The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent committed the offense set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Department), is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged, inter alia, with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, including Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Pamela Jan Powers, is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0508538. On May 8, 1995, Respondent filed an application with the Department for licensure as a real estate broker. Pertinent to this case, item 9 on the application required that Respondent answer yes or no to the following question: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? This question applies to any violation of the laws of any municipality, county, state or nation, including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection, or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, paroled, or pardoned. . . . Respondent responded to the question by checking the box marked "NO." Following approval of Respondent's application, and her licensure as a real estate broker, the Department discovered a "Court Status" document (the "court document") for the Circuit/County Court, Broward County, Florida, which reflected that Respondent, then known as Pamela Jan Saitta, had been charged with five offenses, as follows: DISORDERLY CONDUCT POSSES/DISPLY SUSP/REVK/FRD DL LICENSE SUSP OR REVOKED2 PERS/INJ/PROT/INS REQUIRE FAIL CHANGE ADDRESS/NAME (Petitioner's Exhibit 1.) The court document further reflected that on May 18, 1990, a plea of nolo contendere was entered to counts 1 and 3, adjudication was withheld, and Respondent was assessed costs of $105.00, but not fined. As for the remaining counts, count 2 was nolle prosequi and counts 4 and 5 were dismissed. After receipt of the foregoing information, the Department undertook an investigation, which included an interview with the Respondent. At the time, Respondent told the investigator that she had no knowledge of the charges, as reflected on the court document. Thereafter, on July 18, 1997, the Department filed the Administrative Complaint at issue in this proceeding, which, based on Respondent's negative response to item 9 on the application, charged that Respondent "has obtained a license by means of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment in violation of Section 475.25(1)(m), Fla. Stat." and sought to take disciplinary action against her license. On September 17, 1997, Respondent appeared before the Florida Real Estate Commission in an apparent effort to resolve the complaint informally. At that time, Respondent told the commission, under oath, that she had no recollection of the charges or disposition, as reflected on the court document.3 She acknowledged, however, that the document referred to her, but could offer no explanation. During a recess, the commission's counsel spoke with Respondent, and suggested that she try and secure a copy of the police report, as well as other useful information. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3, page 10.) Respondent, but not the Department, researched the records at the Broward County Police Department, and was able to locate a traffic accident report for February 21, 1990, that apparently related to the charges noted in the court document. (Respondent's Exhibit 1.) No police report was located. The accident report reflects that on February 21, 1990, Respondent's vehicle was struck in the rear by another vehicle. The report reads, in part, as follows: Driver of veh 1 [Respondent] had a suspended D.L. and no proof of insurance. Driver of Veh 1 [Respondent] was subsequently arrested for the suspended D.L. ss 322.34(1) No proof of insurance ss316.646(1) Fail to change address within 10 days ss 322.19 and unlawful Use of License ss 322.32(1). The vehicles were both towed by Dalys towing. There is no mention in the accident report of any disorderly conduct by Respondent or any charge of disorderly conduct against Respondent. Moreover, there is no explanation of record for the disorderly conduct charge made against Respondent, as evidenced by the court document. Regarding the events revealed by the accident report, Respondent acknowledges that these events are most likely the source of the charges that were reflected on the court document. She insists, however, that she has no recollection of receiving any citations at the time of the accident, and denies any knowledge of the court proceeding. In explanation, Respondent avers that, consequent to injuries received at the time, she has no recollection of events immediately following the accident. Regarding the court proceeding or its disposition, Respondent also avers she has no knowledge or recollection of that proceeding and did not appear in court on the charges. The only explanation she can offer for that proceeding or its disposition is that, most likely, her attorney resolved the matter, as he was resolving the civil suit that was brought against the other driver. Given the circumstances of this case, Respondent's averment that she was unaware of the charges or the disposition disclosed on the court document when she submitted the application for a broker's license, and that she was only able to connect the court document to the traffic accident after she had retrieved a copy of the accident report, is credible. In so concluding, it is observed that her testimony was candid and consistent. Moreover, her explanation afforded rational explanation for what, otherwise, would have been an irrational act. In this regard, it is observed that the charges filed against Respondent, as well as their disposition, were not serious and did not reflect adversely on her qualification for licensure as a real estate broker. Consequently, were she aware of the events, there was no rational reason to conceal them from the Department.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 1998.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner' termination from employment was in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On March 9, 1999, the Petitioner was an employee of the State of Florida, Department of Corrections (Department) working as a correctional officer at the Santa Rosa County Correctional Institution in Milton, Florida. The Petitioner was employed as a Correctional Officer, on probationary status. On February 25, 1999, the Petitioner was arrested for a purported traffic violation by a law enforcement officer in Escambia county. An officer of the Escambia County Sheriff's Department, at approximately 1:08 a.m., on that day, observed the Petitioner's blue Toyota Tercel run a stop sign. The officer pulled in behind the vehicle and the vehicle made a quick turn off the road behind a closed business establishment and turned off its lights. The officer stopped near the vehicle and approached the driver's side and asked the driver for identification. The driver was later identified as the Petitioner, Perry Foster. Mr. Foster told the officer that his one-year-old son had torn up his driver's license. While the officer was talking with the Petitioner the officer detected a strong odor of marijuana emanating from inside the vehicle. Believing a narcotic violation was taking place the officer summoned another officer with a drug-detecting dog. The dog detected marijuana in the vehicle. Both the Petitioner and his passenger, Eric Adams, were placed outside the vehicle while the investigation was continuing. Officer Price, who brought the dog to the scene, detected the odor of marijuana on the person of Eric Adams. Ultimately, Eric Adams allowed a search and Officer Price retrieved a small package of marijuana from Mr. Adams shirt pocket. Mr. Adams was arrested for "possession of marijuana under 20 grams." The officer found no marijuana or drugs inside the vehicle although the dog strongly alerted on the driver's seat where the Petitioner had been sitting. There was the odor of marijuana along with signs of blunt cigar usage. Blunt cigars are typically used, hollowed out and packed with marijuana to smoke marijuana, without revealing its presence and use. In any event, the Petitioner was not arrested for possession or use of marijuana, none was found on his person, and he was given a traffic citation and released. The friend or family member who was his passenger was arrested for possession of marijuana. The evidence is unrefuted that the Petitioner was driving the vehicle with a passenger, knowing that that passenger possessed and was using marijuana in his presence. The Petitioner's employer, specifically Warden Ardro Johnson, was made aware of the Escambia County Sheriff's Office offense report that detailed the above facts and circumstances concerning the Petitioner's arrest and the arrest of his companion on the night in question. While the Petitioner remonstrated that he only was charged with running a stop sign and had not been using drugs and that he later passed a drug- related urinalysis, that position misses the point that his termination was not because of drug use. Rather, the Petitioner was dismissed by Warden Johnson from his position as a probationary employee pursuant to Rule 60K-4.003(4), Florida Administrative Code, because his employer believes that he committed conduct unbecoming a correctional officer. The true reason the Petitioner was terminated was because, as delineated by Warden Johnson in his letter to the Petitioner of March 23, 1999 (in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 1), the Petitioner made a personal choice to overlook, ignore, or fail to report a criminal violation occurring in his immediate presence. Warden Johnson thus explained that this leaves a clear question as to whether the Petitioner had, or would in the future, perform his correctional officer duties in the same manner by ignoring, overlooking or failing to report infractions. Because of this and because he was a probationary employee and thus had not yet established his full job qualifications, the Petitioner was terminated. There is no evidence that he was terminated based upon any considerations of his race. There is also no evidence that he was replaced in his position. Moreover, there is no evidence that if he was replaced he was replaced by a new employee who is not a member of the Petitioner's protected class. The evidence that the Petitioner was in the car at approximately 1:00 a.m., on the morning in question with a passenger who was possessed of and using marijuana is unrefuted and is accepted as credible.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the subject Petition in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of August, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark J. Henderson Department of Corrections 2601 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Perry A. Foster 1882 Gary Circle Pensacola, Florida 32505 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: On or about October 25, 1988, a Felony Complaint was filed in Municipal Court, Mt. San Jacinto Judicial District, Riverside County, California (Case No. 884467) charging that Petitioner had committed a violation of Section 278.5, Subdivision (b) of the Penal Code, a felony, in that on or about September 1, 1988, in the County of Riverside, State of California, she, being a person having physical custody of a child pursuant to an order, judgment, and decree of court which granted to another person [her former husband] rights of physical custody and visitation, did willfully and unlawfully, with the intent to deprive such person of such rights to custody and visitation, detain, conceal, take, and entice away such child, to wit, JAMES H. RODEN [her son, who, according to court documents, was born on April 22, 1989]. An Amended Felony Complaint charging Petitioner with the same felony offense was filed on or about April 8, 1991. Subsequently, there were plea negotiations which resulted in Petitioner entering a guilty plea to a reduced, misdemeanor charge, which the court accepted. In June or July of 1993, Petitioner submitted to the Department an application for licensure as a general lines insurance agent. Among the questions on the application form that Petitioner filled out were the following: Have you ever been charged with or convicted of or pleaded guilty or no contest to a crime involving moral turpitude (yes or no), or a felony (yes or no), or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more under the law of any state, territory or county, whether or not a judgment or con- viction has been entered? (yes or no) If yes, give date(s): What was the crime? Where and when were you charged? Did you plead guilty or nolo contendre? Were you convicted? Was adjudication withheld? Please provide a brief description of the nature of the offense charged If there has been more than one such felony charge, provide an explanation as to each charge on an attachment. Certified copies of the Information or Indictment and Final Adjudication for each charge is required. On this portion of the form, Petitioner wrote "no" in each of the first three blank spaces and made no further entries, notwithstanding that several years prior thereto, in Mt. San Jacinto Judicial District Municipal Court Case No. 884467, she had indeed been charged with (albeit not found guilty or convicted of) a felony punishable by imprisonment of one year or more. Petitioner, however, did not intend to misrepresent or conceal any information or to otherwise deceive the Department concerning her past. She mistakenly believed that, in this portion of the form, the Department was inquiring only about criminal offenses involving "moral turpitude." After looking up the term "moral turpitude" in the dictionary, she determined that the crime with which she was charged in Mt. San Jacinto Judicial District Municipal Court Case No. 884467 was not one involving "moral turpitude" inasmuch as her actions in abducting her son were intended to protect the child and were not in any way "wicked." After receiving Petitioner's application, the Department conducted a records check which revealed the felony charge that had been filed against Petitioner in Mt. San Jacinto Judicial District Municipal Court Case No. 884467. The Department thereupon advised Petitioner of its discovery and asked her to supply it with certain documnents that were filed in the case. Petitioner complied with the Department's request.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order announcing its intention to continue to process Petitioner's application for licensure as a general lines insurance agent rather than denying the application on the ground stated in the Department's January 26, 1994, denial letter. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 14th day of September, 1994. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Lisa Beth Weiner 572 Northeast 31st Street Pompano Beach, Florida 33064 James A. Bossart, Esquire Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neill General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Respondent's medical license should be revoked, suspended, or otherwise disciplined on charges that he was convicted or found guilty of a crime directly relating to the practice of medicine or his ability to practice medicine, in violation of Section 48.331(1)(c), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the charge, Respondent was a licensed medical doctor in the State of Florida, having been issued license No. ME 0020485. I. Prior Disciplinary Action Against Respondent The Respondent has been the subject of prior disciplinary proceedings instituted by the Department. On February 7 and 8, 1984, an administrative hearing was conducted by Diane Tremor, hearing officer with the Division of Administrative Hearings in Fort Myers, Florida. The issue for determination was whether his license as a medical doctor should be revoked, suspended, or otherwise disciplined for the medical treatment he provided to five named patients, one of whom was Holli Schmidt. On July 24, 1984, the hearing officer submitted her recommended order to the Board of Medical Examiners. With regard to patient Schmidt, the hearing officer found that Respondent inserted an intrauterine contraceptive device without taking adequate precautions to insure that the patient was not pregnant at the time of insertion, and concluded that his treatment of patient Schmidt fell below an acceptable standard of care, skill and treatment, in violation of Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes. On January 9, 1985, the Board of Medical Examiners adopted the hearing officer's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, but modified her recommended penalty of a one year suspension by providing that he could petition for reinstatement after serving six months of the suspension. II. Criminal Proceedings Against Respondent In the meantime, Respondent was the subject of a criminal proceeding arising out of his treatment of patient Holli Schmidt. On October 28, 1981, the Assistant State Attorney of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit filed an information charging Respondent with Culpable Negligence, a misdemeanor violation of Section 784.05, Florida Statutes. The information alleged that between February 1, 1981 and March 30, 1981, Respondent "exposed Holli Schmidt to personal injury through culpable negligence." (Joint Exhibit 6). On March 23, 1984, in the County Court of Lee County, Florida (Case No. 81MM6984), a jury found Respondent guilty as charged. (Joint Exhibit 4). On June 18, 1984, County Judge Radford R. Sturgis, the presiding judge, entered an order (1) reciting that Respondent had been found guilty (by the verdict of a jury) of culpable negligence; (2) withholding adjudication of guilt; and (3) placing him on probation for a period of six months. The order also reflects that the Court was satisfied that Respondent was "not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct, and that the ends of justice and the welfare of society do not require that [he] should presently be adjudged guilty and suffer the penalty authorized by law." (Joint Exhibit 5). Respondent was ordered to serve 50 hours of Community Service, pay a $500 fine, and serve 59 days of jail time (49 days were suspended and 10 were to be served on weekends). The crime, of which Respondent was found guilty, related to the practice of medicine. In their prehearing stipulation, the parties agree that "[t]here is an identity of underlying facts supporting both [the] criminal conviction . . . and the current suspension of [Respondent's] license by the Board of Medical Examiners based upon the [prior hearing officer's] Recommended Order. . . . Respondent timely appealed the jury's verdict (finding him guilty of Culpable Negligence) to the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit of Florida, which appeal is still pending.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent's medical license be suspended for a period of six months, such suspension to run concurrently with the suspension previously imposed by the Board of Medical Examiners for his treatment of patient Holli Schmidt. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of April, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 1985.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Douglas Clayton Brown (Brown), applied to Respondent, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department) , for examination as a general lines agent. By letter of September 9, 1986, the Department advised Brown that his application was denied because he had pled guilty to certain felonies which involved moral turpitude, and that he had failed to divulge on his application for examination that he had been charged with such felonies. Brown filed a timely request for formal hearing to contest the Department's decision. On March 21, 1983, an Information was filed in the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Florida, charging Brown with one count of burglary, Section 810.02(2) Florida Statutes; and two counts of aggravated assault, Section 784.021, Florida Statutes. Brown entered a plea of guilty to the charges. On December 12, 1983, the court entered a judgment wherein it adjudged Brown guilty of having committed one count of burglary with a deadly weapon and two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The court withheld the imposition of sentence, and placed Brown on 10 years probation. 1/ On August 20, 1984, Brown filed a motion in the criminal proceeding to terminate his probation and vacate the adjudication of guilt. By order of March 4, 1985, the court granted Brown's motion to vacate the adjudication of guilt, but continued his probation on the same terms and conditions as previously set. Subsequently, on March 13, 1985, the court entered a formal order that withheld adjudication of guilt and the imposition of sentence on the charges, and reimposed the term of probation previously established. By application dated March 4, 1985, filed with the Department on March 13, 1985, Brown sought examination for licensure as a general lines agent. Pertinent to this case the application requested and Brown responded: 12(a) Have you ever been charged with a felony? No Brown's application contained a material misrepresentation since he failed to disclose that he had been charged with a felony which involved moral turpitude. Brown's attempt to rationalize his nondisclosure was unpersuasive. According to Brown, he inquired of his attorney before completing his application and was advised that he could respond in the negative to the question set forth in paragraph 6, supra. Brown's assertion is not, however, supported by the proof and is inherently improbable and unworthy of belief. (See: Petitioner's exhibit 2).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the application of Petitioner, Douglas Clayton Brown, for examination as a general lines agent be DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED this 9th day of June, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 1987.
The Issue Whether the Respondent, Michael D. Ely, committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating and licensing law enforcement officers pursuant to Florida law. As such, the Petitioner has jurisdiction over disciplinary actions against law enforcement officers. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Respondent was a certified law enforcement officer holding certificate number 1119822. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Respondent was employed by the Escambia County Sheriff's Office and worked as a deputy sheriff assigned to road patrol for a designated geographic area within the county. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Respondent was romantically involved with or was residing with an individual identified in this record as Greta Fernandez or Greta Brown. By his admission, the Respondent's relationship with Ms. Brown began around the first of August 2002. The Respondent met Ms. Brown while he was working an off duty job at Pensacola Beach. His romantic interest in her began in earnest a short while later after he bumped into her at a club known as "Coconuts." Shortly after beginning his association with Ms. Brown, the Respondent was verbally counseled by his superior officer regarding his choice of friends. Officers are warned not to socialize with and associate themselves with undesirable persons. Concerns over the Respondent's association with Ms. Brown continued and eventually led to a written report (Petitioner's Exhibit 3) issued on September 21, 2002. According to the Respondent, an individual named Patty Clark verbally teased and tormented Ms. Brown's minor child as the student left the school bus en route home. While the child did not testify in this cause it is presumed for purposes of this record that the extent of the "teasing" included verbal comments and a hand gesture commonly referred to as "the finger." It was alleged that the child was very upset by the incident. At Ms. Brown's urging, on or about September 21, 2002, the Respondent contacted Ms. Clark by telephone and identified himself as a deputy sheriff. He further admonished Ms. Clark to cease her behavior regarding the minor child and issued a veiled comment regarding the status of Ms. Clark's driving privileges (suspended). The Respondent did not write up the incident, did not refer the matter to other law enforcement who might have jurisdiction over the matter (e.g. the Pensacola police department), or take any official action against Ms. Clark. Other than the telephone call that was intended to curb Ms. Clark's actions toward the child, the Respondent took no other official action against the alleged perpetrator. Because she did not appreciate the manner in which she had been contacted, Ms. Clark filed a complaint against the Respondent with the Sheriff's Office. That complaint led to the written counseling report noted in paragraph 6. It is not alleged that Ms. Clark's actions or comments to the minor child constituted any criminal behavior. Moreover, other than to pacify Ms. Brown and presumably her child, it is unknown why the Respondent would have used his official position as a deputy sheriff to pursue the matter. If Ms. Clark committed a crime or an actionable infraction, the Respondent's wiser course would have been to refer the matter/incident to an appropriate law enforcement authority. As it happened, the Respondent attempted to use his official position of authority to secure a benefit for himself, his girlfriend and/or her child, that is, to coerce the alleged perpetrator (Ms. Clark) and to thereby keep her from interacting with the minor again. Despite the counseling on September 21, 2002, and in contrast to his testimony in this cause on October 15, 2003 (that his relationship with Ms. Brown ended "like the second week of September of 2002"), the Respondent's relationship with Ms. Brown did not end in September 2002. The weight of the credible evidence supports the finding that the Respondent continued seeing Ms. Brown after the second week of September 2002 and knew or should have known that she associated with persons whose reputations were less than stellar. In fact, the Respondent admitted that he utilized resources available to him through the Sheriff's Office to run background checks on at least two of Ms. Brown's friends because he thought they were "no good." More telling, however, is the fact that the Respondent admitted receiving and delivering to Ms. Brown what he believed were narcotic pills (from Dan Faircloth). The Respondent admitted that Ms. Brown did not go to physicians or doctors on a regular basis for treatment. He also knew that Mr. Faircloth was neither a doctor nor a pharmacist. Finally, the Respondent knew that Ms. Brown continued to receive and take pills for her alleged pain. How the Respondent could have imagined it appropriate for Mr. Faircloth to supply drugs to Ms. Brown is not explained in this record. Whether or not the pills actually were a controlled substance is unknown. It is certain the Respondent believed them to be. Eventually, the Respondent admitted to his superior that he found a crack pipe in his apartment (presumably owned by Ms. Brown). When the incident of the pipe came out, the Respondent was again instructed to break off his relationship with Ms. Brown. As late as November 2002 the Respondent continued to be in contact with Ms. Brown. The Sheriff's Office was by that time so concerned regarding the Respondent's poor judgment in his selection of associates that Lt. Spears felt compelled to write a memorandum to her superior regarding various allegations. One of the incidents that triggered an internal affairs investigation was the Respondent's disclosure to Ms. Brown that the Sheriff's Office was looking for one of her former friends. Ms. Brown tipped the person (for whom an arrest warrant had been issued) off that deputies were looking for her. Based upon the warning of her impending arrest, the suspect fled the jurisdiction. Ultimately, the suspect's arrest was delayed due to the Respondent's disclosure of the warrant information to Ms. Brown. At some point a reasonable person, and certainly a trained law enforcement officer, should have known that Ms. Brown and her associates were not appropriate persons with whom to socialize. In fact, when the Respondent elected to run a background check on Ms. Brown (presumably to check the status of her driving privileges) because he did not want her to drive his vehicle without a valid license, he should have questioned whether or not he should associate with someone he might not be able to trust. When two of her friends were arrested as a result of his checks on them, he should have clearly known to disassociate from Ms. Brown. That he remained in the relationship for as long as he did is incomprehensible. The Respondent offered no rational explanation for his behavior.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, enter a final order finding the Respondent failed to maintain good moral character as required by law and that the Respondent's certification be revoked based upon the severity of the conduct, the number of violations established by this record, and the lack of mitigating circumstances to support a lesser penalty. S DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9675 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Linton B. Eason, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Roy M. Kinsey, Jr., Esquire Kinsey, Troxel, Johnson & Walborsky, P.A. 438 East Government Street Pensacola, Florida 32502
Findings Of Fact Before 1989, the Petitioner, Gregory Miller, was a community control counselor (in effect, a juvenile probation officer) working for HRS. After several years of satisfactory job performance, his employment was terminated for unsatisfactory job performance in 1989. The Petitioner believes his termination by HRS was unfair. On January 30, 1991, the Petitioner, Gregory Miller, pled nolo contendere to attempted arson in violation of Section Section 806.01, Fla. Stat. (1991). Adjudication was withheld, and the Petitioner was placed on probation for two years. The attempted arson charge arose at a time in October, 1990, when the Petitioner, who has a 20-year history of substance abuse and suffers from bipolar disorder and borderline personality disorder, decompensated under financial and other stress and attempted to burn his automobile in order to fraudulently obtain property and casualty insurance benefits. At the time of the arson attempt, his car was parked in the garage, and a tenant was residing in the garage apartment overhead. The tenant noticed the fire started by the Petitioner, put it out and reported it to the Petitioner. The Petitioner berated him for putting the fire out and told him to get his personal belongings out of the garage apartment and leave. While the tenant was in the garage apartment gathering his belongings, the Petitioner was attempting to restart the fire. The tenant had been a worker's compensation client of the Petitioner. The Petitioner continued to have mental and emotional and substance problems that led to additional criminal charges. On February 13, 1991, he was arrested and charged with battery of a law enforcement officer, a third degree felony. On October 3, 1991, the Petitioner pled guilty to the lesser included offense of resisting arrest without violence, a misdemeanor, and was sentenced to seven days time served in jail. On or about December 22, 1991, the Petitioner overdosed on a mixture of drugs and alcohol in a possible suicide attempt. When confronted with law enforcement officers, the Petitioner struck the officers and was arrested and charged with battery of a law enforcement officer, a third degree felony. The Petitioner was involuntarily committed under the Baker Act, and on September 21, 1992, he pled nolo contendere to simple battery, a first degree misdemeanor, and was sentenced to one day time served in jail and ordered to pay $200 in fine and court costs. As a result of his other criminal charges, the Petitioner was charged with violation of his probation on the attempted arson charge. On or about March 16, 1992, the Petitioner pled guilty to violation of probation. Adjudication on the violation of probation was withheld, but probation was revoked, and he was resentenced under the attempted arson charge to a year of community control, followed by a year of probation. On or about March 8, 1992, the Petitioner was charged with driving with his license suspended or revoked for failure to maintain required insurance coverage. Since 1992, the Petitioner has not been involved in any additional criminal activity or charges. On February 23, 1993, his community control was converted to probation. He moved to Pasco County and, on December 22, 1993, his probation was terminated early. The Petitioner has sought professional counseling. On or about March 22, 1993, he was referred to a vocational rehabilitation counselor with the Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. Since approximately early 1994, he also has been under the care of a psychiatrist. With the help of counseling, the Petitioner has been sober since before August, 1993. Fortunately, therapy seems to have been successful. Except for two short hospitalizations for decompensation and medication adjustment early in his counseling, the Petitioner has been sober and mentally stable over the course of the last three years. From a mental health standpoint, the Petitioner no longer seemed to be a danger to himself or others, and he was making good progress in rehabilitating himself. On or about May 18, 1995, the Petitioner sought employment with Action Youth Care, a provider on contract with HRS. When he applied for the job, he was required to complete an Affidavit of Good Moral Character that swore, in pertinent part, that he had "not been found guilty of, or entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, any offense prohibited under . . . Section 806.01 [Florida Statutes, arson]." The affidavit also required the Petitioner to "acknowledge the existence of any criminal . . . record regardless of whether [he] was adjudged guilty by the court and regardless of whether or not those records have been sealed or expunged." The Petitioner signed without acknowledging his attempted arson record. When his name was screened, the attempted arson record disqualified him from employment, and the Petitioner was terminated from his employment pending his request for an exemption. Despite the Petitioner's commendable progress in rehabilitating himself, there still are signs that some instability persists. He does not seem to appreciate the seriousness of his criminal record and history of substance abuse and mental illness, as they relate to HRS's statutory obligation to properly assess his moral character under Section 409.175, Fla. Stat. (1995). Instead, he blames HRS's actions on a "political" conspiracy to prevent him from obtaining employment. Similarly, he attempts to excuse his criminal record by blaming it all on HRS--the termination of his employment in 1989 allegedly was the sole cause of his decompensation and the resulting criminal offenses. His excuse for falsifying his Affidavit of Good Moral Character was that it was reasonable not to disclose the arson record because it was only attempted arson, not arson. He does not seem to appreciate that there is little or no difference in blameworthiness between the two. (The only real difference between the two is how soon the fire goes out or is put out.) Finally, the Employee Closing Summary produced by Action Health Care upon termination of the Petitioner's employment stated that Action would not re-hire the Petitioner and that the Petitioner's "weak areas" included: "poor rapport with team"; "would not accept authority"; and "documentation skills." (No "strengths" were noted on the form.) The Petitioner again blamed HRS, contending that the person who completed the form was lying to cooperate with HRS's conspiracy against the Petitioner. It is found that the evidence, taken as a whole, was not clear and convincing proof of rehabilitation and good moral character at this time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that HRS enter a final order denying the Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 1996.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's application for a real estate license may lawfully be denied based on her criminal history.
Findings Of Fact The Commission is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged, inter alia, with granting or denying real estate licenses. Certain administrative services are provided to the Commission by the Division of Real Estate (Division) of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (Department). Ms. Ellis, at the time of the hearing, was a 34-year- old female residing in Tallahassee, Florida. She is currently employed as a legal secretary and has held a commission as a notary public in Florida since 1997. On July 20, 2007, a DBPR 0010-2 Master Individual Application, prepared by Ms. Ellis, was received by the Department. The application sought a real estate sales associate license. In a letter dated August 7, 2007, the Department notified Ms. Ellis that her application was incomplete. Specifically, the letter noted that she had checked the "yes" block on the inquiry addressing criminal matters and requested additional information with regard to her involvement with the criminal justice system. The letter also requested matters, labeled "Questions 2, 3, and 4," that were not relevant to her application. In a letter dated October 23, 2007, Ms. Ellis responded to the demand for additional information. She provided the Department with letters of recommendation written by her father, Tallahassee attorney Vinson Barrett, and fellow legal secretary Adriana Bernstein. The gist of the letters was that she is a good worker, honest, an exemplary mother, trustworthy, and maintains good working relationships with her fellow workers. In a letter dated October 29, 2007, she provided additional documents illuminating her involvement with the criminal justice system. Despite her input, the Commission rejected her application at its November 14, 2007, meeting. Ms. Ellis did not attend this meeting. The Commission recited findings of fact using reference "keys" as follows: CRIMES IN APPLICATION Applicant's criminal record is revealed in application. * * * UNPERSUASIVE TESTIMONY Applicant's testimony or evidence in explanation/mitigation was unpersuasive. CRIMES RECENT Applicant's criminal history is recent in time. PATTERN OF CRIME Applicant's criminal history shows a pattern and practice of criminal behavior over an extended period of time. * * * The Commission made the following conclusions of law: * * * Failing to demonstrate: honesty, truthfulness, trustworthiness and good character, a good reputation for fair dealing, competent and qualified to conduct transactions and negotiations with safety to others. 475.17(1)(a), 475.181 F.S. Having engaged in conduct or practices which would have been grounds for revoking or suspending a real estate license. 475.17(1)(a), 475.181 F.S. * * * F. Found guilty of a course of conduct or practices which show applicant is so incompetent, negligent, or dishonest that money, property, and rights of others may not safely be entrusted to applicant. 475.25(1)(o), 475.181 F.S. * * * Applicant is subject to discipline under 475.25 (specify), 475.181 F.S. The Commission concludes that it would be a breach of its duty to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public to license this applicant and thereby provide him/her easy access to the homes, families, or personal belongings of the citizens of Florida. 455.201, F.S. A "Summary of Applicants, FREC Meeting: November 14, 2007" prepared for the Commission meeting in Ms. Ellis' case, is inaccurate, and unless read closely and supplemented with additional facts, would cause a reasonable person to believe that Ms. Ellis was convicted of four offenses. In fact, she was found guilty of two offenses, battery and stalking. Although it is apparent that the Commission once had rules in place that perhaps provided guidance in relation to the standards expected of an applicant's behavior, the rules have been repealed and new rules have not be adopted. The events giving rise to the findings recited by the Commission, relate to incidents arising from Ms. Ellis' interaction with law enforcement authorities while a resident of Tampa, Florida. Ms. Ellis moved into Ms. Lisa Nawrocki's home at East 99th Street, in Tampa during the latter part of 1998 with her two children. She and Ms. Nawrocki had a series of disputes with their neighbors. From late 1998 until October 1999, law enforcement was summoned by Ms. Ellis, Ms. Nawrocki, or their neighbors on 30 occasions. On January 31, 1999, Ms. Ellis was arrested for a battery precipitated by a dispute with one of her neighbors. She pleaded not guilty, but was found guilty of battery at a bench trial. She was sentenced on May 26, 1999, to one year of probation and community service. Ms. Ellis was also directed to attend an anger management class. Ms. Ellis alleged to the media that she and Ms. Nawrocki were victims of "hate" crimes. Ms. Ellis asserted to the media that their difficulties with their neighbors arose because she was a homosexual. Ms. Ellis was arrested again on August 25, 1999, as a result of a confrontation with neighbors. The neighbors were witnesses against Ms. Ellis in another case so she was charged with witness tampering. In order to avoid a trial and possible imprisonment, with attendant separation from her children, she pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of stalking and was sentenced to one year of probation on October 27, 1999. Because the latter offense was a violation of probation on the battery offense of January 31, 1999, her probation was revoked. She was sentenced to 30 days in jail. After serving six days in jail Ms. Ellis was released after promising the judge that she and Ms. Nawrocki would move out of their troubled neighborhood on East 99th Street, and relocate to Tallahassee, Florida. Ms. Ellis did in fact move to Tallahassee and has experienced no involvement with the criminal justice system since her move. Her probation, resulting from the battery conviction was successfully completed on March 7, 2000. Her probation resulting from the stalking charge, which was continued subsequent to her release from confinement, was successfully completed on May 15, 2001. All of the charges resulted from the neighborhood dispute that began late 1998 and ended with her departure from her neighborhood early in November 1999. There is no record of Ms. Ellis' involvement with the criminal justice system before or since these events. The period of the neighborhood dispute is insufficiently long to be termed as "a pattern and practice of criminal behavior over an extended period of time." Ms. Ellis' unrebutted testimony at the hearing was that since the end of 1999, she has been employed as a legal secretary in Tallahassee. Ms. Ellis testified that she works with confidential attorney-client matters and that she has maintained the accounts of law firms. Ms. Ellis' testimony at the hearing is supported by the written evidence of record, including a letter penned by Attorney Vinson Barrett, who stated that she was honest and trustworthy. Her testimony is deemed credible.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission withdraw its Notice of Intent to Deny the Application of Dawn J. Ellis, if she is otherwise qualified, that the Commission certify to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation that Dawn J. Ellis has satisfied the applicable statutory and rule criteria for licensure as a real estate sales associate. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Dawn J. Ellis 3409 Cedarwood Trail Tallahassee, Florida 32312 Garnett Chisenhall, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Thomas W. O'Bryant, Jr., Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Suite 802 - North Tower 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 S. W. Ellis, Chairman Florida Real Estate Commission Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801 Ned Luczynski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether the Agency’s intended action to deny Petitioner’s application for exemption from disqualification from employment is an abuse of the Agency’s discretion.
Findings Of Fact Background Petitioner is a 37-year-old female residing in Jacksonville, Florida. She desires to work as a Medicaid waiver provider, an independent solo provider of community-based services to the Agency’s clients with developmental disabilities. On October 12, 2009, the Agency granted Petitioner an exemption from disqualification from employment for an offense of grand theft committed on December 28, 2001. Between 2004 and 2009, Petitioner was a service provider for Agency clients both in a group home setting and as a solo provider of community-based services. On July 14, 2011, the Florida Department of Children and Families issued Petitioner a notice that she was ineligible for continued employment in a position of special trust working with children or the developmentally disabled based on a felony offense of aggravated assault committed on December 30, 2010. The Disqualifying Offense On December 30, 2010, Petitioner was driving by her boyfriend’s home and noticed a vehicle backing out of his driveway. Petitioner knew the vehicle belonged to another woman, Ms. Stevens. Petitioner called her boyfriend on his cellular phone, confirmed he was in the car, and began conversing with him. Petitioner and her boyfriend engaged in a series of calls with each other over the next few minutes while she followed Ms. Stevens’ vehicle. Petitioner wanted the driver of the car to pull off the road so she could talk to her boyfriend in person. Petitioner pulled her vehicle alongside Ms. Stevens’ vehicle. The situation escalated. The vehicles were traveling on a parallel path on a two-lane road in a residential subdivision. In her anger, Petitioner threw an open soda can through the rear window of Ms. Stevens’ vehicle. Finally, Petitioner’s vehicle struck Ms. Stevens’ vehicle. Shortly thereafter, both vehicles pulled off the road. Petitioner’s boyfriend exited the vehicle, but Ms. Stevens took off and returned with a law enforcement officer. The police report notes approximately $700 in damage to the two vehicles. During the entire incident, Petitioner’s two minor children were back seat passengers in Petitioner’s vehicle. Following an investigation, the police determined Petitioner was the primary aggressor. Petitioner was charged with one count of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, and one count of criminal mischief and reckless driving. Petitioner served two days in jail. Petitioner pled nolo contendere to both charges, adjudication was withheld, and Petitioner was placed on 12 months’ probation, ordered to complete 75 hours of community service, attend anger management training, and pay fines and fees amounting to $1,068. Petitioner attended a one-day anger management class through the Salvation Army in 2011. Petitioner was released from probation on May 3, 2012. Employment Following the Disqualifying Offense Petitioner worked as an executive housekeeper for a Hilton Garden Inn in Jacksonville from June 2012 to November 2013. Petitioner worked briefly as a manager at a Subway restaurant between March and October 2014. In November 2014, Petitioner began employment as a manager at a Burger King restaurant in Jacksonville, where she remained employed on the date of hearing. Subsequent Criminal History Petitioner has had no disqualifying offense since the 2011 aggravated battery offense. Petitioner was cited for three traffic infractions between 2011 and 2013. One of the infractions was a criminal charge of driving without a valid driver’s license. The other two citations were for speeding and failing to yield the right- of-way. Petitioner’s Exemption Request Petitioner’s exemption package was slim. In addition to the exemption questionnaire, in which she provided little information regarding herself, Petitioner submitted a one-page narrative letter and two very brief character reference letters. On the questionnaire, Petitioner reported no damage to any persons or property from the disqualifying offense. Further, Petitioner reported no stressors in her life at the time of the offense. As to her current stressors, Petitioner reported none, and listed her family, church, and herself as her current support system. Petitioner reported no counseling other than the one- day anger management class completed in 2011. Petitioner listed no educational achievements or training. As for accepting responsibility for her actions, Petitioner wrote, “I feel very remorse [sic] for my actions and I take full responsibility for them.” One of the character reference letters was from a co- worker (perhaps even someone under her supervision) and did not identify the name of the employer or dates she worked with Petitioner. The letter described Petitioner as “dependable and committed to do her best” as well as “proficient in all cores of her profession.” The author further described Petitioner as a Christian who is very involved with her church and youth ministry, and who is considered a good and loving mother. The author of the second character reference letter did not identify her relationship to Petitioner, but indicated that she had known Petitioner for six years. She described Petitioner as “dependable and committed to the community as a youth leader and big sister to the children of her church.” Further, she wrote, “[Petitioner] is a compassionate and loving person, but above all she is a Christian who loves her children and her church.” In her personal statement, Petitioner described the events surrounding the disqualifying offense as follows: I was involved with a young man at the time of this incidence [sic]. What happen [sic] on that day was this young man had been calling my phone all day and we passed each other on the street in the same neighborhood and I followed him. We both at this time kept calling each others [sic] phone back to back. After a few blocks both cars came to a stop. Neither of us got out of the car. Each of us pulled off the same time and our cars bumped each other. After a few more blocks we stopped again. He got out of the car from the passenger side. I then realize [sic] that he was not the driver. A few minutes later the car came back. An off duty police officer with JSO wrote me a ticket for reckless driving, operating a vehicle with no insurance and criminal mischief. Mean while [sic] two more officers with JSO arrived on the scene and one of the officers decided to arrest me and charged me with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (with no intent to kill). Petitioner offered nothing else related to the disqualifying offense. Petitioner’s narrative does not reveal an understanding of the seriousness of her offense or offer any explanation for her behavior. Nor does the narrative back up her statements on the questionnaire that she feels remorse and has accepted responsibility for her actions. In formulating its decision to deny Petitioner’s request for exemption, the Agency considered the following factors to be significant: Petitioner’s disqualifying offense occurred just a year after having been granted an exemption from a prior disqualifying offense of grand theft. The offense demonstrated a lack of good judgement and decisionmaking. Petitioner was the primary aggressor. Petitioner’s children were in the car at the time of the incident. Petitioner was 32 years old at the time of the incident. Petitioner reported no life stressors at the time of the disqualifying offense and no significant changes in her life subsequently. Petitioner was not forthcoming in her application about the damage to the vehicles incurred during the incident. Petitioner’s driving record raises a concern with her ability to safely transport Agency clients. The Agency also considered that Petitioner’s character references were not from past or current employers, that they revealed very little about the relationship between the author and Petitioner, and that they did not acknowledge the disqualifying offense or offer any indication of changes in Petitioner’s life. Final Hearing Petitioner’s attitude at hearing was defensive. Petitioner took issue with the description of events surrounding the disqualifying offense noted in the police report. Petitioner particularly stressed that the vehicles were stopped, rather than traveling down the one-lane road side by side, when she threw the soda can into Ms. Stevens’ vehicle. Petitioner denied that she intentionally struck Ms. Stevens’ vehicle, but rather insisted that the vehicles “bumped” as they were both pulling off the road at the same time. Petitioner offered no witnesses on her behalf. Petitioner introduced one additional character reference letter from Reverend Charles G. Skinner, Pastor, Twin Springs Missionary Baptist Church. Pastor Skinner stated that he had pastored Petitioner for 10 years and had witnessed “spiritual maturity” in her life. In the letter, Pastor Skinner described Petitioner as an active member of the church, a devout Christian and mother “with an humbling nature exhibiting a thirst for erudition.” Petitioner did not demonstrate her humble nature at the hearing. Petitioner was defensive, argumentative, and spent her time pointing out “inaccuracies” in the police report. Petitioner has no understanding of the seriousness of her offense, and was “baffled” that the charge included a reference to a deadly weapon when she had no weapon at the time. Petitioner downplayed the event, testifying that the whole incident took maybe 8 to 10 minutes, and that the vehicles were traveling slowly, perhaps 15 to 20 miles per hour. Petitioner acknowledged that her children were in the vehicle at the time of the incident, but insisted they were not in danger and that she would never do anything to put her children in danger. Throughout the hearing, Petitioner emphasized she had no idea Ms. Stevens was driving the vehicle in which her boyfriend was riding, until the vehicles pulled off the roadway. Apparently Petitioner believed that the facts were more favorable to her if it was only her boyfriend she was trying to run off the road, rather than her boyfriend and “the other woman.” Petitioner failed to appreciate that no matter who was driving the vehicle, Petitioner’s actions put them at risk.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner’s request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of March, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 2016.
