The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should revoke Respondents' foster home license based on violations of section 409.175(9), Florida Statutes (2014), and provisions of Florida Administrative Code Chapter 65C-13 alleged in the Notice of Intent to Revoke Foster Home License dated April 16, 2015.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for licensing foster care parents and foster homes pursuant to section 409.175.2/ Respondents are foster care parents in a foster care home licensed as Provider FSFN ID #100032652, the therapeutic foster home at issue in this proceeding.3/ A.A., an eight-year-old child, was placed into Respondent's foster home in April 2014.4/ On the afternoon of September 4, 2014, Respondent Cherie Iturriaga took A.A. and her two grandchildren to a shopping center. When they were ready to leave, A.A. refused to get into the family van. Mrs. Iturriaga testified that she tried, for approximately ten to 15 minutes, to persuade A.A. to get into the vehicle, but he refused. She became very frustrated, yelled at A.A. to get into the van, and began to back the van out of the parking space while A.A. was standing next to the van's open door.5/ A passerby called 911 to report that Mrs. Iturriaga—— who the passerby characterized as A.A.'s "grandmother"——was attempting to make A.A. get into the vehicle against his will. The passerby told A.A. "you don't have to get in the van if you don't want to." Mrs. Iturriaga also called 911 to report that A.A. would not get into her vehicle. She told the 911 dispatcher that she was not staying for him, and that she was "going home." The dispatcher told her that because the child was supposed to be in her care, she had to stay with him, and that officers already were on the way to that location. Nonetheless, Mrs. Iturriaga drove away and left A.A. in the parking lot with the passerby, who Mrs. Iturriaga characterized, in testimony at the hearing, as a "random person." The evidence does not clearly establish whether Mrs. Iturriaga left A.A. in the parking lot for "five to ten minutes," as she claimed, or for as much as 20 to 30 minutes, as indicated by other evidence in the record. Regardless, it is undisputed that she drove away from the parking lot and left A.A. in the company of a stranger. At some point, Mrs. Iturriaga returned to the parking lot to pick up A.A., but he was not there. She called 911, and the dispatcher confirmed that A.A. had been taken to the Pembroke Pines Police Department. Mrs. Iturriaga went to the police department to pick up A.A. There, she was arrested and charged with child neglect without great bodily harm, a third-degree felony; this charge ultimately was dropped. A.A. was not physically harmed as a result of being left in the parking lot. The evidence establishes that approximately 45 days before the September 4, 2014, incident, Mrs. Iturriaga requested that Citrus remove A.A. from Respondents' foster home within 30 days; however, he was not timely removed. When the incident giving rise to this proceeding occurred, A.A. was immediately removed from Respondents' foster home. Another child, J.O., who was approximately 14 years old at the time of the incident, was placed in Respondents' foster home approximately two and one-half years before the incident. Since then, J.O. has formed very close bonds with both Respondents, particularly Mr. Iturriaga. At the time of the hearing, J.O. had not been removed from Respondents' home and continued to reside with them. J.O. does not wish to be removed from Respondents' home. Eric Sami serves as the guardian ad litem for J.O., and has done so for the past three and one-half years. Mr. Sami testified, persuasively, that when he was assigned to J.O.'s case, J.O. was a very withdrawn, depressed, socially unstable child who had been moved through several different foster homes, and who was academically struggling. Since being placed in Respondents' home, J.O. has flourished. He has made friends, his academic performance has dramatically improved, and he is no longer depressed and socially unstable. According to Mr. Sami, Respondents have treated J.O. as if he were their own child, including taking him on family vacations and involving him in all holiday celebrations. Mr. Iturriaga participates in parent- teacher conferences for J.O. and has taken an interest in J.O.'s school work and in helping him improve his academic performance. Sami also testified, credibly, that in the short amount of time in which A.A. lived in Respondents' home, he was an extremely disruptive force, bullying J.O. and Respondents' grandchildren and killing ducks in front of Respondents' granddaughter——an event that was extremely traumatic for her to witness. Sami observed, and the undersigned agrees, that it is fundamentally unfair for J.O. to suffer the consequences of Respondents' license revocation due to an event that was precipitated by A.A.'s extreme, ongoing misbehavior before he was removed from the home. Because Sami and J.O.'s therapist, Fred Leon, believed so strongly that removing J.O. from Respondents' home would have very substantial negative consequences for J.O., they advocated to Petitioner and Citrus to allow Respondents to keep their foster home license and to keep J.O. in their home. However, that did not dissuade Citrus from recommending that Petitioner revoke Respondents' license. In October 2014, J.O.'s placement was changed from foster care in Respondents' home to non-relative placement in Respondents' home. Because revocation of Respondents' license would require J.O. to be removed from Respondents' foster home, this placement change was necessary in order for J.O. to remain in the home. However, this placement change is not without negative consequences. J.O. remains in Respondents' home but they do not receive any monetary allowance for his care,6/ so they are placed in the position of supporting him without receiving any financial assistance through the foster care system. Thus, the consequence of revoking Respondents' license is that if J.O. remained in the foster care system, he would have to be moved to a licensed foster home. If he were to stay in Respondents' home in a non-relative placement, Respondents would not receive any monetary assistance through the foster care system to help with his support. Respondents' fervently wish to keep J.O. in their home, even without financial assistance through the foster care system, due to the strong emotional bond they have with him and because of the remarkable social and academic strides he has made while in their care. However, Mr. Iturriaga testified, persuasively, that this situation imposes a financial hardship on them, which, in turn, penalizes J.O. That Respondents wish to continue to provide a nurturing home for J.O., despite the financial hardship, is strong evidence that they have J.O.'s best interests at heart and that they would continue to provide the same stable, nurturing environment for him that they have provided for more than two and one-half years. As noted above, the criminal charges against Mrs. Iturriaga were dropped. Nonetheless, employees of Citrus testified that because there was an open child abuse investigation with verified findings, they could not recommend that Respondents' foster home continue to be licensed. Petitioner presented the testimony of Sonia De Escobar, licensing manager of Petitioner's Circuit II foster care program. Ms. De Escobar testified that Petitioner is seeking to revoke Respondents' license in part due to concern for the safety of children who may be placed in Respondents' foster home in the future. De Escobar noted that it is not uncommon for children in the dependency system to "misbehave,"7/ and Petitioner is concerned about Respondents' ability to deal with child misbehavior in the future. However, the evidence establishes that Respondents successfully cared for eight foster children over a six-year period and never had any problems dealing with child misbehavior until the incident involving A.A. As discussed above, the evidence establishes that A.A. was extremely aggressive and engaged in behavior that seriously disrupted Respondents' home environment. Because of A.A.'s extreme behavior, Respondents previously had given Citrus the required 30-day notice. However, Citrus did not timely remove A.A. from Respondents' home and the incident giving rise to this proceeding thereafter ensued. As noted above, there is no dispute that Mrs. Iturriaga intentionally left A.A. with a complete stranger for some period of time. In doing so, she endangered his health and safety, in violation of section 409.175(9)(a)1. However, the undersigned finds that mitigating circumstances in this case militate against revoking Respondents' foster home license. Specifically, Respondents enjoyed a spotless record as foster parents before the incident involving A.A. Further——and very importantly——they have fostered a very successful, nurturing, long-term parental relationship with J.O. that will be jeopardized if their foster home license is revoked. Finally, it is undisputed that A.A.'s behavior was extremely aggressive, disrespectful, and disruptive throughout the time he was placed in Respondents' home. On September 4, 2014, his behavior finally caused Mrs. Iturriaga to "snap."8/ Although her actions unquestionably were inappropriate and affected A.A.'s health and safety, the evidence indisputably shows that this was a one-time incident that occurred while Mrs. Iturriaga was under significant duress, and that, under any circumstances, A.A. was not injured. The undersigned further notes Citrus' role in this incident. As the child placing agency, Citrus is charged with placing foster children in foster homes, and with removing them when circumstances warrant. As discussed above, in July 2014, Respondents gave Citrus the required 30-day notice for transitioning A.A. out of their home. However, Citrus failed to timely meet its obligation to remove A.A. from Respondents' home and this incident subsequently occurred. Had Citrus met its obligation to timely remove A.A. from Respondents' home, this incident would not have occurred. Thus, Citrus is not without blame in this matter. The undersigned further notes that if Respondents were allowed to keep their license, Citrus, as the child placing agency, is obligated under the Bilateral Agreement to consult with Respondent before placing children in their home. This consultation process presumably would help ensure that children having extreme behavioral problems are not placed in Respondents' home in the future. For these reasons, the undersigned finds that allowing Respondents to keep their foster home license would enable them to continue their close, nurturing relationship with J.O., and, further, likely would not result in any danger or other adverse effect on the health and safety of foster children who may be placed in their home in the future.9/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order dismissing the Notice of Intent to Revoke Foster Home License issued on April 16, 2015, and imposing a corrective action plan on Respondents' foster home license to the extent deemed appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 2016.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent should deny Petitioners' application for a license to provide foster home care for dependent children pursuant to Section 409.175, Florida Statutes (1999). (All statutory references are to Florida Statutes (1999) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster care in the state. Petitioners were foster care parents until October 5, 2000, when Petitioners voluntarily surrendered their foster care license for medical reasons. Prior to October 5, 2000, Mrs. Williams suffered from high blood pressure and dizziness. She was physically unable to care for foster children and asked that Respondent remove all foster children from her home. Before her medical problems began, Mrs. Williams complained to Respondent that she could not provide foster care for children with behavior problems. Mrs. Williams asked Respondent to remove certain children from her home because they presented behavioral problems with which she could not cope. In March of 2001, Petitioners applied for a new license to provide foster care. Petitioners did not provide any medical evidence, during the hearing or the application process, that Mrs. Williams has recovered from her medical problems. Her medical problems have a long medical history and come and go each year. Mrs. Williams is 62 years old. On the family profile sheet filed with Respondent, Mrs. Williams lists her occupation as "disabled."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioners' application for a license to provide foster care to dependent children. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Wilbert and Estella Williams 412 Pine Avenue Sanford, Florida 32771 Craig A. McCarthy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services, District 7 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioners should be issued a family foster home license.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony, exhibits, and stipulated facts in the Joint Stipulation, the following Findings of Fact are made: Parties and Process Petitioners, who are husband and wife, submitted an application for licensure as a family foster home. Although this was an application for initial licensure, Petitioners were previously licensed as a foster home from August 2013 to October 2019.1 The Department is the state agency responsible for licensing foster care parents and foster homes, pursuant to section 409.175, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 65C-45. Petitioners voluntarily relinquished their foster home license on or about October 28, 2019, around the time two female foster children, S.W. and H.C.S., were removed from their care. It is unclear whether the children were removed because of an abuse investigation related to H.C.S., or whether they were removed because Petitioners closed their home to foster children. Regardless, Mrs. Gilio testified that they let their license lapse because they needed a break after fostering H.C.S. The Department administers foster care licensing by contracting with third-party private entities. In Circuit 13, where Petitioners are located, the Department contracted with Eckerd Community Alternatives, doing business as Eckerd Connects (Eckerd), to be the agency responsible for facilitating foster care licensing. Eckerd has subcontracted with Children's Home Network (CHN) to facilitate foster care licensing. 1 Petitioners had previously been denied a foster care license in 2009. At the time relevant to Petitioners, the Department used the "attestation" model of foster home licensing. In this model, a private licensing agency with whom the Department has contracted will conduct a home study on the foster home applicants and attest to the applicants' fitness to be licensed. The Department does not have the discretion to deny the license once the licensing agency has attested to the appropriateness of the applicants, except if they have been named as caregivers in three or more abuse reports within five years. If there are such abuse reports, the Department is required to review those reports and make a final decision regarding the application. There is no requirement that the reports result in a finding of actual abuse for them to be reviewed by the Department.2 Although it is unclear when Petitioners submitted their application for the foster care license in this case, sometime in late 2019, CHN conducted and compiled a Unified Home Study (home study), which included Petitioners' background screening; previous reports of abuse, abandonment, or neglect involving the applicants, and references from all adult children. The home study was reviewed at a meeting on December 19, 2019, by Eckerd, through the Committee. The Committee considered the application, home study, and licensing packet and heard from various agency staff. Petitioners were also allowed to voice comments and concerns at this meeting. Had the Committee approved the application, it would have been sent to the Department along with an attestation that stated the foster home meets all requirements for licensure and a foster home license is issued by the Department. However, the Committee unanimously voted not to recommend approval of a foster home license to Petitioners. 2 The categories of findings for an abuse report are "no indicator," "not substantiated," and "verified." "No indicator" means there was no credible evidence to support a determination of abuse. "Not substantiated" means there is evidence, but it does not meet the standard of being a preponderance to support that a specific harm is the result of abuse. "Verified" means that there is a preponderance of credible evidence which results in a determination that a specific harm was a result of abuse. Frank Prado, Suncoast Regional Managing Director for the Department, ultimately decided to deny Petitioners' application for a family foster home license due to their prior parenting experiences, the multiple abuse reports regarding their home, and the recommendation of the Committee. Mr. Prado expressed concern about the nature of the abuse reports and Petitioners' admission that they used corporal punishment on a child they adopted from the foster care system in the presence of other foster children. Petitioners' Parenting History Petitioners have seven children: one is the biological son of Mr. Gilio; another is the biological son of Mrs. Gilio; and five were adopted through the foster care system in Florida. Of these seven children, six are now adults. Three of the adopted children, Jay, Sean, and Jameson, are biological brothers who Petitioners adopted in 2001. Shawna, who was adopted around 2003, is the only adopted daughter. The Petitioners' one minor child, H.G., is a nine-year-old boy and the only child who resides in their home. H.G. suffers from oppositional defiance disorder. Petitioners admitted they adopted Shawna after there had been allegations of inappropriate behavior made against Jay, by a young girl who lived next door to Petitioners. Later, while they were living with Petitioners, Jay, Sean, and Jameson were arrested for sexually abusing Shawna at different times. As a result, one or more of the sons were court-ordered to not be around Shawna, and the other brothers were required to undergo treatment and never returned to Petitioners' home. During the hearing, both Petitioners seem to blame Shawna, who was nine years old when the sexual abuse by Jay in their home allegedly began, for disrupting their home. They accused her of being "not remorseful" and "highly sexualized." Regarding the abuse by Sean and Jameson, which occurred when Shawna was approximately 12 years old, Mr. Gilio stated Shawna thought it was okay to have sex with boys, and it was "hard to watch every minute of the day if they're, you know, having sex." When Shawna was about 19 years old, she filed a "Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence" against Mr. Gilio in circuit court. The Petition outlined allegations of past sexual comments and inappropriate disciplinary behavior from 2007 to 2012, while she lived with Petitioners. Mr. Gilio denied at the hearing having any knowledge about the Petition against him, but admitted he made comments about Shawna's breasts. As part of the application and home study process, the CHN collected references from Petitioners' former foster children and adult children. Shawna (Petitioners' only adopted daughter) gave them a negative reference and specifically stated she would not want female foster children to live with Petitioners. Reports of Abuse Petitioners were involved in 24 abuse reports during their time of licensure between 2013 and 2019. During the past five years, Petitioners were named as either alleged perpetrators or caregivers responsible in eight reports that were made to the Florida Child Abuse Hotline (Hotline). Of those eight reports, five of them named Mr. Gilio as the alleged perpetrator causing a physical injury, one report named Mr. Gilio as the caregiver responsible for a burn on a foster child, and one report named Mr. Gilio as an alleged perpetrator of sexual abuse against a foster child. Mrs. Gilio was named as an alleged perpetrator of asphyxiation as to a foster child. Seven of the reports in the last five years against Petitioners were closed with no indicators of abuse. One of the abuse reports was closed with a "not substantiated" finding of physical injury. In this report, Mr. Gilio was the alleged perpetrator and the victim was H.G., Petitioners' minor adopted son. Additionally, after Petitioners let their foster license lapse in October 2019, a subsequent report was made against Mr. Gilio for improper contact with a former foster daughter. This incident was discussed at the Committee meeting, but it was unclear if this allegation was ever investigated. Corporal Punishment According to the Department's rules, discussed below, foster parents are forbidden to engage in corporal punishments of any kind. In 2019, there were two reports alleging Mr. Gilio of causing physical injury by corporal punishment on H.G. At the time, there were other foster children in the household. Technically, Mr. Gilio was allowed to use corporal punishment on H.G. because he was no longer a foster child and had been adopted from foster care. If a parent uses corporal punishment on a child, there can be no findings of abuse unless the child suffered temporary or permanent disfigurement. However, foster care providers are not permitted to use corporal punishment. More than one witness at the hearing had concerns about the use of corporal punishment against H.G. because of his operational defiance disorder and because other foster children (who may have been victims of physical abuse) were in the household. Brendale Perkins, who is a foster parent herself and serves on the Hillsborough County Family Partnership Alliance, an organization that supports licensed foster parents, testified she witnessed Mr. Gilio treating a foster child in his care roughly. At the time, she was concerned because this was not the way children in foster care (who may have previously been victims of abuse) should be treated. She did not, however, report it to any authorities. The Department established through testimony that the policy against using corporal punishment is taught to all potential foster families. Mr. Gilio, however, denied ever being instructed not to use corporal punishment against foster children or while foster children were in the home. He also claimed that H.G.'s therapist had never recommended any specific punishment techniques. The undersigned finds Mr. Gilio's testimony not credible. Cooperation with Fostering Partners The Department established that decisions regarding foster children are made within a "system of care" which includes input from case managers, guardian ad litem (GAL), and support service providers. The relationship between Petitioners and others working as part of this system during the time of fostering was not ideal; it was described by witnesses as "tense" and "disgruntled." One witness, a supervisor at CHN, testified Mr. Gilio was not receptive or flexible when partnering with other agencies, and was not always open to providing information when questioned. As an example, Petitioners fired a therapist without consulting with the CHN staff or the GAL for the child. At the final hearing, Mr. Gilio continued to claim he did nothing wrong by not consulting with others in the system regarding this decision. Kristin Edwardson, a child protection investigator for the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office, was tasked with investigating the reports of abuse and neglect against Petitioners that had been reported to the Hotline. She testified she was concerned with the level of cooperation they provided her and other investigators. Although they ultimately would cooperate, Petitioners made it difficult for the investigators and would often "push back" and make the situation more stressful. She described Mr. Gilio as being disrespectful, belittling, and dismissive of her. Licensing Review Committee On December 19, 2020, the Committee, made up of eight individuals, was convened to review Petitioners' application for a foster home license. When determining whether a family should receive a foster home license, the Committee is to evaluate the applicants' background, parenting experience, references from community partners, and the family's openness and willingness to partner. Sheila DelCastillo, a regional trainer with the GAL program, was a Committee member. She had prior knowledge of Petitioners from a report that a foster child's room in Petitioners' home smelled strongly of urine during a home visit and that GAL staff had found a prescription bottle beside the child’s bed that belonged to Mr. Gilio. With regards to Petitioners' application, she read the licensing review packet and home study that contained numerous abuse reports. Ms. DelCastillo was concerned about the 24 abuse reports Petitioners’ received during their time of licensure, the negative reference from Shawna, their use of corporal punishment on H.G., and Petitioners' downplaying of the events that led to multiple abuse reports. Michelle Costley, a licensing director with CHN in charge of level 2 traditional foster homes, also served on the Committee. Ms. Costley has 14 years of experience, with seven of those years spent in foster care licensing. As director of licensing, Ms. Costley was concerned about the number of abuse reports received regarding Petitioners; Mr. Gilio's inability to be open and flexible when working in partnership with other agencies; and the needs of Petitioners' child, H.G. She was also concerned about Petitioners' decision to fire a therapist of a foster child without consulting the GAL or the other individuals involved with that child. Regarding the alleged abuse, Ms. Costley was concerned that most of the reports regarding Petitioners involved allegations of physical abuse, inappropriate touch of a sexual nature, or sexual abuse, with most alleged victims being younger than eight years old. She explained that even though these reports could not be "verified," these types of allegations are harder to establish because testimony by children of that age often is unreliable and there usually must be evidence of physical injury, which no longer is present by the time the alleged abuse is investigated. Ms. Perkins also served on the Committee. Ms. Perkins served as a foster parent mentor, working with foster parents to help them build co- parenting strategies and navigate the system of care. She has been a licensed foster parent for 13 years and has adopted 11 children from foster care. As stated earlier, she was familiar with Petitioners from the Hillsborough County Family Partnership Alliance meetings. Ms. Perkins was concerned with the number of abuse reports with similar allegations, but different victims. She also discussed Petitioners' use of corporal punishment, noting that they could have been using verbal de-escalation methods instead of corporal punishment due to the traumatic histories of many foster care children. Ms. Edwardson also served on the Committee. In addition to her personal interactions with Petitioners, Ms. Edwardson was concerned about the totality of the information presented to the Committee regarding the abuse reports and Mr. Gilio's lack of cooperation. She noted that although they were not substantiated, the number and nature of the reports related to young children were of concern. Based on the Committee notes and transcript of the meeting, Petitioners were allowed to respond to the Committee's questions at the December 2019 meeting. They argued that none of the abuse reports were proven true and any injuries were not their fault. They seemed more concerned about who made the abuse reports and why the abuse reports were called in than whether the foster children were protected in their care. For example, although Mr. Gilio admitted to hitting H.G. with a stick twice as big as a pencil, he denied any bruising was caused by the stick. A report of a burn on another child was explained by Mr. Gilio as an accident that occurred while he was teaching her how to iron; he could not understand why this was reported as possible abuse. Ms. Gilio explained that H.C.S. was a very active child which resulted in her needing stitches and requiring restraint. After hearing from Petitioners, the Committee members discussed their concerns that Petitioners were not forthcoming about the various abuse incidents, and would not take responsibility for any of the injuries or issues raised by the abuse reports. All eight members voted to not move Petitioners' application forward.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Children and Families denying a family foster home license to Petitioners, Mary and James Gilio. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Anthony Duran, Esquire Tison Law Group 9312 North Armenia Avenue Tampa, Florida 33612 (eServed) Deanne Cherisse Fields, Esquire Department of Children and Families 9393 North Florida Avenue Tampa, Florida 33612 (eServed) Lacey Kantor, Esquire Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204Z 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed) Javier A. Enriquez, General Counsel Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204F 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed) Chad Poppell, Secretary Department of Children and Families Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Respondent's foster home license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact There is no dispute that, at all times material hereto, Ms. Azulphar had a foster home license issued by the Department. Ms. Azulphar became a foster parent in January 1999. As with all new foster parents, Ms. Azulphar was required to complete 30 hours of Model Approach to Partnership Parenting (MAPP) training. Among other things, the MAPP training involves discussions regarding duties and responsibilities of a foster parent, the sexual problems of foster care children, and what to do if a foster care child runs away. Ms. Azulphar and the Department entered into a Bilateral Service Agreement regarding foster care. Both of them agreed to abide by the terms of the Bilateral Service Agreement. The Bilateral Service Agreement provided, among other things, the following: The Department's responsibilities to the foster parents include: * * * j. Support will be shown by responding within 24 hours to telephone messages, written correspondence or any other requests the foster parents may have. * * * Commitment to the Child The decision to accept a child into the home is a major one. . . Most foster children have experienced severe emotional, sexual and/or physical abuse as well as trauma. It is not unusual for children who have been sexually abused to act out in sexual inappropriate ways. Foster parents must be aware that these children need extra monitoring, teaching and showing of appropriate affection in order to grow into healthy children. . . By accepting a child into the home, the foster parent(s) agree to the following responsibilities: * * * d. To ensure that the child has supervision appropriate to his/her age and developmental level. * * * Foster parents have responsibilities and duties to both the department [sic] and the child. Responsibilities to the department [sic] include: * * * k. To notify the Department immediately if a child runs away, is missing or does not return home, even if the foster parent knows where the child is. * * * s. To know where and with whom the child is staying and the type of supervision the child is receiving when foster parents approve an outing or overnight activity. . . Non-compliance with any of the above provisions can result in termination of this service agreement by either the foster parents or the Department. Non-compliance with any of the above [sic] provisions may also result in the department [sic] revoking the home's license to provide foster care pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. . . . Any person living with a foster parent is subject to a background check by the Department because such person would have contact with any foster child placed with the foster parent. Such person must not have a disqualifying criminal record1 in order for the person to remain in the foster home during the licensure of the foster home. Ms. Azulphar had a tenant, Louis Bryant, who lived in an attached room to her home, which was converted from a garage. He had his own private entrance to his room. In January 2002, the Department informed Ms. Azulphar that Mr. Bryant, not only had a criminal record, but also had a disqualifying criminal drug record and that, therefore, if she wanted to keep her license, he would have to move. Ms. Azulphar informed Mr. Bryant that he had to move. Mr. Bryant moved, and Ms. Azulphar provided documentation to the Department indicating that he had moved. Ms. Azulphar described Mr. Bryant as a long-time friend and someone that she had relied upon when she first came to the United States. Mr. Bryant was also Ms. Azulphar's former supervisor. Further, even though he was a drug addict, who was skinny and dirty, smelled bad, and needed reminding to bathe, Ms. Azulphar described Mr. Bryant as the only person upon whom she could call when she had an emergency. She also indicated that Mr. Bryant was a handy man who performed repairs for her. Ms. Azulphar admitted that, as to Mr. Bryant, she was a "co-partner." She further admitted that Mr. Bryant was someone she "needs to continue what she was doing." In spite of her reliance upon Mr. Bryant as indicated, Ms. Azulphar showed a willingness to comply with the Department's requirements by requiring Mr. Bryant to move. On or about May 8, 2002, a foster child, F.D.,2 was placed with Ms. Azulphar. F.D. was 12 years of age at the time. F.D. was a special needs foster child because she had a history of being sexually abused at an early age and because F.D.'s father was deceased and her mother had voluntarily surrendered her parental rights. F.D. was the subject of disciplinary action at school. She was suspended for ten days from school for pulling a knife on another student. During the suspension, Ms. Azulphar took F.D. to work with her. F.D. left Ms. Azulphar's workplace without Ms. Azulphar's permission and knowledge. F.D. called her friends who came to Ms. Azulphar's workplace and F.D. left with them. Ms. Azulphar discovered that F.D. was dating a young man who was much older than F.D. Ms. Azulphar believed that the young man was approximately 26 years of age because he "looked" 26 years of age and F.D.'s friends were dating young men who also looked 26 years of age. Ms. Azulphar believed that the young man was among the friends that F.D. contacted to leave Ms. Azulphar's workplace. Also, during F.D.'s suspension, on the afternoon of May 16, 2002, her Guardian Ad-Litem came to Ms. Azulphar's home to visit F.D. The Guardian Ad-Litem knocked but no one answered. F.D. emerged from a neighbor's house. Ms. Azulphar had left F.D. alone at home. Ms. Azulphar had instructed F.D. to wait for the Guardian Ad-Litem at home and to not go outside of the home. Ms. Azulphar talked with the Guardian Ad-Litem on the telephone that same day. She expressed to the Guardian Ad-Litem that she wanted F.D. out of her home. That evening on May 16, 2002, F.D. became so distraught and volatile that she took a knife and threatened to harm herself. Ms. Azulphar called the Department's emergency telephone number and was told to call the Crisis Center for Mobile Children (CCMC). Ms. Azulphar telephoned CCMC, which told her how to talk to F.D. Ms. Azulphar did as she was instructed and F.D. did not harm herself. The next day, May 17, 2002, sometime in the evening after bedtime, which was around 9 p.m., F.D. slipped out of Ms. Azulphar's home. Ms. Azulphar had taken a sleeping pill and was not aware that F.D. was gone. Around 4 a.m. on May 18, 2002, Ms. Azulphar received a telephone call from F.D., who wanted Ms. Azulphar to come and get her. Ms. Azulphar did not want to drive at that time because she had taken the sleeping pill, so Ms. Azulphar asked F.D. to have an adult come to the telephone. Ms. Azulphar believed that F.D. was at a party because of the background noise that she heard, which sounded like a party. Ms. Azulphar recognized that the person who came to the telephone was not an adult, but Ms. Azulphar requested that F.D. be permitted to stay at the person's home until 6 a.m. when she (Ms. Azulphar) would pick-up F.D. F.D. did not wait for Ms. Azulphar. She returned to Ms. Azulphar's home before Ms. Azulphar could get her. Ms. Azulphar did not call the police when she discovered that F.D. was leaving her (Ms. Azulphar's) workplace with the young man who was 26 years of age and when she received the telephone call from F.D. The reason that Ms. Azulplhar did not call the police is that she believed that the police would do more harm than good to F.D., that F.D. had had enough trouble, and that F.D. was a Haitian as she was. After F.D. returned to Ms. Azulphar's home on May 18, 2002, Ms. Azulphar contacted the Guardian Ad-Litem and requested the removal of F.D. from her home. The Guardian Ad-Litem reported the incident to the court and the court ordered an investigation and the removal of F.D. from Ms. Azulphar's home. The Guardian Ad-Litem did not know the results of the court's investigation. During the time that F.D. was in Ms. Azulphar's home, Ms. Azulphar also had, in addition to her own child, T.A., two other foster children, A.A. and her sister, V.A.3 All of the other children agree that F.D. could not be trusted, was a thief, and did not tell the truth. After F.D. was removed from her home, Ms. Azulphar had another foster child placed in her home, who ran away. However, this time, Ms. Azulphar contacted the police and the Department when she discovered that the child had run away. Sometime during the first two weeks that F.D. was placed with Ms. Azulphar,4 the Department's social worker for F.D., Luis Muriel, was making arrangements with Ms. Azulphar to pick-up F.D. Ms. Azulphar requested Mr. Muriel to come to her workplace since F.D. would be there with her; however, he wanted Ms. Azulphar to leave F.D. at home alone. Ms. Azulphar reminded him that she was not to leave F.D. at home alone. However, Mr. Muriel instructed Ms. Azulphar to leave F.D. at home alone and informed Ms. Azulphar that he would be arriving at her home in 30 minutes. Ms. Azulphar contacted a male friend, who was approximately 50 years of age, for assistance and requested that he wait at her home for Mr. Muriel, who would be arriving in 30 minutes. However, she instructed her friend to wait outside in his car, not in her home, and he agreed to do so. When Mr. Muriel arrived at Ms. Azulphar's home and knocked on the door, Ms. Azulphar's friend opened the door. Ms. Azulphar's friend had not complied with her instructions and had gone into her home while F.D. was in the home. The Department had not performed a background check on Ms. Azulphar's friend. There was no reason for the Department to perform a background check on Ms. Azulphar's friend since it was never intended by Ms. Azulphar that he would have contact with the foster children placed with her. As to the incident, Ms. Azulphar had made it clear to her friend that he was not to go inside the home. On May 29, 2002, around 8 p.m., the licensing counselor for Ms. Azulphar's case, Reynaldo Gonzalez, made an unannounced visit to her home after being contacted by F.D.'s Guardian Ad-Litem regarding F.D.'s situation. By that time, F.D. had been removed from Ms. Azulphar's home. Mr. Gonzalez noticed a car parked outside of the house. He knocked on the door. The foster child A.A., who was approximately 15 years of age at the time, looked through the window and informed Mr. Gonzalez that Ms. Azulphar was not at home. Mr. Gonzalez returned around 8:30 p.m. and A.A. was still at home alone. Ms. Azulphar had left A.A. at home alone. However, Mr. Gonzalez's primary concern was not A.A.'s being at home alone. On the following day, around 6:20,5 Mr. Gonzalez returned to Ms. Azulphar's home because the Department had received anonymous information that no food was in the home. The same car was parked outside Ms. Azulphar's home, but the front of the car was parked in a different direction. Ms. Azulphar was not at home, but a relative, who was there, permitted Mr. Gonzalez to enter. Mr. Gonzalez found that there was adequate food in the home. None of the foster children were at home; they were with Ms. Azulphar. Mr. Gonzalez's testimony failed to indicate whether the car was parked along the street or in the driveway. An inference is drawn that the car was parked along the street. Ms. Azulphar voluntarily admitted to Mr. Gonzalez that Mr. Bryant was the owner of the car. She wanted Mr. Bryant to park his car outside her home to make it look as if someone were at home because her home had been burglarized when no one was at home. Further, on one of the days referred to, Mr. Bryant's car was either in disrepair or out of gas.6 According to the Department, Mr. Bryant should not have parked his car in front of Ms. Azulphar's home on the street. However, the evidence fails to demonstrate that such conduct by Mr. Bryant involved contact with the foster children. Ms. Azulphar admits that, at times, Mr. Bryant accompanied her shopping even when the foster children were with her. Ms. Azulphar also admits that Mr. Bryant has cut her grass, but only when she was at home. Ms. Azulphar testified that she obtained the approval of the Department for cutting the grass even though no Department witness recalled approving the action. Ms. Azulphar's testimony is found to be credible. Ms. Azulphar used poor judgment as it relates to Mr. Bryant. At first, Ms. Azulphar believed that, even though Mr. Bryant could not continue to be a tenant, she could continue to have Mr. Bryant to assist her with some things. She now knows that, as long as she has foster children, the Department does not want him to be around the children at any time. Ms. Azulphar believed that nothing was wrong with Mr. Bryant parking or leaving his car at her house. Now, she knows that the Department does not want him to be near her home when she has foster children. A.A. and V.A. were removed from Ms. Azulphar's home when the Department decided to revoke her foster home license. Both A.A. and V.A. want to return to Ms. Azulphar's home. Ms. Azulphar's daughter is in complete agreement with her mother being a foster parent and wants A.A. and V.A. to return.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order dismissing the revocation action of the foster home license of Marie Claire Azulphar. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 2003.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners should be licensed to operate a foster home in Marianna, Jackson County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Respondent licensed Petitioners to operate a foster home in Respondent's District No. 9, West Palm Beach, Florida, beginning in 1995 through April 1, 2000. The Department of Health, under its Children's Medical Services Program, licensed Petitioners as medical foster parents for almost two years of that time. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioners had five children living with them in West Palm Beach, Florida. Two boys, aged six and three, were Petitioners' adopted sons. A two-year-old boy, A.B., and his one-year-old sister, T.B. were medical foster children. C.S. was a two-year-old female foster child. In August 1999, Petitioners bought a home in Respondent's District No. 2, which includes Marianna, Jackson County, Florida. Mr. Mayes is a carpenter and intended to make repairs to the home before moving his family to North Florida. Petitioners knew their foster home license in District No. 9 was not transferable to District No. 2. Therefore, they applied for a foster home license in District No. 2. Petitioners wanted their three foster children to move with them to Mariana, Florida. Petitioners hoped to adopt C.S. and to keep A.B. and T.B. in the same placement until another family adopted them. All of the foster children had been in Petitioners' home since they were a few days old. A.B. was a very active two-year-old child. He regularly climbed out of his crib. On one occasion he climbed up on the stove and turned on the burners. He seemed to "have no fear." In the fall of 1999, Mrs. Mayes requested Respondent to provide her with behavior management assistance for A.B. Because Petitioners were planning to move out of District No. 9, Respondent decided to wait until A.B. was settled after Petitioners' move to perform the behavior management evaluation. In the meantime, Petitioners could not keep A.B. in his highchair during mealtime. They had difficulty keeping him in his crib. They bought a safety harness and attempted to use it to keep A.B. in his crib on one occasion and in his highchair on another occasion. A.B. was able to wiggle out of the harness on both occasions. Petitioners subsequently discarded the harness. They resorted to tightening the highchair's feeding tray in order to keep A.B. still long enough to feed him. Petitioners never used and never intended to use the harness to punish A.B. Petitioners usually disciplined the children by placing them in timeout for one minute per year of age. Timeout for Petitioners' foster children usually meant being held in Mrs. Mayes' lap. Mrs. Mayes admitted using the safety harness on A.B. during a telephone conversation with Respondent's medical foster care counselor in January 2000. The counselor informed Ms. Mayes that foster parents are not allowed to use a harness to restrain foster children. Prospective foster parents must participate in and complete training classes designed by Respondent. Persuasive evidence indicates that Respondent teaches prospective foster parents during this training that children should never be restrained by a harness. Petitioners have taken these training classes. If A.B. and the other children were free to go into a bedroom, they would pull everything out of the chest of drawers. They would flush objects down the toilet in the bathroom. Mr. Mayes put a hook-type latch on the door to the Petitioners' bedroom, A.B.'s bedroom, and the bathroom in the hall. The primary purpose of the door latches was to keep the children out of unsupervised areas of the home. Petitioners never used the door latches as a means of discipline. On two occasions Mrs. Mayes latched the door to A.B.'s room while he was in the room asleep. The first time she latched the door while she went to the mail box in front of her home. The other time, she latched the door while she bathed another child who had a doctor's appointment later that afternoon. On both occasions, A.B. was locked in his room for only a few minutes. Petitioners knew that they needed permission from Respondent in order to take A.B., T.B., and C.S. out of the state on vacations. On several occasions, Respondent's staff gave Petitioners permission to take the foster children to North Florida for short visits during the time that Mr. Mayes was remodeling the home. Respondent's staff approved these short visits as if they were vacations. Petitioners knew that they needed to be licensed in Respondent's District No. 2 before Respondent's staff in District No. 9 could approve the permanent transfer of the foster children. At the same time, the Respondent's staff in District No. 2 could not license Petitioners until they actually made the move with all of their furniture. Petitioners discussed their dilemma with several members of Respondent's staff in District No. 9. During these conversations, Petitioners asked Respondent if they could take the children with them and treat the time that they would be temporarily unlicensed as if it were a vacation. At least one member of Respondent's staff responded that treating the move initially as if it were a vacation was "an option that could be explored." Respondent's staff subsequently advised Petitioners that under no circumstances could the foster children move to Jackson County, temporarily or permanently, until Petitioners were properly licensed. Petitioner's never attempted to deceive Respondent; to the contrary, they were openly looking for an acceptable way to take the foster children with then when they moved. They never intended to circumvent the proper licensing process. Based on Petitioners' former experience with Respondent, they believed that treating the move as a vacation would be an appropriate way to solve what was otherwise a "catch twenty-two" situation. By letter dated March 14, 2000, Respondent's staff in District No. 2 advised Petitioners that they would receive a provisional foster home license as soon as information furnished by Petitioners and copies of Petitioners' file from the licensing unit in District No. 9 could be sent to Respondent's office in Panama City, Florida. Respondent removed the three foster children from Petitioners' home just before Petitioners moved to Jackson County on April 1, 2000. In a memorandum dated April 19, 2000, Respondent listed Petitioners' home as one of two medical foster homes in Jackson County, Florida. Despite the representation in this memorandum, Respondent issued the letter of denial on June 5, 2000.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioners a foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: James Mayes Gail Mayes 4561 Magnolia Road Marianna, Florida 32448 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe, Suite 252-A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Petitioners, K.W. and L.A.W., should be granted a license to be foster parents.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of facts are made: Petitioners are a married couple who applied to Respondent for a foster home license. Petitioners have three children. The background investigation conducted by Respondent revealed reports of incidents of domestic violence and battery involving Petitioners and their children. On October 4, 1999, police officers responded to Petitioners' home after receiving a report of domestic violence. The officer's investigation revealed that one of the Petitioners, L.A.W., had been battered by her son. The child had been involved in pastoral counseling for his aggressive behavior. Petitioner, K.W., advised the police officer that the child, W.A.W., would be moving from the residence because of his continuing inappropriate behavior. On April 7, 2002, another incident of domestic violence was reported and investigated. On this occasion, the two younger children of Petitioners were involved in an altercation that resulted in Petitioner, K.W., being rendered unconscious by a blow to the head with an object delivered by one of the children, C.W. C.W. was arrested for aggravated battery. In February 2003, Petitioners desired to keep a six- month-old, unrelated child in their home. The child was placed in the home contingent on C.W.'s moving from the home and not residing in the home. Petitioners agreed to this contingency of placement, and the child was placed in Petitioners' home. On November 5, 2003, Petitioners applied to be licensed as foster parents. Ten days after Petitioners applied to be licensed, another incident of domestic violence occurred. On November 15, 2003, two of Petitioners' adult children got into a fistfight which resulted in one having a broken nose. As a result, W.A.W. was arrested. At the time of the altercation, W.A.W., 21 years old and the oldest child who had moved out at an earlier time as a result of his behavior, was residing at Petitioners' residence. Although the police report indicates that the incident occurred at Petitioners' residence, the testimony indicated that it occurred "down the street." All three of Petitioners' children continue to reside locally and frequent their parents' home. Petitioners are highly recommended by a representative of The Children's Home Society, a Guardian ad Litem, and their pastor. Respondent has the responsibility of placing foster children in a safe setting. But for the behavior of their children, Petitioners would qualify for licensure. As long as Petitioners' children frequent Petitioners' residence, any child placed in that residence is at risk. As a result, Petitioners are not qualified to be licensed as foster parents.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order denying the foster care license application of Petitioners. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas J. Thompson, Esquire Thomas Thompson, P.A. 100 South Washington Avenue Titusville, Florida 32780 Richard Cato, Esquire Department of children and Family Services 400 West Robinson Street, Suite S-1106 Orlando, Florida 32801-1782 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Respondents’ renewal foster home license application should be denied based upon allegations that Respondents violated a foster child’s safety plan, refused to sign a corrective action plan, and refused to work in partnership with Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Parties DCF is the state agency responsible for licensing foster care parents and foster homes pursuant to section 409.175, Florida Statutes. DCF administers foster care programs by contracting with third-party private entities. In Circuit 19, which is the geographic area encompassing Port St. Lucie, DCF has contracted with Devereux Community Based Care (“Devereux”) to be the “lead agency” to provide the majority of child services. Devereux, in turn, has subcontracted with Camelot Community Care (“Camelot”), which is licensed as a child placement agency. Respondents, who are husband and wife, are foster care parents in a foster care home licensed by DCF. At all times material hereto, Mr. and Mrs. Arias have fostered children at their home in Port St. Lucie. Respondent, Kathleen Arias (“Mrs. Arias”), does not work outside the foster home. She is a “stay-at-home” foster mom. Over the past 16 years, Mrs. Arias has fostered many children. Mrs. Arias is very loving to the foster children in her care, and she has provided a great benefit to the foster children in her care.2/ Kenneth Strout’s Prior History of Sexually Inappropriate Behaviors Kenneth Strout (“Kenneth”), who recently turned 18 years old, was placed into Respondents’ foster home in 2013. Prior to his placement in Respondents’ home, Kenneth engaged in inappropriate sexual behaviors. As a therapeutic foster child in Respondents’ home, Kenneth received therapeutic services, including therapy, psychiatric services, support, and therapeutic parenting by a trained therapeutic foster parent, Mrs. Arias. Despite receiving therapeutic services, Kenneth continued to engage in inappropriate sexual behaviors while living in Respondents’ home. During the time in which Kenneth lived in the home, he had a history of sexually touching others, exposing himself, and masturbating in close proximity to others. On one particular occasion on September 17, 2014, Kenneth was sitting on the couch watching television, and Mrs. Arias’ sister walked in the room. While she had her back to Kenneth, he dropped his pants, exposed himself to her, and pressed his penis against her buttocks. The Applicable Safety Plan Requirements As a result of this incident, an updated safety plan was developed.3/ The safety plan was signed by Mrs. Arias on October 8, 2014. Mrs. Arias reviewed the safety plan and is aware of the requirements of the safety plan. Specifically, the safety plan requires, in pertinent part: “Client needs to be within eyesight and earshot of a responsible adult, who is aware of and will enforce the safety plan at all times.” The May 28, 2015, Incident at LA Fitness and its Aftermath Against this backdrop, on May 28, 2015, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Mrs. Arias took Kenneth, who was 17 years old at the time, to LA Fitness, a gym facility in Port St. Lucie. Mrs. Arias had a membership at LA Fitness and frequented the facility on a regular basis. Despite Ms. Arias’ knowledge of Kenneth’s inappropriate sexual propensities, Kenneth often accompanied Mrs. Arias to the facility, where he would play basketball on an indoor basketball court, while Mrs. Arias exercised in another area at the facility. During the evening of May 28, 2015, Kenneth had been playing basketball on the indoor basketball court. He left the basketball court and approached Mrs. Arias and told her that he needed to use the bathroom. Mrs. Arias gave Kenneth permission to go to the bathroom. The men’s restroom is located inside the men’s locker room. At this point, Kenneth walked toward the men’s locker room, and entered the men’s locker room through the door leading from a hallway into the men’s locker room. Mrs. Arias did not go into the men’s locker room with Kenneth, nor was Kenneth accompanied by an adult when he entered the men’s locker room. Once Kenneth entered the men’s locker room, he walked to the other end of the locker room to another door, which led to the Jacuzzi area. Kenneth then opened the door from the men’s locker room leading to the Jacuzzi area. At this point, Kenneth observed a female, Concepcion Alvarado, sitting alone in the Jacuzzi. Ms. Alvarado was in her swimsuit. At this point, Ms. Alvarado was relaxing in the Jacuzzi with her eyes closed. After observing Ms. Alvarado for a moment, Kenneth stripped down to his boxer shorts, entered the Jacuzzi, and inappropriately touched Ms. Alvarado on her leg. Upon realizing that somebody touched her leg, Ms. Alvarado opened her eyes, saw Kenneth in front of her, and said to him: “What are you doing, little boy?” “Just get out of my way, or do your own stuff.” Kenneth then touched Ms. Alvarado on her shoulder. At this point, Ms. Alvarado became very angry and said to Kenneth: “Why are you touching me? You’re not supposed to do that.” “Just get out.” Kenneth smiled at Ms. Alvarado as Ms. Alvarado exited the Jacuzzi. Ms. Alvarado then entered the nearby pool. Kenneth followed Ms. Alvarado and jumped in the pool as well. Ms. Alvarado recognized Kenneth because he had engaged in similar inappropriate sexual behavior a week earlier. On the prior occasion, Kenneth and Ms. Alvarado were in the Jacuzzi when Kenneth tried to kiss her and touched her leg. Ms. Alvarado did not report the prior incident. However, Ms. Alvarado reported the May 28, 2015, incident to an LA Fitness employee. Shortly thereafter, law enforcement officers arrived at the facility and arrested Kenneth. Kenneth was taken to a juvenile detention facility where he spent the night. Kenneth was not within eyeshot or earshot of Mrs. Arias or another responsible adult once he entered the men’s locker room on May 28, 2015. Kenneth was not within eyeshot or earshot of Mrs. Arias or another responsible adult when the inappropriate physical contact perpetrated by Kenneth against Ms. Alvarado in the Jacuzzi on May 28, 2015, occurred. The persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing establishes that Respondents violated the October 2014 safety plan by failing to ensure that Kenneth was within earshot and eyeshot of a responsible adult at all times when he was at LA Fitness. Had Kenneth been within eyeshot and earshot of a responsible adult at all times on May 28, 2015, while he was at LA Fitness, the incident in the Jacuzzi with Ms. Alvarado would not have occurred.4/ Notably, given Kenneth’s history of sexually inappropriate behaviors, Mrs. Arias knew that she was taking a risk to the public in bringing Kenneth to LA fitness because it was an environment that could be problematic for him. At hearing, Ms. Linda Green, a licensed clinical social worker formerly employed by Camelot, persuasively and credibly explained the difficulties she and Mrs. Arias faced in their efforts to deal with Kenneth’s sexually inappropriate behaviors. According to Ms. Green, a true bond developed between Mrs. Arias and Kenneth. Kenneth referred to Mrs. Arias as “mom,” and he felt like she was his mother. In an attempt to keep the family unit intact, Ms. Green wanted significant “client-directed therapy” and “advocation because the client should have the right to control their life.” On the other hand, Ms. Green was concerned about keeping society safe from Kenneth. In hindsight, Ms. Green candidly admitted at hearing that Kenneth “probably needed institutionalization sooner.” Mrs. Arias recognized her inability to control Kenneth’s sexually inappropriate behaviors and the danger he posed to society prior to the May 28, 2015, incident. Prior to the May 28, 2015, incident, Mrs. Arias requested that Kenneth be placed on a “30-Day Notice.” Kenneth was on a “30-Day Notice” when the incident at the gym on May 28, 2015, occurred. Nevertheless, Kenneth remained in the Respondents’ home as of the May 28, 2015, incident at the gym because Devereux was having difficulty finding a new placement, and Mrs. Arias agreed to keep Kenneth in the home until after the end of the school year. The school year ended the first week of June. Kenneth never returned to Respondents’ home after the May 28, 2015, incident at LA Fitness. Instead, Kenneth was discharged from the foster care program, and placed in a group facility where he has resided ever since. It is anticipated that Kenneth will remain in the group facility until he is 23 years old. Following the incident at the LA Fitness gym on May 28, 2015, DCF undertook an investigation. As a result of its investigation, DCF concluded that the safety plan was violated because Kenneth was not within earshot or eyeshot of a responsible adult when the incident at the gym on May 28, 2015, occurred. DCF’s investigation resulted in a verified finding of abuse against Respondents based on inadequate supervision. Based on DCF’s verified finding of abuse based on inadequate supervision, a corrective action plan was required by administrative rule and prepared for Respondents to execute. A corrective action plan is a document which identifies issues of concern to DCF and how DCF, as an agency, can work together with the foster parent to improve the foster parent’s performance. A corrective action plan serves as a supportive intervention and is not punitive in nature. Respondents refused to execute the corrective action plan because they were concerned that, in doing so, they would admit DCF’s investigative finding of abuse based on inadequate supervision. The persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing establishes that Respondents refused to execute the corrective action plan. The persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing fails to establish that Respondents failed to work in partnership with DCF.5/ Respondents’ foster care license was due to expire on October 18, 2015. After the May 28, 2015, incident occurred, DCF placed another child under Respondents’ care. Regardless of the incident at LA Fitness on May 28, 2015, DCF intended to re-license Respondents. DCF intended to renew Respondents’ foster care license after the May 28, 2015, incident despite the verified finding of inadequate supervision. DCF was unable to re-license Respondents because they failed to execute the corrective action plan required by rule. Had Respondents executed the corrective action plan required by DCF, Respondents’ foster care license would have been renewed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued by the Department of Children and Families placing Respondents’ foster care license in provisional status for six months, during which time Respondents shall execute the corrective action plan. If Respondents decline to execute the corrective action plan within six months, the provisional license will not be replaced with a regular license or renewed.7/ DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 2016.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Respondents' foster care license should be renewed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondents operated a foster home in Broward County, Florida, pursuant to a license that was issued by the Department in January, 1994. In March, 1994, the Department placed a foster child, M.A.G., in the Respondents' home. This child, M.A.G., was an extremely troubled girl whose interfering biological family kept her in an emotional state of constant turmoil. The "Visitation Reports" introduced into evidence by the Department reflect that the child's adjustment to placement with the Respondents went from "good" to "fair." As the contacts with her family continued, the child's progress with the Respondents deteriorated. The evaluation reflects that the placement went from meeting the child's needs to not meeting the child's needs as of a December 14, 1994 visit. In fact, Respondents asked the Department to remove M.A.G. from their home. Ms. Suppa described the family relationship between M.A.G. and the Respondents as "tumultuous." The contacts between M.A.G. and her biological family caused severe unrest within the home as M.A.G. was torn between her biological family and her growing interest in the Respondents. M.A.G.'s emotional problems were not unusual for children in the custody of the Department. In fact, many foster children in the custody of the Department have emotional problems. Ms. Suppa was involved in family therapy with the Respondents and M.A.G. from October, 1994, to the time M.A.G. was removed from the Respondents' home on January 6, 1995. Ms. Suppa verified that the Respondents did not abuse M.A.G. Ms. Suppa acknowledged that Respondents did not provide the necessary emotional support that M.A.G. needed, and recommended to the Department that the placement be changed. Ms. Suppa could not state what the Respondents could have done, which they did not try, to avoid the incident complained of by the Department. M.A.G. spoke of suicide on occasions but Respondents did everything asked of them to assist the girl. On December 18, 1994, M.A.G. was voluntarily admitted to the Florida Medical Center for psychological testing following an incident that occurred in the Respondents' home. On this occasion, M.A.G. had a knife in her hands and threatened to kill herself. The Respondents called the police to assist them. On release, M.A.G.'s emotional state continued to deteriorate despite Respondents' best efforts. Respondents took M.A.G. to counseling. They never missed a counseling session and willingly agreed to explore any options that were suggested. When M.A.G. chose to spend the 1994 holidays with Respondents, she was cursed by her sister and ignored by her grandmother. This caused a serious depression. M.A.G.'s biological mother did not attend her appointed counseling sessions. M.A.G. was disappointed since she had hoped to see her mother. On December 28, 1994, M.A.G. missed one dose of her medication. No conclusion is reached that this omission led to, or caused, the incident of January 3, 1995. On January 3, 1995, M.A.G. had to be Baker Acted. She was again admitted to the Florida Medical Center for psychological testing and treatment following an incident that occurred in the Respondents' home. Once again M.A.G. had threatened to kill herself with a knife. Since being moved from Respondents' home M.A.G. has progressed and is no longer on medication. No conclusion is reached from this progress, however, since M.A.G.'s biological family's contact with her is unknown. M.A.G. had a strong loyalty to her biological family. Respondents have been foster parents for many years in New York. This was the first incident wherein a foster child could not adjust to the Respondents' home. The Respondents tried everything within their control to make the foster relationship with M.A.G. work out.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order approving Respondents' request for licensure renewal. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-1556 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, and 11 are accepted. Paragraphs 4, 5, 8, 10, 12, 13 and 14 are rejected as irrelevant or not supported by the weight of credible evidence. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondents: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, and 9 are accepted. Paragraphs 6, 7, 10, 11, and 12 are rejected as irrelevant or comment. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert L. Powell Agency Clerk Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Kim Tucker General Counsel Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Carole C. Wilhelm Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 201 W. Broward Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Carole A. and Alex Lezdey 9711 N.W. 20th Street Coral Springs, Florida 33701
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should deny the application for renewal of Respondent's foster home license because “skinny dipping” with a foster child at the foster home violates Section 409.175, Florida Statutes (2001), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-13. (All section references are to Florida Statutes (2001). All references to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code in effect on the date of this Recommended Order.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster homes in Florida. A foster home license is valid for a period of one year and must be renewed annually. Various privatized entities supervise licensed foster homes, review applications for foster home licenses, and make recommendations to Petitioner regarding the applications. However, the recommendations are not binding on Petitioner. Petitioner, rather than the private entity, is the licensing agency. For example, Petitioner rejected the recommendation from the private entity with responsibility for reviewing the application at issue in this proceeding. Petitioner first issued a foster home license to Respondent on January 28, 2000. Petitioner licensed Respondent to operate a therapeutic foster home. A therapeutic license authorized Respondent to operate a foster home for children with psychological or emotional disorders and for children without such disorders. Therapeutic foster homes operate under the auspices of a private entity known as Personal Enrichment through Mental Health, Inc. (PEMHS). PEMHS recommended that Petitioner issue the original foster home license on January 28, 2000, and a renewal license that Petitioner issued on January 28, 2001, for the second year. The second therapeutic foster home license expired on January 27, 2002. Petitioner never took action to discipline or revoke Respondent’s therapeutic foster home license. In July 2001, Respondent applied for a non- therapeutic foster home license. The non-therapeutic license that Respondent seeks authorizes a licensee to operate a foster home only for children without psychological or emotional disorders. Non-therapeutic foster homes operate under the auspices of a private entity known as Family Continuity Programs (Family Continuity). Family Continuity recommended that Petitioner approve the application for a non-therapeutic foster home license. However, Petitioner did not follow the recommendation of Family Continuity and denied the application. Petitioner's denial of Respondent's application for a non-therapeutic foster home license is the proposed agency action that is at issue in this proceeding. Respondent's application for a non-therapeutic foster home license is not an application for a new license. Rather, it is an application for renewal of an existing license. Both the therapeutic license that Respondent held at the time of the application and the non-therapeutic license that Respondent seeks authorize the licensee to operate a foster home for children without psychological or emotional disorders. By applying for a non-therapeutic foster home license before the expiration of his therapeutic foster home license, Respondent sought to renew his license to operate a foster home for children without psychological and emotional disorders. The non-therapeutic license that Respondent seeks does not impose any requirements in addition to those that Respondent had already satisfied when Petitioner granted the therapeutic license to Respondent. The requirements for the therapeutic license are more stringent than those that must be met to qualify for a non-therapeutic license. The requirements for a therapeutic license are more comprehensive, and Petitioner requires an applicant for a therapeutic license to have more training than an applicant for a non-therapeutic license. A non-therapeutic license does not impose requirements in addition to those imposed for a therapeutic license. Petitioner proposes to deny the application for renewal of Respondent's foster home license on the sole ground that Respondent went "skinny dipping" with two minor males. One of those males was a foster child assigned to Respondent. The foster child is a victim of past sexual abuse and has psychological and emotional disorders. The child suffers from oppositional defiance disorder and mood disorder. The symptoms of the disorders include self-injury, such as head banging, aggression, anger, and low self-esteem. However, many of the behavioral problems diminished during the 15 months that the foster child was in Respondent's care. The "skinny-dipping" events occurred between six and nine times during the 15 months that the foster child was in Respondent's care. During that time, the foster child was between 12 and 14 years old. The foster child swam nude in the swimming pool at Respondent's residence and bathed nude in the hot tub adjacent to the pool. On some of those occasions, Respondent was nude in the hot tub and swimming pool with the foster child and at other times the two were in the swimming pool and hot tub independently of each other while both were nude. The local sheriff's office investigated the foster home and found no indicators of abuse. Once PEMHS learned of the "skinny dipping" events, neither PEMHS nor Petitioner sought to revoke Respondent's therapeutic foster home license or to provide Respondent with remedial training. Rather, PEMHS removed the foster child from the foster home and refused to assign any more foster children to Respondent's foster home. At the administrative hearing, Petitioner sought the post-hearing deposition testimony of Dr. Cotter for several purposes. One of those purposes was to show the impact on the foster child from the "skinny dipping" events. Another purpose was to show that the "skinny dipping" was "grooming behavior" for future pedophilia. The ALJ sustained Respondent's objection to the admissibility of the expert deposition testimony for the purpose of showing the impact on the foster child and for the purpose of showing that the "skinny dipping" was "grooming behavior" for future pedophilia. Dr. Cotter could not render an opinion concerning the actual impact on the foster child from the "skinny dipping" events or whether those events were actually intended by Respondent as "grooming behavior" for future pedophilia. Dr. Cotter did not intend to evaluate either the foster child or Respondent before rendering his opinions and, in fact, never evaluated either individual. Any expert opinion by Dr. Cotter concerning "grooming behavior" for pedophilia was not relevant to the grounds stated in the Notice of Denial. That expert opinion was relevant only to grounds not stated in the Notice of Denial. Nudity in a swimming pool and hot tub are not synonymous with "grooming behavior" for pedophilia. Nudity and "grooming behavior" for pedophilia are separate grounds for denying the application for renewal of Respondent's license to operate a foster home. Petitioner failed to provide adequate notice prior to the administrative hearing that Petitioner sought to deny the renewal of Respondent's license on the separate ground that Respondent engaged in "grooming behavior" for pedophilia. Fundamental principles of due process prohibit a state agency from notifying a regulated party of the allegations against the party and then, at the hearing, proving-up other allegations. One of the primary functions of an ALJ is to assure that an administrative hearing is a fair hearing. Respondent was not prepared at the administrative hearing to submit evidence, including expert testimony, to refute any allegation not stated in the Notice of Denial. The admission of evidence relevant to allegations not stated in the Notice of Denial would have required a continuance of the administrative hearing to provide Respondent with an opportunity to refute the allegation. A continuance would have denied Respondent a remedy during the period of continuance, increased the economic burden on Respondent, and frustrated judicial economy. Nothing prevents Petitioner from bringing a separate proceeding against the licensee based on the allegation that Respondent engaged in "grooming behavior" for pedophilia. The ALJ limited the testimony of Dr. Cotter to those grounds for denial that Petitioner stated in the Notice of Denial. In relevant part, the Notice of Denial states: After careful review and consideration, your application has been denied. Our decision is based on the following: Your admission that you and two minor boys, one of which was a foster child under your supervision, participated in several "skinny dipping" incidents during your recent licensure as a foster parent for Pinellas Enrichment Through Mental Health Services (PEMHS). As you are aware, the nature of a boy's early experiences may affect the development of his sexual attitudes and subsequent behavior. Therefore, foster parents are expected to provide opportunities for recreational activities appropriate to the child's age. "Skinny dipping" in a hot tub with two minor boys violates the intent of this rule. These incidents reflect poor judgment for a person who is a licensed foster parent. Respondent's Exhibit 1. The Notice of Denial essentially states four grounds for denying the application for renewal of Respondent's license. One ground is the impact on the development of the foster child's sexual attitudes and subsequent behavior. Another ground is nudity between a foster parent and a foster child. A third ground is that Respondent exercised poor judgment. The remaining ground is that Respondent provided recreational activities that were not appropriate to the foster child's age. No evidence shows that the "skinny dipping" events had any adverse impact on the development of the foster child's sexual attitudes and subsequent behavior. Dr. Cotter did not evaluate the foster child to determine the actual impact of the events on the foster child. Contrary to the statements in the Notice of Denial, Petitioner's representative testified at the hearing that Petitioner did not consider the impact on the child that resulted from skinny dipping with Respondent. The preponderance of evidence shows that the actual impact of the foster care provided by Respondent during the 15 months in which the "skinny dipping" events occurred was positive. Many of the foster child's behavioral problems greatly diminished. The foster child made remarkable progress in his behavior both at home and at school. The foster child bonded with Respondent, and Respondent was an exemplary foster parent. The placement of the child with Respondent was so successful that Family Continuity published an article in their magazine about the successful match between the foster child and Respondent. Family Continuity considers Respondent to be an exemplary foster parent and wishes to have Respondent in its foster care program. If Petitioner grants the application for renewal, Family Continuity intends to return the foster child to Respondent for adoption. The second ground stated in the Notice of Denial is nudity between the foster parent and foster child. Without considering the impact on the foster child, Petitioner determined that being naked in the presence of a foster child, without more, was sufficient to close a foster home, remove a child, and revoke a foster home license. Petitioner cited no written statute or rule that prohibits nudity between a foster parent and foster child; or that establishes intelligible standards for regulating such nudity. Petitioner failed to submit competent and substantial evidence to explicate an unwritten policy that prohibits or regulates nudity. Rather, some evidence shows that nudity between foster parents and foster children is generally unavoidable and common. The third ground stated in the Notice of Denial is that Respondent exercised poor judgment. Several witnesses at the hearing and Dr. Cotter opined that Respondent exercised poor judgment. It is unnecessary to determine whether Petitioner exercised poor judgment because Petitioner cited no written rule or policy that defines or prohibits "poor judgment." For reasons stated in the Conclusions of Law, Petitioner must base a denial of a license application on a finding that the applicant violated a specific statute or rule. Petitioner cannot use the Notice of Denial to invent requirements that are not authorized by statute or rule. Petitioner cited no statute or rule that defines "poor judgment" or that establishes intelligible standards to guide the discretionary determination of whether an applicant has exercised poor judgment. In the absence of intelligible standards, the determination of whether an applicant has exercised poor judgment is necessarily an exercise of unbridled agency discretion. The use of unbridled agency discretion to make findings of fact violates fundamental principles of due process. Unbridled agency discretion creates the potential that agency decision-makers may define poor judgment by relying on their personal predilections rather than on those standards authorized by the legislature. Even if it were determined that poor judgment is a standard authorized by the legislature and that Respondent violated that standard, the determination is not dispositive of whether Petitioner should renew Respondent's license to operate a foster home. For example, representatives for Family Continuity and PEMHS agreed in their testimony that Respondent exercised poor judgment. However, Family Continuity recommends that Petitioner issue the non- therapeutic foster home license while PEMHS recommends against renewal of the license. The remaining allegation in the Notice of Denial is that "skinny dipping" is not an age-appropriate recreational activity. Rule 65C-13.010(1)(b)8a. states: 8. Recreation and community. a. The substitute parents are expected to provide opportunities for recreational activities for children. The activities must be appropriate to the child's age and abilities. Swimming in a swimming pool and bathing in a hot tub are recreational activities within the meaning of Rule 65C- 13.010(1)(a)8a. Swimming nude and bathing nude in a hot tub with a nude adult are not appropriate for a child who is between 12 and 14 years old and whose psychological and emotional abilities are diminished by past sexual abuse.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner enter a final order finding that Respondent violated Rule 65C-13.010(1)(b)8 and granting Respondent’s application for a therapeutic foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Frank Nagatani, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 11351 Ulmerton Road, Suite 314 Largo, Florida 33778-1630 Gary A. Urso, Esquire 7702 Massachusetts Avenue New Port Richey, Florida 34653 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Petitioner’s application for licensure as a family foster home should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Sometime around 2004, Petitioner held a license as a foster home in Florida. During the licensure period, Petitioner fostered X. B. and T. T. in her home where she resided with her three biological children. X. B. stayed in Petitioner's home for approximately three weeks to a month. Throughout X. B.'s stay, Petitioner failed to provide breakfast to X. B. prior to school. Petitioner's failure necessitated the case manager providing such breakfast to X. B. when she drove X. B. to school. Additionally, on several occasions the case manager saw evidence of roach infestation in the home. In particular, upon X. B.'s return to Petitioner's home from visiting X. B.'s siblings, the case manager found him in a roach-infested environment, with no running water in the home since the service had been turned off by the service provider for non-payment of the bill. The toilet bowl was filled with feces and urine and had feces on the lid. It was unsanitary and unusable. X. B. asked the case manager to take him to the local gas station so that X. B. could use the bathroom. Soon after, X. B. was removed from Petitioner's care due to unsanitary conditions and/or unsafe conditions in Petitioner's home. T. T. was a one-year-old child who was also placed in Petitioner's foster home during her earlier licensure period. Again, the case manager saw evidence of roach infestation in Petitioner's home. At first, the case manager only saw a couple of roaches in the home. However, the roach problem progressively grew to the point that during one of the case manager's visits the wall behind the baby's crib looked like it was moving because there were so many roaches on it. Soon after, the case manager removed T. T. to another foster home. When they arrived at the new home, a roach crawled out of T. T.'s diaper bag. Upon inspection of the bag, the case manager discovered many dead roaches in the bag. More importantly, half of a dead roach was discovered in the baby bottle of milk that T. T. was drinking while being moved to T. T.'s new foster home. Clearly, the condition of Petitioner's foster home was neither sanitary nor safe. Petitioner's care of both these children resulted in verified abuse reports in Florida's abuse registry for conditions hazardous to the health of children. Petitioner's initial foster home license either lapsed or was not renewed. Since 2004, Petitioner has not been financially stable. In fact, she often asked her neighbors for money to pay her utility bills or buy gas for her car. Additionally, Petitioner lost different homes to foreclosure in 2006 and 2007. Since 2009, she and her children have moved to a different home an average of once a year. To her credit, Petitioner attended college and obtained her doctorate in Theology and Philosophy. However, her history has not demonstrated either household stability or financial ability in her life. In 2011, Petitioner applied for licensure as a family foster home. She successfully completed the Model Approach to Partnership in Parenting (MAPP) training program on September 20, 2011. In June 2012, Trauma Therapist for Children’s Homes Society, Katie Klutz, began the required home study of Petitioner. During the home study, Petitioner and her three biological children were living in a three bedroom home. Petitioner moved her bedroom furniture into the living room in order to make room for potential foster children. The bedroom space was separated from the living room by "curtains" that afforded no significant privacy for those living in the home. Clearly, Petitioner's home did not provide sufficient space to foster an additional child in the home. Petitioner has since moved to a larger home that was not the subject of the home study for this license. However, given Petitioner's past household instability, the very limited evidence regarding this new home does not support a finding that Petitioner's current home offers sufficient space to provide for the privacy and well-being of a foster child. More importantly, Petitioner has not worked since having an accident on the job in May 2010. A neighbor also provided a written reference in which she praised Petitioner’s spirit but stated that it is “a real struggle” for Petitioner to maintain her home and that “she will definitely need additional support in this area.” Notably, it was unclear how Petitioner was currently supporting her household. She has no employment. Petitioner claimed that she received money from a church or charitable organization that she founded. However, there was no evidence that such limited income, if any, was sufficient to support her family and/or provide financially stable conditions to Petitioner and her family. Moreover, Petitioner's bank records reflect that in June 2012, she made deposits of $167.53 and debited the account $266.07. Her ending balance in June was $18.81. At hearing, other than child support and food stamps, Petitioner offered no evidence of additional finances or income that is attributable to her. Given these facts, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate home safety, household stability or financial ability sufficient to entitle her to be licensed as a foster home. Therefore, Petitioner's application for such licensure should be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's application for licensure as a foster home should be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul A. Rowell, Esquire Department of Children and Families 2383 Phillips Road Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Shakinah Glory 4768 Woodville Highway Apartment 428 Tallahassee, Florida 32305 M. Burnette Coats, Esquire Department of Children and Families 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Gregory Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Marion Drew Parker, General Counsel Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 David Wilkins, Secretary Department of Children and Families Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
