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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs RAMONA LEE BOLDING, 00-003711PL (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Sep. 06, 2000 Number: 00-003711PL Latest Update: Jun. 15, 2001

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of unlawfully employing a felon in the conduct of the bail bond business, in violation of Sections 648.44(8)(b) and 648.45(3), Florida Statutes, and Rule 4-221.001, Florida Administrative Code. If so, an additional issue is what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been a licensed limited surety agent, holding license number A025071. At all material times, Respondent has been the president and owner of Dolly Bolding Bail Bonds, Inc. (Dolly Bolding), which is located at 108 South Armenia Avenue in Tampa. In July 1999, Carver Taitt visited the office of Dolly Bolding to obtain a bail bond for his son, who had been arrested on drug charges. The judge had set bond at $20,000, so the bail bond premium was $2000. Mr. Taitt spoke with Respondent and said that he did not have the entire $2000; he had only $1000. Respondent declined to extend Mr. Taitt credit for the $1000 balance. Mr. Taitt then offered $1500, and Respondent agreed to allow Mr. Taitt to owe Dolly Bolding the remaining $500. At this time, Mr. Taitt saw Frank Cueto, Sr., also known as “Paunch,” in the office of Dolly Bolding. Mr. Taitt also told Mr. Cueto that Mr. Taitt would pay the remaining $500. Mr. Taitt had obtained bonds in the past five years from Dolly Bolding. During this time, he had often seen Respondent and Mr. Cueto in the office, and Mr. Taitt was acquainted with both of them from these past purchases of bonds. Mr. Cueto contacted Mr. Taitt several times and asked him to pay the remaining $500. At one point, Mr. Cueto threatened that Dolly Bolding would revoke the bond if Mr. Taitt did not immediately pay the remaining $500, especially because he was about to take a trip whose cost would approximate the outstanding balance. Mr. Taitt paid the $500 on the day prior to his son’s court appearance. When he complained to Mr. Cueto that he should have trusted Mr. Taitt based on their past relationship, Mr. Cueto replied that money is money. Mr. Taitt’s son missed his court appearance, and the judge ordered the forfeiture of the bond. The judge later entered an order reinstating bail, but this order did not reinstate the obligation previously undertaken under the bond by Dolly Bonding or its principal. Consequently, Mr. Taitt telephoned Dolly Bonding and requested a reissuance of the bond. Told that Respondent was unavailable, Mr. Taitt spoke with Mr. Cueto. Mr. Cueto told Mr. Taitt that no surety company would agree to reissue the bond. In the meantime, the assistant public defender obtained an order from the judge for the administrative release of Mr. Taitt’s son. By this means, the jail released Mr. Taitt’s son immediately without posting any bond. The facts contained in paragraphs 4-8 above are derived from Mr. Taitt’s testimony. This constitutes some, but not all, of Mr. Taitt’s testimony. The Administrative Law Judge has not credited much of the remainder of the testimony, including, most significantly, Mr. Taitt’s testimony that Mr. Cueto was always in the office of Dolly Bolding and that he seemed to run the bonding business. Mr. Taitt was angered by Mr. Cueto’s involvement in this transaction. Much of his uncredited testimony lacked the detail of his credited testimony. As for the credited testimony, Respondent, who was not always present in the office, was not able to rebut the more-detailed portion of Mr. Taitt’s description of Mr. Cueto’s handling of the transaction. Mr. Cueto did not testify, although he is engaged to be married to Respondent and lives with her. However, Respondent’s testimony is credited over Mr. Taitt’s vague, conclusory testimony as to the business relationship between Respondent and Mr. Cueto. Thus, consistent with Respondent’s testimony, the Administrative Law Judge finds that Mr. Cueto has not exercised any dominion over Dolly Bolding or Respondent. Respondent is an articulate, intelligent individual, who is a college graduate. She makes all bonding decisions for Dolly Bolding. Mr. Cueto is not an employee, officer, or shareholder of Dolly Bolding, and Respondent is not an employee, officer, or shareholder in any company owned by Mr. Cueto. He maintains an office in the same building as Dolly Bolding’s office, and he is present in the Dolly Bolding office on a frequent basis. At least in the case of the bond for Mr. Taitt’s son, Mr. Cueto has involved himself to some extent in Respondent’s bonding business. It is entirely possible that Mr. Cueto’s involvement in this bonding transaction is isolated, as he may have been inclined to involve himself to an unusual degree in a bonding matter due to the number of years that Mr. Cueto has known Mr. Taitt. It is even more likely that Mr. Cueto’s involvement in this bonding transaction was without the knowledge of Respondent. Mr. Cueto is a felon. He was convicted in 1994 of unlawful engaging in the bail bond business and misleading advertising. Mr. Cueto was formerly a licensed limited surety agent, but Petitioner suspended his license sometime ago. Respondent was at all times aware of these aspects of Mr. Cueto's background. In November 1991, Petitioner commenced an administrative proceeding against Respondent, as a licensed limited surety agent, for allowing an unlicensed person to participate in the bail bond business. By Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order and Consent Order, both signed in April 1992, Respondent agreed, and was ordered, to pay an administrative fine of $2000.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance dismiss the Second Amended Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Commissioner of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Anoush A. Arakalian Division of Legal Services Department of Insurance 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Joseph R. Fritz Joseph R. Fritz, P.A. 4204 North Nebraska Avenue Tampa, Florida 33602

Florida Laws (8) 120.5757.111648.30648.44648.45775.082775.083775.084
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs FREDERICK WENDELL JOHNSON, 02-002258PL (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jun. 05, 2002 Number: 02-002258PL Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs. ADRIANA WINKLEMAN, 88-002588 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-002588 Latest Update: Feb. 24, 1989

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Adriana Winkelmann, d/b/a Adriana's Bail Bonds, Tampa, currently is licensed and eligible for licensure in this State as a Limited Surety Agent. On or about October 31, 1986, William L. Counts and his wife, Madie Counts, a/k/a Madie G. Clark, went to see the Respondent about getting Mr. Counts' first cousin, Clayton D. Counts, bailed out of jail. Cousin Clayton was charged with second degree murder, and bail was set on the second degree murder charge at $5000. Clayton Counts also had been charged with eight other counts involving sexual battery on a child and sexual activity with a child under his custodial authority. On October 2, 1986, Clayton Counts had posted $14,000 of bonds that had been set on the eight charges and had been released from jail. Adriana's Bail Bonds, acting as bail bondsman and as attorney-in-fact for the surety company, Accredited Surety And Casualty Company, Inc. (Accredited or the surety), was the surety on the $14,000 of bonds, and Scott Erickson, a friend of Clayton Counts, indemnified Accredited and put up collateral to secure the indemnification agreement. All but $150 of the premium on the $14,000 of bonds had been paid to Adriana's Bail Bonds; Clayton Counts' wife promised to pay the additional $150 at a later date. When Clayton Counts was re-arrested and charged with second degree murder and just an additional $5000 bond was set on the new charge, Erickson became fearful that Clayton Counts might skip the bonds, jeopardizing Erickson's collateral. He told the Respondent that he wanted to be taken off the bonds. At about this same time, on or about October 31, 1986, Mr. and Mrs. William L. Counts came in to Adriana's Bail Bonds, at Clayton Counts' request, to see about bailing out Clayton for the second time. Mr. and Mrs. Counts agreed with the Respondent to indemnify the surety on the total amount of all of the bonds, $19,000. They agreed to pay the $150 balance of the premium on the bonds put up on or about October 2, 1986, on the first set of charges, plus a $500 premium on the bond put up on or about October 31, 1986, on the second degree murder charge. The indemnity agreement was to indemnify the surety company for the entire $19,000 amount of the bonds in the event of a forfeiture, plus "all claim, demand, liability, cost, charge, counsel fee, expense, suit order, judgment, or adjudication" sustained or incurred by the surety company. As collateral to secure their indemnity agreement, Mr. and Mrs. Counts put up their mobile home, to which they gave the Respondent a power of attorney dated October 31, 1986, and an $8,000 mortgage on a lot worth approximately $8000. They also gave Adriana's Bail Bonds a $19,000 promissory note as collateral. On October 31, 1986, an employee of Adriana's Bail Bonds gave Mr. Counts a collateral receipt, signed by Mr. Counts and the employee, for the $19,000 promissory note, the indemnity agreement, the mortgage on the lot and the mobile home. The original was given to Mr. Counts and Adriana's Bail Bonds kept a copy. There was no evidence that the collateral receipt, or any other statement or affidavit, for this or any other collateral (other than Erickson's original collateral on the $14,000 of bonds on the first set of charges) ever was filed anywhere. Mr. Counts paid $500 by check dated November 14, 1986, for the premium on the $5000 second degree murder bond. In December 1986, Clayton Counts left the state and missed a court appearance on December 19, 1986. The $19,000 of bonds was estreated. In about January 1987, Mrs. Counts went to see the Respondent about substituting some other collateral for the mobile home. She was concerned about where she and her husband would live if the bonds were estreated and forfeited and the mobile home had to be sold to perform the indemnity agreement. She wanted to be able to move the mobile home somewhere else even in that event. After some discussion, it was agreed that the Respondent would accept $6000 cash as substitute collateral in place of the mobile home. Mrs. Counts promised to pay the $6000 in installments of approximately $500 a month. The Respondent repeatedly was able to have the court delay forfeiture of the bonds because she was able to demonstrate that she was trying to locate and return the defendant to the court. In her efforts, the Respondent incurred expenses for hiring private investigators, for a six- day trip to Missouri, for long distance telephone charges, for attorneys' fees for getting postponements of the forfeiture of the bonds and for other miscellaneous expenses. The Respondent collected portions of the promised cash collateral substitution in the following installments, some of which were picked up at the Counts' home by the Respondent: April 21, 1987 $2,000 July 17, 1987 $ 300 August 10, 1987 $ 500 August 20, 1987 $ 800 January 6, 1988 $ 500 On each occasion, the Respondent gave Mrs. Counts a collateral receipt signed by the Respondent and by Mrs. Counts. Each receipt noted the amount received, the balance due on the cash collateral substitution promise, and the $150 balance on the premium on the October 2, 1986 bonds on the first set of charges. Again, there was no evidence that any of these collateral receipts were "filed" anywhere. On January 6, 1988, Mrs. Counts asked the Respondent for a summary of the amounts of collateral paid to that date. The Respondent wrote on a piece of paper, incorrectly dated January 6, 1987, that $4100 had been received to date. Mrs. Counts also was confused what the money would be used for. The Respondent answered her question, saying that the money, together with the lot, would go towards indemnifying the surety for the $19,000 amount of the bonds if they were forfeited and, under the indemnity agreement, could be used to indemnity Adriana's Bail Bonds for expenses caused by the estreature. The Respondent listed these items on a piece of paper, too: Attorney fees to continue case 4 times over one year. Long distance calls for one year. Gas, stamps, & miscellaneous. One trip to Missouri, gas, motel, meals. Investigators services in Missouri and Florida. Later in January 1988, Clayton Counts was arrested and returned to Florida. The bonds, however, were not discharged at that time. Later in 1988, the Respondent made demand on Mrs. and Mrs. Counts for payment of an additional $2,150. This was supposed to represent $2000 due on the cash collateral substitution promise, plus the $150 balance on the premium on the October 2, 1986 bonds on the first set of charges. In fact, only $1900 was due and owning on the cash collateral substitution agreement. In March and April 1988, the Respondent collected from Mrs. Counts two additional $350 installments of the cash collateral substitution promise. Only one receipt was given for both installments, once again signed by both the Respondent and Mrs. Counts, reducing the balance to $1200, plus the $150 premium owing. In June and July 1988, Mrs. Counts was hospitalized. On June 13, 1988, the Respondent went to the hospital to have Mrs. Counts sign a receipt for the return of the original collateral for the $19,000 of bonds--i.e., the $19,000 promissory note and indemnity agreement, the mortgage on the lot and the mobile home. The Respondent did not return the cash collateral. On July 14, 1988, the court entered an order releasing the surety and Adriana's Bail Bonds from the bonds. The Respondent did not return the cash collateral because Mrs. Counts died in July 1988, and the Respondent was unsure to whom the money should be paid.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent be found guilty of the violations set forth in the Conclusions of Law portion of this Recommended Order and that her license and eligibility for licensure be suspended for a period of thirty (30) days, that she be required to pay an administrative fine in the amount of $250, and that she be placed on probation for nine months after expiration of the suspension period, conditioned on : (1) successful completion of either a basic certification course or a correspondence course approved by the Bail Bond Regulatory Board; and (2) payment of the cash collateral to the rightful owner, or in the alternative, if the Respondent is in doubt as to the rightful owner, into a court registry in conjunction with an interpleader action, within 30 days of entry of final order. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of February, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Office Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 88-2588 To comply with Section 120.59(2), Florida statutes (1987), the following rulings are made on the Petitioner'S proposed findings of fact: 1-9. Accepted and, along with other facts, incorporated. 10. Rejected in part and accepted in part. The note was a receipt of sorts, but it was not the only receipt. The incorrect date on the "receipt" was January 6, 1987; the actual date the "receipt" was given was January 6, 1988. 11.-16. Accepted and incorporated. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Marc Herskovitz, Esquire Office of Legal Services Department of Insurance 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 James N. Casesa, Esquire 3845 Fifth Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida 33713 The Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32999-0300

Florida Laws (8) 120.57648.44648.442648.45648.49648.52648.53903.14
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs JAMES ANTHONY MCFADDEN, SR., 07-005096PL (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:New Port Richey, Florida Nov. 06, 2007 Number: 07-005096PL Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs BLAIR FOSTER, 00-000704 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Feb. 10, 2000 Number: 00-000704 Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs LARRY LORENZO JONES, 06-000707PL (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Feb. 23, 2006 Number: 06-000707PL Latest Update: Jan. 19, 2007

The Issue The issues are whether Respondent, who is a limited surety agent, is guilty of violating Section 648.571(1), Florida Statutes, by failing to return the collateral within 21 days after the discharge of the bail bond; Section 648.45(2)(e), Florida Statutes, by demonstrating lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the bail bond business; Section 648.45(2)(g), Florida Statutes, by engaging in fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of business under the license; and Section 648.45(2)(j), Florida Statutes, by willfully failing to comply with, or willfully violating any proper order or rule of the department or willfully violating any provision of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, or the Insurance Code. If guilty of any of these violations, an additional issue is the penalty that should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been a licensed surety agent, holding license number A134458. Respondent is the president and owner of Big Larry Bail Bonds in Fort Lauderdale. Mark Blackman, who is 45 years old, is a licensed mortgage broker and sophisticated in business matters. He has been convicted four times of driving under the influence over the past 20 years. The arrest that resulted in the fourth conviction took place on December 7, 2003. Mr. Blackman's girlfriend at the time of his arrest, Tracy, suggested that he purchase a bail bond from Respondent. Tracy, who was addicted to crack cocaine, had previously purchased a bail bond from Respondent when she had been arrested for the possession of cocaine. Mr. Blackman instructed Tracy to visit Respondent's office and arrange for Respondent to post bond, which was $23,500. Respondent agreed to post bond, but only if Mr. Blackman paid the bond premium of $2350 and delivered, as security, a note for the entire bail bond, an indemnity agreement, title to his 2002 C32 Mercedes Benz, and the vehicle itself. With Tracy's help, Mr. Blackman complied with these conditions, and Respondent bailed him out of jail. At this point, the agreement between Respondent and Mr. Blackman, with respect to the car, was that Respondent would store the car in a safe place. Accordingly, immediately upon receiving the car, Respondent drove it to a body shop where it could be stored safely and without charge. Three or four days later, while out on bail, Mr. Blackman was arrested for felony possession of cocaine. The judge revoked the original bond and refused to set bond for the new offense. At this time, the vehicle no longer served as security because the bail bond that it had secured no longer existed. Thus, at this time, Mr. Blackman was entitled to the return of the vehicle. Neither Mr. Blackman nor Respondent was under any misimpression as to Mr. Blackman's status at the time of the second arrest. Both men knew that Mr. Blackman would not be able to be released from jail on bail for these alleged offenses. Mr. Blackman would remain in jail until February 2004, after which time, following a plea deal, Mr. Blackman began serving nights in jail. The day after his re-arrest, Mr. Blackman called Respondent from jail and asked him if he would help Mr. Blackman sell the vehicle. Mr. Blackman explained that he knew that he was going to lose his driver's license. He asked Respondent if he knew anyone who worked at an automobile auction. Eventually, Mr. Blackman asked Respondent if he wanted to purchase the car, but Respondent declined, at least initially. Within a day or two after speaking to Mr. Blackman the day after his re-arrest, Respondent removed the car from the body shop, so he could show it to a prospective buyer. Respondent did not return the car to the body shop, but instead kept the car at his office or home. The record does not establish that Respondent had driven the car for any reason prior to showing it two or three days after Respondent's second arrest. For several reasons, Mr. Blackman was content with Respondent's possession of the car after it no longer served as collateral for a bail bond. Although released from jail during days starting in February 2004, Mr. Blackman remained concerned about the car during the evenings, while he was in jail. As he explained to Respondent at the time, Mr. Blackman did not want his brother to have access to the car. As Mr. Blackman testified at the hearing, he was also concerned that a friend of Tracy not have access to the car. Mr. Blackman's concerns may have extended to Tracy, who he later determined stole $20,000 from Mr. Blackman while he was in jail. Unable to drive the car due to his loss of driving privileges, Mr. Blackman did not want the car parked in his crime-ridden neighborhood. Additionally, Mr. Blackman's auto insurance expired in January 2004. For these reasons, Mr. Blackman was in no hurry after his re-arrest for Respondent to give up possession of Mr. Blackman's car. The car was safer with Respondent than it would have been returned to Mr. Blackman. Mr. Blackman knew that he would not be charged storage and was hopeful that Respondent would sell the car for Mr. Blackman. At no time, though, did Respondent try to document the change from his holding the car as collateral for a bail bond to holding it for the convenience of Mr. Blackman. Specifically, Respondent never tried to obtain Mr. Blackman's signature on a collateral release, which would document that the car no longer secured a now-nonexistent bail bond. Respondent claimed that he could not obtain Mr. Blackman's signature while he was in jail, but it is customary for limited surety agents to visit inmates in jail to obtain their signatures on paperwork, such as a collateral release. Also, in February 2004, Respondent could have obtained Mr. Blackman's signature at anytime during the day. After showing the car the first time, two or three days after Mr. Blackman's second arrest, Respondent began to use the vehicle for his personal and business purposes, as well as occasionally showing it to a prospective buyer. After January 2004, Mr. Blackman's car was no longer insured. It is unclear whether the registration and license tag expired during this period. Before Mr. Blackman was released on days, Respondent produced offers of $28,000 and $29,000 from two different persons, but Mr. Blackman wanted $38,000 for the car and refused these offers. After being released on days, Mr. Blackman did not visit Respondent or ask for him to return the car. Mr. Blackman was likely preoccupied with other matters immediately after his release from jail in February. Failing to report to jail one night shortly after his release, Mr. Blackman violated one of the conditions of his sentence, took off, and was re-arrested and returned to jail in March or April 2004. Only after he was again incarcerated did Mr. Blackman re-address the issue of the car with Respondent. The first thing he did was tell Respondent to deduct $1200 from the price of the car for a bond forfeiture on a bond that Respondent had written on Tracy. The next thing, on April 13, 2004, Mr. Blackman entered into a written agreement with Respondent for the sale of the vehicle, on the same date, to Respondent for $35,000 cash. However, Respondent backed out of the deal. About six weeks later, in late May 2004, Mr. Blackman sent his sister to pick up the car. She had a power of attorney, but it did not apply to the car, so Respondent would not release the car to her. This was a reasonable action on Respondent's part, given his knowledge of Mr. Blackman's distrust of at least one other family member. A couple of weeks later, in early June, Mr. Blackman's sister returned with a proper power of attorney, and Respondent released the car to her. After taking the car from Respondent, Mr. Blackman's sister and her husband noticed that the car had considerably higher mileage than Mr. Blackman had said that it should have. Respondent had driven the vehicle 7,000 to 10,000 miles during the six months that he had possessed the car, but entirely after the second arrest in December. Respondent was cavalier about his use of the car, as he incurred numerous parking tickets, as well as tolls on Mr. Blackman's SunPass transponder that was in the car when it was delivered to Respondent--all of which charges were imposed on Mr. Blackman. After repeated demands, Respondent paid off only some of these charges. The additional mileage that Respondent put on the vehicle reduced the vehicle's fair market value by as much as $3000. On August 1, 2004, Mr. Blackman's sister, using her power of attorney and with her brother's approval, sold the car for $33,000 to a person other than Respondent.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order dismissing Counts I and III, finding Respondent guilty of violation Section 648.45(2)(e), Florida Statutes, in Count II, and imposing a six-month suspension and a $5000 administrative fine. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of October, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Greg S. Marr, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Michael A. Levin, Esquire Law Offices of Michael A. Levin Global Commerce Center 1900 North Commerce Parkway Weston, Florida 33326 Larry Lorenzo Jones 1310 Sistrunk Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33331 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capital, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Carlos G. Muñiz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57648.442648.45648.49648.52648.571
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs GREGORY MARK HUTCHINSON, 09-002643PL (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Augustine, Florida May 18, 2009 Number: 09-002643PL Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs DAVID LLOYD PATTERSON, 90-000406 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Jan. 22, 1990 Number: 90-000406 Latest Update: Oct. 17, 1990

Findings Of Fact Mr. Patterson is currently eligible for licensure and is licensed in this state as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman). At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Mr. Patterson was eligible for licensure and was licensed in Florida as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman) with Crews Bonding Agency located in Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida. As such, he was a full-time employee of the Crews Bonding Agency and worked the 4:30 p.m. to 8:00 a.m., or night shift, each night. Mr. Patterson was the only licensed bail bondsman on this shift at the Crews Bonding Agency. Ralph Bunch Collins was also a full-time employee of Crews Bonding Agency at all times material, and at all times material, Mr. Collins worked the night shift with Mr. Patterson. Mr. Collins was recognized by Mr. Patterson and his employer as an administrative assistant whose job entailed clerical duties with regard to the bonding process. Mr. Patterson and Mr. Collins worked as a team. Mr. Collins is not a limited surety agent, bail bondsman, runner, or permittee under Chapter 648, F.S. At all times material, Jerelyn Rodriguez, ne' Langtree, was licensed in Florida as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman) with Crews Bonding Agency. She, also, was a full-time employee of that agency and was its designated office manager. Mrs. Rodriquez worked the hours of 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. daily with an administrative assistant named Mrs. Cook, and together Rodriquez and Cook constituted the Crews Bonding Agency's day shift team. The 1983 version of the statute under which Mr. Patterson is charged in the Administrative Complaint read as follows: 648.441 Furnishing supplies to an unlicensed bail bondsmen prohibited: civil liability and penalty.-- No insurer, bail bondsman, runner, or permittee under this chapter shall furnish to any person any blank forms, applications, stationery, or other supplies to be used in soliciting, negotiating, or effecting bail bonds until such person has received from the department a license to act as a bail bondsman and has duly qualified as such. Any insurer, licensee, or permittee who furnishes to any bail bondsman or other person not named or appointed by `the insurer represented any of the supplies mentioned in subsection (1) and accepts any basil bond business from or writes any bail `bond business for such bail bondsman, person, or agency shall be subject to civil liability to any insured of such insurer to thee same extent and in the same manner as if such bail bondsman or other person had been appointed, licensed, or authorized by the insurer, general agent, or bail bondsman to act in its or his behalf by the department. [Emphasis supplied] On March 27, 1984 a Consent Order was entered in the Circuit Court in and for Duval County, Florida, in the case styled, Jack I. Etheridge and F.G.C. Bonding and Insurance Corporation v. State of Florida and State of Florida Department of Insurance, Case No. 82-10537. That Consent Order provided, in pertinent part, as follows: 4. Florida statute 648.441(1) likewise must be given a liberal and common sense application in order to preserve its constitutionality. It is the intent of the Legislature, as interpreted by this Court that said subsection is designed to prohibit licensed bail bondsmen from allowing non- licensed persons to actually conduct a (sic) legitimate and licensed activities of a licensed bail bondsman. Therefore this Court finds that it is a constitutionally permissable (sic) legislative act to prevent licensed person (sic) from providing non- licensed persons with forms and supplies of the trade that would permit the non-licensed persons to violate the law. However, this does not preclude clerical activities by non- licensed persons under the direct supervision of a licensed person to the extent that it is consistent with the general intent of said section. (Emphasis supplied) [Patterson Exhibit 1] The wife of Jack I. Etheridge, who was a plaintiff in the foregoing civil lawsuit, was an owner of the Crews Bonding Agency at all times material to the instant administrative proceeding. The foregoing Circuit Court Consent Order to which DOI was a party is the only relevant interpretation by a court of competent jurisdiction of Section 648.441 F.S. which either party hereto or the undersigned has been able to discover. DOI put on no expert evidence of agency construction of the statute either formally by rule or informally by policy. Subsequent to that Circuit Court Consent Order, the statute interpreted therein [see FOF 5, supra] was amended to add subsection (3), as follows: Any person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. All three statutory subsections were in effect at all times material to the administrative charges against' Mr. Patterson. During the night shift of New Year's Eve, December 31, 1988, Susan Miller a/k/a Sharon Miller, who was then the wife of James Edward Miller, contacted the Crews Bonding Agency by telephone and relayed certain necessary information to Ralph Collins as a predicate to securing a bond to get her husband out of the Duval County Jail. In turn, Mr. Collins called the jail and received basic information for making out the necessary bonding papers. Mrs. Miller arrived at the bonding agency and Mr. Collins prepared certain paperwork for her signature, that of her husband, and that of the Mr. Patterson as bail bondsman. It is the unrefuted testimony of Mr. Patterson, Mr. Collins, Jerelyn Rodriquez, and Gilbert Clark that in doing so, Mr. Collins was conforming to the standard operating procedure of the Crews Bonding Agency and the custom in the bonding trade at least as far as that trade has been practiced within Duval County, Florida, since the entry of the March 27, 1984 Consent Order. Patterson Exhibit 2 and the testimony of Correctional Officer Larry Wooten established that, provided the licensed bondsman presents the bond and personally receives the prisoner into his custody, the foregoing clerical practice and procedure has been acquiesced-in by a published policy of the Duval County Sheriff's Office and by county jail personnel, of which Mr. Wooten is one. There was unrefuted testimony that without such clerical help, a licensed bondsman could not function 24 hours a day, as is common in the trade. It is also the unrefuted testimony of Mr. Patterson, Mr. Collins, and Mrs. Rodriquez that at all times material to the Miller transaction, Mr. Collins was subject to the supervision of Mr. Patterson, that Mr. Patterson had the absolute right to alter any document prepared by Mr. Collins prior to signing the Miller bond, and that Mr. Patterson ultimately could have rejected underwriting Mr. Miller's bond if, after Mr. Patterson's review, the documents Mr. Collins had prepared did not conform to the insurance law, rules, or standards to which Mr. Patterson, as a licensee, was bound to conform. The foregoing testimony is further supported by the testimony of Gilbert Clark. Mr. Clark is a licensed bail bondsman who is not now and never has been associated with the Crews Bonding Agency. He testified that Mr. Patterson could ultimately have refused to place the Miller bond even if Mr. Patterson's only dissatisfaction upon his review of the documents prepared by Mr. Collins had been the sufficiency of the collateral or premium provided by the Millers. With regard to the Miller transaction, Mr. Collins prepared the Indemnity Agreement (DOI Exhibit 2e) for signature by Mr. Miller's wife, which Mr. Collins notarized with certificate, seal, and stamp. Collins prepared a Promissory Note (DOI Exhibit 2f) and signed on the line provided for a witness to Mrs. Miller's signature but without applying his notary certificate, seal, or stamp. Collins prepared a Premium Receipt (DOI Exhibit 2g) and signed on the line acknowledging that the premium had been "received by" him in the form of a check from Mr. and Mrs. Miller. The nature of the Premium Receipt and the Collateral Receipt does not necessarily require the Millers' signatures, but Mr. Collins testified that his own signature on the Premium Receipt was meant to signify that he had witnessed signatures and that he had signed it as a notary but that he did not affix a notary certificate, seal, and stamp because he saw no reason for those formalities. Because of the requirements of Chapter 117 F.S. governing notaries public, because the document speaks for itself, and because Mr. Collins testified that he, in fact, received the premium, his testimony that he signed the Premium Receipt for the Miller transaction only as a notary or witness is not credible, particularly since the exhibit (DOI Exhibit 2g) does not bear the Millers' signatures. Mr. Collins prepared the Collateral Receipt (also DOI Exhibit 2g) and received the collateral, signifying same by his signature. (TR 40-41). However, Mr. Patterson signed on the Miller bond and went through all the bond papers, including the foregoing, with Mr. Miller after Mr. Patterson personally physically obtained Mr. Miller's release from jail. On July 7, 1989, Henry A. Robinson went to Crews Bonding Agency in an effort to bond his son, Henry Steve Robinson, out of the Duval County Jail. All of the father's negotiations were with Mrs. Rodriquez. The father did not testify. At all times material to the Robinson transaction, both Mrs. Cook and Mr. Collins had signs on their respective desks, proclaiming them to be administrative assistants, and a sign on Mr. Patterson's desk proclaimed him to be a bail bondsman. When Mr. Patterson and Mr. Collins arrived at Crews Bonding Agency for the July 7, 1989 night shift, some paperwork had already been prepared by Mrs. Rodriquez and others. Mrs. Rodriquez had already reviewed all the papers prepared by someone else, and Mrs. Rodriquez had tentatively committed to underwriting the bond on Henry Steve Robinson. Mr. Patterson did not thereafter "second guess" Mrs. Rodriquez's initial work or judgment despite his absolute right to reject the bond for all the reasons aforesaid in FOF 12. Some further Robinson transaction paperwork was prepared by Mr. Collins after he came on duty. The nature of several of these documents did not require either the signature of the father, the mother, or the son or the notarizing thereof, but the evidence indicates that Mr. Collins thought some of them did. Premium Receipt 127003 (DOI Exhibit 4f, apparently one of two such receipts) and the Collateral Receipt (DOI Exhibit 4b) for this transaction were signed by Mr. Collins on the "received by" lines. He testified that he signed these only as a Crews employee, i.e., a clerk administrative assistant, and as a notary but without affixing his notarial seal. Collins testified that he signed as a witness for the father's signature on the witness line as a Crews employee for the Contingency Promissory Note (DOI Exhibit 4c, TR 48-50), that he did not notarize the note initially when the senior Mr. Robinson signed it in his presence because arrangements were made for the senior Mr. Robinson's convenience to allow Mrs. Robinson to sign the following day, and that the next day, Mr. Collins just witnessed on the other side of that document. However, the documentary evidence (DOI Exhibit 4c) is clear that Mrs. Robinson (the mother) never signed the Contingency Promissory Note. Mr. Collins testified that he signed as a Crews Bonding Agency employee and then notarized with a certificate, seal, and stamp the Indemnity Agreement to the effect that it had been signed by Mr. Robinson's father and mother when in fact the mother never signed that document. (TR 52-56, DOI 4e). Due to the provisions of Chapter 117 F.S., the discrepancy between the exhibits and the testimony, and the vacillation of Mr. Collins in giving his oral testimony, it is found that contrary to Mr. Collins' oral testimony, he was confused or uninformed as to his actual function with regard to the Robinson transaction. However, Mr. Patterson reviewed all the Robinson papers and documents and signed the General Appearance Bond as surety and as attorney-in-fact and an agent of Crews Bonding Agency. Mr. Patterson also personally effectuated Henry Steve Robinson's release from jail on July 7, 1989. Henry Steve Robinson (the son) had been bonded out of the Duval County Jail by the team of Patterson and Collins of the Crews Bonding Agency on at least two occasions, and due to Mr. Robinson's confusion of dates, his testimony concerning exactly what papers he went over with Mr. Patterson or anyone else on July 7, 1989 was somewhat vague. However, he was very clear on some points: Mr. Collins never said he was a bail bondsman, it was Mr. Patterson who signed Robinson out of jail each time, and Robinson signed papers in the bonding agency office each time. Robinson believed that Mr. Patterson was the person who explained all the papers to him in Collins' presence on the date in question, but could not be sure. Mr. Collins and Mr. Patterson asserted that as of the July 11, 1990 formal hearing, Crews Bonding Agency clerical personnel are no longer permitted to sign premium and collateral receipts. This instruction was given in anticipation of amendments to Section 648.441 F.S. which were due to go into effect October 1, 1990. Although Mrs. Miller did not testify, the evidence as a whole from other witnesses supports the reasonable inference that this case arose partly because she complained to DOI when Mr. Collins and other Crews Bonding Agency employees refused to summarily reincarcerate her husband upon her oral complaints of domestic problems. No finding has been made concerning what impression of Mr. Collins was formed by Mrs. Miller or concerning the state of Mrs. Miller's mind because the evidence presented on those issues was speculative and not the type of hearsay which would explain or supplement direct and probative evidence. Neither Mr. Miller or Mr. Henry Steve Robinson appeared to have any complaints with the bonding process or participants.

Recommendation DOAH Case No. 90-0406 Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DOAH Case No. 90-0584 Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and `Treasurer enter a Final Order granting Mr. Patterson's application for a resident license to represent Amwest Surety Insurance Company as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman). DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of October, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 1990.

Florida Laws (11) 120.57120.68648.30648.441648.442648.46648.50648.52648.53775.082775.083
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