The Issue Whether Petitioner, KOA Campground, violated Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, by placing a sign facing a state road right-of-way without a valid sign permit. Whether Petitioner, KOA Campground, violated Section 479.07(9)(a)2, Florida Statutes, by placing a sign in violation of the DOT spacing rule. Whether Petitioner, KOA Campground, violated Section 479.04(1), Florida Statutes, by operating outside the city limits without a state license. Whether Petitioner, KOA Campground, is entitled to the issuance of a sign permit for the east-facing sign located 678 feet West of Seven Dwarfs Lane on US Highway 192, in Osceola County, Florida. Whether Respondent, Peloso, violated Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, by placing a sign facing a state road right-of- way without a valid sign permit. Whether Respondent, Peloso, violated Section 479.07(9)(a)2, Florida Statutes, by placing a sign in violation of the DOT spacing rule. Whether Respondent, Peloso, violated Section 479.07(5)(a), Florida Statutes, by failure to display a current valid sign permit tag. Whether Respondent, Peloso's state permit number AG636-10 become invalid and subject to revocation by the DOT.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) is the state agency charged with the duty to administer and enforce the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, which regulates outdoor advertising structures along the state highway system. Petitioner, KOA Campground, as Lessor, and Respondent, Arthur S. Peloso, as Lessee, entered into a Lease for space to erect a sign structure to be located approximately 0.67 mile east of State Road 535 (north side) adjacent to U.S. 192 in Osceola County on March 1, 1982. The real property described in said Lease covered an area approximately 100 feet in width adjoining the Peloso property to the east. On the property encompassed in said Lease, dated March 1, 1982, KOA erected some time in 1982, at its expense, an existing sign on its property which was constructed to face east. The message on the sign related to the KOA Campground which is on the same site. As such, it is an on-premises sign not requiring a DOT sign permit so long as the message on the sign relates to the business being conducted on the property. On the land adjoining the property described in said Lease, Peloso erected a sign, at his own expense, on his property in 1982 which was constructed to face west. At that time in 1982, Peloso applied for and received two outdoor advertising permits nos. AG636-10 and AG637-10, from the DOT. AG636-10 was issued for the west facing sign and AG637-10 was issued for the east facing sign. AG636-10 was promptly posted on the west facing sign which presently advertises Peloso's restaurant in Kissimmee, Florida. Said permit has remained posted on that sign continuously to the present time. AG637-10 was lost by Peloso. Thereafter, a request was filed by Peloso to replace permit AG636-10 rather than AG637-10. As a result, permit AX346-35 was issued to replace AG636- 10, and no replacement for AG637-10 has been issued. AX346-35 has now been posted along with AG636-10 on the west-facing sign owned by Peloso. Peloso has continuously paid the renewal fees relating to both permits issued. Pursuant to paragraph 6 and 7 of the Lease, dated March 1, 1982, the 100 foot strip of land owned by KOA was leased to Peloso and states: "6. Said premises are hereby leased for use by the lessee as a site for billboard advertising sign only, and for no other use or purposes unless the lessor gives his written consent thereto, and shall be operated at all times in a lawful manner. The lessee shall carry all necessary insurance, procure all necessary permits and licenses, and build and construct all signs in strict conformity with applicable Florida Statutes; and the lessor shall not be liable or held responsible therefor in any manner whatsoever. The parties agree that the lessee shall position his sign so that it faced in the general direction of west and the lessee shall provide space for the lessor to place a sign in the vicinity thereof also, so that it faces in the general direction of east." The Lease does not set forth a specific purpose on its face, but was requested in order to accommodate setback requirements under local law, and possibly to allow the sign to be erected to overhang the KOA boundary line. Said Lease has not been terminated and is still in full force and effect. On October 14, 1988, Peloso filed applications for two outdoor advertising sign permits "to rebuild and improve existing sign structure", which were treated as an amendment to the existing permits and tentatively approved by DOT. KOA filed an application for an outdoor advertising sign permit for the east-facing sign on its property sometime in the Fall of 1989. Peloso is the holder of the two existing permits (AG636-10 and AX346- 35), and is entitled to maintain permits for both an east-facing and a west- facing sign in the vicinity of the present Peloso restaurant sign (AG636-10). KOA has whited-out the copy on its sign and presently is not advertising any business (on-site or off-site) on the sign. Peloso has ceased construction on his new sign structure.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Alleged Violations of the Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code and Notice to Show Cause, dated June 30, 1989, directed to KOA Campground be dismissed, so long as its sign qualifies for exempt status under the provision of Section 479.16(1), Florida Statutes. The Alleged Violations of the Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code and Notice to Show Cause, dated October 20, 1989, directed to Arthur S. Peloso be dismissed, upon compliance with Section 479.07(5)(b), Florida Statutes, (lost tag). Thereafter, DOT should process the Amended Application of Peloso, dated October 14, 1988, relating to the construction of a new sign structure and ensure compliance with all applicable statutes and rules. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Buildi.ng 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 1990. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by Petitoner, KDA Campground. Paragraph 1- Accepted in substance except the statement the original permit was issued "for the existing sign on KOA property...", which is rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 2- The first sentence is rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. The second sentence is Accepted. Paragraph 3- Accepted in substance. Paragraph 4- Rejected. Paragraph 5- Accepted in substance. Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by Respondent, Arthur S. Peloso. Paragraphs 1-9. Accepted in substance. The Department of Transportation did not file proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: William H. Muntzing, Esquire 1102 Oak Street Post Office Box 421966 Kissimmee, Florida 34742 Philip W. Watson, Esquire Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson Firstate Tower, 17th Floor Post Office Box 231 Orlando, Florida 32302 Rivers Buford, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Thomas H. Bateman, III General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact Mr. Richard Hughes, investigator for the Department, received approximately twelve complaints from various citizens in the Broward County area based on alleged faulty workmanship by the Petitioner. (See State's Composite Exhibit No. 2.) Customer invoice receipts reveal that Petitioner used State Registration No. 2739 on all customer invoice receipts. Evidence reveals further that Petitioner was at one time, the President of King Television, Inc., which was assigned State Registration No. 2739, but that registration expired some time during 1974. William C. Kimberl, Jr. the Division's Director, by sworn affidavit dated December 7, 1976, stated that he, as custodian of the records for the Bureau of Electronic Repair Dealer Registrations, made a search of such records and found no record that Petitioner's business, which is located at 1107 N.W. 15th Place in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, was registered. See State's Exhibit No. 1. During August of 1976, Petitioner was charged with operating a business without a registration and for obtaining property in return for worthless checks and that he pleaded nolo contendre to the charge of operating a business without a registration and adjudication was withheld on the charges of obtaining property in return for worthless checks. Petitioner was placed on probation for eleven months. Additionally, the court required that Petitioner check all TV sets involving the complaints which had been received by the state agent (Mr. Hughes) and repair them to the customers' satisfaction. Thereafter and subsequent to repair, Petitioner was to receive a signed invoice from all disgruntled customers stating in essence that they were satisfied with the TV set as repaired. As to those complainants who refused to sign such an invoice, Petitioner was required to contact Mr. Hughes who would in turn independently check the set to determine whether or not it was operating properly and that, if such was the case, Petitioner would not be required to make further repairs to the set. With the exception of approximately two complainants, it suffices to say that Petitioner complied with the court's ruling regarding the repair of the TV sets. One complainant, Mrs. George Pollack of Hallendale, testified that she had made repeated calls to Petitioner in an effort to obtain her remote control selector to no avail. Petitioner testified credibly that he had ordered the part to repair the remote control selector from the manufacturer and that as soon as such parts were received, he would repair and return the selector to Mrs. Pollack. Shirley Herbstman of Hollywood, contacted Petitioner during April, 1976, to have her set repaired. She paid approximately $102.00 to have tubes, transformer, and a remote control repaired, and when the set was returned, she contends that the same problem existed. Thereafter she called Ace TV and a yoke was replaced at her home for a cost of approximately $75.00. See Respondent's Exhibits No. 3 and No. 4. The Petitioner's Defense. Petitioner testified that he received assurances from investigator Hughes that it was proper for him to operate under his old registration number i.e., No. 2739 until such time as he obtained his new registration. According to the evidence, it appears that this assurance was given during late 1975 at which time Hughes furnished Petitioner with an application form and instructed him to immediately file it with the Division. Evidence also reveals that Petitioner did not submit his application to the Department until August 9, 1976. By letter dated August 10, 1976, the Bureau Chief of Electronic Repair Dealer Registration advised Petitioner that his application for registration was being returned because of certain omissions on his application including his failure to tender the $30 application fee, the sales tax permit number or a receipt for such payment and a certification from the Secretary of State's office that the corporation was in good standing. Thereafter by letter dated October 15, 1976, Petitioner was further advised that after a review of all available facts known to the Division, his registration was not being validated pursuant to Chapter 468.155 and 468.159(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Petitioner testified further that he had not operated as a TV repairman other than to repairs sets per the terms of a court order and that subsequent to August, 1976, he had not, in any manner, held himself out as a registered repairman. He testified that once his license was rejected, he had all phones disconnected and that he was led to believe that his son would take over the business. As events developed, however, his son left the state.
Recommendation Based on the above findings of fact and conclusions of law I recommend that the allegation that the Petitioner violated his probationary status by operating without being registered be dismissed. Based on the remaining violations as found above, I recommend that the Respondent's action in denying Petitioner his registration certificate as an electronic service dealer be sustained. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of February, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence D. Winson, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Business Regulations Division of General Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Gerald H. Birnesser, Esquire 2119 Hollywood Boulevard Hollywood, Florida 33020
The Issue Whether respondent's nonconforming sign was destroyed by an Act of God, and therefore its license should be revoked, or whether respondent's sign was merely damaged and the action taken by respondent constitutes reasonable repair and maintenance of the sign.
Findings Of Fact Harvey's Groves, Inc. is a citrus grower, shipper and retailer. Harvey's Groves has three retail stores in Brevard County. Ten billboards advertise these stores. Two signs advertise the store located at the intersection of I-95 and State Road 50. One of those signs is located one mile north of the intersection and advertises to traffic headed south. The other sign, which is the sign involved in this dispute, is located five miles south of the intersection. It is designed to advertise to northbound motorists, especially tourists on their return trip north. This sign has been in existence since the mid or late sixties. Respondent holds DOT sign permit number 7865-10 for the sign located five miles south of the intersection of I-95 and state road 50. The sign is a nonconforming sign as defined in Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. The sign is located in an area zoned agricultural, and thus would be prohibited except for its nonconforming status. On December 14, 1985, the sign was blown down by a windstorm. All six of the poles which supported the sign snapped a few feet above the ground and below the face of the sign resulting in the rest of the sign structure falling flat on its back. Other than the snapped poles, the sign was only slightly damaged. The two stringers on the top left hand corner of the sign and the top stringer on the right end of the sign had been broken but the remainder of the structure was basically intact. The sign face was still attached to the structure. The majority of the sign face had not been damaged. Mr. Harvey, the only person who saw the sign face prior to its repair, testified that two of the 4' x 8' panels had cracked but were still usable. However, the pictures of the old sign face, introduced-into evidence by respondent, showed that three 4' x 8' panels were missing from the sign face and apparently needed to be replaced. Further, two panels that were in the sign face at the time the pictures were taken contained no copy, and thus appeared to be replacement panels, but no evidence was presented to explain the blank panels. Prior to December 14, 1985, the sign consisted of a 14' x 40' rectangular sign face, with "cutouts" or embellishments which extended the height of the sign at certain points, attached to a sign structure consisting of six perpendicular poles and seven horizontal stringers. The sign face was attached to the stringers which ran the width of the sign. The stringers consisted of 2" x 4" boards which were nailed or spliced together to run the 40' width of the sign. A 2" x 4" board does not come in a 40' length. The poles extended approximately 18 feet above ground level; however, additional boards had been attached to the top of the poles so that the top of the sign extended above the top of the poles. The top two horizontal stringers supporting the sign face were located above the top of the pole that was measured as extending 18 feet above ground level. (R.Ex.#4) The HAGL, or height above ground level, of a sign is measured from the ground to the bottom of the sign face. Immediately prior to December 14, 1985, the HAGL of the sign was approximately 10 feet. However, the evidence was conflicting as to whether the HAGL had always been the same. Mr. King testified that the HAGL was measured in 1976, and at that time the HAGL was five feet. However, although Mr. King personally measured the sign, his testimony was not based on his personal knowledge of the measurement, but was instead based on his recollection of what the DOT records indicated the sign measured. The only record of DOT introduced into evidence, the Outdoor Advertising Inventory Update Listing, listed the HAGL at four feet. However, the computer printout listing alone is not sufficient to establish the HAGL of the sign because there was no competent evidence establishing the source, date, or reliability of the information. Further, other evidence is inconsistent with a 4-foot HAGL. Mr. Wright measured one of the broken poles and determined that the part of the pole still standing was four feet from the ground level to the break on top. However, petitioner's exhibit number 8, which shows the measured pole, notes the location of a 1964 permit tag affixed to the pole. The permit tag is not located on the 4-foot portion of the pole that is still standing; it is located on the portion of the pole that had broken off, and it is located well above the break. Thus, it is apparent that the HAGL could not have been four feet because that would put the permit tag behind the sign face. Petitioner argues that the HAGL had to be only four feet because the broken pole measured 18 feet above ground level and a 14-foot sign face on an 18-foot pole would leave only four feet between the bottom of the sign face and the ground. However, petitioner's argument is premised on the assumption that the top of the sign face was level with the top of the pole. There was no evidence presented to support this assumption. To the contrary, as found in the proceeding paragraph, the evidence clearly indicated that the top of the sign face was located above the top of the pole. Thus, in that there was no competent evidence to the contrary, the testimony of Mr. Harvey, that the HAGL has always been the same, is accepted, and it is found that the HAGL of the sign at all pertinent times prior to December 14, 1985, was approximately 10 feet. Prior to December 14, 1985, the sign was well maintained and in good condition. Every year in October or November the sign was checked to determine if any repairs were necessary. Every two or three years the sign was painted. On December 14 or 15, 1985, Mr. Harvey was advised that the sign was down. He went to the location and found the sign intact, flat on its back, and all six poles broken. Since the sign was down, Mr. Harvey had the sign face removed and taken to Harbor City Signs for painting. About three weeks after the incident, respondent installed six new poles that were 30' in length and extended about 24' above ground level. Respondent put all new stringers on the poles because it was easier and faster to put up new stringers than to remove the stringers from the old poles and put them on the new poles. Because the sign is responsible for a substantial amount of respondent's business, respondent's major concern was to get the sign back up as soon as possible. On January 21 and 22, 1986, Mr. King went to the location. He observed that the old sign structure was on the ground and that a new sign structure, with all new stringers and poles, had been erected. The new structure had nine stringers and the bottom stringer was approximately ten feet above the ground. The sign face had not been attached to the new structure. Mr. King placed a stop work order on the structure. When respondent was ready to attach the repainted sign face, apparently a short time after Mr. King's inspection, the stop work order was discovered. Thereafter, and apparently in an attempt to comply with what he perceived the DOT rules to be, Mr. Harvey had the new stringers removed from the new poles and had the stringers from the old structure affixed to the new poles. The new structure contained 10 horizontal stringers supporting the-sign face, one of which was new material. The cutout was also supported by a new horizontal stringer and a new perpendicular stringer. (P.Ex.10 and 12) The sign face was attached to this structure in March of 1986. The repainted sign face was essentially the same as it was prior to the accident, except that at the bottom, where it previously had stated "Indian River's Finest Citrus", the sign stated "Next Exit Florida's Best." The HAGL of the reerected sign was approximately the same as the old sign. Although Mr. King testified that the new HAGL was about 12 feet and Mr. Wright testified that the new HAGL was from 12-14 feet, their testimony was simply what they estimated the HAGL to be. Mr. Clayton, who actually affixed the stringers and repainted sign face, testified that the repainted sign face was placed at the same height above ground level as it had been before. Further, the photos taken of the sign in March and July (P.Ex.#5 and #10) do not support a finding that the new HAGL was 12-14 feet. Even if the measurement of 28 1/2 feet drawn on petitioner's exhibit number 10 were accurate, and there was no testimony revealing how this figure was derived, it is not useful in determining the HAGL since it purports to measure the distance from the top of the cutout to the ground. The 14' height of the sign does not include the height of the cutout, and there was no testimony to establish how many feet the cutout added to the height of the sign. Therefore, the testimony of Mr. Clayton is accepted as being the most competent evidence regarding the new HAGL. Thus, the HAGL on the sign after the sign face had been replaced was approximately 10 feet. After the sign face was attached in March, the sign looked about the same as it had prior to December. The sign's location in relationship to the road was the same and the HAGL was approximately the same. There was no increase in visibility. As Mr. King testified, there was no significant difference in the way the sign looked after its repair and the way it looked prior to December 14, 1985. There was no evidence presented concerning the actual cost expended by respondent to repair or rebuild the sign. There also was no evidence presented concerning the depreciated value of the sign prior to December 14, 1985. The only evidence presented as to cost was an estimate of the cost to replace the six poles. It was estimated that a new pole would cost about eighty or ninety dollars and that it would cost about thirty dollars per pole to have the poles placed in the ground.
Recommendation It is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation's violation notices seeking revocation of sign permit number 7865-10 be dismissed and that permit number 7865-10 remain in effect as a permit for the nonconforming sign located five miles south of the intersection of I-95 and State Road 50. Respectfully submitted and entered this 2nd day of March, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-0967T Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in paragraph 2. Rejected as stated in paragraphs 5 and 6 as not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Accepted, except evidence showed seven stringers, in paragraph 5. Accepted in paragraph 2. Accepted, except as to date, in paragraph 3. Accepted in paragraphs 8 and 9. Accepted generally in paragraphs 9 and 10. Accepted in paragraph 4. Rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence in paragraph 11. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 1-2. Accepted in paragraph 1. Accepted in paragraph 2. Rejected as irrelevant since only the depreciated value of the structural materials in the- sign is relevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Accepted generally in paragraphs 5 and 6. Accepted in paragraph 7. 8-9. Accepted generally in paragraphs 3 and 4, except as to number panels replaced and damage to stringers. Whether panels could have been reused is irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant (see ruling on paragraph 4). Rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence and contrary finding in paragraph 8. Rejected as irrelevant. Accepted except as to date in paragraph 9 and in Background section. Accepted generally in paragraph 10. Rejected as irrelevant since only actual costs of new materials is irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Accepted as stated in paragraph 10. Accepted in paragraph 12. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Victor M. Watson, Esquire 1970 Michigan Avenue Building C Cocoa, Florida Kaye Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Hayden Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact It was stipulated by the parties that Exhibits 1 and 2 are photographs depicting the signs of the Respondent that are the subject of the allegations of statutory violations. One of the signs (Exhibit 1) is located 9/10 of a mile west of state road 81 on the south side of Interstate Highway I-10. It is located approximately 15 1/2 feet from the edge of the right-of-way of 1-10. The other sign (Exhibit 2) is 1 4/10 of a mile east of state road 81 on the north side of Interstate Highway I-10. It is located approximately 16 feet from the edge of the right-of-way of I-10 (testimony of Mr. Jordan). The two signs, which are commercial in nature, are located outside the limits of any incorporated city or town and are not in zoned or unzoned commercial or industrial areas (testimony of Mr. Jordan). The limits of Ponce de Leon, Florida, generally are located approximately one mile away from the sign locations (testimony of Mr. Jordan; Exhibits 1,2,5,6). Prior to the erection of the signs, the Respondent leased the property where they are presently located after contacting the Mayor of Ponce de Leon, Florida, who advised him that the leased property was located within the city limits of Ponce de Leon. By application dated August 19, 1975, Respondent applied for a state permit for the Signs. This application was denied by Petitioner on August 28, 1975, because the signs were deemed to be in violation of Section 479.11(1), F.S., as being within 660 feet of the Interstate Highway right-of-way (testimony of Mr. Jordan; and Mr. Mosier).
The Issue Whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent for alleged violations of Sections 489.127(1) and 489.531(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, is the sole owner of Expeditior’s Home Improvement Agency. Expeditor’s represents various contractors in the area and markets various home improvement products and services to a homeowner. Respondent is not licensed and has never been licensed to engage in construction or electrical contracting in the State of Florida. Nor did Petitioner’s business possess a certificate of authority to practice as a qualified business in contracting. In the past the company was paid by the homeowner for a construction project and would subsequently hire licensed contractors to do the work. However, that type of arrangement constituted contracting for which Respondent was not licensed. After a complaint for unlicensed contracting by Petitioner in November 2003, Respondent changed his manner of doing business in order to comply with the licensure statutes. Currently, Respondent solicits business for a contractor for which the contractor pays Respondent. The contractor is paid by the homeowner for the work the contractor performs. At about the same time, Respondent revised his forms and business cards to reflect the contractor who will be doing the work, and a disclosure statement stating that Expeditor’s is not a licensed contractor and is acting as a sales agent for the contractor listed in the contract. References to contracting activities were removed from the face of the contract. In December, 2003, Respondent through Expeditor’s employed Saleem Ahmad as an independent contractor/salesman for the company. Respondent had known Mr. Ahmad through a company, similar to Expeditor’s, that they had both been employed by. As a sales representative of Expeditor’s, Mr. Ahmad was given Expeditor’s form proposals/contracts and business cards. At the top of the contract forms were the words “Vinyl Siding, Security Replacements Windows, Sunrooms . . . New Home Construction.” At the bottom of the forms were the words, “Networking Qualified Licensed & Insured Contractors.” Similarly, Mr. Ahmad possessed a business card indicating Expeditor’s engaged in work that included vinyl siding, sunrooms, windows, roofing, fencing, and new home building. Mr. Simmons also had a similar business card. The forms and cards possessed by Mr. Ahmad were the forms that Expeditor’s current forms replaced. The evidence was not clear whether Mr. Ahmad had been given the new forms. Around February 9, 2004, Mr. Ahmad, acting as an apparent agent of Expeditor’s contracted with Mr. Clarence Gavin to, inter alia, replace two windows, install a kitchen counter top and cabinets, four ceiling fans, and remount a water heater. The contract price for the work was $19,875. Such work required a licensed contractor. The contract was written on an Expeditor’s proposal form and listed Calvin Hall as the Architect. The evidence was not clear whether Mr. Hall was an architect. However, the evidence did demonstrate that Mr. Hall was a licensed contractor and was the contractor against who Mr. Gavin was filing the complaint. Mr. Simmons never saw the contract Mr. Ahmad had written for the Gavin job. Likewise, he never saw any money Mr. Gavin may have paid for the job. Indeed, Mr. Simmons was unaware of the Gavin contract or job until the investigation in this matter. Apparently, Mr. Ahmad was defrauding Mr. Simmons and misusing old Expeditor’s business forms. However, the evidence was clear that Respondent did not intentionally engage in unlicensed contracting. Therefore, the Administrative Complaint should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended a Final Order be entered finding Respondent not guilty of violating Sections 489.127 (1) (f) and 489.531 (1), Florida Statutes (2004), and dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of May, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of May, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Brian A. Higgins, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 C. Erica White, Esquire 327 Office Plaza Drive, Suite 211 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John Washington, Hearing Officer Office of the General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Following receipt of the complaint from a competing sign company, Petitioner had Respondent's sign located on the I-110 1844 feet north of SR-296 checked to ascertain its exact distance from the on-ramp to the I-110 nearest this sign. The District sign inspector measured the distance between the point where the I-110 pavement widening begins along the I-110 to the point on the I-110 nearest the sign. This measurement was made twice, once with two other employees of Petitioner and once with one other employee. This distance measured 469 feet. Respondent's witness testified that he and another employee of Respondent measured the same distance and determined it to be 514 feet 1 inch. After considering the contradictory testimony presented, it is found that the sign is located less than 500 feet from the beginning of the widening of the I-110 at the on-ramp which distance is measured along the I-110. Prior to this sign being erected, Respondent's representative visited the site of the sign with Petitioner's District sign inspector and was advised that the location was satisfactory and that a permit could and would be issued for a sign at this location. Respondent built the sign on the spot pointed out to the inspector at a cost of some $12,000, applied for and was issued a permit for this sign. No evidence was presented that Respondent in any manner misled the sign inspector or made any misrepresentation either while both were at the site or at any other time to induce Petitioner to issue a permit for this sign. No evidence was submitted that the sign in question was outside an incorporated town or city.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, on May 20, 1985, submitted an application for an outdoor advertising sign on his property alongside SR 37, 2000 feet north of the intersection of Brannen Road (CR 540A) (Exhibit 5). This application was disapproved by Memorandum of Returned Application dated July 22, 1985, for the specified reason that it did not meet the spacing requirement because it was in conflict with permit No. 2595-12 held by Lamar Citrus. (Exhibit 5) Tag No. 2595-12 was issued to Peterson Outdoor Advertising (Peterson) on application approved December 14, 1976 for a sign, along SR 37,500 feet south of Brannen Road on the right side of SR 37 facing north. In the space on this application for DOT use only was written: "Sec 548 N/B 22.68 Mi 50'R F/N 34'H" (Exhibit 1). This shows the approved location to be at mile 22.68 north bound with the sign facing north. Exhibit 1 further indicates the site was transferred to Lamar Citrus who is the current owner of that permit. The tag numbers originally issued to Peterson were lost and new tag numbers for the sign erected by Lamar in December 1985 have been issued. The sign inventory maintained by the DOT sign inspector in this district showed the permit for the Lamar structure to be at mile 22.07. Petitioner's application is for a sign at mile 22.05 which is within 1000 feet of the sign erected by Lamar in December 1985. At the time Petitioner applied for the sign that is the subject of these proceedings Lamar had no sign erected. Lamar acquired a lease on property consisting of part of the abandoned Seaboard Coastline Railroad right-of-way, which abuts Petitioner's property on the north, subsequent to Petitioner filing the application which was here denied by Respondent. The sign erected on this property in December 1985 is at mile 22.07. When Petitioner applied for the permit here considered, the initial site visit by the DOT sign inspector resulted in a recommendation that Petitioner move his proposed sign location about 100 feet to the south to be at least 1000 feet from the Lamar permit. This Petitioner did. However, his application was thereafter disapproved because of the above noted spacing requirement. Lamar was not a party to these proceedings and submitted no explanation of how the originally approved site 500 feet south of Brannen Road at mile 22.68 was shown on the DOT inventory at mile 22.07. No evidence was presented by DOT that Lamar or its predecessor, Peterson, had ever obtained a permit for the relocation of the site to mile 22.07 as shown in the Department sign inventory. Inspectors for DOT rely upon their sign inventory in determining the permitted site locations rather than the description shown on the original application.
The Issue At issue is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaints and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (Department), is the state agency charged with the duty and responsibility of regulating the practice of contracting and electrical contracting pursuant to Chapters 20, 455, and 489, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the allegations of the Administrative Complaints, Lamar "Marty" Campbell was not licensed nor had he ever been licensed to engage in contracting as a State Registered or State Certified Contractor in the State of Florida and was not licensed, registered, or certified to practice electrical contracting. Mr. Campbell readily acknowledges that he has not had training or education in construction or contracting and has never held any licenses related to any type of construction or contracting. At all times material to the allegations of the Administrative Complaints, Johnston Handyman Services did not hold a Certificate of Authority as a Contractor Qualified Business in the State of Florida and was not licensed, registered, or certified to practice electrical contracting. Respondent, Lamar Campbell, resides in Gulf Breeze, Florida. After Hurricane Ivan, he and his roommate took in Jeff Johnston, who then resided in Mr. Campbell's home at all times material to this case. Mr. Johnston performed some handywork in Respondent's home. Mr. Johnston did not have a car, a bank account, or an ID. Mr. Campbell drove Mr. Johnston wherever he needed to go. At some point in time, Mr. Campbell drove Mr. Johnston to obtain a handyman's license in Santa Rosa County. Mr. Campbell did not apply for the license with Mr. Johnston and Mr. Campbell's name does not appear on this license. The license is in the name of Johnston's Handyman Services. Mr. Campbell is a neighbor of Kenneth and Tracy Cauley. In the summer of 2005, which was during the period of time when Mr. Johnston resided in Mr. Campbell's home, the Cauleys desired to have repairs done on their home to their hall bathroom, master bathroom, kitchen and laundry room. With the help of Mr. Campbell and others, Mr. Johnston prepared various lists of repairs that the Cauleys wanted performed on their home. In August 2005, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Campbell went to the Cauley's home and the proposed repairs were discussed with the Cauleys. There are documents in evidence dated August and October, 2005, which the Cauleys perceive to be contracts for the repairs to be done in their home. However, these documents are not contracts but are estimates, itemizing both materials and labor. The documents have the word "Estimate" in large bold type at the top and "Johnston Handyman Services" also at the top of the pages. The list of itemized materials includes electrical items, e.g., light fixtures and wiring. Also in evidence are documents dated August and October, 2005, with the word "Invoice" in large bold letters and "Johnston Handyman Services" at the top of the pages. Both Mr. and Mrs. Cauley acknowledge that Mr. Johnston performed the vast majority of the work on their home. However, at Mr. Johnston's request, Mr. Campbell did assist Mr. Johnston in working on the Cauley residence. Between August 5, 2005, and October 11, 2005, Mrs. Cauley wrote several checks totaling $24,861.53. Each check was written out to Marty Campbell or Lamar Campbell.1/ Mr. Campbell acknowledges endorsing these checks but asserts that he cashed them on behalf of Mr. Johnston, who did not have a bank account or identification, and turned the cash proceeds over to Mr. Johnston. Further, Mr. Campbell insists that he did not keep any of these proceeds. The undersigned finds Mr. Campbell's testimony in this regard to be credible. Work on the project ceased before it was finished and Mr. Johnston left the area. Apparently, he cannot be located. The total investigative costs, excluding costs associated with any attorney's time, was $419.55 regarding the allegations relating to Case No. 06-2764, and $151.25 regarding the allegations relating to case No. 06-3171, for a total of $570.80.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order imposing a fine of $1,000 for a violation of Section 489.127(1), Florida Statutes; imposing a fine of $500 for a violation of Section 489.531(1), Florida Statutes, and requiring Respondent, Lamar Campbell, to pay $570.80 in costs of investigation and prosecution. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of March, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March, 2006.
Findings Of Fact On 30 April 1976 Salter Advertising Company's application to locate a sign facing north on Salter-owned property off the I-110 near the intersection of Scott and Alcaniz Streets, Pensacola, Florida, was approved (Exhibit 1). By application dated 12 November 1976 Salter requested authorization to erect a sign at the same location facing south (Exhibit 8). This application was disapproved by the District sign inspector on December 20, 1976. What happened to the original of Exhibit 8 was not disclosed at the hearing. On a duplicate original of this application, which was introduced as Exhibit 9, the disapproval on the duplicate original application was erased or whited-out and under date 5-2-77, this application was approved by the District Sign Coordinator, the supervisor of the inspector who had disapproved Exhibit 8. The copy introduced as Exhibit 8 differs from Exhibit 9 in several respects. In the first place it is a carbon copy of what appears to have been the original of Exhibit 8. The "received" stamps dated November 24, 1976, December 13, 1976, and December 21, 1976, appear at different places on Exhibits 8 and 9; Exhibit 8 contains a "returned" stamp with date of 11/15/76 which does not appear on Exhibit 9; Exhibit 9 contains a "received" stamp dated April 29, 1977 which does not appear on Exhibit 8; and Exhibit 9 shows sign to be facing both S and W, while Exhibit 8 shows sign facing S only. The reason given for disapproving Exhibit 8 contained in letter dated January 31, 1977, (Exhibit 5), was that there was inadequate space to place a sign at the location proposed because of the City of Pensacola's setback line 50 feet from the center line of Alcaniz Street. This same condition exists respecting the application approved in Exhibit 1. Accordingly, no sign has been erected at the location despite the approval of the South and West facing sign approved in Exhibit 9. In November of 1976 Respondent contacted Petitioner's sign inspector for Pensacola and arranged to meet at the site of the sign proposed in Exhibits 2 and 4. The property at this location was for sale and Respondent wanted to know if it was suitable for a sign. At this time it was customary for the official who approved the application to go to the site before the application was submitted and advise whether or not an application for a sign at the location would be approved. At the on-site meeting the inspector advised Respondent that approval for the intended sign would be forthcoming. Respondent then purchased the property, submitted the application for sign approval and erected the sign at a cost of some $12,000. The testimony, that it was customary for an applicant after receiving on-site approval, to erect the sign before receiving formal approval of its application for sign permit, was not rebutted. The sign erected by Respondent is located approximately 300 feet from the site for which Salter received approval of its application in Exhibits 1 and The I-110 is part of the interstate system.
