Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence produced at hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed to practice optometry by the State of Florida, Board of Optometry. On or about May 8, 1980, Respondent entered into a lease agreement with Cole National Corporation to lease 154 square feet of space as an optometric office in the location of the retail store of Sears, Roebuck and Co. at 1420 Northwest 23rd Boulevard, Gainesville, Florida. Respondent practiced in that location approximately two days per week until on or about October 1, 1982. Respondent's optometric office was located in a Sears, Roebuck retail store next door to the "Sears Optical Department," in which eyeglasses and contact lenses and other optical merchandise could be purchased. Respondent's office was identified by a large sign overhead reading "Optometrist," in the same print as the sign above the Sears Optical Department. In addition, a small plaque on the door leading into Respondent's examination room read "Dr. L. A. Schwartz, Optometrist." During the time he practiced at the 1420 Northwest 23rd Boulevard location of Sears, appointments could be made with Respondent by calling the Sears Optical Department telephone number. The phone was answered "Sears Contact and Lenses Center" by employees of Cole National Corporation, which controlled and owned the Sears Optical Department. The Cole employees were not paid for this service by Respondent. Respondent had no telephone listing in either the yellow or white pages of the Gainesville, Florida, telephone directory between May, 1980, and July 12, 1982, the date of the Administrative Complaint. The Cole National Corporation employees maintained Respondent's scheduling book and made tentative appointments for his prospective patients, although Respondent customarily would call the patient back to confirm the date and time of the appointment prior to the time of the scheduled visit. Respondent's hours of service and fee information were also given to prospective optometric patients by Cole National personnel. Respondent accepted the Sears, Roebuck and Co. credit card as payment for optometric services. Sears then billed the patients directly and Respondent received monies billed to the patients in full through Sears on a monthly basis, regardless of whether the patient paid the bill fully monthly or carried the debt over to succeeding months. Respondent, pursuant to his lease with Cole National Corporation, was precluded from selling optometric supplies to his patients. Rather, Respondent would in all cases issue prescriptions for optometric goods and supplies, such as glasses and contact lenses, which in most cases were placed on a prescription blank bearing his name. At times, however, when Respondent did not have prescription forms available bearing his own name, he would use such a form from the Sears Optical Department, crossing out all references to Sears and inserting his name and address in place of that of Sears Optical Department. On or about February 22, 1982, the Sears Optical Department mailed letters to various consumers in the Gainesville area. These letters, in part, advised that Respondent, an independent doctor of optometry, was available for eye examinations in his private office in the Sears building and that he could be reached for appointments at a telephone number which was listed in the telephone directory for Sears Optical Department. The evidence in this cause establishes that Respondent's office location at all times material hereto was maintained separately from both Sears, Roebuck and Co. and the Sears Optical Department. In addition, the record in this cause fails to in any way establish that Respondent ever held himself out as an employee or representative of either Sears, Roebuck and Co. or the Sears Optical Department. In fact, the record clearly establishes that both Respondent and employees of the Sears Optical Department always indicated to the consuming public that Respondent was an independent optometric practitioner.
The Issue Whether the Respondent, the Department of Revenue, acted in a fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest manner in deciding to award a contract to the Intervenor, Recognition Equipment Incorporated, based upon the Intervenor's response to Request for Proposal No. 90/91-261?
Findings Of Fact The Parties. The Respondent, the Department of Revenue (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is an agency of the State of Florida. On or about June 24, 1991, the Department issued Request for Proposal on No. 90/91-261 (hereinafter referred to as the "RFP"). The Petitioner, Scan-Optics, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Scan- Optics"), is an unsuccessful responder to the RFP. The Intervenor, Recognition Equipment Incorporated (hereinafter referred to as "REI"), is the successful responder to the RFP. Scan-Optics and REI have standing to participate in this proceeding. Development of the RFP. For a number of years prior to the formal hearing of this case, the Department has been interested in purchasing optical scanning equipment for use in processing certain tax returns filed with the Department. The Department made inquiries and performed investigations concerning available optical scanning equipment as a result of its interest in the equipment. The Department contacted private producers of optical scanning equipment, including Scan-Optics and REI, and other state agencies that already had acquired optical scanning equipment. The Department observed Scan-Optics and REI optical scanning equipment in use by purchasers of the equipment in Florida and other States. During the Spring of 1991, the Department's budget was sufficient to allow the Department to purchase optical scanning equipment and the Department actually began to plan for such a purchase. The Department ultimately decided to acquire the equipment through a request for proposal instead of an invitation to bid because the Department knew what function the equipment was to serve but not how best to fulfill this function. James R. Evers, the Assistant Director of the Department's Division of Tax Processing, was assigned responsibility for drafting the specifications for the equipment to be acquired through the request for proposal. Mr. Evers travelled to several States with agencies that already had acquired optical scanning equipment, observed the equipment in use and discussed the equipment with personnel familiar with the equipment. Mr. Evers acquired and reviewed the specifications used in Florida and in other States in purchasing optical scanning equipment. Mr. Evers acquired requests for proposals and invitations to bid from other States and reviewed them. After preparing the specifications for the equipment to be included in the RFP, the Department submitted the specifications to the Information Technology Resource Procurement Advisory Council (hereinafter referred to as the "ITRPAC"). The ITRPAC was created pursuant to Section 287.073(5), Florida Statutes, and is composed of the Director of the Division of Purchasing of the Department of General Services, the executive administrator of the Information Resource Commission and the Director of the Governor's Office of Planning and Budgeting. The ITRPAC, pursuant to the duty imposed on it by Section 287.073(5)(b), Florida Statutes, reviewed and approved the Department's specifications. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Department's actions in drafting the RFP were fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest. Issuance of the RFP. On June 24, 1991, the Department issued the RFP, No. 90/91-261, "Scanning Equipment Operation". Scan-Optics reviewed the RFP and concluded that several of the requirements of the RFP were product-specific; that only REI's equipment could meet some of the specifications. Based upon Scan-Optics' concerns, Scan-Optics sent a letter to the Department objecting to the RFP as "being a directed procurement to an individual company, namely Recognition Equipment Incorporated." In particular, Scan-Optics questioned why the features on pages 10 through 13 "which define a single vendor's product specifications . . . " were "mandatory" features. Scan- Optics requested that all REI-specific requirements be removed from the RFP. Pursuant to the RFP, a pre-proposal conference was held by the Department on July 16, 1991. This conference was attended by, among others, representatives of Scan-Optics and REI. The purpose of the pre-proposal conference was to provide written responses to written questions submitted by prospective vendors. Prospective vendors were informed through provisions of the RFP of the following concerning modifications to the RFP: Any question concerning the RFP was required to be submitted in writing. No interpretation of the RFP would be considered binding unless issued in writing by the Department. See paragraph 5 of the General Conditions of the RFP. Paragraph 5 of the General Conditions of the RFP also provided that protests to any part of the RFP were to be filed in writing as specified in Rule 13A-1.006, Florida Administrative Code. Section 1.4 of the RFP provided the following: No negotiations, decision, or action shall be initiated or executed by the offeror as a result of any discussions with any Department employee. Only those communications which are in writing from the purchasing office may be considered as a duly authorized expression on behalf of the Department. During the pre-proposal conference written questions that had previously been submitted by prospective vendors, including Scan-Optics' question concerning the "mandatory" features of section 3 of the RFP, and the Department's written responses thereto were distributed. Some discussion of the questions and responses also took place and some oral questions were answered. During the pre-proposal conference the Department's representative answered specific questions concerning the Department's desire to acquire "full multifont, set upper case, lower case alpha/numeric and hand print" capability. The questions to, and the comments of, the Department's representative during the pre-proposal conference were not reduced to writing or otherwise included in the RFP. Although the Department answered the oral questions asked during the pre-proposal conference, the Department's answers were not inconsistent with the intent of the Department evidenced in the RFP as discussed, infra. The evidence failed to prove that the Department's actions during the pre-proposal conference were fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest in light of the clear directions of the RFP concerning modifications thereto being in writing. In response to Scan-Optics' initial complaint about the RFP, the Department changed its "mandatory" features, beginning at Section 3.2 of the RFP, to "desired" features. This the Department did through the issuance of Addendum No. 1, which was issued by the Department after the pre-proposal conference on July 17, 1991, and included all written questions submitted prior to the conference and the Department's responses thereto. No other written modification to the RFP was made by the Department other than Addendum No. 1 and the attached written questions and responses. Other than the questions raised by Scan-Optics concerning the vendor- specific issue and the written questions attached to Addendum No. 1, no written clarification of the RFP was requested by Scan-Optics or any other prospective vendor. No written protest to the RFP was filed by Scan-Optics or any other prospective vendor. The evidence failed to prove that the Department's actions in issuing the RFP or it actions between the issuance of the RFP and the filing of proposals by vendors (i.e., the conduct of the pre-proposal conference) were fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest. Purpose of the RFP. The RFP included the following "overview" of why the Department issued the RFP: The Department of Revenue is planning the purchase of scanning equipment to enhance its data entry capabilities. The Department currently utilizes the Tartan Data Entry System to capture data from tax returns and related documents in a key to disk environment. . . . Scanning equipment would enable the Department to capture handwritten or typed data through optical character recognition. It is estimated that over 90% of typed data and 70% of handwritten data can be captured through optical character recognition. The initial application of Intangible Tax Returns represented over 68 million keystrokes during the last year. . . . . Joint Exhibit 1 (Tab D), section 1.2, page 1. The Department provided the following more specific indication with regard to what it was seeking through the RFP: It is the intent of the State to procure a total turn-key system comprised of all equipment, software, and services associated with optical scanning/optical character recognition of source data to provide output data for further processing at Florida Department of Revenue via magnetic tape or telecommunications. The system must be current state-of-the-art, allowing for future integration of imaging techniques into the scanner system as a field upgrade without replacing installed equipment. . . . A turn- key proposal is envisioned which will include installation, the design of the initial forms, scanner and edit and reject/re-entry system programming, operations and programmer training on-site, and any other support services essential to the successful operation of the system. It is requested that the successful vendor propose a minimum of 100 hours of software support for future applications to be allocated at the discretion of the Department. Reference Current System for details regarding the two Intangible Tax Form(s) and Documentary Tax Forms which we propose as initial scanning applications. We believe that the Section below appropriately sets forth the hardware and software sub-objectives including a scanner/imaging system, but we would like any potential Offerors to know that our overall objectives are a continuing improvement in all areas of operation at Florida Department of Revenue. In order of importance, the following are our goals: . . . . Joint Exhibit 1 (Tab D), section 3.1, page 9. The RFP went on to list a number of objectives (generally referred to as lower costs, enhance taxpayer service, improve quality, accelerate cycle time and decrease paper handling) and approximately 30 "desired" features the Department wanted vendors to address. Joint Exhibit 1 (Tab D), sections 3.2 through 3.31, pages 10-16. There were three forms attached to the RFP which the RFP indicated the Department intended to process with the system initially purchased pursuant to the RFP. Each form was identified and the potential data to be collected was identified by indicating the data elements currently captured, their size and their class. Although the data elements currently captured included only numeric data for two of the forms and numeric and some alpha data for the third form, the RFP did not specify that all data currently captured would necessarily be captured as a result of the RFP. The RFP also indicated that "[s]ubstantial changes to the layout will occur at design time" indicating that the forms were to be redesigned to accommodate a vendor's proposed method of collecting data from the forms. The RFP did not require that the Department acquire equipment which would read all Department forms which may ultimately be processed with optical scanning equipment or even that the exact three forms attached to the RFP for initial processing be processed as a result of any purchase under the RFP. The intent of the Department reflected in the RFP and as explained during the hearing of this matter was for vendors to provide the Department with details concerning their full capability (equipment and costs) to process Department materials with their optical scanning equipment and allow the Department to select a combination of equipment which would initially allow the processing of the three forms, in whatever format could best serve the Department's needs, and allow the Department to later upgrade and increase its use of optical scanning equipment. The RFP requested that vendors identify each component of their systems, including all recommended features for the initial task. Joint Exhibit 1 (Tab D), section 5.2, page 19. Vendors were also required to provide itemized prices for all components of their proposals: This tab must show the itemized prices for all components to include hardware, software, cables/connectors, shipping, installation, training, maintenance, start-up supplies/ equipment and any other goods/services. Pricing information must include all items that may be needed to provide a configuration of equipment and software to the Department. Any recurring charges must also be shown. Any quantity or price discounts offered in the proposal should be clearly stated. Pricing information must be submitted in the formats provided. It is imperative that adequate pricing information be included in the proposal. The Department cannot purchase any item against the proposal if adequate pricing information is not included in the proposal. Therefore, pricing information should be provided for optional features, equipment, software and services that are not a required part of any particular configuration herein, but may be desired if changes become necessary to any configurations purchased by the Department. . . . . . . . Joint Exhibit 1 (Tab D), section 5.2, page 20. Responses to the RFP. On or about August 6, 1991, Scan-Optics, REI and GTE Vantage Solutions submitted responses to the RFP. All responses to the RFP were determined to be responsive to the RFP and were evaluated and scored. The evidence failed to prove that the Department's determination that the responses to the RFP were responsive was fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest. Evaluation of the Proposals to the RFP; General. Section 4.3 of the RFP established the criteria for evaluation of proposals to the RFP. A total of 35 points were available for "costs", 30 points for "functional requirements", 30 points for "future requirements" and 5 points for "tax related experienced". The Department established a four person committee (hereinafter referred to as the "Committee"), to review and evaluate proposals to the RFP. Those individuals were Mr. Evers, George Brown, Larry Neilson and Gerald Johnson. Pat Gonzalez, an employee of the Information Resources Commission, also served as a non-voting member of the Committee. Subsequent to the filing of the proposals to the RFP, the Committee met on several occasions to discuss scoring criteria and to review lists of equipment submitted by each vendor. The members of the Committee reviewed and scored each proposal individually. After individually scoring each proposal, the Committee met and reviewed the individual scores. The individual scores were averaged and tabulated by Ms. Gonzalez. REI received an average score of 30 points for the functional requirements of section 3 of the RFP, an average score of 23 points for section 5 of the RFP and 5 points for section 6 of the RFP. Scan-Optics received average scores of 24.19, 12.5 and 5, respectively, for these three categories. Adding the scores for cost, discussed infra, the final tabulation of scores was as follows: REI 85.16 Scan-Optics 76.69 GTE Vantage 54.72 Based upon the foregoing, the Department decided to award the contract under the RFP to REI. Evaluation of the Proposals to the RFP; Costs. On August 6, 1991, when the proposals to the RFP were first opened, a preliminary bid tabulation sheet was completed. REI's proposed unit price was $1,389,025.00, and Scan-Optics' proposed unit price was $774,868.00. The Committee subsequently reduced the unit price of REI's proposal by $440,658.00, from $1,389,025.00 to $948,367.00. This reduction was made based upon a decision of the Committee, after a review of the REI proposal, to select a configuration of REI's equipment which the Committee believed comported with the Department's intent as evidenced by the RFP and would perform the tasks envisioned in the RFP. This decision was reasonable and consistent with the RFP in light of the following: The RFP informed vendors that the Department reserved the right to select any configuration of equipment submitted by vendors. Paragraph 7, General Conditions of the RFP, provided, in pertinent part: As the best interest of the State may require, the right is reserved to make award(s) by individual item, group of items, all or none, or a combination thereof; to reject any and all proposals or waive any minor irregularity or technicality in proposals received. . . . At Tab 11, Section 5 of the RFP, it was provided, in pertinent part: Offerors are required to include all equipment and software availability for their series or family of equipment proposed. The Department shall use these to determine the final ordered configuration from the selected proposal and from time to time, for additional equipment or software. This will also allow the Department the option of selecting equipment from State contract or under this RFP/Contract. This will also allow the Department to implement functions either undefined or unforeseen. The Department reserves the right to acquire any and all of the equipment, software and services necessary to meet the requirements of this proposal. Vendors were also required by Tab 11, Section 5 of the RFP to submit itemized prices for all components of a proposal: "Pricing information must include all items that may be needed to provide a configuration of equipment and software to the Department." REI's proposal included its entire array of equipment with itemized prices. This information allowed the Committee to equalize the vendors' proposals and, thus, allow a fair comparison of the two vendors. It also allowed the Committee to perform its task of deciding what configuration of equipment would best meet the Department's needs. Scan-Optics' proposal did not include separate itemized prices. Therefore, the Department was not able to decide the most advantageous configuration of Scan-Optics' equipment. Without the reduction in costs, REI's proposal was more extensive and more expensive than Scan-Optics' proposal. The Committee discussed the matter and questioned the Department's purchasing director as to whether REI's proposal could be reduced pursuant to the RFP to make it more compatible with the RFP. After being assured that such a reduction was permissible under the RFP, the Committee removed some of the REI proposed vocabulary kits and the costs of those kits. The Committee was unable to make a similar reduction to Scan- Optics' proposal because Scan-Optics had not itemized the cost of its equipment. With the reduction in REI's unit price made by the Committee, REI received a total of 27.16 points for the cost component during the evaluation process. The total score awarded to REI was 85.16. If the Committee had not given REI the reduction in unit price, REI would have only received 7.26 points for cost and its total score would have been 65.26. Scan-Optics received 76.69 total points (including 35 points for "cost"), which is higher than the points REI would have received but for the Committee's reduction of REI's unit price. REI was contacted by the Department to verify that the Department's understanding of the pricing information contained in REI's response to the RFP was correct. The evidence failed to prove that this contact allowed REI to provide any additional information to the Department or was otherwise improper. The Department did not contact Scan-Optics because Scan-Optics had not provided any information upon which the Department could have evaluated Scan-Optics' proposal in a similar manner as it had REI's. Therefore, there was no similar conclusion reached concerning Scan-Optics to be verified. The evidence failed to prove that the Department's evaluation of the costs of the vendors or the award of cost points to REI or Scan-Optics was fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest. Evaluation of the Proposals to the RFP; An Oklahoma Tax Commission Evaluation Form. Prior to the evaluation of the proposals to the RFP Mr. Evers requested that an evaluation form used by the Oklahoma Tax Commission be provided to him. Mr. Evers made this request because he wanted to use the evaluation format he knew the Oklahoma Tax Commission had used. The evaluation form provided to Mr. Evers included the actual results of the Oklahoma Tax Commission's evaluation of proposals it had received. REI was awarded the Oklahoma Tax Commission contract. Mr. Evers provided a copy of the Oklahoma Tax Commission's evaluation to one of the members of the Committee and told him to give a copy to one other member. The evidence failed to prove if the fourth member and Ms. Gonzalez were provided a copy. The evaluation general point scale on the Oklahoma Tax Commission evaluation form was used by the Committee: Item not bid or does not meet specifications. Partially meets specifications. Meets specifications. Exceeds specifications. Substantially exceeds specifications. ? Need additional information from vendor. Although Mr. Evers could have avoided all appearance of impropriety by distributing a blank Oklahoma Tax Commission evaluation form, the weight of the evidence failed to prove that Mr. Evers' actions in distributing the Oklahoma Tax Commission evaluation form was fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest. The evidence failed to prove that the Committee was in fact influenced by the Oklahoma Tax Commission evaluation form in any substantial way. I. Evaluation of the Proposals to the RFP; REI's TARTAN XP80. REI's proposal included equipment named the TARTAN XP80. This equipment is the basic optical scanning system of REI. The XP80 system proposed by REI is capable of including from 40 to 720 templates. The Department, after evaluation of the proposals, decided that the XP80 with only 40 templates would be sufficient to meet the Department's initial goal as set out in the RFP. The Department concluded that it was not necessary to acquire the XP80 with its 720 template capacity. The 40 template system is the system which the Committee evaluated with regard to the cost of the REI proposal. Section 3.17 of the RFP included the following desired characteristic: Optical Character Recognition - The document scanning system must be capable of employing both feature matching and feature analysis recognition techniques. The system must be capable of processing all standard OCR fonts in single font, multiple font, or multi-font mode under program control. The Offeror must provide a list of all fonts recognized by their system and any restrictions that apply. Vendor to define number of fonts recognized by his system, i.e., single font, multiple font, omnifont, and multifont. The specifications of Section 3.17 of the RFP were not "mandatory" requirements of the system ultimately to be acquired by the Department. The Department requested information concerning these capabilities, but did not specify in the RFP that the system it would ultimately purchase for its initial project would contain the specifications of Section 3.17 of the RFP. In light of Scan-Optics own challenge to the provisions of section 3 of the RFP as "mandatory" and the Department's decision to eliminate the reference to the provisions of section 3 as "mandatory", it is clear that there was no requirement that the ultimate system acquired pursuant to the RFP had to be capable of processing all standard OCR fonts in single font, multiple font, or multifont mode under program control. The evidence failed to prove that REI did not provide information concerning its capabilities to meet the specifications set out in Section 3.17 of the RFP or that the information provided was inaccurate. Two of the forms to be initially processed (forms 601I and 601C) only required capability to read numeric characters. The third form (form 219) could, in a limited number of instances, contain numeric and alpha characters. In evaluating the proposals, the Department decided that, to the extent that alpha characters may be contained on form 219's, the alpha characters could be ignored without creating significant problems in processing. The Department's conclusion that the XP80 with only 40 templates can handle the initial task contemplated by the RFP was based upon the fact that the forms may be redesigned and the conclusion that the number of instances when alpha characters appear will be insignificant enough to ignore. There was evidence presented that the XP80 with only 40 templates cannot efficiently and successfully process the three forms to be initially processed. There was also evidence that the XP80 with only 40 templates will not be successful even if the forms are redesigned. The weight of the evidence failed, however, to substantiate this claim. Whether the XP80 with only 40 templates can successfully process the three forms depends upon the environment in which the forms are completed. It is possible that if the exact environment is known so that the number and type of fonts that may be used is known, only 40 templates can process the forms coming from that environment. The Department has not determined what exactly the environment in which the forms will be completed is. The Department did, however, consider the probable environment in reaching its decision. More importantly Scan-Optics did not prove what that environment is. Nor did Scan- Optics prove that the environment is, or will be, one which will prevent the XP80 with only 40 templates from being successfully used as contemplated by the RFP. The evidence proved that an XP80 with a minimum of 200 templates up to a maximum of 350 templates could be used to successfully carry out the task contemplated in the RFP even in a random environment (one in which any number of fonts might be used to complete a form). If up to at least 280 templates were purchased the XP80 could handle the processing of the forms and, adjusting the score of REI for the additional costs and additional performance characteristics of an XP80 with up to 280 templates, REI would still be the highest scorer. Exactly where the cut-off between the number of additional templates which it may be necessary to acquire according to evidence presented by Scan-Optics (between 200 and 350) and the resulting reduction in REI's score to below Scan- Optic's score would occur was not proved. The evidence failed to prove that the actions of the Department with regard to its decision to acquire an XP80 with as low as 40 templates was fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest. Evaluation of the Proposals to the RFP; Table C. Table C of the RFP required that vendors list any optional features, which would enhance optical scanning operations: "LIST ANY OPTIONAL FEATURES WHICH ENHANCE PERFORMANCE OF THE SCANNING EQUIPMENT OPERATION". Joint Exhibit 1 (Tab D), page 30. REI did not provide a completed Table C with its proposal. REI's proposal included additional vocabulary kits containing from 40 to 720 templates and the cost of those kits in Table B of its proposal. Table B was to be used to provide the following: "LIST EACH AND EVERY COMPONENT AND FEATURES REQUIRED FOR INSTALLATION AND FULL OPERATIONAL STATUS." REI's proposal was consistent with these instructions. The fact that the vocabulary kits involved in the award of points for costs were included on Table B and were not included on Table C does not mean that the Department could not reject vocabulary kits as unnecessary for its initial purchase based upon other information contained in REI's proposal. The inclusion of the kits on Table B merely indicates that, to acquire REI's total capability with an XP80, up to 720 templates are required for "FULL OPERATIONAL STATUS." That does not mean that the Department intended or was required by the RFP to actually acquire "FULL OPERATIONAL STATUS." Section 3.9 of the RFP provided the following desired feature: Document Imaging - The proposed document scanning system must be capable of being field upgraded with image cameras for both front and back imaging of documents. Imaging must occur on both sides of the document in a single pass. The proposed system must be capable of taking partial images of the document within the confines of windows, zones, or strips. When and if imaging is added to the proposed system, it must not slow any other operations or functions of the system below that of normal throughput speed of the identical system without the added imaging capability. The following question, submitted in writing to the Department, and the following written answer from the Department, were included in Addendum No. 1: 48. Is the cost to retrofit to imaging included in evaluation criteria? Answer: Future costs will be considered. REI responded to section 3.9 as follows: Exceeds Requirement: The proposed TARTAN XP80 can be upgraded to imaging exactly as defined in Section 3.9. In addition, image output can be passed to an extremely wide range of image processing systems including those from IBM, NCR, Unisys, FileNet, Plexus and many others. Joint Exhibit 3 (Tab H), page 5. REI failed to list the equipment necessary to meet the desired feature of section 3.9, or the price of such equipment, on Table C of its proposal. This information, however, was included by REI on Table B according to the testimony of Mr. Evers. To the extent that Table C was not provided, REI's failure to provide the information to be contained thereon was a minor irregularity. The RFP did not require that the Department evaluate the proposals based upon the cost of future upgrades. The RFP only required that the Department determine the ability of vendors to upgrade and REI's proposal gave the Department sufficient information to accomplish this requirement. The evidence failed to prove that the Department's failure to reject REI's proposal because of its failure to provide Table C or that the Department's grading of REI's proposal in light of the failure to include a Table C with its proposal was fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest. Evaluation of the Proposals to the RFP; The One- Year Warranty. The RFP required that a one-year warranty be included with each proposal. REI's proposal only included a 90-day warranty. REI's proposal, however, included the cost of one-year's maintenance costs of $61,587.00. The evidence failed to prove that the Department's acceptance of REI's warranty and maintenance costs was fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest. Evaluation of the Proposals to the RFP; Grading of Sections 3.2 through 3.31. Addendum No. 1 to the RFP modified, among other things, three of the desired features of section 3 of the RFP. In particular, sections 3.5, 3.11 and 3.20 of the RFP were modified. The scores awarded to Scan-Optics by some of the members of the evaluation committee for its response to sections 3.5, 3.11 and 3.20 were lower than the scores awarded to REI. The evidence failed to prove the actual reason why the scores awarded to Scan-Optics pursuant to sections 3.5, 3.11 and 3.20 of the RFP were lower than the scores awarded to REI or that the lower scores were based upon the requirements of those sections without regard to the modifications of Addendum No. 1. The impact on the scores of Scan-Optics, even if attributable to error by the Department, would be minimal. The evidence failed to prove that even if the Department had graded Scan-Optics' proposal without taking into account the modifications of Addendum No. 1 to sections 3.5, 3.11 and 3.20, that the Department acted in a fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest manner. Conclusion. Based upon the foregoing, it is concluded that the evidence failed to prove that the Department's actions from the time that it developed the RFP to the announcement of its proposed award of the contract under the RFP to REI was fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest. Any unfairness to Scan-Optics was a result of the Department's broad discretion pursuant to the RFP to decide what to acquire as a result of the RFP and the apparent confusion of Scan Optics, and probably REI, caused by the RFP. The RFP was not, however, challenged.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order dismissing the Formal Written Protest and Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing filed by Scan-Optics, Inc. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 1992. APPENDIX Case Number 91-6545BID Scan-Optics and REI have submitted proposed findings of fact. The Department has indicated its intent to adopt the proposed findings of fact of REI. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Scan-Optics' Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 3 and 5. 2 4-5. 3 See 31-37. See 32. See 33. 6-7 Hereby accepted and see 33 and 64-69. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 31-37 and 64-69. 11 and 13. The third, fourth and seventh sentences are not relevant. The fifth and sixth sentences are misleading and not totally accurate--there was only one RFP and one ITB and they were included in Mr. Evers' file on REI. See 19-20. The last sentence is not relevant. 11-12 20 and 26. 13 26. 14 22-23 and 26. 15 Hereby accepted. 16 See 20. But see 22, 25 and 27-30. 17-19 See 22, 25 and 27-30. 48, 58 and hereby accepted. Hereby accepted. But see 31-37. 58 and hereby accepted. 32, 70-71 and hereby accepted, except the fourth sentence, which is not supported by the weight of the evidence, and the last sentence, which is not relevant to this proceeding. 24-28 Hereby accepted. Not relevant. Hereby accepted. 31 32. 32 41. 33 44. 34 48 and 50-51. 35 See 47-48 and 51 and hereby accepted. 36 50-51. 48-49 and 51 and hereby accepted, except the fifth and last sentences, which are not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 54-57. The third sentence mischaracterizes Mr. Evers' testimony and is, therefore, not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence or not relevant. 40 56. 41-42 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 43 See 60. 44 See 60-63. 45 Not relevant. 46-47 Not relevant. See 60-63 48 49-51 Not relevant. See 66-69. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 66-69. 52 See 45. But see 83-86. 53 Hereby accepted. 54 See 83 and hereby accepted. 55 Hereby accepted. 56 See 84-86. 57 Hereby accepted. 58 See 83 and hereby accepted. 59 See 84-86. 60-62 Hereby accepted. 63 See 84-86. 64 32. 65 74. 66 75. 67 76. 68 See 70-71 and hereby accepted. 69 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 77. 70 First sentence: hereby accepted. Second sentence: not supported by the weight of the evidence. Third sentence: hereby accepted as to the scores given REI; the rest of the third sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 71 Not relevant. 72 See 80-81. The computation of maintenance cost ignores the apparent discount which is given, depending on the length of the maintenance period purchased. For example, if a year's maintenance is purchased, the costs is less than the monthly rate times. 73 Not relevant. See 60-63. 74 58. 75 Not relevant. See 31-37 and 60-63. 76 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 77-79 and 81 Although these proposed findings of fact include correct quotations, other evidence was more persuasive. 80 Hereby accepted. 82 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 68. 83 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 65 and 68. 84 See 67. 85 67. 86 See 67. 87-88 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 68. Not relevant. See 68. 92 52. 93 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 31-37. REI's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 6. 2 7. 3 8. 4 9. 5 10. 6 11 and 13. 7 14. 8 15. 9 There was no proposed finding of fact 9. 10 18. 11 19-20. 12 20 and 26. 13 22 and hereby accepted. 14 22. 15 22 and hereby accepted. 16 29. 17 21. 18 26. 19-20 28. 21 24-25. 22 38. 23 41. 24 Hereby accepted. 25 42. 26-30 48. 31-32 48-49. 33 43. 34 40. 35 50-51. 36 44. 37 43. 38 45. 39 46. 40 39. 41 Hereby accepted. 42 59. 43 Hereby accepted. 44 See 61-63. 45 Hereby accepted. 46 See 37, 70 and 78. 47 77. Not relevant. Hereby accepted. 50-51 64. 52 59 and 65. 53 33 and 65. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence--there was some evidence presented. 54 67. 55-59 See 68. 60 See 83-86. 61 87. 62 Hereby accepted. 63 81. COPIES FURNISHED: James W. Linn, Esquire Rosa H. Carson, Esquire 1711-D Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William E. Williams, Esquire Rex D. Ware, Esquire Post Office Box 1794 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Gene T. Sellers Assistant General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Vicki Weber, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 J. Thomas Herndon Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue This cause arose as an action pursuant to Section 120.56(2), Florida Statutes, challenging the validity of the amendment to Rule 59U-16.002(2), Florida Administrative Code, proposed and published by the Board of Opticianry on February 14, 1997. The issues are: Do Petitioners have standing to bring this rule challenge? Is the following proposed amendment of Rule 59U- 16.002(2), Florida Administrative Code, an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, pursuant to Sections 120.52(8)(c) and (8)(e), Florida Statutes? A sponsor must be an optician who is licensed under Chapter 484, F.S., for no less than one (1) year, a physician or an optometrist licensed in this state, whose license is not subject to any current disciplinary action; must be actively engaged in the practice of the qualifying profession; and must provide the equipment set forth in Rule 59U-10.007 on the premises of any establishment in which apprentices are trained. (Amended language underlined) Are Petitioners entitled to attorney's fees, pursuant to Section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact All persons seeking to be licensed as opticians in Florida must first pass a minimal qualifications licensure examination. Before being qualified to sit for this examination, one of the following courses of preparation provided in Section 484.007, Florida Statutes, must be met. In relevant part, this section provides that one must have (1) received an associate degree, or its equivalent, in Opticianry from an accredited educational institution; (2) be an individual who is licensed to practice the profession of Opticianry in another state, territory, or jurisdiction, who has actively practiced for more than three years; or (3) come from a state or jurisdiction which is not licensed and have actively practiced in that state, territory, or jurisdiction for more than five years immediately preceding application; or (4) be an individual who has completed an apprentice program consisting of 6,240 hours of training under the supervision of an optician, a physician, or an optometrist licensed under the law of this state. Respondent Board of Opticianry published on February 14, 1997 a proposed change to Rule 59U-16.002(2), Florida Administrative Code, as set out below. The underlined language is the only substantive change: 59U-16.002 Qualifications for Apprentices and Sponsors. Apprentices and sponsors for apprenticeship programs must meet the following qualifications: No change. A sponsor must be an optician who is licensed under Chapter 484, F.S., for no less than one (1) year, a physician or an optometrist licensed in this state, whose license is not subject to any current disciplinary action; must be actively engaged in the practice of the qualifying profession; and must provide the equipment set forth in Rule 59U-10.007 on the premises of any establishment in which apprentices are trained. Specific Authority - 484.005 F.S. Law Implemented - 484.007(1)(d)4. F.S. The parties' Amended Prehearing Stipulation agreed that, Petitioners did not request a public hearing pursuant to the Florida Administrative Weekly notice. A Notice of Additional Public Hearing scheduled for May 16, 1997, was published on April 18, 1997, Volume 23, No. 16, Florida Administrative Weekly. At that hearing, the Board of Opticianry discussed and approved an amendment to proposed amendment to Rule 59U- 16.002. At formal hearing, counsel for the Board represented that the Board had voted to amend the challenged proposed rule so that it would not restrict persons who had completed more than one year of opticianry practice out of state prior to passing the Florida Opticianry licensure examination from acting as sponsors of apprentices within their first year of Florida practice; however, the Board would not withdraw the challenged rule as published and would not publish/file a Notice of Change until a Final Order is entered on the instant challenge. The Board's position was that this vote did not constitute a stipulation of invalidity, arbitrariness, capriciousness, or overreaching its statutory authority. According to the Board, this representation was made only because the Board would not be putting on evidence to support certain portions of the rule language, as published. Nonetheless, Sam Jones, licensed optician and Board member, testified, on behalf of the Board, that new Florida licensees from out of state could not properly sponsor apprentices for at least one year because they "need a little more exposure" to Florida laws and rules before teaching others and because some other states have no licensure criteria at all and no continuing education requirements. The Petition challenges the ability of the Board to require that opticians be licensed for at least one year prior to serving as apprentice sponsors, alleging that the Board lacks statutory authority to promulgate such a rule and that the proposed change is arbitrary and capricious and not based on appropriate factual or legal justification. Petitioner Lenscrafters, Inc. is a corporation that does business in the State of Florida, offering optical services and goods to the public. Lenscrafters hires employees to work as opticians, as well as hiring other unlicensed store employees. Petitioner Sanjiv Matta is Lenscrafters' Regional Trainer of Operations and apparently Lenscrafters' primary Florida employment recruiter. He also locates coaches for Lenscrafters' training programs. He has been a licensed optician in Florida for more than one year. He does not currently sponsor an apprentice. Lenscrafters and Mr. Matta allege that they will be substantially affected because the proposed rule amendment will reduce the number of available sponsors, which will in turn reduce the number of apprentices, which will in turn reduce the number of available employees now and the number of available licensed opticians in the future. As a subset of this alleged chain of unavailability of sponsors, apprentices, and employees generally, Petitioners claim great difficulty will arise in attempting to coordinate apprentice work hours with sponsor work hours. Lenscrafters has 64 stores in Florida. Each store is staffed by opticians, but there is often an independent optometrist next door. Lenscrafters employs approximately 200 opticians in Florida, with an average of three opticians working in each of its stores. Approximately 25 of the 200 opticians employed by Lenscrafters in Florida have been licensed for less than one year. These 25 were among the 60 new employees hired by Lenscrafters last year. Some of the licensed opticians Lenscrafters hires unilaterally elect to serve as sponsors to other employees who would like to obtain their opticianry license by completing an apprenticeship program. However, according to Mr. Matta, it would not be "integrity based" for Lenscrafters to urge or encourage optician employees to take on sponsorship. Lenscrafters provides the optometric equipment used by sponsors and apprentices in its employ. Although Lenscrafters provides programs to help all its employees, including apprentices, achieve expertise in fitting and adjusting eyeglasses and provides situational training, equipment training, training tests, performance tests, and lending libraries, it has no specific apprenticeship program, as such, in place. Some of Lenscrafters' programs assist apprentices in attaining credit hours towards licensure. Some supplement the apprentice program requirements. The primary purpose of Lenscrafters' programs is to educate and train its employees for servicing its customers. The ultimate testimony of Mr. Matta that there currently are three opticians employed by Lenscrafters who have been licensed in Florida for less than one year and who are also currently serving as sponsors was anecdotal at best and at worst was speculative and self-contradictory of prior testimony. Lenscrafters currently has 66 apprentices in its employ in Florida. Pursuant to Board rules, each sponsor may oversee two apprentices and any apprentice may have both a primary and a secondary sponsor. Credit hours in the apprentice program are only earned when the apprentice works under a sponsor's supervision. Board rules would permit Lenscrafters' 200 opticians to sponsor 400 apprentices if each licensee had two apprentices. The proposed change in the rule would allow 175 Lenscrafters' opticians to sponsor 350 apprentices. Simple mathematics shows that Lenscrafters has between 33 and 66 optician employees who serve as apprentice sponsors, primary or secondary. Clearly, Lenscrafters currently employs many more non-sponsors than sponsors. Section 484.011, Florida Statutes, allows any employee of an optician to perform any of the functions an optician performs, as long as the acts are performed under the direct supervision of the optician. Lenscrafters allows apprentices to perform more tasks than other unlicensed employees. Lenscrafters considers apprentices to have greater expertise, employee commitment, and career commitment than other unlicensed employees. Lenscrafters pays apprentices more than other unlicensed employees. Lenscrafters and Mr. Matta believe that apprentices who have worked in Lenscrafters' stores and trained on Lenscrafters' equipment will eventually provide a pool of trained opticians for hire or promotion. However, Lenscrafters submitted no statistical data to confirm this "belief" expressed by Mr. Matta, and based on the ratio of available sponsors to apprentices which was developed at formal hearing, this "belief" constitutes pure speculation. It could be just as beneficial for Lenscrafters to train non-apprentices at a lower salary. Intervenor Odette Gayoso has been involved in opticianry for 15 years. She has an Associate of Arts (AA) degree in Optical Science and has been licensed as an optician in Puerto Rico since 1991. Ms. Gayoso is employed as an optician by Lenscrafters. She has been a licensed optician in Florida since December 1996. Therefore, at the time of formal hearing, she had been Florida- licensed for less than one year. Under the proposed rule amendment, she would be unable to act as a sponsor for five more months. Ms. Gayoso does not sponsor an apprentice currently, although the current rule permits her to do so. She has never applied to be a sponsor. No apprentice currently wants her as a sponsor. In the past, two Lenscrafters employees needed sponsors, but both left Lenscrafters' employ before any agreements concerning sponsorship were reached. Ms. Gayoso feels she is qualified to sponsor an apprentice and that she would derive satisfaction from teaching one. The parties' Amended Prehearing Stipulation stipulated that POF had standing to intervene. POF put on no evidence of standing. Mr. Matta and Ms. Gayoso testified that they recruit for Lenscrafters. Ms. Gayoso is an assistant retail manager in a single store. Mr. Matta recruits state-wide. Only Mr. Matta testified that, in his experience, there is a shortage of qualified opticians available to be hired. Only Mr. Matta testified that due to the Board's rule requirement of direct supervision it was difficult for him to match apprentices' work hours with those of their sponsors. Ms. Gayoso did not corroborate Mr. Matta's perception that it is difficult to match apprentices' work hours with those of their sponsors. Although she could see how that could be, it apparently was not a problem in her store where the optician/manager sponsored two apprentices and where another optician who had been employed less than 90 days was prohibited by Lenscrafters from acting as a sponsor. The fact that Lenscrafters prohibits some of its licensed opticians from sponsoring apprentices undermines Lenscrafters' position that the proposed rule change alone would undermine apprentices locating willing sponsors. Mr. Sam Jones perceived no shortage of licensed opticians, only a shortage of licensed opticians he would care to hire in his establishment. The Board office receives approximately 86 calls about the apprenticeship program each month. The Board has never received a call concerning a prospective apprentice's inability to find a sponsor. There are currently approximately 2,500 actively licensed opticians in Florida. Of these 2,500 licensees, 174 were licensed last year. This number of annual new licensees has stayed relatively stable for many years. Of 544 current apprentices in Florida, only 27 currently have sponsors of less than one year licensure. The statistics show that many more potential sponsors are available both state-wide and within Lenscrafters' Florida operation than there are those who want to be apprentices. Under the current rule, only those licensees who are currently under disciplinary action are precluded from being sponsors. Under the proposed rule, and excluding any disciplinary concerns, only the 174 new admittees could not be sponsors for one year. A year later, those 174 could become sponsors. So in effect, the only licensees who could not be sponsors each year are the newest licensees, while each year the total number of potential sponsors grows respectively. Of course, the number of eligible physicians and optometrists who could also serve as sponsors would not fall below the current number and would continue to grow respectively year by year. Florida has two junior colleges with an Opticianry AA degree program. These colleges graduate approximately 60 opticians per year. Approximately half of the successful opticianry licensure examinees come from the AA program, and half come from the apprentice program. There is a 90 percent first time pass rate on the examination. The number of apprentice program examinees who fail on both the initial examination and "retake" examinations is higher than for AA degree holders. Since 1991, the Board has been concerned that the apprenticeship route has not been adequately educating future opticians and ensuring the safety of their public practice after licensure even if they were being adequately prepared to pass the standardized minimal qualifications examination. The Board consulted no empirical data for formulating its rule as published, but it held between nine and 12 Board meetings which included discussions on upgrading the apprenticeship program. Board members reported information from nationally recognized professional associations and reviewed a national trend whereby more states are requiring licensure and more states are phasing out apprenticeship programs. Some Board members took the minimum qualifications licensure examination so that they could understand what was involved and how the examination could be improved and report back to the Board. Board members heard reports from staff and investigators on reasons more disciplinary cases were not prosecuted. These Board meetings were open to the public and solicited public input. Some were referred to as "workshops," although they might not meet the generally understood Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, definition of "workshop." In 1996, a bill to amend Chapter 484, Florida Statutes, so as to require optician licensees to have three years of licensure before becoming sponsors did not pass into law. The Board viewed the one-year rule amendment as a more conservative step than requiring three years of licensure for sponsorship. All witnesses agreed that an experienced optician knows more about the practice of opticianry than a newly licensed optician. Lenscrafters' witnesses contended that newly licensed opticians were more enthusiastic sponsors and more able to teach what would be required on the licensure examination. Sam Jones was one of the Board members who retook and passed the current licensure examination. On behalf of the Board, he stated that the teaching of how to pass the licensure examination did not equate with teaching the practice of opticianry. In drafting the rule challenged herein to apply to all new optician licensees regardless of which of the four alternative routes they had taken to licensure, the Board viewed the new one-year requirement as constituting an internship akin to the internship required of other health care professionals. The new rule does not require physicians and optometrists to be licensed for one year before acting as a sponsor. In not applying the one-year requirement to physicians and optometrists, but only to opticians, the Board considered that licensed physicians and optometrists already had clinical experience in excess of licensed opticians. The parties stipulated that the Board is authorized to make such rules as are necessary to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public as it relates to the practice of opticianry and is authorized, "to establish administrative processing fees sufficient to cover the cost of administering apprentice rules as promulgated by the Board."
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner is entitled to a passing grade on the clinical portion of the August 2000 optometry licensure examination.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner took the optometry licensure examination in August of 2000. He received passing scores on three of the four parts of the licensure examination. He received a failing score on the clinical portion of the examination. The Petitioner's score on the clinical portion of the subject examination was 70.50. The minimum passing score is 75.00. The Petitioner contested the scores awarded to him for his performance of procedures itemized on the examination as 2A, 7B, 10A, 22A, 33C, 9A, 18B, and 14B.3 During the course of the hearing, two of the challenged items were resolved without the need for evidence. The Petitioner withdrew his challenge to item 10A. The Respondent stipulated that the Petitioner's performance on item 2A had been incorrectly graded, and agreed that 1.5 points should be added to the Petitioner's grade on the subject examination. On five of the items challenged by the Petitioner, one of the examiners gave the Petitioner credit for successful completion of the procedure and the other examiner did not.4 With regard to these five items, the Petitioner's primary contention is that, if one examiner gave him credit, he should also have received credit from the other examiner. However, given the nature of the manner in which the clinical examination is conducted, different scores by examiners evaluating a candidate's performance are not unusual, and, standing alone, different scores are not indicative of any irregularity in the manner in which the examination was conducted. On the clinical portion of the optometry licensure examination, each candidate is evaluated by two examiners, each of whom grades the candidate's performance of a procedure independently of the other examiner. Further, the examiners are not permitted to confer with each other regarding a candidate's scores. Specific written grading standards have been prepared for each of the procedures candidates are required to perform as part of the clinical portion of the subject examination. These written grading standards are provided to all examiners prior to each examination so that the examiners can review the standards and be prepared to apply them in a fair and even-handed manner. Before serving as an examiner, each proposed examiner goes through a training session. During the training session, each proposed examiner practices scoring the performance of various optometry procedures. Following the practice sessions, the work of each examiner is evaluated to determine whether the examiner is correctly applying the grading standards. If a potential examiner is unable to demonstrate the ability to apply the grading standards, then that examiner is assigned to other duties and is not assigned to grade candidates on the licensure exam. The examiners assigned to grade the Petitioner on the clinical portion of the subject examination all successfully completed the training process and were determined to be acceptable by the Department. The examiners assigned to grade the Petitioner on the clinical portion of the subject examination were all experienced examiners and a statistical analysis of their scoring of all candidates on the subject examination demonstrates that they reliably applied the grading standards. With regard to the procedure required by item 14B, the Petitioner asserts that his ability to demonstrate the required procedure was impaired by the fact that the patient was photophobic. The greater weight of the evidence is otherwise. While the subject examination was in progress, two optometrists examined the patient and determined that the patient was not photophobic. There is no competent substantial evidence of any misconduct by any of the examiners who graded the Petitioner's performance during the subject examination. Similarly, there is no competent substantial evidence that the Department acted arbitrarily or capriciously, or that it abused its discretion. There is no competent substantial evidence that the scoring of the Petitioner's examination performance was flawed, other than the additional 1.5 points that the Department agreed should be given for item 2A.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued concluding that the Petitioner is not entitled to a passing grade on the clinical section of the optometry licensure examination and dismissing the petition in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 2001.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether alleged statements attributed to the Board of Optometry were made by the Board, and if so, whether the statements constitute unpromulgated rules prohibited by Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes, (Supp. 1996).
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated as a matter of fact that: The FOA is a not-for-profit Florida corporation whose membership is comprised of optometrists licensed under Chapter 463, Florida Statutes, to practice optometry in Florida. All FOA members are subject to and regulated by the Board of Optometry and its rules. The FOA has approximately 1,022 members. The Board of Optometry is the agency responsible for regulating the optometric practice of all FOA members. Board rules and agency statements of general applicability regulate the optometric practice of all FOA members. Individual members of the FOA, being subject to and regulated by the rules and policy of the Board of optometry, are persons whose substantial interests will be affected by the alleged agency statements and are thus substantially affected persons within the meaning of Section 120.56(1)(e), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1966). As all members of the FOA are subject to and regulated by Board rules and statements of general applicability, a substantial number of the FOA’s members would be substantially affected by the alleged statements. The objective of the FOA is to promote and protect the interests of the general public and licensed optometrists in ensuring the availability of high quality eye care at an affordable price. The FOA represents its members through the provision of education and training, and by participation in administrative proceedings, legislative activities, and court litigation. Petitioner, Brian Lloyd Weber, O.D., is an optometrist licensed and practicing in Florida. Petitioner, 29/49 Optical Inc., (29/49), is a corporation which operates optical establishments in Florida. The Board of Optometry is the state agency in Florida which licenses optometrists and regulates the practice of optometry in this state. On January 29, 1992, the Probable Cause Panel of the Board of Optometry determined there was probable cause to discipline the license of Dr. Weber because of an alleged violation of Section 463.014(1)(b), Florida Statutes, involving the corporate practice of optometry. Thereafter, on February 2, 1992, an Administrative Complaint was filed with the Board which alleged that Dr. Weber had violated the cited statute by engaging in the practice of optometry with a corporation not composed of other health care providers; by entering into a corporate arrangement which permitted an unlicensed person to practice optometry through Dr. Weber, in violation of Rule 21Q-3.008, (now Rule 59V-3.008, Florida Administrative Code); and by holding himself out to the public as available to render professional services in a manner which implies he is professionally associated with an entity which is not a licensed practitioner, also in violation of the Rule. The investigation conducted by the then Department of Professional Regulation, which led up to the action of the panel and the filing of the Administrative Complaint indicated that Dr. Weber owned 250 shares of stock in 29/49, along with an optician, Anthony Record, not licensed to provide optometry services, who also owns stock in the corporation. Allegedly, the corporation operated at five different locations, at one or more of which eye examinations were performed. It was also alleged that 29/49 had publicly advertised itself as an entity which provided complete eye examinations, and that Dr. Weber performed the eye examinations described in the advertisements. In fact, Dr. Weber is a director and officer of 29/49. He holds a 75% ownership share in the corporation. Both Dr. Weber and Mr. Record control the corporation and share the duties and profits of the operation. The firm provides optitianry services, as defined in Sections 484.002(3) and (7), Florida Statutes. Dr. Weber asserts that the operations of 29/49 are separate from the operations of his optometric practice, and claims that the Board’s direction to him to change the corporate structure of 29/49 so as to dissolve his partnership with a lay person is a continuation of what he claims is a long-standing policy of prohibiting the joint ownership of an optitianry between and optometrist and a lay person. Before a hearing was held on the Administrative Complaint, Dr. Weber and counsel for the Board entered into a stipulation which, if accepted by the Board, would have resolved the pending disciplinary action. The stipulation was presented to the Board at its July 8, 1993 meeting, at which time the Board voted to reject it and to propose a counter-stipulation. At that meeting, the Board did not enunciate any of the alleged agency statements at issue here nor did it take a position as to what Dr. Weber must do to rectify the practice situation to its satisfaction. Nonetheless, by Order dated September 9, 1993, the Board formally rejected the proposed stipulation and proposed its own stipulation. On September 12, 1996, Dr. Weber and the Agency’s counsel presented a second stipulation to the Board for settlement of the disciplinary matter, but again the Board voted to reject the stipulation and to offer its own second counter- stipulation. This counter-proposal called for Dr. Weber to change his corporate structure so that he no longer violated the statutory prohibition against practicing optometry with non- licensed individuals, and that he no longer practice with a lay person. This second counter-proposal by the Board did not enunciate any of the alleged agency statements at issue herein. This second counter-proposal was promulgated in an Order of the Board issued on October 15, 1996. Sections 463.014(1)(a)&(b), Florida Statutes, provide: No corporation, lay body, organization, or individual other than a licensed practitioner shall engage in the practice of optometry through the means of engaging the services, upon a salary, commission, or other means or inducement, of any person licensed to practice optometry in this state. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prohibit the association of a licensed practitioner with a multidisciplinary group of licensed health care professionals, the primary objective of which is the diagnosis and treatment of the human body. No licensed practitioner shall engage in the practice of optometry with any corporation, organization, group or lay individual. This provision shall not prohibit licensed practitioners from employing, or from forming partnership or professional associations with, licensed practitioners licensed in this state or with other licensed health care professionals, the primary objective of whom is the diagnosis and treatment of the human body. Consistent therewith, the Board of Optometry has promulgated Rule 59V-3.008, Florida Administrative Code, which implements the provisions of the statute. Rule 59V-3.008, Florida Administrative Code, restates the intent of the legislature regarding the need for licensure of practitioners of optometry, defines a “licensed practitioner”, and thereafter outlines with particularity those actions which may and those which may not be carried on by licensed optometrists in Florida. The rule is quite clear in its definitions and leaves little room for misunderstanding regarding what constitutes the practice of optometry and optometric services; those individuals who must be licensed; what professional activities a licensed practitioner may perform and what activities constitute a violation of Section 463.014,Florida Statutes. Of specific relevance to the issues herein are: (15)(b) Entering into any agreement (whether written or oral) which allows, permits or facilitates an entity which itself is not a licensed practitioner to practice optometry, to offer optometric services to the public, or to control through any means whatever any aspect of the practice of optometry. Allowing, permitting, encouraging, forbearing, or condoning any advertisement including those placed in a newspaper, magazine, brochure, flier, telephone directory, or on television or radio, which implies or suggests that the licensed practitioner is professionally associated or affiliated with an entity which itself is not a licensed practitioner. Occupying or otherwise using professional office space in any manner which does not clearly and sufficiently indicate to the public that his/her practice of optometry is independent of and not associated with an entity which itself is not a licensed practitioner. , (I), and(j), [which all refer with specificity to some action which relates to the practice of optometry by a licensed practitioner with an entity which itself is not a licensed licensed practitioner.] This rule has been challenged in the courts and determined to be a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Petitioner claims that pronouncements by the Board of Optometry since the passage of the relevant statute and the promulgation of the relevant rule, including a Declaratory Statement by the Board in response to a Petition therefore by Phillip R. Sidran, O.D. in 1991, found at 13 FALR 4804; and in discussion of members at various meetings of the Board’s Probable Cause Panel; all indicate that the Board has formulated a policy regarding the instant issue which is neither a statute nor a properly promulgated rule. In 1991, Dr. Sidran, a licensed optometrist, sought a declaratory statement from the Board regarding the propriety of having a licensed optician share the revenues and responsibilities deriving from the optical portion of his practice. In its Declaratory Statement, issued on October 9, 1991, the Board specifically referred to and quoted the controlling portions of the statute and the rule which it then interpreted as indicating such an arrangement was prohibited. At no time did the Board promulgate new guidelines or expand the strictures imposed by the existing statute and rule. It applied an existing statute and rule to the factual situation posed by Dr. Sidran and concluded that under the facts of that case, the existing statute and rule prohibited the proposed relationship. The subsequent discussion of that opinion at the meeting of the Board’s Probable Cause Panel, convened on January 29, 1992, to consider proposed disciplinary action against Dr. Weber for the situation described here with 20/49, again interpreted existing statute and rule but did not formulate policy. Petitioner further refers to two additional meetings of the Board of Optometry at its meetings on July 8, 1993 and September 12, 1996, at both of which the members present discussed the situation regarding Dr. Weber’s business relationship in 29/49. He claims that in both situations, the Board members made policy statements which should have been formalized through the promulgation of a rule amendment or supplement. Review of the transcripts of those meeting does not support Dr. Weber’s position, however. It is clear that in each case the Board members examined the facts presented to them, applied the existing statutory and rule provisions to those facts, and concluded that the Petitioner’s actions constituted a violation of existing law. The Board’s position vis a vis Dr. Weber’s business arrangement was made a part of the Board’s counter-proposal to the stipulation of settlement initially agreed to by Dr. Weber and the Department’s counsel. In it’s counter-stipulation, which came out of the September 12, 1996 Board meeting, the Board required Dr. Weber to “... change his corporate structure so he is no longer in violation of Section 463.014(1)(b), Florida Statues, and that [his] practice be changed so that he is no longer practicing with a lay person.”
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner sat for the optometry licensure examination administered by the State of Florida in September, 1989. The examination included a clinical portion, consisting of three components: Section 1; Section 2; and a refraction exercise. The maximum number of points Petitioner could have earned on each these three parts of the examination was as follows: Section 1- 28 points; Section 2- 52 points; and refraction exercise- 20 points. Petitioner needed a combined total of 80 points on these three parts of the examination to pass the clinical portion of the examination. He received a combined total of 78 points: 28 points for Section 1; 30 points for Section 2; and 20 points for the refraction exercise. On Section 2 of the clinical portion of the examination, Petitioner was required to perform the following 15 routine optometric procedures, with each procedure worth the number of points indicated: Demonstrate equator- 5 points; Demonstrate posterior pole- 5 points; Scan vessel- 5 points; Demonstrate a parallelpiped focusing on the endothelium- 4 points; Estimate anterior chamber depth- 2 points; Demonstrate technique to determine cell and flare- 2 points; Demonstrate optic section of crystalline lens- 2 points; Demonstrate crystalline lens retroillumination- 2 points; Demonstrate anterior vitreous- 4 points; Focus on optic disc and estimate C/D ratio- 2 points; Demonstrate AV crossing and estimate AV ratio- 3 points; Determine foveal reflex- 3 points; Demonstrate accurate measurement of intraocular pressure- 5 points; Demonstrate nasal angle and describe structures- 4 points; and Estimate pigment deposition- 4 points. Petitioner's attempted performance of these routine procedures was independently observed 1/ and graded, on a pass/fail basis, by two qualified examiners, each of whom had been given detailed instructions regarding their responsibilities prior to the administration of the examination. The examiners had been instructed to use a standard of minimal competency in deciding whether to give a candidate a passing or failing grade. Their determination as to whether Petitioner had met this standard with respect to a particular procedure was necessarily a subjective process which required them to exercise their professional judgment. Petitioner received full credit for a procedure if both examiners gave him a passing grade (P). He received no credit for a procedure if both examiners gave him a failing grade (F). Where one examiner gave him a passing grade and the other examiner gave him a failing grade, Petitioner received half credit for the procedure. The following are the individual grades that were given Petitioner for each of the 15 procedures he attempted to perform: Examiner 40 Examiner 54 Procedure 1 F F Procedure 2 P P Procedure 3 F F Procedure 4 P F Procedure 5 P P Procedure 6 P F Procedure 7 P P Procedure 8 F F Procedure 9 P P Procedure 10 P P Procedure 11 P P Procedure 12 P P Procedure 13 F F Procedure 14 F P Procedure 15 P P As they had been instructed to do, if they gave Petitioner a failing grade or a borderline passing grade, Examiners 40 and 54 provided written comments regarding the grade on the grade sheets they filled out. The passing grades that, in the view of the Examiner 40, warranted such comments were those given for Procedures 6, 10 and 15. Examiner 54 believed that the passing grades he gave for Procedures 2, 7, 11 and 14 deserved such comments. With respect to the failing grade he gave Petitioner for Procedure 1, Examiner 40 commented on his grade sheet, "never got view." Examiner 54's comment for this procedure was, "very poor focus." Petitioner was initially provided with a binocular instrument that, due to his inability to fuse, he was unable to use to perform Procedure 1. He so advised the two examiners, who obtained another instrument for him to use. After testing the instrument, Petitioner was asked by the examiners if it was better. Petitioner responded in the affirmative, but indicated to them that it still was not ideal. He thereafter attempted to perform the procedure and asked the examiners to grade him. Procedure 4 is performed with a slit lamp. When the candidate has performed the procedure and he is ready to be graded, he so informs the first examiner, who thereupon looks through the oculars to ascertain whether the candidate has demonstrated a parallelpiped focusing on the endothelium of the cornea of the patient's eye. After the first examiner has completed his evaluation and the candidate indicates that he is ready to be graded again, the second examiner takes the oculars to make his determination as to whether the candidate has properly performed the procedure. The candidate is responsible for holding the focus throughout the procedure. If he does not hold the focus, one examiner may see a properly performed parallelpiped, while the other may not and therefore justifiably give the candidate a failing grade. As noted above, Petitioner received a passing grade from Examiner 40 and a failing grade from Examiner 54 for Procedure 4. The comment, "specular reflection,'1 appears on Examiner 54's grade sheet next to the failing grade he gave for this procedure. This comment suggests that, unlike Examiner 40, Examiner 54 was unable to observe a parallelpiped focused on the endothelium because the reflection of light off the cornea interfered with his view. Apparently, during the time between the examiners' observations, there had been a change in focus that resulted in Examiner 40 seeing one thing and Examiner 54 seeing another. In giving Petitioner a failing grade for Procedure 14, Examiner 40 commented on his grade sheet, "never got stable view." Examiner 54, while he gave Petitioner a passing grade for this procedure, made the comment on his grade sheet regarding this procedure that Petitioner achieved a "very borderline focus." Furthermore, Examiner 54's grade was based upon an observation that was not made at the same time as the observation upon which Examiner 40's grade was based.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board of Optometry reject Petitioner's challenge to the failing score he received on the clinical portion of Part II of the September, 1989 optometry licensure examination. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 24th day of August, 1990. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 1990.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Petitioner's document filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on January 8, 1992, which was initially construed to be a petition challenging an existing rule, and which was assigned to the undersigned on January 16, 1992, should be dismissed as argued in the motion to dismiss filed by the Respondent on January 28, 1992.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a second year medical student currently enrolled at the University of South Florida, College of Medicine, in Tampa, Florida. Petitioner is a licensed optometrist in the State of Florida and graduated valedictorian from the University of Houston, College of Optometry in May, 1990. In Florida, the Board of Optometry (Board) retains licensed optometrists who write the questions for the licensing examination administered by the Board. In some instances, the same examination drafters are retained by the Board to administer the practical portions of the examination. Thus, the drafter of the questions may proctor the examination given to examinees. Further, in some instances, the examination drafters have working in their employ unlicensed optometrists or optometry students who receive training from such employer. When that occurs, the unlicensed employee may receive assistance from the employer not available to others who would seek licensure by examination. This appearance of assistance or potential assistance is created because the drafter of the examination is also the grader and employer of the unlicensed person who must be tested for licensure. It is the Petitioner's position that licensed optometrists who provide both the content of the written test and administer the practical portions of the examination for licensure should not also serve as mentor or employer of those seeking licensure by the same examination. Petitioner has not cited an existing rule that regulates the activities described. Rule 21Q-4.006, Florida Administrative Code, adopts by reference Rule 21-11.014, Florida Administrative Code, as the rule governing examination security and monitoring for the Board. That rule provides, in pertinent part: Any individual found by the Department or any board within the Department to have engaged in conduct which subverts or attempts to subvert the examination process may have his or her scores on the examination withheld and/or declared invalid, be disqualified from the practice of the profession, and/or be subject to the imposition of other appropriate sanctions by the Department or, if administered by a board within the Department, by the applicable board. Conduct which subverts or attempts to subvert the examination process includes: Conduct which violates the security of the examination materials. . . Petitioner has not alleged that anyone violated the foregoing rule. Rather, Petitioner maintains that allowing the activities described above to continue gives the appearance of impropriety or increases the potential for impropriety.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, respondent Patrick Gallagher was a licensed optician in Florida, having been issued license number D00001006. From approximately March of 1979 until December of 1981, except for the months of June and July, 1981, respondent was employed as a licensed optician for Union Optical in Tampa, Florida. Prior to May, 1981, respondent worked full time. When he returned to Union Optical in late July or August, 1981, he worked only three days a week. Another optician, Bobby Prohenza, was employed at Union Optical on a part-time basis in June and July of 1981. Rose Ochs, the manager and/or supervisor of Union Optical in Tampa is not now, and has never been, licensed as an optician in the State of Florida. Having received a complaint from Bobbie Prohenza against Union Optical and Rose Ochs, petitioner's investigator, Wayne Lopez, went to Union Optical on December 3, 1981, to investigate unlicensed opticianry activities. The only employee on the premises was Rose Ochs. While on the premises, Mr. Lopez observed Ms. Ochs handing a glasses case and glasses to a customer. Investigator Lopez, identifying himself to Ms. Ochs as a long , distance truck driver asked her if she could duplicate his existing prescription "glasses"" into "sunglasses." When Ms. Ochs refused to do so without a written prescription, Lopez told her he would obtain one. The investigator obtained a duplicate prescription from his personal physician and returned to Union Optical a few hours later. He handed the written prescription to Ms. Ochs and she took his eyeglasses and put them on a lensometer to see if the two prescriptions were the same. Mr. Lopez and Ms. Ochs then sat at a table across from one another and she began taking measurements with a small ruler across the bridge of his nose. She then wrote some numbers on a piece of paper and attached that paper to the prescription. Investigator Lopez, attempted to leave a deposit with Ms. Ochs, but was told he could pay for the glasses when he returned some weeks later. When Mr. Lopez departed from the Union Optical premises, he observed a Florida opticianry license hanging over the entrance door, which license was issued to respondent Patrick Gallagher. After learning of respondent's address, Mr. Lopez went to respondent's residence on December 3rd, identified himself as an investigator with the Department of Professional Regulation and told respondent that he wanted to discuss with him the operation of Union Optical. Respondent worked at Union Optical 24 hours a week on Mondays, Tuesdays and Fridays. While he knew the store was open on his days off, respondent had been assured that opticianry work would not be performed on those days. It was the respondent's understanding that when he was not on the premises, the only business which would be transacted was the selling of non-prescription items, glass care items and cleaning solutions. Respondent was aware that Rose Ochs would receive written prescriptions in his absence and would, on occasion, transfer or copy the prescriptions onto an invoice which went to an independent laboratory. He was also aware that Ms. Ochs occasionally assisted customers in the selection of a frame for their lenses and quoted prices to customers in his absence. Respondent did not suspect that Ms. Ochs took pupillary distance measurements or used the lensometer when he was not on the premises. He does not believe that Ms. Ochs has sufficient knowledge or experience to properly operate the lensometer. Respondent was not present at Union Optical on December 3, 1981, when Investigator Lopez was on the premises. When Mr. Lopez described to him the events which had transpired at Union Optical on that date, some one-half hour after their occurrence, respondent was surprised to hear that Ms. Ochs had performed the functions of operating the lensometer and taking pupillary distances. Respondent had no managerial control over the premises of Union Optical or Rose Ochs.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint charging respondent with a violation of Section 484.014(1)(n), Florida Statutes, be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 16th day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry Frances Carter, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul W. Lambert, Esquire Slepin, Slepin, Lambert & Waas 1115 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Fred Varn Executive Director Board of Opticianry Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Lamar Advertising Company was issued permits numbered AH998-10 and AH999-10 on or about October 11, 1982. These permits were for the erection of a sign on the north side of I-10 approximately 1.78 miles west of U.S. 29 in Escambia County, Florida. They were issued because of the existence of an auto paint and body shop within 800 feet of the proposed sign location. When Lamar Advertising Company submitted the applications for the subject permits it designated thereon that the proposed location was within 800 feet of a business. These applications also certified that the signs to be erected would meet all of the requirements of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. In February of 1984, Lamar Advertising Company was advised that the subject permits were being revoked because of the absence of any visible commercial activity at the permitted location. Subsequently, Lamar Advertising Company requested an administrative hearing pursuant to this notice. Effective on June 30, 1984, Lamar Advertising Company assigned the subject permits to the Respondent. By letter dated September 25, 1984, the Department advised Lamar that the subject permits had been transferred to the Respondent subject to pending litigation. Prior to the issuance of the subject permits to Lamar Advertising Company, the site was inspected by the Department's outdoor advertising inspector, who is presently employed by the Respondent. Before this field inspection the inspector had been informed that a paint and body shop was located in the area, and this business was shown on a sketch submitted with the Lamar applications. When the inspector viewed the site from the interstate, she observed an area where several cars were parked and also saw someone working on a car. She measured the distance from the area where the parked cars were, to the proposed sign site, with her car odometer. No other measurements were made at this time. The inspector made no inquiry of anyone at this location regarding whether or not an automobile paint and body business was actually being conducted there. Nevertheless, she approved the subject permit applications based upon the existence of such a business. Willie James Pritchett who resides at the site of the subject automotive business, is employed by Pensacola Paint & Body, but he does conduct a business known as "Willie's Paint and Body" at this location. Mr. Pritchett's business is such that he works on cars in the back yard of his residence a couple of hours in the evening after work and on the weekends. A detached three stall garage is located behind Mr. Pritchett's residence. The business does not have a telephone listing separate from the residence, and all bookkeeping is conducted at the Pritchett home. Before the Department's inspector became employed by the Respondent, she arranged with Mr. Pritchett for the erection of a small on-premise sign, visible from I-10, advertising Willie's Paint and Body Shop. The phone number listed on this sign is the number of the Pritchett residence. The sign was furnished to Mr. Pritchett by the Respondent, and was erected around the first of February, 1985. If one were looking at the right spot, the Pritchett property is visible from I-10, but is almost completely obstructed by trees. The immediate area is residential in nature. There is nothing about the Pritchett property that would indicate to a traveler on I-10 that anything other than a residence is located at this site, even if the traveler were to see the entire property from the interstate. Mr. Pritchett produced occupational licenses for the periods October, 1977 - September, 1980, and October, 1983 through September, 1985. He testified that "the times I didn't have the license I wasn't in business". Consequently, in the month of October, 1982, when the subject permits were issued, Mr. Pritchett was not conducting an automotive paint and body business. The Department's present outdoor advertising inspector made several measurements at this location with the standard roller tape used by the State. The distance as measured along the pavement of I-10 from the location of Willie's Paint and Body Shop to the closest point at which the Respondent could locate its sign is either 890 feet or 920 feet or 940 feet, depending on how the distance is measured. The Respondent contends that the distance is 781 feet, but the measurements made by the Department's present inspector are accorded the greater weight because of the verification procedures utilized by him.
