Findings Of Fact At some point in late 1984 or early 1985, Respondent, DOT, solicited bids for its Project Number 77030-3510 to be accomplished in Seminole County, Florida. Three bids were submitted. The bid by Petitioner, Macasphalt, was in the amount of $186,367.05. The two other bidders were Martin Paving Company, whose bid was for $196,391.99 and Orlando Paving whose bid was in the amount of $213,054.56. Petitioner's bid was the lowest by approximately $10,000.00. This particular project required the contractors to meet certain goals in the area of Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (DBE) and Women-Owned Business Enterprises (WBE). The goals for this project were 7% for DBE and 3.05% for WBE. In its bid, Macasphalt showed that it would award 20.14% of the contract to DBE's but only 2.01% of the contract to WBE's. Martin Paving Company, on the other hand, whose bid was approximately $10,000.00 higher, indicated that it would award 19.19% of the contract to DBE's and 3.04% of the contract to WBE's. Orlando Paving, which was the highest bidder, showed 2.4% WBE. As a result of the fact that Petitioner failed to achieve 3% WBE, whereas the second lowest bidder exceeded the 3% WBE goal, Respondent declared Petitioner's bid nonresponsive for failure to meet the WBE goal and recommended award of the contract to the second lowest bidder, Martin Paving, even though Martin's bid was approximately $10,000.00 higher. The goals set by DOT must be met at the time of letting of the contract. If a contractor cannot meet these goals, he must submit satisfactory evidence of his good faith efforts to meet them in order to be considered responsive. In regard to the goals, DOT issues a monthly list of certified DBE/WBE contractors listed by the type of work they are qualified to do and the geographical area in which they operate. According to Mr. LaLonde, Macasphalt routinely sent out letters to a majority of the subcontractors they feel could do the work generally and a follow-up letter is sent monthly to those subcontractors who do the type of work needed in a particular contract. These letters are sent monthly because Macasphalt bids frequently on DOT contracts and bid lettings are done on a monthly basis. This procedure gives, they feel, DBE's and WBE's information on jobs on which the Petitioner is bidding and keeps them informed. In the instant case, to solicit WBE's, on January 9, 1985 Petitioner sent out letters by certified mail to 47 DBE/WBE's requesting bids on several projects including the one in question here and naming areas in which it anticipated issuing subcontracts. Items to be subcontracted on the instant project included. barricades and signs guard rails landscaping painting and striping trucking, and concrete. No solicitation was made of DBE/WBE's for quotes on asphalt work because that is Petitioner's prime business and it is, in the opinion of its officers, not feasible to subcontract work they do themselves. When it became obvious that Petitioner could not achieve the 3.05% WBE goal, Petitioner, pursuant to the terms of the contract documents, submitted a summary of its good faith efforts to achieve the WBE goals with the contract bid. The Petitioner's summary of good faith effort includes a "remarks" sheet on which the following comments exclusively are made: "We have exceeded DBE goal with a total of 20.14%. However, have only attained 2.01% FBE goal. All subcontract items except guardrail were reflected in DBE or FBE quotes received. No DBE or FBE quote was received for guardrail item." In addition, Petitioner submitted a form letter entitled, "Good Faith Efforts" apparently used in numerous contracts, which requires only the insertion of two numbers and two dates and copies of two different letters in blank sent to subcontractors on apparently a routine basis. In addition to the above, Petitioner submitted two copies of DOT's DBE/WBE Directory, one dated September, 1984 and the other dated January, 1985 in which various subcontractors are identified with check marks, the explanation for which is contained in the form letter referenced above. No explanation was made as to why some WBE's were not solicited. Upon receipt of Petitioner's bid with the good faith explanation included, it was submitted to Respondent's Good Faith Efforts Review Committee. This committee deals only with an analysis of the good faith efforts made by bidders. It has been in operation since its creation in August, 1984 and applies the standards established in Rule 14-78, F.A.C. Here, the committee evaluated Petitioner's good faith effort as outlined in the material submitted with the bid and, based on Petitioner's submission, concluded that Petitioner was non-responsive because its good faith efforts, as documented, were insufficient. The committee based its conclusion on the following considerations: Petitioner did not meet the seven day requirement for notice by certified mail. The sample letter indicated "certified mail" but no copies of receipt showing it was sent by certified mail or to whom it was sent by certified mail were included. All potential subcontractors (WBE's) were not contacted. The ability of the contractor to do the work himself "asphalt) will not justify failing to achieve the goal. Whether or not other bidders met the goal. The remarks sheet was inaccurate and inadequate. The explanation about failing to solicit from those subcontractors who did not do business in Seminole County is inconsistent. Some were solicited and some were not. One contractor (Fran) who operates in three categories and who works statewide, was not solicited by the Petitioner in any category. The criteria as set forth in Rule 14-78 are not exclusive or necessarily determinative. There is no specific definition of good faith efforts. The committee is given the latitude to make a judgment measure of the bidder's efforts opposed to the criteria set forth in the rule. Mr. Pitchford, Chairman of the committee, indicated that after the committee had been in operation for a while, the approach taken toward looking at the criteria set forth in the rule was more strictly and severely applied. No notice of this change in approach was set to any bidder, however Petitioner contends that this was misleading and that it submitted them on a previous successful demonstration of good faith efforts. In October, 1984 it submitted a bid on a contract which did not meet the DBE goal. Nonetheless, the evidence of good faith which it submitted at that time was not questioned and Petitioner was awarded the contract. This good faith information was the same kind of information as submitted here which was considered inadequate. No documentation to support any of this was forthcoming, however. Since each case must be taken and considered on its own merits, even if true, this is not necessarily inconsistent. Petitioner readily admits that it did not submit requests for bids to al; DBE/WBE subcontractors in the directory. However, it does claim that for the most part, it submitted solicitations to every WBE listed in the directory that worked in the specialty needed and in the geographical area of the project. Petitioner defends its exclusion of potential subcontractors on the basis that, for example, they had no experience with those subcontractors and were not familiar with them. In most cases, Petitioner left out companies that were not known to it. Mr. LaLonde could not be sure whether Petitioner solicited any potential subcontractor not solicited by Petitioner previously. He is certain, however, that Petitioner did solicit all subcontractors on the list who had been solicited previously. In any event, it is important to the Petitioner to know the subcontractors and how they perform because Petitioner, as the prime contractor, is responsible for the work whether it or its subcontractor accomplishes it. It is for this reason, the lack of familiarity with a subcontractor and its performance, that it did not solicit some WBE's which operate statewide. Petitioner has used many WBE's before and has never failed, it claims, to meet WBE goals prior to this occasion. It has previously failed to meet DBE goals, however, but still was awarded the contract if it was the low bidder. It is apparent, then, that if the above is true, Petitioner's demonstrated good faith efforts were considered satisfactory on those occasions. Based on that experience, Petitioner felt that the procedures used here which it claims had previously been demonstrated to be satisfactory, were again sufficient. It is significant to note that while the fact of the bid submissions reflects a difference of approximately $10,000.00 between Petitioner's bid and that submitted by the next lowest bidder, a computer analysis run on this solicitation reflects a different figure. On the computer analysis, Martin Paving's bid is listed at slightly over $203,000.00 as opposed to the bid face of slightly over $196,000.00. If the $203,000.00 figure is used, the 3.05% goal would not be met. This discrepancy was explained by Mr. Haverty who indicated that the initial figure submitted by the contractor on the bid form is used to assess whether the DBE/WBE goals are met. The issue of good faith effort is raised at a later date. Where, as here, it is determined that the original price is in error and the actual price means that the bidder has failed to meet the goal, if the error is less than 10%, the bid may still be considered responsive.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's bid on State Project Number 77030-3510, in Seminole County, Florida, be rejected as non-responsive for failure to meet the WBE goal. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 20th day of June, 1985. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: William B. Miller, Esquire Tower Place, Suite 600 3340 Peachtree Road, N.E. Atlanta, GA 30326 Larry D. Scott Staff Attorney Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Paul A. Pappas Secretary Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, FL 32301
The Issue Whether the Petitioner qualifies for renewal of a consumer's certificate of exemption as an "educational institution" as defined in Section 212.08(7)(o)2.d., Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is an active not-for-profit incorporated organization, having its principal place of operation in the State of Florida. Petitioner is a recipient of a 501(c)3 Letter from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and maintains its exempt status thereunder. Respondent is the state agency charged with the administration of the tax laws of the State of Florida and is the agency responsible for issuing or denying certificates of exemption to qualified organizations. Petitioner applied for renewal of its certificate of exemption on or about January 5, 1997, as an educational institution. The application for exemption was denied by Notice of Intent to Deny rendered by Respondent, after several requests for information, on the grounds that Petitioner did not qualify under the statutory requirements for a consumer certificate of exemption. Petitioner, founded in 1981, is a nationwide organization of writers, located in east central Florida, which seeks to encourage, train, and develop professional and avocation writers. It holds an annual writers' conference for adults and students; sponsors writing contests in the public schools and community colleges; provides a community speakers' bureau in the community and schools of the area; bestows scholarship and awards service to deserving individuals; and publishes periodic newsletters and an annual directory. The only criteria Petitioner could meet as an educational institution was as an "administrative office." No evidence was presented to indicate that Petitioner could qualify under any other alternatives or options allowed under Section 212.08(7)(o)2., Florida Statutes. Petitioner is not an accredited educational institution with regular classes, a television or radio network, a museum, library, or an accepted and statutorily recognized continuing educational program. There was no evidence to show that Petitioner has any control of or any organizational nexus with any accredited educational institution; or that Petitioner functions to assist or regulate any specific educational institution within the meaning of the applicable statute as it has been defined by prior Final Orders of the Department. See Section 212.08(7)(o)2.d., Florida Statutes. There was no evidence to show that Petitioner customarily and routinely exercised any control over any specific educational institution or that an agreement of any kind with any educational institution existed. There was no evidence to show Petitioner functions or operates within a larger hierarchy of any educational institution, or that any administrative rules, policies or by- laws have been promulgated or adopted by any educational institution that specifically identify the Petitioner or the conditions in which Petitioner uses or controls public property, facilities, or personal services operated by an educational institution. The Florida Department of Education has not approved Petitioner as an educational institution or promulgated any administrative rules regarding the Petitioner. Petitioner has not provided or raised funds for any educational institutions or for the administrative assistance of any educational institutions, nor does it directly provide 50 percent of its expenditures to any educational institution; Petitioner provides no volunteers and raises no funds for any charitable or educational organizations; and does not provide 50 percent of its expenditures to statutorily provided educational or charitable programs. Petitioner is not organized or operated exclusively to receive, hold, invest and administer property and to make expenditures to or for the benefit of public education programs in this state, nor is Petitioner a Charter School under Section 228.056, Florida Statutes, a Direct Support Organization under Sections 237.40, 240.299, or 240.331, Florida Statutes, or a Nonprofit Cable Consortium.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order denying a consumer's certificate of exemption for Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 1998, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: William B. Nickell, Esquire Department of Revenue 501 South Calhoun Street Carlton Building, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dr. Ed Kirschner Petitioner's Representative Space Coast Writer's Guild Post Office Box 804 Melbourne, Florida 32902-0804 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to recover attorneys fees and costs.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, B.R., is the sole proprietor of an adult congregate living facility known as Rona's Retirement Home located in Perrine, Dade County, Florida. Petitioner has a net worth less than two million dollars and employs one part-time worker at the six bed facility. At the time of hearing, Petitioner had four clients residing at the home for whom she provides room and board, snacks, and cleaning. Petitioner receives compensation from each at the rate of $575.00 per month. Petitioner hired her attorney of record and agreed to pay her $200.00 per hour to represent her in connection with the underlying case (DOAH case no. 92-1889C) and the present cause. Petitioner's attorney has been practicing since 1977 and has expended 38.4 hours representing Petitioner in these matters. Petitioner incurred $1,203.46 for costs in connection with Case no. 92- 1889C. The formal hearing in DOAH case no. 92-1889C was conducted by Hearing Officer Michael Parrish on December 15, 1992. During that formal hearing the Department presented testimony from one witness, the investigator, and offered one exhibit, the FPSS report at issue. The Petitioner testified at the formal hearing on her own behalf and presented the testimony of one lay witness and one expert witness, a physician. Two exhibits regarding care given to the alleged victim (S.T.) were introduced on behalf of Petitioner. Pertinent findings reached in DOAH case no. 92-1889C are: During the period of S.T.'s residence at Rona's Retirement Home, the Respondent was a caregiver for S.T. within the meaning of the definition at Section 415.102(4), Florida Statutes (1991). At the time of S.T.'s arrival at Rona's Retirement Home, his legs were swollen. S.T. had been transferred from the hospital to Rona's Retirement Home without any medical documentation or release papers. Upon inquiry by B.R., it was determined that S.T. was a diabetic. Arrangements were made by Rona's Retire- ment Home for a medical service to provide a nurse to administer insulin to S.T. on a daily basis. S.T. refused to allow the nurse to administer insulin to him during his stay at Rona's Retirement Home. S.T. was an uncooperative resident during his entire stay at Rona's Retirement Home. The retirement home specially prepared food for S.T. consistent with dietary guide- lines for diabetics. He refused to eat the specially prepared food and requested to be fed the same food as other residents. During his entire stay at Rona's Retirement Home, S.T. constantly made requests to go to the hospital. There was no medical basis for S.T.'s requests to go to the hospital. On August 29, 1991, Dr. Mark Caruso made his regular monthly visit to Rona's Retirement Home to examine the residents. On that day, Dr. Mark Caruso observed S.T. and asked B.R. if he should examine S.T. B.R. told Dr. Caruso that S.T. was a guardianship placement and that there was not, as yet, any approval by his guardian for any regular medical care. Dr. Caruso did not observe any indication that S.T. was in medical distress. On August 30, 1991, another resident at Rona's Retirement Home slipped and fell at the facility and an ambulance was called to transport that resident to the hospital. Upon arrival of the ambulance, S.T. asked one of the ambulance attendants to take him to the hospital. B.R. refused to allow S.T. to be taken to the hospital. As a result of a report of abuse or neglect, on the morning of August 30, 1991, Lourdes Paneda, a Protective Investigator with the Department of Health and Rehabilita- tive Services, visited Rona's Retirement Home where she interviewed S.T. At that time S.T. complained to Investigator Paneda of having chest pains. Investigator Paneda also observed that S.T. had swollen legs and that he seemed to be breathing heavily. Investigator Paneda was of the view that S.T. was suffering from medical distress, including the possibility of congestive heart failure. Accordingly, she contacted Dr. Mark Caruso and, following Investigator Paneda's description of her observations and concerns, Dr. Caruso said that if Investigator Paneda thought that S.T. was really sick, she should have him taken to Baptist Hospital. Investigator Paneda immediately called for rescue service. Shortly thereafter, the rescue service came and, for reasons not revealed in the record in this case, took S.T. to Deering Hospital. S.T. was seen and treated by emergency room physicians as soon as he got to the hospital. A few hours after his admis- sion to the hospital, S.T. was examined by Dr. Caruso. Based on his examination of S.T. and on the results of tests performed on S.T. at the hospital, Dr. Caruso was of the opinion that S.T. was not suffering from any acute medical distress. Dr. Caruso was also of the opinion that S.T. was not at any time in danger of death and that the conduct of B.R. did not place S.T. in danger of death or cause any harm to S.T. During the time S.T. was a resident at Rona's Retirement Home, B.R. exercised reasonable judgment in her care of S.T. All of her actions regarding the care of S.T. were reasonable. B.R. did not medically neglect S.T., nor did she neglect him in any other way. B.R. did not at any time put S.T. in any life-threatening situation. The final order entered by the Department adopted each of the foregoing findings without exception and accepted the Hearing Officer's recommendation that the FPSS report be classified as unfounded with the Petitioner's name being expunged from the registry. Petitioner was a prevailing party as defined in Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, in the underlying matter. The Respondent did not present any evidence in this cause to support allegations that an award of fees would be unjust or that the agency's actions were substantially justified. The Respondent presented no evidence. Moreover, the attorney representing the Department at the formal hearing in this case did not attend the hearing of nor investigate the Department's case in the underlying matter. No conflicting medical evidence was presented in the underlying case which required resolution. A reasonable attorney's fee for 38.4 hours in an administrative proceeding such as the instant case is $7,680.00.
The Issue Whether Petitioner qualifies for the renewal of a consumer certificate of exemption as a qualified religious organization pursuant to Section 212.08(7)(o), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an active not-for-profit corporation organized under the laws of the State of Florida. It maintains exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Respondent is the state agency charged with the administration of the tax laws of the State of Florida, including those dealing with the grant or denial of consumer certificates of exemption to qualified organizations. Reverend Roy Harthern is an ordained Assembly of God minister who previously had a career as a minister in several churches in Texas and Florida, as well as founding a Christian magazine and a Christian television station in Florida. The Reverend and Mrs. Harthern are evangelists and Bible teachers. In 1983, Reverend Harthern and his wife, Pauline, founded the organization from which the Reverend and Mrs. Harthern practice an itinerant ministry. They preach in different established churches each week, both inside and outside of the State of Florida and the United States. In the past, Reverend Harthern has had a regular religious show on television. Reverend Harthern also writes, records religious tapes and has a weekly radio program on a station owned by others. Petitioner does not have an established physical place of worship at which nonprofit religious services are regularly held; does not provide transportation for church members or other services; and does not provide services to state prisoners. There has been no substantial change in the type or nature of Petitioner's ministry since its founding in 1983. Respondent issued a certificate of exemption to Petitioner in 1983 as a "religious organization." Petitioner has renewed the exemption, in five-year intervals, ever since. Respondent has never sought to revoke or suspend Petitioner's exempt status since 1983. On July 18, 1997, Petitioner applied to renew its consumer certificate of exemption as a "religious organization." Its previous certificate was issued on October 6, 1992, and was due to expire on October 5, 1997 There has been no substantive changes to the implementing statute during the relevant time period. On October 13, 1997, Respondent issued its Notice of Intent to Deny to Petitioner on the grounds that Petitioner did not have an established physical place of worship at which nonprofit religious services and activities were regularly conducted.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's renewal application for exemption, and the provisions of Section 212.08(7)(o)2.1., Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of April, 1998, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Roy Harthern, President Roy Harthern Ministries, Inc. Post Office Box 915971 Longwood, Florida 32791 Rex D. Ware, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a nonprofit corporation whose purpose is to promote the betterment of the fire service in Ft. Lauderdale and Broward County; to promote the image of firemen and the City of Ft. Lauderdale and Broward County; to operate a pension program for the firemen in Ft. Lauderdale; and to help in community relations and youth work. Petitioner has recently built a meeting hall which, in addition to a large banquet room, has a lounge area, which can be physically separated from the banquet room, in which they would place a bar should they receive their license. Petitioner has been in existence in essentially its present form for more than 25 years. Over that period of time Petitioner has contributed money and its members have contributed time in the name of Petitioner, to many community activities, with particular emphasis on youth activities. According to the Executive Director of the Boys' Club of Broward County, Petitioner, since 1967, has been a major supporter of the Boys' Club. The members of the Petitioner have contributed a substantial amount of time in the name of Petitioner, since 1967, to functions from which the Boys' Club of Broward County raise the bulk of their funds. The Executive Director testified far that the Petitioner has been and continues to be a great help to the Boys' Club. The Director of Recreation for the City of Ft. Lauderdale has been acquainted with the Petitioner since 1959. During that period of time Petitioner has been the main source of manpower for the Ft. Lauderdale, Broward County Soapbox Derby. Petitioner has been very active in virtually all the youth baseball activities, as well as the youth football leagues, by sponsoring teams and contributing volunteer time. Petitioner has been active in local beauty contests. According to the Director of Recreation for the City of Ft. Lauderdale, Petitioner is one of four or five organizations he counts on for the main financial and manpower support of the county recreation programs. Mr. Alvin Ronald Hill, of the Ft. Lauderdale Gold Coasters, a wheelchair athletic group, testified that Petitioner is one of the largest supporters of the Gold Coasters. The Gold Coasters are an organization of handicapped people whose purpose is to promote services for the handicapped. Mr. Lou Thiese, a past president and member of the Board of Directors for Muscular Distrophy for Broward County, testified that Petitioner is the best organized group for collecting money in Broward County with regard to the Muscular Distrophy Foundation. When he was president, Petitioner collected $25,000 to $30,000 in the Muscular Distrophy Drive and continues to be an integral part of that fund raising effort. Petitioner was the initial contributor, in 1970, to the Little Yankees Football League in Broward County which now has 600 children participating and a $72,000 budget annually. The Petitioner sponsored a team in that football league until 1974, and contributed volunteer workers to do a substantial amount of the construction on the building which the league built for its operations. Since 1974 Petitioner has contributed very little, if any, monetary support to the community services in Ft. Lauderdale and Broward County because they have directed their financial resources to the construction of their meeting hall. It is the intention of the Petitioner to again undertake its financial support of many of the community projects as soon as it is in a financial position to do so. Petitioner has continued its support of the various community projects by contribution of voluntary manpower. The support, both financial and by manpower, of community programs such as the Soapbox Derby and youth athletic groups, as well as support of programs such as the Muscular Distrophy Drive, promotes community, municipal and county development. The actions of Petitioner over the years indicate its devotion to the promotion of community, municipal and county development. It is noted that Article II of the Articles of Incorporation of Petitioner sets forth its general nature and object. Is is further noted that the general nature and object of Petitioner as set forth in Article II, does not specifically state that an object of Petitioner is the promotion of community, municipal and county development.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes, by terminating Petitioner's employment on account of his marital status.
Findings Of Fact Watkins was employed by Greater Bethel, a congregation within the AME (African Methodist Episcopal) Church, from June 2000 through August 8, 2001. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, popularly known as the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA). At all times material to this case, Respondent acted through its duly-authorized representative, White, who served as Greater Bethel’s senior minister and chief executive officer. At relevant times, Greater Bethel provided an AIDS outreach ministry. White hired Watkins to direct its AIDS prevention programs, under the direct supervision of Rev. Marilyn Hardy (Hardy). It was also White who eventually fired Watkins. Watkins is gay, and his sexual orientation was known to White at all relevant times. Throughout his decade-plus tenure at Greater Bethel, White had hired other gay individuals, married and single, to work there. In Watkins' view, White hired Watkins for the AIDs prevention position precisely because Watkins was gay (as well as African-American) because, in Watkins’ words, the program ". . . targeted black men who have sex with men. " Yet, Watkins contends, the governing bodies of the AME Church, and individuals who served on them at times relevant to this case, were opposed to allowing practicing homosexuals to serve in positions of spiritual leadership within the Church. It is undisputed that religious organizations have a constitutional right to ordain their clergy without the constraints imposed by anti-discrimination laws applicable to jobs which are performed at the church, but not specifically related to its religious mission. While Watkins continued to work in the AIDS program, and White continued as Greater Bethel's pastor, both men campaigned for election to positions involving spiritual leadership. Soon after Watkins was hired in June 2000, he sought election to the Board of Examiners, which represents the South Florida Conference of the AME Church (the Board). Election to the Board is a prerequisite to becoming ordained as an AME clergyman. For Watkins to be considered for admission to the Board, his application needed to be sponsored by an incumbent board member. Though not required to do so, White, a Board member, supported Watkins' application. Watkins' application was denied by the Board in October 2000. Watkins argued, but did not prove, that his failure to be elected to the Board and ultimately ordained, as well as his employment termination, was related to Watkins' marital status. Watkins claimed that by remaining single, Watkins posed an obstacle to White's prospects of being elected Bishop of Florida. The only competent evidence regarding White's candidacy for Bishop of Florida was provided by White himself, who testified that from November 1996 to November 2000, White offered himself as a candidate for that post. White's candidacy was unsuccessful. Watkins resented the fact he had not been elected to the Board and, therefore, had no chance to be ordained. Watkins was convinced that he was rejected because the then Bishop felt that gays seeking to serve in the AME ministry should at least attempt to cover up their sexual orientation by participating in a sham marriage. Watkins' theory is based entirely upon his own speculation, and is unpersuasive. Watkins admits that White said nothing about Watkins’ marital status, or White's candidacy for Bishop of Florida, until May 2001. This was some five months after White's campaign for Bishop had ended. Watkins fell far short of proving he was fired on account of his marital status. It appears instead, that he fell out of favor with his boss, White, months after he was hired and months after White's campaign for Bishop had ended when in May 2001, he launched a protest of AME's failure to elect him to the Board. Watkins wanted White's support on this issue and was upset that it was not forthcoming. White, for his part, was upset that Watkins wanted to challenge the Board with regard to what Watkins perceived to be the former Bishop’s bias against gays in the ministry. Relations between Watkins and White deteriorated from May 2001 to August 2001, when White fired Watkins and demoted Hardy to perform White's job duties.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order which DENIES Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination and dismisses his complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David H. Nevel, Esquire Nevel & Greenfield, P.A. 11900 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 806 North Miami, Florida 33181 Robert L. Norton, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A 121 Majorca, Suite 300 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, Community Health Charities of Florida (CHC), is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs as a "prevailing small business party" pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes (2008), by being a prevailing small business party in the underlying case of Community Health Charities of Florida, et. al v. Florida Department of Management Services, DOAH Case No. 07-3547, Recommended Order February 29, 2008; Final Order May 29, 2008. Also, at issue is whether the Respondent Agency's actions, with regard to the underlying case, were substantially justified or whether special circumstances exist which would render an award of attorney's fees and costs unjust.
Findings Of Fact This cause arose upon the filing of a motion or petition for attorney's fees and costs on July 22, 2008, by the Petitioners, CHC and the Charities (the American Liver Foundation, Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, Crohn's and Colitis Foundation, Prevent Blindness Florida, Children's Tumor Foundation, March of Dimes, Lupus Foundation of America, Florida Chapter, Florida Hospices and Palliative Care, Hemophilia Foundation of Greater Florida, National Parkinson Foundation, American Diabetes Association, Leukemia and Lymphoma Society, American Lung Association, ALS Association, Alzheimer's Association, Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation, Arthritis Foundation, Florida SIDS Alliance, Sickle Cell Disease Association of Florida, Easter Seals Florida, St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Muscular Dystrophy Association, Nami Florida, National Kidney Foundation, National Multiple Sclerosis Foundation, Huntington's Disease Society of America, and Association for Retarded Citizens). This attorney fee and cost motion was filed in connection with the above Charities having received distribution of undesignated contributions from the 2006 Florida State Employees' Charitable Campaign (FSECC). The Charities made application for the funds and then contested the initial decision of the Steering Committee charged with determining distribution of undesignated contributions (by fiscal agent area). Ultimately, after obtaining a Writ of Mandamus from the First District Court of Appeal, requiring an administrative proceeding and hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings on the contested claims, the Charities received additional distribution of undesignated contributions. Those additional distributions represent an additional benefit the Charities received upon the entry of the Recommended Order and the Final Order in the underlying proceeding. Therefore, one Petitioner, CHC, in the motion for attorney's fees and costs asserts that it is thus a prevailing party and a small business for purposes of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs. The Respondent is an Agency of the State of Florida with authority to establish an maintain the FSECC.1/ It administers the decision-making process involving distribution of undesignated funds and issued the Final Order in the original proceeding. The attorney fee and cost proceeding was initially assigned to Administrative Law Judge Charles Adams. Thereafter the case was re-assigned to Administrative Law Judge T. Kent Wetherell, II. He issued an Order, sua sponte, on July 29, 2008, instructing the Petitioners to show cause why the case should not be held in abeyance pending disposition of the appeal of the Final Order in Community Health Charities of Florida v. State of Florida, Department of Management Services, 1D08-3126, the appeal before the First District Court of Appeal. The Petitioners filed a response to the Order to Show Cause stating, in essence, that the issues preserved for appeal involved discreet claims under Section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes. The parties agreed that the portions of the Final Order in the underlying proceeding which granted undesignated fund distributions to the Charities were separable, and not the subject of the appeal to the First District Court of Appeal in the above-cited case. The parties thus stipulated that the case could proceed on the matter of fees and costs, notwithstanding the pending appeal. An Order was entered by Judge Wetherell on August 11, 2008, based upon the responses to the Order to Show Cause. The Order references the parties' agreement that the case could go forward notwithstanding the pending appeal of the Final Order in the underlying case and then, significantly, Judge Wetherell made the following finding: "a closer review of the motion [the motion seeking the award of attorney's fees and costs] reflects that the only Petitioner alleged to be a prevailing small business party entitled to an award of fees under that statute [Section 57.111, Florida Statutes] is Community Health Charities of Florida." Judge Wetherell thereupon proceeded to order that the case style be amended to identify Community Health Charities of Florida (CHC), as the "only Petitioner in this fee case." The Petitioner, CHC, is a Florida non-profit corporation that employs less than 25 full-time employees and has a net worth of less than two million dollars. It is a "federation" under the FSECC Act. A "federation" is defined as an umbrella agency that supplies "common fund raising, administrative and management services to . . . charitable constituent member organizations. . . ." Fla. Admin. Code R. 60L-39.0015(1)(j). Federations were required to file with the Committee (the Steering Committee) a Direct Local Certification Form, describing the direct services that each member charity provided in the various fiscal agent areas. In this capacity, the Petitioner CHC represented 27 member charities in the 2006 charitable campaign. Charitable organizations that provide "direct services in a local fiscal agent's area" are entitled to receive "the same percentage of undesignated funds as the percentage of designated funds they receive." § 110.181(2)(e), Fla. Stat. (2006). CHC is not a provider of services or direct services. Therefore, it, itself, did not receive any undesignated funds. The charitable organizations named above, are the entities which received undesignated funds related to direct services they provided in local fiscal agents' areas. Some received them through the initial decision of the subject Steering Committee, and some after the underlying administrative proceeding was litigated through Final Order. On February 28, 2007, the Steering Committee, under the Respondent's auspices, conducted a public meeting in which it found the charities named above provided direct services in 18 percent of the fiscal agent areas in which they had applied. The Committee therefore denied Charities their share of undesignated funds in the remaining fiscal agent areas. That Committee decision was announced by memorandum of March 12, 2007, which provided the Petitioners with a point of entry to dispute the initial decision in an administrative proceeding. On March 30, 2007, the Petitioners filed an Amended Petition which alleged that they had provided direct services in all the fiscal agent areas in which they applied for undesignated funds, and identified alleged deficiencies in the Committee's decision-making process. That Amended Petition was ultimately referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for conduct of a formal proceeding, by Order of the First District Court of Appeal, requiring the Agency to refer the Amended Petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings. With the Amended Petition pending before the Division of Administrative Hearings, the Steering Committee called an unscheduled meeting on September 10, 2007, to further address the Petitioners' claims and re-visit the earlier decision denying some applications for undesignated funds. Thereafter, the Respondent changed its initial decision by increasing the percentages of fiscal agent areas where direct services were provided and undesignated funds awarded to the Petitioners, the Charities, as a result of the September 10, 2007, meeting. This percentage thus increased from 18 percent to 77 percent as a result of "additional review of material provided by Petitioners." The Respondent Agency ultimately rendered a Final Order that adopted the decision of the Statewide Steering Committee, approving 77 percent of the Petitioners' previous submittals, as well as the finding of the Administrative Law Judge with regard to the three additional member charities. The Respondent had maintained in the original proceeding that the Committee must limit its consideration to the Direct Local Certification Form. The Petitioners, on the other hand, argued that they were entitled to a de novo review of the Agency action before the Division of Administrative Hearings. Reserving ruling on that matter, Judge Adams permitted the Petitioners, at the Final Hearing, to introduce additional evidence of direct services provided in those fiscal agent areas in which their applications had been denied by the Committee. The issue of direct services was considered de novo before the Division. The judge considered not only the direct local services certification form, but also supporting evidence of direct services introduced by the Petitioners at the Final Hearing. On considering that evidence, the Administrative Law Judge found that three additional member charities, not previously approved by the Committee, had provided direct services, which entitled them to receive undesignated funds. The Final Order entered by the Respondent Agency adopted the Administrative Law Judge's ruling. No exceptions were filed to that Recommended Order, thus the Agency waived its appellate rights with respect to any issue it might have raised, and the Charities prevailed as to the relief they sought in the Amended Petition. In their affidavits filed with the Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs on July 22, 2008, the attorneys Byrne and Hawkins, for the above-named Petitioners, stated that they were "retained" by those Petitioners, meaning all the above- named charities and also the Petitioner CHC. In the affidavits they stated that those Petitioners "incurred" the attorney's fees and costs to which the affidavits relate. As stated above, the attorney's fee Motion was filed and joined-in by all the above-named charities and CHC. The Petitioners in the underlying case, which was appealed to the First District Court of Appeal, were all the above-named charities and CHC. Nonetheless, the Petitioner CHC took the position at the hearing in this proceeding that an agreement or understanding existed with the affiliate charities, whereby CHC would bear the attorney's fees and costs on behalf of all the affiliate charities. CHC has an agreement concerning how revenue it receives is shared with its national office and member charities. CHC pays its national office a percentage of revenue. It sends money to the national office and the national office also sends an allocation of funds to CHC. CHC is a member of the Arlington, Virginia-based Community Health Charities of America. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 2006, CHC withheld 25 percent of charitable donations from Florida employees to its affiliated charities as its fee. This is the maximum amount authorized by Florida law in order for it to participate in the FSECC. § 110.181(1)(h)1., Fla. Stat. (2006). In the 2006 campaign at issue, CHC did not file an application in its own name to the Steering Committee for receipt of undesignated funds. As Ms. Cooper testified "we did not apply." CHC received no allocation or award of undesignated funds either in the initial Steering Committee consideration process or as a result of the underlying proceeding through the Agency's Final Order. All the undesignated fund distributions were made to the charities themselves, who were the entities who filed applications to the Steering Committee seeking receipt of undesignated funds. The Steering Committee, which made the initial decisions about distribution of undesignated funds is composed of appointed volunteers. The members of the committee are not compensated and do not have support staff to assist them in their fact-finding review of applications concerning receipt of undesignated funds. The committee members personally review all applications. Review of the applications takes many hours by each member of the committee, much more time than is spent in actual committee meetings. The combined net worth and number of employees of some or all of the Charities, was not established. It was not established that the net worth of one or more of the charities filing this Motion for Attorney's Fees and participating as Petitioners in the underlying case, is less than two million dollars, nor that one or more of them have less than 25 employees. The legislature appropriated $17,000.00 dollars to DMS to administer the FSECC for 2006. Substantially more than that appropriated sum has been expended by DMS to administer the campaign. DMS has no insurance coverage which would pay attorney's fees and costs if they were awarded. DMS is also subject to at least a four percent budget "hold back" for the current fiscal year and is contemplating laying off employees in January 2009, due to budget reductions. If DMS is ordered to pay attorney's fees and costs to CHC, DMS will bill the fiscal agent, United Way, for payment of those amounts from the FSECC charitable contributions. Contrary to the situation with the Petitioner Charities, who made the original filing of the Amended Petition in the underlying case and were named as parties in the filing of the Motion for Attorney's Fees at issue in this case, CHC did offer evidence that its net worth was less than two million dollars and that it had less than 25 employees. Thus, it established this threshold for being considered a small business party. It is also true, however, that the Recommended Order from the Administrative Law Judge and the Final Order from the Agency in the underlying proceeding specifically make no mention of CHC as a prevailing party and award nothing of benefit to CHC, as opposed to the other actual charities, who filed the subject applications.
The Issue The issue presented for decision in this case is whether the Holiday Rotary Endowment Fund, Inc. (“Holiday Endowment”) is eligible for a consumer certificate of exemption as a charitable institution pursuant to Section 212.08(7)(o), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner, the Holiday Endowment, is an organization incorporated in the State of Florida as a not-for-profit corporation under Chapter 617, Florida Statutes. It was formed in October 1996 by the Holiday Rotary Club of Holiday, Florida, as a vehicle for accruing funds to contribute to the various charities supported by the Holiday Rotary Club. The Holiday Endowment is exempt from federal income tax under Section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code as an organization described in Section 501(c)(3), having obtained an exemption letter from the Internal Revenue Service on May 30, 1997. Larry Schalles, Treasurer of the Holiday Endowment, testified that annual fundraising achieves variable results, and that the membership of the Holiday Rotary Club seeks to attain stability in its philanthropic endeavors by placing a portion of its funds into the Holiday Endowment each year. Once the endowment is built up, the interest can be used to pay for scholarships each year, leaving the principal intact. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the sole active function of the Holiday Endowment has been to raise moneys to establish the endowment fund. All moneys raised by the Holiday Endowment are invested in the fund to provide scholarships in the future. All of the Holiday Endowment’s fund raising activities are conducted by unpaid volunteers. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the Holiday Endowment has made no expenditures of any kind. The Department denied the Holiday Endowment’s application for a certificate of exemption on the ground that the Holiday Endowment did not qualify as a charitable institution under the seven criteria set forth in Section 212.08(7)(o)2.b., Florida Statutes. In particular, the Department found that the Holiday Endowment does not expend in excess of 50% of its operational expenditures toward qualified charitable services, meaning that the provision of a charitable service is not the organization’s sole or primary function. As set forth above, the Holiday Endowment has in fact made no expenditures of any kind. The Department also found that the Holiday Endowment does not provide a reasonable percentage of services free of charge or at a substantially reduced cost to persons unable to pay for such service. The Holiday Endowment’s response is that the exemption should nonetheless be granted, because any expenditures it makes in the future will be for charitable purposes.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying the certificate of exemption sought by the Holiday Rotary Endowment Fund, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry C. Schalles, C.P.A. Treasurer, Holiday Rotary Endowment Fund, Inc. 5728 Main Street New Port Richey, Florida 34652 William B. Nickell Assistant General Counsel Department of Revenue 501 South Calhoun Street, Suite 304 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
