The Issue Did the Department of Transportation (Department) improperly deny a refund to Petitioner of a penalty assessed pursuant to Chapter 316, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Department is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility of enforcing the provisions of Chapter 316, Florida Statutes. On June 7, 1999, the Department's Inspector Clemente Igracio stopped Petitioner's truck for an inspection. After inspecting Petitioner's truck, Inspector Igracio issued a Safety Report Citation numbered 0862152 wherein Petitioner was cited for the alleged violations of Sections 316.515(1) and (3) and 316.550, Florida Statutes. The total fine imposed was $1,600.00 which included a fine of $1,250.00 for the alleged violation of Section 316.515(3), Florida Statutes. However, since the maximum fine imposed for a Section 316.515(3), Florida Statutes, violation is $1,000.00, the total fine imposed was $1,350.00, which Petitioner paid. Subsequently, due to mitigating circumstances, the Department refunded Petitioner the $100.00 that it had paid for the alleged violation of Section 316.550, Florida Statutes. Petitioner does not protest the Section 316.515(1), Florida Statutes violation nor does it protest the Section 316.550, Florida Statutes violation. Petitioner stipulated that the combined length of the truck and trailer was 65 feet, 9 inches. Petitioner also stipulated that the length of the trailer was 42 feet, 10 inches. Inspector Igracio categorized the truck as a "straight- truck" because it had two axles and load-carrying capacity on the power unit. The vehicle in question is a two-axle vehicle with the cargo unit and motive power unit located on the same frame so as to form a single, rigid unit. The subject vehicle and trailer combination was 65 feet, 9 inches in overall length. The subject trailer was 42 feet, 10 inches in length. Petitioner did not have a permit to be over the legal length.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order denying the refund sought by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter Byra West Coast Towing 124 South Berkley Road Auburndale, Florida 32823 Kelly A. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue Whether two policy statements issued by Respondent, TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18, are unadopted rules, as defined in section 120.52(20), Florida Statutes, that violate section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes.3/
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is a co-trustee of the Sparkhill Trust (the "Trust"), which was created in July 2009. Opinicus Sentinel, LLC ("Opinicus Sentinel") currently is a co-trustee of the Trust, and has been a trustee of the Trust since its creation. Barbara Williams is the manager of Opinicus Sentinel, and has served in that capacity since its creation.8/ Petitioner was appointed as a trustee of the Trust on October 11, 2016.9/ The Trust owns a 2001 Porsche 996/911 Turbo motor vehicle (hereinafter, "Vehicle"). Solely for purposes of this proceeding,10/ the Vehicle Identification Number ("VIN") of the Vehicle is WP0ZZZ99Z1S682830, as alleged in the Amended Petition. As of the final hearing, the Vehicle was located in Germany. During all times relevant to this proceeding, the Vehicle was located in a foreign country. Respondent is the state agency responsible for, among other things, implementing and administering chapter 319, Florida Statutes, governing the issuance of certificates of title for motor vehicles. See § 319.17, Fla. Stat. Background and Events Giving Rise to This Proceeding On or about September 30, 2014, Opinicus Sentinel——at that time, the sole trustee of the Trust——submitted an application consisting of completed Form 8204011/ and supporting documentation to the Lee County Tax Collector ("Tax Collector")12/ on behalf of the Trust, requesting issuance of a certificate of title for the Vehicle in the name of the Trust. The application included a letter from a motor vehicle dealer in London, Ontario, Canada, stating that the dealer had inspected the Vehicle and that the Vehicle's VIN is WP0ZZZ99Z1S682830. On or about October 22, 2014, the Tax Collector sent a letter to Ms. Williams, as manager of Opinicus Sentinel, stating that the application for certificate of title could not be processed "because all used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country must have the Vehicle Identification Number verified by a Division of Motorist Services Compliance Examiner." When asked for further explanation, the Tax Collector responded by electronic mail ("email"): The Lee County Tax Collector is a Constitutional Office that provides the services of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV). As such, we are bound by both statutory and department procedural guidance. Procedures often are entitled Technical Advisories. The technical advisory relied upon by this office indicates that all used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country must have the VIN verified by a Division of Motorist Services Compliance Examiner as referenced in TL-10 in effect on the date the correspondence was drafted. Email from Tax Collector to Barbara Williams, dated October 27, 2014 (emphasis added). This email directed Ms. Williams to contact Respondent if the trustee wished to challenge the denial of the application for certificate of title for the Vehicle. On November 3, 2014, Ms. Williams contacted Respondent, asserting that the Tax Collector's denial of the application for a certificate of title violated section 319.23(3)(a)2, Florida Statutes. Also on that date, Ms. Williams filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing with Respondent on behalf of Opinicus Sentinel, challenging TL-10 as an invalid and unadopted rule pursuant to section 120.56(4).13/ On November 24, 2014, Respondent sent a letter to Ms. Williams, refusing to issue the requested certificate of title. The letter stated: After researching the issue identified in your letter, the Department stands by the decision made by . . . [the Lee County Tax Collector]. Section 319.23(a)(2), Florida Statutes, states that, '[a]n appropriate departmental form evidencing that a physical examination has been made of the motor vehicle by the owner and by a duly constituted law enforcement officer in any state, a licensed motor vehicle dealer, a license inspector as provided by s. 320.58, or a notary public commissioned by this state and that the vehicle identification number shown on such form is identical to the vehicle identification number shown on the motor vehicle. Letter from Respondent to Barbara Williams, dated November 24, 2014 (emphasis added). The letter further stated: However, section 319.23(11), Florida Statutes, states that, '[t]he Department shall use security procedures, processes, and materials in the preparation and issuance of each certificate of title to prohibit to the extent possible a person's ability to alter, counterfeit, duplicate, or modify the certificate of title.' In the case at bar, the Department is choosing to implement the language found in 319.23(11) to ensure that the certificate of title is issued correctly. The Department has the authority to require VIN verifications on vehicles entering the state of Florida from a foreign country before a title can be issued. In subsequent correspondence to Ms. Williams, dated December 18, 2014, Respondent stated: I can only again point you to s. 319.23(11). Since April of 2000 the Department's policy is to require all used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country to have the VIN verified by a Motor Vehicle Field Office Compliance Examiner prior to being titled. * * * I have included a copy of the Department's Technical Advisory, TL 14-18, which explains the Department's policy in depth.[14/] On December 18, 2014, Respondent referred Opinicus Sentinel's Petition for Administrative Hearing to DOAH. The case was assigned DOAH Case No. 14-6005. On March 3, 2015, Opinicus Sentinel withdrew the petition, and the DOAH case file for Case No. 14-6005 was closed. Notwithstanding that Case No. 14-6005 was pending at DOAH, on February 25, 2015, Respondent sent Ms. Williams a letter dismissing the previously-filed petition for administrative hearing with leave to file an amended petition. The letter also asserted an additional basis15/ for Respondent's denial of the certificate of title for the Vehicle, specifically: Because the vehicle to be titled is not currently in Florida, clearly the vehicle will not be operated on the roads of Florida. Accordingly, the vehicle cannot be registered in Florida and the titling provisions of Chapter 319, Fla. Stat., do not apply. Therefore, the application for title you submitted to the Lee County Tax Collector pursuant to section 319.23, Fla. Stat. will not be approved. While DOAH Case No. 14-6005 was pending, Stephen J. Williams, as beneficiary of the Trust, filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing challenging both TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as unadopted and invalid rules pursuant to section 120.56(4). That case was assigned DOAH Case No. 15-0484 and ultimately was dismissed by Final Order dated March 25, 2015.16/ As previously noted, on October 11, 2016, Petitioner was appointed as a co-trustee of the Trust. On October 17, 2016, Petitioner, as a trustee of the Trust, initiated this proceeding by filing a Petition for Administrative Hearing, again challenging both TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as unadopted and invalid rules. As noted above, the scope of this proceeding subsequently was narrowed to eliminate the challenge to the substantive invalidity of TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18, so that the sole issue in this proceeding is whether TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 are unadopted rules that violate section 120.54(1)(a). The Challenged Statements: TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 TL-10, identified by the Tax Collector as the original basis for denial of issuance of the certification of title for the Vehicle, went into effect on April 30, 2014. The portion of TL-10 pertinent to this proceeding states: IV. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION * * * B. Vehicle identification number (VIN) verifications are to be completed by the applicant. * * * 2. VIN verification may be done by one of the following: * * * c. Florida Division of Motorist Services (DMS) Compliance Examiner, DMS or tax collector employees. * * * NOTE: All USED vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country, including dealer transactions, MUST have the VIN verified by a DMS Compliance Examiner. Technical Advisory RS/TL 14-18 is titled "Motor Vehicles Coming Into Florida from a Foreign Country." It states in pertinent part: All used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country (including dealer transactions) must have the vehicle identification number verified by a Motor Vehicle Field Office Compliance Examiner prior to being titled. * * * The Regional Motor Vehicle Field Office staff will perform an inspection of the vehicle that includes verification of the public VIN, confidential VIN or secondary VIN, manufacturer’s label or letterhead letter that states compliance with US vehicle standards, computer checks of NMVTIS/NICB data-bases, and a review of documentation showing vehicle clearance through US Customs (if applicable). Copies of these documents, including a copy of the completed form HSMV 84044, will be maintained in the regional office. The VIN verification will be completed by the compliance examiner on a form HSMV 84044, in lieu of a form HSMV 82040 or HSMV 82042. The compliance examiner will give the customer the original required documentation (including the original complete form HSMV 84044). The customer must submit all documentation to a tax collector’s office or license plate agency in order for him/her to apply for a Florida Certificate of Title. The undisputed evidence establishes that neither TL-10 nor RS/TL 14-18 have been adopted as rules pursuant to the procedures prescribed in section 120.54. Respondent did not present any evidence showing that rulemaking was not practicable or feasible. Respondent's Position Respondent admitted, in its Amended Responses to Requests to Admissions served on Petitioner on November 21, 2016, that TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 are intended to be, and are, of general application; that TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy and/or describe the procedure or practice requirements of Respondent; and that TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 have not been, and are not published in the Florida Administrative Code. Additionally, Respondent acknowledges that neither TL-10 nor RS/TL 14-18 have been adopted as rules. Respondent takes the position that Petitioner lacks standing to challenge TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as unadopted rules. Specifically, Respondent asserts that Petitioner has not suffered a "real or immediate injury in fact" for purposes of having standing because although the Tax Collector and Respondent referred the Trust to TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as grounds for denial of the certificate of title, they were not the "ultimate grounds" on which the Trust was denied a certificate of title. On this basis, Respondent asserts that it did not apply TL-10 or RS/TL 14-18 to Petitioner, so Petitioner did not suffer injury as a result of application of these statements. Respondent further asserts that because Petitioner cannot meet the requirements in section 319.23 to be entitled to issuance of a certificate of title for the Vehicle, Petitioner's claimed injury in this proceeding is speculative and hypothetical. To this point, Respondent argues that Petitioner's alleged injury in this proceeding is speculative because the Trust has not satisfied the requirements of section 319.23 for purposes of being entitled to issuance of a certificate of title. Specifically, Respondent argues that because the Vehicle is not physically present in the state of Florida, it is not being operated on the roads of Florida, and because it is not being operated on the roads of Florida, it is not required to be registered or to obtain a certificate of title——and, indeed, cannot be registered and a certificate of title issued until it is physically present in Florida. Accordingly, Respondent reasons, until the Vehicle is physically present in Florida and thus subject to registration and licensure requirements, TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 were not, and cannot be, applied to determine whether the certificate of title for the Vehicle should be issued. Also on this point, Respondent argues that Petitioner's alleged injury is speculative because Petitioner did not meet the requirement in section 319.23 that a physical examination of the Vehicle be made by the owner and a motor vehicle dealer licensed in the state of Florida. Respondent further asserts that Petitioner's alleged interest does not fall within the zone of interest of this proceeding. Specifically, Respondent argues that because the Vehicle is located in a foreign country, Petitioner is unable to establish that the Vehicle must be registered and a certificate of title issued in Florida. Respondent concludes: Because Petitioner cannot meet the burden of establishing that the motor vehicle in question is required to be licensed and registered in Florida, and because he failed to satisfy the application requirements of section 319.23(3)(a)(2), he cannot meet the burden of establishing that any interest in obtaining a certificate of title for the vehicle in question is within the 'zone of interests' to be protected and regulated.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the administrative complaint; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: At all times material to the allegations of the administrative complaint, Respondent has been certified by the Commission as a law enforcement officer, certificate No. 02- 34512. In April, 1987, Respondent was employed by the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) in Dade County, Florida. On the morning of April 9, 1987, at approximately 7:00 a.m., while dressed in his FHP uniform, Respondent went to the home of his girl friend, Connie Hawkins. Unable to waken Ms. Hawkins by knocking at the door, Respondent went around to her bedroom, began to bang on the glass, and attempted to pry open the window. As a result, the window broke and Ms. Hawkins was awakened by the noise. Respondent then demanded that Ms. Hawkins open the door since he had cut his left arm on the broken window. When Ms. Hawkins opened the door, Respondent began to strike her about the face and arm. Apparently, Respondent was angry that Ms. Hawkins had not opened the door earlier and felt she had caused the injury to his arm. This injury, a two inch cut on the left arm, was bleeding rather badly. Respondent went to Ms. Hawkins' bathroom and wrapped a hand towel around the wound in order to apply pressure and stop the bleeding. Subsequently, Respondent left the Hawkins' home in his FHP vehicle. After she was sure Respondent was gone, Ms. Hawkins telephoned the Metro-Dade police to report the incident. She did not want to have the Respondent criminally prosecuted, but she did want to take measures to assure he would not attack her again. After giving a statement to the police, Ms. Hawkins went to an area hospital for examination and treatment of her swollen face and bruised arm. She was required to wear a sling on the injured arm for a couple of days. The Metro-Dade police notified the FHP that one of its employees, Respondent, had been named in connection with a domestic disturbance. The report of the incident was given to Lt. Miller, the FHP supervisor on duty the morning of April 9, 1987. Coincidentally, that same morning at approximately 7:30 am., Lt. Miller had observed a cut on Respondent's left arm and had ordered him to a hospital for stitches. According to the story Respondent gave Lt. Miller, the injury had been caused by the FHP car door when Respondent was entering it after a routine highway stop. A sharp piece of the window framing had allegedly snagged Respondent's arm causing the cut. According to the Respondent, the piece of metal framing may have fallen off the car since the area was later found to be smooth.- Following treatment for the cut, Respondent signed a Notice of Injury form which is required by the Division of Workers' Compensation for all work- related injuries. This form alleged the injury had been sustained as described in paragraph 8. Subsequently, an investigation conducted by the FHP raised questions regarding the incident with Ms. Hawkins and the "work-related" cut on Respondent's arm. Lt. Baker attempted to interview Respondent regarding this investigation. Respondent declined to be interviewed and resigned from the FHP. Later, Respondent obtained a job as a security officer with the Dade County School District. Prior to his resignation from the FHP, Respondent did not claim he had cut or injured both arms on the morning of April 9, 1987. Lt. Miller did not observe a cut on Respondent's right arm on April 9, 1987. Neither Lt. Miller nor Trooper Allen, a trained traffic homicide investigator, could discover any trace evidence on Respondent's FHP vehicle to substantiate Respondent's claim regarding the cut. There were no breaks in the metal or paint along Respondent's door in the area he identified as the point of injury. There were no rough or jagged edges. The Notice of Injury signed by Respondent contained information which was false or misleading.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Criminal Justice standards and Training Commission enter a final order revoking the certification for a law enforcement officer held by Respondent. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 19th day of January, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of January, 1989. APPENDIX RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Paragraphs 1-38 are accepted. Paragraph 39 is rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary to the findings made herein. Paragraph 40 is rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary to the findings made herein. Respondent's testimony and that of Mr. Black relating to the alleged wound to the right arm was not credible. Paragraph 41 is rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary to the findings made herein. See comment p. 3 above. Paragraph 42 is rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary to the findings made herein. See comment p. 3 above. RULINGS ON RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Paragraphs 1-5 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 6, to the extent that it relates Respondent's testimony it is correct, however, the fact it not. That is, it is found that Respondent injured his left arm at the Hawkins' home; consequently, Paragraph 6 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Respondent's account was not credible. Paragraph 7 is accepted to the extent that it relates the story given by Respondent; such story being deemed incredible and therefore, rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 8 is accepted to the extent that it relates the testimony of the troopers; however, the conclusion reached is speculative and unsupported by the record in this cause. Paragraph 9 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 10 is accepted; however the facts related in that form were false or misleading. Paragraph 11 is rejected as argument, or unsupported by the credible evidence in this cause. Paragraph 12 is rejected as argument, or unsupported by the credible evidence in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Denis Dean, Esquire Dean & Hartman, P.A. 10680 N. W. 25 Street Suite 200 Miami, Florida 33172 Daryl McLaughlin Executive Director Department of Law Enforcement P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice standards Training Commission P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether a recreational vehicle with a gross vehicle weight in excess of 10,000 pounds meets the definition of "commercial motor vehicle" under relevant Florida law when driven by an employee of a licensed recreational vehicle dealer, rather than by the ultimate consumer.
Findings Of Fact On January 22, 2001, the Department of Transportation (Department) issued a driver vehicle inspection report (No. FL6050069 - Citation Violation) to Karl A. Nessamar. At the time the report was issued Mr. Nessamar was driving a private motor coach owned by Leisure Tyme RV, Inc. (Leisure Tyme), on a state road. A private motor coach is a vehicle which does not exceed the length, width and height limitations of Section 316.515(9), Florida Statutes, and is built on a self-propelled, bus-type chassis having no fewer than three load-bearing axles and being primarily designed to provide temporary living quarters for recreational, camping or travel use. See Section 320.01(b)(5), Florida Statutes. Leisure Tyme is a recreational vehicle dealer as defined in Section 320.822(i), Florida Statutes. The recreational vehicle Mr. Nessamar was operating did not have a U.S. Department of Transportation number on display. When Mr. Nessamar was issued the inspection report he did not possess a Class B driver's license; had no driver's record of duty status (log book); and had no medical certificate in his possession. Further, Mr. Nessamar was operating the vehicle in the course of his employment for Leisure Tyme at the time the inspection report was issued. The gross vehicle weight rating of the subject recreational vehicle was 33,700 pounds. When the inspection report was issued, Mr. Nessamar was an employee of Leisure Tyme and was driving the vehicle from Tampa, Florida to Mary Esther, Florida. It was being returned to Mary Esther after having been displayed at the Florida RV "Super Show." This recreational vehicle was not carrying any cargo, passengers or hazardous materials at the time it was driven by Mr. Nessamar and when the citation or inspection report was issued. Because of the issuance of the vehicle inspection report the vehicle and Leisure Tyme were placed "out-of-service," which means that none of the vehicles in its ownership or operation can be driven until those vehicles and drivers meet all of the requirements of Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 390 through 395 and Chapter 322, Florida Statutes. The Department contends that whenever a recreational vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVW) exceeds 10,000, pounds and is driven by anyone other than the ultimate consumer or owner of that vehicle, it becomes a "commercial motor vehicle." It defines a commercial motor vehicle as any self- propelled or towed vehicle used on the public highways in commerce to transport passengers or cargo if such vehicle has a GVW of 10,000 pounds or more; is designed to transport more than 15 passengers including the driver; or is used in the transportation of materials found to be hazardous for the purposes of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, as amended (49 USC subsections 1801 et. seq.). See Section 316.003(66), Florida Statutes (2000). There is no question, however, that the vehicle at issue meets the definition of a "private motor coach" because it has three load-bearing axles, a self-propelled bus type chassis, is primarily designed to provide temporary living quarters for recreational camping and travel use and does not exceed the length, width and height limitations provided in Section 316.515(9), Florida Statutes. If indeed the vehicle in question is deemed to be a commercial vehicle, the driver, vehicle and owner become subject to many restrictions and regulations that do not apply to non- commercial motor vehicles. This is because the Legislature has adopted many of the federal regulations pertaining to commercial motor vehicles in Section 316.302(1)(b), Florida Statutes, specifically, 49 C.F.R. Parts 382, 385 and 390 through 397, with the exception of 49 C.F.R. Section 390.5. Thus, the pivotal question to determine concerning whether the cited violation is correct, is whether the vehicle in question is a commercial motor vehicle and, as related thereto, whether it is a recreational vehicle.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was certified as a law enforcement officer by the CJSTC. On March 29, 1987, He was employed by the City of Clearwater in the uniform patrol division. Respondent graduated from the police academy in 1985, and served one and one-half years with the Belleair Police Department before being hired by the Clearwater Police Department. On the morning of March 29, 1987, while on patrol in a City of Clearwater police car, Respondent drove into the driveway of Lisa Scholl, a young woman occupying that residence. Ms. Scholl heard the engine of a car running in her driveway and came out of the house to inquire why the police car was there. At about the same time, Respondent received a call to investigate a complaint. He told Ms. Scholl he had stopped because her front door was open and that he had to leave to answer the call received on his radio. As a matter of fact, Respondent, who was having marital problems at the time, was intending to ask Ms. Scholl for a date. Respondent had never met Ms. Scholl but had accompanied another police officer to Ms. Scholl's residence some months earlier and was aware of who she was and where she lived. Ms. Scholl surmised Respondent intended to ask her for a date before he received the call on his radio and departed. Shortly thereafter it started raining rather hard. Ms. Scholl glimpsed a man in a yellow slicker crossing the woods alongside her house and became concerned that some criminal activity was happening in her vicinity. She then walked into her bathroom where she saw the face of a man peering through the jaloused window of her bathroom. She screamed, and the man wearing a yellow raincoat ran through the woods toward a police car parked down from her house. Ms. Scholl then called her cousin to come over to her house and she called the police who sent an officer to investigate. During the course of the investigation, Ms. Scholl identified Respondent as the individual she initially spoke to while parked in her driveway and the man she observed peering through her bathroom window. When questioned, Respondent ultimately admitted that he had looked through the window to Ms. Scholl's bathroom but did so only for the purpose of seeing if there was another person in the house. Respondent acknowledged that he had done a stupid thing in looking through a window into Ms. Scholl's home, but contended that no immoral conduct was intended by this act and that his sole purpose was to attempt to learn if some other man was in the house with Ms. Scholl. Respondent's denial of any attempt at voyeurism is supported by Exhibit 2, a psychological evaluation of Respondent. This evaluation found Respondent to be psychologically competent in all respects; a conscientious, hard working individual with a high sense of responsibility and loyalty; with none of the criteria for voyeurism; and highly unlikely to be involved in similar situations in the future.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a Community Association Manager by Examination should be granted.
Findings Of Fact When Petitioner was 20 years old, he and a group of other young adults stole approximately $15 worth of chrome off of a car in a used car lot. Petitioner was arrested on November 11, 1983, by the Deland, Florida, Police Department. On February 1, 1984, Petitioner appeared in Volusia County Court and pled guilty to "Petit Theft" under Section 812.014(3)(a), Florida Statutes. This offense is a second degree misdemeanor punishable as provided in Sections 775.082 or 775.083, Florida Statutes. The court withheld adjudication of guilt, placed Petitioner on six months' probation and assessed Petitioner $75 in costs. Petitioner was again arrested on March 12, 1993, by the Daytona Beach Shores, Florida, Police Department. Petitioner was charged with "Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol." Section 316.193, Florida Statutes, does not equate "Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol" with either a felony or a misdemeanor until the fourth conviction. Petitioner appeared in Volusia County Court on May 11, 1993, and pled nolo contendere to the lesser charge of "reckless driving," under Section 316.192, Florida Statutes. Florida Department of Law Enforcement documents created at the time list this charge as a first degree misdemeanor. In actuality, the offense of "reckless driving" is grouped under the "State Uniform Traffic Control" statutory Chapter. Without specifying whether or not "reckless driving" constitutes a felony or misdemeanor, Subsection 316.192(2)(a) provides that upon a first conviction of reckless driving the offender shall be punished by imprisonment for a period of not more than 90 days or by a fine of not less than $25 nor more than $500, or by both. The court adjudicated Petitioner guilty of "reckless driving" and assessed $300 in fines and costs. Petitioner's sentence fits the statutory category of a "first conviction," so it is concluded that this was his first reckless driving offense. There also is no evidence of any other traffic offenses committed by Petitioner. The statutory trail of "reckless driving" runs through Sections 316.192, 322.291, 318.17, and 921.0012, and the undersigned has been unable to determine that a first offense under Section 316.192 constitutes either a misdemeanor or a felony. Sections 775.04 and 775.08(2), Florida Statutes, suggest that a first offense of "reckless driving" is neither a crime nor a misdemeanor. From this information, it is concluded that there is no affirmative proof that Petitioner was convicted of a first degree misdemeanor. It is further concluded that there is no presumption created by his plea of nolo contendere to the reckless driving charge that Petitioner lost his civil rights. On February 10, 1997, Petitioner submitted an application for licensure by examination to become a Community Association Manager. Prior to his application for licensure, Petitioner had been the subject of an investigation by the Respondent Department for the unlicensed practice of community association management. As a trusted maintenance man for the same employer for over nine years, Petitioner had been trusted with money, with purchasing supplies and with doing maintenance work. He had acquitted himself honestly and honorably. Petitioner and his employer believe that the investigation arose out of a complaint that Petitioner also was giving instructions to other maintenance personnel or advising tenants, which arguably constitutes an element of the practice of Community Association Managment. They believe that the complaint was made by a rival condominium owner and/or by a resident manager whom the employer terminated. The investigation has been abated pending the instant application licensure proceeding. The application submitted by Petitioner contained the following question regarding the applicant's criminal history: Have you ever been convicted or found guilty of a felony or misdemeanor, entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a felony or misdemeanor? Yes ( ) No ( ). This question applies to any violation of the laws of any state, territory, or country without regard to whether the matter is under appeal or you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, were paroled or pardoned. If you answer "NO" and it is later determined that the records have not been sealed or expunged, it will be considered that you knowingly provided inaccurate information on this application. Petitioner marked the space for "No," and submitted no history of his offenses and pleas with his application. On March 12, 1997, the Agency notified Petitioner that his application was deficient because the 1983 and 1993 arrests and case dispositions were not fully disclosed and documented on his application. He was given 60 days in which to submit the required information, which he did. On May 28, 1997, Respondent sent Petitioner its Intent to Deny Community Association Manager's Application for Licensure by Examination for failure to establish good moral character as required by Section 468.433, Florida Statutes. Petitioner explained that he thought the withholding of adjudication on the second degree misdemeanor guilty plea charge meant it was erased and need not be revealed. Although Petitioner conceded that no one told him adjudication was withheld on his 1993 reckless driving charge, he first testified that somehow he initially assumed that adjudication had been withheld. The remainder of his testimony, together with Petitioner's Exhibit 1, are construed to prove that, prior to Petitioner's completion and submission of his application for licensure in January of 1997, Petitioner had been informed that adjudication of guilt had not been withheld on his 1993 plea of nolo contendere to the charge of reckless driving, because the charge and conviction had shown up in a computer check when he tried to insure a new car prior to his professional licensure application. While testifying at formal hearing, Petitioner initially stated that he had not fully read the application question concerning any criminal record. Then, he represented that he had not fully comprehended it. Finally, he said he thought the 1993 conviction constituted a traffic offense and was not a misdemeanor. Based on the difficulty of determining the classification of the 1993 conviction, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner did not willfully withhold that information, and need not have disclosed it as the application question was drafted. The question is ambiguous in first requesting information about nolo contendere pleas to felonies or misdemeanors and then adding "violation of the laws" as an afterthought. Petitioner has not had any criminal charges or traffic offenses lodged against his record since 1993. Petitioner has never been the subject of any civil law suit involving fraud, dishonesty, misrepresentation, or concealment of material facts. Petitioner is highly respected by his direct supervisor and one of the owners of the buildings he maintains, both of whom testified to Petitioner's veracity, trustworthiness, and good moral character spanning 1988 through the date of formal hearing.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a Final Order permitting Petitioner to sit for the examination. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward D. Broyles, Executive Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Professions Regulatory Council of Community Association Managers Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Lynda Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 R. Michael Kennedy, Esquire Kennedy & Pyle 687 Beeville Road, Suite A South Daytona, Florida 32119 Thomas G. Thomas Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of gross immorality or an act involving moral turpitude or an immoral conduct because the State Attorney's Office filed a misdemeanor charge of possession of controlled substance, and Respondent entered and completed a pre-trial intervention program and the State Attorney nolle prosequi the criminal charge. The Board of Education is now prosecuting Respondent for possession of a controlled substance. In a possession of controlled substance charge, there shall be proof of two distinct elements. The Board of Education must prove that: (1) Respondent had knowledge of the presence of the controlled substance, and (2) Respondent had knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence in evidence deemed relevant and material, and the entire record complied herein, the following relevant and material facts are found: At all times material and pertinent hereto, Respondent, David J. Suldo, a state-certified teacher, had worked 21 years with the Osceola County School District and had been appointed Director and Coordinator of Human Relations Issues. Respondent was born and reared in Osceola County and, after attending college, returned to enter the school system. He and his wife own a five-acre homestead in Osceola County where they, along with their family, enjoyed a long and friendly relationship with many of his students and their parents in the small community of Sebring, Florida. He is currently employed by the Orange County School Board. Respondent holds a Florida Educator's Certificate No. 378761, covering the areas of Administration/Supervision and Psychology, which is valid through June 30, 2005. Currently, Respondent is employed as Dean of Sixth Grade at Westgate Middle School in the Orange County School District. Before the issue raised by the allegation in the case at bar, Respondent has never had a complaint filed against him. On the weekend of January 30, 1998, Respondent and his wife drove away in their jointly registered family car from a Seven-Eleven parking lot, in Sebring, Highlands County, Florida, and were stopped by Officer, Donald Minervino, for an expired tag. In response to the Officer's request to produce his diver's license, Respondent produced his Director of Student Services Osceola County School District identification card,1 explaining that he lost his driver's license a few days prior. Officer Minervino requested that Respondent and his wife exit the vehicle, which they did, and he requested permission to search the vehicle, which was granted. During his search, Officer Minervino found a small baggie containing a suspected controlled substance in the console of the vehicle. Officer Minervino found a small amount of illicit substance in a plastic bag and a broken pipe. Also found in the console was a St. Cloud High School, 1995-96, I.D. card of Scott Suldo, a tenth grader, who is Respondent's son. During his interrogation, Officer Minervino asked Respondent if he would like to make a statement regarding the suspected illicit substance in the baggie and the broken pipe. Respondent answered "NO," and made no statements regarding knowledge of the presence of the illicit substance or knowledge of the nature of the illicit substance recovered from the console of the family car. Officer Minervino observed two beer bottles, one of which was open, in the vehicle. Because of this traffic stop, vehicle search, interrogation of vehicle occupants, and observation of their movements and speech patterns, Officer Minervino concluded neither was intoxicated and no roadside sobriety tests were taken. The Officer issued Respondent two citations: (1) warning citation for the expired tag, and citation for having an open container (beer bottles) in the vehicle.2 Officer Minervino did not arrest Respondent on a charge of possession, but filed an Affidavit Prosecution Summary (APS) with the State Attorney's Office regarding the baggie of illicit substance and the broken pipe,3 in accord with the Osceola County Sheriff's Department's policy. On Monday following the January 30, 1998, traffic stop incident, Respondent met with Dr. Thomas L. McCarley, superintendent of the Osceola County School District, and they mulled over and discussed the situation. Dr. Thomas L. McCarley offered Respondent the opportunity to transfer to another school district pending the outcome of the ongoing investigation, specifically, the potential outcome regarding the content of the plastic bag, i.e. whether the State Attorney would or would not file criminal charges. Having considered his career opportunities, his family, and his lifetime residency in Sebring, Florida, Respondent opted to retire from the Osceola County School District and did so on or before February 13, 1998.4 Sebring, Florida, is a small community and community members of long standing know each other well. The community knew of Respondent's long association with and his position within the school system; they knew also of his traffic stop by the local police and the police finding illicit materials in Respondent's family car. The Sebring local newspaper ran, almost daily, updates and recounts of this incident over an extensive period. Respondent is of the opinion that the prolonged newspaper publicity created public pressure on the State Attorney's Office, who, months after the incident, filed misdemeanor criminal charges against Respondent. At some undetermined time before September 1998, the State Attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit, in and for Osceola County, Florida, filed a two-count misdemeanor criminal charge of Possession of Cannabis and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia against Respondent. On or about September 1, 1998, the State Attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit, in and for Osceola County, Florida, in open court filed nolle prosequi5 of the two-count misdemeanor criminal affidavit. Listed as "Exculpatory information received" was checked the statement: "Defendant completed pre- trial diversion program." Subsequent to September 1, 1998, the Orange County Superintendent of Public Schools asked Respondent to apply for employment with the Orange County School Board because there existed a need for someone with Respondent's particular expertise and training in "student issues." After completion of the Orange County School Board's application form, Respondent was interviewed by the Orange County School Board. During his interview, Respondent informed the Orange County School Board of the circumstances, from the initial traffic stop, retiring from Osceola County School District, the misdemeanor criminal charges filed against him, his retaining counsel, his entering and completing the pre-trial program, and his having taken several independent and successful drug tests since the incident to demonstrate that he was not a user of drugs. On August 5, 2002, the Orange County School Board offered Respondent a 196-day, 2000-2003 school year, professional Instructional Personnel contract of employment with the Orange County School System. Respondent accepted the Orange County School Board's offer and formally executed his employment contract on December 5, 2000. Mrs. Joy Suldo, wife of Respondent, took the vehicle in question to Circuit City for a stereo upgrade and repair then to Addison's Body Shop for minor repair work picking up the care on or about January 27, 1998. From the body shop, she took the car to the upholstery shop for a day and a one-half day. At these several service location, employees had access to the vehicle. Mrs. Suldo did not open or check the console when she returned the car home. Respondent's son also had access to the vehicle, along with his friend and fellow band members. Respondent recalled seeing several of them sitting together in the car listening to the enclosed sound car stereo. His son and his friends had unlimited access to the vehicle. Multiple accesses to the vehicle by persons other then Mr. Suldo created, not an inference of solo possession by Mr. Suldo, but rather created the burden of upon Petitioner to reinforce the inference of constructive possession by Mr. Suldo. There was no evidence was presented by Petitioner from which circumstantial constructive possession by Respondent could in inferred. At all times material to the case at bar, there was no teacher's labor union contract between teachers and the Osceola County School Board. Petitioner has offered no evidence to prove the allegation contained in its letter dated October 25, 2001, to wit: possession of a controlled substance.6 No evidence was offered to prove that Respondent knew of the illicit nature of the substance or that Respondent knew of the presence (in the vehicle) of the illicit substance. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to prove Respondent actually possessed or constructively possessed a controlled substance. Petitioner's substantial evidence failed to demonstrate that from the circumstances of this incident that Respondent is guilty of gross immorality or an act involving moral turpitude.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner of Education enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of January, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 2003.
Findings Of Fact William B. Barker, Jr., is certified as a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida employed by the Walton County Sheriff's Department and stationed at DeFuniak Springs, Florida. On or about 20 June 1981, Diana Marie Preston was driving her automobile west on Interstate Highway 10, in Walton County, Florida, on her way to her grandparents' home in Gulf Breeze, Florida. She had just completed the Law School Admissions Test in Tallahassee that morning and was on her way back home. Due to heavy rain in the area, she was driving carefully and was not exceeding the speed limit. At approximately 3 to 4 p.m., she was hailed by a police officer in a county police car. When she pulled over to the roadside at his request, the officer advised her she had been speeding and requested to see her driver's license. Since her license was in her purse which was in the trunk of her car, she had to get out of her car and open the trunk, at which time the officer noticed a pair of high-heeled shoes she had in there and asked her to take them out, indicating he had been looking at a pair like that for his wife. When Ms. Preston got her license out, the officer requested that she accompany him to his car, get in on the passenger side and close the passenger door. She complied, though she did not close the door completely. During this period, she noticed that though the officer was in uniform, he was not wearing either a name tag or a badge with a number on it. She does not recall whether he was wearing a pistol, but states there was a rifle in the vehicle on which he placed his hand several times while talking to her. The officer took Ms. Preston's driver's license and reached across her to the glove compartment for his ticket book, but at no time did he use his radio to call in either her driver's license number or her car tag number. Before writing out the ticket, the officer indicated he would not issue a ticket to her if she would put on her high heels (she had been driving barefoot) and let him try to guess her shoe size. He stated that for every size he was off in his guess, he would kiss her foot a certain number of times. Ms. Preston repeatedly refused, but because the officer was insistent and she felt she was in a difficult position due to the fact that she was alone on a lightly travelled (at the time) section of highway, she ultimately acquiesced. Though the officer had ample opportunity to see the shoe size when he examined the shoes, he guessed wrong on the size by several sizes. At this time, her left foot was in his lap, and he picked it up and kissed it several times. When he was finished, in the course of conversation, the officer asked her what she had been doing in Tallahassee. She told him she had been taking the LSAT, and his attitude changed immediately. He told her to go on with her trip, but cautioned her not to tell anyone what had happened, as he could get into trouble. Upon being released by the officer, Ms. Preston proceeded on to Gulf Breeze to the home of her grandparents, whom she told about the incident the following day. She did not report the incident to the police nor discuss it until several weeks later when she was contacted by two investigators who showed her a large photograph of individuals who, it was represented to her, were members of the Walton County Sheriff's Department. From this group, she identified the Respondent, Barker, and subsequently again identified him at the hearing as the officer in question, describing him as a heavyset man with a mustache and wearing tinted glasses. Respondent, upon graduation from high school, attended O. W. Junior College and then went on to the University of West Florida where he received his bachelor's degree in criminal justice. He unequivocally denies the allegations against him, stating he had never seen Ms. Preston until the day of the hearing at the hearing room. In fact, his shift was over, and he signed out just prior to 3 p.m. on 20 June 1981. In his opinion and that of his mother, the allegations against him are attributable to his stated position in a political dispute during which he sided against the incumbent sheriff for whom he was working. There is no evidence bearing on this issue other than the testimony of the Respondent and his mother.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in this Administrative Complaint. It is RECOMMENDED: That the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. ENTERED this 24th day of January, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Department of Administration 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 1983.
