlier quarters. Not only will the fourth quarter bottom line be better, but, using Kindred's figures, the fourth quarter of year two of operations is profitable. Second, and most importantly given the Agency's willingness to credit Kindred with financial support from its parent, Kindred's application included in its application an interest figure of $1.2 million for year one of operation and $1.03 million for year two. Kindred claims in its proposed recommended order that "[i]n reality ... this project will incur no interest expense as Kindred intends to fund the project out of cash on hand, or operating capital, and would not have to borrow money to construct the project." Id., at paragraph 54, p. 20. Through the testimony of John Grant, Director of Planning and Development for Kindred's parent, Kindred Healthcare, Kindred indicated at hearing that its parent might, indeed, fund the project: A ... Kindred [Healthcare] would likely fund this project out of operating capital. Like I said, in the first nine months of this year Kindred had operating cash flow of approximately $180 million. So it's not as if we would have to actually borrow money to complete a project like this. Q And what was the interest expense that you had budgeted in Year Two for this facility? A $1,032,000. Q ... so is it your statement then that this facility would not owe any interest back to the parent company? A That's correct. Tr. 221-222 (emphasis supplied). If the "financing interest" expense is excluded from Kindred's statement of projected expenses in Schedule 8 of the CON application, using Kindred's revised projections, the project shows a profit of approximately $612,0002 for the second year of operation. If Select-Palm Beach's figures and bottom line loss excludes the "finances interest" expense, the elimination of the expense yields of profit for year two of operations in excess of $500,000. If the support of Kindred's parent is considered as the Agency has signaled its willingness to do and provided that the project is, in fact, funded by Kindred Healthcare rather than financed through some other means that would cause Kindred to incur interest expense, Kindred's project is financially feasible in the long term. With the exception of the issue regarding Kindred's long term financial feasibility, as stated above, taken together, the stipulation and agreements of the parties, the Agency's preliminary review contained in the SAAR, and the evidence at hearing, all distill the issues in this case to one overarching issue left to be resolved by this Recommended Order: need for long term care hospital beds in District 9. Need for the Proposals From AHCA's perspective prior to the hearing, the only issue in dispute with respect to the two applications is need. This point was made clear by Mr. Gregg's testimony at hearing in answer to a question posed by counsel for Select-Palm Beach: Q. ... Assuming there was sufficient need for 130 beds in the district is there any reason why both applicants shouldn't be approved in this case, assuming that need? A. No. (Tr. 398). Both applicants contend that the application each submitted is superior to the other. Neither, however, at this point in the proceeding, has any objection to approval of the other application provided its own application is approved. Consistent with its position that both applications may be approved, Select-Palm Beach presented testimony through its health care planner Patricia Greenberg3 that there was need in District 9 for both applicants' projects. Her testimony, moreover, rehabilitated the single Kindred methodology of three that yielded numeric need less than the 130 beds proposed by both applications: Q ... you do believe that there is a need for both in the district. A I believe there's a need for two facilities in the district. Q It could support two facilities? A Oh, absolutely. Q And the disagreement primarily relates to the conservative approach of Kindred in terms of not factoring in out-migration and the narrowing the DRG categories? A Correct. ... Kindred actually had three models. Two of them support both facilities, but it's the GMLOS model that I typically rely on, and it didn't on the surface support both facilities. That's why I reconciled the two, and I believe that's the difference, is just the 50 DRGs and not including the out-migration. That would boost their need above the 130, and two facilities would give people alternatives, it would foster competition, and it would really improve access in that market. Tr. 150-51. Need for the applications, therefore, is the paramount issue in this case. Since both applicants are qualified to operate an LTCH in Florida, if need is proven for the 130 beds, then with the exception of Kindred's long term financial feasibility, all parties agree that there is no further issue: both applications should be granted. No Agency Numeric Need Methodology The Agency has not established a numeric need methodology for LTCH services. Consequently, it does not publish a fixed-need pool for LTCHs. Nor does the Agency have "any policy upon which to determine need for the proposed beds or service." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.008(2)(e)1. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(2), which governs "Fixed Need Pools" (the "Fixed Need Pools Rule") states that if "no agency policy exist" with regard to a needs assessment methodology: [T]he applicant will be responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology which must include, at a minimum, consideration of the following topics, except where they are inconsistent with the applicable statutory or rule criteria: Population demographics and dynamics; Availability, utilization and quality of like services in the district, subdistrict or both; Medical treatment trends; and Market conditions. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.008(2)(e)2. The Fixed Need Pools Rule goes on to elaborate in subparagraph (e)3 that "[t]he existence of unmet need will not be based solely on the absence of a health service, health care facility, or beds in the district, subdistrict, region or proposed service area." Population, Demographics and Dynamics The first of the four topics to be addressed when an applicant is responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology is "population, demographics and dynamics." The Agency has not defined service areas for LTCHs. Nonetheless, from a health planning perspective, it views LTCH services as being provided district-wide primarily for Medicare patients. Consistent with the Agency's view, Select-Palm Beach identified the entire district, that is, all of AHCA District 9, as its service area. It identified Palm Beach County, one of the five counties in AHCA District 9, as its primary service area. In identifying the service area for Select-Palm Beach, Ms. Greenberg drew data from various sources: population estimates for Palm Beach County and surrounding areas; the number of acute care hospital beds in the area; the number of LTCH beds in the area; the types of patients treated at acute care hospitals; and the lengths of stay of the patients treated at those hospitals. AHCA District 9 has more elderly than any other district in the State, and Palm Beach County has more than any other county except for Dade. Palm Beach County residents comprise 71% of the District 9 population. It is reasonably projected that the elderly population (the "65 and over" age cohort) in Palm Beach County is projected to grow at the rate of 8 percent by 2008. The "65 and over" age cohort is significant because the members of that cohort are most likely to utilize hospital services, including LTCH services. Its members are most likely to suffer complications from illness and surgical procedures and more likely to have co-morbidity conditions that require long- term acute care. Persons over 65 years of age comprise approximately 80 percent of the patient population of LTCH facilities. Both Select-Palm Beach and Kindred project that approximately 80 percent of their admissions will come from Medicare patients. Since 90 percent of admissions to an LTCH come from acute care facilities, most of the patient days expected at Select-Palm Beach's proposed LTCH will originate from residents in its primary service area, Palm Beach County. When looking at the migration pattern for patients at acute care facilities within Palm Beach County, the majority (90 percent) come from Palm Beach County residents. Thus, Select- Palm Beach's projected primary service area is reasonable. Just as Select-Palm Beach, Kindred proposes to serve the entire District. Kindred proposes that its facility be based in Palm Beach County because of the percentage of the district's population in the county as well as because more than 70% of the district's general acute care hospitals are in the county. Its selection of the District as its service area, consistent with the Agency's view, is reasonable. Currently there are no LTCHs in District 9. Availability, Utilization and Quality of Like Services The second topic is "availability, utilization and quality of like services." There are no "like" services available to District residents in the District. Select-Palm Beach and Kindred, therefore, contend that they meet the criteria of the second topic. There are like services in other AHCA Districts. For example, AHCA District 10 has at total of 188 beds at two Kindred facilities in Fort Lauderdale and Hollywood. The Agency, however, did not present evidence of their quality, that they were available or to what extent they are utilized by the residents of AHCA District 9. Medical Treatment Trends The third topic is medical treatment trends. Caring for patients with chronic and long term care needs is becoming increasingly more important as the population ages and as medical technology continues to emerge that prolongs life expectancies. Through treatment provided the medically complex and critically ill with state of the art mechanical ventilators, metabolic analyzers, and breathing monitors, LTCHs meet needs beyond the capability of the typical general acute care hospitals. In this way, LTCHs fill a niche in the continuum of care that addresses the needs of a small but growing patient population. Treatment for these patients in an LTCH, who otherwise would be cared for without adequate reimbursement to the general acute care hospital or moved to an alternative setting with staff and services inadequate to meet their needs, is a medical trend. Market Conditions The fourth topic to be addressed by the applicant is market conditions. The federal government's development of a distinctive prospective payment system for LTCHs (LTC-DRG), has created a market condition favorable to LTCHs. General acute care hospitals face substantial losses for the medically complex patient who uses far greater resources than expected on the basis of individual diagnoses. Medicare covers between 80 and 85 percent of LTCH patients. The remaining patients are covered by private insurance, managed care and Medicaid. LTCH programs allow for shorter lengths of stay in a general acute care facility, reduces re-admissions and provide more discharges to home. These benefits are increasingly recognized. Numeric Need Analysis Kindred presented a set of needs assessment methodologies that yielded numeric need for the beds applied for by Kindred. Select-Palm Beach did the same. Unlike Kindred, however, all of the needs assessment methodologies presented by Select-Palm Beach demonstrated numeric need in excess of the 130 beds proposed by both applications. Select-Palm Beach's methodologies, overall, are superior to Kindred's. Select-Palm Beach used two sets of needs assessment methodologies and sensitivity testing of one of the sets that confirmed the methodology's reasonableness. The two sets or needs assessment methodologies are: (1) a use rate methodology and (2) length of stay methodologies. The use rate methodology yielded projected bed need for Palm Beach County alone in excess of the 130 beds proposed by the two applicants. For the year "7/05 - 6/06" the bed need is projected to be 256; for the year "7/06 - 6/07" the bed need is projected to be 261; and, for the year "7/07 - 6/08" the bed need is projected to be 266. See Select Ex. 1, Bates Stamp p. 000036 and the testimony of Ms. Greenberg at tr. 114. If the use rate analysis had been re-computed to include two districts whose data was excluded from the analysis, the bed need yielded for Palm Beach County alone was 175 beds, a numeric need still in excess of the 130 beds proposed by both applicants. The use rate methodology is reasonable.4 The length of stay methodologies are also reasonable. These two methodologies also yielded numeric need for beds in excess of the 130 beds proposed. The two methodologies yielded need for 167 beds and 250 beds. Agency Denial The Agency's general concerns about LTCHs are not without basis. For many years, there were almost no LTCH CON applications filed with the Agency. A change occurred in 2002. The change in the LTCH environment in the last few years put AHCA in the position of having "to adapt to a rapidly changing situation in terms of [Agency] understanding of what has been going on in recent years with long-term care hospitals." (Tr. 358.) "... [I]n the last couple of years long-term care hospital applications have become [AHCA's] most common type of application." (Tr. 359.) At the time of the upsurge in applications, there was "virtually nothing ... in the academic literature about long- term care hospitals ... that could [provide] ... an understanding of what was going on ... [nor was there anything] in the peer reviewed literature that addressed long-term care hospitals" id., and the health care planning issues that affected them. Two MedPAC reports came out, one in 2003 and another in 2004. The 2003 report conveyed the information that the federal government was unable to identify patients appropriate for LTCH services, services that are overwhelmingly Medicare funded, because of overlap of LTCH services with other types of services. The 2004 report gave an account of the federal government decision to change its payment policy for a type of long-term care hospitals that are known as "hospitals-within- hospitals" (tr. 368) so that "hospitals within hospitals as of this past summer [2004] can now only treat 25 percent of their patients from the host hospital." Id. Both reports roused concerns for AHCA. First, if appropriate LTCH patients cannot be identified and other types of services overlap appropriately with LTCH services, AHCA cannot produce a valid needs assessment methodology. The second produces another concern. In the words of Mr. Gregg, The problem ... with oversupply of long-term care hospital beds is that it creates an incentive for providers to seek patient who are less appropriate for the service. What we know now is that only the sickest patient ... with the most severe conditions are truly appropriate for long-term care hospital placement. * * * ... [T]he MedPAC report most recently shows us that the greatest indicator of utilization of long-term care hospital services is the mere availability of those services. Tr. 368-369. The MedPAC reports, themselves, although marked for identification, were not admitted into evidence. Objections to their admission (in particular, Kindred's) were sustained because they had not been listed by AHCA on the stipulation required by the Pre-hearing Order of Instructions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued by the Agency for Health Care Administration that: approves Select-Palm Beach's application, CON 9661; and approves Kindred's application CON 9662 with the condition that financing of the project be provided by Kindred Healthcare. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of April, 2005.
