The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Robert D. Taylor, is eligible for the services offered by Respondent's Developmental Services Program.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Robert D. Taylor (Petitioner), filed an application with Respondent, the Department of Children and Family Services (Department), to receive services of the Department's Developmental Services Program. Based on information provided by Mrs. Tye, the suspected developmental disability/medical conditions which were the basis for Petitioner's potential eligibility were mild mental retardation and behavior problems. Following submittal of Petitioner's application, his eligibility for the Development Services Program was reviewed and determined by Dr. Bruce Crowell, a licensed psychologist employed by the Department. In order to determine Petitioner's eligibility, Dr. Crowell reviewed Petitioner's school psychological evaluations, all of which were completed prior to Petitioner's eighteenth birthday. According to Petitioner's school psychological evaluations, the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, Third Edition, was administered to Petitioner in January 1993. Petitioner obtained a verbal Intelligence Quotient (IQ) of 80, a performance IQ of 82, and a full scale IQ of 79. Petitioner was also evaluated by Dr. Ruth Nentwig, a licensed psychologist, in June 16, 1999. As part of her evaluation, Dr. Nentwig administered the WAIS-III, an instrument that measures an individual's overall intellectual functioning. On the WAIS-III, Petitioner obtained a verbal IQ of 86, a performance IQ of 80, and a full scale IQ of 82. This evaluation was completed prior to Petitioner's eighteenth birthday. Based upon the statutory criteria, Petitioner is not eligible for services provided by the Department's Developmental Services Program. The IQ scores obtained by Petitioner place him in the low average to borderline intellectual functioning level and are not indicative of significant cognitive or intellectual functioning impairment reflective of retardation. Petitioner would have to obtain a full scale IQ score of 69 or lower to be considered retarded and eligible for the Department's Developmental Services Program. Moreover, manifestation of such impairment would have to be documented prior to age 18 in order to demonstrate eligibility for the program.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent, the Department of Children and Family Services, enter an order denying Petitioner's application for services through the Developmental Services Program. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert D. Taylor c/o Sarah Tye 1455 Winston Road Fort Myers, Florida 33917 Eugenie Rehak, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 60085 Fort Myers, Florida 33906-0085 Virginia Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), operates the Developmental Services Program for individuals in the State of Florida who are qualified, through its Diagnostic and Evaluation Services (DES) DES operates through a team of professionals who make appraisals of applicants for diagnostic services. In the operation of this program, an application is forwarded along with supporting documents to the DES office by the social worker who takes it in. Upon receipt, the package is scanned for a preliminary determination of eligibility. If not obviously ineligible, the applicant is then given a series of evaluations including nursing, educational, psychological, etc. Wherever possible, existing evaluations are utilized. When all the evaluations have been completed, the package is given to a team of experts to develop a treatment plan for the individual. However, if after review of the evaluation it is determined that the applicant is not eligible for the service for some reason, then that individual is notified and no plan is developed. That was the scenario in this case. Criteria applied in evaluating an individual for eligibility for service include: an IQ of 69 or below; defects in adaptive behavior; the condition had to exist prior to the applicant turning 18; and such conditions as cerebral palsy, epilepsy, or autism exist without retardation. Petitioner, Joseph Braxton, currently a resident of a foster home in Orlando, through the Legal Aid Society, applied for placement in Respondent's Developmental Services Program. He is an individual who withdrew from high school in January, 1961, after failing to successfully progress even in remedial classes as indicated in the records of his former school in West Virginia. At the hearing, petitioner indicated he did "pretty good" in school, a definite inconsistency with his record, and feels that, while he is a slow learner, he is not retarded. His IQ, however, when tested during the evaluation process, was determined to be 66. Petitioner quit school before the age of 16 to work at odd jobs and as a house painter for a lady who owned several houses, to help support his mother. Each time he got paid, he would give all but $20.00 to her. She would pay all his bills, do all his shopping, do all the cooking, and take care of his clothes and his room. He admits to being shy and tends to do whatever is asked of him by others. He is unmarried and has no family in this state. Petitioner came to Florida several years ago and thereafter held several unskilled jobs, the last of which was as a migrant farm worker which earned him between $50.00 and $60.00 per week. In March, 1983, while drinking with friends, he fell off the brick wall on which he was sitting and suffered a spinal cord injury for which he was hospitalized until September 10, 1983. At that time, he was transferred to the foster home where he now lives. As a result of the spinal cord injury he sustained, he cannot walk without a cane and has lost the full use of his hands--one more so than the other. He is unable to do more than care for his own basic personal needs, but is desirous of being productive and wants to be trained. Respondent produced nursing and academic assessments, psychosocial evaluations, and the medical records on Petitioner from the hospital where he had been treated. Upon review of all the information available, the committee determined Petitioner was ineligible because there was no proof his deficiency existed before age 18. To arrive at this conclusion, Respondent relied heavily on two sources: (1) the intellectual evaluation done by Dr. Robert T. Edelman, a clinical psychologist, done while Petitioner was in the hospital; and (2) the academic evaluation done by Bonnie Burke, a developmental disabilities consultant, done after he got out of the hospital. At the time of both evaluations, Petitioner was 39 years old. The academic evaluation by Ms. Burke, using the Peabody Individual Achievement Test among others, showed Petitioner was functioning at the sixth grade level overall. That evaluation is broken down as follows: Mathematics 3.8 Reading Recognition 4.7 Reading Comprehension 6.8 Spelling 8.0 General Information 7.5 Average 6.16 The Picture Vocabulary Test showed his Receptive Language Age to be 10.8,and his Visual-Motor Integration Age Equivalent was 5.7. This latter area, of course, may well be attributed to his injury, as Respondent claims, but is not, of itself, determinative. Respondent also claims that the test scores show that if Petitioner had been retarded while going to school, he would not have been able to achieve test scores this high. This position has merit, and it is so found. The previously mentioned high school record showing unsatisfactory performance up to withdrawal is also not persuasive to Respondent's witness, Mr. Carpenter. He contends there are many reasons, other than retardation, for doing poorly in school. Since the criteria cutoff for IQ is 69, and Petitioner's IQ tested at 66, this is a borderline case showing "mild" mental retardation. However, there are other criteria as well, as was seen before. Of equal importance is the question of whether Petitioner has any adaptive behavior defects. These would affect his ability to function in the environment in which he is placed. Respondent, while admitting current adaptive behavior defects, contends they came after, and as a result of, his injury. In support of that position Mr. Carpenter cites the fact that Petitioner survived for many years and was totally self-sufficient after leaving school and before his injury. Adaptive behavior defects can be mental as well as physical--in fact, usually are mental. Though Respondent contends Petitioner can adapt well and is not deficient in that area and cites Dr. Edelman's reference to the Lie Scale, which indicates generally that Petitioner would try to please or answer as he thought was wanted, Petitioner was not interviewed by the committee to see how he would react, nor is there any indication that his case worker got into the question of his ability to handle funds. Respondent contends that Petitioner does not fall within the criteria for enrollment because: Petitioner has a mild mental retardation at present; There is no evidence of retardation prior to age 18; and There is no evidence of severe adaptive behavior problems. It is Respondent's position that petitioner would not benefit from developmental services because: He needs a residential placement; If Petitioner were to be placed in a group home with mental retardeds, it would most likely make him very unhappy and could cause him to regress; and Petitioner needs the stimulation of normal people in his own age group to help him develop, and a residential setting in Respondent's program would not fulfill this need. Respondent contends, through Mr. Carpenter, that Petitioner should be in an Adult Congregate Living Facility and enrolled in vocational rehabilitative schooling with the potential for him to progress to a sole living situation in the future. In Petitioner's case, the factors other than the pre-18 year condition (the program's potential for benefiting Petitioner) did not enter into the original decision to deny Petitioner enrollment. It is quite conceivable that if Petitioner could prove retardation prior to age 18 and were to reapply, he might be accepted. Mr. Carpenter indicated he would be disposed to grant the eligibility under those circumstances, but he could not speak for the rest of the team. With that in mind and recognizing that Petitioner had the school records not available to the team at the time of the original evaluation, the Hearing Officer recessed the hearing to allow the team to reconsider in light of this additional evidence. On February 28, 1984, the original diagnostic and evaluation team which took the action complained of by Petitioner met and considered the evidence from Valley High School. It thereafter determined it could not retreat from its original position.
The Issue Whether the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ or Department) acted illegally, arbitrarily, dishonestly or fraudulently in the rejection of all proposals for the Better Outlook Center request for proposals.
Findings Of Fact The Department has responsibility for the custody and treatment of delinquent youth in the State of Florida. As part of that responsibility, the Department sought proposals for a halfway house program to be located in Dade County, Florida (District 11). This program, also known as the Better Outlook Center (BOC), will provide residential beds for twenty-eight male juveniles who are considered a moderate risk to public safety and require a structured residential community. The Department advertised a request for proposal (RFP) for the BOC project, RFP #K6P07, on January 24, 1997. Subsequent to the general mailing of the RFP packet, the Department received twelve proposals for the BOC project. Among those proposals, the Petitioner, Haynes Services Corporation, was awarded the highest score. In a telephone conference call conducted in February, 1997, the Petitioner’s CEO was advised of his apparent highest ranking but was asked to lower the per diem rate. Petitioner agreed to the amendment. Subsequently, upon further review of the matter, the Department determined it had not included criteria which would consider quality assurance performance on similar programs, third party reviews, or past performance. The Department determined that these criteria should be included in all RFP evaluations and set about to draft language incorporating these provisions into new RFP instructions. These new criteria would be applicable throughout the state and would be applied to review all applicants for programs awarded through the DJJ. Concern over the new criteria arose because the Department was advised that Petitioner had failed quality assurance requirements at another project. Thus, while the Department had considered Petitioner’s proposal for the subject project well articulated, it became concerned regarding Petitioner’s ability to perform as represented. In order to place all applicants on an even playing field for consideration of this project as well as others where this issue might arise, the Department determined that all applicants should submit records of past performance. The results of past performance and quality assurance ratings would then be a factor to consider before awarding future projects. Accordingly, all proposals which had been submitted for the BOC RFP at issue were rejected. On or about March 7, 1997, all applicants who had submitted proposals for the BOC project were notified that the Department intended to re-advertise the RFP with new criteria. The Petitioner was not awarded a contract for the subject RFP.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Juvenile Justice enter a final order dismissing the challenge to the rejection of all bids for RFP #K6P07. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of May, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Calvin Ross Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Janet Ferris General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Kaydell Wright-Douglas, Esquire The Wright Building 110 North Armenia Avenue, Suite A Tampa, Florida 33609 Scott C. Wright, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
Findings Of Fact The dwelling at 1622 Turner Street is a four-bedroom, three-bath residence on a corner lot 125 feet by 103 feet. The property is zoned RM-12 but is subject to a rezoning application to change the zoning to RM-8. The property is owned by William A. and Esther Toiga, who purchased the property in 1975 as a residence in which they raised 12 children. The Toigas intend to sell the property to Alternate Human Services, a non-profit organization, for use as a Level II Group Care Facility as a Youth Shelter licensed to provide counseling services for five children at one time. The building is adequate for more than the number for which a license will be requested. Alternate Human Services operates a similar facility in St. Petersburg, Florida. The proposed facility will provide counseling for runaway children and abused children between the ages of 10 and 17 years who are likely to be runaways. There will be no children classified as delinquent at the facility. The average stay of a child at the St. Petersburg facility is five days and a similar length of stay is anticipated at the proposed facility. The neighborhood in the vicinity of the proposed facility is composed largely of elderly people, some of whom live alone; and most of whom oppose the proposed Facility. These residents anticipate a traffic increase due to counselors, police, workers, etc., coming to and going from the facility; they are concerned about their safety with runaway children residing close to them; they are concerned about reduced property values resulting from the operation of the proposed facility; and they are concerned for their safety when walking to and from local stores and banks where there are no sidewalks and pedestrians have to walk in the street. In short, the Petitioner, and those testifying in opposition to the requested special exception, would much prefer the facility be located elsewhere than in their neighborhood. On the other hand, public officials, including police, juvenile specialists, a member of the Juvenile Welfare Board, and an HRS official in charge of licensing youth care facilities all testified that they have never experienced problems to the neighborhood as a result of such a facility as is here proposed, that no additional traffic is generated by such a facility, and that with the careful screening given the children admitted to such facility, no complaint against such a facility has been filed subsequent to tie licensing of the facility.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was subjected to discrimination in the work environment by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) due to Petitioner's race, sex, and martial status in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Lince Musgrove Favors, a single African- American female (who has since married), began working for DCF as a Human Services Counselor III with the Aging and Adult Services Program in DCF's Panama City, Florida, office on October 3, 1988. In this capacity, Petitioner occupied Department Position Number 50790. Petitioner's duties involved services designed to help elderly persons remain in the community. One of her colleagues, fellow Human Services Counselor III Rebecca Schwetz, had the duties of implementing the Home Care for the Elderly and Home Care for the Disabled Programs, which focused on finding residential placements for the elderly and disabled in adult living facilities and adult family homes. In September 1995, due to budget cuts and the transfer of certain functions from DCF to the Department of Elder Affairs, a memorandum issued from DCF state headquarters announcing that 134 positions in DCF's Aging and Adult Services Program would be eliminated. District II of DCF, the District in which Petitioner worked, would eliminate 11 of these positions. George Benner, then the Operations and Program Administrator over the Aging and Adult Services Program in one portion of District II, had the responsibility of eliminating four of these positions. Benner, in making this difficult decision, sought to minimize the adverse impact on workers occupying these positions. Accordingly, he selected those positions which were already vacant or which were about to be vacated. As a consequence, Benner’s four choices of positions to be eliminated were the following: a) the position of Sydney Canaday, a white female clerical worker whose position was deemed to be less essential than others; b) the position of John Johnston, a white male who had indicated an interest in finding another position; c) the position of Petitioner who had expressed to Benner and others in the office, inclusive of her immediate supervisor, that she intended to marry and leave District II to find other employment; and d) a vacant position. While Petitioner, in the course of her testimony at hearing, denied saying that she intended to leave her position after her impending marriage, the testimony of her immediate supervisor and Benner that Petitioner intended to get married around the beginning of 1996 and leave District II to live with her new husband, was direct, candid, and credible. The testimony of Petitioner on this point is not credited. Petitioner made numerous attempts to find employment in DCF's District I during the months of October and November 1995. On October 13, 1995, Benner wrote a letter to the district program manager in District I recommending Petitioner for employment there. Benner also telephoned the district program manager with a recommendation for Petitioner. At this time, Benner still believed that Petitioner intended to leave District II and seek employment within District I. On October 31, 1995, DCF notified Petitioner in writing that the effective date of the deletion of her position would be December 29, 1995. The notification letter advised her of her right to request reassignment or demotion. Petitioner submitted a Request for Reassignment or Demotion on November 6, 1995. A Personal Interest Form submitted by Petitioner the same day specified that she was seeking employment in Okaloosa, Santa Rosa, Walton, and Escambia Counties. As the effective date of the position deletion drew near, DCF continued to search for a position for Petitioner. On December 1, 1995, DCF offered Petitioner a Human Services Counselor III position in the Developmental Disabilities Program in the Panama City, Florida, office. Petitioner declined this position because it involved different skills and a different clientele. Petitioner did not explain why she felt that it would be unacceptable to be required to acquire new knowledge and skills. As the December 29, 1995, deadline approached and Petitioner still had no other employment prospects, DCF took unilateral action to preserve Petitioner's employment and reassigned her, effective December 22, 1995, to a Health Services Representative position at the Bay County Public Health Unit. Petitioner received the same pay in the new position as she did in the Human Services Counselor III position. DCF continued to let Petitioner know that it would assist her in finding another position either in District II or elsewhere if she so desired. There is no evidence that Petitioner ever attempted to avail herself of this assistance. Due to legislatively mandated reorganization in the executive branch, the Department of Health was created and Petitioner's position at the Bay County Public Health Unit became a position within the Department of Health at some point subsequent to her reassignment to that position. In July 1999, Petitioner was still employed as a Health Services Representative with the Department of Health. At this time, the Department of Health informed Petitioner that her duties would now include drawing blood samples from the Health Department’s clientele. The Department of Health offered Petitioner training in how to safely draw blood, but she decided to resign instead. She was convinced that she would not be able to safely perform these tasks after receiving training in the proper technique, but she was able to offer no reasons at the hearing to support this belief. Petitioner submitted her resignation on July 19, 1999, effective August 5, 1999. The Department of Health accepted the resignation on July 20, 1999, and Petitioner voluntarily left her employment with the State of Florida on August 5, 1999. No evidence of any kind, direct or inferential, testimonial or documentary, was introduced to establish that DCF or any of its personnel were motivated negatively by concerns of race, sex, or marital status with regard to Petitioner. No pleading has identified with any specificity the type of relief sought. No evidence was introduced at the final hearing to establish what remedy would be required to make Petitioner whole relative to back pay, benefits, or other forms of relief.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Families 2639 North Monroe Street Building A, Suite 104 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Cecile M. Scoon, Esquire Peters & Scoon 25 East 8th Street Panama City, Florida 32401 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is 26 years old. She lives by herself. Her residence is 280 John Knox Road, Tallahassee, Florida. She has maintained that residence since September of 1993. Petitioner works at Pyramid Industries, a structured workshop. She is receiving training as a receptionist. In addition, she packages headrests and does other duties which are assigned to her at the workshop. Petitioner's employment with Pyramid Industries is for four days a week, 9:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., on each day. That employment began on January 8, 1994. Petitioner was referred to Pyramid Industries by officials of Vocational Rehabilitation. Petitioner has difficulty in controlling a tendency to use inappropriate language, which she described as "swearing". Petitioner's parents take her shopping, to include trips to the grocery store, assist the Petitioner in maintaining her checkbook, visit with Petitioner on a daily basis, and give her support and try to assist her in controlling her "swearing". When Petitioner's mother was pregnant with Petitioner, the mother contracted rubella. Subsequently, Petitioner was taken to a pediatrician at age one and one-half because Petitioner was not speaking. Petitioner was then taken to Yale Child Study in an effort to analyze her condition. No competent evidence was presented concerning the findings made by that organization. Petitioner participated in a program administered by Yale Child Study, which, from a layperson's perspective, was designed to address Petitioner's behavior. When attending schools in Connecticut, Petitioner rode a special school bus with other students. There is no competent proof in the record concerning the nature of the problem which Petitioner and the other students experienced which required them to have special transportation to school. When Petitioner was a child, her mother attempted to address Petitioner's problems of verbal skills by using vocabulary flash cards and engaging in conversations with Petitioner. As a child, Petitioner was removed from kindergarten and reading readiness class to a private school in which an Individual Education Plan (IEP) was prepared to address her problems. No competent evidence was presented concerning the nature of the problem experienced by Petitioner at that time. Under funding provided by the Guilford, Connecticut, public school system, Petitioner was provided a residential placement at Devereux Foundation for education in middle school in accordance with an IEP. Petitioner attended Guilford High School in Guilford, Connecticut and received a certificate pursuant to a special education program in lieu of a diploma. No evidence was presented concerning the nature of this special education program. Petitioner has sought developmental services from Respondent so that she might be provided transportation to certain outings, such as bowling, and would be allowed to participate in the outings with persons who receive developmental services. The basis for the claim for developmental services is the allegation that Petitioner suffers from retardation, as defined in Section 393.063(41), Florida Statutes. No competent evidence was presented to prove that Petitioner suffers from retardation, as defined in Section 393.063(41), Florida Statutes. When Petitioner initially made application for developmental services from Respondent, she provided supporting information, to include a document which was entitled "Report of Psychological Assessment-Intellectual Functioning", performed by the Devereux Foundation, Devon, Pennsylvania. Consistent with its policy, Petitioner considered information in that document, which was dated March 10, 1992. In particular, Respondent took cognizance of a Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, a test administered to Petitioner.1 Respondent considered this test and its results to be collateral source information. Respondent relied upon the test results in making a preliminary decision about Petitioner's entitlement to receive developmental services. At hearing, Respondent, in the person of its employee and policy spokesperson, continued to defer to the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children scores in the Devereux Foundation testing as a means of determining Petitioner's eligibility for developmental services. Preliminarily and at hearing, Respondent held to the opinion that the full-scale score of 72 obtained by Petitioner disqualified Petitioner from receiving developmental services. Respondent's preliminary decision and position at hearing, was to the effect, that the full-scale score of 72 in the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children obtained by Petitioner placed Petitioner above the range of persons who have significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning. When Respondent saw the full-scale score on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children that had been administered by the Devereux Foundation to Petitioner, and having been persuaded by that information that Petitioner was not entitled to developmental services, it took no further action to review the material submitted by Petitioner or to seek additional material from Petitioner. Additional information which Petitioner provided to Respondent prior to hearing, on a form from the Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, which contained information purportedly related to a WAIS76-69-72 assessment of Petitioner's intellectual functioning, was not considered in determining the question of eligibility because Respondent was persuaded that this testing was done too late in Petitioner's life to be of value. The Social Security Administration form entitled "Disability Determination and Transmittal" makes reference to a report prepared on March 31, 1986 concerning Petitioner's intellectual functioning as purportedly prepared by Kenneth Gilstein, Ph.D. C/E. The Disability Determination and Transmittal form paraphrases that report. The actual report is not part of the Disability Determination and Transmittal form.2 Other than the reference to the full-scale score of 72 obtained by Petitioner in the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, administered by the Devereux Foundation, Petitioner presented no other competent evidence in support of her application for developmental services, as such information would address Petitioner's general intellectual functioning, manifested during the period from conception to age 18. Petitioner presented no competent evidence concerning deficits in her adaptive behavior that existed concurrently with the measurement of her general intellectual functioning, as manifested during the period from conception to age 18. Neither party presented competent evidence concerning Petitioner's intellectual function to establish that Petitioner's performance was two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test specified in the rules of the Respondent, as this proof might describe significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's eligibility for developmental services. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 1994.
The Issue Whether the application of Petitioner to participate in the Developmental Services Program offered by Respondent to benefit mentally retarded individuals should be granted.
Findings Of Fact An application filed on behalf of 20-year-old Janette Stone, Petitioner, to receive services of Respondent’s Developmental Services Program was denied by Respondent’s representative as documented in a letter dated January 16, 1997. Following submittal of Petitioner’s application, her eligibility for admission to the program was reviewed by Respondent’s staff psychologist, Filipinas Ripka. In order to determine Petitioner’s eligibility, Ripka reviewed psychological evaluations of Petitioner, three of which had been completed prior to Petitioner’s 18th birthday. One of the reviewed evaluations was made when Petitioner was 12 years of age. Another evaluation of Petitioner was completed when she was 15 years and eleven months of age. A third evaluation occurred when Petitioner was 17 years old. Petitioner received full-scale intelligence quotient (IQ) scores of 73, 72 and 73 respectively on the evaluations reviewed by Ripka. The evaluations were made on the revised Weschler Intelligence Scale For Children. The final evaluation, where Petitioner obtained a full-scale IQ score of 73, was made on the revised Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale. The IQ scores received by Petitioner were all within what is termed the borderline range of intellectual functioning, as opposed to test results indicative of significant cognitive or intellectual functioning impairment reflective of retardation. Petitioner would have had to score 69 or lower to be considered retarded and eligible for Respondent’s developmental program. Further, manifestation of such impairments must be documented prior to age 18 in order to demonstrate eligibility for participation in Respondent’s program. Accordingly, Ripka determined that Petitioner was ineligible to participate in the Developmental Services Program offered by Respondent because Petitioner exhibited only borderline intelligence prior to age 18, instead of cognitive or intellectual function impairment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner’s application. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Robin H. Conner, Esquire 1750 Highway A1A South, Suite B St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Roger L. D. Williams, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32217 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard A. Doran, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
