The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner’s application for licensure as a resident all-lines adjuster should be approved or denied.
Findings Of Fact DFS is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating insurance adjusters and agents pursuant to chapters 624 and 626, Florida Statutes. On April 20, 2016, Petitioner filed with DFS his application to become licensed as an all-lines adjuster in the state of Florida. On the second page of the application form, Petitioner answered “yes” to the question asking whether he has ever pled nolo contendere, no contest, or guilty to, or ever had adjudication withheld for, or ever been convicted of or found guilty of, any felony crime under the laws of any state. Despite answering yes to that question, on the third and fourth pages of the application, Petitioner answered “no” to the following three questions: First, Petitioner was asked whether his felony crime(s) fell within the following categories: any first-degree felony; a capital felony; a felony involving money laundering, fraud of any kind, or embezzlement; or a felony directly related to the financial services business. Second, Petitioner was asked whether his felony crime(s), if not falling in one of the above categories, were crimes involving moral turpitude. Lastly, Petitioner was asked whether his felony crime(s) were within the category of “all other felonies.” The questions asking how to categorize the felony crime(s) that Petitioner acknowledged on page two of the application correlate to the statute prescribing a range of consequences depending on the type of felony criminal background an applicant has. According to the statute, an applicant with felony criminal history falling in the first group above (first degree felony, etc.) is permanently barred from applying for licensure in Florida as an insurance agent or adjuster. For an applicant whose felony criminal history does not fall in the first group, but is categorized as a felony (or felonies) involving moral turpitude, the statute provides for a long period of disqualification. If an applicant’s felony criminal history does not fall in either of the first two categories, then a shorter period of disqualification is provided by the statute. See § 206.207, Fla. Stat., adopted in its current form in 2011 (with one immaterial amendment in 2014 to change a statutory cross-reference). Petitioner’s admitted felony history must, of necessity, fall within one of the three groups: the felony history must have involved one or more felonies identified for permanent bar, other felonies involving moral turpitude, and/or all other felonies. The application answers were internally inconsistent and at least one of the answers on pages three and four was wrong. At hearing, Petitioner did not offer any explanation for his incorrect answer(s).1/ Petitioner did not file with his April 2016 application submitted to DFS, and did not offer into evidence at hearing any proof of the felony criminal history to which he admitted in his application. Petitioner gave little information at all about his criminal background at hearing. He testified that he identified his prior criminal history on page two of the application (by answering “yes” to the question asking whether he had ever been convicted, etc. of any felony crimes). The only detail he was asked by his counsel to address was as follows: Q: Now the criminal history that you identified, is that something that occurred a while ago? A: Yes, sir. Q: And can you give me the approximate time period? A: The offense? It was in 1994, I believe. Q: Okay. And do you recall when you finished all your restitution and probation concerning any of these prior convictions? A: 1999. (Tr. 32). Petitioner later acknowledged on cross-examination, as suggested by his attorney’s attempted correction in his follow-up question, that there was not just one (“the”) offense--there was more than one offense and more than one conviction. Other than correcting that error, Petitioner volunteered no information regarding his prior convictions. He did, however, offer into evidence documentation generally corroborating his testimony regarding when he completed probation for his prior convictions. Two letters from New Jersey Superior Court personnel state that court records reflect that Mr. Bivona completed three different probationary terms associated with three different indictment numbers, as follows: for indictment number 96-03-0031-I, probation was completed as of August 9, 1999; for indictment number 95-10-0453-I, probation was completed as of May 2, 1999; and for indictment number 95-05-0206-I, probation was completed as of September 27, 1998. Although Petitioner offered no details or documentation for his prior felony convictions, either with his application or at hearing (other than the letters documenting when he completed probation), Petitioner said that he had previously provided documentation to Respondent regarding his felony convictions, a fact confirmed by Respondent. Respondent had in its files certified copies of court records for Petitioner’s felony convictions in New Jersey, obtained by Respondent in 2010 in connection with a prior license application by Petitioner.2/ Respondent offered into evidence at hearing certified copies of court records regarding Petitioner’s felony criminal history, including indictments issued by grand juries setting forth the original charges, and the subsequent judgments of conviction issued by New Jersey Superior Court judges. Because Respondent was willing to use the criminal history documentation previously provided by Petitioner that was already in Respondent’s files, Respondent did not require Petitioner to obtain or submit the same documentation again in connection with his new license application.3/ The indictment numbers identified in the three judgments of conviction match the three indictment numbers contained in Petitioner’s exhibit offered to prove when he completed his probationary terms for his prior convictions. Thus, although Petitioner was evasive at hearing, unwilling to identify the court records of his prior convictions, the records themselves establish the missing information about Petitioner’s felony criminal history that Petitioner only alluded to at hearing. In a September 28, 1995, judgment of conviction issued by Judge Leonard N. Arnold, New Jersey Superior Court for Somerset County, Mr. Bivona pled guilty to, and was convicted of, the charges set forth in indictment 95-05-0206-I. As enumerated in the judgment of conviction, these were: four counts of fraudulent use of a credit card, a third-degree felony; one count of unlawful theft or receipt of a credit card, a fourth-degree felony; four counts of forgery, a fourth-degree felony; and one count of theft by deception, a fourth-degree felony. For sentencing purposes, the court merged nine of the counts into count two (one of the charges for fraudulent use of a credit card), and imposed the following sentence: three years of probation, restitution of $271.60, a $500.00 fine, and other monetary assessments. On May 3, 1996, another judgment of conviction was issued by Judge Leonard N. Arnold. The judgment of conviction shows that Mr. Bivona pled guilty to, and was convicted of, the charges set forth in indictment 95-10-0453-I. As enumerated in the judgment of conviction, these were: three counts of fraudulent use of a credit card, a third-degree felony; and one count of theft, a fourth-degree felony. The sentence imposed by the judgment of conviction was incarceration for 180 days in the county jail, a three-year probationary term, restitution of $380.02, and monetary assessments. On August 9, 1996, a judgment of conviction was issued by Judge Marilyn Hess, New Jersey Superior Court for Hunterdon County. As shown on the judgment of conviction, Mr. Bivona pled guilty to, and was convicted of, the charges set forth in indictment 96-03-00031-I. As enumerated in the judgment of conviction, these were: one count of theft by deception, a third-degree felony; one count of forgery, a fourth-degree felony; and one count of credit card theft, a fourth-degree felony. The sentence imposed by the judgment of conviction was a three-year probationary term, restitution of $2,488.30, and monetary assessments. As noted, Mr. Bivona testified that he completed the probationary terms for his prior convictions in 1999. He provided documentation corroborating that he served the three probationary terms and completed them on three different dates in 1998 and 1999, the last of which was August 9, 1999. No evidence was presented to prove that Mr. Bivona has paid all restitution, fines, and other monetary assessments imposed in the three judgments of conviction, and, if so, when all payments were completed. Petitioner’s application was initially denied by DFS because of Petitioner’s felony criminal history. DFS determined that at least two of the judgments of conviction, and possibly all three, were for felony crimes involving fraud. DFS did not undertake a review of Petitioner’s rehabilitation from his past crimes or his present trustworthiness and fitness to serve as an insurance adjuster, because in DFS’s view, Petitioner was subject to the statutory permanent bar from applying for licensure. DFS did not determine that Petitioner did not otherwise meet the requirements for licensure as a resident all-lines adjuster. At hearing, neither party went into any detail regarding the requirements for licensure as an all-lines adjuster. Instead, the focus of both Petitioner and Respondent was on whether Petitioner’s criminal history renders him disqualified from applying for licensure as an adjuster, either permanently or for a period of time, and, if the latter, whether mitigating circumstances reduce the disqualifying period. No evidence was offered of aggravating circumstances. Respondent has not disputed whether, aside from the implications of Petitioner’s criminal history, Petitioner otherwise qualifies for licensure. Therefore, it is inferred that Respondent was and is satisfied that, aside from the implications of Petitioner’s criminal background (including questions about rehabilitation, trustworthiness, and fitness), Petitioner otherwise meets the requirements for licensure as an all-lines adjuster. Petitioner presented evidence addressed to the mitigating factors in Respondent’s rule to shorten the period of disqualification in certain circumstances, where there is no permanent bar. Petitioner testified that he moved to Florida with his wife in 1998 (apparently before he had completed his probationary terms for at least two of his convictions). He and his wife started a business in the Sarasota area, a corporation that has operated under two different names, but has remained essentially the same since 1998. The business has always been small; although it has gone up and down in size over the years, Petitioner said that the business has had at least five employees for over three years. Since 1998, the nature of his business has been to provide technical support and assistance to insurance adjusters. The business has not been engaged in the actual adjuster work; instead, his clients are licensed adjusters who perform the actual adjuster work. Petitioner testified that he has been employed by the corporation he owns, working at least 40 hours per week for a continuous two-year period within the five years preceding the filing of his application. This parrots one of the mitigation factors in Respondent’s rule, and although no documentation of his employment hours was provided for any period of time, the undersigned accepts Petitioner’s testimony as sufficient under the mitigation rule. If Petitioner is determined to be disqualified for a period of years and subject to the mitigation rule, this mitigation factor would reduce the disqualification period by one year. To meet another mitigation factor, Petitioner submitted five letters of recommendation in evidence. Three of those letters appear to be from someone who has known Petitioner for at least five years (one undated letter states that the author has known Petitioner for three years; another letter, more of a business reference from an insurance company representative in Maryland, does not state how long the author has known Petitioner). Those letters that are dated bear dates after the license application was submitted and initially denied, but there is no impediment to receiving and considering them in this de novo hearing. The letters meet the requirement in Respondent’s rule for mitigation. If Petitioner is determined to be disqualified for a period of years and subject to the mitigation rule, this mitigation factor would reduce the disqualification period by one year. Although the letters satisfy one of the mitigation factors in Respondent’s rule, the contents of the letters are hearsay, as none of the authors testified. The matters stated in the letters, for the most part, do not corroborate any non- hearsay evidence, except in a few immaterial respects (such as that Petitioner runs his own business and has daughters who play volleyball). Petitioner did not present any testimony from witnesses at hearing who could attest to his character, his business reputation, or his trustworthiness. Petitioner testified that he does volunteer work on a “sporadic” basis. He is active as a volunteer for his three daughters’ schools and travel volleyball activities, and he also works with youth groups in his church. Although Petitioner testified that he believes he has volunteered at least 180 hours over the three years preceding the filing of his application, Petitioner did not present any documentation from one or more charitable organizations confirming the number of his volunteer hours. It is undisputed that Petitioner held an insurance adjuster license in Florida for some period of time, until, according to DFS, the license expired by operation of law. Although Petitioner admitted that since 1998, his business has not been engaged in insurance adjuster work, merely holding a license appears to at least superficially satisfy a mitigation factor in Respondent’s rule. No evidence was presented to show that Petitioner has been arrested or charged with any criminal violations since he completed his third probation in August 1999, more than 17 years ago. The length of time without any additional criminal incidents is a positive consideration. Notably lacking from Petitioner were: an explanation for the circumstances underlying the multiple crimes he committed that involved fraud, theft, forgery, and deception, through use of other people’s credit cards and checks; express acceptance of responsibility for his criminal past; the expression of genuine remorse for his wrongdoing; and an explanation as to why his criminal history should not present concerns if Petitioner becomes authorized to engage in insurance adjusting. As Petitioner acknowledged, a licensed adjuster “would negotiate settlement [of claims under insurance policies], would offer payment, [and] would have authority to write payment and receive payments” (Tr. 35), placing the adjuster in a position of trust and responsibility in dealing with other people’s money. Simply noting that it has been a good number of years since Petitioner completed his probations, that he is running his own business (that does not engage in insurance adjusting), that he has a family, that he is involved with church, and that he does volunteer work is not enough, when Petitioner’s past crimes and the concerns they present go unexplained, to support a finding of rehabilitation, moral fitness, and trustworthiness today. It may well be that Petitioner could prove these things if he had addressed them; it may have been an unfortunate strategic choice to avoid any mention of Petitioner’s past crimes in anything but the most general and vague terms. Perhaps in light of decisional law discussed in the Conclusions of Law below, Respondent’s licensure application form asks applicants who disclose criminal history whether they have had their civil rights restored. Petitioner answered yes. He was asked to explain, and his response was: “Rights were restored and I have the ability to vote and act as a standard US Citizen.” (Pet. Exh. 11 at 4). In the initial review of Petitioner’s application, DFS staff apparently accepted Petitioner’s representation that his civil rights had, in fact, been restored.4/ However, in a “deficiencies” listing at the end of the application, DFS noted that Petitioner failed to provide a certificate of civil rights restoration, or other proof of restoration of his civil rights. Petitioner’s application was not denied because of these omissions, and Petitioner’s failure to provide such evidence in his application would not have been an impediment to receiving and considering proof of restoration of Petitioner’s civil rights at hearing, had such evidence been offered. At hearing, Petitioner attempted to prove that his civil rights were restored. However, Petitioner presented no evidence that he ever applied for restoration of his civil rights, or that his civil rights have been restored by order of the governor in the exercise of clemency power. Instead, the only evidence offered by Petitioner was a Florida voter status printout showing that he is an active registered voter. The exhibit was admitted for the limited purpose of showing that Petitioner was registered to vote in Florida. However, this fact is insufficient to support an inference that Petitioner’s civil rights must have been restored or he would not have been allowed to register to vote. If Petitioner has actually had his civil rights restored, there would be direct evidence of that, and Petitioner had no such evidence. It is equally or more plausible that Petitioner was allowed to register to vote in Florida by mistake; Petitioner acknowledged that he represented in his voter registration application that his civil rights were restored (just as he represented to DFS in his license application). Petitioner’s counsel argued that Petitioner was allowed to register to vote in Florida because Florida gave full faith and credit to what New Jersey had done. This argument was unsupported by evidence of how Petitioner became registered to vote in Florida. Regarding what was done in New Jersey, the only evidence offered by Petitioner was a “voter restoration handbook” from the state of New Jersey, which indicates as follows: “In New Jersey, any person who is no longer in prison or on parole or probation, can register to vote. . . . In New Jersey, unlike some other states, those who have been convicted of felony offenses in the past are not forever barred from voting. . . . Any ex-felon who has satisfactorily completed the term of his or her sentence can register to vote.” (Pet. Exh. 7, admitted for a limited purpose, at 1 - 2). The rest of the handbook simply describes how one goes about registering to vote in New Jersey. Under New Jersey law, then, one particular civil right--the right to vote--is taken away from convicted felons only until they complete their sentence, parole, and probation. This is confirmed by a New Jersey statute that has been officially recognized, providing that the right of suffrage--the right to vote--is taken away from any person “[w]ho is serving a sentence or is on parole or probation as the result of a conviction of any indictable offense under the laws of this or another state or of the United States.” § 29:4-1(8), N.J. Stat.5/ The right to vote is only one of the civil rights that may be lost by reason of being convicted of a crime. For example, under another New Jersey law officially recognized in this proceeding, persons convicted of a crime are disqualified from serving on a jury. See § 2C:51-3b., N.J. Stat. Petitioner presented no evidence to prove that he ever sought or received a restoration of his civil rights by executive order of the governor pursuant to an exercise of executive branch clemency power, either in the state of New Jersey or in Florida. In New Jersey, restoration of civil rights and privileges (one of which may be the right to vote) is accomplished pursuant to section 2A:167-5, New Jersey Statutes, officially recognized in this proceeding and providing in pertinent part: Any person who has been convicted of a crime and by reason thereof has been deprived of the right of suffrage or of any other of his civil rights or privileges . . . may make application for the restoration of the right of suffrage or of such other rights or privileges . . . which application the governor may grant by order signed by him. (emphasis added). Similarly, the Florida Constitution vests in the executive branch the following clemency powers: [T]he governor may, by executive order filed with the custodian of state records, suspend collection of fines and forfeitures, grant reprieves not exceeding sixty days and, with the approval of two members of the cabinet, grant full or conditional pardons, restore civil rights, commute punishment, and remit fines and forfeitures for offenses. (emphasis added). Art. IV, § 8(a), Fla. Const. Petitioner admitted that he did not apply to the governor for a restoration of civil rights in New Jersey, and he has no order from the governor restoring his civil rights. Similarly, Petitioner did not apply for and receive an order from the governor restoring his civil rights in Florida. Instead, he admitted that he is relying on whatever happened in New Jersey. The following testimony reveals Petitioner’s misconception of the process in New Jersey for restoration of civil rights: Q: Okay. Mr. Bivona, what’s your understanding of how your civil rights were restored in New Jersey? A: My understanding is that once probation and restitution and everything is completed, that civil rights are restored in the State of New Jersey. Q: And did that happen, to your knowledge? A: The completion? Q: Yes. A: Yes, sir. I also verified that with the State of New Jersey. I called them. The Court: I can’t consider that.[6/] A: I understand. I’m sorry. The Court: Do you have any exhibits that show that civil rights have been restored? Mr. Terrell: There’s a handbook from New Jersey that’s also how the rights are restored. [Pet. Exh. 8, in evidence for limited purpose] (Tr. 44).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services issue a final order denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a resident all-lines insurance adjuster. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2017.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner should be exempt from disqualification from employment in a position of trust, pursuant to section 435.07, Florida Statutes (2016).1/
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented at hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Agency is the state entity which supports vulnerable persons with various developmental disabilities. The Agency contracts with direct service providers and is responsible for regulating the employment of persons serving in positions of trust with these providers. The ARC of Martin County, Inc. (the ARC), is a service provider for the Agency. Ms. Ford applied with the ARC to become an after-school counselor, a position of trust which requires completion of level 2 background screening. The Department of Children and Families conducts initial screening on behalf of the Agency. Background screening and local criminal records revealed a history of involvement with law enforcement, as Ms. Ford admitted in her exemption request paperwork and her testimony at hearing, summarized below. On September 30, 2011, Ms. Ford entered a plea of guilty to forgery, driving on a suspended license, and providing a false name to law enforcement, for events that took place on April 9, 2010. Forgery, a felony of the third degree, is a disqualifying offense for employment in a position of trust. She was ordered to pay court fees and costs, and was put on probation for a period of 18 months for that offense. In her responses in the Exemption Questionnaire, Ms. Ford gave few details as to the events surrounding the disqualifying offense itself. She stated only that she was a witness to an accident on March 20, 2011, almost a year after the forgery incident, and, after identifying herself to the police, was arrested on an outstanding warrant from Martin County for the forgery charge. Ms. Ford wrote in her own words:2/ The forgery was do to traffic when I was pulled over and I gave my sister name to the officer. The officer then allowed me to go to go. I didn't know I had a warrant for Martin County until the night of the crash. In response to inquiries concerning another arrest for driving with a suspended license and providing a false name to a law enforcement officer while being arrested or detained a couple of months later on May 9, 2011, Ms. Ford wrote: I was on my to work and I was running late so I then was doing over milage and I was pulled over and gave officer a other name, cause I didn't want to be late for work. At hearing, in response to inquiries concerning her arrest for shoplifting on January 22, 2013, Ms. Ford acknowledged shoplifting a medical device for her daughter from Wal-Mart. Ms. Ford completed all confinement, supervision, and nonmonetary conditions imposed by the court for her disqualifying offense by March 29, 2013. Mr. Gerry Driscoll is the regional operations manager for the Southeast Region of the Agency. He has served in his current position for three years and has been employed with the Agency for seventeen years. Mr. Driscoll credibly testified that the Agency has responsibility for a very vulnerable population, many of whom are unable to later tell others about the actions of their caregivers. This population is thus very susceptible to exploitation. Mr. Driscoll noted that the Agency must consider any prior criminal conduct or dishonesty very carefully. In her written submission to the Agency, Ms. Ford did not recognize that she caused any harm or injury to any victim. However, at hearing, she admitted that she caused injury to her sister when she provided and signed her sister's name to law enforcement after being detained or arrested on more than one occasion. Ms. Ford submitted three identically worded "form" character reference letters to the Agency, stating generally that she is a responsible, reliable, and honest person. The letters do not indicate the employment status or positions of the individuals signing the references. Ms. Ford further stated that she was remorseful. In her Exemption Questionnaire, Ms. Ford wrote: Yes my remorse is I accepting made bad choose in my life and I accept full responsibility for the actions that I made. I want to move forward and put the pass behind me so I can make a better future for me and my kids. Ms. Ford seems sincere in her desire to assist vulnerable persons and asks for a chance to work with them to demonstrate that she is rehabilitated. However, the statute requires that rehabilitation be shown first; only then may an exemption for disqualification be granted. While Ms. Ford stated that she is rehabilitated, she offered little evidence to clearly demonstrate that. She completed a home health aide course in 2012, but has not participated in other counseling or coursework since the disqualifying offense. Ms. Ford's recent work history includes employment as an administrative assistant with Florida Community Health Centers, Inc., from October 8, 2014, to October 5, 2015, and employment as a mental health technician with Sandy Pines Residential Treatment Center from July 18, 2008, to January 7, 2014. Passage of time is a factor to be considered in determining rehabilitation, and the last disqualifying offense was over five years ago. However, Ms. Ford's history since her disqualifying offense includes more to reflect incidents and does not contain sufficient positive indications of rehabilitation. Ms. Ford failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she is rehabilitated and that she will not present a danger if she is exempted from her disqualification from employment in a position of trust.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order denying Ms. Jennifer Ford's application for exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 2016.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in Administrative Complaint, as amended? If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since April 30, 1982, certified by the Commission as a law enforcement officer. He holds certificate number 08-82-002- 01. Respondent is now, and has been since early 1982, employed by the Florida Highway Patrol (hereinafter referred to as the "FHP"). He currently holds the rank of sergeant, a rank he has held since 1986, with the exception of a brief period of time in 1990 when he served as a lieutenant. As a sergeant, Respondent is responsible, on a regular basis, for the direct supervision of eight troopers. There are occasions, however, when as many as 40 troopers are under his supervision. During the time that he has been with the FHP, Respondent has received numerous commendations and his overall work performance has been rated as either satisfactory or above. Only twice during the period of his employment has he been disciplined- - in 1983, for the negligent operation of his FHP vehicle, for which he received a written reprimand, and, more recently, for the incidents which gave rise to the issuance of the instant Amended Administrative Complaint. These incidents all occurred during the time Respondent held the rank of lieutenant. Respondent was promoted to the rank of lieutenant and assigned to the investigative section of the FHP's Troop "E" in Miami on or about February 1, 1990. His duties included working out of uniform (in civilian clothes) investigating driver's license fraud. Among the other investigative lieutenants assigned to Troop "E" with whom Respondent worked were Lieutenants Jimmy Hobbie, Paul Sharpe and Kenneth Glass. Respondent shared an office with Lieutenant Hobbie. They each had their own desk. Lieutenants Sharpe and Glass occupied other nearby offices. Respondent enjoyed a congenial, professional relationship with his fellow investigative lieutenants. At no time did he ever have an exchange of angry or threatening words with them. On at least three separate occasions between February 19, 1990 and April 15, 1990, while in his office and in the presence of Lieutenants Hobbie and Sharpe, with whom, at the time, he was engaged in casual, light conversation injected with attempts at humor, Respondent removed his .38 caliber FHP-issued service revolver from his holster, placed it near the side of his head, pulled the hammer partially back, and, without firing any shots, returned the revolver to his holster. On none of these occasions did Respondent intend to harm or threaten anyone. He was simply trying to be funny. Neither Hobbie nor Sharpe, however, were amused by Respondent's careless and potentially dangerous display of his firearm. 1/ To the contrary, they were troubled by Respondent's actions, but they did not express their concerns to Respondent. On March 30, 1990, Respondent displayed a firearm in arresting an individual named Mark Barken for driver's license fraud. Prior to locating and arresting Barken, Respondent had been told by Barken's brother that Barken was a heroin addict and that Barken had recently threatened the brother with a shotgun and told the brother that he was going to kill him and his wife. Based upon the information he had been provided by the brother, Respondent considered Barken to be an unstable, dangerous and violent individual. Therefore, when he received a tip that Barken was at a drug treatment and rehabilitation facility in Perrine, he asked Lieutenant Hobbie to accompany him to the facility to assist in arresting Barken. Hobbie agreed to provide such backup support. Respondent and Lieutenant Hobbie drove to Perrine and waited together outside the facility for Barken to leave. After a while, Respondent left the surveillance area for brief moment. When he returned, Hobbie advised him that Barken, or at least someone who looked like Barken, had just left the facility. Respondent thereupon got into his FHP vehicle and drove off in the direction Hobbie had told him Barken was headed. Hobbie remained behind in the surveillance area. Shortly thereafter Respondent spotted Barken, who was with a companion. As Respondent approached the two, they ran across the street into a parking lot. Respondent followed them. As he pulled into the lot, he identified himself as a law enforcement officer 2/ and ordered Barken and his companion to stop, turn around and face him with their hands up. The pair stopped, but they did not comply with Respondent's other directives, even after these directives had been given several times. Believing that it would be prudent to do so, Respondent took a shotgun with him as he exited the vehicle and initially held it in a port-arms position in an effort to gain control of the situation. Ultimately, Respondent did gain control of the situation. When Lieutenant Hobbie arrived on the scene, Barken and his companion were laying face down on the pavement and Respondent was pointing a shotgun in their direction. 3/ Following Hobbie's arrival, Respondent placed the shotgun back in his vehicle and Barken and his companion were taken into custody. On or sometime between April 16, 1990, and April 20, 1990, while seated at his desk in the office he shared with Lieutenant Hobbie, Respondent jokingly pointed his revolver out the open doorway of the office and in the direction of a reception area. As he did so, he commented to Hobbie, who was in the office with him, "Wonder what he would do if he would, you know, look up and see me pointing this gun at him." From where he was situated, Hobbie was unable to see the person to whom Respondent was referring. After making this comment, Respondent put the gun back in his holster. At around lunchtime, on or sometime between April 16, 1990, and April 20, 1990, Respondent walked into Lieutenant Sharpe's office and the two began to engage in a friendly conversation. Their discussion centered upon their plans for lunch. During the conversation, Respondent was standing immediately in front of the desk at which Sharpe was seated. At some point in their discussion, Respondent decided that he needed to tuck his shirt in his pants. Before loosening his pants, he unholstered his service revolver and laid the revolver on Sharpe's desk. As Respondent placed the revolver on the desk, he carelessly pointed the barrel of the gun in Sharpe's direction and pulled the hammer partially back. Sharpe reacted by quickly changing his position to avoid being in the line of fire in the event the revolver discharged. Respondent saw Sharpe's reaction. He immediately removed the revolver from the desk and placed it back in his holster without bothering to tuck in his shirt. Although concerned about this incident, Lieutenant Sharpe did not discuss his concerns with Respondent; 4/ however, he did report the incident shortly after it had occurred to Randy Snow, who was his, as well as Respondent's, immediate supervisor. 5/ On April 25, 1990, Respondent and Lieutenants Hobbie, Sharpe and Glass were standing in close proximity to one another in the secretarial area of Troop "E" headquarters and engaged in informal and friendly conversation when Respondent, in response to a remark make by Hobbie and in an effort to be humorous, removed his service revolver from his holster, pointed it at Hobbie's head and pulled the hammer partially back. Hobbie turned his head to the side and ducked. Glass threw his hands up and exclaimed, "That's loaded," in response to which Respondent stated, "I know it is." Respondent then put the revolver back in his holster. At the time of this April 25, 1990, incident, an internal investigation of Respondent's conduct was already underway. During the course of the investigation, Respondent, who had not yet completed his probationary period as a lieutenant, was returned to the rank of sergeant and placed on "administrative duty." Following the conclusion of the investigation, Respondent was dismissed by the FHP on the ground that he was unfit for duty. The FHP subsequently determined that it did not have just cause to dismiss Respondent for fitness deficiencies. Accordingly, pursuant to a settlement agreement with Respondent, it rescinded Respondent's dismissal and instead suspended Respondent for ten days without pay for the improper display of a weapon. In accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement, Respondent successfully participated in the FHP's Employee Assistance Program. He also took a firearms retraining course, which he also successfully completed. Since Respondent's return to work, his overall work performance has been rated as exceeding performance standards and he has received a letter of commendation from his supervisor. There have not been any reoccurrences of the improper conduct for which he was suspended. Apparently, he has mended his ways. He is today considered to be an effective, hard working and honest law enforcement officer who is an asset to the FHP.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order (1) finding Respondent guilty of having failed to maintain "good moral character," in violation of Section 943.1395, Florida Statutes, by virtue of his having engaged in the conduct described in Findings of Fact 10, 18, 19 and 21 of this Recommended Order, and (2) issuing him a written reprimand and placing him on probation for a period of two years, during which time he shall be required to undergo firearms training and meet any other terms and conditions deemed appropriate by the Commission. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 27th day of April, 1993. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 1993.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner was convicted of specified criminal offenses, requiring the forfeiture of all of his rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System, except for the return of accumulated contributions.
Findings Of Fact From 2002 until 2011, including all times relevant to this case, Petitioner Jonathan Bleiweiss ("Bleiweiss") was employed as a deputy sheriff by the Broward Sheriff's Office. As a public employee, he became a member of the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"), which is administered by Respondent Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement ("Division"). On February 12, 2015, Bleiweiss pleaded guilty in the Broward County Circuit Court, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, to 14 counts of armed false imprisonment.1/ False imprisonment, as defined in section 787.02(1)(a), Florida Statutes, is a felony of the third degree. This crime must be reclassified upward, however, where, as here, "the defendant carrie[d], display[ed], use[d], threaten[ed] to use, or attempt[ed] to use any weapon or firearm" while committing the felony, unless an exception applies, which none did in Bleiweiss's case. See § 775.087(1)(c), Fla. Stat. Accordingly, armed false imprisonment, as charged against Bleiweiss, is a second-degree felony. Based on Bleiweiss's pleas, the court entered judgments of conviction adjudicating Bleiweiss guilty.2/ The Amended Information from one of the criminal cases, which is dated October 1, 2009, sets forth the ultimate facts underlying each of the false imprisonment charges to which Bleiweiss entered a plea of guilty, as follows: [O]n or between [various dates], in [Broward County, Florida, Bleiweiss] did forcibly, by threat, or secretly confine, abduct, imprison, or restrain [the alleged victim] without lawful authority and against his will, and during the commission thereof Jonathan Bleiweiss carried or displayed a firearm . . . . By pleading guilty, Bleiweiss admitted the foregoing allegations, which the undersigned accordingly adopts as findings of fact herein.3/ These facts, however, which closely conform to the elements of the offense, shed little light on what actually happened. At the plea colloquy, Bleiweiss stipulated to a few additional facts, agreeing that if the "cases were to proceed to trial the State would prove that . . . while working as a Broward Sheriff's deputy while dressed in full police uniform and driving a marked police vehicle [Bleiweiss] did forcibly by threat or secretly confine certain individuals whose initials are AL, JM, SG, MP, LS, AP, and JH against their will, and in the course thereof . . . exhibited a firearm." These undisputed factual grounds for Bleiweiss's plea are adopted as findings, as well. The court sentenced Bleiweiss to five years in prison, to be followed by ten years on probation. As of the final hearing in this case, Bleiweiss was incarcerated. In due course the Division learned of Bleiweiss's pleas and adjudications of guilt. Upon review, the Division determined that Bleiweiss had been convicted of "specified offenses" (a legal term that will be discussed below) and concluded that, consequently, he had forfeited his rights and benefits as a member of the FRS. By letter dated November 24, 2015, the Division notified Bleiweiss of its preliminary decision regarding the forfeiture of his retirement benefits and offered him an opportunity to request a formal administrative proceeding to contest the determination. Bleiweiss timely requested a hearing. Although not directly relevant to the disposition of this dispute, it is a fact that, when he was charged with armed false imprisonment, Bleiweiss was also charged with multiple crimes relating to sexual battery upon various persons in his custody. The government nolle prossed these charges simultaneously with the entry of Bleiweiss's guilty pleas. Therefore, the government never proved that Bleiweiss had committed any sex crimes, as alleged, and, obviously, he was not convicted of any such crimes. At the final hearing in this proceeding, the Division could have offered nonhearsay evidence——e.g., the testimony of an alleged victim, eyewitness, or Bleiweiss himself——tending to establish that, in the course of committing the acts of false imprisonment for which he was convicted, Bleiweiss additionally committed sexual batteries against the person or persons whom he had unlawfully detained. The Division, however, did not offer any direct, nonhearsay evidence that during the commission of the felonies to which he pleaded guilty, Bleiweiss had sought or secured any personal gain or advantage in the form of sexual gratification or elsewise.4/ Moreover, when asked at hearing by the Division's counsel whether he had engaged or attempted to engage in sexual activities with any of the persons whom he falsely imprisoned, Bleiweiss testified under oath that he had not. The record contains scant evidence, if any, concerning the actual circumstances surrounding the commission of the crimes to which Bleiweiss pleaded guilty. Bleiweiss testified that it was his understanding that the factual bases for the guilty pleas were that he had conducted traffic stops without probable cause (thereby committing the crime of false imprisonment); conducted searches without probable cause (committing simple battery); and carried a holstered gun, resulting in the upward reclassification of the false imprisonment charge from a third- to a second-degree felony. Bleiweiss made clear, however, that this was not what actually happened, as a matter of historical fact, but rather that this was what he understood to be the factual predicate for the plea agreement. He believes that, in fact, he did nothing wrong and was not guilty of any crimes.5/ Although Bleiweiss did not testify about what he actually did that resulted in his being (as he sees it) wrongfully charged, prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned, he declared that he had "no problem with" doing so if the undersigned wanted to know. The undersigned elected to let the Division inquire about this, but the Division did not pursue the matter. The result is that the only facts regarding Bleiweiss's conduct which the undersigned can consider in determining whether he committed a specified offense are those set forth above in paragraphs 3 and 4 (the "Basic Facts"). Because the Division, not Bleiweiss, has the burden of proof in this case, the adverse consequences of insufficient evidence fall on the Division. The Basic Facts do not directly establish that Bleiweiss committed the crimes of false imprisonment with the specific intent to defraud the public or the Broward Sheriff's Office of the right to receive the faithful performance of his duties as a deputy, which the Division must prove as a condition of forfeiture. There is, indeed, no persuasive direct evidence in the record of Bleiweiss's intent. Because false imprisonment is a general intent crime,6/ moreover, the commission of this crime does not, without more, give rise to a reasonable inference of fraudulent intent. Here, the Basic Facts establish, in addition to the bare elements of the crime, that Bleiweiss committed false imprisonment while dressed in uniform, carrying a gun, and driving his police car. These facts are not only consistent with the conclusion, but persuasively demonstrate (and it is found), that Bleiweiss used the power of his official position in the commission of these crimes——an additional element that the Division needed to prove. There can be little doubt that Bleiweiss's ability to detain individuals was significantly enhanced, if not dependent upon, the authority of his office, which was literally worn upon his person. Fraudulent intent is another matter. This is because police officers are called upon in the proper exercise of their duties to detain or restrain persons, forcibly or by threat, against their will.7/ The only fact that necessarily distinguishes a lawful arrest from an act of criminal false imprisonment is the presence of "lawful authority." Thus, a police officer who makes a traffic stop without reasonable suspicion,8/ or a warrantless arrest without probable cause,9/ theoretically could commit the crime of false imprisonment——which, to repeat, is a general intent crime that can be committed without the intent to unlawfully detain the victim——even while intending to perform his official duties faithfully; put differently, the commission of false imprisonment is not necessarily so inconsistent with the faithful performance of a police officer's duties that the commission of the crime inevitably implies an intent to defraud on the perpetrator's part.10/ The upshot is that while there is a little more here, factually speaking, than the bare elements of false imprisonment to consider, the circumstantial evidence is yet insufficient to persuade the undersigned to find, by inference, that Bleiweiss intended to defraud the public or his employer, so as to make it appear that he was faithfully discharging his duties when he was not. On the instant record, the undersigned can only speculate that this was the case——and that is not enough. The evidence is even weaker on the question of whether Bleiweiss, in committing the crime of false imprisonment, sought or obtained a profit, gain, or advantage for himself or another person, which is something else that the Division must prove. As previously discussed, the record is devoid of evidence sufficient to establish that Bleiweiss obtained or sought a profit, gain, or advantage for himself in the form of sexual gratification or the fulfillment of some other "untoward intentions." The Division argues that Bleiweiss "gained an advantage over the individuals [whom he falsely imprisoned] by employing his uniform, patrol vehicle, firearm, and general status as an officer of the law who must initially be obeyed . . . ." Resp.'s PRO at 11. Such an "advantage," however, was inherent in the power, rights, privileges, and duties of Bleiweiss's position as a deputy sheriff and was something he had whenever he went to work. An advantage a public employee enjoys by virtue of the power, rights, privileges, or duties of his position cannot be the advantage realized or sought as the object of a "specified offense" as defined in section 112.3173(2)(e)6., Florida Statutes, for the obvious reason that, if it could, the "profit, gain, or advantage" element would always be met——and thus would be unnecessary. The Division's argument on this point must, therefore, be rejected.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order restoring to Bleiweiss his rights and benefits under the FRS and providing for payment to him of any past due benefits, together with interest at the statutory rate. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2016.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a contractor engaged in highway construction and holds a certificate of qualification with Respondent. Action pending in DOAH Case No. 84-2538 could result in the suspension of Petitioner's certificate if an alleged contract delinquency is proven. Section 337.16, F.S., delegates to Respondent the authority to revoke or suspend a certificate when contract delinquency is demonstrated. This statute provides: No contractor shall be qualified to bid when an investigation by the highway engineer discloses that such contractor is delinquent on a previously awarded contract, and in such case his certificate of qualification shall be suspended or revoked. The department may suspend, for a specified period of time, or revoke for good cause any certificate of qualification. The purpose of the above statute is to enforce timely completion of construction work and to prevent a contractor from taking on new work which might require diversion of resources from the delinquent job, thus lessening the contractor's ability to catch up. Rule 14-23.01, F.A.C. was promulgated by Respondent to implement its authority to suspend or revoke contractor certificates for job delinquency. Because contractors charged with delinquency frequently catch-up or cure the delinquency during the pendency of administrative proceedings, 1/ Respondent's statutory authority to enforce construction schedules was easily thwarted. To "put teeth" in its ability to deter job delays, Respondent amended its delinquency rule in 1982 to provide after- the-fact certificate suspension where a contractor was proven to have been delinquent in its progress on a construction project. This provision, which is challenged here, states as follows: (b) REINSTATEMENT. Any contractor disqualified under the above provisions shall be disqualified from further bidding and shall be disapproved as a contractor until the delinquency is cured. Where a contractor cures the alleged delinquency during the course of administrative proceedings, the Department may suspend the qualification to bid and disapprove as a subcontractor for the number of days the contractor is administratively determined to be delinquent. Specifically, Petitioner challenges the last sentence which it contends amounts to unauthorized punishment since the deficiency sought to be corrected by the statute no longer exists. However, the provision would arguably have some deterrent force since contractors would recognize that suspension could not be avoided merely by requesting formal proceedings 2/ and counting on administrative delay to render the delinquency issue moot.
The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to exemption from disqualification by law with regard to working in a position of special trust and responsibility related to children, disabled adults, and elderly persons?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is disqualified from working in a position of special trust because of: a 1990 conviction of cocaine possession, a 1990 conviction of sale of a counterfeit substance, two 1992 convictions for possession of cocaine, and conviction of a 1992 charge of failure to appear. Prior to these criminal convictions, Petitioner had worked as a mail carrier. Petitioner explained that the drug convictions really revolved around residue found on paraphernalia in his possession. He offered no explanation as to how this detail diminished the gravity of his conduct. After Petitioner's conflict with law enforcement and his release from subsequent incarceration in the state prison system, he has earned a bachelor's degree in social work. He is presently applying for admission to graduate school at Florida State University to work toward a master's degree in his chosen field of social work. Petitioner presently works with his church and with inmates at the correctional facility in Wakulla, Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner's request for exemption from disqualification to work with children in positions of special trust. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Suite 252-A 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Andrew C. Greene Apartment K-103 2125 Jackson Bluff Road Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The two issues in this case are whether the Petitioner had been convicted of an offense involving assault, battery, or force on a person except in self- defense, and whether he concealed this on his application.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Harry Paul Hett, applied to the Department of State for licensure as an unarmed security guard. The Department denied Petitioner's application. The parties stipulated that, except for the grounds stated by the Department in its letter of denial which are at issue, the Petitioner is qualified for licensure. In 1977, Petitioner was arrested for rape. While awaiting trial, he entered a plea under the mentally disordered sex offender statute, was found guilty, and was sent to Florida State Hospital on August 29, 1977. Subsequently, he was released from Florida State Hospital upon a determination that he was competent. Because it was determined the Petitioner was not qualified as a mentally disordered sex offender and had been adjudicated guilty, on June 1, 1978, he was placed on 15 years probation. As part of his probation, Petitioner was ordered to continue outpatient care. On February 6, 1981, an affidavit of probation violation was filed against the Petitioner. He was arrested on March 9, 1981, and charged with lewd and lascivious conduct (child molestation) and probation violation. On March 26, 1981, Petitioner pled guilty to probation violation and was sentenced to five years in Florida State prison with credit for time previously served. The Petitioner was released early in 1983 and subsequently was employed as an unarmed security guard. Petitioner's application revealed his arrest for lewd and lascivious conduct, which was dealt with by the court as part of the Petitioner's probation violation. On September 25, 1981, while being held by the authorities in Hillsborough County, the Petitioner was held in contempt by the court in Pinellas County, Florida, for failure to appear. When the Petitioner must recall the events which surrounded his arrest for lewd and lascivious conduct, he becomes emotionally upset. At the hearing, this affected his recollection of those events surrounding his offenses. Because he has back problems, Petitioner cannot obtain employment as a laborer. While working as an unarmed security guard, the Petitioner was assigned to a variety of posts such as the local colosseum, malls, and shopping centers. Petitioner has a history of inappropriate sexual conduct associated with alcohol abuse. At the time of this hearing, the Petitioner was not attending any counseling sessions or Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of State deny licensure as an unarmed security guard to the Petitioner. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 7th day of November, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of November, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Harry Paul Hett 7317 Las Palmas Court Tampa, Florida 33614 Stephen Nall, Esquire Office of General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable George Firestone Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Ernest Brown is a registered real estate salesman holding a registration issued by the Florida Real Estate Commission. Brown received notice of the instant hearing as required by the statutes and rules. His probation officer testified she had contacted him and he had advised her that he would not attend the proceedings. Brown was placed on probation with an adjudication of guilt withheld by the Circuit Court of Pinellas County, Florida, on January 25, 1989 (see Exhibit 2). Paragraph 10 of the conditions of probation requires that Brown serve 180 days in the Pinellas County Jail on weekends from 7:00 p.m. Friday until 7:00 p.m. Sunday. Because of the appeal of his case, Brown did not begin serving this jail term until August 24, 1989. He has served 72 of the 180 days according to the records of his probation officer. Brown is currently in the custody of the State's probation department.
Recommendation The Board's counsel advised the Hearing Officer after hearing that Respondent had surrender his license. This constitutes an ex parte communication of which notice is hereby given to all parties. This fact is immaterial to consideration of the matter at hand. The Board has long taken the position, quite correctly, that surrendering of a license did not impair jurisdiction to consider violations of its statutes by a licensee while licensed. Similarly, surrender of a license cannot terminate the Hearing Officer's consideration of the matter after hearing. The instant case was duly heard and the Recommended Order prepared prior to receipt of any pleadings relative to surrender by Brown of his license. At this point, the Board may accept surrender of the license and dismiss the Administrative Complaint, in which case Brown would be considered not to have had any disciplinary action against him, or the Board may enter its final order based upon the record and this Recommended Order. Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that no action be taken against the license of Ernest Brown. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of April, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Ernest B. Brown 2027 Thirteenth Street, South St. Petersburg, Florida 33172
The Issue Is Petitioner lawfully entitled to work in a position of trust in an assisted living facility licensed by the State of Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for receiving, evaluating, and approving or denying applications for exemptions from disqualification to hold a position of trust, with regard to certain assisted living facilities. Petitioner worked in one of Ms. Weaver's assisted living facilities for a short period in late 2000. Ms. Weaver's facilities were licensed by the Department. Petitioner was required to undergo Level 2 screening pursuant to Section 435.04, Florida Statutes, in order to hold a position of trust in the facility. The screening revealed, among other things, that Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere on October 17, 1994, to theft of a firearm, pursuant to Section 812.014(2)(c)3 (1993), Florida Statutes, and carrying a concealed firearm, pursuant to Section 790.01, Florida Statutes. Both of these offenses are third degree felonies. Adjudication was withheld and he was sentenced to three years probation. On March 7, 1996, Petitioner was arrested on a charge of aggravated battery with a firearm and discharge of a firearm within the city limits, in violation of a city ordinance. These allegations were not prosecuted. Petitioner asserted that the incident of March 7, 1996, occurred as a result of a dispute with his brother and stated that he did not assault anyone. Petitioner further stated that it was not he who discharged a firearm within the city limits. Petitioner's version of the events of March 7, 1996, was not rebutted and his testimony in this regard is considered to be factual. Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere, on December 23, 1996, to domestic battery, a felony, pursuant to Section 784.03(2), Florida Statutes. He was adjudicated guilty. Petitioner's previously imposed probation was extended for a year as a result. Petitioner asserted that the incident which occurred on December 23, 1996, was occasioned as the result of a dispute with the mother of his children. The dispute concerned his children. He is not married to the mother of his children. Petitioner stated that he was angry and that he grabbed the woman's arm but that he did not hurt her. He stated that the woman complained to the law enforcement authorities with the result that he was thereafter arrested. This version of the events which transpired were not rebutted and his testimony in this regard is considered to be factual. Petitioner successfully completed his probation. During his probation he attended an anger management class. Pursuant to an invitation by Ms. Ware, his probation officer, he gave a presentation on anger management to a class in Tampa. During the time Petitioner worked in Ms. Weaver's facility he was in charge of bookkeeping and helped with the clients of the facility. He helped clients learn skills such as tying their shoes. The clients with whom he interacted were classified from level one to level six. Those that are classified as level four to level six are severely retarded. Those classified as level one to level three are less retarded. Petitioner enjoyed working with the facility's clients. He noted that they appreciated the attention that he gave to them. During the short time that Petitioner worked at the facility, someone filed an allegation to the effect that a client had been abused. Petitioner stated that Ms. Weaver was having a physical confrontation with a client and that he got involved in order to ensure that neither the client nor Ms. Weaver received injuries. Petitioner was not charged as a result of this incident and no evidence was presented which indicated that he engaged in unacceptable conduct. Petitioner currently attends Tallahassee Community College. He has been a student there for a year and a semester. He has not received his grades for the current semester at the time of the hearing but so far he has attained a 3.8 grade point average. He was on the dean's list. He is studying business and psychology. When he completes his associate of arts degree he plans to attend either Florida State University or the University of Central Florida. Petitioner's purpose in studying psychology is to gain the skills he needs to work in Ms. Weaver's assisted living facilities. He wants to eventually run the assisted living facility with Ms. Weaver and to open up more facilities. Petitioner has been licensed as a cosmetologist for five years. He currently works at Clipper's Hair Fashions in Tallahassee and manages a staff of 15 persons. Petitioner testified that he believed that he had been rehabilitated and that he had "learned his lesson." Curtiss D. Robbins, who serves as Chief of Police of Howey-in-the Hills, Florida, stated that he had previously been a deputy sheriff in Lake County and that he had become Petitioner's friend subsequent to the three incidents in which Petitioner ran afoul of law enforcement authorities. Chief Robbins opined that Petitioner was a fine young man. Petitioner had discussed with Chief Robbins his interest in working with mentally handicapped persons. Chief Robbins said that Petitioner was a patient person and that he had never observed him become angry. He described Petitioner as being honest, open, and respectful. He said that Petitioner attended church and that he had observed him interact with Petitioner's children and with his own children. Marland Bluhm is employed by the Department. He has a master's degree in psychology and had done post-masters work. He has worked in the field of mental retardation for over 45 years. Mr. Bluhm sat on a three-person committee appointed by the Department to review Petitioner's application for an exemption. Mr. Bluhm stated that the Petitioner appeared before this committee. He stated that he believed that it would be best to administer a Minnesota Multi-phasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) to determine Petitioner's fitness for working in an assisted living facility. However, he joined the rest of the committee in recommending to their superiors that an exemption be granted. Mr. Bluhm also said that working with mentally ill and mentally retarded persons required specific skills. He noted that mentally retarded persons could exhibit aberrant behavior and could try the patience of staff who were charged with taking care of them. He testified that the Petitioner was not a "fit," in his opinion. As noted before, the results of an MMPI could change his opinion.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding Petitioner to be qualified to work in an assisted living facility licensed by Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of March, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Candace A. Hawthorne, Esquire 319 East Main Street Tavares, Florida 32778 Ralph McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785-8158 Peggy Sanford, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue for resolution in this proceeding is whether Petitioner, Marcus A. Patrick, should be granted an exemption from employment disqualification which would allow him to work in a position of special trust or responsibility with Respondent, Department of Juvenile Justice.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Marcus Patrick, resides in Orlando, Florida, and is attending college in the field of criminal justice/criminology. He anticipates that he will receive his Bachelor of Science degree from Florida A&M University in August 2000. In December 1998, during the process of applying for a position with a Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) facility in Longwood, Florida, Mr. Patrick filed the necessary forms for background screening. These included an affidavit of good moral character which he signed and had notarized on December 18, 1998. The affidavit states that Mr. Patrick has not been found guilty nor pled guilty or no contest, regardless of whether adjudication was imposed or withheld, of any of a series of offenses listed on the affidavit. The listed offenses included violations of Chapter 812, Florida Statutes, relating to theft, robbery, and related crimes. The statement on the affidavit form immediately above Mr. Patrick's signature provides: I attest that I have read the above carefully and state that my attestation here is true and correct that neither my adult nor juvenile record contains any of the listed offenses. I understand that it is my responsibility to obtain clarification on anything contained in this affidavit which I do not understand. I am aware that any omissions, falsifications, misstatements or misrepresentations may disqualify me from employment consideration and, if I am hired, may be grounds for termination at a later date. Contrary to his affidavit, the background screening revealed certain offenses by Mr. Patrick. In 1990, while employed as a cashier at Wal-Mart, he passed store merchandise through the counter without scanning it, thus allowing his friends to obtain items without paying for them. Mr. Patrick and co-defendants entered a pre-trial intervention program and the case was dismissed with a nolle prosequi by the State Attorney on May 5, 1992. On February 3, 1997, Mr. Patrick pled nolo contendere to two counts of grand theft, a felony described in Section 812.014, Florida Statutes. He was placed on probation, was fined, and was ordered to make restitution. Adjudication was withheld. The date of the actual charge was October 6, 1996. When DJJ learned of the disqualifying offenses it offered Mr. Patrick an opportunity to explain them and to explain why he lied on the affidavit. In response, Mr. Patrick submitted documents explaining his criminal history and other documents relevant to his fitness for employment. He also submitted a revised affidavit. DJJ Inspector General Perry Turner denied Mr. Patrick's request for an exemption from disqualification on February 1, 1999. At that time Mr. Patrick was still on probation. Mr. Turner denied a second request in June 1999, when Mr. Patrick submitted evidence of his early termination from probation, but his felony (dating back to October 1996) was still within the three-year prohibition period. Mr. Turner denied Mr. Patrick's third request on December 14, 1999. It is this most recent denial that is the subject of this proceeding. Mr. Turner's final denial was based on the pattern of theft, the falsification of an affidavit, and the mere lapse of four years since the most recent offense. At the hearing Mr. Patrick admitted he falsified his affidavit but said that he was misled by his lawyer who he admits did not read the affidavit. Apparently the lawyer told him that he could answer "no" if the question asked whether he was convicted. That was not the question, and the affidavit form is quite clear that the questions also included pleas of guilty or no contest and circumstances where adjudication was withheld. Perhaps more troubling is the discrepancy between Mr. Patrick's explanation at hearing and his written explanation submitted to DJJ on January 22, 1999, regarding his 1996 grand theft offense. In 1996, Mr. Patrick was working at the Courtyard by Marriott in Tallahassee, Florida. In his 1999 version of the events, an acquaintance of his from Florida A&M University came to the hotel on several occasions allegedly to escape from his many girlfriends. The acquaintance would check in with a credit card and Mr. Patrick would check him in. The hotel policy was not to question why the name on the card did not match the reservation as long as the card cleared. The acquaintance was caught using bad cards and when it was discovered that Mr. Patrick had checked him in they both were in trouble. Mr. Patrick's version at the hearing in this case involved the use of a credit card that belonged to someone else, but Mr. Patrick would not charge the card. Instead, he took cash from the acquaintance in an amount less than the full hotel rate. The testimony is not clear whether Mr. Patrick pocketed all or just part of the cash. In his testimony on cross-examination Mr. Patrick said he thought he had given the whole story to DJJ earlier. Mr. Patrick is working again for Marriott, now in Orlando, Florida. He acknowledges that he made some bad decisions and he believes that his experience and commitment to avoid crime now would enable him to be an effective role model for the troubled youth with whom he so anxiously wants to work. Mr. Patrick worked in a juvenile residential program in Tallahassee, Florida, from April 1997 until December 1998, with promotions from counselor to treatment director to assistant program director. His letters of recommendation from staff at the program are highly laudatory of his character and his work. The record does not reveal how he eluded the screening process when he was hired or whether he was screened for that job, as he would have been on probation for his 1996 felony during that period. Mr. Patrick also has an excellent letter of recommendation from his pastor who has known him since 1996. This letter and those from his co-workers and supervisors do not acknowledge any criminal history, but the individuals may be ignorant of the history. The crimes themselves are of less consequence than Mr. Patrick's unwillingness to be fully candid. His training in criminal justice certainly has informed him of the solemnity of an affidavit. He should have known what a no contest plea is and should have been able to understand what he was required to disclose. He is 31 years old, and served in the Marine Corps for approximately 8 years, including Gulf War combat. He is very articulate and appears well-motivated in his pursuit of a career of working with problem youth, a career which does not promise great financial reward. Such a talented, earnest young man should not be forever precluded from working in the field in which he could succeed in helping others avoid the mistakes he has made. For now, however, it is impossible to find sufficient evidence of rehabilitation to assure those mistakes are truly behind him.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the agency enter its final order denying Marcus A. Patrick's request for exemption. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of May, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of May, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Marcus A. Patrick 2734 Fireside Court Orlando, Florida 32839 Lynne T. Winston, Esquire Inspector General's Office 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 William G. "Bill" Bankhead, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Robert N. Sechen, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
