The Issue Whether the Petitioner’s request for an exemption pursuant to Chapter 435, Florida Statutes, should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Saunders seeks an exemption for employment in a position for which a security background check is required pursuant to Sections 397.451 and 435.04, Florida Statutes. Presently, Mr. Saunders is employed as an intern human service worker at Reliance House, an adult residential facility located in Panama City, Bay County, Florida. In addition to working at Reliance House, Mr. Saunders is enrolled at Gulf Coast Community College working toward a degree as a Certified Addition Associate Professional. Mr. Saunders sought this exemption so that he could work with children receiving substance abuse services. In 1990, Mr. Saunders was charged with and plead nolo contendere to the charges of burglary, possession of burglary tools, and carrying a concealed weapon. Mr. Saunders was placed on two years' probation. In 1991, Mr. Saunders pled guilty to the charges of burglary of a structure, attempted burglary of a structure, grand theft, criminal mischief, and burglary of a business. In 1992, Mr. Saunders was charged with burglary of a liquor store. Mr. Saunders testified that the burglary charge was reduced to a charge of criminal trespass and that he remained under court supervised probation until October, 1996. Mr. Saunders expressed remorse for his criminal behavior and accepted complete responsibility. He also believes that he shares some of the same problems that are exhibited by the residents of Reliance House and that he would be a good role model because he is attempting to correct his life. Christiane LeClair is a background screening coordinator employed by the Department of Children and Families. As part of her duties, Ms. LeClair reviews employment applications to determine if an applicant is worthy of a position of special trust. Ms. LeClair determined that Mr. Saunders was not qualified because of his conviction of grand theft. She also noted that Mr. Saunders has been released from supervision of the courts for only three months and that it is too early to determine if he has been rehabilitated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order and therein DENY Mr. Saunders’ request for an exemption.DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of March, 1997, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM A. BUZZETT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 1997.
The Issue Whether Petitioner has cause to terminate the Respondent's employment as alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated October 20, 1998.
Findings Of Fact On August 14, 1998, Respondent, a teacher employed by Petitioner, entered a plea of guilty to the charge of exploitation of an elderly person, which is a first degree felony pursuant to Section 825.103, Florida Statutes. At the same time, Respondent also entered a plea of guilty to the charge of petit theft over $100.00, which is a first degree misdemeanor. In entering these pleas, Respondent advised the court, pursuant to Rule 3.172(d), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, that she believed the pleas were in her best interest and that she was maintaining her innocence to the charges. The court withheld adjudication of guilt as to the charge of exploitation of an elderly person, adjudicated her guilty of petit theft, sentenced her to one day of time served, placed her on probation for 20 years, and required that she pay restitution to the Estate of Lillie Keller in the amount of $52,000.00. 1/ By letter dated October 21, 1997, Petitioner reassigned Respondent to a position with no direct contact with children pending the outcome of the criminal charges. Following an investigation, the superintendent of schools recommended to the school board that Respondent's employment be suspended without pay and terminated. On October 7, 1998, the school board voted to adopt that recommendation. The recommendation and the subsequent vote to adopt the recommendation were based on Respondent's plea of guilty to the charge of exploitation of an elderly person. Petitioner followed its procedural rules in investigating this matter and in voting to terminate Respondent's employment. As of October 7, 1998, Respondent held a professional services contract and had been employed by Petitioner for approximately 13 years as a teacher. Section 231.02(1), Florida Statutes, requires school board employees to be of good moral character. Respondent, as a teacher, is required by Section 231.02(2), Florida Statutes, to be fingerprinted and screened by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Section 435.03(2), Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (2) Any person for whom employment screening is required by statute must not have been found guilty of, regardless of adjudication, or entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, any offense prohibited under any of the following provisions of the Florida Statutes or under any similar statute of another jurisdiction: * * * (v) Section 825.103, relating to exploitation of an elderly person or disabled adult, if the offense was a felony. Petitioner's Rule 3.12, pertaining to criminal background checks of current and prospective employees, has been duly enacted and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Definitions: For the purposes of this policy: * * * b. "Conviction" means a determination of guilt that is the result of a plea or a trial regardless of whether adjudication is withheld. * * * 3. A prospective or current employee may be disqualified or may be terminated from continued employment if the prospective or current employee has been convicted of a crime classified as a felony or first degree misdemeanor directly related to the position of employment sought or convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude or any of the offenses enumerated in Chapter 435, Florida Statutes. Section M of the collective bargaining agreement between the Petitioner and the Palm Beach County Classroom Teachers' Association provides for progressive discipline of covered employees such as Respondent. Section M provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Without the consent of the employee and the Association, disciplinary action may not be taken against an employee except for just cause, and this must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence which supports the recommended disciplinary action. * * * 7. Except in cases which clearly constitute a real and immediate danger to the District or the actions/inactions of the employee constitute such clearly flagrant and purposeful violations of reasonable school rules and regulations, progressive discipline shall be administered as follows: Verbal Reprimand With a Written Notation. . . . Written Reprimand. . . . Suspension Without Pay. A suspension without pay may be issued to an employee when appropriate, in keeping with the provisions of this Section, including just cause and applicable law. ... Dismissal. An employee may be dismissed (employment contract terminated or non-renewed) when appropriate in keeping with provisions of this Section, including just cause and applicable law. Section 435.06(2), Florida Statutes, requires an employing agency, such as the Petitioner, to take the following action when an employee has failed to meet the requirements of Section 435.03(2), Florida Statutes: The employer must either terminate the employment of any of its personnel found to be in noncompliance with the minimum standards for good moral character contained in this section or place the employee in a position for which background screening is not required unless the employee is granted an exemption from disqualification pursuant to s. 435.07. 2/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that terminates Respondent's employment based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of August, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 1999.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent was convicted or found guilty of a crime which directly relates to the practice of chiropractic medicine; and, if so, whether Petitioner should impose discipline on Respondent's chiropractic license within the applicable penalty guidelines or take some other action.
Findings Of Fact The Parties At all times relevant to this case, Respondent Mia Ann Higginbotham, D.C., was licensed to practice chiropractic medicine in the state of Florida. The Department has regulatory jurisdiction over licensed chiropractors such as Dr. Higginbotham. In particular, the Department is authorized to file and prosecute an administrative complaint against a chiropractic physician, as it has done in this instance, when a panel of the Board of Chiropractic Medicine has found that probable cause exists to suspect that the licensee has committed a disciplinable offense. The Material Historical Facts In April 2006, the State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit filed an Amended Information in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida, which charged Dr. Higginbotham with six counts of insurance fraud as defined in section 817.234(1), Florida Statutes (2004); four counts of grand theft in the third degree, as defined in section 812.014; 24 counts of communications fraud as defined in section 817.034(4)(b)1.; and one count of organized fraud as defined in section 817.034(4)(a)1. Dr. Higginbotham had been arrested earlier on some or all of these (or similar) criminal charges, on October 21, 2004. The record does not contain the original information. The 38-count Amended Information also charged five other defendants, namely Francisco Javier Espinosa, Evelyn Cajuste, Romer Ferguson, Deborah Eugene, and Christopher Wesley Nelson.3 Two of these individuals——Mr. Ferguson and Ms. Eugene—— testified at the final hearing in this case. Each admitted having participated in a staged (i.e. fake) automobile accident on March 18, 2004, and, afterwards, having seen Dr. Higginbotham for treatment of "injuries" purportedly sustained in the "accident." Each claimed to have received real treatment from Dr. Higginbotham and other providers in her office. (Ms. Eugene testified that her back truly hurt at the time, not as a result of the fake accident of course, but due to a previous injury.) Each disclaimed any personal knowledge that Dr. Higginbotham had been aware that the March 18, 2004, "accident" was staged to defraud insurance companies.4 To the extent and as described in this paragraph, the undersigned credits the testimony of Mr. Ferguson and the testimony of Ms. Eugene and finds these facts, as stated, to be true. By the time the criminal case finally came to trial in February 2009, Dr. Higginbotham was the last defendant remaining, the others having previously made deals with the state pursuant to which they, or some of them, had agreed to testify against Dr. Higginbotham. During the nearly four and one-half years that elapsed between Dr. Higginbotham's arrest and the trial, the state had offered her numerous deals. Dr. Higginbotham had rejected all of the proposed deals because they would have required her to plead guilty, which she refused to do. Dr. Higginbotham consistently maintained her innocence throughout the criminal proceeding and has done the same in this proceeding as well. At the outset of the criminal trial on February 3, 2009, the state offered Dr. Higginbotham a no-prison deal under which, if she agreed to plead nolo contendere to eight of the 35 charges pending against her, the state would recommend that adjudication of guilt be withheld and that she be sentenced to a term of probation. Significantly, the state did not demand that Dr. Higginbotham relinquish her chiropractic license as consideration for the deal. Dr. Higginbotham had very little time to think about whether to accept the state's offer. Her defense attorney was adamant that she accept the deal because juries are unpredictable and the proposed plea bargain would eliminate the risk of incarceration. As Dr. Higginbotham recalled the scene, in testimony the undersigned accepts as credible and persuasive, "[My attorney] was screaming at me at the top of his lungs that he felt I needed to take this deal and all he was concerned about was that . . . I wouldn't be going to jail and he said you never know what could happen." The adverse consequences of a guilty verdict would have been devastating for Dr. Higginbotham. She faced the possibility of a lengthy prison sentence if convicted——in the worst case scenario, about 160 years, the prosecutor had stated. Were she to be incarcerated for even a fraction of that period, Dr. Higginbotham's professional life would be finished and her personal life shattered. In regard to the latter, Dr. Higginbotham wanted to start a family but felt she could not do so while the criminal case was pending. She likely would lose that opportunity if she spent her childbearing years behind bars. Ultimately, Dr. Higginbotham accepted the state's offer because, as she put it, "at the time I was scared, I was nervous, I was under a lot of stress. My attorney was putting an enormous amount of pressure on me and I felt I really had no other choice." The undersigned accepts this testimony as truthful and finds that Dr. Higginbotham agreed to plead nolo contendere, not because she had a guilty conscience, but to avoid the catastrophic downside of a guilty verdict, which she needed to reckon a possibility, despite being conscious of her own innocence. Consequently, Dr. Higginbotham pleaded no contest to four counts of insurance fraud as defined in section 817.234(1), Florida Statutes (2004), and four counts of communications fraud as defined in section 817.034(4)(b)1. (the "Uncontested Charges"). The court accepted the plea and entered an order disposing of the case, which is captioned "Finding of Guilt and Order Withholding Adjudication/Special Conditions" (the "Order"). In the Order, after reciting that it appeared Dr. Higginbotham "ha[d] been found guilty" of the Uncontested Charges "upon the entry of a nolo contendere plea," and that it appeared Dr. Higginbotham should not "presently [be required] to suffer the penalty imposed by law," the court ordered that "adjudication of guilt be . . . stayed and withheld." The court placed Dr. Higginbotham on probation for a period of four years, subject to early termination after the successful completion of two years. The court further ordered Dr. Higginbotham to pay about $2,300 in costs but reserved ruling on whether to require her to make restitution. Due to the insufficiency of the evidence, the undersigned is unable to make any findings of fact regarding the conduct of Dr. Higginbotham which gave rise to the Uncontested Charges. Simply put, given the minimal persuasive evidence regarding Dr. Higginbotham's conduct, the undersigned cannot determine what she actually did as a result of, or in connection with, the fake accident described above, besides (a) provide some chiropractic treatment to persons who falsely told her they had been hurt, as found above, and (b) plead no contest to the Uncontested Charges. In short, other than the undisputed fact of the plea, there is no persuasive evidence in the record to support a finding that Dr. Higginbotham committed any crime. Ultimate Factual Determinations Dr. Higginbotham did not impliedly admit guilt when she pleaded nolo contendere to the Uncontested Charges. Her explanation of the reasons for accepting the state's offer provides objectively reasonable grounds——consistent with innocence——for having entered the plea, refuting the implication that she acted on a guilty conscience or the substantial likelihood of a conviction. In this connection, it is further determined that Dr. Higginbotham, while being conscious of her innocence and never admitting guilt, entered the plea to avoid the possibility of being found guilty and sent to prison, potentially for many years; to be able to get on with her personal life; and to retain the ability to resume her professional career as a chiropractic physician. In addition, given that the state was willing to give up more than three-quarters of the criminal charges against Dr. Higginbotham; and that the sentence imposed (four years' probation subject to early termination) was lenient as compared to the range of potential sentences, including many years of imprisonment, which could have been imposed were she tried and convicted; the undersigned infers that the prosecutor's offer was a generous one, reflecting the strength of Dr. Higginbotham's position relative to the state's. In sum, under the circumstances, the no-prison plea bargain offered to Dr. Higginbotham was too good to refuse, given that an acquittal would have been only marginally more beneficial than a sentence of probation with a withhold of adjudication, whereas a guilty verdict would have been ruinous. Accordingly, it is determined as a matter of fact, based on the totality of the evidence including the plea of nolo contendere and the presumption of a conviction which arises therefrom, that Dr. Higginbotham was not "convicted or found guilty" of crimes relating to the practice of chiropractic medicine. Dr. Higginbotham is not guilty, as a matter of fact, of committing an offense punishable under section 460.413(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2008).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Chiropractic Medicine enter a final order finding Dr. Higginbotham not guilty of the charge set forth in the Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings This 11th day of May, 2011.
The Issue At issue is whether Joseph Houston's (Mr. Houston) license as a limited surety agent should be temporarily suspended pursuant to Subsection 648.45(1), Florida Statutes (2007).1
Findings Of Fact Mr. Houston is, and was at all times material hereto, licensed as a limited surety agent in the State of Florida, pursuant to Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. By their joint Stipulation, the parties have agreed that: The attached Capias in the case of State of Florida v. Joseph Houston, Case No. 07- 3886-CFA, issued by Clerk of the Circuit Court, Collier County, Florida, which involves one Joseph Houston under an indictment/information for third degree felony, is one and the same Joseph Houston named as Respondent in this action. Section 648.45(1), Florida Statutes, is applicable to the temporary Order of Suspension issued by Petitioner concerning licensure of the said Joseph Houston, and a Recommended Order may be entered to that effect in this action. The Capias attached to the parties' Stipulation and dated December 18, 2007, requested Mr. Houston be taken into custody to answer a pending indictment or information in the Circuit Court, in and for Collier County, for allegedly: (1) violating Subsection 648.44(8) and Section 777.011, Florida Statutes, a third degree felony; (2) violating Sections 648.30 and 777.011, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 69B-221, a third degree felony; and (3) violating Subsection 648.44(1) and Section 777.011, Florida Statutes, a first degree misdemeanor. According to the Collier County Sheriff's Office Report No. 0700010430 (Report) attached to the parties' Stipulation, Mr. Houston was taken into custody without incident on December 18, 2007, due to the outstanding Capias described above. The report mistakenly lists the name of the apprehended as "Joe Huston," but the parties have stipulated that this was in fact the Respondent named in this action.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Respondent violated Subsection 648.45(1), Florida Statutes, and temporarily suspending Respondent's limited surety license. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2008.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the application filed by John Stover Mark (Petitioner) for licensure as a resident independent all lines adjuster should be approved.
Findings Of Fact On June 13, 2005, the Petitioner was driving his vehicle and was stopped for unlawful speeding. During the traffic stop, the law enforcement officer discovered that a grand theft warrant had been issued and was outstanding against the Petitioner. Prior to the traffic stop, the Petitioner was unaware of the warrant. The Petitioner was arrested on the warrant and charged with a third degree felony count of grand theft. The Petitioner testified that the charge was related to a claim by his former employer that the Petitioner had stolen tools from a construction job site. According to the Petitioner, he had been employed in the construction industry for many years by the same employer and had become unhappy with the lack of financial support he believed he was receiving from the employer. Eventually, he decided to quit the job and called his employer from the job site to do so. The Petitioner testified that he advised the employer that he was leaving the job and that the tools that belonged to the employer were being left at the job site. The abandoned tools apparently went missing, and the Petitioner was subsequently charged with the theft of the equipment. Although the Petitioner testified that he entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge upon advice of his public defender, the court records indicate that the Petitioner entered a guilty plea to one count of grand theft, a third degree felony, on July 29, 2005, in Case No. 05-CF-012565, Circuit Court for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County, Florida. The confusion related to the actual plea entered is immaterial to the disposition of this case. In any event, adjudication was withheld, and the Petitioner was sentenced to make restitution and pay court costs and to complete a five-year probationary period. The probation was terminated by order of the Court after approximately two years after the Petitioner had complied with all other requirements of his sentence. The Petitioner was subsequently injured in an automobile accident and through the services of the Department of Education, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation (DVR), received training for another occupation for which he was physically capable. The Petitioner testified that the DVR provided computer equipment and also funded the educational training that was a requirement for licensure as an insurance adjuster. The Petitioner testified that he disclosed the grand theft felony to his DVR counselor, who was apparently unconcerned or unaware that the felony incident posed an impediment to the Petitioner's prospects for licensure as an insurance adjuster. After completing the relevant training, the Petitioner filed an application for licensure as a resident independent all lines adjuster on July 11, 2007. The application contained the following question: Have you ever been convicted, found guilty, or pled guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a felony under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory or country, whether or not adjudication was withheld or a judgment of conviction was entered. The Petitioner answered the question in the affirmative. The Petitioner truthfully answered other questions on the application related to the felony problem and properly disclosed the relevant information. There is no evidence that the Petitioner has failed to disclose the grand theft incident in response to any inquiry material to this case, or has made any attempt to conceal the matter from the Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's application for licensure as a resident independent all lines adjuster be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of May, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of May, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: William Gautier Kitchen, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 John Stover Mark 8143 Sudbury Drive Port Richey, Florida 34668 Honorable Alex Sink Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Sumner, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
Recommendation It is recommended that the application for license no. 54- 405, series 2- APS, as applied for by the Petitioner be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd of December, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: William E. Terrell 67 Avenue East Key West, Florida 33040 William Hatch, Esquire Johns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Larry C. Abramson, held real estate salesman license number 00400601 issued by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate. He currently resides at 830 Southeast Fifth Terrace, Pompano Beach, Florida. On or about July 19, 1984, respondent entered into a negotiated plea of guilty to a one-count information charging a conspiracy to commit securities fraud and mail fraud arising from an insider trading scheme in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371. A violation of the foregoing section carries a maximum sentence of five years and a $10,000 fine. When the violation herein occurred, Abramson was employed as a plant superintendent and manufacturing supervisory staff member for a New York financial printing concern. Documentation received in evidence concerning the charge are (a) a letter of June 15, 1984 executed by respondent and the prosecuting attorney outlining the nature of the plea and Abramson's requirement to fully cooperate with the government, (b) a news release issued by the United States Attorney outlining the guilty plea, (c) a certified copy of Abramson's docket sheet in the U. S. District Court in New York City, (d) a copy of the information filed against respondent, and (e) a certified copy of respondent's waiver of indictment and consent to information. However, respondent has not yet been sentenced by the court, and there is no evidence of record that the plea of guilty has been accepted by the court.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the administrative complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of August, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 1985.
The Issue Can the Board of Real Estate consider matters surrounding the offense to which a person pleads guilty in determining whether that person possesses the necessary character to be licensee? What is the evidentiary effect of a plea of guilty by an applicant for licensure? Is the Petitioner qualified for licensure?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Edward J. Gibney made application to The Board of Real Estate for licensure as a real estate salesman. The Board denied Petitioner's application pursuant to Section 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes, because he was convicted of crimes against the laws of the United States and against the laws of the State of New Jersey involving moral turpitude. Petitioner pleaded guilty to the crimes of conspiring to commit fraud on medicaid and medicare claims, a felony under the laws of the United States. He also pleaded guilty to a similar offense which was a felony under the laws of New Jersey. Both offenses arose out of the same factual situation. The sole grounds for denial of Petitioner's application were his criminal convictions and the matters surrounding them. The Petitioner is otherwise qualified for licensure. After initial notification of the Boards intention to deny his application, the Petitioner requested and received an informal hearing before the Board. The Board notified Petitioner that it still intended to deny his application, and the Petitioner requested and was granted a formal hearing. The transcript of the Board's informal hearing was received as Petitioner's Composite Exhibit #1. Petitioner was the only witness at the hearing. He explained very candidly the facts surrounding his entry of guilty pleas to the criminal charges brought against him. His testimony was uncontroverted and is accepted as true. Petitioner, a graduate chemist, was qualified and licensed as a medical laboratory director in New Jersey. For 15 years prior to 1975, he owned and operated a small medical laboratory directly providing clinical laboratory services to private physicians. In 1975, Petitioner was approached several times over a period of three months by Seymour Slaughtnick to provide laboratory services to several doctors for medicaid/medicare patients. Slaughtnick was functioning as an intermediary. Slaughtnick picked up test samples at the doctors' offices and transported them to another laboratory. Slaughtnick wanted to change laboratories because of the poor quality laboratory work. Although Slaughtnick's function was described, Slaughtnick's relationship with the other laboratory or the doctors was never defined. Petitioner described Slaughtnick as a salesman. Petitioner initially refused the Slaughtnick offer because he had not done medicare/medicaid work and did not know how to process the paperwork. Slaughtnick continued to press Petitioner for a commitment to do this work and offered to prepare and submit all the paperwork for Petitioner. Slaughtnick and petitioner eventually agreed to an arrangement under which Slaughtnick picked up the samples, brought them to Petitioner's laboratory, transmitted the test results back to the physicians, and prepared Petitioner's billings to medicare/medicaid for the professional services rendered. Petitioner performed all the laboratory work as ordered by the physicians and prepared all test results, paying Slaughtnick a percentage of the fee for each test for his services. Petitioner was aware that his arrangement with Slaughtnick and permitting Slaughtnick to bill in his name was illegal under New Jersey law. To assure himself that Slaughtnick's billings were in order, Petitioner checked on Slaughtnick's billings after they began to work together. The State of new Jersey's medicaid/medicare plan was administered by Prudential Insurance Company using a blind fee schedule. Petitioner was advised by Prudential that his schedule initially provided various fees for various laboratory tests, but laboratories would not be advised of the amounts of payment or criteria used for assessing the appropriateness of ordering the tests. He was advised Prudential would reject any billings that were inappropriate. In 1976, the State of New Jersey began an investigation of its entire medicare/medicaid system. Initially, the inquiry with Petitioner's laboratory centered on whether he was performing the work ordered. It was determined that Petitioner performed all the work for which he billed the state. This investigation gave rise to an administrative complaint against Petitioner that charged him with overbilling. An administrative hearing was conducted which lasted eight months, during which 55 days of testimony were taken. The New Jersey hearing officer eventually that 50 percent of the orders and billings were correct; however, before the administrative order was entered, the Petitioner was indicated by the state of New Jersey and the United States for conspiracy to defraud under medicaid/medicare. The indictment alleged that Petitioner, Slaughtnick and other unnamed co-conspirators had conspired to defraud medicaid and medicare. The indictment was not introduced at this hearing; however, the Petitioner explained it alleged that the conspirators arranged to order more complex tests than were necessary, performed these tests, and then billed the state for the inflated service. Petitioner denied any knowledge of such a scheme to inflate test orders, however Petitioner did admit that his permitting Slaughtnick to prepare bills to medicaid and medicare in the laboratory's name was not authorized under the New Jersey law. Petitioner also denied knowledge of any kickbacks paid by Slaughtnick to any of the physicians or those in their employment. However, Petitioner stated he had no doubt after the fact that Slaughtnick was engaged in such a practice. Since his release from probation slightly more than 18 months ago, Petitioner has studied real estate and attempted to recover from the strain of the loss of his business, the long hearing, and his conviction and sentencing. The facts upon which this case are based occurred in 1975-76. Petitioner was sentenced in 1977, and has been released from confinement and probation since January, 1980. There is no evidence that petitioner has engaged in any conduct that would reflect adversely on his character since he terminated his laboratory work for medicaid/medicare in 1976.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that Petitioner Edward J. Gibney be denied licensure upon the specific ground that under Section 475.17(1), Florida Statutes, he failed to present sufficient evidence of his reputation in the community to assure the Board of Real Estate that the interest of the public and investors would not be endangered unduly. DONE and ORDERED this 14th day of October, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of October, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry H. Spalding, Esquire 6360 South Tamiami Trail Sarasota, Florida 33581 Jeffrey A. Miller, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Administrative Law Section The Capitol, 16th Floor Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos B. Stafford, Executive Director Board of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street PO Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue The issues in the case are whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint are correct, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulation of pari-mutuel wagering pursuant to Chapter 550, Florida Statutes (2003), and is responsible for licensing employees of pari-mutuel facilities. Respondent is a card dealer holding Florida occupational license number 6927724-1012 for employment as a card dealer at the Tampa Bay Downs racetrack. By application filed at the racetrack on December 3, 2003, Respondent applied for the referenced license. Persons unknown apparently conducted the application process for all employees of the facility. Employees completed the applications and submitted them at the racetrack, again to persons unknown. The application includes a section titled "Background Information." Question 1 asks in relevant part the following question: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contender (no contest) to, even if you received a withhold of adjudication? Question 1 further provides as follows: YOUR ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION WILL BE CHECKED AGAINST LOCAL, STATE AND FEDERAL RECORDS. FAILURE TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION ACCURATELY MAY RESULT IN DENIAL OR REVOCATION OF YOUR LICENSE. IF YOU DO NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND THIS QUESTION, CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY OR CONTACT THE DEPARTMENT. Respondent answered the question in the affirmative. The question provides that if the applicant responds in the affirmative to the question, "form 0050-1" should be completed to disclose additional information about the convictions. Form 0050-1 includes space to list three criminal convictions. The application instructions related to the form state: "[i]f you have more than seven offenses to document on form 0050-1, attach additional copies . . . as necessary." Respondent completed a form 0050-1. On the form, he stated that he had been convicted of a misdemeanor in 1987. The Respondent identified the offenses as "trespassing," "suspended license," and "cashed check." Respondent stated that the penalty had been probation, which was violated, and that he was required to finish the sentence. Respondent initially identified the location of the conviction as Pasco County, but crossed through the writing and changed it to Hillsborough County. Above Respondent's signature on the application is a statement that in material part provides as follows: I hereby certify that every statement contained herein is true and correct and that I understand that any misstatement or omission in this application may result in denial or revocation of my pari-mutuel license. Other than the information on the application, there was no evidence offered at the hearing that Petitioner was convicted of a misdemeanor in 1987 in Hillsborough County. Petitioner asserts that at the time he filed the application, he completed a second form 0050-1 on which he disclosed additional information related to felony convictions. At the hearing, he testified that an unidentified person allegedly involved in the application process instructed him to make the felony disclosures on a second form. Although there is no evidence contradicting Respondent's account of the events, the application submitted through the racetrack to Petitioner did not include a second form 0050-1. In 1983, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of felony charges, including Forgery and Uttering a Forged Check in Pasco County, Florida (Circuit Court, Sixth Judicial Circuit, Case No. 8101927CFAWS). In 1990, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of a felony charge of Grand Theft, Third Degree in Hillsborough County, Florida (Circuit Court, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Case No. 90-279). In 1991, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of a felony charge of Grand Theft in Pasco County, Florida (Circuit Court, Sixth Judicial Circuit, Case No. 8701762CFAWS). A few days after the application was completed, Respondent met with an employee of Petitioner (identified as "Nick") to discuss the felony convictions. "Nick" did not testify at the hearing. As filed with Petitioner, Respondent's application failed to include a second form 0050-1 and did not disclose the felony convictions identified herein. There is no evidence that Respondent has had any involvement in criminal activity since 1991.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order suspending Respondent's occupational license for a period of three months. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Ralf E. Michels, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Stefan Thomas Hoffer Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Jerry M. Bonett 7801 Willowbrook Court Hudson, Florida 34667 Leon Biegalski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 David J. Roberts, Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
