The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioners have been subjected to discrimination as envisioned by the "Fair Housing Act" Section 760.37, Florida Statutes (2007), concerning the terms, conditions, privileges, or services and facilities, regarding their rental housing and based upon their alleged disabilities.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners (the Tuccis) have been long-time tenants of Mrs. Ngyuen's. They moved into apartment number eight in the apartment complex known as Silver Springs Place Apartments in May 2002. They have resided there ever since. When the Petitioners first heard about their apartment being available in 2002 they had a conversation with the Respondents and she invited them to go look over the apartment to determine if they wished to move in. Before the Respondents were aware of it, the Tuccis had moved into the apartment. They apparently never actually filed an application for rental with the Respondents. After she learned that they had unilaterally moved into the apartment, she met with the Petitioners and the Petitioners signed a lease. They have lived in apartment number eight ever since. The Respondent and her husband own the apartment complex in question in Ocala, Florida. The property is located at 1315 Southeast Silver Springs Place in Ocala, Florida. The Petitioners contend that they are disabled with various mental and physical disabilities. Mr. Tucci has chronic low back pain and degenerative arthritis of the knees. Mrs. Tucci has sclerosis with chronic back pain. Mrs. Tucci is receiving Social Security Disability benefits. The Petitioners maintain that the Respondents knew of their disabilities because the Ocala Housing Authority informed the Respondents of their disabilities at the time or after the time they rented they originally rented the apartment. They contend that they indicated their disabilities and the fact that Mrs. Tucci was receiving Social Security Disability benefits, on their rental application. Neither the Petitioners nor the Respondents provided any evidence of such a rental application. There is no persuasive evidence that the Ocala Housing Authority ever informed the Respondents, concerning any disabilities of the Petitioners. The Petitioners maintain that they requested a reasonable accommodation for their disabilities from the Respondents, consisting of the opportunity to move to a downstairs apartment in order to enable them to avoid the physical rigors of climbing stairs and to better enjoy their apartment premises. They maintain that the Respondents denied their request. The Petitioners also maintain that they requested that numerous repairs be made by the Respondents since June of 2005, such as repairs to the refrigerator, the stove, and the cabinets. They contend that the Respondents refused to make those repairs. Additionally, they Petitioners contend that the Respondents harassed, intimidated, and threatened them by attempting to terminate their tenancy if they did not pay a noticed rent increase. They maintain that the Respondents coerced them by not renewing their lease after they requested a downstairs apartment. Mrs. Nguyen contends that the Respondents had no knowledge that the Tuccis were handicapped. They have been long-time tenants of the Respondents. It was only upon her advising Mr. Tucci that she was going to have to raise the rent by $25.00 per month, to cover the increased expenses of insurance and tax increases, that the Petitioners lodged an allegation of discrimination against the Respondents. There is no question that the Petitioners are disabled and that is undisputed. The Respondents knowledge of that disability, whether or not they received a request for a reasonable accommodation of it and whether they acted to accommodate the disability in a reasonable fashion is in dispute. On several occasions Mrs. Ngyuen has observed Mr. Tucci walk up and down the stairs carrying groceries and washing and waxing his car. She has observed Mrs. Tucci on numerous occasions walk up and down the stairs carrying groceries from the store, walk to the store, or hang clothes on a clothes line. She observed that the Petitioners seem to be able to perform these tasks without any difficulty and to give no indication that they suffered from a disability or a handicap. Mr. Tucci, on a number of occasions requested to move to a downstairs apartment. The first time was approximately two years or more ago when a downstairs apartment became available. Mrs. Ngyuen told the Tuccis they could have the apartment, but that they would need to move within two days in order to give her adequate time to prepare the Tuccis apartment for re-rental. The Tuccis stated to her that they could not move that quickly and so the move never occurred. Mrs. Ngyuen rented the apartment to another tenant. Vacancies do not occur frequently in this apartment complex and when a vacancy occurs the apartment is typically rented within one week. If the Respondents left the downstairs apartment un-rented for the two weeks the Tuccis requested, as necessary time to allow them to arrange a move to the downstairs apartment, such would cause the Respondents to keep the apartment vacant for an inordinate period of time and to suffer significant financial loss. The second request by the Tuccis to move to another downstairs apartment came approximately six months after the first request. In this instance the Petitioners wanted to move from their one bedroom apartment into a two-bedroom apartment, which was a downstairs apartment. Mr. Ngyuen advised them that they could have that apartment, but the rent would be more than for the one bedroom apartment they were currently living in. Mr. Tucci offered to pay the same one bedroom rent and then to, in effect, pay in-kind for the extra amount of rental for the two bedroom apartment by keeping a watch on the Respondents property at the apartment complex, in lieu of paying the extra rental price. Mrs. Ngyuen rejected that offer and Mr. Tucci did not agree to move into the apartment. It was rented to another tenant. On two other occasions in October of 2004 and October 2005 downstairs apartments became available for rental, but the Petitioners never requested to move on those two occasions. The Petitioners never communicated to the Respondents that they were actually handicapped or disabled nor did they actually request a reasonable accommodation for their disabilities, in terms of requesting a downstairs apartment (or otherwise). The persuasive, preponderant evidence reveals that the Respondents did not harass, intimidate, or threaten the Petitioners with terminating their tenancy. Mrs. Ngyuen did call the Petitioners in April of 2006 to ask them if they intended to renew their lease. Their lease was due to expire on May 31, 2006. Mrs. Ngyuen informed them at this time that their rent would have to increase from $350.00 per month to $375.00 per month due to increases in property insurance premiums and property taxes and other costs. Mr. Tucci apparently became angry at this prospect and at about this time Mrs. Ngyuen informed him that if he did not pay the increase in rent she would be forced to lease the property to someone else. She then sent the Petitioners a 30-day notice of expiration of their lease. Thereafter, however, the Petitioners continued to live in the same apartment and entered into an agreement with the Respondents for a month-to-month tenancy. The Petitioners have also alleged that the Respondents failed to provide them with the same terms and conditions of tenancy in terms of making requested repairs to items in their apartment. Specifically, they requested repairs to their refrigerator, the stove, and the cabinets. The Petitioners apparently attribute this alleged failure to provide the same terms and conditions of tenancy as other tenants to be due to their disabilities. In fact, the Respondents received two requests for repairs from the Petitioners since they have resided in the apartment. The first one was a requested repair to the refrigerator and stove. The repairs were completed within a matter of one or two days. The second request was on June 5, 2006, in which the Petitioners stated that their toilet was leaking. In fact, Mr. Tucci fixed it himself. The Respondents did go to inspect the Petitioners unit on June 6, 2006, to see if any further repairs needed to be made. Mr. Tucci informed the Respondents of his refrigerator leaking at that time and they replaced it. The Petitioners, in fact, acknowledged that the requested repairs had been made. Witness George Henry Bennett had been a tenant of the Respondents for approximately 13 years. He is a disabled person and receives Social Security, 100 percent disability benefits and has since 1994. He has never observed or experienced any instances of discrimination against disabled persons, including himself, by the Respondents. He is unaware of any complaints by tenants concerning the way the Respondents operate and maintain the apartment complex. In his experience, repairs are always made by the Respondents in a timely manner. He has heard the Petitioner Angelo Tucci state that he was going to "get" the Ngyuens. In summary, in consideration of the totality of the testimony it is apparent that a rather rancorous relationship on the part of Petitioner Angelo Tucci towards the Respondents has developed over time. In view of the testimony, and upon observation of the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is evident that this relationship has biased the testimony of the Petitioners somewhat, particularly that of Angelo Tucci. In light of this circumstance, it is determined that the testimony of witness Ngyuen, for the Respondents, and that of George Bennett is more credible and persuasive than that of the Petitioners. It was thus established that, although it is undisputed that the Petitioners are disabled, that there is no credible, persuasive evidence that the Respondents have been motivated to, nor have acted in a manner discriminatory toward the Petitioners on account of their disabilities. It is determined that the Petitioners have not requested a downstairs apartment as a request for a reasonable accommodation for their disabilities. It has not been demonstrated by credible, persuasive evidence that the Respondents were aware of their disabilities. It is further determined that the Respondents' decision not to keep the subject downstairs apartment or apartments vacant for the period of time the Petitioners deemed required for them to effect a move was a reasonable business decision. It was made by the Respondents to avoid an undue financial impact on their operation which would be caused by leaving an apartment vacant for a two week period of time while waiting for the Petitioners to move and with the resultant delay in refurbishing and preparing their vacated apartment for new tenants. This decision by the Respondents was not shown to be related in any way to any discriminatory animus toward the Petitioners because of their disabilities. It is determined that the Petitioners never provided the Respondents any rental application which depicted the fact and circumstance of their disabilities to the Respondents.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and the arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of February, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Angelo and Melissa Tucci 1315 Southeast Silver Spings Place Number 8 Ocala, Florida 34471 David Porter, Esquire 351 Northeast 8th Avenue Ocala, Florida 34470
The Issue Did Respondent, Winter Haven Housing Authority (Authority), discriminate against Petitioner, Donald Bayer, in the sale or rental of housing on account of a disability?
Findings Of Fact Mr. Bayer is visually impaired. At all material times he was a resident of Lakeside Terrace Senior Apartment Homes (Lakeside) in Winter Haven, Florida, operated by the Authority. On March 3, 2017, while in Lakeside’s management office to pay his rent, Mr. Bayer asked the property manager, Bersy Sanchez, to help him complete an application for a section 8 housing subsidy. Because it was early in the month, Ms. Sanchez was very busy collecting rents for Lakeside’s 84 units. She was the only employee in the office. Ms. Sanchez and Mr. Bayer disagree about the exact content of their conversation. Considering the witnesses’ demeanor and the areas about which there is no disagreement, Ms. Sanchez’ testimony was more credible and persuasive. In addition, they agree that Ms. Sanchez told Mr. Bayer she was too busy to assist him that day but would assist him if he returned to the office the following day. (Tr 61 & 62). According to Mr. Bayer, Ms. Sanchez said, “Will you come back tomorrow?” (Tr 19). Mr. Bayer did not return to the office to complete the application the next day or any day afterwards. He explained his decision like this: “I – if I would have went back the next day I would have given away my complaint that she had violated my rights because maybe she would have helped me fill out the application. I’m not giving away a free violation of my rights, and that’s why I did not go back.” (Tr 61). By any measure, Ms. Sanchez’ offer to assist Mr. Bayer the next day was a reasonable accommodation for his visual disability. Mr. Bayer’s explanation for refusing to return the next day demonstrates intent to secure an advantage over the Authority.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition for Relief of Petitioner, Donald Bayer. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of May, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of May, 2019.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her national origin or ethnicity in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Fabiola Heiblum ("Heiblum") is a Hispanic woman who, at all times relevant to this action, has owned Unit No. 5C in the Carlton Bay Condominium, which is located in North Miami Beach, Florida. She purchased her unit in 2004 and has resided there continuously since some time in 2005. Respondent Carlton Bay Condominium Association, Inc. ("Association") is the entity responsible for operating and managing the condominium property in which Heiblum's unit is located. In March 2008, the Association's Board of Directors ("Board") approved a special assessment, to be levied against all unit owners, the proceeds of which would be used to pay insurance premiums. Each owner was required to pay his share of the special assessment in full on April 1, 2008, or, alternatively, in three equal monthly installments, due on the first of April, May, and June 2008, respectively. Heiblum's share of this special assessment was $912.81. At or around the same time, the Board also enacted a procedure for collecting assessments, including the special insurance assessment. According to this procedure, owners would have a grace period of 15 days within which to make a required payment. After that period, a delinquent owner would be notified, in writing, that the failure to pay his balance due within 15 days after the date of the notice would result in referral of the matter to an attorney for collection. The attorney, in that event, would file a Claim of Lien and send a demand letter threatening to initiate a foreclosure proceeding if the outstanding balance (together with costs and attorney's fees) was not paid within 30 days after receipt of the demand. This collection procedure applied to all unit owners. Heiblum did not make any payment toward the special assessment on April 1, 2008. She made no payment on May 1, 2008, either. (Heiblum concedes her obligation to pay the special assessment and does not contend that the Association failed to give proper notice regarding her default.) The Association accordingly asked its attorney to file a Claim of Lien against Unit No. 5C and take the legal steps necessary to collect the unpaid debt. By letter dated May 8, 2008, the Association's attorney notified Heiblum that a Claim of Lien against her property had been recorded in the public records; further, demand was made that she pay $1402.81 (the original debt of $912.81 plus costs and attorney's fees) to avoid foreclosure. On or around May 10, 2008, Heiblum gave the Association a check in the amount of $500, which the Association returned, under cover of a letter dated May 16, 2008, because its attorney was now in charge of collecting the overdue debt. Heiblum eventually paid the special assessment in full, together with costs and attorney's fees, thereby obviating the need for a foreclosure suit. Heiblum believes that the Association prosecuted its claims for unpaid special assessments more aggressively against Hispanics such as herself than persons of other national origins or ethnicities, for which owners the Association allegedly showed greater forbearance. Specifically, she believes that the Association did not retain its attorney to undertake collection efforts against non-Hispanic unit owners, sparing them the costs and fees that she was compelled to pay. There is, however, no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that the Association did not commit any prohibited discriminatory act vis-à-vis Heiblum.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding the Association not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Heiblum no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2009.
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioners by evicting them from their apartment as alleged in the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioners.
Findings Of Fact At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Elizabeth Anne Skelton was the owner of a group of apartments in West Palm Beach, Florida, known as Bermuda Village In March and April 1994, Geoffrey K. Adams was a tenant of Bermuda Village on a month-to-month basis. The rent for one person living alone in one of the Bermuda Village apartments was $475.00 per month, while the rent for two people was $500.00 per month. These rents were consistently applied. Mr. Adams testified at the formal hearing that he was aware of the different rates, depending on whether there was one or two people living in the apartment.1 In March 1994, Mr. Adams planted a banana tree in the vicinity of the front door of his apartment. Because there was insufficient space for the banana tree, Ms. Skelton told Mr. Adams to remove it, which she had the right to do. Instead of removing the banana tree, Mr. Adams camouflaged the growing tree to make it appear to be a potted plant. When Ms. Skelton instructed her handyman to move what was thought to be a potted plant, it was discovered that the tree was still growing in the ground. Ms. Skelton then had the banana tree uprooted. Mr. Adams got into a verbal confrontation with Ms. Skelton over this matter and loudly cursed her in profane terms. He later made threatening statements and gestures to her. Ms. Skelton consulted her lawyers, who began the process to evict Mr. Adams. During this same period of time, Lillamae Adams (known then as Lillamae Jordan) moved in with Mr. Adams. Mrs. Adams is black. Mr. Adams and Ms. Skelton are white. When Mr. Adams informed the management of Bermuda Village that Mrs. Adams would be moving in to his apartment, he was informed that his rent would be increased by $25.00 per month. This increase was unrelated to the race of Mrs. Adams. In early April, 1994, approximately two weeks after Mrs. Adams moved in with Mr. Adams, Mr. Adams was served with eviction papers. Petitioners were subsequently evicted from their apartment. The eviction of Petitioners was based on the behavior of Mr. Adams. The eviction was not based on the race of Mrs. Adams.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition For Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of December, 1997
The Issue Whether Respondents, Charleston Cay, Ltd., et al. (Charleston Cay), violated the Florida Fair Housing Act, as amended, sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2010).1/
Findings Of Fact Ms. Cardwell is an African-American woman who rented an apartment from Charleston Cay. Ms. Cardwell and Charleston Cay entered into a written lease beginning on December 23, 2009, and ending on November 30, 2010. The lease required Ms. Cardwell to pay her rent on the first of each month and that the rent would be delinquent by the third of each month. Furthermore, the lease provided that non-payment of rent shall result in a breach of the lease and eviction. The initial monthly rent for Ms. Cardwell's apartment was $663.00, a month and was subsequently increased to $669.00, a month. Ms. Cardwell credibly testified that she had not read the lease or the Housing Addendum which she signed when entering into the lease and that she had not subsequently read either document. On November 1, 2010, Ms. Cardwell failed to pay her rent. On November 4, 2010, Ms. Jaster, manager of Charleston Cay apartments, posted a three-day notice to pay rent or vacate the premises. On November 9, 2010, Ms. Jaster posted another notice for Ms. Cardwell about non-payment and requesting that Ms. Cardwell call or come to the office. Ms. Cardwell paid $100.00, of the rent on November 17, 2010. Again, Ms. Jaster posted a three-day notice seeking payment of the remaining November 2010, rent in the amount of $569.00. On November 24, 2010, Ms. Cardwell paid an additional $200.00, of the $569.00, owed, leaving a balance of $369.00 for November 2010. Because Ms. Cardwell's written lease was to expire at the end of November, she requested that Charleston Cay enter into a month- to-month lease, but Ms. Jaster informed Ms. Cardwell that Charleston Cay was not interested in entering into a month-to- month tenancy. On December 1, 2010, Ms. Jaster posted another three- day notice requiring Ms. Cardwell to pay the $369.00, owed in November, or to vacate the premises. The facts also showed that Ms. Cardwell did not pay the $669.00, owed by December 1, 2010, or anytime thereafter. On December 8, 2010, Charleston Cay filed an eviction and damages complaint against Ms. Cardwell based on non-payment of the rent. Some time in December 2010, Ms. Cardwell contacted Ms. Tina Figliulo of the Charlotte County Homeless Coalition, seeking financial assistance to avoid being evicted. Ms. Figliulo credibly testified that the Charlotte County Homeless Coalition administers grant money to help prevent a person from being evicted and helps individuals find affordable housing. A provision of the grant, however, prevents the Charlotte County Homeless Coalition from paying money into a court registry if an eviction process has begun. Ms. Figliulo credibly testified that she contacted Ms. Jaster about making a payment on Ms. Cardwell's behalf. Ms. Jaster informed Ms. Figliulo that Charleston Cay had already begun eviction proceedings. Consequently, Ms. Figliulo was unable to use grant money to pay for Ms. Cardwell's back rent. Based on the eviction proceedings, Ms. Cardwell vacated the premises sometime in December 2010, and turned in her key for the apartment. The initial hearing on the eviction was set for January 5, 2011. On December 28, 2010, the hearing was cancelled based on Ms. Cardwell's vacating the premises. On January 13, 2011, Ms. Cardwell filed a Motion to Dismiss the case in county court indicating that she had given up possession of the premises. On January 31, 2011, the Charlotte County Court issued an Order dismissing the case effective March 1, 2011, unless Charleston Cay set a hearing on damages. The record credibly showed through the exhibits and Ms. Jaster's testimony that Ms. Cardwell was evicted from her apartment based on her non-payment of rent. There was no evidence that other individuals, who were not in Ms. Cardwell's protected class, were treated more favorably or differently, than she was in the proceedings. There was no evidence, either direct or indirect, supporting Ms. Cardwell's claim of racial discrimination. Ms. Cardwell testified that she felt that Ms. Jaster had acted based on race, because of Ms. Jaster's perceived attitude. Ms. Cardwell did not bring forward any evidence showing a specific example of any comment or action that was discriminatory. Ms. Jaster credibly testified that she did not base the eviction process on race, but only on non-payment. Ms. Cardwell specifically stated during the hearing that she was not addressing the retaliation claim or seeking to present evidence in support of the FCHR determination concerning the retaliation claim. Consequently, the undersigned does not make any finding concerning that issue. There was testimony concerning whether or not Ms. Cardwell had properly provided employment information required by the written lease in relation to a tax credit. The facts showed that Charleston Cay apartments participated in a Low Income Tax Credit Housing Program under section 42, of the Internal Revenue Code. On entering the lease, Ms. Cardwell had signed a Housing Credit Lease Addendum which acknowledged her participation in the tax credit, and agreement to furnish information concerning her income and eligibility for compliance with the tax credit. Failure to provide information for the tax credit would result in a breach of the rental agreement. As early of August 2011, Ms. Jaster, manager for Charleston Cay Apartments, contacted Ms. Cardwell about providing information concerning her income and continued eligibility for the program. Ms. Cardwell provided information that was incomplete as to her income, because it failed to demonstrate commissions that she earned. Again, in November 2010, Ms. Jaster contacted Ms. Cardwell about providing information to recertification for the tax credit. Finally, on November 11, 2010, Ms. Jaster left a seven-day notice of non-compliance, with an opportunity to cure, seeking Ms. Cardwell to provide information concerning her income. Ms. Cardwell provided information concerning her salary, but did not have information concerning commissions that she earned from sales. This information was deemed by Ms. Jaster to be incomplete and not in compliance for the low income housing tax credit. The record shows, however, that Ms. Cardwell's failure to provide the required income information was not a basis for her eviction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order of dismissal of the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 2011.
The Issue The issue is whether the Petition for Relief was timely filed.
Findings Of Fact In January 2008, Petitioner filed a “Housing Discrimination Complaint” with FCHR and/or the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The complaint alleged that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based upon her race (black) and religion (Christian) in its servicing of her home mortgage loan. On or about March 27, 2008, a “Determination” was issued finding no reasonable cause to believe that Respondent committed a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner. On April 18, 2008, FCHR sent a “Notice of Determination of No Cause” to Petitioner by certified mail No. 7007 1490 0002 5958 0931. Petitioner received the Notice on April 22, 2008, according to the certified mail receipt included in the case file. The Notice advised Petitioner that “FCHR has determined reasonable cause does not exist to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred.” The Notice further advised Petitioner that she could request an administrative hearing, and clearly stated that any such request “must be filed with the FCHR within 30 days of the date of mailing of this Notice.” A “Petition for Relief, in blank” was sent to Petitioner along with the Notice. On May 23, 2008, FCHR received a completed “Petition for Relief” form from Petitioner. The form was signed by Petitioner and dated May 20, 2008. Petitioner stated in her response to the Order to Show Cause that she “never received any paperwork on the above case” and that “the only paperwork that [she] received was on or a about June 9, 2008.”
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FCHR issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of June, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 2008.
The Issue The purpose of the hearing in this case was to provide Petitioner an opportunity to present evidence as to the relief to which she is entitled in a housing discrimination case.2
Findings Of Fact As a result of the admitted facts alleged in the Petition for Relief, Petitioner has suffered both tangible and intangible harm. As a result of the admitted facts, when Petitioner and her family were evicted from the apartment they had been subletting, they were locked out of the apartment and were unable to retrieve most of the personal property that was in the apartment. The reasonable value of the personal property that was lost as a result of the acts alleged in the Petition for Relief is $5,281.00.6 Petitioner also suffered intangible harm as a result of the admitted facts. The most serious aspects of the intangible harm were humiliation and loss of personal pride and self-esteem as a result of, in her words, “being treated like a dog.” Petitioner also suffered a substantial amount of personal inconvenience and indignity, because for a period of time after the eviction from the apartment she was truly homeless and was forced to live in her automobile. The harm to Petitioner described in this paragraph cannot be quantified. There is no evidence in this case that Petitioner incurred any attorney’s fees or costs. Alina Portuono is no longer employed at the apartment complex where the events giving rise to this proceeding occurred. Whoever owned the apartment complex at the time of the events giving rise to this proceeding is no longer the owner. The subject apartment complex no longer rents apartments as all the units are now condominiums.
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR issue a final order awarding quantified damages in the amount of $5,281.00 to Petitioner, if the FCHR believes it has provided adequate notice to Respondent(s) in this case and has jurisdiction arising from such notice.8 DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 2004.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents violated section 70-176, Pinellas County Code of Ordinances (Code), as alleged in Petitioner's Housing Discrimination Complaint (Complaint).
Findings Of Fact This case concerns an allegation that Petitioner, an African-American female, was the victim of housing discrimination in two respects. First, after complaining that her bathroom was not timely repaired by her landlord, Petitioner reported the problem to the City of St. Petersburg (City). When the manager came to repair the bathroom, Petitioner alleges he told her he "would throw her black ass out of here for calling the city on them." Second, Petitioner alleges she was told by the manager to move her car that was parked "for a few days" on the property, yet white tenants were allowed to keep a truck with "no tags and flat tires" on the premises for more than a year. Because no evidence was presented on the second issue, only the first allegation will be addressed. By way of background, from August 2012 until she was evicted in October 2015, Petitioner resided in an apartment complex at 3865 9th Avenue North, St. Petersburg, Florida. The complex is owned by Holly Berry Gifts, Inc., whose president is Holly Bonk. The complex is managed by Mike Prusinski. Bonk and Prusinski are employed full-time in other jobs, but devote attention to apartment matters when required. Bonk has a practice of leasing units to whoever is qualified, regardless of their race. She was drawn into this affair because of the alleged comments of her manager. It is fair to assume that Bonk has delegated responsibility to Prusinski to deal with maintenance issues and to evict tenants. Pursuant to a one-year Residential Lease executed by Petitioner in July 2012, she was required to pay $500.00 rent each month, due no later than the fifth day of the month. If rent was paid after the fifth day, a $60.00 late charge was imposed. After the lease expired on July 31, 2013, Petitioner continued renting her apartment on a month-to-month basis, but all terms and conditions in the original lease still applied, including the same monthly rent and late payment provisions. Prior to 2015, Petitioner was periodically late in paying her rent. For the months of February, March, July, and August 2015, she was either late paying her rent, or she did not pay the full amount. No rent was paid for September 2015. Despite Petitioner being in arrears throughout her tenancy, Prusinski "worked with" her because of her financial constraints, and according to Petitioner, he never demanded she pay the late charge. On June 2, 2015, Petitioner sent a text message to Bonk complaining that her upstairs neighbor (a female) was playing loud music and was noisy, which interfered with Petitioner's enjoyment of her apartment. When the neighbor came to Petitioner's apartment to discuss the complaint, Petitioner opened the door and "maced" the neighbor in the face. The neighbor filed a complaint with the police. Petitioner was arrested and charged with battery. In 2016, a jury convicted her of battery, and she was sentenced to 15 days in jail and placed on probation for 11 months. According to Prusinski, the macing incident was the final straw that led him to begin the eviction process. Besides the macing incident, Prusinski explained that Petitioner "harassed" the air-conditioning crew that serviced the complex to the point they refused to provide further service unless they received a $45.00 surcharge for each visit. He described Petitioner as being "hostile" towards him throughout her tenancy, and he noted it reached the point where she would not answer the door half of the time when he knocked. On August 14, 2015, a Fifteen Day Notice to Vacate the premises was personally served on Petitioner informing her that she must vacate the premises by August 31, 2015. An Eviction Notice was then obtained from the court. Before it was served on Petitioner, she changed the door locks, padlocked the circuit breaker box to her apartment, and moved out without notice to Respondents. Each of these actions violated the terms of her lease. Petitioner says she did this because she was "scared" that "Mike was coming over to throw her out," and a friend told her it was okay to change the locks. Prusinski was forced to call a locksmith to access the empty apartment and use bolt cutters on the padlock to restore electricity. In all, Petitioner still owes $1,933.00 for past due rent, late charges, court costs, locksmith charges, and the cost of a bolt cutter. There is no evidence that the eviction process was motivated by racial bias. The record shows that Prusinski has evicted four black tenants and eight white tenants for failing to pay their rent. Although Petitioner was upset that she had to relocate to new housing, she agrees there was justification for her eviction. A month after her eviction, Petitioner filed her Complaint. Petitioner says the Complaint was filed only to address issues other than her eviction. Against this backdrop, the only allegation that requires resolution is an assertion by Petitioner that Prusinski directed a racial slur towards her when he was repairing her bathroom.2/ Due to a leak in the upstairs bathroom, Petitioner's bathroom developed multiple problems, which required repairs to the walls and ceiling and professional mold remediation. Although these problems were eventually resolved, they were not resolved as quickly as Petitioner desired. Therefore, she reported the problem to the City. The City inspected her unit in early April 2015, determined that repairs were needed, and relayed its findings to Prusinski. After receiving the City's report, Prusinski came to the apartment to repair the bathroom. Petitioner says an argument over the repairs ensued, and he told her he would "throw her black ass out of here for calling the city on them." Except for Petitioner's testimony, there is no other credible evidence to corroborate this statement. Notably, even though the incident occurred in early April 2015, Petitioner never reported it to Bonk (Prusinski's boss), she did not mention the incident at the eviction hearing, and she waited until after she was evicted to raise the issue with the County. Prusinski denies making any racial comments to Petitioner and attributes her allegation to the hostile relationship between the two and her eviction in September 2015. Having considered the record as a whole, Prusinski's testimony is accepted as being the most credible on this issue. Ironically, Petitioner sometimes used the term "black ass" when referring to herself in text messages sent to Bonk, and during the hearing, she sometimes referred to herself as a "black ass."
