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AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION vs GULF COAST MEDICAL CENTER LEE MEMORIAL HEALTH SYSTEM, 09-005365 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Oct. 01, 2009 Number: 09-005365 Latest Update: Jul. 01, 2010

The Issue The issues in this case are set forth in 11 separate counts within the four consolidated cases: Case No. 09-5360 Count I--Whether Respondent failed to properly monitor and care for a patient in restraints. Count II--Whether Respondent failed to ensure the physician's plan of care for patient was implemented. Case No. 09-5363 Count I--Whether Respondent failed to properly implement the physician's plan of care for patient. Case No. 09-5364 Count I--Whether Respondent failed to ensure a patients' right to privacy. Count II--Whether Respondent failed to ensure that food was served in the prescribed safe temperature zone. Count III--Whether Respondent failed to ensure that only authorized personnel had access to locked areas where medications were stored. Count IV--Whether Respondent failed to perform proper nursing assessments of a patient. Count V--Dismissed. Count VI--Whether Respondent failed to maintain patient care equipment in a safe operating condition. Case No. 09-5365 Count I--Whether Respondent failed to triage a patient with stroke-like symptoms in a timely fashion. Count II--Whether Respondent's nursing staff failed to assess and intervene for patients or ensure implementation of the physician's plan of care.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for, inter alia, monitoring health care facilities in the state to ensure compliance with all governing statutes, rules and regulations. It is the responsibility of AHCA to regularly inspect facilities upon unannounced visits. Often AHCA will inspect facilities for the purpose of licensure renewal, certification, or in conjunction with federal surveys. AHCA will also inspect facilities on the basis of complaints filed by members of the general public. Respondent, Gulf Coast Medical Center ("Gulf Coast" or "GCH") is a hospital within the Lee Memorial Health System. South West Florida Regional Medical Center ("SWF") was another hospital within the Lee Memorial Health System. SWF closed in March 2009, when it was consolidated with Gulf Coast. On October 15, 2008, the Agency conducted a complaint investigation at SWF; a follow-up complaint investigation was done on November 13, 2008. SWF filed and implemented a plan of correction for the issues raised in each of the investigations. The November investigation resulted in an Administrative Complaint containing two counts. On December 16, 2008, AHCA performed another complaint investigation at Gulf Coast. Gulf Coast filed and implemented a plan of correction for the issues raised in the investigation. The investigation resulted in an Administrative Complaint containing one count. On January 5 through 9, 2009, AHCA conducted a routine licensure survey at Gulf Coast. The hospital filed and implemented a plan of correction for the issues raised in the survey. The survey resulted in an Administrative Complaint containing six counts (although Count V was dismissed during the course of the final hearing). On February 18, 2009, AHCA did its follow-up survey to the previous licensure survey. Gulf Coast filed and implemented a plan of correction for the issues raised in the survey. The survey resulted in an Administrative Complaint containing two counts. Case 09-5360 The complaint investigation at SWF on November 13, 2008, was conducted under the supervision of Charlene Fisher. Count I in this case addresses findings by the Agency concerning a patient who was placed in restraints at the hospital on August 28, 2008. The patient, A.D., came into the hospital emergency department under the Baker Act seeking medical clearance to a facility. The patient presented at approximately 4:00 p.m., with back pain. He had a history of drug abuse, so there was concern by the hospital regarding the use of narcotics or certain other medications to treat the patient. The patient engaged in some scuffling with police. A physician signed and dated a four-point restraint (one on each limb) order, resulting in the patient being physically restrained. The restraint was deemed a medical/surgical restraint, rather than a behavioral restraint. AHCA had concerns about the restraint, specifically whether there was a notation for Q 15 (or every 15 minutes) monitoring of the restrained patient. However, medical/surgical restraints only require monitoring every two hours. The restraint worksheet for the patient confirms monitoring every two hours. The patient was ultimately admitted to the hospital at 9:37 p.m., and, thereafter, began complaining of left shoulder pain. The hospital responded to the patient's complaints about back pain and began treating the pain with analgesics. However, the patient continued to complain about the pain. An X-ray of the patient's shoulder was finally done the next morning. Shoulder dislocation was confirmed by the X-ray, and the hospital (four hours later) began a more substantive regimen of treatment for pain. Surgery occurred the following morning, and the shoulder problem was resolved. It is clear the patient had a shoulder injury, but it is unclear as to when that injury became more painful than the back injury with which the patient had initially presented. The evidence is unclear whether or when the shoulder injury became obvious to hospital staff. During its course of treating this patient, the hospital provided Motrin, Tylenol, Morphine, Percocet and other medications to treat the patient's pain. Count II in this case also involved a restrained patient, M.D., who had presented to the emergency department under the Baker Act. The patient was released from handcuffs upon arrival at the hospital. After subsequently fighting with a deputy, this patient was also placed in a medical/surgical restraint pursuant to a physician's order. The doctor signed and dated, but did not put a time on, the restraint order. A time is important because there are monitoring requirements for patients in restraints. However, the time of 0050 (12:50 a.m.) appears on the patient's chart and is the approximate time the restraints were initiated. The proper procedure is to monitor a restrained patient every two hours. This patient, however, was removed from his restraints prior to the end of the first two-hour period. Thus, there are no records of monitoring for the patient (nor would any be necessary). The evidence presented by AHCA was insufficient to establish definitively whether the hospital nursing staff failed to properly respond to the aforementioned patients' needs. It is clear the patients could have received more care, but there is not enough evidence to prove the care provided was inadequate. Case No. 09-5363 On December 16, 2008, AHCA conducted a complaint investigation at SWF. The Agency had received a complaint that the hospital did not properly implement a physician's plan of care. Count I in this complaint addresses alleged errors relating to two of four patients reviewed by the surveyors. Both of the patients came to the hospital from a nursing home. One patient, I.A., had presented to the emergency department complaining of chest pains. The medication list sent to the hospital by the nursing home for I.A. actually belonged to someone other than I.A. I.A.'s name was not on the medication list. The drugs listed on the patient chart were different than the drugs I.A. had been taking at the skilled nursing facility from which she came. The skilled nursing facility actually sent I.A.'s roommate's medication list. The erroneous medications were then ordered by the admitting physician and administered to the patient. The hospital is supposed to review the medication list it receives and then enter the medications into the hospital system. The person reviewing the medication list does not necessarily have to be a nurse, and there is no evidence that the person making the error in this case was a nurse or was some other employee. It is clear, however, that the person reviewing the medication list did not properly ascertain that the list belonged to patient I.A. The other patient from the nursing home had been admitted for surgery at SWF. Again, the nursing home from whence she came sent a medication list that was incorrect. The medications on the incorrect list were entered into the system by a SWF employee. The erroneous medications were ultimately ordered by the attending physician for the patient, but there is no evidence the patient was ever administered those medications. Neither of the residents was harmed by the incorrect medications as far as could be determined. Case 09-5364 From January 5 through 8, 2009, AHCA conducted a licensure survey at Gulf Coast and SWF in conjunction with a federal certification survey. Count I of the complaint resulting from this survey addressed the right of privacy for two residents. In one instance, a patient was observed in her bed with her breasts exposed to plain view. In the other instance, a patient's personal records were found in a "public" place, i.e., hanging on the rail of a hallway in the hospital. AHCA's surveyor, Nancy Furdell, saw a female patient who was apparently asleep lying in her bed. The patient's breasts were exposed as she slept. Furdell observed this fact at approximately 1:15 p.m., on January 7, 2009. Furdell did not see a Posey vest on the patient. She did not know if anyone else saw the exposed breasts. Furdell continued with her survey duties, and at approximately 5:00 p.m., notified a staff member as to what she had seen. Furdell did not attempt to cover the patient or wake the patient to tell her to cover up. The female patient with exposed breasts was in the intensive care unit (ICU) of the hospital. Visiting hours in ICU at that time were 10:00 to 10:30 a.m., and again from 2:00 till 2:30 p.m. Thus, at the time Furdell was present, no outside visitors would have been in the ICU. ICU patients are checked on by nursing staff every half-hour to an hour, depending on their needs. This particular patient would be visited more frequently due to her medical condition. On the day in question, the patient was supposed to be wearing a Posey vest in an effort to stop the patient from removing her tubing. The patient had been agitated and very restless earlier, necessitating the Posey vest. Also on January 7, 2009, a surveyor observed some "papers" rolled up and stuffed inside a hand-rail in the hospital corridor. This occurred at 1:15 p.m., on the fourth floor of the south wing of the hospital. A review of the papers revealed them to be patient records for a patient on that floor. The surveyor could not state at final hearing whether there were hospital personnel in the vicinity of the handrail where she found the patient records, nor could she say how long the patient records had been in the handrail. Rather, the evidence is simply that the records were seen in the handrail and were not in anyone's possession at that moment in time. Count II of the complaint was concerned with the temperature of certain foods being prepared for distribution to patients. Foods for patients are supposed to be kept at certain required temperatures. There is a "danger zone" for foods which starts at 40 degrees Fahrenheit and ends at 141 degrees Fahrenheit. Temperature, along with time, food and environment, is an important factor in preventing contamination of food and the development of bacteria. Surveyor Mary Ruth Pinto took part in the survey. As part of her duties, she asked hospital staff to measure the temperature of foods on the serving line. She found some peaches at 44 degrees, yogurt at 50 degrees, and cranberry juice at 66 degrees Fahrenheit. According to Pinto, the hospital's refrigerator temperatures were appropriate, so it was only food out on the line that was at issue. Pinto remembers talking to the hospital dietary manager and remembers the dietary manager agreeing to destroy the aforementioned food items. The hospital policies and procedures in place on the date of the survey were consistent with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration Food Code concerning the storage, handling and serving of food. The policies acknowledge the danger zone for foods, but allow foods to stay within the danger zone for up to four hours. In the case of the peaches and yogurt, neither had been in the danger zone for very long (not more than two hours). The cranberry juice was "shelf stable," meaning that it could be stored at room temperature. The food services director for the hospital remembers the peaches and yogurt being re-chilled in a chill blaster. She does not believe any of the food was destroyed. Count III of the complaint addressed whether an unauthorized person had access to a room where medications were being stored. A state surveyor, Gary Furdell, was part of the survey team on January 5, 2009. Furdell was touring the second floor of the hospital when he noticed a locked door. Furdell asked a hospital medical technician who was standing nearby about the door. The medical technician gave Furdell the code to unlock the door. Furdell peeked inside and noticed bottles that he presumed were medications. It would be a violation for a medical technician to have access to medications, because medical technicians cannot distribute drugs. The room Furdell looked into is a "mixed use" room located behind a nursing station. A mixed use room is used to store medical supplies, including medications, as long as there is a locked cabinet in the room for that purpose. This particular mixed use room had a locked cabinet. The room is used for the preparation of medications and for other purposes. No narcotics were stored in this particular mixed use room. The room contained locked cabinets used to store other medications. The evidence presented was insufficient to determine what "medications" Furdell may have seen in the room. Count IV of the complaint concerned the nursing assessment of a patient, and whether the assessment was properly and timely performed. A patient, M.S., had been admitted to the hospital on June 18, 2008, for lung surgery. Following the surgery, Amiodarone (a very toxic drug which can cause clots and other complications) was administered to treat M.S. for heart arrhythmia. The Amiodarone was administered intravenously and M.S. developed blisters and irritation at the intravenous site. That is not an uncommon complication with Amiodarone. M.S.'s attending physician was notified about the irritation and prescribed a treatment. He also ordered a consult with an infectious disease specialist who ultimately changed M.S.'s antibiotics. Although M.S. was seen daily by her physicians, the nursing notes do not reflect the assessment and treatment of her blisters. It appears that proper care was rendered, but the care was not documented properly. Another patient was admitted to the hospital on December 15, 2008, with End Stage Renal Disease and diabetes mellitus for which she began dialysis treatment. The patient was not weighed before and after a particular dialysis treatment on January 5, 2009. However, the patient had been moved to an air mattress bed on that date for comfort. The air mattress bed did not allow for a weight to be taken as it could be on a regular bed. There is an allegation in the Administrative Complaint concerning the discontinuation of the calorie count for a patient. This issue was not discussed in AHCA's Proposed Recommended Order, nor was sufficient evidence of any wrong- doing concerning this matter presented at final hearing. During the survey, the hospital was found to be storing the medication Mannitol in blanket warmers, rather than in warmers specifically designed for the drug. The blanket warmers maintained the Mannitol at 100-to-110 degrees Fahrenheit. The manufacturer's label on the drug calls for it to be dispensed (injected) at between 86 and 98.5 degrees Fahrenheit. In order to meet this requirement, the hospital takes the drug out of the blanket warmer in time for it to cool sufficiently before it is injected. There is nothing inherently wrong with using a blanket warmer to store Mannitol. On January 5, 2009, a surveyor found two vials of Thrombin, one vial of half-percent Lidocaine and Epi, and one vial of Bacitracin in operating room No. 4. The operating room is within the secured and locked suite of surgical rooms on the second floor. Two of the vials had syringes stuck in them and one of them was spiked. Whoever had mixed the medications was not attending to them at the time the surveyor made her observation. There were two unlicensed technicians in the room preparing for the next surgery. A registered nurse anesthetist was present as well. There was no identifying patient information on the medications. The hospital's policies and procedures do not require the patient's name to be on the label of medications prepared for impending surgery. That is because the procedures for the operating room include a process for ensuring that only the correct patient can be in the designated operating room. There is a fail-safe process for ensuring that only the proper patient can receive the medications that are set out. At around 2:45 p.m. on January 5, 2009, there were patient records in the emergency department showing that several drugs had been administered to a patient. The surveyor did not see a written order signed by a physician authorizing the drugs. When the surveyor returned the next morning, the order had been signed by the physician. The hospital policy is that such orders may be carried out in the emergency department without a doctor's signature, but that a physician must sign the order before the end of their shift. AHCA cannot say whether the physician signed the order at the end of his shift or early the next day. Count V of the complaint was voluntarily dismissed by the Agency. Count VI of the complaint concerned the status of certain patient care equipment, and whether such equipment was being maintained in a safe operating condition. A patient was weighed at the hospital upon admission on December 27, 2008, and found to weigh 130 pounds using a bed scale. Six days later, on January 2, 2009, the patient's weight was recorded as 134 pounds. Two days later, in the same unit, the patient weighed 147 pounds and the next day was recorded as weighing 166 pounds. During the survey process, the patient was weighed and recorded at 123 pounds on a chair scale. The hospital does not dispute the weights which were recorded, but suggests there are many factors other than calibration of the equipment that could explain the discrepant weights. For example, the AHCA surveyor could not say whether the patient sometimes had necessary medical equipment on his bed while being weighed, whether different beds were involved, or whether any other factors existed. AHCA relies solely on the weight records of this single patient to conclude that the hospital scales were inaccurate. Case No. 09-5365 On February 18, 2009, AHCA conducted a licensure survey at Gulf Coast. Count I of the complaint from this survey concerned the timeliness of triage for a patient who presented at the hospital emergency department with stroke-like symptoms. AHCA surveyors witnessed two patients on stretchers in the ambulance entrance hallway leading to the emergency department. Each of the two patients had been brought in by a separate emergency medical service (EMS) team and was awaiting triage. One patient was taken to an emergency department room (ER room) 50 minutes after his/her arrival at the hospital. The other patient waited 45 minutes after arrival before being admitted to an ER room. Meanwhile, a third patient arrived at 2:20 p.m., and was awaiting triage 25 minutes later. During their observation, the surveyors saw several nursing staff in the desk area of the emergency department, i.e., they did not appear to be performing triage duties. The emergency department on that date was quite busy. That is not unusual during February, as census tends to rise during the winter months due to the influx of seasonal residents. A summary of the action within the emergency department from 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m., on the day of the survey shows the following: Patient L.G., 74 years old with stable vital signs, was radioed in by her EMS team at 1:08; L.G. was processed into the ER at 1:21 (which is not an unreasonable time; EMS teams call in when they arrive at or near the hospital. By the time they gain access, wait their turn if multiple ambulances are present, and get the patient inside, several minutes may lapse). L.G. was stabilized and quickly reviewed by ER staff, then officially triaged at 2:04. Patient H.M., an 89-year-old male residing in a nursing home, arrived at 1:20 and was processed in at 1:59. He was triaged at 2:01, but ultimately signed out of the hospital against medical advice. Patient E.M. arrived at 2:18 and was processed at 2:25. Triage occurred one minute later. This patient presented as a stroke alert, and hospital protocol for that type patient was followed. Patient C.J. arrived at 1:08 and was processed at 2:38. Triage occurred immediately after C.J. was processed. This patient was not stroke alert, but had some stroke-like symptoms.1 C.J. had not been transported to the hospital as emergent, because the symptoms had been going on for 24 hours. Patient W.M., an auto accident victim, arrived at 1:40 and was processed at 1:49. Triage occurred within six minutes. Patient M.M., W.M.'s wife (who had been with M.M. in the automobile accident, but was placed in a separate ambulance), arrived at 2:06 and was triaged at 2:34. There is no record of when M.M. was processed. Patient L.M. came to the hospital from a nursing home. She arrived at 1:43 and was processed at 2:35. L.M. was triaged at 2:37. Patient K.M. arrived at 2:45 and was processed within three minutes. Triage occurred at 2:52. Her triage was done very quickly due to the condition in which she arrived, i.e., shortness of breath and low oxygen saturation. Patient R.S. arrived at 1:00 and was triaged at 1:15. The aforementioned patients represent the patients presenting to the emergency department by ambulance during a two-hour period on a very busy day. It is the customary procedure for ER staff to make a quick visual review (rapid triage) of patients as they come into the hospital. Those with obvious distress or life-threatening conditions are officially triaged first. Others, as long as they are stable, are allowed to wait until staff is available for them. As part of their duties, nurses necessarily have to be in the desk area (nursing station) in order to field phone calls from physicians concerning treatment of the patients who present. It is not unusual or improper for nurses to be in the nursing station while residents are waiting in the processing area. It is clear that some patients waited a much longer time for triage than others. However, without a complete record of all patients who presented that day and a complete review of each of their conditions, it is impossible to say whether the hospital was dilatory in triaging any of them. Count II of the complaint addressed the nursing staff and whether it failed to assess and intervene in the care of a patient or failed to implement a physician's plan of care for the patient. Patient D.W. was a 67-year-old female who was morbidly obese, diabetic, debilitated, had end stage renal disease, and was receiving dialysis. Upon admission, D.W. had a Stage 3 pressure ulcer to her sacrum and a Stage 4 ulcer on her left calf. A wound care protocol was initiated immediately, and a Clinitron bed was obtained for her on the day of admission. Due to the seriousness of her condition, the wound care physician declined to accept her case at first. He later ordered Panafil, and it became part of the protocol for treating the patient. The nursing documentation for D.W. was only minimally sufficient, but it does indicate that care was provided. Patient R.H. was an 83-year-old male who presented on February 10, 2009, in critical condition. R.H. was suffering from congestive heart failure, pneumonia, and respiratory failure. Due to the critical nature of his respiratory problems, R.H. was placed on a ventilator. As a ventilator patient, he did not fit the profile for obtaining wound care. Nonetheless, the hospital implemented various other measures to deal with R.H.'s pressure wounds.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration, imposing a fine in the amount of $500.00 in DOAH Case No. 09-5363 and a fine in the amount of $500.00 in DOAH Case No. 09-5364, Count VI. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 2010.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57395.1055395.1065 Florida Administrative Code (3) 59A-3.208559A-3.25359A-3.276
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs JOHN B. MILTON, M.D., 07-003609PL (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Deland, Florida Aug. 09, 2007 Number: 07-003609PL Latest Update: Jun. 25, 2008

The Issue Should discipline be imposed against Respondent's license to practice medicine for violation of Section 458.331(1)(m) and (t), Florida Statutes (2005)?

Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts: Petitioner is the state department charged with the regulation of the practice of medicine pursuant to Chapter 20.43, Florida Statutes; Chapter 456, Florida Statutes; and Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent is John B. Milton, M.D. Respondent is a licensed medical doctor in the State of Florida having been issued license ME 53961. Respondent's mailing address of record is 4702 Van Kleeck Drive, New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32169. Additional Facts: Hospital Records (Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 1) On December 31, 2005, Patient W.C. came to the Bert Fish Medical Center (Bert Fish) in New Smyrna Beach, Florida, at 1:40 a.m. He was 40 years old at the time. He was seen in the Emergency Department at Bert Fish. Triage of the patient took place at 1:43 a.m. The triage record reports that he walked in to the hospital complaining of his throat swelling and difficulty breathing. The record reflects that the patient was experiencing pain of an intensity level seven (7) in his throat. At the time his blood pressure was 153/83. His pulse rate was 88. His respirations were 20. His temperature was 98.2. His 02 sat. was 99. In the heading within the Emergency Department Triage Record, statement of "Previous Surgery/Other Medical Hx (referring to history)" it states "allergic reaction to birds with throat swelling, " According to the Emergency Department triage nursing notes Patient W.C. was first seen by Respondent at 1:55 a.m. on the aforementioned date. Respondent was serving in the capacity of emergency room physician at Bert Fish at the time. Among the nursing note entries in the Emergency Department triage record for Patient W.C. are handwritten nursing notes that state: At 2:05 Rocephin was given; at 2:20 a.m. pt. (patient) states throat closing saO2 98%; at 2:25 a.m. pt. (patient) tubed by Dr. Milton- placement checked tube pulled-(pt.) patient vent 100% O2 via ambu; at 2:31 a.m. crick. (cricothyroidotomy) by Dr. Milton tube inserted 100% 02; at 2:35 a.m. H/R 40's - atropine; at 2:37 a.m. b/p 213/90 P-87 Dr. Milton attempting crick 0249 epi 1 mg IV; at 2:41 a.m. Dr. Schreiber here; at 2:43 pt. (patient) tubed by Dr. Schreiber s/r 0 pulses and at 2:54 a.m. code called by Dr. Milton. The Bert Fish Emergency Physician Record refers to Patient W.C.'s chief complaint as "shortness of breath." It states "pt (patient) seems to have acute severe pharyngitis and difficulty breathing and mild stridor at rest." The degree of the condition is further described in the record as "moderate." An associated symptom is listed under "Pulmonary," as "cough." It is noted in this record that the patient is experiencing a "sore throat." The Emergency Physician Record under the "Social Hx (history)," notes that the Patient W.C. was a "smoker" and occasionally used "alcohol." No reference is made to the use of any other form of drugs. On the patient chart describing a physical exam performed on the patient, the categories of "alert" and "anxious" are checked. The level of distress is described as "NAD." There is a reference to "pharyngeal erythema," associated with that entry a handwritten note states "mild stridor at rest." A reference is made to "lymphadenopathy" both right and left "mild." There was no "respiratory distress" and "breath sounds nml (normal);" Again the condition "stridor" is noted while the patient is "at rest." "CVS" is noted as regular rate rhythm with "no JVD." On the same page as discussed in the preceding paragraph, within the patient record maintained by Bert Fish, under "clinical impression," Respondent notes several things in the overall experience in treating the patient. They are in turn: acute severe pharyngitis/epiglottitis; emergency cricothroidotomy cardio pulmonary arrest and ER death. These entries reflect events at the end of the case. The medication administration record at Bert Fish in relation to Patient W.C. notes administration of Decadron (a steroid) at 2 a.m.; Solu-cortef (a steroid) at 2:02 a.m.; Rocephin (an antibiotic) at 2:05 a.m.; Versed (a sedative) at 2:20 a.m. and Anectine (a paralytic agent) at 2:25 a.m. A separate set of entries is made in the Code Blue Record at Bert Fish, noting the administration of Epinephrine, and Atropine during the Code Blue response prior to Patient W.C.'s death due to his cyanotic condition (lack of oxygen). Nurse's notes on the Code Blue Record for Patient W.C. maintained by Bert Fish state: Upon me entering the room Dr. Milton was doing CPR on pt. Dr. Schreiber, Dr. Milton and the ER staff attending to pt. ER staff busy. I started scribing for them. Note pt. was in PRA throughout the code. Pt. was given 3 ep. & 3 atoprine total = (-)response. Respondent signed the Code Blue Record as physician. The ER Physician's Order Sheet, as signed by Respondent concerning Patient W.C., in a shorthand reference, describes orders for nebulized racemic Epinephrine, which is an aerosol adrenaline agent, together with the Solu-cortef, Decadron and Rocephin. In the records maintained by Bert Fish concerning Patient W.C., there is a handwritten note made by Respondent at 3:35 a.m., on December 31, 2005, following Patient W.C.'s death, which says: S/P IV steroids, Racemic epinephrine PT continued to c/o "getting worse" "can't breath." At times his respirations were gasping. .. I discussed with him fact the he may require intubation & he understood. PT placed in TRI and preparation made for intubation. PT had secure IV site, Respiratory TX in Room to assist. S/P preoxygenation 1HR> 80 PT had IV Versed and Anectine to facilitate intubation. The laryngoscope revealed a massive "beefy" appearance of the epiglottis. Attempted X 2 E 8.0 & 7.5 ET to secure an airway but Ø success. PT had attempts to ventilate E BVM? Ø air movement. PT cyanotic @ this point so a scalpel was used to attempt a crichothyroidotomy. When a ETT was passed thru the incision however attempts to ventilate were again unsuccessful. Dr. Schreiber (gen surgery) had been paged and he responded. He was able to place a ETT in the airway but by now PT had arrested. Monitor-bradycardia at this time ACLS measures were undertaken and PT given repeated doses of atropine/epinephrine/CPR-> ventilated E BVM. PT continued to have Ø response to proper ALS measurers and Resus efforts stopped @ 0254. Patient Care Explained Nurse Haas William Haas, R.N., was working at Bert Fish on the early morning that Patient W.C. was seen. Nurse Haas first saw the patient around 1:55 a.m. He hooked the patient up to a monitor and took his vital signs. None of the readings were considered by the nurse to be abnormal. Those readings were blood pressure 153/83, heart rate 88, respirations 20, temperature 98.2. and O2 sat. 99%. Patient W.C. was taken into treatment room 16 and was seen by Respondent and nurse Haas. Nurse Haas asked Respondent what Respondent thought was wrong with the patient. Orders were given by the Respondent for 8 mg. of Decadron and 100 mg. of Solu-cortef IV. The purpose of these medicines was to reduce inflammation. Both medications were steroids designed for that purpose. At that time Respondent gave an order for the antibiotic Rocephin. Respondent also wanted a racemic Epinephrine treatment. That treatment was to be provided by the respiratory therapist. When nurse Haas first saw the patient, the patient was complaining about difficulty breathing. Nurse Haas did not observe any manifestation of those difficulties. At one point the patient told nurse Haas that he, the patient, was experiencing an allergic reaction to feathers or birds. The patient told nurse Haas by way of history that it happened to him in the past. (None of this was true. He had no allergy to birds. The patient's deception was never discovered by the hospital treatment team, and they all proceeded on the basis that the patient had a bird allergy.) On the evening before arriving at the hospital, the patient explained to nurse Haas that he went to bed about 9:00 or 10:00 p.m. and woke up around 1:00 a.m. with a raspy feeling in his throat and he felt like his throat was closing up. So he came to the emergency room for care. After attending to the patient in treatment room 16, nurse Haas left the presence of the patient. He next saw the patient standing in treatment room 17 talking on the phone. This was around 2:20 a.m. The patient was again placed on a monitor to track his vital signs. Nothing about those vital signs appeared abnormal. At that time Mary Boothe, R.N., told nurse Haas that the patient was going to be intubated. Nurse Haas inquired of Respondent on the subject, and Respondent told nurse Haas that the patient wanted to be intubated and to get ready to perform the intubation. The procedure for intubation that was being utilized by Respondent is referred to as rapid sequence intubation or RSI. Nurse Haas retrieved Anectine and Versed to be administered in the intubation. The patient was told about the procedure for intubation. The patient was laid down. Nurse Haas gave the patient Versed and Anectine. The Versed was designed to, as nurse Haas describes it, "muddle the mind." The Anectine was an agent that would promote paralysis in the area where the intubation would occur. When in treatment room 17, at around 2:20 a.m., the patient said to nurse Haas that the patient felt that his throat was closing. Those remarks were made when the patient was being hooked up to the monitor to measure his vital signs. This was the second time that the patient had mentioned his throat closing. He had made similar remarks when nurse Haas first saw him in treatment room 16. Steve Igrec, R.T., participated in the intubation procedure in addition to nurse Haas, nurse Boothe and Respondent. Prior to the laryngoscope being introduced in the intubation procedure, nurse Haas did not notice any sharp decline in Patient W.C.'s vital signs. When Respondent accessed the airway for Patient W.C., nurse Haas heard Respondent say, "Oh, he's got epiglottitis," while proceeding further with the intubation. Respondent was unable to intubate and removed the ET tube. Another tube was used to try and intubate, again without success. Nurse Boothe Nurse Boothe first encountered Patient W.C. after he had undergone his racemic Epinephrine treatment. He came out of the treatment room and told her that he did not feel that the treatment had worked. Respondent came by and the nurse repeated what the patient had told her. Nurse Boothe did not notice anything about the patient that made her believe that he was having difficulty breathing. He coughed and told her, "Can you hear it?" but he was not gasping for air, nor making gestures about his chest or throat. Respondent then offered the patient the option of being admitted to the hospital and continuing treatments by steroids to address his condition or putting him on a ventilator and letting him have the treatments through the ventilator. The patient elected the latter option. The ventilator option would allow the patient to be released the next day. The patient was told by Respondent that he would "knock him out" and put the tube in and give the patient the medication that way and that the patient's release would come the next day. Nurse Boothe did not hear the Respondent make any mention to the effect of what might happen if there were difficulties in intubating the patient. The attempted intubation was made in the treatment room 17, which is also referred to as CC-1. The patient walked into the room. Once in the room nurse Boothe did not notice anything about the patient that indicated any difficulty breathing. The patient did mention that he was not feeling any better. Nurse Boothe overheard the patient talking on the telephone. On his end of the conversation he told his wife that he did not feel any better and that they were going to "knock him out" and put him on a breathing machine overnight and that he would see her the following day. Nurse Boothe noticed that as the attempted intubation proceeded, the patient began to have trouble with the intubation. The equipment that was in the room for those purposes included the laryngoscope, the intubation tube, and a stylet. Before the tube was introduced the patient was being ventilated with a bag and mask. When difficulties arose concerning the intubation, nurse Boothe left the treatment room to get a scalpel and to get what is referred to as a "cric" kit. That kit is a set-up that has been assembled to aid in providing emergency access to the trachea. The kit is not kept in treatment room 17. It was kept in another room on a respiratory cart. Nurse Boothe observed Respondent utilize the scalpel and the "cric." After the Respondent experienced difficulties in this effort, the on-call surgeon was contacted by a secretary at the hospital. The Surgeon Arrives On December 31, 2005, Dr. Schreiber was the on-call surgeon at Bert Fish. When he was paged by the hospital, he called and was told that he needed to go immediately to the emergency room because of an airway problem. He received the call at approximately 2:30 a.m. He arrived at the hospital at 2:41 a.m. Once at the hospital Dr. Schreiber, took over and performed surgery, insertion of the endotracheal tube, thereby ventilating the patient. That procedure by Dr. Schreiber was quickly performed. Mr. Igrec Mr. Igrec administered the racemic Epinephrine treatment to Patient W.C. Prior to providing the treatment Mr. Igrec visibly examined the patient to see if the patient was using assessory muscles to breathe or if he had any stridor, any wheezing or anything of that nature. He did not observe the patient using any assessory muscles to breathe. He did not notice the patient evidencing stridor, that is to say a high- pitched sound that is made when a person experiences upper airway obstruction. Mr. Igrec provided two of the treatments to Patient W.C. Before the second treatment, he visibly examined Patient W.C. and did not notice the patient having difficulty breathing. Sometime during the course of the treatment, near the end, the patient asked the question, "How long is this going to take to work?" Mr. Igrec told the patient to give it time. The patient appeared anxious. He did not appear short of breath. Mr. Igrec reported to Respondent that he had provided Patient W.C. the second treatment. Following the second treatment, Mr. Igrec suggested to Respondent the use of Decadron to aerosolize Patient W.C. The racemic Epinephrine is a short- acting drug, and Decadron is a steroid that takes longer to work. In response, the Respondent told Mr. Igrec "We may have to intubate." Mr. Igrec was called to treatment room 17 where Respondent told him that they were going to intubate Patient W.C. In preparation, an ambu-bag, mask, intubation tube, pressure cuff, stylet and strap were retrieved. The cuff was used to keep the intubation tube in place during the procedure. The stylet keeps the tube rigid. Once the patient was sedated, Mr. Igrec began to use the ambu-bag with the patient. At that time, there was no difficulty using the bag, squeezing the bag to provide air into the patient's lungs. Mr. Igrec had one hand on the mask over the patient's face and one hand on the ambu-bag. Respondent used the laryngoscope in placing the tube, trying to look while placing the tube. The tube went into the stomach and not the trachea, such that ventilation did not occur. After that, when Mr. Igrec was bagging the patient he had a lot more resistance, to the point where Respondent had to hold the mask while Mr. Igrec bagged the Patient W.C. After a second attempt to intubate the patient, Respondent attempted to establish a surgical airway. Respondent was using a scalpel and palpating the patient to try and find the crichothyroid cartilage to create the necessary incision. An incision was created. There was no success in placing an airway because the tube did not pass through the crichothyroid cartilage. Mr. Igrec understood this because the tube that he had cut down to place and to ventilate the patient could not be used because there was no hole in the trachea. Blood was pooling around the patient. Dr. Schreiber arrived and established the surgical airway. During this time, CPR was provided the patient under Code Blue conditions where the patient's heart had stopped beating. Attempts at reviving the patient were not successful. Respondent and Patient W.C. Prior to the occasion when he intubated Patient W.C., Respondent had vast experience in performing intubations. As he describes it, this is a necessary skill for an emergency room doctor, recognizing that having an unobstructed airway is vital to a patient's survival. When intubating a patient, Respondent believes that you would want to do this before they "crash," before they lose their vital signs and become unconscious. Before his attempt to intubate Patient W.C., Respondent had never had an instance in which he could not intubate the patient, a function that he had performed numerous times without the assistance of a surgeon or an anesthesiologist. By contrast, before the circumstance that was confronted in Patient W.C., Respondent had never performed a crichothyroidotomy. He had been trained to perform that procedure. On December 31, 2005, nurse Haas approached Respondent and told Respondent that he placed Patient W.C. in a treatment room, described as the ortho room, and that the patient was having trouble breathing and that he needed to be seen by Respondent. Respondent inquired of the patient about the duration of his problem. He asked the patient if he had asthma. Had this happened before? The patient told Respondent that he was having an allergic reaction to his wife's bird and that this problem that he was experiencing had occurred once years before. Respondent asked the patient if he was telling Respondent that an hour ago he was fine and that now he was not. Patient W.C. said "absolutely." When listening to the patient's lungs Respondent did not notice any wheezing. There was no fever in the patient and the patient had not been sick. Unlike the other health care providers attending the patient, Respondent observed that Patient W.C. was having trouble getting air in, the patient was having inspriatory stridor. Respondent believed that the presentation by Patient W.C. was that of someone having an allergic reaction, with some airway compromise, he refers to as laryngospasm. Respondent told nurse Haas to start an IV on the patient and get respiratory therapy to provide a racemic Epinephrine treatment. The reasons for this decision was Respondent thought the patient was having an allergic reaction. In particular, Respondent's impression at that moment was that the patient was someone having an allergic reaction to birds. Patient W.C.'s case was comparable to another case that Respondent had with a woman who had experienced an allergic reaction. In the case of the woman, the patient worsened and quickly had to be intubated. The differential diagnosis that Respondent was proceeding with was that of a patient having an allergic reaction. The orders Respondent gave concerning administration of medications were designed to alleviate an airway problem associated with an allergic reaction. Consistent with Respondent's orders, the nurse started the IV and provided medications, and the respiratory therapist came to provide the aerosol treatment. Respondent observed that Patient W.C. was sitting up in bed and did not appear to be doing anything unusual. Respondent received the report on the patient's status. Respondent went to see Patient W.C., who at that time was anxious and restless. He was having trouble getting air in and telling Respondent that he could not breathe and that his airway was closing off. Patient W.C. told Respondent that "you guys ain't helping me at all." Respondent told the patient that the treatment already provided was the normal thing that was done. Respondent got more history from the patient by asking the patient, "You were perfectly fine until an hour ago?" The response was "yes." Respondent asked the patient if he had not been sick at all. Again the response was "no." The Respondent asked the patient if he had a sore throat. The patient said a little bit. Respondent took a tongue depressor and looked in the patient's throat. It looked pretty normal. (The Emergency Physician Record indicated the patient had a sore throat.) The patient had very mild prominent lymph nodes but nothing out of the ordinary. There was still no wheezing. At that juncture, the decision was made to give Patient W.C. another aerosol treatment. In addition, the decision was made to provide antibiotics in case there was some tracheitis, pharyngitis. It was anticipated that the antibiotics would take 24 hours to have any effect. Epiglottitis was a condition at the bottom of the list on the differential diagnosis. Respondent's experience with that condition was that a patient would be sick for a period of time before the condition worsened. Nothing in Patient W.C.'s presentation led Respondent to believe that he had epiglottitis at that point. By way of history, there was no indication from the patient that he had used cocaine within 24 hours of the time of his visit to the emergency room. (Indeed subsequent toxicology studies revealed recent use of cocaine.) Had such use been reported Respondent would have acted differently in treating Patient W.C. In his second encounter with the patient on the night in question, the patient told him several times that his airway was closing off and that he believed that any second he was not going to be able to breathe. In reply, Respondent told Patient W.C. that the normal things to address his condition had been done, but there was one other thing that could be done and that would be to intubate Patient W.C. Respondent explained that it meant that they would lay the patient in a critical care room and render him unconscious and take a breathing tube and put it into his lungs and admit Patient W.C. to the hospital. This would then be followed by 24 to 48 hours of ventilatory support with use of steroids to address swelling. Patient W.C. told Respondent "let's do it quick." Respondent told a nurse to gather the standard rapid sequence medication, which in this instance involved the use of Versed and Anecitine. In the procedure room where the intubation was attempted, the procedure commenced with the patient having a good heart rate. There was a crash cart available in case there were problems. At the moment, Respondent continued to believe that the patient was experiencing an allergic reaction. Although the patient could have been experiencing epiglottitis secondary to infection, the patient did not show any signs or symptoms of that condition, indications of an on-going infection such as a fever. He was not sweating, his heart rate was not rapid. Once in the treatment room where the intubation was attempted, the patient worsened. Patient W.C. was gasping. He closed his eyes a second. The respiratory therapist Mr. Igrec experienced problems bagging the patient. Efforts by Respondent and the respiratory therapist were not succeeding in getting air into the patient. When Respondent looked in, using the laryngoscope, he noticed something that he had not encountered before. Patient W.C.'s epiglottis had the appearance of a "mushroom." It did not appear as normal anatomy. Respondent described it as a "moonscape." When Respondent looked into the patient using the laryngoscope, he describes the "picture" as looking like a scorched airway when viewing the larynx and the epiglottis. Now that he had observed the epiglottitis, Respondent decided to try and "get under it" using the ET tube. He encountered a complete blockage. Respondent then asked for a smaller tube. The smaller tube did not work. Efforts at bagging the patient were not successful. Respondent concluded that he could not intubate the patient and could not ventilate the patient in that manner, leaving him the only choice, in his perception, to deal with the obstruction by establishing a surgical airway. Respondent asked for a scalpel to perform a "cric." Respondent also told someone to call and get the surgeon and indicate that there was an airway emergency and to come immediately, as Dr. Schreiber did. Respondent took the scalpel and located the crichothyroid membrane below the crichothyroid cartilage and made an incision and air bubbled out. Respondent widened the incision, as he had been trained to do in a course dealing with trauma associated with the airway. Respondent took the ET tube that he had been using and inserted it. It went in smoothly and the treatment team was able to bag the patient. Respondent then noticed that the heart rate was dropping and that the "stats" were not coming up. Respondent then observed that the patient's neck was bigger. What had happened was that the tube had slipped out of the incision, tracking anteriorly over the trachea and the air was being introduced into the neck. Once the subcutaneous emphysema was seen in the neck, it occurred to Respondent that the tube was in the wrong place. The patient was bleeding profusely. There was an effort at reintroducing the tube but the neck had become more swollen, and the tube could not be replaced. A nursing supervisor, Tom Frith, went to the next trauma room and took one of the crichothyroidotomy kits and brought it back. Respondent was not trained to use that kit. He had seen the kits used at a demonstration. The kit was opened. Respondent took a needle from the kit and tried to find an airway but was unable to locate the airway that had been created because efforts at aspiration produced more blood. Other equipment in the kit was utilized to try to replace the endotracheal tube back in the patient, but the field would quickly fill with blood and the tube could not be placed into the membrane. When Dr. Schreiber arrived, using the skill of a surgeon, not that of an emergency room doctor, he performed an emergency tracheotomy on Patient W.C. Respondent acknowledges that persons suffering from an allergic reaction have a common presentation where they experience hives and itching. Some people have wheezing. Patient W.C. had none of these symptoms. Nonetheless, the patient appeared to Respondent to be having an allergic reaction involving the airway Respondent describes as laryngospasm. Respondent understood the patient's condition to be one in which he was able to move about and speak but he was unable to get air in. While able to compensate for that condition for awhile, that ability did not last. Respondent had never seen a patient with epiglottitis. Hypothetically, if a patient were perceived as having that condition, Respondent would consult with a surgeon or an anesthesiologist, if he had time. If confronted with classic signs of epiglottitis, Respondent would start an IV, give the patient supplemental oxygen and not attempt intubation unless the case was emergent. Given sufficient time, the patient would be taken to an operating room and an anesthesiologist could attempt intubation, failing which a surgeon would be available to address the obstruction by placing a surgical airway. This case became one of an emergency, and Respondent took the measures he deemed appropriate. Concerning notes made pertaining to treatment provided Patient W.C., that record was provided after Patient W.C. died. Given the volume of patients that were being seen in the emergency room, other patients as well as Patient W.C., five sets of records and tests were being established aside from Patient W.C. As a consequence, Respondent was doing paperwork on those patients and telling nurses what to do for Patient W.C. Only after the attempts at trying to save Patient W.C. were unsuccessful and after talking to Patient W.C.'s family did Respondent turn his attention to the medical records for Patient W.C. Expert Opinion Dr. John Murray is an emergency physician at Central Florida Regional Hospital in Sanford, Florida. He is licensed to practice in Florida and has been since 1983. He is also licensed to practice in Alabama. Dr. Murray attended medical school at the University of South Florida in Tampa, Florida. He did his residency at the University of Alabama in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. His residency was in family practice. Dr. Murray practiced in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, in emergency medicine, until four or five years ago. He then entered family practice for about three years. Following that time, he returned to practice in emergency medicine. Dr. Murray is board-certified in family practice and emergency medicine. Dr. Murray was received as an expert in emergency medicine to allow him to offer his opinion as an expert. Dr. Murray served as Petitioner's consultant in the case and was presented as its witness at hearing. To prepare himself to testify, Dr. Murray reviewed the Bert Fish hospital records relating to Patient W.C., the autopsy report, the Administrative Complaint, correspondence from Respondent's attorney, Respondent's deposition, the deposition of the nurses who treated Patient W.C. at Bert Fish, the deposition of the respiratory therapist involved with Patient W.C.'s patient care, and the toxicology report pertaining to Patient W.C. Having prepared himself Dr. Murray testified concerning Respondent's performance when measured against the expected "standard of care." In offering his opinion, Dr. Murray conformed to the expectation that Respondent's performance meet what was minimally acceptable in the standard of care. Dr. Murray does not believe that Respondent met the standard of care incumbent upon Respondent. In Dr. Murray's opinion, when a patient is seen in an emergency room the development of the differential diagnosis begins with the worse case scenario. In Patient W.C.'s case, the first consideration in the differential diagnosis should have been epiglottitis, recognizing that the main problem in the condition is inspiratory stridor, the closing of the airway or the upper airway which may cause the patient to die. Therefore, the physician should do everything possible to assure that this does not happen. Dr. Murray believes that the patient was presenting with signs and symptoms of epiglottitis when he arrived at the emergency room at Bert Fish. Dr. Murray believes that when Respondent decided to intubate Patient W.C., it should have been anticipated that there was going to be a very difficult procedure if the patient had acute epiglottitis. Sometimes the intubation fails and there is the need to provide a surgical airway. Because Respondent did not anticipate that difficulty, the intubation procedure was not properly "setup," according to Dr. Murray. That setup would envision dealing with intubation to potentially be followed by the need to provide a surgical airway. Given the possibility that the patient had epiglottitis, it was important to have the most experienced person available to perform the intubation. Dr. Murray believes that would be an anesthesiologist. Beyond that point, if the surgical airway is needed, a surgeon should be available to provide a surgical airway. Dr. Murray believes there was time to have a successful intubation, or if not, the provision of a successful airway by surgery and these arrangements were not made. Notwithstanding the patient's reported history, recognizing the symptoms present, Dr. Murray did not believe that the patient was suffering from an allergic reaction. Nothing in the medical records suggested to Dr. Murray that Patient W.C. was under the influence of cocaine when he was seen at Bert Fish. Commenting on the medical record where the term "pharyngeal erythema" was circled, Dr. Murray explained that pharyngitis is a form of infection either viral or bacterial in relation to the red or sore throat seen in the back of the throat of Patient W.C. when examined by Respondent. Respondent also made reference to lymphadenopathy both right and left, swollen lymph nodes. Patient W.C. was experiencing inspiratory stridor, difficulty in getting air in to his lungs. With inspiratory stridor, swollen lymph nodes and a red and painful throat, Dr. Murray said he would be concerned about Patient W.C.'s having an infection. Dr. Murray was concerned that if Patient W.C. had a lot of inspiratory stridor that the condition might be epiglottitis. With infection and stridor, the airway can close quickly. These circumstances could make intubation of the patient difficult, if not impossible. Dr. Murray acknowledges that epiglottitis was on Respondent's differential diagnosis for Patient W.C. Respondent's orders for use of racemic Epinephrine through nebulization and the provision of steroids, Decadron and Solu-cortef were appropriate in Dr. Murray's view. Repeating the nebulization would have been appropriate in dealing with an allergic reaction which was the number one condition treated by Respondent. Dr. Murray speaks of the use of antihistamines as well. Dr. Murray opined that as long as Patient W.C. was perceived as having an allergic airway problem, the patient would be treated with updraft treatments and antihistamines, if the patient remained stable and did not appear to be "going down hill and crashing." If the patient is "crashing," stops breathing, then a response to the condition would be necessary before the patient had respiratory arrest. However, with epiglottitis most patients would have to be intubated to protect the airway. The condition would be treated as an infection with use of an antibiotics and steroids over time while being cautious about the patient having his or her airway close off. Criticism that Dr. Murray has of Respondent's care was not the basic idea that the patient was intubated to address epiglottitis. It was the expectation that intubation need not be done unless it was absolutely an emergent circumstance, i.e., the patient had stopped breathing. If there is suspected epiglottitis, the physician should not use a tongue blade that may cause spasms or a laryngoscope. The physician should not paralyze the patient. The doctor is going to be confronted potentially with the fact that there is "no hole" to put the tube, in an attempt at intubation and it becomes necessary to "do something and get an airway in." Again the arrangement that needs to be made, in Dr. Murray's opinion, is the double setup to address the intubation and possible surgical airway. Dr. Murray does not believe that Respondent had the needed equipment to address the patient's condition when he began the intubation. In particular, the necessary equipment for the second step in the double setup, that of providing a surgical airway had not been sufficiently arranged by Respondent. Only in the instances where the patient had stopped breathing and Respondent had no time to call in other physicians would it be appropriate to paralyze the patient and attempt the intubation. Dr. Murray does not believe that the patient was dying, and there was the opportunity to call in the surgeon who was available in eight minutes, to provide assistance if one anticipates difficulty. Dr. Murray described three methods of addressing the surgical airway. One is crichothyroidotomy, which was attempted here. The second method is jet insufflation used in pediatrics but also taught for use in adults. The third method is the use of a needle with a catheter. Dr. Murray explained that if using the crichothyroidotomy is a procedure that is comfortable to the physician, then there is no necessity for redundancy beyond the use of that method for providing a surgical airway. Redundancy would be the use of the kit known as Seldinger that causes a small puncture wound. This method is a new technique, an alternative to needle crichothyroidotomy and regular crichothyroidotomy. The Seldinger method is the jet insufflation. Jet insufflation is not a common procedure in adults and is used more in pediatric care. In Dr. Murray's opinion, a reasonably prudent emergency room doctor would know of the availability of that option for ventilating a patient whether the patient is an adult or a child. Dr. Murray criticizes Respondent's medical records for Patient W.C. In his review, Dr. Murray did not find an explanation why it was necessary to intubate Patient W.C. at that moment and by the method employed. The record does not justify attempting a paralytic intubation under the existing circumstances, according to Dr. Murray. Dr. Marlon Priest, witness for Respondent, graduated from the University of Alabama with a degree in chemistry. He attended the University of Alabama School of Medicine from 1974 until 1977. He completed an internal medicine residency. From 1981 through November of 2006, Dr. Priest was on the faculty of the University of Alabama, Birmingham, Alabama, and served as a professor of emergency medicine and director of critical care transport. Over the years, Dr. Priest has had extensive experience in emergency medicine in a hospital setting. He is licensed to practice medicine in Alabama. Dr. Priest was accepted as an expert and allowed to testify concerning his opinion of Respondent's care provided Patient W.C., whether Respondent met the standard of care. Dr. Priest reviewed the Administrative Complaint, the medical records from Bert Fish concerning Patient W.C., Respondent's deposition, the deposition of Thomas Beaver, M.D., and the deposition of Michael A. Evans, Ph.D. to prepare himself to testify. He found the information sufficient to prepare to offer his opinion concerning the care provided Patient W.C. When asked whether Respondent violated the standard of care for failing to consult with or gain the assistance from an anesthesiologist or the on-call surgeon prior to inducing paralysis and attempting RSI, referring to rapid sequence intubation on Patient W.C., fell below the standard of care for an emergency room physician, Dr. Priest indicated that he felt that Respondent met the applicable standards. Dr. Priest believes emergency medicine has evolved to the point where emergency room physicians are able to assess and carryout that form of intubation. In Dr. Priest's experience, on numerous occasions, he has intubated patients without consulting a surgeon or an anesthesiologist. Based upon those insights Dr. Priest does not believe that Respondent was obligated to consult a surgeon or an anesthesiologist before attempting the intubation on Patient W.C. Specific to Patient W.C.'s case, the patient presented with shortness of breath and stridor and having failed to improve following treatment to address a possible allergic reaction, the decision was made to oxygenate the patient prior to some event where the patient could not breathe. Based upon the symptoms of the patient and gravity of the situation, Dr. Priest is persuaded that it was appropriate to attempt intubation. Concerning the allegation that Respondent failed to meet the standard of care by inducing paralysis in Patient W.C., Dr. Priest indicated that RSI is the preferred method of gaining access to a patient's airway where the patient is awake and alert and who might struggle if that method was not employed in an effort to intubate the patient. In his opinion, Dr. Priest makes mention of the progression in the case from having stridor, complaining of not being able to breathe and Dr. Priest's expectation that the airway was becoming smaller over time. Dr. Priest believes that the principal diagnosis in the differential pertaining to Patient W.C., possible allergic reaction was a reasonable diagnosis based upon information in the patient records. Concerning the allegation about Respondent's medical records related to alleged failure to document symptoms in Patient W.C. that would justify paralysis and RSI, as opposed to other less risky forms of securing the airway, Dr. Priest believes that there is sufficient evidence in the medical record to justify the intubation. Related to the second allegation dealing with record keeping by Respondent alleging that Respondent failed to document Patient W.C.'s O2 sat. and cardiac activity during the RSI attempt and subsequent procedures, Dr. Priest believes that this information would have been written down by someone else on the treatment team during the course of the treatment, the attempt to intubate. Even beyond that point, Dr. Priest believes that standard protocol would call upon the respiratory therapist or the nurse to create the record or potentially someone else on the hospital staff, not the Respondent. The inaccurate report by Patient W.C. concerning his past history with bird allergies changes the priorities in the differential diagnosis, in Dr. Priest's opinion. That history meant that allergic reaction was placed at the top of the differential diagnosis, in particular with a physical examination that was consistent with the history. Dr. Priest holds this belief even in the absence of fever, sweating, or questionable vital signs in the patient. When Dr. Schreiber entered the treatment room, he noticed a group including a physician and nurses who were attending Patient W.C. They were trying to resuscitate the patient. The patient did not have an airway. The patient was cyanotic. The patient was bloated and did not have a pulse. An attempt was being made to revive the patient from arrest. A valve bag mask was being used and drugs administered that would support the patient's blood pressure. An effort at gaining a surgical airway had not succeeded. There was a surgical incision on the patient's neck. Blood was on the patient and on the floor. At the moment no attempt was being made to establish a surgical airway. Dr. Schreiber observed that the patient had a protruding tongue that was obstructing this mouth and airway. Dr. Schreiber observed that the Petitioner's upper check and abdomen were bloated. Dr. Schreiber noted that the patient evidenced crepitancy, indicating subcutaneous air in the patient's neck and chest. This would be consistent with the placement of an airway tube into the subcutaneous tissue outside the trachea and air blown into the area. Dr. Schreiber made a nick in the trachea and placed a number 8 ET tube into the trachea. Following the placement of the ET tube in the trachea, Dr. Schreiber observed air movement in the lungs. However, the patient did not regain a pulse or adequate saturation of oxygen. On January 3, 2006, Dr. Thomas Beaver, Chief Medical Examiner and pathologist, performed an autopsy on Patient W.C. As part of his Medical Examiner's report on Patient W.C., special studies had been done, and a comprehensive toxicology analysis performed by AIT Laboratories. Dr. Beaver determined the cause of death as complications of acute epiglottitis and that the manner of death was of natural causes. The complications of acute epiglottitis were explained as a status post crichothyroidotomy. Dr. Beaver also noted atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease involving coronary arteries, mild. In particular, Dr. Beaver found that the epiglottis was swollen to an extent that it obstructed the deceased's airway. The condition observed was not the result of an attempted intubation of the patient, in Dr. Beaver's opinion. The condition observed was a disease process that Dr. Beaver felt was on-going for a matter of hours or perhaps a number of days before the attempted intubation. This type of mechanical obstruction in the epiglottitis would obstruct the airway and disable the patient from breathing, according to Dr. Beaver. The condition of the epiglottitis was not perceived by Dr. Beaver to be in association with some form of allergic reaction. The exact cause was not clear. Dr. Beaver does not believe that the ingestion of cocaine, whose metabolites were in the body caused the death. Marie Herrmann, M.D., is the present Medical Examiner and pathologist in the jurisdiction where Dr. Beaver served. Dr. Herrmann had the opportunity to review Dr. Beaver's autopsy report on Patient W.C. and to examine some evidence available to Dr. Beaver in performing his examination. She too was not persuaded that cocaine was a contributing factor to Patient W.C.'s death. In offering this opinion Dr. Herrmann was aware of the toxicology report from AIT Laboratories. Dr. Herrmann agrees with Dr. Beaver's opinion concerning Patient W.C.'s cause of death. Dr. Herrmann was unable to determine within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the efforts by Respondent to intubate Patient W.C. caused the blockage in the airway. Michael Evans, Ph.D., is the founder, president and CEO of AIT Laboratories. He is an expert in toxicology. He testified concerning the findings in his laboratory related to Patient W.C. using established protocols for examination of the samples provided his facility. Based upon his analysis, Dr. Evans believes that Patient W.C. had ingested cocaine as recent as three hours and no longer than 24 hours before his death based upon values found in the blood and urine samples provided. Bruce Goldberger, Ph.D., is an expert in forensic toxicology. He is a professor and director of toxicology at the University of Florida College of Medicine, Departments of Pathology and Psychiatry. He is familiar with the medical examiner's report prepared by Dr. Weaver and the AIT Laboratories' report on Patient W.C. Dr. Goldberger offered the opinion that Patient W.C. could have been using cocaine a day or two before his death. He defers to the medical examiner as to the cause of the patient's death. It is accepted from the findings made in the autopsy report by Dr. Beaver that Patient W.C. died from complications of acute epiglottitis, from natural causes, not as a result of Respondent's attempt to intubate the patient. Having considered the facts and the opinions of experts, clear and convincing evidence was not presented to establish the violations alleged in Count One (Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes) paragraph 27. a). and b). related to consultation with or assistance from an anesthesiologist or the on-call surgeon prior to inducing paralysis in the patient as part of RSI. Likewise, the violation alleged in Count Two (Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes) paragraph 30. a). relating to failure to document symptoms justifying paralysis and RSI was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. Concerning the alleged violation in Count Two (Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes) paragraph 30. b). involving the documentation of Patient W.C.'s O2 sat. and cardiac activity during the RSI attempt and subsequent procedures, the opinion of Dr. Priest is compelling. Based upon that opinion Respondent would not be expected to provide that documentation and maintain the record beyond that point in time. Respondent's Background Respondent received his undergraduate education from the University of Tennessee, earning a B.S. in biology. He attended medical school in Nashville, Tennessee, at Harry Medical College and worked as an emergency physician in Tennessee. He undertook a flexible internship at the University of Tennessee in Knoxville, Tennessee. In 1987 Respondent went to Jacksonville, Florida, to do a three-year residency in pediatrics, graduating from that program in 1990. During that time he worked in local emergency rooms in St. Augustine, Palatka, and Tallahassee, Florida. He took courses in Advanced Trauma Life Support and Advanced Cardiac Life Support. Since 1990 Respondent has been a full-time emergency room physician living in New Smyrna Beach, Florida. At present, Respondent works for M. Care Emergency Services in Jacksonville, Florida. Mitigation and Aggravation Respondent has no prior violations related to his license to practice medicine in Florida. Patient W.C.'s Family Patient W.C. was married to F.C. and had two young children. At his death his daughter was approximately two-and- a-half years old and his son was 14 months old. Following Patient W.C.'s death, the family has had a difficult time coping with their loss.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of facts found and the conclusions, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered, which dismisses the Administrative Complaint, as amended. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2008.

Florida Laws (9) 120.569120.5720.43381.0261456.072456.073456.50458.331766.102 Florida Administrative Code (1) 64B8-8.001
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs JOHN BATISTA, M.D., 03-000309PL (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Jan. 28, 2003 Number: 03-000309PL Latest Update: Oct. 21, 2003

The Issue Whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's license to practice medicine based on allegations that Respondent violated the provisions of Subsections 458.331(1)(m) and (t), Florida Statutes, arising from his treatment and care of Patient R.E., as alleged in the Administrative Complaint in this proceeding.

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.43, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent is and has been at all times material hereto a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0057927. Respondent practices primary care and internal medicine. He is board-certified in internal medicine, and has never had disciplinary action taken against his license. Patient R.E., a male who was 78 years old in January 2001, had a history of diabetes, hypertension, heavy smoking, high blood pressure, and circulatory problems. Respondent had first treated Patient R.E. on August 28, 2000, while covering for the physician with whom Respondent shared a practice. Patient R.E. had been a patient of the practice for several years. In August or September 2000, Respondent purchased the other physician's portion of the practice. The other physician remained as an employee of the practice until January 2001, when Respondent assumed the total care of Patient R.E. On January 16, 2001, Patient R.E. presented to Respondent with a complaint of redness and swelling in the right ankle that made walking difficult. Patient R.E. did not have a regularly scheduled office visit, but Respondent "squeezed him in" after Patient R.E. telephoned Respondent's office complaining of a great deal of pain. On January 16, 2001, the complete patient chart from the previous physician was available to Respondent and became part of Respondent's office chart for Patient R.E. Patient R.E.'s chart contained a "problem list" reflecting diagnoses made throughout his treatment at that office. A problem list assists the physician in tracking on- going problems with a patient. Patient R.E.'s problem list included a diagnosis of "PVD," or peripheral vascular disease. Peripheral vascular disease describes reduced blood flow to the extremities. It can be caused by a narrowing of large blood vessels, and exacerbated by diabetes-related small vessel disease. Prior to Respondent's involvement with his treatment, Patient R.E. had been evaluated for peripheral vascular disease, and was referred to a vascular specialist who recommended revascularization by way of bypass surgery. However, Patient R.E. declined the referral and elected to undergo chelation therapy instead. Mainstream physicians do not consider chelation an effective therapy for peripheral vascular disease, though Patient R.E. believed that it relieved his symptoms. After the November 11, 1999, physical exam, Patient R.E. was seen by the previous physician for three-month follow- ups on February 24, 2000, and June 5, 2000, with no particular complaints. As noted above, Respondent first saw Patient R.E. on August 28, 2000. This visit was for shortness of breath, diagnosed as bronchitis and treated with antibiotics and inhalants. Patient R.E. returned to see the previous physician on September 11, 2000, with chest congestion and coughing. This was his last office visit prior to January 16, 2001. The office visit of January 16, 2001, was a complaint- driven visit, meaning that Respondent's exam addressed Patient R.E.'s specific complaint. Such an exam is appropriate where the physician has a chart with a record of a complete history and physical exam. Respondent checked Patient R.E.'s blood pressure and listened to his heart and lungs, which were clear. Respondent then examined Patient R.E.'s right ankle, finding erythema (redness) and tenderness to palpation. Respondent did not perform an examination to address peripheral vascular disease, because he did not consider peripheral vascular disease as the presenting problem and was already aware that peripheral vascular disease was present in this patient. Respondent recorded a diagnosis of "? gout vs. cellulitis." Gout is an inflammation of the joints caused by deposition of uric acid crystals in the joint fluid. Cellulitis is a term given to an infection of the tissue, typically skin and underlying soft tissue. Gout and cellulitis are symptomatically similar conditions, in that both typically present with pain, stiffness, swelling, and redness of the affected area. Respondent prescribed Levaquin, an antibiotic, and Indocin, a medication for gout with some pain-relieving properties. Respondent told Patient R.E. to follow up in ten days, and gave Patient R.E. a quantity of medication for ten days' duration. Respondent's office chart did not clearly indicate instructions for the frequency or duration of the Levaquin prescription. The chart indicated that the Indocin was to be taken three times per day, but did not indicate a duration for taking the medication. On January 17, 2001, Patient R.E. telephoned Respondent's office to request a walker. On January 18, 2001, Respondent ordered a walker through a home health care provider and had it delivered to the patient's home. Respondent heard nothing from Patient R.E. on January 19, 2001. On Saturday, January 20, 2001, Respondent's office was closed. That evening, he received a telephone call from Patient R.E.'s wife, who told him that her husband was in a lot of pain. Respondent told the wife that Patient R.E. had not been on the prescribed medications long enough to cure his condition, and that if his pain became worse she should take him to the hospital emergency room. Shortly after 8:00 p.m., on January 20, 2001, Patient R.E. presented at the emergency room of Oak Hill Hospital complaining of pain and tenderness in his right ankle. There was an intact red blister over the ankle. The emergency room physician performed an examination, ordered blood tests, and confirmed the diagnosis of cellulitis. Patient R.E. was given injections of insulin and of Rocephin, an antibiotic. The emergency room physician instructed Patient R.E. to continue taking the Levaquin, and to stop taking the Indocin for the suspected gout. Respondent consulted with the emergency room physician by telephone. At Respondent's suggestion, the emergency room physician also prescribed Flagyl, another antibiotic, to ensure coverage against all potential anaerobes or aerobes that could cause cellulitis. The emergency room physician told Patient R.E. to follow up with Respondent on Monday, January 22, 2001. The emergency department of Oak Hill Hospital provided Patient R.E. with written discharge instructions for his cellulitis, including the following information: With antibiotic treatment, the size of the red area will gradually shrink in size until the skin returns to normal. This will take 7-10 days. The red area should never increase in size once the antibiotic medicine has been started. FOLLOW UP with your doctor or this facility as directed. If you were not given a specific follow-up appointment, look at the infected area in two days for the warning signs listed below. RETURN PROMPTLY or contact your doctor if any of the following occur: Increasing area of redness Increasing swelling, or pain Appearance of pus or drainage Fever over 100.5 orally Patient R.E.'s wife telephoned Respondent's office on Tuesday, January 23, 2001, to schedule a follow-up visit. The office visit was scheduled for January 26, 2001. On the scheduled date, Respondent examined Patient R.E. and found that his ankle had worsened and begun to develop necrosis. Respondent referred Patient R.E. to Dr. Malik Piduru, a vascular surgeon, for debridement, instructed him to continue taking the prescribed antibiotics, and to soak his foot in soapy water, which would help to debride the necrotic tissue in the interim. On February 1, 2001, Dr. Piduru examined Patient R.E. and noted a blue-black discoloration on the right lateral aspect of the lower right leg. The physical examination notes stated: "On the right lateral aspect of the leg approximately 6 x 4 cm necrotic, gangrenous patch of skin which appeared to be very fluctuant indicating underlying either abscess or hematoma of necrosis. The foot itself does not appear to be acutely ischemic and appears to be pink and viable." Dr. Piduru recommended hospitalization, excision of the necrotic area, and evaluation for further peripheral vascular disease correction. He also discussed the option of amputation if the leg did not heal. The surgeon noted that Patient R.E. understood the options presented to him, and the risks involved, but that Patient R.E. preferred to pursue another course of chelation therapy rather than undergo the recommended bypass surgery to correct the PVD. On February 5, 2001, Patient R.E. was admitted to the hospital for debridement of the right ankle. While in the hospital, Patient R.E. underwent an angiogram that revealed multiple occlusions of the blood vessels of the right leg. Dr. Piduru recommended bypass surgery, though he estimated the chances of success at around 30 percent. After discussion of all the options, Patient R.E. elected to have his right lower leg amputated. Dr. Piduru agreed that this was a reasonable decision in light of all the known factors. Patient R.E.'s right leg was amputated below the knee on February 12, 2001. In March 2001, Patient R.E. suffered an infection of the stump requiring additional hospitalization for debridement. His health continued to decline due to his multiple medical problems, including pain and peripheral vascular disease. On April 14, 2001, Patient R.E. was again admitted to Oak Hill Hospital with cellulitis of the left foot and the right stump. He declined any invasive procedures to restore circulation to his left leg. Patient R.E. was discharged to a hospice on April 20 and died on April 23, 2001. Dr. Patrick Hennessey, Petitioner's expert, testified that he reviewed all of the pertinent medical records concerning the treatment and care provided by Respondent to Patient R.E. and that based upon his review of these records and based upon his education, training, and experience, it was his opinion to within a reasonable degree of medical probability that Respondent deviated from the accepted standard of care in his treatment and care of Patient R.E., which constituted a violation of Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes. Dr. Hennessey also testified that in his opinion, Respondent violated Subsection 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes, in that he failed to compile appropriate medical records reflecting the treatment and care provided to Patient R.E. Dr. Hennessey's opinion as to the standard of care was based on several criticisms of the examination conducted on January 16, 2001. First, Dr. Hennessey opined that Respondent should have scheduled a follow-up appointment within three days to evaluate Patient R.E.'s clinical response to the prescribed medicines. The quick follow-up was indicated because of Patient R.E.'s advanced age, and because Patient R.E.'s diabetes and peripheral vascular disease could cause the cellulitis to progress rapidly. Dr. Hennessey also noted that peripheral vascular disease can reduce the effectiveness of antibiotics, further indication of the need for a prompt follow-up examination. Dr. Hennessey also believed that a three-day follow-up was necessary to definitively rule out the differential diagnosis of gout, if Respondent seriously believed gout was a possibility. Dr. Hennessey testified that Indocin should have provided relief from gout within three days, and that Levaquin should have stopped any increase in swelling, pain, or size of the affected area if Patient R.E. was suffering from cellulitis. In Dr. Hennessey's opinion, a three-day follow-up appointment would have allowed Respondent to determine whether Patient R.E. was obtaining relief and, if not, to try a different antibiotic regime or pursue other avenues of treatment. Dr. Hennessey also believed that Respondent should have tested Patient R.E.'s blood sugar level on January 16, 2001. Dr. Hennessey testified that diabetes has an impact on a person's ability to fight infection, and that the right antibiotic would be inadequate if the patient had uncontrolled diabetes. Thus, Respondent should have assessed Patient R.E.'s current and recent diabetic controls. Finally, Dr. Hennessey criticized Respondent for failing to give Patient R.E. adequate instructions for monitoring his own progress after the January 16, 2001, appointment. Dr. Hennessey testified that the instructions that the Oak Hill Hospital emergency room provided to Patient R.E. on January 20, 2001, set forth in full above, were precisely the kind of instructions Respondent should have given to Patient R.E. on January 16, 2001. Dr. Hennessey could not say whether the amputation of Patient R.E.'s right leg was inevitable, though he conceded it was likely to occur within a year or two even if his preferred course of treatment had been followed. He concluded that, on January 16, 2001, the correct alternative was to undertake an "aggressive evaluation" and to make the case to Patient R.E. that he should undergo surgical re-vascularization immediately, while the skin was still intact. Dr. Hennessey's "best guess" was that this course could have given Patient R.E. "probably fifty percent or better likelihood" of avoiding amputation, though he also conceded that "there's a lot of unknowns in there." Dr. Hennessey concluded that the time lost between January 16 and February 1, when Patient R.E. was seen by Dr. Piduru, the vascular surgeon, made a successful outcome much less likely. Respondent's expert, Dr. Kent Corral, testified that he reviewed all of the pertinent medical records concerning the treatment and care provided by Respondent to Patient R.E. and that based upon his review of these records and based upon his education, training, and experience, it was his opinion to within a reasonable degree of medical probability that Respondent did not deviate from the accepted standard of care in his treatment and care of Patient R.E. Dr. Corral also testified that in his opinion, Respondent did not violate Subsection 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes, by failing to compile appropriate medical records reflecting the treatment and care provided to Patient R.E. Dr. Corral testified that Respondent's examination of Patient R.E. was within the standard of care. The examination was complaint-driven, directed at the immediate presenting problem, a common and acceptable method employed by nearly all physicians in office practice. Dr. Corral testified that gout versus cellulitis is a very common differential diagnosis, especially in a patient with diabetes. Because there was inflammation of the ankle, peripheral vascular disease would fall very low on the list of possible diagnoses. Had Patient R.E. presented with a cold, necrotic foot, then peripheral vascular disease would have been more likely to be the presenting problem. Respondent knew that Patient R.E. had peripheral vascular disease, and it was apparent from the presenting symptoms that peripheral vascular disease was not the acute problem on January 16, 2001. Dr. Corral agreed that setting a three-day follow-up appointment would have met the standard of care. However, Dr. Corral disagreed that it was necessary to do so. He believed that Respondent reasonably elected not to schedule a three-day follow-up, but to follow up in ten days. Based on the information available on January 16, 2001, it was not unreasonable for Respondent to test the ten-day course of the prescribed antibiotics before scheduling a follow-up appointment. Dr. Corral testified that no laboratory tests were necessary to arrive at the differential diagnosis of gout versus cellulitis. He agreed that there was "potentially" some benefit to be derived from testing Patient R.E.'s blood sugar, but did not agree that Respondent's failure to do so amounted to practice below the standard of care. When Patient R.E.'s blood sugar level was checked in the emergency room on January 20, 2001, it was only slightly elevated. Dr. Corral also disagreed that Respondent failed to meet the standard of care in not giving Patient R.E. instructions on monitoring his own progress. Dr. Corral concluded that instructions would have made no difference. In his opinion, the antibiotic therapy was the only essential treatment to pursue on January 16, 2001. Dr. Corral believed that anything beyond the antibiotics would amount to "a hope and a prayer." In summary, Dr. Corral found the examination adequate and the diagnosis correct. He believed that the criticism of Respondent was due entirely to the poor outcome for Patient R.E., and that the poor outcome was not caused by anything Respondent did or did not do on January 16, 2001. In his own defense, Respondent testified that, prior to the January 16, 2001, appointment, he knew he was dealing with a very difficult patient who had a history of declining surgical intervention to resolve his circulatory problems. Respondent testified that his "first and foremost belief" was that Patient R.E. had cellulitis, and that the only other option, given the presenting symptoms, was an acute attack of gout. The potential for gout led him to prescribe Indocin as well as the antibiotics, because the Indocin would control the pain. Respondent noted that the emergency room physician confirmed his diagnosis of cellulitis on January 20, 2001. Respondent did not chart peripheral vascular disease on January 16, 2001, because that was not the presenting problem. Further, Respondent testified that Patient R.E.'s cellulitis was not necessarily related to peripheral vascular disease. Patient R.E. had several other problems, such as his heavy smoking and his diabetes, that could have generated cellulitis independently of peripheral vascular disease. Respondent disagreed with Dr. Hennessey's suggestion that "aggressive evaluation" and immediate surgery might have saved Patient R.E.'s foot, because it would not be prudent to undertake surgery until the cellulitis infection was cleaned up. Immediate surgery would have the potential of infecting the bypass grafts. On January 16, 2001, Patient R.E.'s foot was not gangrenous, and Respondent believed it essential to give Patient R.E. a reasonable trial of antibiotic therapy before sending him for surgical evaluation. Respondent's opinion on this issue was supported by Dr. Malik Piduru, the vascular surgeon who performed the amputation on Patient R.E.'s right leg. Dr. Piduru testified that in a patient with peripheral vascular disease and a diagnosis of cellulitis with no acute gangrenous changes or acute pain, the standard of care is to treat the infection first, then perform the re-vascularization. The weight of the evidence does not support an ultimate finding that Respondent failed to practice medicine with an acceptable level of care in the treatment of Patient R.E. Dr. Hennessey's conclusion that a more "aggressive evaluation" might have improved the chances of saving Patient R.E.'s leg rests on the assumption that Patient R.E. would have agreed to the proposed surgery had it been recommended on January 16, 2001. Patient R.E. rejected bypass surgery on his left leg before he became Respondent's patient, rejected it again in February 2001, and rejected it a third time in April 2001 when his right leg was threatened by cellulitis. There is little reason to assume that his decision would have been different on January 16, 2001. In view of all the evidence, the expert testimony of Dr. Corral was at least as persuasive as that of Dr. Hennessey in regard to the standard of care and Respondent's actions in this matter. Dr. Hennessey believed that the standard of care required a more aggressive approach to Patient R.E.'s presentation from the outset. Dr. Corral agreed that Dr. Hennessey's approach to the case would have met the standard of care, but also concluded that Respondent's approach was unexceptionable. Further, Dr. Hennessey could state with no degree of confidence that his own approach would have changed the ultimate outcome for Patient R.E. Dr. Hennessey opined that Respondent should have taken a blood sugar level and have given Patient R.E. detailed instructions for self-monitoring similar to those he later received at Oak Hill Hospital. Dr. Corral agreed that a blood sugar level might have been helpful, but was not necessary to meet the standard of care given the presentation and differential diagnosis. Dr. Corral believed that the failure to provide instructions was de minimus at most. Given the facts presented, Dr. Corral's opinion on these issues was at least as persuasive as Dr. Hennessey's. The evidence did not support a finding that Respondent took lightly Patient R.E.'s condition, or failed to consider any of the many variables created by Patient R.E.'s complicated history in arriving at a therapeutic approach. Respondent correctly diagnosed Patient R.E.'s cellulitis, and reasonably decided to attempt a course of antibiotic treatment to heal the infection before pursuing surgical options. The evidence presented at the hearing failed to establish that Patient R.E.'s poor outcome could be fairly attributed to Respondent's treatment of Patient R.E. on January 16, 2001. The main evidence submitted in support of the contention that Respondent failed to keep adequate medical records was directly related to the standard of care claim. Dr. Hennessey conceded that Respondent's medical record was minimally sufficient to justify the treatment provided. His chief criticism of Respondent's records for the January 16, 2001, appointment focused on the lack of documentation to explain actions that Respondent did not take, i.e., set a three- day follow-up appointment, order laboratory tests, and provide detailed instructions to Patient R.E. Because it has been found that the standard of care did not require Respondent to take these actions, his medical records cannot be faulted for failure to explain why he did not take them. However, Dr. Hennessey rightly criticized the lack of examination detail noted in the records of the January 16, 2001, examination. It was established at the hearing that Respondent charted by exception, meaning that he noted only positive findings rather than every unremarkable detail of the examination. Dr. Hennessey noted that, while this method of charting is acceptable practice, it was not acceptable that Respondent provided no description of the size or location of the erythema or the extent of the swelling of the ankle. Such detail would be essential to a subsequent treating physician in determining whether Patient R.E.'s condition had worsened. Further, Respondent did not note the frequency or duration of the Levaquin prescription, or the duration of the Indocin prescription, though Respondent credibly testified that he gave Patient R.E. oral instructions as to both medications. Again, a subsequent treating physician would need to know the details of Patient R.E.'s current medications before undertaking treatment. Finally, Respondent's notes were in several places illegible. Petitioner did establish that Respondent's records failed to document the office notes in a completely legible manner. The detail in Respondent's records was sufficient to justify the course of treatment on January 16, 2001, but their illegibility and lack of detail made them of limited use to anyone other than Respondent in assessing Patient R.E. for subsequent treatment. Patient R.E. was not exposed to potential injury because Respondent was consistently available to consult with the other treating physicians, but this fact does not cure Respondent's failure to keep adequate, legible records.

Recommendation Based on all the evidence of record, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order holding that the evidence is not clear and convincing that Respondent has violated Subsections 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, in his treatment of Patient R.E., and that the evidence is clear and convincing that Respondent has violated Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes, in his failure to keep appropriate written medical records regarding his treatment of Patient R.E. and that Respondent be reprimanded for that violation. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce A. Campbell, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Christopher J. Schulte, Esquire Burton, Schulte, Weekley, Hoeler & Beytin, P.A. 100 South Ashley Drive, Suite 600 Tampa, Florida 33602 Larry McPherson, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 R.S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.5720.43456.072456.073458.331
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BOARD OF MEDICINE vs RAUL ENRIQUE PORTELA, 96-002703 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jun. 05, 1996 Number: 96-002703 Latest Update: Jan. 29, 1999

The Issue Whether Respondent, a physician, violated the provisions of Sections 458.331(1)(t) and 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the administrative complaint and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed as a physician in the State of Florida and held medical license number ME00597713. Respondent graduated from medical school in the Dominican Republic in 1981. Subsequent to medical school, Respondent completed a year residency at St. Clare's Hospital and Memorial Center in New York City, which was affiliated with New York Medical College. Respondent completed a second year of surgical residency at University of Miami, Jackson Memorial Hospital. Respondent then completed one year of flexible residency and three years of internal medicine residency at Mercy Catholic Medical Center, which was affiliated with Thomas Jefferson University in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Respondent has practiced as an emergency medicine physician since 1988. Respondent has served as the medical director of the emergency department of Palm Springs General Hospital, Hialeah, Florida, since 1990. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was not board certified in any specialty. The administrative complaint centers on Respondent's treatment of patient R. A., a 48 year old male, at the Palm Springs emergency room on December 24, 1991. EMERGENCY ROOM TREATMENT ON DECEMBER 23, 1991 R. A. presented to the Palm Springs emergency room on December 23, 1991, at 3:50 p.m., via ambulance. He complained of severe epigastric pain over the past 24 hours that radiated to the right quadrant of his back. His blood pressure reading was 230 over 110. R. A. reported that he smoked a pack of cigarettes a day, did not drink alcohol, and had no allergies. R. A. also reported that he had not been vomiting. On December 23, 1991, R. A. was treated by Dr. Wilfred P. Fernandez, an emergency room physician employed by Palm Springs. Dr. Fernandez took the patient's medical history and then proceeded with his physical examination. The examination of the head, ears, eyes, nose, and throat were within normal limits. The lungs were clear and the heart rate and rhythm were regular. The abdominal evaluation demonstrated positive bowel sounds and positive epigastric tenderness. There was no guarding or rebound tenderness. A rectal exam revealed there was no blood in the stool. The extremity evaluation was within normal limits, as was the neurological evaluation. Dr. Fernandez ordered several diagnostic studies, including a complete blood count, an EKG, chest x-ray, abdominal film, and gallbladder sonogram. For reasons that were not made clear, the gallbladder sonogram was not performed. All other diagnostic tests were unremarkable. At 4:45 p.m. on December 23, 1991, Dr. Fernandez prescribed the following medications for R. A.: Donnatal, Maalox, Procardia, and Reglan. Donnatal contains a mild sedative and belladonna contains alkaloids to treat spasms. Maalox is an anti-acid. Procardia contains a channel blocker and was used to treat his hypertension. Reglan was administered via IV to clear R. A.'s bowels. R. A. was discharged from the Palm Springs emergency room at approximately 6:30 p.m. on December 23, 1991. On discharge, Dr. Fernandez gave R. A. a tablet of Clondine for his hypertension and prescriptions for Clondine 1 mg. and Zantac 150 mg. Dr. Fernandez instructed R. A. not to smoke, not to drink, and not to operate dangerous machinery while on the prescribed medication. R. A. was instructed to see his personal physician or return to the emergency room if his condition worsened. R. A. did not have his prescription for Clondine or for Zantac filled before his second admission to Palm Springs emergency room on December 24, 1991. EMERGENCY ROOM TREATMENT ON DECEMBER 24, 1991 On December 24, 1991, R. A. presented to Palm Springs emergency room for the second time. R. A. was transported to the emergency room by Hialeah Fire Rescue and arrived at approximately 6:05 p.m. On arrival, R. A. complained of epigastric pain. His vital signs at 6:10 p.m. included his blood pressure reading of 230 over 130. The nurses notes for this visit reflect that the patient had been seen the day before and had received a GI (gastrointestinal) cocktail, which is a reference to the concoction given to him to relieve his epigastric pain. Respondent treated R. A. while he was at the Palm Springs emergency room on December 24, 1991.1 At 6:20 p.m., Respondent performed his initial evaluation of R. A. Respondent took a history from the patient and observed the patient's appearance and composure. R. A. reported that he had not filled his prescriptions from the prior day. He reported to Respondent that he had epigastric pain in the mid-epigastric region that had been ongoing for several days. R. A. also reported that the medications he had received the previous day had helped him. Respondent noted the initial blood pressure on admission and that the patient had not filled his prescription for Clondine. Respondent discussed with R. A. the importance of taking Clondine for his hypertension. After observing the patient initially and obtaining a history, Respondent requested the emergency room records for R. A. from the previous day. He noted that Dr. Fernandez diagnosed the patient's condition as dyspepsia and hypertension. He also noted the laboratory and radiological studies that had been ordered, including that a gallbladder ultrasound had been ordered. The records did not at that time indicate that the gallbladder ultrasound had not been performed. Respondent discussed R. A.'s prior visit with an emergency room nurse who had participated in his treatment on December 23, 1991. The nurse told Respondent that all tests were normal. Respondent understood from what the nurse had told him that the gallbladder ultrasound was also normal. It is common practice for an emergency room doctor to rely on such statements from an emergency room nurse. Respondent thereafter performed an appropriate physical examination of R. A. The patient's eyes were found to be slightly jaundiced (icteric), which was a factor in leading Respondent to suspect that the patient may have had an illness affecting his liver, such as hepatitis. The abdominal evaluation revealed epigastric tenderness on palpation but no rebound. The patient's blood pressure was elevated. All other physical findings were within normal limits. A consistent blood pressure of 230 over 130 or higher is considered hypertension that warrants treatment before discharge. Labile hypertension is the acute elevation of blood pressure caused by anxiety, stress, or pain. Labile hypertension will often resolve itself without treatment once stressors or pain is resolved. A patient with a blood pressure of 230 over 130 who is suspected of suffering labile hypertension should have his blood pressure checked no less than every fifteen minutes to observe whether the hypertension resolves itself. Based on the patient's history and his evaluation and observation of the patient, Respondent determined that R. A. was more likely suffering from labile hypertension than from an emergent condition that warranted emergency treatment of the patient's hypertension. Respondent thereafter administered to the patient what was referred to as a GI cocktail to relieve his epigastric distress. The GI cocktail consisted of Zantac, Connatal, and Viscous Lidocaine and was administered at approximately 6:30 p.m. Respondent believed it likely that the GI cocktail would reduce the patient's pain and result in a lowering of the patient's blood pressure. The emergency room staff checked R. A.'s blood pressure every fifteen minutes and advised Respondent of the readings. Respondent ordered additional tests to evaluate whether the patient's epigastric pains were symptoms of a condition that required emergency care. Respondent ordered a complete blood count, a liver profile, and EKG and an abdominal x-ray. The blood studies came back within normal limits. The liver profile indicated an elevation of serum bilirubin as well as an elevation of the liver enzymes. All other tests were within normal limits. The GI cocktail relieved most of R. A.'s epigastric pain. Because he had lingering discomfort, Respondent administered a small dose of Demerol and Vistaril, which completely relieved R. A.'s pain. Respondent determined that R. A. was not suffering from a condition that required emergency care. He formed the opinion that the patient had hepatitis, but that his condition did not require immediate hospitalization. At approximately 9:00 p.m., R. A. was discharged from the Palm Springs emergency room. At the time of his discharge, R. A.'s blood pressure was approximately 160 over 80, which is within acceptable limits. Prior to his discharge, Respondent spoke with the physician who he thought would be following R. A.'s condition. This physician had treated R. A.'s wife, but he had not treated R. A. The patient was also given the name of a doctor who was on the hospitals primary physician call list. Also prior to discharge the patient was instructed not to drink any alcohol while taking his medication, to fill his prescriptions for Zantac and Clondine, and to follow-up with his primary care physician in three to four days. He was also instructed to eat lightly and increase fluid intake. Respondent told R. A. to return to the emergency room or go to his primary physician if his condition worsened. Respondent's care and treatment of R. A., including his determination that the patient did not require further emergency treatment did not fall below the standard of care imposed on emergency room physicians. As will be discussed below, his diagnosis of hepatitis was incorrect. The testimony of Dr. Dellerson established that the incorrect diagnosis did not fall below the standard of care imposed on emergency room physicians. THE MEDICAL RECORDS FOR DECEMBER 24, 1991 R. A.'s records for the emergency room visit to Palm Springs on December 24, 1991, indicate that his blood pressure reading at 6:45 p.m. was 230 over 170. This is the last recorded blood pressure reading for R. A. on December 24, 1991. Respondent testified, credibly, that R. A.'s blood pressure was checked approximately every 15 minutes and that his blood pressure came down to an acceptable level during the course of his emergency room stay on December 24, 1991,2 but that the records do not reflect those blood pressure readings. While it was the emergency room nurse's responsibility to take and to record that blood pressure, Respondent had the ultimate responsibility for the records as the treating physician. Although Respondent's practice did not fall below the standard of care imposed on emergency room physicians, the records that were kept were inadequate to reflect the patient's condition or to justify the Respondent's course of treatment.3 EMERGENCY ROOM TREATMENT ON DECEMBER 25, 1991 On December 25, 1991, R. A. presented to Jackson Memorial Hospital at approximately 2:10 p.m. He complained of epigastric pain that radiated to his back. He had vomited earlier that morning and had noticed blood in his vomit and blood in his stool. These were complaints and symptoms that were not present the day before. At the time of his presentation, his blood pressure was 160 over 110. The following day a CT scan was performed that led to a diagnosis of gall stones in the gallbladder and in the distal common bile duct, which did not require emergency surgery. R. A. was also diagnosed as having suffered a recent hypertensive stroke. This stroke most likely occurred after the patient presented at Jackson Memorial Hospital.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that dismisses count one of the Administrative Complaint, but finds Respondent guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes, as alleged in count two of the Administrative Complaint. It is further recommended that Respondent be reprimanded and assessed an administrative fine in the amount of $250.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Hearings Hearings CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 14th day of July, 1997

Florida Laws (2) 120.57458.331
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AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION vs GULF COAST MEDICAL CENTER LEE MEMORIAL HEALTH SYSTEM, 09-005360 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Oct. 01, 2009 Number: 09-005360 Latest Update: Jun. 22, 2010

The Issue The issues in this case are set forth in 11 separate counts within the four consolidated cases: Case No. 09-5360 Count I--Whether Respondent failed to properly monitor and care for a patient in restraints. Count II--Whether Respondent failed to ensure the physician's plan of care for patient was implemented. Case No. 09-5363 Count I--Whether Respondent failed to properly implement the physician's plan of care for patient. Case No. 09-5364 Count I--Whether Respondent failed to ensure a patients' right to privacy. Count II--Whether Respondent failed to ensure that food was served in the prescribed safe temperature zone. Count III--Whether Respondent failed to ensure that only authorized personnel had access to locked areas where medications were stored. Count IV--Whether Respondent failed to perform proper nursing assessments of a patient. Count V--Dismissed. Count VI--Whether Respondent failed to maintain patient care equipment in a safe operating condition. Case No. 09-5365 Count I--Whether Respondent failed to triage a patient with stroke-like symptoms in a timely fashion. Count II--Whether Respondent's nursing staff failed to assess and intervene for patients or ensure implementation of the physician's plan of care.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for, inter alia, monitoring health care facilities in the state to ensure compliance with all governing statutes, rules and regulations. It is the responsibility of AHCA to regularly inspect facilities upon unannounced visits. Often AHCA will inspect facilities for the purpose of licensure renewal, certification, or in conjunction with federal surveys. AHCA will also inspect facilities on the basis of complaints filed by members of the general public. Respondent, Gulf Coast Medical Center ("Gulf Coast" or "GCH") is a hospital within the Lee Memorial Health System. South West Florida Regional Medical Center ("SWF") was another hospital within the Lee Memorial Health System. SWF closed in March 2009, when it was consolidated with Gulf Coast. On October 15, 2008, the Agency conducted a complaint investigation at SWF; a follow-up complaint investigation was done on November 13, 2008. SWF filed and implemented a plan of correction for the issues raised in each of the investigations. The November investigation resulted in an Administrative Complaint containing two counts. On December 16, 2008, AHCA performed another complaint investigation at Gulf Coast. Gulf Coast filed and implemented a plan of correction for the issues raised in the investigation. The investigation resulted in an Administrative Complaint containing one count. On January 5 through 9, 2009, AHCA conducted a routine licensure survey at Gulf Coast. The hospital filed and implemented a plan of correction for the issues raised in the survey. The survey resulted in an Administrative Complaint containing six counts (although Count V was dismissed during the course of the final hearing). On February 18, 2009, AHCA did its follow-up survey to the previous licensure survey. Gulf Coast filed and implemented a plan of correction for the issues raised in the survey. The survey resulted in an Administrative Complaint containing two counts. Case 09-5360 The complaint investigation at SWF on November 13, 2008, was conducted under the supervision of Charlene Fisher. Count I in this case addresses findings by the Agency concerning a patient who was placed in restraints at the hospital on August 28, 2008. The patient, A.D., came into the hospital emergency department under the Baker Act seeking medical clearance to a facility. The patient presented at approximately 4:00 p.m., with back pain. He had a history of drug abuse, so there was concern by the hospital regarding the use of narcotics or certain other medications to treat the patient. The patient engaged in some scuffling with police. A physician signed and dated a four-point restraint (one on each limb) order, resulting in the patient being physically restrained. The restraint was deemed a medical/surgical restraint, rather than a behavioral restraint. AHCA had concerns about the restraint, specifically whether there was a notation for Q 15 (or every 15 minutes) monitoring of the restrained patient. However, medical/surgical restraints only require monitoring every two hours. The restraint worksheet for the patient confirms monitoring every two hours. The patient was ultimately admitted to the hospital at 9:37 p.m., and, thereafter, began complaining of left shoulder pain. The hospital responded to the patient's complaints about back pain and began treating the pain with analgesics. However, the patient continued to complain about the pain. An X-ray of the patient's shoulder was finally done the next morning. Shoulder dislocation was confirmed by the X-ray, and the hospital (four hours later) began a more substantive regimen of treatment for pain. Surgery occurred the following morning, and the shoulder problem was resolved. It is clear the patient had a shoulder injury, but it is unclear as to when that injury became more painful than the back injury with which the patient had initially presented. The evidence is unclear whether or when the shoulder injury became obvious to hospital staff. During its course of treating this patient, the hospital provided Motrin, Tylenol, Morphine, Percocet and other medications to treat the patient's pain. Count II in this case also involved a restrained patient, M.D., who had presented to the emergency department under the Baker Act. The patient was released from handcuffs upon arrival at the hospital. After subsequently fighting with a deputy, this patient was also placed in a medical/surgical restraint pursuant to a physician's order. The doctor signed and dated, but did not put a time on, the restraint order. A time is important because there are monitoring requirements for patients in restraints. However, the time of 0050 (12:50 a.m.) appears on the patient's chart and is the approximate time the restraints were initiated. The proper procedure is to monitor a restrained patient every two hours. This patient, however, was removed from his restraints prior to the end of the first two-hour period. Thus, there are no records of monitoring for the patient (nor would any be necessary). The evidence presented by AHCA was insufficient to establish definitively whether the hospital nursing staff failed to properly respond to the aforementioned patients' needs. It is clear the patients could have received more care, but there is not enough evidence to prove the care provided was inadequate. Case No. 09-5363 On December 16, 2008, AHCA conducted a complaint investigation at SWF. The Agency had received a complaint that the hospital did not properly implement a physician's plan of care. Count I in this complaint addresses alleged errors relating to two of four patients reviewed by the surveyors. Both of the patients came to the hospital from a nursing home. One patient, I.A., had presented to the emergency department complaining of chest pains. The medication list sent to the hospital by the nursing home for I.A. actually belonged to someone other than I.A. I.A.'s name was not on the medication list. The drugs listed on the patient chart were different than the drugs I.A. had been taking at the skilled nursing facility from which she came. The skilled nursing facility actually sent I.A.'s roommate's medication list. The erroneous medications were then ordered by the admitting physician and administered to the patient. The hospital is supposed to review the medication list it receives and then enter the medications into the hospital system. The person reviewing the medication list does not necessarily have to be a nurse, and there is no evidence that the person making the error in this case was a nurse or was some other employee. It is clear, however, that the person reviewing the medication list did not properly ascertain that the list belonged to patient I.A. The other patient from the nursing home had been admitted for surgery at SWF. Again, the nursing home from whence she came sent a medication list that was incorrect. The medications on the incorrect list were entered into the system by a SWF employee. The erroneous medications were ultimately ordered by the attending physician for the patient, but there is no evidence the patient was ever administered those medications. Neither of the residents was harmed by the incorrect medications as far as could be determined. Case 09-5364 From January 5 through 8, 2009, AHCA conducted a licensure survey at Gulf Coast and SWF in conjunction with a federal certification survey. Count I of the complaint resulting from this survey addressed the right of privacy for two residents. In one instance, a patient was observed in her bed with her breasts exposed to plain view. In the other instance, a patient's personal records were found in a "public" place, i.e., hanging on the rail of a hallway in the hospital. AHCA's surveyor, Nancy Furdell, saw a female patient who was apparently asleep lying in her bed. The patient's breasts were exposed as she slept. Furdell observed this fact at approximately 1:15 p.m., on January 7, 2009. Furdell did not see a Posey vest on the patient. She did not know if anyone else saw the exposed breasts. Furdell continued with her survey duties, and at approximately 5:00 p.m., notified a staff member as to what she had seen. Furdell did not attempt to cover the patient or wake the patient to tell her to cover up. The female patient with exposed breasts was in the intensive care unit (ICU) of the hospital. Visiting hours in ICU at that time were 10:00 to 10:30 a.m., and again from 2:00 till 2:30 p.m. Thus, at the time Furdell was present, no outside visitors would have been in the ICU. ICU patients are checked on by nursing staff every half-hour to an hour, depending on their needs. This particular patient would be visited more frequently due to her medical condition. On the day in question, the patient was supposed to be wearing a Posey vest in an effort to stop the patient from removing her tubing. The patient had been agitated and very restless earlier, necessitating the Posey vest. Also on January 7, 2009, a surveyor observed some "papers" rolled up and stuffed inside a hand-rail in the hospital corridor. This occurred at 1:15 p.m., on the fourth floor of the south wing of the hospital. A review of the papers revealed them to be patient records for a patient on that floor. The surveyor could not state at final hearing whether there were hospital personnel in the vicinity of the handrail where she found the patient records, nor could she say how long the patient records had been in the handrail. Rather, the evidence is simply that the records were seen in the handrail and were not in anyone's possession at that moment in time. Count II of the complaint was concerned with the temperature of certain foods being prepared for distribution to patients. Foods for patients are supposed to be kept at certain required temperatures. There is a "danger zone" for foods which starts at 40 degrees Fahrenheit and ends at 141 degrees Fahrenheit. Temperature, along with time, food and environment, is an important factor in preventing contamination of food and the development of bacteria. Surveyor Mary Ruth Pinto took part in the survey. As part of her duties, she asked hospital staff to measure the temperature of foods on the serving line. She found some peaches at 44 degrees, yogurt at 50 degrees, and cranberry juice at 66 degrees Fahrenheit. According to Pinto, the hospital's refrigerator temperatures were appropriate, so it was only food out on the line that was at issue. Pinto remembers talking to the hospital dietary manager and remembers the dietary manager agreeing to destroy the aforementioned food items. The hospital policies and procedures in place on the date of the survey were consistent with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration Food Code concerning the storage, handling and serving of food. The policies acknowledge the danger zone for foods, but allow foods to stay within the danger zone for up to four hours. In the case of the peaches and yogurt, neither had been in the danger zone for very long (not more than two hours). The cranberry juice was "shelf stable," meaning that it could be stored at room temperature. The food services director for the hospital remembers the peaches and yogurt being re-chilled in a chill blaster. She does not believe any of the food was destroyed. Count III of the complaint addressed whether an unauthorized person had access to a room where medications were being stored. A state surveyor, Gary Furdell, was part of the survey team on January 5, 2009. Furdell was touring the second floor of the hospital when he noticed a locked door. Furdell asked a hospital medical technician who was standing nearby about the door. The medical technician gave Furdell the code to unlock the door. Furdell peeked inside and noticed bottles that he presumed were medications. It would be a violation for a medical technician to have access to medications, because medical technicians cannot distribute drugs. The room Furdell looked into is a "mixed use" room located behind a nursing station. A mixed use room is used to store medical supplies, including medications, as long as there is a locked cabinet in the room for that purpose. This particular mixed use room had a locked cabinet. The room is used for the preparation of medications and for other purposes. No narcotics were stored in this particular mixed use room. The room contained locked cabinets used to store other medications. The evidence presented was insufficient to determine what "medications" Furdell may have seen in the room. Count IV of the complaint concerned the nursing assessment of a patient, and whether the assessment was properly and timely performed. A patient, M.S., had been admitted to the hospital on June 18, 2008, for lung surgery. Following the surgery, Amiodarone (a very toxic drug which can cause clots and other complications) was administered to treat M.S. for heart arrhythmia. The Amiodarone was administered intravenously and M.S. developed blisters and irritation at the intravenous site. That is not an uncommon complication with Amiodarone. M.S.'s attending physician was notified about the irritation and prescribed a treatment. He also ordered a consult with an infectious disease specialist who ultimately changed M.S.'s antibiotics. Although M.S. was seen daily by her physicians, the nursing notes do not reflect the assessment and treatment of her blisters. It appears that proper care was rendered, but the care was not documented properly. Another patient was admitted to the hospital on December 15, 2008, with End Stage Renal Disease and diabetes mellitus for which she began dialysis treatment. The patient was not weighed before and after a particular dialysis treatment on January 5, 2009. However, the patient had been moved to an air mattress bed on that date for comfort. The air mattress bed did not allow for a weight to be taken as it could be on a regular bed. There is an allegation in the Administrative Complaint concerning the discontinuation of the calorie count for a patient. This issue was not discussed in AHCA's Proposed Recommended Order, nor was sufficient evidence of any wrong- doing concerning this matter presented at final hearing. During the survey, the hospital was found to be storing the medication Mannitol in blanket warmers, rather than in warmers specifically designed for the drug. The blanket warmers maintained the Mannitol at 100-to-110 degrees Fahrenheit. The manufacturer's label on the drug calls for it to be dispensed (injected) at between 86 and 98.5 degrees Fahrenheit. In order to meet this requirement, the hospital takes the drug out of the blanket warmer in time for it to cool sufficiently before it is injected. There is nothing inherently wrong with using a blanket warmer to store Mannitol. On January 5, 2009, a surveyor found two vials of Thrombin, one vial of half-percent Lidocaine and Epi, and one vial of Bacitracin in operating room No. 4. The operating room is within the secured and locked suite of surgical rooms on the second floor. Two of the vials had syringes stuck in them and one of them was spiked. Whoever had mixed the medications was not attending to them at the time the surveyor made her observation. There were two unlicensed technicians in the room preparing for the next surgery. A registered nurse anesthetist was present as well. There was no identifying patient information on the medications. The hospital's policies and procedures do not require the patient's name to be on the label of medications prepared for impending surgery. That is because the procedures for the operating room include a process for ensuring that only the correct patient can be in the designated operating room. There is a fail-safe process for ensuring that only the proper patient can receive the medications that are set out. At around 2:45 p.m. on January 5, 2009, there were patient records in the emergency department showing that several drugs had been administered to a patient. The surveyor did not see a written order signed by a physician authorizing the drugs. When the surveyor returned the next morning, the order had been signed by the physician. The hospital policy is that such orders may be carried out in the emergency department without a doctor's signature, but that a physician must sign the order before the end of their shift. AHCA cannot say whether the physician signed the order at the end of his shift or early the next day. Count V of the complaint was voluntarily dismissed by the Agency. Count VI of the complaint concerned the status of certain patient care equipment, and whether such equipment was being maintained in a safe operating condition. A patient was weighed at the hospital upon admission on December 27, 2008, and found to weigh 130 pounds using a bed scale. Six days later, on January 2, 2009, the patient's weight was recorded as 134 pounds. Two days later, in the same unit, the patient weighed 147 pounds and the next day was recorded as weighing 166 pounds. During the survey process, the patient was weighed and recorded at 123 pounds on a chair scale. The hospital does not dispute the weights which were recorded, but suggests there are many factors other than calibration of the equipment that could explain the discrepant weights. For example, the AHCA surveyor could not say whether the patient sometimes had necessary medical equipment on his bed while being weighed, whether different beds were involved, or whether any other factors existed. AHCA relies solely on the weight records of this single patient to conclude that the hospital scales were inaccurate. Case No. 09-5365 On February 18, 2009, AHCA conducted a licensure survey at Gulf Coast. Count I of the complaint from this survey concerned the timeliness of triage for a patient who presented at the hospital emergency department with stroke-like symptoms. AHCA surveyors witnessed two patients on stretchers in the ambulance entrance hallway leading to the emergency department. Each of the two patients had been brought in by a separate emergency medical service (EMS) team and was awaiting triage. One patient was taken to an emergency department room (ER room) 50 minutes after his/her arrival at the hospital. The other patient waited 45 minutes after arrival before being admitted to an ER room. Meanwhile, a third patient arrived at 2:20 p.m., and was awaiting triage 25 minutes later. During their observation, the surveyors saw several nursing staff in the desk area of the emergency department, i.e., they did not appear to be performing triage duties. The emergency department on that date was quite busy. That is not unusual during February, as census tends to rise during the winter months due to the influx of seasonal residents. A summary of the action within the emergency department from 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m., on the day of the survey shows the following: Patient L.G., 74 years old with stable vital signs, was radioed in by her EMS team at 1:08; L.G. was processed into the ER at 1:21 (which is not an unreasonable time; EMS teams call in when they arrive at or near the hospital. By the time they gain access, wait their turn if multiple ambulances are present, and get the patient inside, several minutes may lapse). L.G. was stabilized and quickly reviewed by ER staff, then officially triaged at 2:04. Patient H.M., an 89-year-old male residing in a nursing home, arrived at 1:20 and was processed in at 1:59. He was triaged at 2:01, but ultimately signed out of the hospital against medical advice. Patient E.M. arrived at 2:18 and was processed at 2:25. Triage occurred one minute later. This patient presented as a stroke alert, and hospital protocol for that type patient was followed. Patient C.J. arrived at 1:08 and was processed at 2:38. Triage occurred immediately after C.J. was processed. This patient was not stroke alert, but had some stroke-like symptoms.1 C.J. had not been transported to the hospital as emergent, because the symptoms had been going on for 24 hours. Patient W.M., an auto accident victim, arrived at 1:40 and was processed at 1:49. Triage occurred within six minutes. Patient M.M., W.M.'s wife (who had been with M.M. in the automobile accident, but was placed in a separate ambulance), arrived at 2:06 and was triaged at 2:34. There is no record of when M.M. was processed. Patient L.M. came to the hospital from a nursing home. She arrived at 1:43 and was processed at 2:35. L.M. was triaged at 2:37. Patient K.M. arrived at 2:45 and was processed within three minutes. Triage occurred at 2:52. Her triage was done very quickly due to the condition in which she arrived, i.e., shortness of breath and low oxygen saturation. Patient R.S. arrived at 1:00 and was triaged at 1:15. The aforementioned patients represent the patients presenting to the emergency department by ambulance during a two-hour period on a very busy day. It is the customary procedure for ER staff to make a quick visual review (rapid triage) of patients as they come into the hospital. Those with obvious distress or life-threatening conditions are officially triaged first. Others, as long as they are stable, are allowed to wait until staff is available for them. As part of their duties, nurses necessarily have to be in the desk area (nursing station) in order to field phone calls from physicians concerning treatment of the patients who present. It is not unusual or improper for nurses to be in the nursing station while residents are waiting in the processing area. It is clear that some patients waited a much longer time for triage than others. However, without a complete record of all patients who presented that day and a complete review of each of their conditions, it is impossible to say whether the hospital was dilatory in triaging any of them. Count II of the complaint addressed the nursing staff and whether it failed to assess and intervene in the care of a patient or failed to implement a physician's plan of care for the patient. Patient D.W. was a 67-year-old female who was morbidly obese, diabetic, debilitated, had end stage renal disease, and was receiving dialysis. Upon admission, D.W. had a Stage 3 pressure ulcer to her sacrum and a Stage 4 ulcer on her left calf. A wound care protocol was initiated immediately, and a Clinitron bed was obtained for her on the day of admission. Due to the seriousness of her condition, the wound care physician declined to accept her case at first. He later ordered Panafil, and it became part of the protocol for treating the patient. The nursing documentation for D.W. was only minimally sufficient, but it does indicate that care was provided. Patient R.H. was an 83-year-old male who presented on February 10, 2009, in critical condition. R.H. was suffering from congestive heart failure, pneumonia, and respiratory failure. Due to the critical nature of his respiratory problems, R.H. was placed on a ventilator. As a ventilator patient, he did not fit the profile for obtaining wound care. Nonetheless, the hospital implemented various other measures to deal with R.H.'s pressure wounds.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration, imposing a fine in the amount of $500.00 in DOAH Case No. 09-5363 and a fine in the amount of $500.00 in DOAH Case No. 09-5364, Count VI. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 2010.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57395.1055395.1065 Florida Administrative Code (3) 59A-3.208559A-3.25359A-3.276
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs BABAK SAADATMAND, M.D., 16-004346PL (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 28, 2016 Number: 16-004346PL Latest Update: Feb. 23, 2017

The Issue The issue to be determined in this proceeding is whether Respondent, Babak Saadatmand, M.D. (Respondent or Dr. Saadatmand), has violated section 458.331(1)(m) and (t), Florida Statutes (2013), as alleged in the Administrative Complaint.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and documentary evidence presented at hearing, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Parties Petitioner, the Department of Health, is the agency charged with the regulation of the practice of medicine pursuant to chapters 20, 456, and 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Babak Saadatmand, M.D., is a medical doctor licensed by the Board of Medicine. Dr. Saadatmand holds Florida license number ME 114656. Respondent graduated from the University of Maryland, College of Medicine, in 1988, and completed his residency at Case Western Reserve. He then completed a residency in emergency medicine at Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. Respondent was board-certified in internal medicine, but no longer holds that certification because at the time it was due for renewal, he was no longer eligible because his practice was devoted to emergency medicine as opposed to internal medicine. He remains board-certified in emergency medicine. Respondent has held positions that required him to supervise residents and give lectures at Yale University, New York College of Medicine, and Indiana University. Dr. Saadatmand chose to practice emergency medicine as a traveling physician for the last three years, because of the financial benefits available by doing so while he gained additional experience in emergency medicine. However, he has since or now accepted a position as the assistant program director of the emergency medicine residency program at Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami, Florida, where his job responsibilities will include the supervision of residents. Dr. Saadatmand holds a medical license in several other states in addition to Florida, and has not been disciplined in any state where he is licensed. Dr. Saadatmand’s Treatment of R.D. In June and July of 2014, Respondent was working as a traveling physician at Parrish Medical Center in Titusville, Florida. While most of his assignments in various emergency facilities have been six months long, the assignment at Parrish Medical Center was for approximately one month. Respondent treated patient R.D. on June 27, 2014, at Parrish Medical Center emergency room. R.D. was accompanied by his wife, C.D. R.D. was a 52-year-old male when he presented to Parrish Medical Center. He had a history of T-cell lymphoma and had been treated for his cancer through the Space Coast Cancer Center. Just days before his presentation to the emergency room on June 27, 2014, he had been cleared to return to his place of employment. However, on June 27, 2014, R.D.’s supervisor called R.D.’s wife, C.D., and asked her to come get R.D. as he was too ill to be at work. R.D. arrived at Parrish Medical Center in the early afternoon, and was triaged by a nurse at approximately 2:13 p.m. The notes from the triage nurse’s assessment recorded, among other things, R.D.’s vital signs upon arrival; his chief complaint, including its duration and intensity; a brief medical history; a list of his current medications; and a drug/alcohol use history. Registered Nurse Sharon Craddock was the emergency room nurse who completed the initial assessment, or triage assessment, of R.D.’s condition. According to her triage notes in the Parrish Medical Center records, R.D.’s chief complaint upon arrival was constipation, which was described as constipation for three days, with bilateral abdominal pain. The pain was described as aching, pressure, shooting, and throbbing, and R.D.’s pain level was reported in Ms. Craddock’s notes as being an eight on a ten-point scale. Her description of his abdomen was “soft, non-tender, round, and obese.” Nurses are directed to record the pain level reported by the patient, and not to alter the pain level based on the nurse’s observation.1/ R.D.’s vital signs were taken upon his arrival at Parrish Medical Center and were recorded in the electronic medical records as follows: temperature, 98.4F; pulse, 127H; respiration, 20; blood pressure, 120/70; and pulse oximeter, 95. The only abnormal reading reflected in R.D.’s vital signs was his pulse, which was above 100, considered to be the upper limit of normal. R.D. reported that he had a medical history which included T-cell lymphoma and that he did not smoke or drink. His current medications were listed as aspirin, Zyrtec, Amaryl, Metformin, Prilosec, Percocet, Pravastatin, and a multivitamin. The Percocet dosage was listed as one tablet, three times daily, as needed for pain. Ms. Craddock also recorded a nursing note for R.D. at 3:37 p.m., and she was in the room when Respondent first went in to see R.D. Ms. Craddock’s nursing note indicates, “Pt with a hx of stomach CA with a recent ‘clean bill of health’ presents with ABD pain and constipation. Occasionally takes Percocet for pain. Wife at BS. Pt. sleepy, states he normally takes a nap this time of day. Pending MD eval with orders.” The Parrish Medical Center chart documents that R.D. was calm, cooperative, and asleep at 15:37 hours (3:37 p.m.). This presentation is generally inconsistent with a patient who is in severe abdominal pain. Dr. Saadatmand saw R.D. at approximately 3:56 p.m. Consistent with the custom at Parrish Medical Center, he worked with a scribe who took Respondent’s dictation for notes during his visit with the patient, and then loaded those notes into the electronic medical record. Respondent would then have the opportunity to review the notes as transcribed and direct the scribe to make any necessary changes. Dr. Saadatmand’s notes indicate that R.D. presented with abdominal pain, and was experiencing moderate pain that was constant with cramping. The description of R.D.’s pain as moderate was based upon Dr. Saadatmand’s observation of R.D. The chief complaint listed was constipation. Dr. Saadatmand took a history from R.D., who reported that he had been diagnosed with gastric lymphoma in 2013, and was treated with radiation and chemotherapy. R.D. and his wife, C.D., reported to Respondent that they feared his cancer might be returning, as his current symptoms were similar to those he experienced when his cancer was first diagnosed. He had returned to Space Coast Cancer Center for some additional screening two to three weeks before the emergency room visit, which included a CT of the abdomen and an upper and lower endoscopy. R.D. and his wife both believed that the results of the screening were normal. Respondent recorded this conversation in the electronic medical record as “[R.D.] had a recent follow up with Dr. Rylander and had normal EGD and colonoscopy. [R.D.] had recent CT scan with cancer center.” Space Coast Cancer Center does not use Parrish Medical Center to perform its CT scans or other testing, so the results of the recent CT scan were not available for Respondent to view. Respondent believed that R.D. and C.D. had followed the directions of R.D.’s oncologists, and R.D. had been a compliant patient. Respondent asked R.D. about his use of Percocet. He did not ask how much he was taking, but how often and whether the use had changed. He considered the answer to this question to be important, because a change in the use could indicate a change in R.D.’s pain intensity. R.D. did not report any change in the amount that he was taking, which was generally an “every other day thing for him.” Respondent testified that, given that the type of Percocet that R.D. was prescribed was an extra-strength as opposed to a standard version of Percocet, it was highly likely that R.D. would suffer from opioid-induced constipation. R.D. reported to Respondent that he had not attempted any laxatives. R.D. also denied having any nausea or surgical history. The lack of a surgical history is significant because patients with a recent surgical history and abdominal pain may be experiencing complications related to the surgery, which would account for the patient’s pain. There is no reference to R.D.’s diabetes in either the nursing triage notes or Dr. Saadatmand’s notes. The only reference in the past medical history is the report of cancer. The list of medications R.D. was taking at home includes Metformin HCI. No evidence was presented to establish whether Metformin is a drug prescribed only for diabetes or whether it is an accepted treatment for other conditions. Moreover, there is no evidence presented to establish how Respondent was to know that R.D. was diabetic if R.D. did not report the condition. In addition to taking R.D.’s medical history, Respondent performed a review of systems and a physical examination, including palpation of his abdomen. In his chart, the electronic medical record states under “review of systems,” “All systems: Reviewed and negative except as stated.” Under the category “Gastrointestinal,” the record indicates “Reports: Abdominal pain, Constipation. Denies: Nausea, vomiting, Diarrhea.” In the physical examination section of the electronic medical record, it is noted that R.D. was alert and in mild distress. The cardiovascular examination indicates that R.D. had a regular rate, normal rhythm, and normal heart sounds, with no systolic or diastolic murmur. With respect to his abdominal exam, Respondent indicated, “Present: Soft, normal bowel sounds. Absent: Guarding, Rebound, Rigid.” The notation that the abdomen was soft with normal bowel sounds is another way of noting that the abdomen is non-tender. Because R.D. was tachycardic upon presentation to the emergency room, Dr. Saadatmand noted R.D.’s anxiety about the possibility of his cancer returning, and checked his pulse a second time. When Respondent checked R.D.’s pulse, it had slowed to 90, which is within a normal range. In light of R.D.’s normal vital signs, normal abdominal examination, and the length of his pain and constipation, Respondent determined that the most likely cause for Respondent’s pain was constipation, and communicated that determination to R.D. and C.D. He asked whether R.D. had used a laxative and was told he had not. Dr. Saadatmand told R.D. and his wife that the pain medication that he took could be a source for his constipation, and that it would be prudent to try a laxative and see if that produced results before considering any further diagnostic tests. Respondent did not order any lab tests for patient R.D. on June 27, 2014, because his vital signs and abdominal examination were normal. He did not order an EKG for R.D. because there were no symptoms to indicate a cardiac issue. Respondent also did not order a CT scan of the abdomen or pelvis for patient R.D. on June 27, 2014. He felt that, in terms of R.D.’s concern about cancer recurrence, there were tests available to R.D.’s oncologist that would be more useful in detecting any recurrence of R.D.’s cancer that are not available through an emergency room visit. For example, a PET scan would be the most helpful, but is not something that Respondent could order through the emergency room because it is not considered an emergent study. The Department has not alleged, and the evidence did not demonstrate, that R.D. suffered from any emergency condition that additional testing would have revealed and that went undetected by Dr. Saadatmand. Respondent did order a prescription-strength laxative, i.e., Golytely, for R.D., which is a laxative commonly used to treat constipation and to prepare patients for a colonoscopy. Dr. Saadatmand communicated his recommendation to R.D. and C.D., who seemed relieved that the problem might be limited to constipation. He also advised them to return to the emergency room should R.D.’s symptoms get worse or if he developed a fever, because those developments would indicate a change in his condition. R.D. received discharge instructions that are consistent with Dr. Saadatmand’s discussion with R.D. and his wife. The discharge instructions referred R.D. to his primary care physician, noted the prescription for Golytely, and provided information related to the community health navigator. The Patient Visit Information sheet received by R.D. specifically noted that the patient was acknowledging receipt of the instructions provided, and stated, “I understand that I have had EMERGENCY TREATMENT ONLY and that I may be released before all my medical problems are known and treated. Emergency medical care is not intended to be a substitute for complete medical care. My Emergency Department diagnosis is preliminary and may change after complete medical care is received. I will arrange for follow-up care.” R.D. also received printed materials about constipation and how to address the problem. These instructions stated that the patient should contact his or her primary care provider if the constipation gets worse, the patient starts to vomit, or has questions or concerns about his or her condition or care. It also instructed the patient to return to the emergency room if he or she had blood in his or her bowel movements or had a fever and abdominal pain with the constipation. R.D. signed the acknowledgment that he had read and understood the instructions given to him by his caregivers. The acknowledgment specifically referenced the instructions regarding constipation. The written instructions are consistent with the verbal advice provided by Respondent. R.D.’s Subsequent Treatment Unfortunately, R.D.’s symptoms did not improve. He developed a fever and his pain level increased significantly. As stated by his wife, his pain the following day was “way worse” than when he saw Dr. Saadatmand. After a call to her niece, a nurse that worked in the emergency room at Parrish Medical Center, C.D. took R.D. back to the hospital on June 28, 2014, at approximately 6:30 p.m. At that point, he had a heart rate of 125, a temperature of 101.6 degrees, and tenderness in the lower left quadrant of his abdomen. Testing indicated that R.D. had intra-abdominal masses and small collections of extra-luminal gas that suggested the possibility of a contained micro-perforation. There is no allegation in the Administrative Complaint that the micro- perforation existed at the time R.D. saw Respondent. R.D. died on August 23, 2014, as a result of end-stage T-cell lymphoma. The Expert Witnesses The Department presented the expert testimony of Annie Akkara, M.D. Dr. Akkara is board-certified in emergency medicine and has been licensed to practice medicine in Florida for approximately nine years. All of her practice has been in the greater Orlando area in the Florida hospital system. She worked full-time for one year when she first moved to Florida, and since that time approximately 80 percent of her practice has involved reviewing medical charts for Veracode Associates, to determine whether diagnostic codes are fully supported in the medical records. She takes emergency room shifts on an as-needed basis, and has supervisory responsibility over patient extenders, such as nurses and physicians’ assistants, but not over other physicians. Dr. Akkara has never served on any committee for a medical staff at a hospital or helped develop protocols for an emergency room, and has not conducted any type of medical research. Although her position requires her to review electronic medical records, she was not familiar with the program used by Parrish Medical Center. Dr. Akkara reviewed the medical records for the emergency room visits for both June 27 and 28, 2014, as well as the records from the inpatient admission after the June 28 visit. She also reviewed the expert witness reports of Drs. Orban and Smoak. Dr. Saadatmand presented the expert testimony of David Orban, M.D. Dr. Orban practices emergency medicine in the Tampa area. He attended medical school at St. Louis University and completed residencies in orthopedics and emergency medicine. Dr. Orban has been licensed to practice medicine in Florida since 1982 and has been board-certified in emergency medicine since 1981. Before he practiced in Florida, Dr. Orban served as an instructor in surgery at the Washington University School of Medicine, and from 1970 through 1983, was an assistant professor of medicine at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). In that position, he supervised residents in the emergency medicine program and helped to develop the program’s curriculum. Dr. Orban left UCLA in 1983 and moved to Florida, in order to help establish the emergency medicine residency program at the University of Florida. Currently, Dr. Orban is the director of emergency medicine for the University of South Florida (USF), College of Medicine, and the Medical Director Emeritus for the Tampa General Hospital Emergency Room. The USF emergency medicine residency program is a competitive program which receives approximately 1,200 applications each year for ten residency positions. Dr. Orban continues to spend approximately 20-24 hours each week practicing in the emergency room, in addition to his teaching responsibilities. He both sees patients on his own and supervises residents who are seeing patients. He has extensive experience in evaluating non-traumatic abdominal pain in the emergency room.2/ Allegations Related to the Standard of Care Dr. Akkara testified that in her opinion, Dr. Saadatmand’s care and treatment departed from the standard of care in a variety of ways. She agreed that Respondent assessed R.D.’s abdomen, but believed that he erred in not specifically documenting that the abdomen was not tender. In this case, the patient record specifically states, “Abdominal exam: Present: Soft, Normal bowel sounds. Absent: Guarding, Rebound, Rigid.” In Dr. Akkara’s view, the notes should have been more specific, and she found fault with the fact that the notes did not use the words “tender” or “non-tender.” Dr. Orban, on the other hand, noted that Respondent specifically documented the absence of guarding, rigidity and rebound tenderness, and described the abdomen as “soft, with normal bowel sounds.” Dr. Orban testified that assessing an abdomen for guarding, rigidity, and rebound are all forms of checking for abdominal tenderness. He did not hesitate to interpret Respondent’s medical records for R.D. as reflecting a normal exam, meaning no tenderness was discovered. Dr. Orban’s opinion is supported by the differences in the medical records from R.D.’s June 27 and 28 emergency room visits, and what options are provided in the electronic medical record when a positive finding for tenderness is chosen. Dr. Orban’s testimony is credited. The Administrative Complaint alleges and Dr. Akkara opined that Respondent departed from the appropriate standard of care by failing to obtain a complete set of normal vital signs before R.D. was discharged from the hospital. The only vital sign that was ever abnormal during R.D.’s June 27 visit was his heart rate, which upon arrival was 127. Respondent rechecked R.D.’s heart rate when he examined him, and upon re-examination it was 90, well within normal limits. Dr. Orban did not believe that the standard of care required the physician, as opposed to possibly supportive staff, to obtain a complete set of vital signs prior to ordering a patient’s discharge. The evidence established that while there is sometimes a nursing standard in emergency rooms requiring a nurse to obtain a second set of vital signs before a patient is discharged, there is no corresponding standard that requires the physician to repeat all of the vitals as well. Dr. Akkara admitted that while she attempts to get a complete set of vital signs before she discharges a patient, she does not always succeed in doing so. The evidence did not demonstrate a departure from the standard of care for not obtaining a second set of vital signs prior to discharge, especially where, as here, all of R.D.’s vital signs were normal when he arrived at the emergency room, except for his heart rate, and Dr. Saadatmand did, in fact, re-assess R.D.’s heart rate prior to discharge. The Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondent fell below the standard of care by not ordering routine lab work for R.D. The Administrative Complaint does not allege what purpose the routine lab work would serve in the emergency treatment of R.D. Dr. Akkara testified that routine lab work should have been completed before discharge, and that it was a departure from the standard of care not to do so. She stated that the labs were necessary to assess white blood cell count, glucose levels, and kidney function, and in those cases where tenderness was noted in the upper right quadrant of the abdomen, also could indicate issues with the patient’s liver enzymes. Dr. Akkara acknowledged, however, that it is possible for a CBC (complete blood count) to be frequently misleading in patients with abdominal pain, and is often normal with patients with appendicitis. Blood work often cannot distinguish between serious and benign abdominal conditions, and Dr. Akkara admitted that with respect to R.D., given the records from the subsequent admission, any results from a CBC ordered on June 27 would not have altered the treatment of the patient or changed his ultimate outcome. Dr. Orban testified that in the majority of cases where a CBC is ordered in the emergency room, it is not helpful. Ordering a CBC is helpful where a patient has a fever because it would help identify infection, or where a patient appears anemic. Other than those instances, it is not all that useful and is over-utilized. A chemistry panel measures a patient’s serum levels for things like sodium, creatinine, and glucose. Dr. Orban testified that, even with a diabetic patient, unless the patient is experiencing vomiting, mental status changes, blurred vision, frequent urination, or other symptoms associated with diabetes, a blood chemistry panel would not be helpful for assessing a patient with non-traumatic abdominal pain. Records for R.D.’s June 28 visit (the day after Respondent saw R.D.) note that he was diabetic, while the June 27 records do not. However, it was not established that either R.D. or his wife ever told anyone, whether nursing staff or Dr. Saadatmand, that he was diabetic. There is no testimony that his prescription for Metformin was to treat diabetes, as opposed to some other condition, and there was no evidence to indicate that diabetes is the only condition for which Metformin can be prescribed. Dr. Akkara repeatedly referred to R.D.’s diabetes as a basis for her opinions, but never identified the records that formed a basis for her knowledge of R.D.’s diabetic condition. The evidence presented does not establish that ordering a blood chemistry or CBC was required by the appropriate standard of care related to the care and treatment of R.D. in the emergency room on June 27, 2016. Dr. Akkara also testified that Respondent departed from the standard of care by failing to obtain a CT scan of the abdomen and pelvis. Her opinion is based, at least in part, on her belief that Respondent failed to document that R.D.’s abdomen was non-tender. She agreed with Dr. Orban that if a patient has no abdominal tenderness, then a CT scan is probably not warranted. In addition, Dr. Orban testified credibly that over the last ten years, there has been a trend toward over-utilization of CT scans, with the concomitant increased risk of radiation- induced cancer. In this case, R.D. had reported having a CT scan just weeks before this emergency room visit. His abdomen was not tender. In a case such as this one, where the patient presents with non-traumatic abdominal pain and a normal abdominal examination and no fever, a CT scan is not warranted. Dr. Orban’s testimony is credited. There is not clear and convincing evidence to establish that the standard of care required Respondent to order a CT scan under the circumstances presented in this case. Dr. Akkara testified that Respondent also violated the standard of care by not ordering an EKG for R.D. However, she acknowledged that R.D. did not present with any cardiac-related symptoms and denied chest pain. The purpose of an EKG is to explore any cardiac-related symptoms, and R.D. did not present with any. Dr. Akkara did not provide any protocols that dictate when an EKG should be ordered. Dr. Akkara also acknowledged that ordering an EKG would have no impact on the care provided to R.D., and that a patient does not need an EKG just because he or she walks in the emergency room with tachycardia.3/ The Department did not establish that the failure to order an EKG violated the applicable standard of care in this case. The Department also has charged Respondent with failing to arrange for follow-up care and failing to discuss follow-up care, as well as reasons for R.D. to return to the emergency room, if necessary. However, as noted in paragraphs 32-34, Dr. Saadatmand discussed follow-up care with R.D. and told him what circumstances would require a return visit to the emergency room. Dr. Akkara acknowledged that the discharge instructions given to R.D. were adequate. As stated by Dr. Orban, the role of an emergency room physician with regard to the assessment of patients is to identify emergency situations and treat them. Emergency situations are those that are acute, rapidly decompensating, and that require either medical or surgical intervention, with most likely a hospital admission for more definitive care. It is not the emergency physician’s responsibility to manage a patient’s chronic conditions. It is routine to advise patients with non- acute conditions to follow up with their established physicians and to provide written instructions to that effect. Dr. Saadatmand’s actions in providing instructions, both in terms of follow-up and possible return to the emergency room, were consistent with the standard of care. Finally, the Administrative Complaint finds fault with Dr. Saadatmand for not conducting another abdominal examination and not re-assessing R.D.’s vital signs prior to discharge. As noted previously, the only vital sign that was abnormal when R.D. arrived was his heart rate. Respondent did re-assess R.D.’s heart rate prior to discharge, and it was normal. With respect to a second examination of Respondent’s abdomen, the Department did not establish that one was necessary. Here, Respondent’s initial examination was normal, and there was a reasonable explanation for his discomfort that Respondent believed needed to be addressed before going any further. Dr. Akkara offered no protocol or other authority other than her own clinical experience to support the opinion that serial examinations of the abdomen were required. On the other hand, Dr. Orban testified that where, as here, where the first examination was normal and there was no fever or vomiting, no second examination would be required.4/ Dr. Orban’s testimony is credited. In summary, the Department did not establish that Respondent violated the applicable standard of care in his care and treatment of R.D. Further, his medical records, while not perfect, justify the course of treatment provided in this case.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 2016.

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57456.072456.073456.50458.331766.102766.202
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DAVID MCKALIP, M.D. vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 05-001246RP (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Apr. 07, 2005 Number: 05-001246RP Latest Update: Dec. 15, 2006

The Issue Whether proposed rules 59B-15.001 through 59B-15.007 are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

Findings Of Fact The State Center for Health Statistics (State Center) within the Agency collects and disseminates data from hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers. One of the responsibilities of the State Center is to produce comparable and uniform health information and statistics through a Comprehensive Health Information System. § 408.05(3), Fla. Stat. The State Comprehensive Health Information System Advisory Council (CHIS) is established within the Agency to assist the State Center in reviewing the Comprehensive Health Information System and to recommend improvements for the system. § 408.05(8), Fla. Stat. In conjunction with CHIS, the agency is to develop and implement a long-range plan for making available performance outcome and financial data that will allow consumers to compare health services. § 408.05(3)(l), Fla. Stat. In 2004, Section 408.061, Florida Statutes, was amended to require health care facilities to submit hospital emergency department data, data on hospital-acquired infections as specified by rule, and data on readmissions as specified by rule. On October 20, 2004, a meeting of CHIS was held, and a discussion was held on the collection and dissemination of data relating to infection rates. A motion was approved to consider the adoption of Surgical Infection Prevention (SIP) measures and to form a Technical Workgroup for Hospital Acquired Infections (Technical Workgroup) to make recommendations to the Agency on how to report SIP measures, to review the current systems of reporting infection rates, and to determine the appropriate infection measures to report. On December 1, 2004, CHIS met and heard recommendations from the Technical Workgroup concerning the collection and reporting of SIP measures. The recommendations included developing draft rules. The agency assigned Carolyn Turner, a Government Analyst II with the Agency, to draft rules relating to the collection of SIP Measures. Ms. Turner began drafting the rules in December 2004. Ms. Turner drafted the Proposed Rules. On January 13, 2005, the Agency held a rule development workshop, which had been noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly on December 30, 2004. During the workshop and subsequent to the workshop, the Agency received comments and suggestions for modifications to the Proposed Rules, and, as a result, the Agency made some changes to the Proposed Rules. The Proposed Rules were published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on March 11, 2005, and a public hearing was held on the Proposed Rules on April 4, 2005. The Proposed Rules provide: 59B-15.001 Purpose The rules in this section describe the requirements for reporting Surgical Infection Prevention (SIP) Measures to the Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency) for the purpose of providing comparative information to consumers. 59B-15.002 Definitions "Hospital" means an entity that is licensed per Section 395.002(13), Florida Statutes. "Reporting period" means a calendar quarter. "Eligible patient" means a selected surgical patient 18 years of age or older with no prior evidence of infection as specified by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) in the Specifications Manual for National Hospital Quality Measures available on the CMS website at: www.cms.hhs.gov/quality/hospital. 59B-15.003 Exclusions State-operated hospitals. Psychiatric hospitals with no licensed acute care beds other than licensed psychiatric or substance abuse beds. Specialty rehabilitation as defined in subparagraph 59A-3.52(1)(c)2. F.A.C. Intensive Residential Treatment Programs for Children and Adolescents as defined in paragraph 59A-3.252(1)(d), F.A.C. 59B-15.004 Reporting Requirements Hospitals shall report Surgical Infection Prevention (SIP) Measures to the Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency) quarterly due on or before December 1, 2005 for the period April 1, through June 30, 2005. Thereafter, data shall be reported for each calendar quarter due 150 days following the end of the quarter. Hospitals shall report the following measures for all eligible patients regardless of type of payer. Prophylactic antibiotics received within 1 hour prior to surgical incision; Prophylactic antibiotic selection for surgical patients; Prophylactic antibiotics discontinued within 24 hours after surgery end time. The methodology used to prepare the measures shall meet the standards specified by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) in the Specifications Manual for National Hospital Quality Measures available on the CMS website at: www.cms.hhs.gov/quality/hospital. CMS standards include submission of SIP data to the Quality Improvement Organization Clinical Warehouse, providing records required for reabstraction activities, and compliance with other data quality standards as specified by CMS. Hospitals shall use the SIP methodology specified by the CMS for the applicable reporting period to determine the SIP measures reported to the Agency. If the hospital uses sampling, the hospital must follow the sampling protocol specified by CMS. Hospitals shall report the population size, rate numerator value, and denominator value as specified by CMS for each type of surgery to include coronary artery bypass surgery (CABG), cardiac surgery, hip arthroplasty, knee arthroplasty, colon surgery, hysterectomy, vascular surgery, and for all of the above surgeries overall. Hospitals shall report data separately for each location consistent with Rule 59E-7.012, F.A.C. unless reporting separately would be contrary to CMS specifications. If a combined report is submitted, report the name of the hospital and AHCA hospital identification number required in subsection 59B-15.005(1), F.A.C. for each of the hospitals included in the report. The data shall be submitted in a text file, using a tab between each data element. Start a new line for each type of surgery and for each measure. Order the rows of data by type of surgery as listed in subsection (5) with three consecutive rows of data for each measure in subsection (2) above reported for each type of surgery. Each line of data shall state the name of the type of surgery or state all of the above surgeries overall as in subsection (5) above and state the name of the type of surgery or state all of the above surgeries overall as in subsection (5) above and state the name of the type of measure as in (2) above. The rate shall be reported as a decimal number greater than or equal to zero (0) and less than or equal to one hundred (100) using the format X.XX, XX.XX, or XXX.XX as required. Report hospital contact information required in Rule 59B-15.005, F.A.C. in the order specified starting a new line beginning with contact name and contact telephone number. Hospital contact information should be reported at the beginning of the document. (8) Hospitals shall send the SIP measures by electronic mail to SIPReport@ahca.myflorida.com or, if requested in writing by the hospital and approved by the Agency to the Agency's mailing address using a 3.5" diskette or CD- ROM. The mailing address of the Agency is: Agency for Health Care Administration, 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #16, Tallahassee, Florida 32308 with the statement, "Attention: State Center for Health Statistics." If the hospital has a vendor send the SIP measures to the Agency, the hospital will direct the vendor to copy (cc) the hospital contact when the report is e- mailed to the Agency. 59B-15.005 Hospital Contact Information. Each hospital shall include the following contact information when submitting a report required in this section to the Agency for Health Care Administration: Name of hospital; AHCA hospital identification number; Reporting year in four digits; Reporting quarter as a 1, 2, 3, or 4 where 1 corresponds to the first quarter of a calendar year; Contact name; Contact title; Contact address; Contact direct telephone number; Hospital telephone number; Contact e-mail address; Contact FAX number. The hospital contact information shall be reported in a text file as described in Rule 59B-15.004, F.A.C., using a tab between each data element. 59B-15.006 Certification Each hospital shall provide certification of the accuracy of the Surgical Infection Prevention Measures including all data required in this section as provided in Section 408.061(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The certification shall be submitted to the Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency) using the Certification of Surgical Infection Prevention Measures from SIP-1, dated 2/01/2005, incorporated by reference. The certification shall be submitted to the Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency) quarterly prior to or concurrent with the submission of the Surgical Infection Prevention Measures as provided in Rule 59B-15.004, F.A.C. The Certification of Surgical Infections Prevention Measures Form will be available from the Agency website at www.ahca.myflorida.com. The signed Certification of Surgical Infections Prevention Measures may be submitted electronically to SIPReport@ahca.myflorida.com. using a pdf file with a scanned signature or mailed to the Agency address provided in Rule 59B- 15.004, F.A.C. If a combined report is submitted per subsection 59B-15.004(6), F.A.C., a separate Certification of Surgical Infection Prevention Measures Form SIP-1 must be submitted for each hospital included in the report. 59B-15.007 Administrative Penalties Failure to report as required in this section in whole or in part is subject to administrative fines as provided in Section 408.08(2) and 408.08(5), Florida Statutes, unless the hospital has been granted an extension of up to 30 days by the Agency for Health Care Administration for reasons of extraordinary or hardship circumstances such as a natural disaster or emergency event impacting the hospital. Hospitals must request the extension, in writing, prior to the due date specified in Rule 59B-15.004, F.A.C. The Proposed Rules provide that the specific authority for the promulgation of the Proposed Rules is Subsection 408.06(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes, and the law implemented by the Proposed Rules is Subsection 408.05(3)(l)1., Florida Statutes. Dr. McKalip is a neurological surgeon practicing in St. Petersburg, Florida. He has hospital privileges at Bayfront Medical Center (Bayfront) and St. Anthony's Health Care (St. Anthony's). Both hospitals would be required by the Proposed Rules to report SIP Measures to the Agency. SIP Measures would be required to be reported only on the following surgical categories: coronary artery bypass surgery, cardiac surgery, hip arthroplasty, knee arthroplasty, colon surgery, hysterectomy, and vascular surgery. Dr. McKalip performs vascular surgery of the brain, vascular bypass surgery in the neck, and, as part of his board certification, is required to be able to perform carotid artery surgery in the neck. These procedures would be included under the category of vascular surgery in the ICD-9 codes as other (peripheral) vascular shunt or bypass VASC SHUNT and BYPASS NEC.2 The Proposed Rules do not require Dr. McKalip to report the use of SIP measures; they require the hospitals in which he performs the procedures to report the SIP measures. The Proposed Rules do not require the hospitals to implement SIP measures, merely to report whether the SIP measures were implemented. Some hospitals, including Bayfront and St. Anthony's, have developed policies which require physicians practicing in those hospitals to implement the SIP measures. Data collection relating to SIP measures is not a new concept. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) have developed a methodology to collect data on SIP measures, and some hospitals are currently voluntarily reporting the use of SIP measures for certain surgical procedures. The Proposed Rules adopt the methodology developed by CMS. The Proposed Rules are supported by the Florida Hospital Association; Florida Medical Quality Assurance, Inc.; and CMS. The use of SIP measures is supported by many medical societies and organizations. The Agency views the collection of the SIP measures as the first step in a three-step process for collecting and reporting hospital-acquired infection data. The second step will involve the collection of infection rates that are acquired in the inpatient setting, and the third step will involve reporting the infection rates by physicians.

Florida Laws (13) 1.02120.52120.54120.56120.68381.026395.002408.05408.061408.07408.08408.15815.03
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BOARD OF MEDICINE vs GEORGE J. DETKO, JR., 94-003752 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Vero Beach, Florida Jul. 08, 1994 Number: 94-003752 Latest Update: Jul. 18, 1995

The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him, if any.

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been a physician licensed to practice in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0025685. For 18 years prior to the event complained of herein, Respondent worked at Indian River Memorial Hospital, where he practiced as an anaesthesiologist. Also prior to the event complained of herein, Respondent was a tri- athlete, training in swimming, biking, and running. During the summer of 1992 he competed in five or six tri-athalons and did quite well in his age class. Respondent was also a snow skier. In accordance with his physical fitness values, Respondent does not drink alcoholic beverages or smoke cigarettes. He is also a vegetarian. Peter G. Wernicke is an orthopedic surgeon in the Vero Beach area. After arriving there, he and Respondent became social friends and went on ski trips together. He also became Respondent's treating physician, caring for Respondent when Respondent suffered broken bones, strains, and sprains as a result of his sporting activities. In early winter of 1992 Respondent seriously injured his knee while snow skiing. Respondent discussed his need for surgery with Wernicke after Respondent returned to the Vero Beach area. Wernicke was insistent that he perform Respondent's knee surgery, but Respondent wanted to have the surgery performed by Dr. Richard Steadman in Vail, Colorado, since he believed that Dr. Steadman was probably the best in the world at taking care of that particular kind of knee injury. Wernicke then insisted that Respondent allow Wernicke to perform the knee surgery with Respondent awake, and once the knee was opened up, Wernicke and Respondent would look at it and decide whether it was something Wernicke was able to take care of or if the knee should be closed and Respondent would then go to whomever he wanted to have the surgery performed. Respondent would not agree to that approach since he well understood that opening the knee twice would double Respondent's risk of infection in that injured knee. Up to the time that Respondent left to travel to Vail for his knee surgery, Wernicke maintained that he was not giving Respondent his blessing for having the surgery performed by someone else. Respondent went to Vail and had Dr. Steadman perform the surgery in early December of 1992. Respondent remained in Vail post-operatively undergoing physical therapy which commenced within hours of surgery being completed to increase his chances of obtaining full range of motion with that knee by keeping it moving and preventing scarring. Respondent returned to Vero Beach on December 13 and returned to work the next morning, working a full shift that day. After his shift was over, he drove himself to Orlando for a meeting. While in Orlando, Respondent began to have very severe pain and swelling in his knee. He drove back to Vero Beach, arriving at his home at approximately 9:30 p.m. Upon his arrival, he telephoned Wernicke, told Wernicke he was in a great deal of pain, and begged Wernicke to help him by meeting him at the hospital and looking at Respondent's knee. Wernicke told Respondent that he would not go to the hospital to meet Respondent, that Respondent should elevate his knee and apply ice, and then see Wernicke in the morning. Respondent elevated his leg and applied ice for the next few hours. By approximately midnight the pain had become "absolutely excruciating," unlike any Respondent had experienced with all of his broken bones and other sports injuries. Although Respondent's tolerance for pain was high enough that he had gone through the surgery performed by Dr. Steadman without pain pills and had tolerated getting on an exercise bike 12 hours after that surgery, Respondent knew that he could no longer endure the pain, that he had a serious problem with his post-operative knee, and that he needed to get help immediately. Respondent got himself up with crutches and got in the car to drive himself to the emergency room. While driving, he telephoned the emergency room at Indian River Memorial Hospital and told the staff he was on his way there and asked the name of the orthopedist who was on call. He was advised that Dr. Wernicke was not only on call, but was present in the emergency room at that moment. Respondent told the emergency room staff to tell Wernicke to wait for him. Respondent then called the operating room at Indian River Memorial Hospital and asked if an anaesthesiologist were there so he could get something to relieve his pain. He was told that Dr. Brennan had just finished with surgery and had taken the patient to the intensive care unit. Respondent then asked for two things: (1) to have Dr. Brennan go to the emergency room to take care of Respondent and (2) to bring Respondent's anaesthesia cart to the emergency room. The operating room staff agreed. Respondent's requests resulted from his experience with that hospital's emergency room staff and procedures. He knew he needed medication for his knee and for his pain. He knew that Dr. Brennan was not employed by the hospital and did not have his own anaesthesia cart there. He knew that the emergency room staff were notoriously slow in responding to patient needs or doctor requests. Therefore, over the years, Respondent had learned that whenever he was called to the emergency room, the patient was better served if Respondent took his own anaesthesia cart and supplies with him. As a result of his telephoning ahead, Respondent's arrival was expected. Dr. Wernicke waited for him. Someone took Respondent's anaesthesia cart to the emergency room and placed it next to a stretcher. Dr. Brennan was paged and told that Respondent needed him in the emergency room, and Dr. Brennan went to the emergency room to assist his colleague. When Brennan got there, Respondent had not yet arrived, but Wernicke was present. Brennan told Wernicke he was there to help with Respondent. For whatever reason, Wernicke told Brennan that Brennan was not needed and told him to leave. Before leaving the emergency room, Brennan told Wernicke that if he were needed he would be nearby in the intensive care unit and to please summon him. Respondent arrived at the hospital emergency room on crutches. The emergency room was currently under construction and had no dividing walls or partitions so that it was simply one room in which everyone could see everything occurring. There were no patients in the emergency room when Respondent arrived, but there were three or four nurses and the emergency room doctor at the nurses' station. Respondent went to the nurses' station to be admitted. He was told that he should wait in the lobby and he would be called when they were ready to begin the admission process. Respondent refused to do that, told them he was in excruciating pain, and insisted that he be given the emergency room release form and financial responsibility form to sign and be taken to one of the emergency room stretchers. He was given the forms to sign, which he did, and he was then escorted to the stretcher next to his anaesthesia cart. For the remainder of his time in the emergency room, Respondent remained on that stretcher which was no more than 30 feet from the nurses' station. No chart for his emergency room visit was prepared by the hospital personnel. Further, no one took his vital signs; no one took his blood pressure; no one asked what his problem or complaints were which caused his visit; and no one asked whether Respondent had any allergies or had recently eaten. Respondent lay on the stretcher waiting for Wernicke to return to the emergency room for approximately five minutes. When Wernicke came in, he was wearing a big smile. He remarked to Respondent that Wernicke could see that Respondent had a problem with his knee. Wernicke then gave one swipe across Respondent's knee with an alcohol swab and prepared to jab an 18 gauge needle into the knee to aspirate it, i.e., to drain the fluid. Respondent became terrified and told Wernicke to stop. Respondent's terror was caused by two fears. First, it was apparent that his knee was full of blood. He knew that blood outside of its normal confines is an irritant which causes inflammation and he knew that it was also the perfect medium in which bacteria could grow. He also knew that the risk of infection in his knee was substantial because it was a post-operative knee. Infection in such a knee presents a best-case scenario of a damaged knee and a worst-case scenario of rendering him a cripple, requiring a total knee replacement. Yet, Respondent saw that Wernicke intended to stick the needle into Respondent's dirty knee without even using a Betadine preparation to remove bacteria from the skin. Second, Respondent was in "unbelievable" pain from the significant swelling in his knee. The surgical incisions above and below his knee had ruptured from the pressure caused by the swelling. In order for Wernicke to aspirate Respondent's knee, it would be necessary for him to poke his fingers into the swollen knee area in order to locate the right place to stick the needle, and it was impossible for Respondent to hold his leg still for Dr. Wernicke to palpate, let alone insert the needle in the correct location. Respondent told Wernicke that he needed an I.V. started; that he needed Kefzol, an I.V. antibiotic, to prevent infection; that he needed Toradol intravenously for its anti-inflammatory effect; and that he was in very, very severe pain and needed pain medication so he could hold his leg still for Wernicke to aspirate. Although Wernicke recognized that Respondent was in significant, severe pain, he told Respondent he would agree to the antibiotic and he would agree to the anti-inflammatory, but that he didn't think Respondent needed anything for pain. Respondent's anaesthesia cart was not equipped with I.V. fluids. Someone brought an I.V. bag and set-up. Respondent does not know who brought the I.V. and whether it was on Dr. Wernicke's order or ordered by the emergency room doctor, but Respondent did not order the I.V. brought. No one offered to start Respondent's I.V. for him, and Wernicke did not tell Respondent that Dr. Brennan had come to the emergency room, had been sent away by Wernicke but was nearby, and had told Wernicke to summon him if he were needed. Wernicke kept telling Respondent to hurry up because it was late and he wanted to go home. He told Respondent that they needed to get finished because Wernicke was doing Respondent a favor just by being there. Respondent, while still lying on his stretcher, started his own I.V. Wernicke assisted Respondent by handing him tape for the I.V. since Respondent was performing the task with one hand. Respondent then removed his medication box from the bottom of his anaesthesia cart. He took out an ampule of Kefzol, a dry powder. He took a syringe and drew fluid from the I.V. that was running into him and mixed up that dry powder antibiotic by flushing it back and forth. He then gave the antibiotic to himself. He attempted to delay Wernicke from inserting the needle into his knee until after the antibiotic could circulate through his system and get to his knee before any bacteria was introduced, a process which would take approximately six minutes to complete enough circulations. Respondent next prepped his own knee with Betadine solution while Dr. Wernicke continued to stand there by his side, watching him. Respondent then took an ampule of Toradol, a new anti-inflammatory medication, and gave himself 60 milligrams intravenously, while Wernicke stood and watched. Although that anti-inflammatory medication would also serve to reduce Respondent's pain, Toradol is a slow-acting medication in that regard, having a slow onset but thereafter lasting for a number of hours. Respondent then removed from his medication box a 5 cc ampule of Alfenta. That ampule is a 2 1/2 inch object made of glass with its name in blue lettering on the outside, large enough to read. Alfenta is a Schedule II controlled substance and is a narcotic. Alfenta has a fast onset and a fast offset; it works in 30 to 60 seconds, and its effect lasts for approximately 10 minutes. While Dr. Wernicke watched, Respondent filled a needle and gave himself 1 cc of Alfenta which is a very conservative test dose for a man weighing 190 pounds who is in good condition. Respondent then waited a minute or a minute and a half to see what effect it had on his pain level and trembling leg. It had very little effect. Therefore, Respondent injected an additional 1/2 cc and waited. That additional amount was sufficient. Wernicke watched as Respondent gave himself the Alfenta, standing, as he had been, within inches of Respondent. As he injected the medications, Respondent filled out the chart on his anaesthesia cart, noting the medication, the dosage, and that he was the patient. Respondent then laid back on the stretcher, closed his eyes, and then told Wernicke he was ready. Wernicke then palpated Respondent's knee and inserted the needle to aspirate Respondent's knee. The pressure in his knee was so high that it blew the syringe back. Wernicke commented that he had never before seen that happen and had never seen pressure like that. Wernicke withdrew approximately 100 ccs of fluid from Respondent's knee, commenting that he did not think he'd seen one with more volume. Although initially Wernicke had said that he did not agree that Respondent needed any pain medication, Wernicke totally acquiesced in everything Respondent did to assist Wernicke in treating Respondent. Wernicke accepted Respondent's judgment and watched Respondent execute step by step the course of treatment Respondent said was needed to render proper medical treatment. Wernicke totally agreed and acquiesced with the use of Alfenta as much as he did the antibiotic and the anti-inflammatory as evidenced by Wernicke's own conduct. Wernicke never told Respondent to stop doing Wernicke's work for him. Wernicke never told him not to administer the medications. Wernicke never suggested that he or someone else perform the administration. Wernicke could have easily stopped Respondent who was laying on a stretcher but did not. Wernicke knew that Alfenta was a pain killer and a narcotic. He did nothing to stop or prevent Respondent from injecting a medication Respondent needed. Further, Wernicke continued to treat Respondent after the administration of Alfenta by thereafter performing the aspiration. After he completed the aspiration, Wernicke left. Respondent lay on the stretcher for a little while. The nurses and the emergency room doctor remained at the nurses' station, and there were still no other patients in the emergency room. Respondent asked if someone would bring him a wheelchair so he could leave, and he was told that they were too busy. Respondent took his crutches and hobbled out of the emergency room. The next morning Respondent reported to work for his regular shift which began at 7:00 a.m. After Respondent completed the first case on his shift that day, at approximately 10:30 to 11:30 a.m. he called Haynes McDaniel, the hospital's pharmacist, and told him what had happened the night before, what medications Respondent had used, and that he had used the medications on himself. Respondent said he needed to do whatever paperwork the pharmacist wanted and specifically asked the pharmacist to bill him for the medications he had used. McDaniel told Respondent that there was no problem regarding the Kefzol and the Toradol and that he would simply send Respondent a bill for those medications; however, as to the Alfenta, the pharmacist needed a prescription for his records. McDaniel asked Respondent who the attending physician had been, and Respondent told him that Peter Wernicke was the attending doctor. McDaniel told Respondent to get a prescription from Wernicke for the Alfenta so that the hospital record keeping would be proper. Respondent went to Wernicke and asked him for a prescription for the Alfenta that had been used, and Wernicke refused. Respondent then personally went to McDaniel and told him that Wernicke would not write the prescription and told McDaniel why, i.e., that Wernicke was still mad that Respondent had not considered him good enough to do Respondent's surgery. McDaniel asked Respondent who could write the prescription because Respondent needed a prescription from somebody and Respondent could not write the prescription for himself. Respondent told McDaniel that he had asked Dr. Brennan to be there to give him the pain medication, that Dr. Brennan had never showed up, but that Brennan was in the hospital at the time the medication was administered. McDaniel suggested that Respondent see if Brennan would sign a prescription. Respondent went to Brennan's office and told Brennan exactly what had happened. He told Brennan he had given himself 1 1/2 ccs of Alfenta and that Wernicke was the attending physician. He told Brennan that Respondent had self- administered and why, that Wernicke had refused to write the prescription and why, and that Haynes McDaniel had suggested that Brennan could sign the prescription for the hospital's records. Dr. Brennan became upset that he had not been there to help when his colleague needed him, agreed to sign the prescription, and offered Respondent pain pills or anything else Respondent needed for what remained a painful knee and leg. Respondent declined the offer of any additional medication. In good faith and in the course of his professional practice, Dr. Brennan signed a prescription for 1 1/2 ccs of Alfenta for Respondent. Respondent then hand- delivered that prescription to the pharmacist. After receiving the prescription from Respondent, the pharmacist wrote an Unusual Occurrence Report dated December 16, 1992. In January of 1993 the hospital summarily suspended Respondent's privileges, and he has been unable to practice medicine since that time. Respondent's emergency room visit happened on a Monday evening. On the following Thursday, Respondent and Wernicke's partner Dr. Jim Cain were in the doctor's lounge together. Respondent told Cain that his leg really hurt him and was swollen, and Cain offered to look at it. Respondent pulled up his scrub suit and showed Cain his calf which was twice its normal size and "hot". Cain suggested that Respondent get an ultrasound and get some blood thinner since it looked as though Respondent had developed phlebitis, a dangerous condition. Respondent immediately went to the x-ray department and had an ultrasound performed. The ultrasound revealed that Respondent had compartment syndrome in his calf, four days after the aspiration was performed. Dr. Wernicke's office notes regarding Respondent's emergency room visit, supposedly dictated that same evening or the following day, discussed the ultrasound that Respondent had. Accordingly, Dr. Wernicke did not dictate his notes regarding his treatment of Respondent on Monday evening or on Tuesday. Those notes, however, do bear Tuesday's date and are included in the hospital's medical record for Respondent's emergency room visit. The medical chart created by the hospital was likely created on December 21, 1992, the date stated on the Unusual Occurrence Report as the date the chart was initiated. The chart which thereafter purports to be Respondent's emergency room record is actually a composite of different patients' charts. To the extent it purports to be Respondent's chart, the entries contained therein are false. The Alfenta used by Respondent was an appropriate drug for the purpose for which it was used. It is a rapid but short-acting narcotic analgesic when given in the amount in which it was given. Further, the amount of Alfenta administered was an appropriate dose. Respondent used the Alfenta because it was an appropriate drug for immediate relief so he could endure the palpation and aspiration of his knee and so he could stop his leg from trembling allowing Wernicke to aspirate it. He knew the Alfenta would be worn off even before the analgesic effect of the anti- inflammatory medication was felt. It is noteworthy that all physicians who testified in this proceeding rated the pain Respondent was in as between eight and ten on a pain scale where ten is the worst. Respondent did not use Alfenta as a result of any addiction, and his use of the drug under the circumstances in this case was not related to any abuse of narcotics. Respondent has not exhibited any of the behavior of a drug user. Respondent did not engage in any attempt to "cover up" his administration of Alfenta to himself. He called the hospital and requested his anaesthesia cart be brought and that an anaesthesiologist come to the emergency room to administer the medication. The administration occurred with the implicit consent of Wernicke and it took place in front of Wernicke, in front of three or four emergency room nurses, and in front of the emergency room doctor. At the time, he filled out the narcotics record on his anaesthesia cart and telephoned the hospital's pharmacist the following day to tell him what had occurred and request that he be billed for the medication he used. His giving the hospital a prescription from Dr. Brennan was caused by Wernicke's refusal to document the treatment he rendered to Respondent, by Respondent's inability to write his own prescription, and was in response to the hospital's specific request that a prescription be written for the purpose of the hospital's record keeping. Further, Dr. Wernicke knew what had happened, as did the other emergency room personnel present that evening, and Respondent fully disclosed the events that had occurred to both Dr. Brennan and to the hospital pharmacist. Respondent's use of Alfenta on December 14, 1992, was not in any way related to patient care and had no impact on any patient care rendered by Respondent.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent not guilty and dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against him in this cause. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of March, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-6 and 9-12 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 1 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 7, 8, 13, 14, and 16 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the competent evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 15 has been rejected as being subordinate to the issues herein. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 3-19, 21-31, 33-35, 38-40, 42, 43, and 45 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 2, 20, 32, 36, 37, and 44 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 41 has been rejected as being subordinate to the issues herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur B. Skafidas, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Joseph L. Mannikko, Esquire 215 South Federal Highway, Suite 100 Stuart, Florida 34994 Dr. Marm Harris, Executive Director Agency for Health Care Administration Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Tom Wallace, Assistant Director Agency for Health Care Administration Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68458.331
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BOARD OF MEDICINE vs. JORGE LUIS CAMBO, 88-004967 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-004967 Latest Update: Apr. 03, 1989

Findings Of Fact Dr. Cambo is licensed by the Board of Medicine, holding license number 48428, and was licensed at all times pertaining to the events alleged in the Administrative Complaint. L. M., a 67 year old male, arrived at the emergency room of John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital in Atlantis, Florida, at 12:08 p.m., on April 15, 1987. L. M. had been a resident at the Atlantis Nursing Home. L. M. spoke Finnish; he did not speak English. He had had an amputation of a portion of his right leg two weeks earlier due to gangrene caused by peripheral vascular disease. The staples from this amputation were still visible. He had had a stroke, had irregularities in a prior E.K.G. and generally was in poor health. His current medications included ecotrin, motrin, vasotic, lopressor, halcion and catapress. He had indicated that he had chest pain to the nursing home staff and to the Fire-Rescue technicians by signing. When he arrived at the emergency room L. M. was described as cyanotic, diaphoretic and hypotensive. His breathing was labored. He was examined by the emergency room physician, Randall Wolff. L. M.'s chest pain, labored breathing and cyanotic appearance were consistent with cardiogenic shock. Dr. Wolff ordered certain diagnostic tests which included a complete blood count, a chest x-ray, and arterial blood gases. An E.K.G. was performed at approximately 3:00 p.m. that afternoon. L. M.'s urine color that afternoon was indicative of infection. Test results showed an elevated white blood count, and immature white blood cell forms. These are consistent with an active infection from the recent amputation or a myocardial infarction. Dr. Wolff thought the patient should have been admitted to J.F.K. because of his chest pain and abnormal vital signs. Dr. Cambo was contacted by the emergency room staff because Dr. Cambo was on call for the health maintenance organization which provided L. M.'s medical care. Dr. Cambo came to the hospital at about 2:40 p.m. and saw L. M. and other HMO patients. No treatment for L. M., other than oxygen, had been ordered by Dr. Wolff. Apparently, Dr. Wolff did not regard L. M.'s condition as serious. Dr. Cambo conducted a physical examination of L. M., who by that time denied having chest pain by signing. The examination revealed that the right stump had no femoral pulse, while the left leg had 2+ femoral pulse. His blood pressure was on the low side of the normal range. Dr. Cambo also reviewed L. M.'s test results, including the 3:00 p.m. E.K.G. tracing. Dr. Cambo then telephoned Dr. Jerome Vincente, the primary care physician who had managed the care of patient L. M. while L. M. was being served by the International Medical Center No. 90 in West Palm Beach. During that telephone call Dr. Cambo and Dr. Vincente compared the 3:00 p.m. E.K.G. tracing with a prior E.K.G. tracing from L. M.'s records at International Medical Center. The prior E.K.G. tracing was similar to that taken at 3:00 p.m. Dr. Cambo's reading of the 3:00 p.m. tracing led him to diagnose inferior wall ischemia and marked T anterior wall ischemia. Taken in isolation, the 3:00 p.m. tracing would indicate that L. M. might be having a heart attack. After the comparison Dr. Cambo made of the prior tracing, Dr. Cambo concluded that L. M.'s current cardiac condition was not abnormal for him, and decided to transfer L. M. to Humana Hospital for the purpose of achieving continuity of treatment, i.e., so that he would be seen at Humana by his regular physicians. Dr. Cambo believed L. M. had an infection resulting from the recent amputation and had circulatory problems which had resulted in gangrene that had caused the amputation. Dr. Cambo returned to J.F.K. Hospital at 3:30 p.m. to see HMO patients, including L. M. who had not yet been transferred to Humana Hospital. Dr. Cambo again examined L. M. and after reviewing the progress notes of L. M. maintained by the J.F.K. Hospital nursing staff, he determined that L. M.'s condition had not changed since 3:00 p.m. Dr. Cambo left J.F.K. Hospital between 5:30 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. with the instruction that L. M. be transferred to Humana. Due to the delay encountered in obtaining transportation, Dr. Cambo ordered that the patient continue to receive oxygen and that he receive I.V. fluids. Between 6:30 p.m. and 7:30 p.m. Dr. Cambo contacted the nursing staff at the J.F.K. Hospital emergency room on two occasions. Each time he was told that L. M.'s condition remained the same and had not altered since his arrival at the emergency room shortly after noon. The Atlantis Ambulance Service arrived at J.F.K. Hospital at about 7:45 p.m. to transport L. M. to Humana Hospital. At about 11:00 p.m. on April 15, 1987, patient L. M. died from an anterior wall myocardial infarction at Humana Hospital.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the charges contained in Count I of the Administrative Complaint be dismissed. Count II of the Administrative Complaint was dismissed by the Department at the final hearing and requires no further action by the hearing officer or the Board of Medicine. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 1989. APPENDIX Rulings on the proposed findings of fact. Findings proposed by Department of Professional Regulation. Covered in finding of fact 1. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 2 and 3. Covered in finding of fact 2. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 2. To the extent appropriate covered in finding of fact 3 and 4. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 3. Rejected because the programming of the data scope to produce the quoted printout was not proven to be accurate. What is most important is the judgment of the physicians who examined the patient and were in a much better position to evaluate the significance of the results, not only of the E.K.G., but of all testing. Covered in finding of fact 4. The proposed finding that L. M. communicated non-verbally due to aphasia is rejected because it is equally likely that he could not communicate because English was not his primary language. Rejected as inconsistent with the Hearing Officer's view of the evidence. Rejected because the testimony of Dr. Cambo and Dr. Vincente indicates that the E.K.G. was not clearly indicative of myocardial infarction in this patient. Covered in finding of fact 4. Rejected as unnecessary and because there is no way to know whether the patient's blood pressure was low due to cardiogenic shock or the medication he was taking. Rejected is inconsistent with the Hearing Officer's view of the evidence. Rejected as inconsistent with the Hearing Officer's view of the evidence. Rejected as inconsistent with the Hearing Officer's view of the evidence. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. There is no indication that the patient suffered from any problem because of the absence of written instructions for care to be given during the transfer. Rejected as inconsistent with the Hearing Officer's view of the evidence. Covered in finding of fact 5. Rejected because there was no argument between Dr. Wolff and Dr. Cambo about admitting the patient to J.F.K. The nursing notes, from which this inference is derived, are unreliable. Dr. Wolff did not testify to any such argument. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected, the patient's breathing was not labored at 6:30 p.m. To the extent the nurses notes might indicate otherwise, they are rejected as unreliable. Rejected because the second page of the nurses notes is an after-the-fact creation. Rejected because the second page of the nurses notes is an after-the-fact creation. Rejected because the nurses notes have been found to be unreliable. Covered to the extent necessary in finding of fact 9. Covered to the extent necessary in finding of fact 9. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as inconsistent with the Hearing Officer's view of the evidence. Rejected as inconsistent with the Hearing Officer's view of the evidence. Findings proposed by Respondent The findings proposed by the Respondent are not submitted in numbered paragraphs. The burden of the proposed findings of Dr. Cambo have been accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: LEE SIMMS, ESQUIRE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 ROBERT H. SPRINGER, ESQUIRE 3003 SOUTH CONGRESS AVENUE SUITE 1A PALM SPRINGS, FLORIDA 33461 DOROTHY FAIRCLOTH EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FLORIDA BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750

Florida Laws (2) 120.57458.331
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