Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Sammie Rayner, Respondent, was employed by the City of Clearwater as a customer service representative in the utility department. On February 11, 1992, Respondent needed to take her daughter to Seminole High School for a test and mentioned this to Joyce Griesel, Senior Customer Service Representative. The only city employees in the customer service section with authority to grant Respondent permission to leave the building on February 11, 1992, were John Scott, Utility Consumer Response Manager and Tim Bissonnette, Customer Service Supervisor. On the afternoon of February 11, 1992, Bissonnette was out of the office attending a conference; however, Scott was available. Bissonnette was Respondent's immediate supervisor, and Scott was over Bissonnette. Prior to October 1991, the Senior Customer Service Representative had authority to allow customer service representatives to leave the building for short periods. However, because of an incident in October 1991, this authority was removed from the Senior Customer Service Representative, and all employees were advised of the changed policy. Although Respondent denies that she was told that only Scott and Bissonnette could grant permission to leave the building, she did ask if Bissonnette was available before she departed the office around 3 p.m., on February 11, 1992. Respondent also contends that she asked Giesel for permission to leave, but Giesel denies that she gave such authorization, knowing full well that she had no such authority. Respondent was not given permission to leave the building on February 11 by Giesel.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's request for attorney's fees and costs should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In these cases, Petitioner, Couch Construction, L.P., seeks to impose sanctions against Respondents, Darel Holland (Holland) and Diane Lowery (Lowery), on the ground that they allegedly filed petitions for an improper purpose challenging the issuance of a permit by the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). In responsive papers filed by Respondents, both deny that the actions were initiated for an improper purpose. The facts in the underlying DEP case involving Holland (OGC Case No. 98-3015) show that on October 30, 1998, Petitioner published a copy of DEP's Notice of Intent to Issue Permit to Petitioner authorizing the construction of a hot mix asphalt concrete plant at 2780 North Highway 95-A, Cantonment, Florida, with potential emissions of up to 29 tons per year of particulate matter. After learning of the proposed action, various citizens in the Cantonment area signed a petition opposing the project. In addition, a local attorney, John T. Reading, Jr., Esquire (Reading), offered to provide them with pro bono assistance as a "community service." Among other things, Reading prepared a form petition challenging the issuance of the permit and requesting a formal hearing. That form was apparently made available to the local citizens so that they could sign and file it, if they chose to do so. Holland says that he did, and it is fair to infer that this form was the source of Lowery's petition as well. Holland lives only 9 blocks from the proposed plant and suffers from a lung disease which has left him with only 58 percent of his lung capacity. Because of his legitimate concerns about the projected amount of particulate emissions and their potential effect on his respiratory system, on November 12, 1998, he filed in proper person a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing challenging the proposed issuance of the permit. Holland's petition alleged that he was a property owner in the area where the plant would be constructed; that "due to respiratory problems," he would be "substantially affected by the permitted 29 tons of particulate emissions"; that his property "may be substantially reduced in value and peaceful enjoyment" as a result of the permit being issued; and that the petition was not "being interposed merely for the purposes of delay, or any other improper purpose as listed in F.S. 120.57(1)(b)(5)." There was no showing that the petition was filed for an improper purpose or that Holland's concerns were not genuine. Holland's petition also requested an extension of time "to determine which rules or statutes require reversal or modification of the Department's action" and "to obtain counsel" to assist him in his action. On December 21, 1998, DEP entered an order dismissing Holland's petition on the ground that he failed to allege the information required by Rule 28-106.201(2)(e), Florida Administrative Code. It also determined that no good cause had been shown to warrant an extension of time for Holland to determine if any rules or statutes supported his position. He was, however, granted leave to file an amended petition within 15 days from the date of service of DEP's dismissal order (December 23, 1998). This meant that an amended petition had to be filed with DEP no later than January 7, 1999. After learning that his petition had been dismissed, Holland had a brief conversation with Reading about the dismissal and was left with a somewhat vague understanding that Reading "would get an extension" from DEP. Thereafter, on January 12, 1999, or 5 days after the due date, Reading filed with DEP an Amended Petition of Darel Holland for Administrative Hearing. The petition was signed by Reading, and it represented that a copy of the petition had been served on Petitioner's counsel on January 5, 1999. On January 14, 1999, Reading also filed with DEP on behalf of Holland a paper styled Plaintiff's Motion to Enlarge Time in which Reading claimed that "due to circumstances not known," the amended petition had not been timely filed. Reading accordingly requested that DEP authorize the untimely filing. By order dated January 28, 1999, DEP denied the Motion to Enlarge Time and dismissed the amended petition, with prejudice, as being untimely. No appeal from that final agency action was taken. Lowery did not attend the final hearing. However, according to Holland, Lowery lives only 500 feet from the proposed cement plant. She boards horses on her property and frequently has children visit the property to ride their horses. The papers filed in her underlying case (OGC Case No. 98-2932) reflect that the facts in that case are essentially the same as those involving Holland. On November 12, 1998, Lowery filed in proper person a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing which was virtually identical to the petition filed by Holland. As an additional ground, however, she alleged that the October 30, 1998, notice published by Petitioner was defective, and she requested that DEP require Petitioner to re-advertise the matter. There was no evidence that this petition was filed for an improper purpose or that Lowery's concerns were not genuine. On December 21, 1998, Lowery's petition was dismissed by DEP because she had failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 28-106.201(4), Florida Administrative Code. Like Holland, she was given until January 5, 1999, in which to file an amended petition. In papers filed by Lowery after this sanction proceeding arose, she denies that she had any knowledge that any further papers in the permit case would be filed on her behalf after the DEP dismissal order was entered. In any event, on January 12, 1999, or five days after the due date, Reading filed on Lowery's behalf with DEP an Amended Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing which was identical to that filed on behalf of Holland. Also, on January 14, 1999, Reading filed a Plaintiff's Motion to Enlarge Time seeking to excuse his tardiness in filing the amended petition. Both papers were served on Petitioner's counsel. On January 28, 1999, DEP entered its Final Order Denying Motion to Enlarge Time and dismissing Lowery's amended petition, with prejudice. No appeal from that final order was taken. Because no appeal was taken by either Respondent, DEP's intent to issue a permit became final, and it is fair to infer that a permit has been issued to Petitioner. On January 7, 1999, or prior to DEP's final order of dismissal, Petitioner's counsel noticed both Respondents for a deposition in Pensacola, Florida, on January 14, 1999. Because Reading had signed the amended petitions, Petitioner's counsel logically served the notices by Federal Express on Reading. However, Reading failed to notify Respondents, and neither he nor Respondents appeared at the deposition or advised counsel prior to the depositions that they would not appear. As a result, Petitioner incurred the costs and fees for having its counsel travel to Pensacola. In addition, Petitioner presumably incurred the cost of a court reporter's appearance fee. Assuming that Petitioner's claim is meritorious, those costs would be the responsibility of Reading, and not Respondents. At the hearing, it was represented that Reading is no longer a member of the Florida Bar. This is because in an unpublished order dated January 7, 1999, the Florida Supreme Court revoked his license to practice law effective 30 days thereafter, or on February 7, 1999. His current address is unknown. Petitioner has asserted that in defending against Respondents' petitions, "the bulk" of its costs and fees are related to the deposition and that a few other undisclosed fees and costs have been incurred. At the final hearing, Petitioner did not specify the amount of fees and costs that it seeks or provide any breakdown of those amounts; rather, it opted to provide an affidavit detailing those costs after this final order is rendered, assuming it prevails in this action.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Fletcher Armour, should have been suspended by the Respondent, City of Clearwater, for a three-day period.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an employee of the City of Clearwater and was at the time pertinent to this hearing a meter reader for the city. He was suspended for a period of three (3) days beginning July 31, 1979, and ending August 2, 1979, for insubordination and a serious breach of discipline. In February, 1979, Petitioner Armour and his superior, Fred W. Lewis, Accounts Supervisor, discussed the Petitioner's planned vacation. The Petitioner requested six (6) consecutive days: June 28 and 29, 1979, for religious reasons, plus the following four (4) days. Although tentative written approval was given by Lewis, he warned the Petitioner that if a meter reader with seniority requested the same four (4) "non-religious" vacation days Lewis would have to accede to the request for the reason that there is a seniority policy in the Utilities Department of the City of Clearwater, and further that the department could not properly function with two (2) meter readers on vacation at the same time. Lewis told the Petitioner that the two (2) vacation days requested for religious purposes, June 28 and 29, would be granted regardless of seniority. Subsequent to this first meeting, a Mr. Henderson, a meter reader with seniority over Petitioner Armour, requested the same four (4) days desired by the Petitioner. To resolve this conflict of vacation schedules, Lewis called a meeting during early June, 1979, at which all meter readers were present, including Kim Kyler, a witness for Respondent at the hearing. According to the testimony of Lewis and Kyler, Lewis asked Petitioner Armour during the meeting what days he wanted to take off. Petitioner responded by stating he would take his first two (2) vacation days (June 28 and 29), but not the last four (4) days, and that he would postpone taking these four (4) days until sometime in December when he had two (2) weeks. He was then told that he was not entitled to two (2) weeks until after January 1, and therefore could not take the requested four (4) days in December. Lewis thereupon documented the vacation schedules of Petitioner Armour and Henderson accordingly, giving Henderson the last four (4) days he desired and had theretofore requested. Witness Kyler corroborated the testimony of Lewis. Petitioner Armour took off the four (4) days following the two (2) days leave granted that he had requested in February but was denied in June.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the three (3) days suspension of the Petitioner, Fletcher Armour, by the Respondent, City of Clearwater, be sustained. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of January, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Rick Griesinger, Esquire Assistant City Attorney City of Clearwater Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 33518 Mr. Fletcher Armour 535 Fairwood Avenue, #230 Post Office Box 794 Clearwater, Florida 33518
Findings Of Fact Burney was employed by HRS until 5:00 p.m. on September 28, 1988, when she was deemed to have abandoned her position. Her regular working hours were 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. Burney was not at work on September 26, 1988. She maintains that she had someone call in for her to inform HRS that she would not be in that day. Burney does acknowledge that her supervisor, Sherry Martin, told the caller that she could not approve leave for that day. Burney did not report for work on September 27, 1988. Burney called her office and spoke with another clerk, not with her supervisor. Her supervisor was unavailable and the clerk did not have the authority to approve leave. Burney again failed to report for work on September 28, 1988. She called in and spoke with Mrs. McClenton, another supervisor. Burney informed Mrs. McClenton that she had a drug problem which was why she had not been at work. Burney asked her where she could get some help for her problem. Burney was told that her supervisor could not help her and that she would have to get help on her own. On October 4, 1988, HRS sent Burney a certified letter advising her that her absence from work on September 26-28, 1988, was not authorized and that she was deemed to have abandoned her position and to have therefore resigned from Career Service, effective 5:00 p.m. September 28, 1988. On October 7, 1988, Burney returned to her office seeking her paycheck. She was told by the personnel office that leave was not approved for that period and that she was no longer employed there. Burney did not report for work on any day between September 26 and October 7, 1988. She had not requested leave on a leave request form and no leave was authorized by her supervisor for this period. Burney knew that she was not on approved leave and had been told that her supervisor would not approve leave for that period. Leave is only authorized when it is requested on an appropriate leave request form and is approved by a supervisor. Rule 22A-7.010(2), Florida Administrative Code, provides: An employee who is absent without authorized leave of absence for 3 consecutive workdays shall be deemed to have abandoned the position and to have resigned from the Career Service...
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order and therein find that Angela B. Burney has abandoned her position, deem that Angela B. Burney has effectively resigned from Career Service, and dismiss the petition for review. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of February, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Angela B. Burney 1585 West 35th Street Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Scott D. Leemis Assistant District Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32231-0083
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent was a career-service employee of Respondent. She served as a health service representative assigned to the Seminole County Public Health Unit. Her specific task was to investigate and follow up on contacts for sexually transmitted diseases. Petitioner's Employee Handbook, which Respondent received when she was hired, states: You may request annual leave for any purpose desired, but you must obtain Your supervisor's approval before taking annual leave. If an emergency develops, tell your supervisor of the emergency and ask for verbal approval to use annual leave. When you return to work, complete the leave request form for your supervisor's signature. The Handbook also Provides that certain employees are entitled to one eight-hour personal holiday "at a time which is mutually agreeable to the individual and the immediate supervisor." The local policy of the Seminole County Public Health Unit required each employee to request leave by filling out the back of a timesheet. In this manner, the employee would show the type of leave requested, the date and time of the leave, the employee's initials. The form provided spaces for the signature of the supervisor and the date described in detail in the Paragraph 5 below. The back of the timesheet states: "All Leave and Overtime must be requested and approved in advance." The Handbook requires advance approval of annual leave. Although the blanket statement on the back of the timesheet requires advance approval of all leave and overtime, the Seminole County Public Health Unit routinely did not require advance approval for all types of leave. For instance, sick leave, overtime, and annual leave for less than a few hours were normally approved after the fact. On at least two occasions, including one involving Respondent, annual leave for an entire day was also approved after it had beef taken. However, the Seminole County Public Health Unit normally requires advance approval of annual leave for a Period of one day or more. The instructions on the timesheet direct that the date next to the supervisor's signature indicate the date of the request for leave. Consistent with the varying policies governing leave, the date beside the supervisor's signature on the timesheet was used to show the date of approval of a request for annual leave and the date of the request for sick leave and certain other types of leave. By negative implication, the Handbook also requires written approval of annual leave for nonemergencies because it expressly permits "verbal approval" for annual leave for emergencies. There are no requirements in the Handbook or the timesheets for written approval of requests for other forms of leave, and the Seminole County Public Health Unit did not maintain enforceable policies to that effect. Two persons were authorized to approve requests of Respondent for annual leave. The first person was Charlotte Blades, who was the coordinator of the sexually transmitted disease program of the Seminole County Public Health Unit. Ms. Blades was Respondent's immediate supervisor The other person authorized to approve requests for annual leave was Bernice Duncan, who was the senior community health nurse of the Seminole County Public Health Unit and Ms. Blades' supervisor. In practice, the written approval of Ms. Blades could be revoked by Ms. Duncan. On one occasion, Respondent requested eight hours' annual leave to attend her son's high school graduation on June 9, 1989. Ms. Blades signed the timesheet on May 23, 1989. Between that date and the date of the leave, Ms. Duncan told Respondent that, although Ms. Blades had signed the timesheet, the leave was not approved. Ultimately, Respondent received approval for leave through 2:30 p.m., rather than 5:00 p.m., on the day of the graduation. In late July or early August, 1989, Respondent submitted a timesheet requesting 32 hours' annual leave from August 28-31, 1989. About one week later, before Ms. Blades or Ms. Duncan had acted on the request, Respondent changed the request to September 1, which was the Friday before Labor Day weekend, and September 13-14, 1989. In addition, she requested leave with pay for September 15, 1989, as her personal holiday. According to the timesheets, Ms. Blades approved the September 1 leave request on August 25, 1989, which was a Saturday. She assured Respondent that she would discuss with Ms. Duncan the remaining requests for leave. Respondent followed up with Ms. Blades several times, explaining that she wanted the leave to attend her son's graduation ceremonies from military basic training in South Carolina. Despite her assurances, Ms. Blades had not mentioned Respondent's request to Ms. Duncan before Ms. Blades became sick and missed work from September 6-9. On the second day of Ms. Blades' absence, Respondent took her request to Ms. Duncan, who said that she had not been aware of Respondent's request. Ms. Duncan told Respondent that Ms. Blades was on sick leave and did not respond further. The following day, Respondent spoke again with Ms. Duncan, who this time assured her that if Ms. Blades were not at work on Monday, September 11, Ms. Duncan would sign the timesheet approving the leave requested for September 13-15. Ms. Blades returned to work on Monday, September 11. When Respondent asked her in the morning to sign the timesheet, Ms. Blades refused to do so and told her that it had not yet been approved. Consistent with her prior conversations with Respondent, though, Ms. Blades did not say that the request had been disapproved. Respondent then left the office for much of the day. When she returned, Ms. Blades and Ms. Duncan were both out. The next day, Tuesday, September 12, Ms. Blades spoke with Respondent, but still declined to say whether the request was approved or rejected. She continued to say merely that the request had not yet been approved. Tuesday afternoon, Respondent told a coworker to tell Ms. Blades that Respondent was going to South Carolina and would be back the following Monday morning. While still in town, Respondent telephoned both supervisors shortly after 8:00 a.m. on Wednesday, but they had not arrived at work yet. Respondent asked the receptionist to remind Ms. Blades that Respondent had gone to South Carolina and would return the following Monday morning. Both messages were delivered to Ms. Blades, who relayed them to Ms. Duncan. Respondent then departed for South Carolina, where she remained through at least September 15. At the time of her departure, Respondent knew that her request for annual leave had not been approved and that she was taking unauthorized annual leave. When she arrived back in the office on September 18, Respondent received a copy of a letter dated September 15 that had been mailed to her the prior Friday. The letter states that Respondent had been separated from State service for abandonment of position, effective at the close of business on September 15, 1989. The second paragraph of the letter contains material misstatements of fact. It states that Respondent had been advised that, due to the present work situation, her leave could not be approved. The letter also states that she did not contact her supervisor that she would be absent. No one ever advised Respondent that her leave could not be approved or in fact was rejected until after her return from South Carolina. Also, Respondent informed both supervisors, directly and through third parties, that she would be absent, where she was going, why, and when she would return. However, she did not contact them during the three-day absence. Concerning the request for leave for a personal holiday, neither Ms. Blades nor Ms. Duncan ever informed Respondent that the date was inconvenient. Under the circumstances, Respondent could reasonably infer that the date was agreeable with Ms. Blades. At no time did Respondent intend to abandon her career-service position. The facts do not support a reasonable inference that Respondent abandoned her job during the three days in question.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order finding that Respondent has not abandoned her position in Career Service employment with the State of Florida. ENTERED this 28th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT D. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda L. Parkinson Attorney Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 701 Orlando, FL 32801 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Gregory L. Coler Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Alva J. Barfield 1010 Locust Avenue Sanford, FL 32771
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner was employed by Respondent and supervised by Frank J. Alogna, Park Manager at Ravine State Gardens at Palatka, Florida. Petitioner signed an acknowledgment receipt indicating that: (a) he had received an Employee Handbook; (b) it was his responsibility to review the Handbook; and (c) he was to request clarification, if needed, from his supervisor. Petitioner knew, or should have known, since the Handbook explained job abandonment, that unauthorized leave of absence could result in the loss of his job through abandonment. Petitioner was absent without leave on January 14, 15, and 16, 1987. Respondent's regular days off were January 17 and 18, 1987. January 19, 1987 was a paid holiday. Respondent was absent without leave again on January 20 and 21, 1987. Petitioner's last day of work was January 11, 1987 since January 12 and 13, 1987 were Petitioner's regular days off. Respondent tried on several occasions to reach Petitioner, but was unable to do so. At 7:00 p.m. on January 21, 1987 Petitioner telephoned Alogna but had no satisfactory explanation for his unauthorized leave. During this telephonic conversation on January 21, 1987, Petitioner was informed by Alogna that he was considered to have abandoned his position and to have resigned from the Career Service. Respondent formally advised Petitioner of this decision by letter dated January 23, 1987 which was hand delivered to the Petitioner on February 12, 1987 after Petitioner failed to claim the letter sent by certified mail through the post office. At no time relevant to this proceeding was any type of leave requested by Petitioner, or granted by Respondent. Although Petitioner was notified by regular U.S Mail of the date, place, and time of the formal hearing, Petitioner failed to appear. Petitioner lived approximately one (1) block from the entrance of Ravine State Gardens where he worked.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered deeming the Petitioner to have abandoned his position and to have resigned from the Career Service. Respectfully submitted and entered this 10th day of September, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-1236 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Petitioner did not submit any Proposed Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent 1.-2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. COPIES FURNISHED: Ed Pantaleon, Esquire Asst. Gen. Counsel Dept. of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Raymond W. Johnston Route 3., Box 4655 Palatka, Florida 32034 Pamela Miles, Esquire Dept. of Admin. 435 Carlton Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Adis Vila, Secretary Dept. of Administration 435 Carlton Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Gen. Counsel Dept. of Admin. 435 Carlton Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Tom Gardner, Executive Dir. Dept. of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32303
