The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to formal training and education sponsored by the Division of Workers' Compensation, pursuant to Section 440.491(6), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact From 1985 through 1995, Petitioner was employed by Truly Nolen, a pest-control company. In April 1995, Petitioner was a termite supervisor engaged in fumigation work. In this job, Petitioner set up crews and sent different crews to do jobs. He scheduled work and performed actual work on the job, such as dragging sand bags around a building and putting tarps on the roofs of buildings. While so employed on April 26, 1995, Petitioner fell while spreading tarp on a roof. Petitioner injured his back, suffering what the neurosurgeon described as “fundamentally a frozen back,” and was unable even to bend forward and touch his knee caps. Diagnosed with a herniated disc in the lumbar region, Petitioner had surgery on September 12, 1995. Although the surgery repaired the herniated disc, Petitioner’s recovery was prolonged. The surgeon determined that Petitioner reached maximum medical improvement on January 19, 1996. At this time, the surgeon stated that Petitioner was capable of working in light- to medium-duty work with no lifting of more than 50 pounds and no repetitive lifting of 25 pounds or more. The surgeon assigned Respondent a 12 percent impairment of the person as a whole, but later agreed that it was a 16 percent permanent partial impairment. The surgeon believes that Petitioner may have intermittent problems with his back for the rest of his life, but it is not medically probable that he will require surgery or any other form of aggressive intervention. The day after being released by the surgeon, Petitioner met with the branch manager of the Truly Nolen office, out of which Petitioner had worked at the time of his accident. For about one month, Petitioner had been performing part-time, light office duties at this office as part of a work-hardening program. The branch manager offered Petitioner a residential pest-control route, rather than Petitioner’s old job as a termite supervisor. Although not entirely clear in the record, the office appears to have employed only one termite supervisor. By the time that Petitioner was able to return to work, the branch manager had hired another person for the job of termite supervisor. It is, in any event, unclear whether Petitioner would have been able to do his old job anymore, as it required the supervisor to drag heavy tarps over the tops of buildings, as Petitioner was doing when he fell and was injured. Petitioner and the branch manager discussed two routes, but the manager was inclined to give Petitioner the route that Petitioner found less preferable. Petitioner visited one house on the route and determined that the value of the route, as posted in the office, was less than one-half of what Petitioner had been making at the time of the injury. Petitioner then informed his supervisor that he would not take the job due to inadequate money. Petitioner admits that money, rather than the physical demands of the job, was the sole reason for declining the job offer. The most productive pest-control routes in this Truly Nolen office earn $35,000 annually. Petitioner could probably earn $20,000 to $25,000 from the route that the branch manager offered him. Two weeks prior to the hearing, Petitioner started work as a car salesperson at a local Chevrolet dealer. He was earning about $250 weekly and 4 percent of the profit on each car sold. He had sold only one car for a commission of $50. Previously, he had worked on an occasional basis for his uncle driving a mowing tractor and earning $5.25 hourly; however, he had not worked over one week consecutively on this job. At the time of his injury, Petitioner’s average weekly wage was about $800. He was born on January 15, 1966. Petitioner completed his formal education when he finished high school. Petitioner is a certified pest-control technician. Except for some general construction and service work experience, Petitioner’s entire work history consists of his employment with Truly Nolen. The record does not disclose if Petitioner applied to Truly Nolen or its competitors for work as a termite supervisor or pest-control technician. Petitioner has not proved that he is physically unable to work in either position. To the contrary, it is likely that he could do the job as a pest-control technician, given his refusal to take the offer of such a job solely on monetary grounds and the relatively light physical demands of this work. In light of Petitioner’s age, education, work history, transferable skills, previous occupation, and injury, the job offered by the branch manager in January 1996 gave Petitioner a chance to regain as soon as practicable and as nearly as possible his pre-accident average weekly wage. Thus, the branch manager’s offer to take a pest-control route represented suitable gainful employment.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Workers’ Compensation enter a final order denying Petitioner’s requests for training and education sponsored by the Division and attorneys' fees. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of February, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter C. Burkert Burkert & Hart Post Office Box 2485 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Attorney Michael G. Moore, Sr. Department of Labor and Employment Security 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast 307 Hartman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189 Russell Schropp Henderson Franklin Post Office Box 280 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Edward A. Dion General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast 307 Hartman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189 Douglas L. Jamerson, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast 303 Hartman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to service credit in the Florida Retirement System (FRS) from June 1, 1995, through August 2001.
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner has been a school psychologist, certified by the Florida Department of Education. From June 1995 through August 2001, Petitioner performed duties as a psychologist under "purchase of services agreements" with SBAC to perform special needs assessments for gifted children. These formal contracts were executed between Petitioner and SBAC in and for each successive school year during that period. Although there was the expectation that a new contract would be negotiated/signed each year, there was no guarantee to that effect. The annual contracts for June 1995 through August 2001, between SBAC and Petitioner provided that Petitioner was to assume all risks, and that he was a "consultant." They further provided that he was to be paid at a rate of $150.00 for each assessment he completed. Either party to the contract could terminate it on 30 days' notice. In pertinent part, the annual contracts described Petitioner as an independent consultant and not an employee in the following terms: * * * The CONSULTANT is an Independent Consultant and will perform all services at the Consultant's risk, assuming full responsibility for completion of the services stipulated below: Psychoeducational evaluations of students referred for determination of eligibility to the Gifted Program as shall be requested by the Board through its Director of Exceptional Student Education or Lead School Psychologist. All psychoeducational evaluations shall be completed within 30 days of having been received by the CONSULTANT. All reports and billing for services rendered by the CONSULTANT shall be submitted in a timely manner. All reports are to be submitted in triplicate. * * * CONSULTANT also acknowledges that in rendering the services provided herein, the CONSULTANT will be acting as an Independent Consultant, and not as an employee of the School Board of Alachua County. (Emphasis added.) The contracts contained no specific provision for reimbursement of Petitioner's expenses. However, a calculated amount for travel expenses was built into the fee of $150.00 per child. SBAC did not consider Petitioner an "employee" during the period of his annual contracts, because he was not filling a regularly established position. Accordingly, SBAC did not report to FRS any retirement information/contributions on the amounts it paid Petitioner during this period. Likewise, during the specified period, Petitioner received no paid leave or other employee benefits from SBAC. Also, SBAC did not provide unemployment compensation coverage or workers' compensation coverage for Petitioner during the specified period. While under contract as an independent consultant, Petitioner did not report his time to SBAC via a timesheet or otherwise. Rather, he was paid for each completed assessment under the terms of his respective contracts. He was only required to file his test results within five business days of the date he assessed a student. Between 1995 and 2001, SBAC reported Petitioner's pay for federal income tax purposes by Form 1099, rather than by Form W-2. A 1099 form is traditionally used for occasional employees and for independent contractors. W-2 forms are used for regular employees. Petitioner reported his income from SBAC as "other income," i.e. self-employment income. In a similar vein, SBAC withheld no taxes, Social Security, or Medicare deductions for Petitioner during this period. SBAC made no matching contributions for Social Security or Medicare. During the specified period, Petitioner was hired solely for special needs assessments. The time frame for testing by SBAC was established by law. Other than special needs assessments, Petitioner had no duties for SBAC, but he was assigned cases by SBAC as necessary to meet its caseload and time frame. Petitioner was only called upon when SBAC's school psychologists, who filled regularly established positions, were not available or could not timely meet the demand for assessments in a school year of 10 months' duration. Petitioner was required to hold a professional license as a psychologist to perform his SBAC contracts, and he was expected to perform his services for SBAC within the standards of his profession. His contracts provided for him to render personal services, and he could not hire an assistant or subcontract out his duties to another psychologist. SBAC could not instruct Petitioner how to do his job as a professional psychologist or what decision or recommendation to reach on any child. However, SBAC told him which text to use, and he was initially trained by another school psychologist on the testing instrument required by SBAC. Petitioner also received initial training from SBAC on how to report his assessments, and SBAC provided him with test kits and word processing assistance for each child assessment. SBAC set the format for his reports and provided him with a template therefor. Petitioner was not regularly provided office space by SBAC. However, he was allotted a room on each school's premises for each test, as he traveled from school to school within the county, and he had to do his testing on a day the specified child was in school and that school was open. Each test had to be completed within 30 days of its assignment, per his contracts. Petitioner was free to schedule one or more of his assessments on the dates most efficient for him, provided he met his deadlines. Petitioner's efforts for SBAC during this period might be described as "frequently recurring, but not regular." Petitioner never worked for SBAC more than four consecutive months during the entire time period at issue. During that period, he was on his own for defending his test results. Petitioner was required to carry his own professional liability insurance during the time in question, whereas then and now, SBAC "covered" their employees' liability insurance. Between 1995 and 2001, Petitioner was free to offer his professional services to other clients besides SBAC, but he chose not to do so. There was no profit or loss involved for SBAC or Petitioner in Petitioner's 1995-2001 service. Petitioner had to invest none of his personal funds to do his assessments. In September 2001, Petitioner was hired by SBAC in a half-time, regularly established position with all benefits, including sick leave, personal leave, and FRS membership. Upon that event, his duties were altered to include rendering any psychological assistance required by any SBAC school in which he was working. He is now reimbursed for travel by submitting request forms. He has continued to meet that job description and has filled that regularly established position to date. SBAC requested, and in 2002, received a letter-opinion from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) interpreting various federal statutes and regulations. That IRS letter-opinion concluded that during the period in question, the Petitioner was an "employee" of SBAC; that various federal forms might require filing or amending by SBAC; and that SBAC and Petitioner might need to pay yet-to-be determined amounts. That IRS opinion is based on facts submitted by SBAC and not necessarily in evidence; is based on federal laws which are not determinative of the Florida retirement issue before this forum, and was not necessarily final. Accordingly, it is not binding in the instant case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for membership and service credit in the FRS from June 1, 1995, through August 2001. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Leonard D. Jackson 2731-B Northwest 104th Court Gainesville, Florida 32606-7174 Alberto Dominguez, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sarabeth Snuggs, Interim Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to creditable service with the Florida Retirement System (FRS) from February 1, 1997 through November 30, 1999.
Findings Of Fact Hendry County is governed by the Hendry County Board of County Commissioners (Board). The period in dispute is February 1, 1997, through November 30, 1999. During this 32- month period, Petitioner served as legal counsel for the Port LaBelle Utility System (PLUS), a division of Hendry County, under the direction of the County Administrator. (Stipulation e.2.b., modified. See also Finding of Fact 11.)1/ Both immediately prior to and immediately following the period in dispute, Petitioner was employed full-time by Hendry County in the regularly established position of "County Attorney." (Stipulation e.1.a. modified) Regularly established positions in Hendry County, such as "County Attorney," are created by the Board and supervised by the County Administrator. When Petitioner resigned the County Attorney position in 1997, he was approached by a Board member to work on two specific PLUS projects for $500.00 per month minimum, at the rate of $100.00 per hour. The Board and Petitioner initially called the $500.00 a "retainer fee" and anticipated that Petitioner would only work on two specific PLUS projects. Petitioner is only claiming that this guaranteed $500.00 per month, which was paid for 32 months, should have been covered by FRS. The new County Attorney had no experience in water and sewer utilities, so Hendry County and Petitioner later struck a deal for Petitioner to take up the additional role of counsel of record for all routine PLUS matters, including special projects, and to act (as he had when he was County Attorney) as PLUS contact person between PLUS and all governmental regulatory agencies at the rate of $100.00 per hour for every hour he worked above the guaranteed minimum of $500.00 per month. Petitioner was hired in this capacity due to his legal expertise in the area of utilities. Both Petitioner and the Board contemplated that he would personally render his legal services, and it was never anticipated by either party that Petitioner would sub-contract out those legal services. All of his services were rendered personally by Petitioner during the disputed period of time. At the commencement of the agreement, both parties anticipated their arrangement would continue indefinitely. No formal written contract was executed between Petitioner and the County for the period at issue. Either Petitioner or the Board could terminate the oral contract at any time without financial liability, but Petitioner would have had a professional duty to assist in the transition of cases to a replacement attorney. (Stipulation e.l.k. expanded.) The County Administrator could terminate the County Attorney, but only the Board could terminate Petitioner. During the disputed period of time, Petitioner's responsibilities and services as counsel for PLUS became essentially the same as the responsibilities and services he had provided to PLUS in his regularly-established position as County Attorney prior to the disputed period and which he subsequently provided to PLUS as County Attorney after the disputed period. However, during the period at issue, Petitioner did not perform all the other non-PLUS duties of the County Attorney. The oral agreement between Petitioner and the Board provided for Petitioner to be paid $500.00 per month by the County on behalf of PLUS. (Stipulation e.2.b., modified. See also Finding of Fact 1.)2/ Originally, Petitioner understood that the agreement guaranteed him $500.00 minimum per month even if he did no routine or special project work for PLUS. Ultimately, the oral agreement also contemplated that Petitioner could charge the County at an hourly rate of $100.00 per hour for any time he spent working on PLUS projects. This was substantially more money per hour than the full-time regular employee salary Petitioner had previously received from the County as its County Attorney. Petitioner is not claiming FRS coverage for any additional amounts of money above $500.00 per month that he charged Hendry County for PLUS work during the 32 months at issue. Petitioner is only claiming that the $500.00 per month constitutes his part time employee "salary" for this period of time. The parties stipulated that the $500.00 fee was paid to Petitioner by the County on a monthly basis, and Petitioner was not required to submit a time card to his supervisor setting forth his time worked each month in order to be entitled to the $500.00 payment. (Stipulation e.1.d. expanded.) Petitioner was not required to submit a timesheet or to similarly account for his time. However, Petitioner, in fact, billed the County for his services. The testimony is that he billed monthly, but his invoices appear to have been rendered every two or three months. Petitioner referred to the $500.00 as a "retainer" on each invoice he prepared. Each of his invoices included a vendor number, recognizable by the County Finance Department. Regularly established positions in Hendry County have no numbers. He sent his invoices from a law office in his home. Most, if not all, of the months during the disputed period, Petitioner billed more than $500.00, including time for projects and legal work not originally anticipated. Most of his services were frequent and sometimes recurring; other were not. Despite his testimony that his agreement with the County guaranteed him a retainer of $500.00 per month, regardless of how few or how many hours he worked on PLUS projects, Petitioner conceded that from the first invoice, he always credited the guaranteed $500.00 to the County and deducted it from the total hours of legal work he billed the County. Petitioner's invoices itemized all services for PLUS and any other projects he performed for the County in tenths of hours worked at the rate of pay of $100.00 per hour, and the $500.00 was always applied each month against the total PLUS hours worked. The County's Finance Department's policies were directed by the Board. Testimony shows that during the period at issue, Petitioner's monthly $500.00 was paid by the County's Finance Department, out of funds exclusive to PLUS, in response to Petitioner's invoices. However, the invoices which are in evidence show that the $500.00 and all additional charges were paid by a single County check for a lump sum in response to the total on each invoice, whenever the invoice was received. The accompanying check stub differentiated between specific projects and general charges, but the $500.00 was not isolated on the check stub. The greater weight of the credible evidence is that during the period at issue, the County Administrator's Office, Human Resources Office, and Clerk of Court did not handle Petitioner's situation as if he were an employee filling a regularly established part-time position. Rather, they treated the whole of his services, invoices, and remuneration as if he were a vendor or independent contractor. Payments to him were designated by the Finance Department as paid out of "professional services." However, the County's current Finance Director, an accountant who was not hired by the County until later, testified that the County should have separated out the $500.00 retainer and the cost of Petitioner's monthly services above that amount into separate amounts because Petitioner was performing non-vendor services for the $500.00 base amount. The County reported Petitioner's pay by Form 1099 for an independent contractor, rather than by Form W-2 for an employee. The Hendry County Personnel Manual requires that one work 7.5 hours per day in order to qualify as a full-time County employee. By law, the County is required to withhold income tax, social security, and medicare deductions for its employees, even the part-time ones. The County withheld no taxes, social security, or medicare deductions from the amounts it paid to Petitioner during the period at issue. The County did not make matching contributions for social security or medicare from the amounts it paid to Petitioner in this period. (Stipulation e.1.c., expanded.) The County did not include any fees paid to Petitioner in its wage computations for its workers' compensation insurance premiums, but had Petitioner claimed to have been injured on the job, and coverage denied by the company, only litigation would have determined if he were "covered" by workers' compensation. (Stipulation e.1.c., expanded.) Petitioner did not accrue, and was not paid, sick pay or vacation time during this period. (Stipulation e.1.c., expanded.) According to the County Personnel Manual, a County employee who works less than 22 hours per bi-weekly pay period does not earn sick or vacation leave, but would still be eligible for FRS. No FRS payments are linked to Petitioner's employment during this period. All County employees in regularly established positions, both part-time and full-time, are paid bi-weekly. Petitioner billed every two or three months. In response, the Finance Department paid Petitioner's invoices in lump sums, as if Petitioner were a vendor or independent contractor. Petitioner did not consider himself a County employee during the disputed time period, and, in fact, considered his arrangement with the County to be a classic retainer agreement. Petitioner treated his income from the County as "other income" by paying both the employer's and employee's share of social security during this period. During the period at issue, Petitioner did not list himself in the business section of the phone book or the yellow pages or otherwise offer his services to the general public, although he could have done so without violating his arrangement with the County. Petitioner had a separate and independent law office in his home during this period and charged individuals for occasional deeds and wills. Petitioner did not have to account to the County for any of his time not on the clock for County business. During this period, Petitioner also acted and was paid as counsel for the Central County Water Control District. Prior to accepting the District as his client, Petitioner sought from the Hendry County Board of County Commissioners permission to represent the Central County Water Control District, because of the Florida Bar Rules on attorneys' conflicts of interest and, presumably, rules on full disclosure to clients, but not because Hendry County was his employer. During the period at issue, Petitioner advised the Hendry County Attorney of what work he was performing, but the County Attorney could not instruct Petitioner how to do his job and did not assign him tasks or direct him. (See Findings of Facts 40 and 42.) During the period at issue, Petitioner received no training from the County. Most of the knowledge Petitioner had regarding County procedures and PLUS issues had been acquired prior to the period in question while he had been serving as the County Attorney. Some of the additional issues Petitioner represented Hendry County on during the disputed time period were assigned by the County Administrator or the Board, but Petitioner could prioritize issues and had discretion as to when he would work on them. The Board, as Petitioner's client, could direct certain of Petitioner's actions as its utilities counsel and had to agree or disagree to certain proposals. On most of these matters, votes of the Board were necessary. A major part of Petitioner's duties as counsel for PLUS during the disputed period involved attendance and providing advice to the Board and other County personnel at meetings or appointments scheduled unilaterally by the County Administrator. Petitioner was required to make reports at these events. No one in the County's administrative hierarchy could instruct Petitioner how to do his job as an attorney but the Board, County Administrator, and Utility Director could assign him tasks and instruct him on projects. In the main, however, the Board and its County Administrator had to rely on Petitioner's expert legal capabilities and professionalism as would any client in an attorney-client situation. During the disputed period, almost all of Petitioner's work for PLUS was done at a County office facility or at meeting sites designated by the County. The County made available office materials, books, and other equipment to Petitioner. All of the clerical and other staff assisting Petitioner in the performance of his duties for the County were employees of the County in regularly established County positions. Petitioner reimbursed the County for its paralegal's services at the rate of $15.00 for each hour she worked on PLUS projects. Petitioner's reimbursement to the County was in the form of a deduction from his invoices. The County paid Petitioner's cell phone and travel expenses or provided reimbursement of these expenses during this period, as billed on his invoices. Petitioner submitted his travel expenses as starting from the County courthouse, not from his home with its private law office. During this period, the services provided by Petitioner were critical and essential to the continued operation of PLUS. Petitioner did not use any of his personal capital in performing the services as counsel for PLUS during the disputed period.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order ratifying its denial of FRS creditable service for February 1, 1997 through November 30, 1999. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of April, 2005.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was employed by the School Board of Volusia County from September 1, 1981 until November 14, 1989 as a painter or painter mechanic. T- II-39,40. The terms and conditions of the Respondent's employment was governed by the contract between the Petitioner and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 79, Local 850. This contract provides that employees can be disciplined, to include discharge for just cause. Joint Exhibit 1. The Respondent was employed as a painter within the Board's facilities support operations department. This department employs approximately 130 craftsmen and 20 clerical and supervisory staff. T-I-38. The Respondent's immediate superior was foreman of the painters, Joe Isaac, who has held that position for the past 18 years. T-I-38,64 The chain-of-command from the top of the facilities support department is Charles Lambeth, who is Director of Facilities Operation; Terry Ellis, who is Assistant Director in charge of the crafts area; and Clifton Robertson, who is the Director of Facilities Support Operations or the personnel administrator for the facilities support department. Clifton Robertson investigated the allegations against the Respondent, counseled with the Respondent, and issued the disciplinary letters and reprimands given to the Respondent. On October 24, 1989, Mr. Florio engaged in a loud, profane, and inappropriate shouting match with a coworker, Larry Brazil, while on the job scraping paint outside a classroom at Seville School. Their conduct was such that a teacher left her classroom, outside of which they were working, and cautioned them about the disturbance they were causing. The acting foreman, Don Jenkins, overheard the exchange between the Respondent and Brazil in which the Respondent used obscene or profane language. The acting foreman did not hear Brazil use such language, and other witnesses testified that they had never heard Brazil use such language on the job. On October 25, 1989, the Respondent got into another argument with another coworker, Ken Griswold. During this argument, the Respondent threw his paint scraper at Griswold, who had made no threat to the Respondent. With only the verbal provocation, the Respondent threw the scraper at Griswold and would have struck him had Griswold not jumped back out of the way. There was dissatisfaction among the Respondent's coworkers about the way he did his job. The Respondent had been injured in 1987 and was restricted from working on ladders over six feet tall, lifting regular ladders, and spray painting. Sometime later, the Respondent's restrictions were altered to permit him to work on a six-foot aluminum ladder. His refusal to do any type of work which was covered by his medical restrictions was a source of contention with his coworkers. In addition, he had a history of not following regulations and requirements which the other men were required to follow. On October 24 and 25, 1989, the Respondent was assigned to a team of painters to scrape and paint the exterior of a school. On both days, arguments between the Respondent and coworkers arose over the Respondent's refusal to scrape paint from the ladder. On October 24, 1990, this led to a shouting match with Larry Brazil and to the Respondent throwing a paint scraper at Ken Griswold on October 25, 1990. On March 21, 1989, the Respondent was directed at 7:00 a.m. to report to work at Seabreeze Senior High School by his foreman, Joe Isaac. The Respondent did not do so and stayed at the main maintenance facility until 8:45 a.m., when he was discovered by the Assistant Maintenance Director, Terry Ellis, who instructed him to report to the high school. The Respondent again refused to go and remained at the main maintenance facility until 8:54 a.m., when the Maintenance Director, Charles Lambeth, arrived. The Respondent had asked his foreman, Joe Isaac, to see Lambeth; and Isaac had told Florio to report to work at the high school and if Lambeth wanted him, Lambeth would send word through Isaac for Florio to report to Lambeth. When confronted by Ellis, the Respondent told Ellis he wanted to see Lambeth. Ellis also told Florio to report to the school immediately. Florio remained at the maintenance headquarters until Lambeth arrived. Lambeth asked Florio why he was there, and Florio stated that he had been told Lambeth wanted to see him. Lambeth told Florio that he had not wanted to see him, and Florio blamed the incident on the men lying to him. Florio did not report until told to do so by Lambeth. The Respondent had his pay docked for two hours and received a letter of reprimand for failure to follow direct instructions. The letter of reprimand described the Respondent's actions as malingering and insubordination. Painters reported each day to the maintenance headquarters, after which they took School Board vehicles to the job sites. Similarly, after being released at the job site, the painters were supposed to return to the main maintenance facility, where employees were dismissed for the day. On September 11, 12, 13 and 14, 1989, the Respondent drove his private automobile to the school at which the paint team was working. Although the Respondent had been given permission to drive his car on Monday of that week because his stomach had been giving him problems, he took his car the rest of the week and left directly from the school, not returning to the maintenance headquarters, as required on the dates indicated above. The Respondent received written notice that he was being docked 160 minutes. On or about September 21, 1989, the Respondent told a coworker that he refused to drive. The Respondent did not deny telling the coworker that he would not drive but asserted that he had been kidding. On September 22, 1989, the Respondent slammed open the door of a School Board truck striking another School Board truck in the door and damaging both trucks. The property damage was $121.63. The Respondent had slammed the door open because he was angered by the remarks of a coworker who chided him about driving. The letter of reprimand which the Respondent received for his conduct on September 21 and 22 indicated that the Respondent had been encouraged to enter the Employee Assistance Program. The Respondent did not avail himself of the program. The Respondent frequently complained to his supervisors about what he described as "harassment" and "kidding" by his coworkers although the Respondent engaged in similar behavior with his coworkers. As a result of his complaints, his superiors counseled his coworkers not to tease, harass, or kid the Respondent. The Respondent is a malingerer. He developed a pattern of avoiding work by failing to report when he was supposed to report; by refusing to perform duties within his ability as requested by his fellow workers; and by asserting he was ill. The Respondent was ill-tempered and acted out inappropriately with increasing frequency and violence. The Respondent refused to acknowledge that there was a problem, that the problem was him, and to seek assistance for it. The employer counseled with the Respondent and used progressive discipline to attempt to modify the Respondent's behavior to no avail. The employer had just cause to discharge the Respondent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore recommended that the Respondent be discharged. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-6360 The parties filed proposed findings of fact which were read and considered. The following is a listing by party of the findings which were adopted and those which were rejected and why: Petitioner's findings by paragraph number which began with paragraph 7: Paragraph 7 Adopted Paragraph 8 Adopted Paragraph 9 Adopted and rewritten Paragraph 10 Rejected; restates exhibit Paragraph 11 1st sentence adopted; remainder irrelevant Paragraph 12,13,14 Adopted and rewritten Paragraph 15(a) Irrelevant Paragraph 15(b) Rejected; restates exhibit Paragraph 16-20 Adopted and rewritten Paragraph 21 Irrelevant Paragraph 22-29 Adopted and rewritten Respondent's findings by paragraph number beginning with paragraph 1: Paragraph 1-4 Adopted and rewritten Paragraph 5 Irrelevant Paragraph 6-10 Adopted and rewritten Paragraph 11 Whether Brazil was disciplined is unknown Paragraph 12 Rejected as contrary to fact Paragraph 13-14 Adopted and rewritten Paragraph 15 Rejected that Florio did not throw the scraper at Griswold; remainder adopted and rewritten Paragraph 16 Adopted and rewritten Paragraph 17 Evidence was received that coworkers were counseled on several occasions; however, it is also irrelevant because the disciplinary records of the other employees were not introduced. Evidence was received that; at least one other employee was discharged for similar types of behavior. Paragraph 18 Adopted and rewritten Paragraph 19-24 Irrelevant Paragraph 25 The statement is true, but gives the erroneous impression that Florio was discharged because he did not participate in the program. The employer's reference of the employee to this program was relevant because it shows the employer had such a program and it was available. The employee's rejection was relevant because it indicates how confused the employee is about his situation and condition. Paragraph 26 Rejected as contrary to fact COPIES FURNISHED: Harrison C. Thompson, Esq. THOMPSON, SIZEMORE & GONZALEZ P.O. Box 639 Tampa, FL 33601 Ben Patterson, Esq. P.O. Box 4289 Tallahassee, FL 32315 Dr. Jame D. Surratt, Superintendent Volusia County School Board P.O. Box 2118 Deland, FL 32720 Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact Leo Willie Johnson commenced work as a custodian at Citizens Field on September 23, 1985, under inauspicious circumstances. For reasons not germane to this proceeding he had been discharged as a school bus driver and was reinstated by the Superintendent. As part of the reinstatement he was transferred from the Transportation Department to a custodial position. Since he didn't want a full-time position and the Citizen's Field assignment was part- time, he was assigned to that site. (tr-16, 127, Exhibit #R-2) Citizen's Field is a football stadium owned by the City of Gainesville and leased by the Alachua County School Board (SBAC). There are two concrete bleachers, an east side and a west side, accommodating a total of 6500 persons. The fall months are extremely busy with frequent football games and some use of the field by the City of Gainesville. (tr-16, 39, 70, 73) On Mr. Johnson's first day of work he was given a brief orientation to the job by his immediate supervisor, Dave Waters, who has been in charge of maintenance of Citizens Field for 26 years. He was also given a "pep" talk by Kirby Stewart, who is Mr. Waters' supervisor and the individual in charge of health education, drivers education and athletics for the SBAC. Mr. Stewart told Willie Johnson the work would be hard but rewarding, since parents, students and administrators are quick to acknowledge how great the field looks. (tr-16, 17, 69, 70) Mr. Johnson's assigned work day was from 8:00 a.m. until 1:00 p.m. Monday through Friday, with a 10-minute break at 10:00 a.m. His duties included general cleaning and field maintenance: using a blower to remove papers and trash from the bleachers, sweeping the restrooms and walks, removing paper from the ground, raking, and similar functions. None of the duties required training or preparation on the part of the worker. (tr- 17, 38, 48) From the first day on the job, Leo Johnson's performance was substandard, and by his words and actions he made it clear that he was not remotely interested in fulfilling his duties. On September 23, 1986, he spent his entire work day using the blower to clean the east bleachers. He accomplished in five hours what an experienced worker could do in forty-five minutes and an inexperienced worker could do in two hours. (tr- 17-18, 71, Exhibit #P-1) On September 24, 1986, he spent five hours cleaning the restrooms, a concession stand and one locker room. In Dave Waters' opinion, based upon twenty-six years experience and the supervision of many different workers, these tasks should take a new man approximately two hours. (tr-18) On the third day, Leo Johnson spent four hours washing out two bathrooms and one locker room. He then sprayed out one restroom with a waterhose. At 12:30 Dave Waters gave him a short, fifteen minute assignment, but he laid down his tools and walked away. He returned after about fifteen minutes and Dave Waters told him that he must keep working until his work time was up. Mr. Johnson responded that there was too much work to do, that he didn't think the job would work out for him and that he would talk to Mr. Griffin in personnel about another assignment. He then left the work site. (tr-18-20, Exhibit #P-1) Tile next two days, Mr. Johnson was cut on sick leave. He came to work on Monday, September 30th, but left after two hours. He was out then until Monday, October 14th and worked four full days Friday, the 18th was a Homecoming holiday. He was not very productive that week as he had a portable radio plugged into his ears. Dave Waters asked him to remove the earphone so that he could give him instructions, but he replaced it later. (tr-21-23) Because of the concerns expressed by both Dave Waters and the employee, Wilfred Griffin (Career Service Specialist, and the School Board Superintendent met with Mr. Johnson on October 2, 1985. Mr. Johnson was told again the duties of his job and was told that he was expected to carry out those duties. Mr. Johnson complained about having problems with his feet due to having to stand in water. Later, when Mr. Griffin had the safety officer investigate to see if boots should be purchased, the report back to him was that the field had good drainage and there was no standing water. In addition, boots had already been made available to the workers. (tr-l28-129) At Mr. Griffin's direction, On October 7, 1985, Kirby Stewart asked Mr. Johnson to bring in a note from his doctor. Mr. Johnson replied that it would be "no problem". Thereafter, Kirby Stewart repeated the request on several occasions. The only thing he received was a note from the A.C.O.R.N. Clinic secretary that Leo Johnson was examined on October 8, 1985. (tr-74, Exhibit #P-7, and #P-17) On Monday, October 21, 1985, Mr. Johnson worked four and a half hours. He left the work site without permission for 30 minutes. When he returned and was told by Dave Waters that he was not to leave without permission, he replied that he would leave and sign out whenever he wanted and would not change his work pace for anyone. Later that same day, Kirby Stewart came to the work site since Dave Waters had called to tell him that Leo Johnson left. Mr. Stewart reminded Mr. Johnson about the doctor's note and he wanted to leave immediately to go get it. He and Mr. Stewart walked the grounds while Mr. Stewart pointed out areas where his work was not satisfactory. Leo Johnson replied in a loud and abusive manner that "I beat the transportation department, and now ... [he didn't finish the sentence]" (tr-25,26,27, 113-115, 118, Exhibits #P-7 and P-13) Mr. Johnson did not return to work until December 12, 1985. In the meantime he called in sick every day. He was reminded several times that a doctor's note was required and he responded that the doctor would call. The doctor did not call. He complained of headaches, backaches and swollen feet. Yet on payday, November 27th, he was observed by Mr. Stewart jogging into the Administration building to get his paycheck. (tr-27, 28, 82, Exhibits #P-7, P- 15) When Mr. Johnson appeared for work on December 12, 1985, Mr. Waters gave him the message that he must go see Kirby Stewart. He called Kirby Stewart instead, and was told that since he missed so many days Kirby Stewart needed to talk with him about whether he was physically able to work. Leo Johnson did not go to see Kirby Stewart. Mr. Stewart wrote a memo to Wilfred Griffin detailing the call from Leo Johnson and expressing his need for a resolution of the problems. (Exhibit #P-9) By January 6, 1986, after the holiday break, Mr. Johnson had the impression that he was dismissed. While the record is not at all clear who told him that, Kirby Stewart also thought that Leo Johnson was dismissed as of December 20, 1985 (tr.100, Exhibit #R-6(e)) On January 6, 1986, Leo Johnson called School Board member, Charles Chestnut III, to complain that he was discharged. Charles Chestnut called the School superintendent, Dr. MaGann, who said that It must be a mistake because he didn't know anything about it. Charles Chestnut had been involved in the earlier disciplinary action that the superintendent corrected regarding Leo Johnson. Mr. Chestnut had no personal knowledge regarding Leo Johnson's performance. (tr-174-177) Leo Johnson returned to work at Citizen's Field on January 13, 1986. He took numerous breaks and left in his car at one point during the work day. He was absent for approximately 20 minutes. When he was told to hoe the grass under the bleachers he dragged an iron rake around the area with the teeth up. He put away his tools early and left before 1:00 p.m.. (tr. 30-34) On Tuesday, January 14, 1986, Leo Johnson was also at work but took breaks frequently all day. (tr.34-36) On Wednesday, January 15, 1986, Leo Johnson came to work at 8:00 a.m. Between 8:00 and 10:27, he worked 92 minutes and took breaks totaling 55 minutes. He left at 10:27 after telling Dave Waters that he had a headache. (tr-37) Kirby Stewart saw him at the County Office around 11:00 a.m. and asked why he was there. He replied that the had come to see Wil Griffin because his feet were too swollen to work. (tr.89) On January 17th, Kirby Stewart wrote a memo to his supervisor, Jack Christian reiterating the numerous problems with Leo Johnson and stating that had Mr. Johnson returned to work that morning, he would have officially reprimanded him. (Exhibit #R-10) Leo Johnson never returned to Citizens Field, and on January 21, 1986 he was suspended pending a hearing on his termination. (Exhibit #P-14) Between September 23, 1985 and January 21, 1986, there were a total of 73 school board work days. Leo Johnson was at work for 8 full days, was present for 4 partial days and was absent for 61 full days. (tr. 90-91, Exhibit #P-15) Mr. Johnson was a regular, part-time career service employee of SBAC while he was assigned to citizen's Field. Wilfred Griffin, a Career Service Specialist had the authority to interview, recruit, hire, fire and counsel career service employees. While Dave Waters was responsible for directing Johnson's work in the field and Kirby Stewart was Mr. Johnson's supervisor for administrative purposes, Wilfred: Griffin had the most substantial authority over this employee. As revealed by the record, both Superintendent MaGann and a school board member, Charles Chestnut III, had hand in dealing with Leo Johnson. This complicated hierarchy contributed to confusion and delays but did not prejudice or result in detriment to Mr. Johnson. He used the 57 sick days he transferred from the Department of Transportation, plus the days he earned on the payroll for his time assigned at Citizen's Field and ended with a full paycheck for the month of January. Despite repeated requests by Kirby Stewart and Wilford Griffin, Leo Johnson never produced a doctor's statement explaining his protracted absences. At the hearing he produced a photocopy of an "Illness-in-line-of-duty-leave" form with two lines completed by a Dr. Guido, whom Mr. Johnson contended was a foot doctor. The form is dated and signed by Leo Johnson on January 15, 1986, but the form is incomplete and there is no evidence that anyone at the school board has ever seen it. (tr- 212, 213) Further, the almost illegible statement by the doctor appears to be a diagnosis with nothing about Mr. Johnson's ability to work. (Exhibit #R-9) The verification of his visits to A.C.O.R.N. Clinic provide no information about his ability to work. By letter dated February 25, 1986, Bonnie Coats, RN, the clinic coordinator, responded to Mr. Johnson's request for the dates and reasons for his clinic visits. They are as follows: 08/23/83 Physical Exam for Work 08/07/84 Physical Exam for Work 10/08/85 1. Dizziness Calluses of feet Muscle Spasm 08/22/85 Blood Pressure evaluation 11/19/85 Blood Pressure evaluation 11/26/85 Blood Pressure evaluation 12/10/85 Blood Pressure evaluation (Exhibit #R-5(b)) Leo Johnson had ample notice of his deficient performance, although none in the supervisory chain wrote up a Job Performance Warning Record. Dave Waters did not because Mr. Johnson simply was not on the job enough. (tr-58) Kirby Stewart intended to formalize his complaints in an official reprimand, but Mr. Johnson failed to return to work again. (Exhibit #P-13) Wilfred Griffin orally warned Mr. Johnson about his job performance, leaving the job, excessive breaks and absenteeism. He met with Mr. Johnson on six or seven occasions and shared with him the detailed written memos about his work from Dave Waters and Kirby Stewart. (tr-129, 130, 154, 155) As a career service employee Leo Johnson was subject to the rights and responsibilities found in the SBAC Career Service Employee Handbook. (Exhibit #P-18) Leo Johnson was thoroughly familiar with the provisions of the handbook.
Findings Of Fact Respondent employs petitioner as a youth counselor II in Ft. Pierce, Florida. Petitioner attained permanent career service status in May of 1972. In addition to "carrying a normal caseload," i.e., supervising 85 to 88 youngsters in the customary fashion, petitioner met four times weekly with children who had been referred by courts or school authorities for intensive counseling. These groups counseling sessions began at six o'clock in the evening and lasted from one to one and a half hours. John B. Romano became petitioner's immediate supervisor on March 18, 1977. With the acquiescence of Mr. Romano's immediate predecessor, Ben Robinson, petitioner ordinarily reported for work between half past nine and half past ten in the morning. The week Mr. Romano started as petitioner's supervisor, he noticed that petitioner arrived for work between half past nine and ten in the morning. When he spoke to petitioner about this, petitioner told him of an accommodation that had been reached with Mr. Robinson, on account of petitioner's staying at work late to conduct group counseling. Mr. Romano told petitioner that he should report for work at half past eight in the morning, until a youth counselor's vacancy that then existed in the office could be filled. Subsequently, on at least one occasion before May 31, 1977, Mr. Romano spoke to petitioner about being late for work. On May 31, 1977, by which time another counselor had been hired, petitioner reported for work at approximately half past ten. On June 7, 1977, after petitioner had been suspended, Mr. Romano issued a written reprimand to petitioner, characterizing petitioner's arrival at half past ten on May 31, 1977, as "an insubordinate offense." Respondent's exhibit No. 5. One Harry Greene told Earl Stout, a service network manager for respondent and Mr. Romano's superior, that a boy whom petitioner had supervised had accused petitioner in open court of selling drugs and smoking marijuana. Messrs. Greene, Stout and Romano visited the facility at which petitioner's accuser was incarcerated and interrogated him. On May 13, 1977, a Friday, Mr. Romano told petitioner to meet him at nine o'clock the following Monday, but did not explain why. Present at the meeting on May 16, 1977, were petitioner, Mr. Romano, Mr. Greene and Mr. Stout. Petitioner was told of the accusations against him, but the accuser's identity was withheld. Mr. Stout gave petitioner the choice of resigning his position or taking annual leave for the duration of a formal investigation. Petitioner refused to resign. Mr. Stout instructed petitioner to tell no one that he had been asked to take leave or that he would be the subject of an investigation. When petitioner left this meeting he promptly told his fellow youth counselors that the had been suspended. For this petitioner received a written reprimand dated June 7, 1977. Respondent's exhibit No. 6. Petitioner subsequently availed himself of grievance procedures to raise the question whether he should have been permitted to take administrative leave instead of annual leave; and it was decided that he was entitled to take administrative leave. On June 8, 1977, Earl Stout wrote petitioner a letter which began "On June 1, you were advised by me that effective June 2, you were being suspended for insubordinate acts . . . ." This letter was sent to petitioner by certified mail. Mr. Stout testified without contradiction that blanket authority had been delegated to him to suspend employees under him.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the suspension be upheld. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. J. Wayne Jennings, Esq. 2871 Forth-Fifth Street Gifford, Florida 32960 Mr. K.C. Collette, Esquire Forum 3, Suite 800 1665 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
The Issue Whether Petitioner, pursuant to Rules 22A-7.010(2)(a) and 22A-8.002(5)(a)3, Florida Administrative Code, abandoned her position and resigned from the State of Florida Career Service System.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Petitioner, Emily D. McGee, was employed by the Respondent, Department, as a Public Assistance Specialist II in the Department's Medically Needy Unit #87 in New Port Richey, Florida. In that assignment, Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Public Assistance Specialist Supervisor Dorothy White. It is established policy at the HRS facility in question for employees who will be absent to notify their supervisors as soon as possible when they know they will be absent. During her employment, Petitioner had received printed copies of this general policy and of the State rules governing the presumption of abandonment of position in cases where an employee is on unexcused leave for three consecutive workdays. On April 13, 1990, Petitioner was overcome with job stress and was admitted to a residential mental health care facility for four days, which was drawn against Petitioner's earned sick leave. Subsequent to her release, she received outpatient psychological therapy at the Center for the Treatment of Depression in New Port Richey, Florida, with Howard L. Masco, M.D., as her treating physician. On April 20 and again on April 25, 1990, Petitioner was advised by White that in order to properly draw against earned sick leave she must provide a doctor's statement that she was disabled and unable to perform her duties and the projected date of her return to work. On April 25, 1990, a doctor's statement was received, but it did not contain a projected date of return. On April 26, 1990, Petitioner applied to draw against the District V Sick Leave Pool, beginning on May 1, 1990 for an indeterminate period of time. This request was denied by the Committee Administrator. On May 9, 1990, White advised the Petitioner, telephonically and in writing, that her request to draw against the sick leave pool was denied. If she was unable to return to work, Petitioner must submit a written request for leave without pay for her current absence from work, with a beginning date of May 4, 1990 and a projected date of return to work. A physician's statement would also be required. After a period of misunderstanding, a written request with a physicians' statement was submitted by the Petitioner and Leave Without Pay was approved on June 18, 1990 retroactive to May 4, 1990. The physician's statement, dated May 18, 1990, stated that Petitioner has been unable to work since her hospitalization on April 13, 1990 and was still unable to work at the present time. Dr. Masco indicated that he was unable to determine when Petitioner would be able to return to work but that the present diagnosis was depression. Petitioner was advised, in writing, that additional leave could not be granted beyond July 17, 1990 and that Petitioner was required to return to work with medical certification at that time as to her ability to perform her assigned job functions. On the dates between July 18 and July 20, 1990, inclusive, Petitioner neither appeared at work nor informed her supervisor or anyone at HRS that she was going to be absent or was medically unable to return to work. No leave was authorized for her. This period constitutes in excess of three consecutive workdays of absence without approved leave. By letter dated July 27, 1990, Petitioner was advised in writing by the District Administrator that her failure to return to work on July 18 and thereafter constitutes abandonment of position. At the hearing, Petitioner attempted to show that her disability continued beyond July 20, 1990 and up to the present day, and that she had no intention of abandoning her position. That in fact she was physically unable to perform her duties due her continuing stress and depression.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Petitioner, Emily D. McGee, abandoned her position with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and resigned from the Career Service when, on July 18, 19 and 20, 1990, without authority, she absented herself from her workplace for three consecutive days. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Emily D. McGee Post Office Box 1223 Port Richey, Florida Thomas W. Caufman, Esquire Assistant District Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 701 94th Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida John Pieno, Jr. Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Linda Stalvey Acting General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550
The Issue What amount of legal fees and costs should be awarded to Petitioner pursuant to Section 120.569(2)(e) or 57.105(5), Florida Statutes, for Respondent’s erroneous classification of Petitioner’s position and subsequent failure to correct that error and reclassify Petitioner’s position back to career service as requested by her in Georgalis v. F.D.O.T., DOAH Case No. 03-4665SED.
Findings Of Fact On April 1, 2002, Petitioner was discharged from her position with the Department without stated cause or hearing. See Petitioner’s Ex. 1-2, Dep’t of Transportation v. FCHR, 842 So. 2d 253, 256 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). On June 11, 2003, Petitioner was temporarily reinstated by order of the Circuit Court to her position with the Department pursuant to section 112.3187(9)(f). Petitioner’s Ex. 1-3. The administrative case underlying this request for fees and costs was initiated by Petitioner through the filing of a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on August 15, 2002. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-4. In that Petition, Petitioner demonstrated, through reference to the position description provided to her by the Department, that she did not fit within any of the categories of employees exempted from career service by Section 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-4, paragraph 7. Petitioner also put the Department on notice that she believed the Department’s action in reclassifying her was “frivolous and was done for an improper purpose,” since it was contradicted by the Department’s own documents. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-4, paragraph 12. She also requested that she be awarded appropriate attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. After nearly four months, the Department forwarded the Petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a formal administrative hearing regarding whether its decision to reclassify Petitioner was proper. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-5. By this letter, which was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 10, 2003, the Department requested a formal administrative hearing and manifested its opposition to the relief requested by Petitioner in her Petition. A hearing was held in DOAH Case No. 03-4665SED on April 15, 2004. Following the preparation of a transcript, the parties submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. Petitioner filed a Motion to Strike portions of the Department’s Proposed Recommended Order because it improperly raised an argument that Petitioner could properly be exempted from career service because she was an “administrator.” Petitioner’s Ex. 1-6. That Motion was granted. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-7.1/ On July 2, 2004, the undersigned entered a Recommended Order concluding that Petitioner was improperly reclassified into Select Exempt Service. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-8, p. 12. On September 1, 2005, the Department entered a Final Order adopting the Recommended Order entered in DOAH Case No. 03-4665SED.2/ Petitioner’s Ex. 1-11. Paragraph 13 of the fully-adopted Recommended Order states that: based on the duties and responsibilities contained in Petitioner’s position description and the actual duties she performed, there is no basis for concluding that Petitioner was subject to exemption from career service as concluded by Respondent in July 2001. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-8, paragraph 13. In paragraph 19 of the fully-adopted Recommended Order, the undersigned concluded that: [t]he suggestion of the Respondent’s witness that the exemption should apply if a state employee is assigned to work with anyone retained or commissioned by Respondent to perform services for Respondent, however menial the task, simply misconstrues the statutory exemption: the relevant issue for the purposes of the exemption is whether such persons are department “employees,” not whether a department has contracted or engaged their services as independent technical consultants. Such contract administration is not relevant to the issue of whether Petitioner could properly be classified as a selected exempt employee. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-8, paragraph 19. Following entry of the Recommended Order, Petitioner filed her two (2) Motions for Attorneys’ Fees. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-12 and 1-13. These motions seek an award of attorney’s fees and costs based on the lack of factual or legal support for the Department’s opposition to Petitioner’s request that the Department correct its error in reclassifying her position to Select Exempt Service. Id. Petitioner submitted an affidavit and itemized statement of the requested hours, a summary of hours by the attorney, and a summary of costs incurred in this matter. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-14. Petitioner also submitted the testimony of J. Steven Menton, Esquire, who corroborated the reasonableness of the services and time expended by Petitioner’s counsel and also confirmed the reasonableness of the fees charged and costs incurred by Petitioner’s counsel for those services. The Department did not contest the number of hours sought by Petitioner’s counsel. Respondent did offer the testimony of Michael Mattimore, Esquire, who was also counsel of record for the Department in this case, suggesting that the rates charged by Petitioner’s counsel exceeded those which are normally charged by similar attorneys in the community. Mattimore’s testimony related to fees charged in “employment” law cases in which he has been involved during his career and did not focus on administrative litigation challenging the actions of a governmental agency, such as the present case which involved more than merely examining the factual circumstances surrounding a discharge or other adverse employment action. Confirming the complexity of the underlying case was Mattimore’s testimony regarding the outcome in other reclassification cases. The great majority of reclassification challenges (more than 95 percent of them) have been resolved in favor of the governmental agency or have not been pursued by the impacted employee. Id. The outcome obtained by attorneys for Petitioner in the underlying case is suggestive of fees toward the high end of the range. Petitioner reported the following hours and rates (Petitioner’s Ex. 1-14): LAWYERS: Hours Rate Amount M. Stephen Turner, P.A. 44.40 $400 $17,760.00 David K. Miller, P. A. 1.00 $300 $ 300.00 Martin A. Fitzpatrick 228.50 $250 $57,125.00 Brooke Lewis .90 $200 $ 80.00 TOTAL ATTORNEY HOURS 274.80 $75,365.00 Paralegals: Theresa J. Everhart Hours 1.90 Rate $80 Amount $152.00 Trishia Finkey 1.00 $80 80.00 TOTAL PARALEGAL HOURS 2.90 $ 232.00 TOTAL LEGAL FEES: $75.597.00 The hours and rates requested are found to be reasonable in view of the novelty and complexity of the issues, level of legal skills required, and the result obtained for the Petitioner. The rates sought are in line with fees charged by similarly-situated attorneys for similar work in the community. The amount requested is reasonable and justified under the circumstances. Moreover, the costs and expenses for which reimbursement is sought ($1,523.25) and the expert witness fees of $1400 ($280 /hour for 5 hours) are also reasonable and are of a kind typically billed to clients in addition to the hourly rate charged.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent YWCA is a nonprofit corporation that sponsors educational, social, and recreational programs. The YWCA's purpose states that it is a "movement rooted in the Christian faith"; however, expressed belief in Christianity is not required for membership in the YWCA or for employment by the YWCA. Its membership is comprised of adult women seventeen years of age and older. The personnel policy of the YWCA expressly states that: "Equal employment opportunity and affirmative action will be applied in recruitment, hiring, compensation, fringe benefits, staff development, and training, promotion, and any other condition of employment regardless of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, age, national origin, or any other nonperformance factors." (Emphasis added.) Regarding termination, the personnel policy of the YWCA expressly states that: "Reasons for staff termination must be carefully documented. They should be based upon objective performance appraisals, which in turn are based upon job descriptions, work plans, and performance standards. Except in cases of reorganization/retrenchment or termination for cause, a probationary period for work improvement must be provided, followed by another performance appraisal." The YWCA of West Palm Beach operates three facilities: Central and Residence, the Mamie Adair Branch, and the Recreation Center. The Mamie Adair Branch primarily serves the black community in West Palm Beach and includes a day-care facility. The Petitioner, Davis, was hired as the Branch Executive of the Mamie Adair Branch of the YWCA, effective July 21, 1980, at a starting salary of $12,000.00. The Petitioner was given copies of the YWCA's personnel policy, affirmative action plan, and job description. She was not given notice of particular standards of behavior to which she was required to conform away from the job. As branch Executive she was supervised by the Executive Director, Jo Prout. The Petitioner successfully completed her initial 90-day probationary period, and her annual salary was increased by five percent to $12,600.00. In October 1981, however, the Petitioner received her annual evaluation and was again placed on three months probations due primarily to an unsatisfactory working relationship with the Branch Committee. The Petitioner had a bad attitude and was antagonistic. The Petitioner became pregnant but did not immediately disclose the fact of her pregnancy. In approximately December, 1981, the Petitioner confided to a coworker that she was pregnant and the coworker, in turn, told the YWCA's Executive Director, Jo Prout, that the Petitioner was pregnant. The YWCA's Executive Director was concerned that the Petitioner's relationship with the Branch Committee would be severely adversely affected if the Committee found out the Petitioner was pregnant and unmarried. Because of this concern, the Executive Director removed the Petitioner from her position as Branch Executive, effective December 31, 1981. The Petitioner would not have been removed from her position on December 31, 1981, but for the fact that she was pregnant and unmarried. Prior to removing the Petitioner from her position as Branch Executive, the Executive Director did not attempt less drastic alternatives such as asking the Petitioner not to discuss or disclose her marital status or asking the Petitioner to take a leave of absence. Prior to her removal, the Petitioner had not discussed the fact that she was pregnant and unmarried with members of the Branch Committee or with the YWCA membership in general. At no time had the Petitioner advocated unwed motherhood as an alternative life- style or otherwise advocated or espoused principles contrary to her understanding of Christianity. In the past, certain employees of the YWCA whose on-the-job behavior was contrary to Christian principles received job discipline but were not removed from their positions. A desk clerk at the YWCA's residence, for example, who was found to have stolen property from residence guests was not discharged. The removal of the Petitioner from her position by the YWCA because she was pregnant and unmarried was not justified by the business necessity rule because: A requirement to conduct one's life, including one's off-the-job activities, according to Christian principles, was not disclosed to the Petitioner or to other employees; The YWCA did not discipline or discharge other employees for conduct which conflicted with the YWCA's alleged requirement to conduct one's life by Christian principles; and The YWCA did not show that a requirement of all employees to conduct their lives by Christian principles has a manifest relationship to the employment in question. Then the Petitioner was removed from the Branch Executive position, she was transferred to the position of center consultant for gymnastics. The position of the center consultant for gymnastics to which the Petitioner was transferred was a demotion in that the Petitioner went from an administrative to a non-administrative position. The transfer also changed the Petitioner's employment status from full-time employee to part-time employee with a 25 percent decrease in earned income and a lunch "hour" reduced to 30 minutes. The petitioner's new position as center consultant was a temporary one designated to last no longer than five months. Petitioner was removed from probationary status as a result of the transfer. The position of center consultant to which the Petitioner was transferred was not a legitimate position. The position did not exist prior to December 31, 1981, the date the Petitioner was transferred. No job description was ever written for this position, despite the fact that the YWCA personnel policy required job descriptions. The Petitioner was verbally assigned job tasks inconsistent with her title of center consultant, including cleaning toilets at the gymnastics center. The position was eliminated on February 16, 1982, approximately six weeks after it was created, allegedly due to financial streamlining. The YWCA committed an unlawful employment act against the Petitioner, discriminating against her on the basis of sex and marital status by removing her from her position as Branch Executive because she was pregnant and unmarried. Moreover, this transfer was not justified by business necessity. Because the YWCA committed an unlawful employment act against the Petitioner, the Petitioner could be entitled to be reinstated to her former position or to a comparable position and could also be entitled to recover lost wages and fringe benefits, plus interest thereon, from the date of the wrongful act, December 31, 1981, to November 31, 1982, the date she was hired by the Lutheran Ministries, set off by any interim earnings and reduced by the Petitioner's unemployment compensation benefits plus her reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Regarding reinstatement, the Petitioner has been and is now willing and able to be reinstated to her former position as Branch Executive or to a comparable administrative position. The employer's argument that the Petitioner is not entitled to reinstatement because she was an unsatisfactory employee is rejected for the following reasons: The employer's allegations that the Petitioner will not satisfactorily perform her job if reinstated are too speculative and any doubts about the Petitioner's entitlement to reinstatement should be resolved in favor of the victim of discrimination; and In the event that the Petitioner's job performance upon reinstatement is not satisfactory, the employer may avail itself of the procedures set forth in its personnel policy to improve the Petitioner's performance or discharge her for unsatisfactory job performance. However, reinstatement may not be feasible in this case due to the fact that another employee has been placed in the Petitioner's former position. If the Petitioner is not reinstated to a comparable administrative position, then she should be compensated by the award of six months front pay in lieu of reinstatement. The Petitioner is entitled to damages in the amount of $13,551, which represents a back pay award of $11,000 plus 10 percent interest, six months front pay in the amount of $6,000, minus $1,575 for salary paid from January 1, 1982 - February 16, 1982, including two weeks severance pay and $2,974 in unemployment compensation benefits. The Petitioner is also entitled to costs of $232.65 and attorneys fees totaling $5,000.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner graduated from high school in the People's Republic of China in 1972. She thereafter worked for a short time in a factory that manufactured Chinese medicines as a foreman. She became interested in Chinese medicine and enrolled in Kenchow Chinese Medical College, a nighttime professional university. She studied chemistry, biochemistry, and Chinese medicine. As a part of this program, she studied acupuncture meridians and points. For a full year, she spent two hours per day in classroom studies directly related to acupuncture and two hours practicing acupuncture as an apprentice. Thereafter, from 1973 until 1980, she worked as an acupuncturist for four hours per day, six days per week. She worked at a Chinese medicine industrial research center. In addition to her work with patients as an acupuncturist, she was involved in field studies regarding herbs and Chinese medicines and in the recording of statistics and research data. During this same time, the Petitioner enrolled in a correspondence course at Western Pacific College in Hong Kong. This program included courses in the basic theory of Chinese medicine, including courses specifically dealing with the theory and practice of acupuncture. The Petitioner enrolled at Western Pacific College so that she could receive certification as an acupuncturist. She already had completed similar work at Kenchow, and she was able to complete the course work by devoting approximately two hours per week to it. She received a certification from Western Pacific College that she completed the acupuncture course. The certification is dated January 20, 1980. In January, 1981, Petitioner moved to the United States. Since May, 1981, she has worked under the supervision of physicians performing acupuncture treatments in Volusia County, Florida. Petitioner appears to have sufficient education and experience to practice as an acupuncturist. The Department of Professional Regulation has not approved any programs of education in acupuncture or any apprenticeship programs in acupuncture. There is insufficient evidence in the record in this matter from which it could be determined that the programs offered at either Kenchow Chinese Medical College or Western Pacific College should be approved by the Department. Inquiries directed to the schools by the Department have not been answered, and the Petitioner has been unable to obtain transcripts of her course work. It cannot be determined whether anyone in any of the clinical portions of the educational programs attended by Petitioner were certified acupuncturists. The Department of Professional Regulation has not approved any apprenticeship programs for the practice of acupuncture. While it appears that Petitioner has an ample theoretical and practical background as an acupuncturist, it does not appear that prior to her coming to the United States she was ever supervised by a person who is licensed under Chapters 458, 459, or 468, Florida Statutes. Indeed, since all of her experience was in China, it is extremely unlikely that she was supervised by any such person. Petitioner has been practicing as an acupuncturist since May, 1981, under supervision as required under Chapters 458 and 459, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered denying the application of Lucy Wei-Nor Yu for licensure as an acupuncturist in Florida. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of March, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER Assistant Director Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Drucilla E. Bell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ms. Lucy Wei-Nor Yu 1360 Ridgewood Avenue Holly Hill, Florida 32017 Mr. Samuel R. Shorstein Secretary, Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
